

106TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 89

To state the policy of the United States with respect to certain activities of the People's Republic of China, to impose certain restrictions and limitations on activities of and with respect to the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 19, 1999

Mr. HUTCHINSON introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To state the policy of the United States with respect to certain activities of the People's Republic of China, to impose certain restrictions and limitations on activities of and with respect to the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “People's Republic of  
5       China Policy Act of 1999”.

1 **TITLE I—TRAVEL AND ACTIVI-**  
2 **TIES OF CERTAIN OFFICIALS**

3 **SEC. 101. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the President should make freedom of reli-  
6 gion one of the major objectives of United States  
7 foreign policy with respect to the People’s Republic  
8 of China;

9 (2) as part of this policy, the Department of  
10 State should raise in every relevant bilateral and  
11 multilateral forum the issue of individuals impris-  
12 oned, detained, confined, or otherwise harassed by  
13 the Government of the People’s Republic of China  
14 on religious grounds;

15 (3) in its communications with the Government  
16 of the People’s Republic of China, the Department  
17 of State should provide specific names of individuals  
18 of concern and request a complete and timely re-  
19 sponse from that government regarding the individ-  
20 uals’ whereabouts and condition, the charges against  
21 them, and sentence imposed; and

22 (4) the goal of these official communications  
23 should be the expeditious release of all religious pris-  
24 oners in China and Tibet and the end of the policy  
25 and practice of the Government of the People’s Re-

1 public of China of harassing and repressing religious  
2 believers.

3 **SEC. 102. CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC**  
4 **OF CHINA INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE VISAS**  
5 **AND EXCLUDED FROM ADMISSION.**

6 (a) REQUIREMENT.—Notwithstanding any other pro-  
7 vision of law, any national of the People's Republic of  
8 China described in subsection (b), other than the head of  
9 state, the head of government, and cabinet level ministers,  
10 shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded  
11 from admission into the United States.

12 (b) COVERED NATIONALS.—A national referred to in  
13 subsection (a) is any military or civilian official or em-  
14 ployee of the Government of the People's Republic of  
15 China who carried out or directed the carrying out of any  
16 of the following policies or practices:

17 (1) Formulating, drafting, or implementing re-  
18 pressive religious policies.

19 (2) Imprisoning, detaining, or harassing indi-  
20 viduals on religious grounds.

21 (3) Promoting or participating in policies or  
22 practices which hinder religious activities or the free  
23 expression of religious beliefs.

1 (c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require-  
 2 ment in subsection (a) with respect to an individual de-  
 3 scribed in such subsection if the President—

4 (1) determines that it is vital to the national in-  
 5 terest to do so; and

6 (2) provides written notification to the appro-  
 7 priate congressional committees containing a jus-  
 8 tification for the waiver.

9 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES  
 10 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-  
 11 gressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign  
 12 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Inter-  
 13 national Relations of the House of Representatives.

14 (e) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect  
 15 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

## 16 **TITLE II—FORCED ABORTION**

### 17 **SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.**

18 This title may be cited as the “Forced Abortion Con-  
 19 demnation Act”.

### 20 **SEC. 202. FINDINGS.**

21 Congress makes the following findings:

22 (1) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a  
 23 crime against humanity by the Nuremberg War  
 24 Crimes Tribunal.

1           (2) For over 15 years there have been frequent  
2           and credible reports of forced abortion and forced  
3           sterilization in connection with the population con-  
4           trol policies of the People's Republic of China. These  
5           reports indicate the following:

6                   (A) Although it is the stated position of  
7                   the politburo of the Chinese Communist Party  
8                   that forced abortion and forced sterilization  
9                   have no role in the population control program,  
10                  in fact the Communist Chinese Government en-  
11                  courages both forced abortion and forced steri-  
12                  lization through a combination of strictly en-  
13                  forced birth quotas and immunity for local pop-  
14                  ulation control officials who engage in coercion.  
15                  Officials acknowledge that there have been in-  
16                  stances of forced abortions and sterilization,  
17                  and no evidence has been made available to  
18                  suggest that the perpetrators have been pun-  
19                  ished.

20                  (B) People's Republic of China population  
21                  control officials, in cooperation with employers  
22                  and works unit officials, routinely monitor wom-  
23                  en's menstrual cycles and subject women who  
24                  conceive without government authorization to  
25                  extreme psychological pressure, to harsh eco-

1            nomic sanctions, including unpayable fines and  
2            loss of employment, and often to physical force.

3            (C) Official sanctions for giving birth to  
4            unauthorized children include fines in amounts  
5            several times larger than the per capita annual  
6            incomes of residents of the People's Republic of  
7            China. In Fujian, for example, the average fine  
8            is estimated to be twice a family's gross annual  
9            income. Families which cannot pay the fine may  
10           be subject to confiscation and destruction of  
11           their homes and personal property.

12           (D) Especially harsh punishments have  
13           been inflicted on those whose resistance is moti-  
14           vated by religion. For example, according to a  
15           1995 Amnesty International report, the Catho-  
16           lic inhabitants of two villages in Hebei Province  
17           were subjected to population control under the  
18           slogan "better to have more graves than one  
19           more child". Enforcement measures included  
20           torture, sexual abuse, and the detention of re-  
21           sistors' relatives as hostages.

22           (E) Forced abortions in Communist China  
23           often have taken place in the very late stages  
24           of pregnancy.

(F) Since 1994 forced abortion and sterilization have been used in Communist China not only to regulate the number of children, but also to eliminate those who are regarded as defective in accordance with the official eugenic policy known as the “Natal and Health Care Law”.

**SEC. 203. DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES OF PERSONS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ENGAGED IN ESTABLISHMENT OR ENFORCEMENT OF FORCED ABORTION OR STERILIZATION POLICY.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may not issue any visa to, and the Attorney General may not admit to the United States, any national of the People’s Republic of China, including any official of the Communist Party or the Government of the People’s Republic of China and its regional, local, and village authorities who the Secretary finds, based on credible information, to have been directly involved in the establishment or enforcement of population control policies forcing a woman to undergo an abortion against her free choice or forcing a man or woman to undergo sterilization against his or her free choice.

(b) EXCEPTIONS.—The prohibitions in subsection (a) shall not apply in the case a national who is the head of state, the head of government, or a cabinet level minister.

**SEC. 204. WAIVER.**

The President may waive the prohibitions contained in section 203(a) with respect to a national of the People’s Republic of China if the President—

(1) determines that it is in the national interest of the United States to do so; and

(2) provides written notification to Congress containing a justification for the waiver.

**TITLE III—HUMAN RIGHTS**

**SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.**

This title may be cited as the “Political Freedom in China Act of 1999”.

**SEC. 302. FINDINGS.**

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Congress concurs in the following conclusions of the United States Department of State on human rights in the People’s Republic of China in 1996:

(A) The People’s Republic of China is “an authoritarian state” in which “citizens lack the freedom to peacefully express opposition to the party-led political system and the right to

1 change their national leaders or form of govern-  
2 ment”.

3 (B) The Government of the People’s Re-  
4 public of China has “continued to commit wide-  
5 spread and well-documented human rights  
6 abuses, in violation of internationally accepted  
7 norms, stemming from the authorities’ intoler-  
8 ance of dissent, fear of unrest, and the absence  
9 or inadequacy of laws protecting basic free-  
10 doms”.

11 (C) “Abuses include torture and mistreat-  
12 ment of prisoners, forced confessions, and arbi-  
13 trary and incommunicado detention”.

14 (D) “Prison conditions remained harsh  
15 [and] [t]he Government continued severe re-  
16 strictions on freedom of speech, the press, as-  
17 sembly, association, religion, privacy, and work-  
18 er rights”.

19 (E) “Although the Government denies that  
20 it holds political prisoners, the number of per-  
21 sons detained or serving sentences for  
22 ‘counterrevolutionary crimes’ or ‘crimes against  
23 the state’, or for peaceful political or religious  
24 activities are believed to number in the thou-  
25 sands”.

1 (F) “Nonapproved religious groups, includ-  
 2 ing Protestant and Catholic groups \* \* \* expe-  
 3 rienced intensified repression”.

4 (G) “Serious human rights abuses persist  
 5 in minority areas, including Tibet, Xinjiang,  
 6 and Inner Mongolia[, and] [c]ontrols on religion  
 7 and on other fundamental freedoms in these  
 8 areas have also intensified”.

9 (H) “Overall in 1996, the authorities  
 10 stepped up efforts to cut off expressions of pro-  
 11 test or criticism. All public dissent against the  
 12 party and government was effectively silenced  
 13 by intimidation, exile, the imposition of prison  
 14 terms, administrative detention, or house ar-  
 15 rest. No dissidents were known to be active at  
 16 year’s end.”.

17 (2) In addition to the Department of State,  
 18 credible independent human rights organizations  
 19 have documented an increase in repression in China,  
 20 and effective destruction of the dissident movement  
 21 through the arrest and sentencing of pro-democracy  
 22 and human rights activists not already in prison or  
 23 exile.

24 (3) Among such activists are the following:

1 (A) Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai, and Qin  
2 Yongmin, who were sentenced to 13 years, 11  
3 years, and 12 years, respectively, for their par-  
4 ticipation in forming the China Democracy  
5 Party.

6 (B) Li Hai, who was sentenced to 9 years  
7 in prison on December 18, 1996, for gathering  
8 information on the victims of the 1989 crack-  
9 down, which according to the court's verdict  
10 constituted "state secrets".

11 (C) Liu Nianchun, an independent labor  
12 organizer, who was sentenced to 3 years of "re-  
13 education through labor" on July 4, 1996, due  
14 to his activities in connection with a petition  
15 campaign calling for human rights reforms.

16 (D) Ngodrup Phuntsog, a Tibetan na-  
17 tional, who was arrested in Tibet in 1987 im-  
18 mediately after he returned from a 2-year trip  
19 to India, where the Tibetan government in exile  
20 is located, and following a secret trial was con-  
21 victed by the Government of the People's Re-  
22 public of China of espionage on behalf of the  
23 "Ministry of Security of the Dalai clique".

1           (4) Many political prisoners in China are suffer-  
 2           ing from poor conditions and ill-treatment leading to  
 3           serious medical and health problems, including—

4                   (A) Gao Yu, a journalist honored by  
 5           UNESCO in May 1997, who was sentenced to  
 6           6 years in prison in November 1994 and has a  
 7           heart condition; and

8                   (B) Chen Longde, a leading human rights  
 9           advocate now serving a 3-year reeducation  
 10          through labor sentence imposed without trial in  
 11          August 1995, who has reportedly been subject  
 12          to repeated beatings and electric shocks at a  
 13          labor camp for refusing to confess his guilt.

14          (5) The People's Republic of China, as a mem-  
 15          ber of the United Nations, is expected to abide by  
 16          the provisions of the Universal Declaration of  
 17          Human Rights.

18          (6) The People's Republic of China is a party  
 19          to numerous international human rights conventions,  
 20          including the Convention Against Torture and Other  
 21          Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-  
 22          ment.

23 **SEC. 303. CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.**

24          (a) **RELEASE OF PRISONERS.**—The Secretary of  
 25          State, in all official meetings with the Government of the

1 People's Republic of China, should request the immediate  
 2 and unconditional release of Ngodrup Phuntsog and other  
 3 prisoners of conscience in Tibet, as well as in the People's  
 4 Republic of China.

5 (b) ACCESS TO PRISONS.—The Secretary of State  
 6 should seek access for international humanitarian organi-  
 7 zations to Drapchi prison and other prisons in Tibet, as  
 8 well as in the People's Republic of China, in order to en-  
 9 sure that prisoners are not being mistreated and are re-  
 10 ceiving necessary medical treatment.

11 (c) DIALOGUE ON FUTURE OF TIBET.—The Sec-  
 12 retary of State, in all official meetings with the Govern-  
 13 ment of the People's Republic of China, should call on that  
 14 government to begin serious discussions with the Dalai  
 15 Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, on the  
 16 future of Tibet.

17 **SEC. 304. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR ADDI-**  
 18 **TIONAL PERSONNEL AT DIPLOMATIC POSTS**  
 19 **TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEO-**  
 20 **PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

21 There is authorized to be appropriated to support  
 22 personnel in the United States Embassies in Beijing and  
 23 Kathmandu, as well as the American consulates in  
 24 Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Chengdu, and Hong  
 25 Kong, in order to monitor political repression in the Peo-

1 ple's Republic of China, \$2,200,000 for fiscal year 2000  
2 and \$2,200,000 for fiscal year 2001.

3 **SEC. 305. DEMOCRACY BUILDING IN CHINA.**

4 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR  
5 NED.—In addition to such sums as are otherwise author-  
6 ized to be appropriated for the National Endowment for  
7 Democracy for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, there is au-  
8 thorized to be appropriated for the National Endowment  
9 for Democracy \$7,000,000 for fiscal year 2000 and  
10 \$7,000,000 for fiscal year 2001, which shall be available  
11 to promote democracy, civil society, and the development  
12 of the rule of law in China.

13 (b) EAST ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL DEMOCRACY  
14 FUND.—The Secretary of State shall use funds available  
15 in the East Asia-Pacific Regional Democracy Fund to pro-  
16 vide grants to nongovernmental organizations to promote  
17 democracy, civil society, and the development of the rule  
18 of law in China.

19 **SEC. 306. ANNUAL REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA.**

20 (a) REPORTS.—Not later than March 30, 2000, and  
21 every year thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit  
22 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and  
23 the Committee on International Relations of the House  
24 of Representatives a report on human rights matters in  
25 China during the preceding year, including information on

1 religious persecution, the development of democratic insti-  
2 tutions, and the rule of law. Each report shall provide in-  
3 formation on such matters in each region of China.

4 (b) PRISONER INFORMATION REGISTRY.—(1) The  
5 Secretary of State shall establish and maintain a registry  
6 which shall provide information on all political prisoners,  
7 prisoners of conscience, and prisoners of faith in China.  
8 The registry shall be known as the “Prisoner Information  
9 Registry for China”.

10 (2) Information in the registry required by paragraph  
11 (1) shall include information on the charges, judicial proc-  
12 esses, administrative actions, uses of forced labor,  
13 incidences of torture, lengths of imprisonment, physical  
14 and health conditions, and other matters associated with  
15 the incarceration of prisoners referred to in paragraph (1)  
16 in China.

17 (3) The Secretary of State may make funds available  
18 to nongovernmental organizations presently engaged in  
19 monitoring activities regarding political prisoners in China  
20 in order to assist in the creation and maintenance of the  
21 registry required by paragraph (1).

1 **SEC. 307. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ESTABLISH-**  
 2 **MENT OF A COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND**  
 3 **COOPERATION IN ASIA.**

4 It is the sense of Congress that Congress, the Presi-  
 5 dent, and the Secretary of State should work with the gov-  
 6 ernments of other countries to establish a Commission on  
 7 Security and Cooperation in Asia which would be modeled  
 8 after the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Eu-  
 9 rope.

10 **SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING DEMOCRACY**  
 11 **IN HONG KONG.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that the people of Hong  
 13 Kong should continue to have the right and ability to free-  
 14 ly elect their legislative representatives.

15 **SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ORGAN HAR-**  
 16 **VESTING AND TRANSPLANTING IN THE PEO-**  
 17 **PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

18 It is the sense of Congress that—

19 (1) the Government of the People's Republic of  
 20 China should stop the practice of harvesting and  
 21 transplanting organs for profit from prisoners that  
 22 it executes;

23 (2) the Government of the People's Republic of  
 24 China should be strongly condemned for such organ  
 25 harvesting and transplanting practice;

1           (3) the President should bar from entry into  
 2           the United States any and all officials of the Gov-  
 3           ernment of the People’s Republic of China known to  
 4           be directly involved in such organ harvesting and  
 5           transplanting practice;

6           (4) individuals determined to be participating in  
 7           or otherwise facilitating the sale of organs harvested  
 8           through such practice in the United States should be  
 9           prosecuted to the fullest possible extent of the law;  
 10          and

11          (5) the appropriate officials in the United  
 12          States should interview individuals, including doc-  
 13          tors, who may have knowledge of such organ har-  
 14          vesting and transplanting practice.

## 15           **TITLE IV—CONCESSIONAL** 16                           **LOANS**

### 17   **SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.**

18          This title may be cited as the “Communist China  
 19   Subsidy Reduction Act of 1999”.

### 20   **SEC. 402. FINDINGS.**

21          Congress makes the following findings:

22           (1) The People’s Republic of China has enjoyed  
 23          ready access to international capital through com-  
 24          mercial loans, direct investment, sales of securities,  
 25          bond sales, and foreign aid.

1           (2) Regarding international commercial lending,  
2           the People's Republic of China had \$48,000,000,000  
3           in loans outstanding from private creditors in 1995.

4           (3) Regarding international direct investment,  
5           international direct investment in the People's Re-  
6           public of China from 1993 through 1995 totaled  
7           \$97,151,000,000, and in 1996 alone totaled  
8           \$47,000,000,000.

9           (4) Regarding investment in Chinese securities,  
10          the aggregate value of outstanding Chinese securi-  
11          ties currently held by Chinese nationals and foreign  
12          persons is \$175,000,000,000, and from 1993  
13          through 1995 foreign persons invested  
14          \$10,540,000,000 in Chinese stocks.

15          (5) Regarding investment in Chinese bonds, en-  
16          tities controlled by the Government of the People's  
17          Republic of China have issued 75 bonds since 1988,  
18          including 36 dollar-denominated bond offerings val-  
19          ued at more than \$6,700,000,000, and the total  
20          value of long-term Chinese bonds outstanding as of  
21          January 1, 1996, was \$11,709,000,000.

22          (6) Regarding international assistance, the Peo-  
23          ple's Republic of China received almost  
24          \$1,000,000,000 in foreign aid grants and an addi-  
25          tional \$1,566,000,000 in technical assistance grants

1 from 1993 through 1995, and in 1995 received  
2 \$5,540,000,000 in bilateral assistance loans, includ-  
3 ing concessional aid, export credits, and related as-  
4 sistance.

5 (7) Regarding international financial  
6 institutions—

7 (A) despite the People's Republic of Chi-  
8 na's access to international capital and world fi-  
9 nancial markets, international financial institu-  
10 tions have annually provided it with more than  
11 \$4,000,000,000 in loans in recent years,  
12 amounting to almost a third of the loan com-  
13 mitments of the Asian Development Bank and  
14 17.1 percent of the loan approvals by the Inter-  
15 national Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-  
16 ment in 1995; and

17 (B) the People's Republic of China bor-  
18 rows more from the International Bank for Re-  
19 construction and Development and the Asian  
20 Development Bank than any other country, and  
21 loan commitments from those institutions to the  
22 People's Republic of China quadrupled from  
23 \$1,100,000,000 in 1985 to \$4,300,000,000 by  
24 1995.

1   **SEC. 403. OPPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TO**  
2                   **CONCESSIONAL LOANS TO THE PEOPLE'S RE-**  
3                   **PUBLIC OF CHINA.**

4           Title XV of the International Financial Institutions  
5 Act (22 U.S.C. 262o–262o–1) is amended by adding at  
6 the end the following:

7   **“SEC. 1503. OPPOSITION OF UNITED STATES TO**  
8                   **CONCESSIONAL LOANS TO THE PEOPLE'S RE-**  
9                   **PUBLIC OF CHINA.**

10          “(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury  
11 shall instruct the United States Executive Directors at  
12 each international financial institution (as defined in sec-  
13 tion 1701(c)(2)) to use the voice and vote of the United  
14 States to oppose the provision by the institution of  
15 concessional loans to the People’s Republic of China, any  
16 citizen or national of the People’s Republic of China, or  
17 any entity established in the People’s Republic of China.

18          “(b) CONCESSIONAL LOANS DEFINED.—As used in  
19 subsection (a), the term ‘concessional loans’ means loans  
20 with highly subsidized interest rates, grace periods for re-  
21 payment of 5 years or more, and maturities of 20 years  
22 or more.”.

1 **SEC. 404. PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD BE ADHERED TO BY**  
2 **ANY UNITED STATES NATIONAL CONDUCTING**  
3 **AN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROJECT IN**  
4 **THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

5 (a) PURPOSE.—It is the purpose of this section to  
6 create principles governing the conduct of industrial co-  
7 operation projects of United States nationals in the Peo-  
8 ple's Republic of China.

9 (b) STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES.—It is the sense of  
10 Congress that any United States national conducting an  
11 industrial cooperation project in the People's Republic of  
12 China should:

13 (1) Suspend the use of any goods, wares, arti-  
14 cles, or merchandise that the United States national  
15 has reason to believe were mined, produced, or man-  
16 ufactured, in whole or in part, by convict labor or  
17 forced labor, and refuse to use forced labor in the  
18 industrial cooperation project.

19 (2) Seek to ensure that political or religious  
20 views, sex, ethnic or national background, involve-  
21 ment in political activities or nonviolent demonstra-  
22 tions, or association with suspected or known dis-  
23 sidents will not prohibit hiring, lead to harassment,  
24 demotion, or dismissal, or in any way affect the sta-  
25 tus or terms of employment in the industrial co-  
26 operation project. The United States national should

1 not discriminate in terms or conditions of employ-  
2 ment in the industrial cooperation project against  
3 persons with past records of arrest or internal exile  
4 for nonviolent protest or membership in unofficial  
5 organizations committed to nonviolence.

6 (3) Ensure that methods of production used in  
7 the industrial cooperation project do not pose an un-  
8 necessary physical danger to workers and neighbor-  
9 ing populations or property, and that the industrial  
10 cooperation project does not unnecessarily risk harm  
11 to the surrounding environment; and consult with  
12 community leaders regarding environmental protec-  
13 tion with respect to the industrial cooperation  
14 project.

15 (4) Strive to establish a private business enter-  
16 prise when involved in an industrial cooperation  
17 project with the Government of the People's Repub-  
18 lic of China or other state entity.

19 (5) Discourage any Chinese military presence  
20 on the premises of any industrial cooperation  
21 projects which involve dual-use technologies.

22 (6) Undertake to promote freedom of associa-  
23 tion and assembly among the employees of the  
24 United States national. The United States national  
25 should protest any infringement by the Government

1 of the People's Republic of China of these freedoms  
2 to the International Labor Organization office in  
3 Beijing.

4 (7) Provide the Department of State with infor-  
5 mation relevant to the Department's efforts to col-  
6 lect information on prisoners for the purposes of the  
7 Prisoner Information Registry, and for other report-  
8 ing purposes.

9 (8) Discourage or undertake to prevent compul-  
10 sory political indoctrination programs from taking  
11 place on the premises of the industrial cooperation  
12 project.

13 (9) Promote freedom of expression, including  
14 the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information  
15 and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either  
16 orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or  
17 through any media. To this end, the United States  
18 national should raise with appropriate authorities of  
19 the Government of the People's Republic of China  
20 concerns about restrictions on the free flow of infor-  
21 mation.

22 (10) Undertake to prevent harassment of work-  
23 ers who, consistent with the United Nations World  
24 Population Plan of Action, decide freely and respon-  
25 sibly the number and spacing of their children; and

1       prohibit compulsory population control activities on  
2       the premises of the industrial cooperation project.

3       (c) PROMOTION OF PRINCIPLES BY OTHER NA-  
4 TIONS.—The Secretary of State shall forward a copy of  
5 the principles set forth in subsection (b) to the member  
6 nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and  
7 Development and encourage such nations to promote prin-  
8 ciples similar to these principles.

9       (d) REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT.—

10           (1) IN GENERAL.—Each United States national  
11       conducting an industrial cooperation project in the  
12       People’s Republic of China shall register with the  
13       Secretary of State and indicate that the United  
14       States national agrees to implement the principles  
15       set forth in subsection (b). No fee shall be required  
16       for registration under this subsection.

17           (2) PREFERENCE FOR PARTICIPATION IN  
18 TRADE MISSIONS.—The Secretary of Commerce  
19       shall—

20           (A) consult the register required under  
21       paragraph (1) before the selection of private  
22       sector participants in any form of trade mission  
23       to China; and

24           (B) undertake to involve those United  
25       States nationals that have registered their

1 adoption of the principles set forth in sub-  
 2 section (b).

3 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

4 (1) The term “industrial cooperation project”  
 5 refers to a for-profit activity the business operations  
 6 of which employ more than 25 individuals or have  
 7 assets greater than \$25,000.

8 (2) The term “United States national”  
 9 means—

10 (A) a citizen or national of the United  
 11 States or a permanent resident of the United  
 12 States; and

13 (B) a corporation, partnership, or other  
 14 business association organized under the laws  
 15 of the United States, any State or territory  
 16 thereof, the District of Columbia, the Common-  
 17 wealth of Puerto Rico, or the Commonwealth of  
 18 the Northern Mariana Islands.

19 **SEC. 405. PROMOTION OF EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL, SCI-**  
 20 **ENTIFIC, AGRICULTURAL, MILITARY, LEGAL,**  
 21 **POLITICAL, AND ARTISTIC EXCHANGES BE-**  
 22 **TWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.**

23 (a) EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES  
 24 AND CHINA.—Agencies of the United States Government  
 25 which engage in educational, cultural, scientific, agricul-

1 tural, military, legal, political, and artistic exchanges shall  
 2 endeavor to initiate or expand such exchange programs  
 3 with regard to China.

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
 5 gress that a Federally-chartered not-for-profit organiza-  
 6 tion should be established to fund exchanges between the  
 7 United States and China through private donations.

## 8 **TITLE V—RADIO FREE ASIA**

### 9 **SEC. 501. RADIO FREE ASIA.**

10 (a) REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON GRANT AMOUNT OR  
 11 GRANT USE.—Subsection (d) of section 309 of the United  
 12 States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (title III  
 13 of Public Law 103–236; 22 U.S.C. 6208) is amended—

14 (1) by striking paragraphs (4) and (5); and

15 (2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as para-  
 16 graph (4).

17 (b) REPEAL OF ADDITIONAL GRANT LIMITATION.—  
 18 Paragraph (2) of that subsection is amended by striking  
 19 “, and shall further” and all that follows through “Sep-  
 20 tember 30, 1999.” and inserting a period.

21 (c) REPEAL OF SUNSET ON GRANT AUTHORITY.—  
 22 That section is further amended—

23 (1) by striking subsection (g); and

24 (2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as  
 25 subsections (g) and (h), respectively.

1       (d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Subsection (c) of  
2 that section is amended—

3           (1) in paragraph (1)—

4               (A) by striking subparagraph (A); and

5               (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (B)

6           and (C) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respec-

7           tively; and

8           (2) by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).

9       (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is  
10 authorized to be appropriated for “Radio Free Asia”,  
11 \$30,000,000 for fiscal year 2000 and \$30,000,000 for fis-  
12 cal year 2001.

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