S. 1360

To preserve the effectiveness of Secret Service protection by establishing a protective function privilege, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

July 13 (legislative day, July 12), 1999

Mr. Leahy introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To preserve the effectiveness of Secret Service protection by establishing a protective function privilege, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Secret Service Protec-
- 5 tive Privilege Act of 1999".
- 6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
- 7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
- 8 ings:

- (1) The physical safety of the Nation's top elected officials is a public good of transcendent importance.
 - (2) By virtue of the critical importance of the Office of the President, the President and those in direct line of the Presidency are subject to unique and mortal jeopardy—jeopardy that in turn threatens profound disruption to our system of representative government and to the security and future of the Nation.
 - (3) The physical safety of visiting heads of foreign states and foreign governments is also a matter of paramount importance. The assassination of such a person while on American soil could have calamitous consequences for our foreign relations and national security.
 - (4) Given these grave concerns, Congress has provided for the Secret Service to protect the President and those in direct line of the Presidency, and has directed that these officials may not waive such protection. Congress has also provided for the Secret Service to protect visiting heads of foreign states and foreign governments.
 - (5) The protective strategy of the Secret Service depends critically on the ability of its personnel

- to maintain close and unremitting physical proximity
 to the protectee.
 - (6) Secret Service personnel must remain at the side of the protectee on occasions of confidential conversations and, as a result, may overhear top secret discussions, diplomatic exchanges, sensitive conversations, and matters of personal privacy.
 - (7) The necessary level of proximity can be maintained only in an atmosphere of complete trust and confidence between the protectee and his or her protectors.
 - (8) If a protectee has reason to doubt the confidentiality of actions or conversations taken in sight or hearing of Secret Service personnel, the protectee may seek to push the protective envelope away or undermine it to the point at which it could no longer be fully effective.
 - (9) The possibility that Secret Service personnel might be compelled to testify against their protectees could induce foreign nations to refuse Secret Service protection in future state visits, making it impossible for the Secret Service to fulfill its important statutory mission of protecting the life and safety of foreign dignitaries.

- 1 (10) A privilege protecting information acquired 2 by Secret Service personnel while performing their 3 protective function in physical proximity to a 4 protectee will preserve the security of the protectee 5 by lessening the incentive of the protectee to dis-6 tance Secret Service personnel in situations in which 7 there is some risk to the safety of the protectee.
 - (11) Recognition of a protective function privilege for the President and those in direct line of the Presidency, and for visiting heads of foreign states and foreign governments, will promote sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.
 - (12) Because Secret Service personnel retain law enforcement responsibility even while engaged in their protective function, the privilege must be subject to a crime/treason exception.

(b) Purposes.—The purposes of this Act are—

- (1) to facilitate the relationship of trust and confidence between Secret Service personnel and certain protected officials that is essential to the ability of the Secret Service to protect these officials, and the Nation, from the risk of assassination; and
- (2) to ensure that Secret Service personnel are not precluded from testifying in a criminal investiga-

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1	tion or prosecution about unlawful activity com-
2	mitted within their view or hearing.
3	SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTIVE FUNCTION PRIVI-
4	LEGE.
5	(a) Admissibility of Information Acquired by
6	SECRET SERVICE PERSONNEL WHILE PERFORMING
7	THEIR PROTECTIVE FUNCTION.—Chapter 203 of title 18,
8	United States Code, is amended by inserting after section
9	3056 the following:
10	"§ 3056A. Testimony by Secret Service personnel; pro-
11	tective function privilege
12	"(a) Definitions.—In this section:
13	"(1) PROTECTEE.—The term 'protectee'
14	means—
15	"(A) the President;
16	"(B) the Vice President (or other officer
17	next in the order of succession to the Office of
18	President);
19	"(C) the President-elect;
20	"(D) the Vice President-elect; and
21	"(E) visiting heads of foreign states or for-
22	eign governments who, at the time and place
23	concerned, are being provided protection by the
24	United States Secret Service.

1	"(2) Secret service personnel.—The term
2	'Secret Service personnel' means any officer or agent
3	of the United States Secret Service.
4	"(b) General Rule of Privilege.—Subject to
5	subsection (c), testimony by Secret Service personnel or
6	former Secret Service personnel regarding information af-
7	fecting a protectee that was acquired during the perform-
8	ance of a protective function in physical proximity to the
9	protectee shall not be received in evidence or otherwise dis-
10	closed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or be-
11	fore any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency
12	regulatory body, or other authority of the United States
13	a State, or a political subdivision thereof.
14	"(c) Exceptions.—There is no privilege under this
15	section—
16	"(1) with respect to information that, at the
17	time the information was acquired by Secret Service
18	personnel, was sufficient to provide reasonable
19	grounds to believe that a crime had been, was being
20	or would be committed; or
21	"(2) if the privilege is waived by the protected
22	or the legal representative of a protectee or deceased
23	protectee.
24	"(d) Concurrent Privileges.—The proximity of
25	Secret Service personnel to a protectee engaged in a privi-

- 1 leged communication with another shall not, by itself, de-
- 2 feat an otherwise valid claim of privilege.".
- 3 (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.—
- 4 The analysis for chapter 203 of title 18, United States
- 5 Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to
- 6 section 3056 the following:

"3056A. Testimony by Secret Service personnel; protective function privilege.".

7 SEC. 4. APPLICATION.

- 8 This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall
- 9 apply to any proceeding commenced on or after the date
- 10 of enactment of this Act.

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