

106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 208

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, in light of the Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the European Union's June 1999 Cologne Summit.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 28, 1999

Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. KYL, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. LIEBERMAN, and Mr. HELMS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

NOVEMBER 3, 1999

Reported by Mr. HELMS, without amendment

NOVEMBER 8, 1999

Considered, amended, and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, in light of the Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the European Union's June 1999 Cologne Summit.

Whereas NATO is the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership;

Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues concerning the security of North America and Europe;

Whereas NATO's military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its members, capable of projecting power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members to defend common values and interests;

Whereas these requirements dictate that European NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts;

Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 highlighted (1) the significant shortcomings of European allies in command, control, communication, and intelligence resources; combat aircraft; precision-guided munitions; airlift; deployability; and logistics; and (2) the overall imbalance between United States and European defense capabilities;

Whereas this imbalance in United States and European NATO defense capabilities undercuts the Alliance's goal of equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;

Whereas NATO has undertaken great efforts to facilitate the emergence of a stronger European pillar within NATO through the European Security and Defense Identity, including the identification of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander as the commander of operations led by

the Western European Union (WEU); the creation of a NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations; and the establishment of close linkages between NATO and the WEU, including planning, exercises, and regular consultations;

Whereas in promulgating NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative Alliance members committed themselves to improving their respective forces in five areas: (1) effective engagement; (2) deployability and mobility; (3) sustainability and logistics; (4) survivability; and (5) command, control and communications.

Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course of its Cologne Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and structures of the Western European Union, including its command structures and military forces, and established within it the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy; and

Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 Cologne Summit indicate a new determination of its member states to develop a European Security and Defense Identity with strengthened defense capabilities to address regional conflicts and crisis management: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved,

SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

(a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—The Senate—

(1) believes NATO should remain the primary institution through which European and North American allies address security issues of transatlantic concern;

(2) believes all NATO members should commit to improving their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can project power decisively with equitable burden-sharing;

(3) endorses NATO's decision to launch the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which is intended to improve the defense capabilities of the European Allies, particularly the deployability, mobility, sustainability, and interoperability of these European forces;

(4) acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged; and

(5) calls upon the member states of NATO and the European Union to promulgate together during their respective meetings, ministerials, and summits in the course of 1999 principles that will strengthen the transatlantic partnership, reinforce unity within NATO, and harmonize their roles in transatlantic affairs.

(b) FURTHER SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is further the sense of the Senate that—

(1) on matters of trans-Atlantic concern, the European Union should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through the European Security

and Defense Identity only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had declined to undertake that mission;

(2) improved European military capabilities, not new institutions outside of the Alliance, are the key to a vibrant and more influential European Security and Defense Identity within NATO;

(3) failure of the European allies of the United States to achieve the goals established through the Defense Capabilities Initiative would weaken support for the Alliance in the United States;

(4) the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective partners of the United States in supporting mutual interests;

(5) the European Union should implement its Cologne Summit decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will not be discriminated

against, but will be fully involved when the European Union addresses issues affecting their security interests;

(6) the European Union's implementation of the Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that promoted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(7) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication of the resources and capabilities provided by NATO; and

(8) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a decline in the military resources that European allies contribute to NATO, but should instead promote the complete fulfillment of their respective force commitments to the Alliance.

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