[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 43, Number 42 (Monday, October 22, 2007)]
[Pages 1364-1372]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
<R04>
Directive on Public Health and Medical Preparedness
October 18, 2007
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21
Subject: Public Health and Medical Preparedness
Purpose
(1) This directive establishes a National Strategy for Public Health
and Medical Preparedness (Strategy), which builds upon principles set
forth in Biodefense for the 21st Century (April 2004) and will transform
our national approach to protecting the health of the American people
against all disasters.
Definitions
(2) In this directive:
(a) The term ``biosurveillance'' means the process of active data-
gathering with appropriate analysis and interpretation of biosphere data
that might relate to disease activity and threats to human or animal
health--whether infectious, toxic, metabolic, or otherwise, and
regardless of intentional or natural origin--in order to achieve early
warning of health threats, early detection of health events, and overall
situational awareness of disease activity;
(b) The term ``catastrophic health event'' means any natural or
manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in a number of ill
or injured persons sufficient to overwhelm the capabilities of immediate
local and regional emergency response and health care systems;
(c) The term ``epidemiologic surveillance'' means the process of
actively gathering and analyzing data related to human health and
disease in a population in order to obtain early warning of human health
events, rapid characterization of human disease events, and overall
situational awareness of disease activity in the human population;
(d) The term ``medical'' means the science and practice of
maintenance of health and prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and
alleviation of disease or injury and the provision of those services to
individuals;
(e) The term ``public health'' means the science and practice of
protecting and improving the overall health of the community through
disease prevention and early diagnosis, control of communicable
diseases, health education, injury prevention, sanitation, and
protection from environmental hazards;
(f) The term ``public health and medical preparedness'' means the
existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment
necessary to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover
from major events, including efforts that result in the capability to
render an appropriate public health and medical response that will
mitigate the effects of illness and injury, limit morbidity and
mortality to the maximum extent possible, and sustain societal,
economic, and political infrastructure; and
(g) The terms ``State'' and ``local government,'' when used in a
geographical sense, have the meanings ascribed to such terms
respectively in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
101).
Background
(3) A catastrophic health event, such as a terrorist attack with a
weapon of mass destruction (WMD), a naturally-occurring pandemic, or a
calamitous meteorological or geological event, could cause tens or
hundreds of thousands of casualties or more, weaken our economy, damage
public morale and confidence, and threaten our national security. It is
therefore critical that we establish a strategic vision that will enable
a level of public health and medical preparedness sufficient to address
a range of possible disasters.
(4) The United States has made significant progress in public health
and medical preparedness since 2001, but we remain vulnerable to events
that threaten the health of large populations. The attacks of September
11 and Hurricane Katrina were the most significant recent disasters
faced by the United States, yet casualty numbers were small in
comparison to the 1995 Kobe earthquake; the 2003 Bam, Iran, earthquake;
the 2004 Sumatra tsunami; and what we would expect from a 1918-like
influenza pandemic or large-scale WMD attack. Such events could
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immediately overwhelm our public health and medical systems.
(5) This Strategy draws key principles from the National Strategy
for Homeland Security (October 2007), the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002), and Biodefense for the 21st
Century (April 2004) that can be generally applied to public health and
medical preparedness. Those key principles are the following: (1)
preparedness for all potential catastrophic health events; (2) vertical
and horizontal coordination across levels of government, jurisdictions,
and disciplines; (3) a regional approach to health preparedness; (4)
engagement of the private sector, academia, and other nongovernmental
entities in preparedness and response efforts; and (5) the important
roles of individuals, families, and communities.
(6) Present public health and medical preparedness plans incorporate
the concept of ``surging'' existing medical and public health
capabilities in response to an event that threatens a large number of
lives. The assumption that conventional public health and medical
systems can function effectively in catastrophic health events has,
however, proved to be incorrect in real-world situations. Therefore, it
is necessary to transform the national approach to health care in the
context of a catastrophic health event in order to enable U.S. public
health and medical systems to respond effectively to a broad range of
incidents.
(7) The most effective complex service delivery systems result from
rigorous end-to-end system design. A critical and formal process by
which the functions of public health and medical preparedness and
response are designed to integrate all vertical (through all levels of
government) and horizontal (across all sectors in communities)
components can achieve a much greater capability than we currently have.
(8) The United States has tremendous resources in both public and
private sectors that could be used to prepare for and respond to a
catastrophic health event. To exploit those resources fully, they must
be organized in a rationally designed system that is incorporated into
pre-event planning, deployed in a coordinated manner in response to an
event, and guided by a constant and timely flow of relevant information
during an event. This Strategy establishes principles and objectives to
improve our ability to respond comprehensively to catastrophic health
events. It also identifies critical antecedent components of this
capability and directs the development of an implementation plan that
will delineate further specific actions and guide the process to
fruition.
(9) This Strategy focuses on human public health and medical
systems; it does not address other areas critical to overall public
health and medical preparedness, such as animal health systems, food and
agriculture defense, global partnerships in public health, health threat
intelligence activities, domestic and international biosecurity, and
basic and applied research in threat diseases and countermeasures.
Efforts in those areas are addressed in other policy documents.
(10) It is not possible to prevent all casualties in catastrophic
events, but strategic improvements in our Federal, State, and local
planning can prepare our Nation to deliver appropriate care to the
largest possible number of people, lessen the impact on limited health
care resources, and support the continuity of society and government.
Policy
(11) It is the policy of the United States to plan and enable
provision for the public health and medical needs of the American people
in the case of a catastrophic health event through continual and timely
flow of information during such an event and rapid public health and
medical response that marshals all available national capabilities and
capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner.
Implementation Actions
(12) Biodefense for the 21st Century provides a foundation for the
transformation of our catastrophic health event response and
preparedness efforts. Although the four pillars of that framework--
Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and Detection,
and Response and Recovery--were developed to guide our efforts to defend
against a bioterrorist attack, they are applicable to a broad array of
natural and manmade public health and medical challenges
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and are appropriate to serve as the core functions of the Strategy for
Public Health and Medical Preparedness.
(13) To accomplish our objectives, we must create a firm foundation
for community medical preparedness. We will increase our efforts to
inform citizens and empower communities, buttress our public health
infrastructure, and explore options to relieve current pressures on our
emergency departments and emergency medical systems so that they retain
the flexibility to prepare for and respond to events.
(14) Ultimately, the Nation must collectively support and facilitate
the establishment of a discipline of disaster health. The specialty of
emergency medicine evolved as a result of the recognition of the special
considerations in emergency patient care, and similarly the recognition
of the unique principles in disaster-related public health and medicine
merit the establishment of their own formal discipline. Such a
discipline will provide a foundation for doctrine, education, training,
and research and will integrate preparedness into the public health and
medical communities.
Critical Components of Public Health and Medical Preparedness
(15) Currently, the four most critical components of public health
and medical preparedness are biosurveillance, countermeasure
distribution, mass casualty care, and community resilience. Although
those capabilities do not address all public health and medical
preparedness requirements, they currently hold the greatest potential
for mitigating illness and death and therefore will receive the highest
priority in our public health and medical preparedness efforts. Those
capabilities constitute the focus and major objectives of this Strategy.
(16) Biosurveillance: The United States must develop a nationwide,
robust, and integrated biosurveillance capability, with connections to
international disease surveillance systems, in order to provide early
warning and ongoing characterization of disease outbreaks in near real-
time. Surveillance must use multiple modalities and an in-depth
architecture. We must enhance clinician awareness and participation and
strengthen laboratory diagnostic capabilities and capacity in order to
recognize potential threats as early as possible. Integration of
biosurveillance elements and other data (including human health, animal
health, agricultural, meteorological, environmental, intelligence, and
other data) will provide a comprehensive picture of the health of
communities and the associated threat environment for incorporation into
the national ``common operating picture.'' A central element of
biosurveillance must be an epidemiologic surveillance system to monitor
human disease activity across populations. That system must be
sufficiently enabled to identify specific disease incidence and
prevalence in heterogeneous populations and environments and must
possess sufficient flexibility to tailor analyses to new syndromes and
emerging diseases. State and local government health officials, public
and private sector health care institutions, and practicing clinicians
must be involved in system design, and the overall system must be
constructed with the principal objective of establishing or enhancing
the capabilities of State and local government entities.
(17) Countermeasure Stockpiling and Distribution: In the context of
a catastrophic health event, rapid distribution of medical
countermeasures (vaccines, drugs, and therapeutics) to a large
population requires significant resources within individual communities.
Few if any cities are presently able to meet the objective of dispensing
countermeasures to their entire population within 48 hours after the
decision to do so. Recognizing that State and local government
authorities have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens,
the Federal Government will create the appropriate framework and
policies for sharing information on best practices and mechanisms to
address the logistical challenges associated with this requirement. The
Federal Government must work with nonfederal stakeholders to create
effective templates for countermeasure distribution and dispensing that
State and local government authorities can use to build their own
capabilities.
(18) Mass Casualty Care: The structure and operating principles of
our day-to-day public health and medical systems cannot meet the needs
created by a catastrophic
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health event. Collectively, our Nation must develop a disaster medical
capability that can immediately re-orient and coordinate existing
resources within all sectors to satisfy the needs of the population
during a catastrophic health event. Mass casualty care response must be
(1) rapid, (2) flexible, (3) scalable, (4) sustainable, (5) exhaustive
(drawing upon all national resources), (6) comprehensive (addressing
needs from acute to chronic care and including mental health and special
needs populations), (7) integrated and coordinated, and (8) appropriate
(delivering the correct treatment in the most ethical manner with
available capabilities). We must enhance our capability to protect the
physical and mental health of survivors; protect responders and health
care providers; properly and respectfully dispose of the deceased;
ensure continuity of society, economy, and government; and facilitate
long-term recovery of affected citizens.
(19) The establishment of a robust disaster health capability
requires us to develop an operational concept for the medical response
to catastrophic health events that is substantively distinct from and
broader than that which guides day-to-day operations. In order to
achieve that transformation, the Federal Government will facilitate and
provide leadership for key stakeholders to establish the following four
foundational elements: Doctrine, System Design, Capacity, and Education
and Training. The establishment of those foundational elements must
result from efforts within the relevant professional communities and
will require many years, but the Federal Government can serve as an
important catalyst for this process.
(20) Community Resilience: The above components address the supply
side of the preparedness function, ultimately providing enhanced
services to our citizens. The demand side is of equal importance. Where
local civic leaders, citizens, and families are educated regarding
threats and are empowered to mitigate their own risk, where they are
practiced in responding to events, where they have social networks to
fall back upon, and where they have familiarity with local public health
and medical systems, there will be community resilience that will
significantly attenuate the requirement for additional assistance. The
Federal Government must formulate a comprehensive plan for promoting
community public health and medical preparedness to assist State and
local authorities in building resilient communities in the face of
potential catastrophic health events.
Biosurveillance
(21) The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall establish an
operational national epidemiologic surveillance system for human health,
with international connectivity where appropriate, that is predicated on
State, regional, and community-level capabilities and creates a
networked system to allow for two-way information flow between and among
Federal, State, and local government public health authorities and
clinical health care providers. The system shall build upon existing
Federal, State, and local surveillance systems where they exist and
shall enable and provide incentive for public health agencies to
implement local surveillance systems where they do not exist. To the
extent feasible, the system shall be built using electronic health
information systems. It shall incorporate flexibility and depth of data
necessary to respond to previously unknown or emerging threats to public
health and integrate its data into the national biosurveillance common
operating picture as appropriate. The system shall protect patient
privacy by restricting access to identifying information to the greatest
extent possible and only to public health officials with a need to know.
The Implementation Plan to be developed pursuant to section 43 of this
directive shall specify milestones for this system.
(22) Within 180 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall establish an
Epidemiologic Surveillance Federal Advisory Committee, including
representatives from State and local government public health
authorities and appropriate private sector health care entities, in
order to ensure that the Federal Government is meeting the goal of
enabling State and local government public health surveillance
capabilities.
[[Page 1368]]
Countermeasure Stockpiling and Distribution
(23) In accordance with the schedule set forth below, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall develop templates, using a variety of tools and
including private sector resources when necessary, that provide minimum
operational plans to enable communities to distribute and dispense
countermeasures to their populations within 48 hours after a decision to
do so. The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall ensure that this
process utilizes current cooperative programs and engages Federal,
State, local government, and private sector entities in template
development, modeling, testing, and evaluation. The Secretary shall also
assist State, local government, and regional entities in tailoring
templates to fit differing geographic sizes, population densities, and
demographics, and other unique or specific local needs. In carrying out
such actions, the Secretary shall:
(a) within 270 days after the date of this directive, (i) publish an
initial template or templates meeting the requirements above, including
basic testing of component distribution mechanisms and modeling of
template systems to predict performance in large-scale implementation,
(ii) establish standards and performance measures for State and local
government countermeasure distribution systems, including demonstration
of specific capabilities in tactical exercises in accordance with the
National Exercise Program, and (iii) establish a process to gather
performance data from State and local participants on a regular basis to
assess readiness; and
(b) within 180 days after the completion of the tasks set forth in
(a), and with appropriate notice, commence collecting and using
performance data and metrics as conditions for future public health
preparedness grant funding.
(24) Within 270 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security and the Attorney
General, shall develop Federal Government capabilities and plans to
complement or supplement State and local government distribution
capacity, as appropriate and feasible, if such entities' resources are
deemed insufficient to provide access to countermeasures in a timely
manner in the event of a catastrophic health event.
(25) The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall ensure that
the priority-setting process for the acquisition of medical
countermeasures and other critical medical materiel for the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS) is transparent and risk-informed with respect
to the scope, quantities, and forms of the various products. Within 180
days after the date of this directive, the Secretary, in coordination
with the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans
Affairs, shall establish a formal mechanism for the annual review of SNS
composition and development of recommendations that utilizes input from
accepted national risk assessments and threat assessments, national
planning scenarios, national modeling resources, and subject matter
experts. The results of each such annual review shall be provided to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism at the time of the
Department of Health and Human Services' next budget submission.
(26) Within 90 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services shall establish a process to share relevant
information regarding the contents of the SNS with Federal, State, and
local government health officers with appropriate clearances and a need
to know.
(27) Within 180 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretaries of
State, Defense, Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security,
shall develop protocols for sharing countermeasures and medical goods
between the SNS and other Federal stockpiles and shall explore
appropriate reciprocal arrangements with foreign and international
stockpiles of medical countermeasures to ensure the availability of
necessary supplies for use in the United States.
[[Page 1369]]
Mass Casualty Care
(28) The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination
with the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland
Security, shall directly engage relevant State and local government,
academic, professional, and private sector entities and experts to
provide feedback on the review of the National Disaster Medical System
and national medical surge capacity required by the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) (Public Law 109-417). Within 270 days
after the completion of such review, the Secretary shall identify,
through a systems-based approach involving expertise from such entities
and experts, high-priority gaps in mass casualty care capabilities, and
shall submit to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism a concept plan that identifies and coordinates all
Federal, State, and local government and private sector public health
and medical disaster response resources, and identifies options for
addressing critical deficits, in order to achieve the system attributes
described in this Strategy.
(29) Within 180 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, shall:
(a) build upon the analysis of Federal facility use to provide
enhanced medical surge capacity in disasters required by section 302 of
PAHPA to analyze the use of Federal medical facilities as a foundational
element of public health and medical preparedness; and
(b) develop and implement plans and enter into agreements to
integrate such facilities more effectively into national and regional
education, training, and exercise preparedness activities.
(30) The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall lead an
interagency process, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security and the Attorney General, to
identify any legal, regulatory, or other barriers to public health and
medical preparedness and response from Federal, State, or local
government or private sector sources that can be eliminated by
appropriate regulatory or legislative action and shall, within 120 days
after the date of this directive, submit a report on such barriers to
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism.
(31) The impact of the ``worried well'' in past disasters is well
documented, and it is evident that mitigating the mental health
consequences of disasters can facilitate effective response. Recognizing
that maintaining and restoring mental health in disasters has not
received sufficient attention to date, within 180 days after the date of
this directive, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in
coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and
Homeland Security, shall establish a Federal Advisory Committee for
Disaster Mental Health. The committee shall consist of appropriate
subject matter experts and, within 180 days after its establishment,
shall submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
recommendations for protecting, preserving, and restoring individual and
community mental health in catastrophic health event settings, including
pre-event, intra-event, and post-event education, messaging, and
interventions.
Community Resilience
(32) The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination
with the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland
Security, shall ensure that core public health and medical curricula and
training developed pursuant to PAHPA address the needs to improve
individual, family, and institutional public health and medical
preparedness, enhance private citizen opportunities for contributions to
local, regional, and national preparedness and response, and build
resilient communities.
(33) Within 270 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Defense, Commerce, Labor, Education, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland
Security and the Attorney General, shall submit to the President for
approval, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism, a plan to promote comprehensive community medical
preparedness.
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Risk Awareness
(34) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall prepare an unclassified
briefing for non-health professionals that clearly outlines the scope of
the risks to public health posed by relevant threats and catastrophic
health events (including attacks involving weapons of mass destruction),
shall coordinate such briefing with the heads of other relevant
executive departments and agencies, shall ensure that full use is made
of Department of Defense expertise and resources, and shall ensure that
all State governors and the mayors and senior county officials from the
50 largest metropolitan statistical areas in the United States receive
such briefing, unless specifically declined, within 150 days after the
date of this directive.
(35) Within 180 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Director of National
Intelligence, shall establish a mechanism by which up-to-date and
specific public health threat information shall be relayed, to the
greatest extent possible and not inconsistent with the established
guidance relating to the Information Sharing Environment, to relevant
public health officials at the State and local government levels and
shall initiate a process to ensure that qualified heads of State and
local government entities have the opportunity to obtain appropriate
security clearances so that they may receive classified threat
information when applicable.
Education and Training
(36) Within 180 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall develop and thereafter maintain processes for
coordinating Federal grant programs for public health and medical
preparedness using grant application guidance, investment
justifications, reporting, program performance measures, and
accountability for future funding in order to promote cross-sector,
regional, and capability-based coordination, consistent with section 201
of PAHPA and the National Preparedness Guidelines developed pursuant to
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 of December 17, 2003
(``National Preparedness'').
(37) Within 1 year after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Defense, Transportation, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, and
consistent with section 304 of PAHPA, shall develop a mechanism to
coordinate public health and medical disaster preparedness and response
core curricula and training across executive departments and agencies,
to ensure standardization and commonality of knowledge, procedures, and
terms of reference within the Federal Government that also can be
communicated to State and local government entities, as well as academia
and the private sector.
(38) Within 1 year after the date of this directive, the Secretaries
of Health and Human Services and Defense, in coordination with the
Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security, shall establish
an academic Joint Program for Disaster Medicine and Public Health housed
at a National Center for Disaster Medicine and Public Health at the
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. The Program shall
lead Federal efforts to develop and propagate core curricula, training,
and research related to medicine and public health in disasters. The
Center will be an academic center of excellence in disaster medicine and
public health, co-locating education and research in the related
specialties of domestic medical preparedness and response, international
health, international disaster and humanitarian medical assistance, and
military medicine. Department of Health and Human Services and
Department of Defense authorities will be used to carry out respective
civilian and military missions within this joint program.
Disaster Health System
(39) Within 180 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services shall commission the Institute of Medicine
to lead a forum engaging Federal, State, and local governments, the
private sector, academia, and appropriate
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professional societies in a process to facilitate the development of
national disaster public health and medicine doctrine and system design
and to develop a strategy for long-term enhancement of disaster public
health and medical capacity and the propagation of disaster public
health and medicine education and training.
(40) Within 120 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services shall submit to the President through the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
and shall commence the implementation of, a plan to use current grant
funding programs, private payer incentives, market forces, Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services requirements, and other means to create
financial incentives to enhance private sector health care facility
preparedness in such a manner as to not increase health care costs.
(41) Within 180 days after the date of this directive, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretaries of
Transportation and Homeland Security, shall establish within the
Department of Health and Human Services an Office for Emergency Medical
Care. Under the direction of the Secretary, such Office shall lead an
enterprise to promote and fund research in emergency medicine and trauma
health care; promote regional partnerships and more effective emergency
medical systems in order to enhance appropriate triage, distribution,
and care of routine community patients; promote local, regional, and
State emergency medical systems' preparedness for and response to public
health events. The Office shall address the full spectrum of issues that
have an impact on care in hospital emergency departments, including the
entire continuum of patient care from pre-hospital to disposition from
emergency or trauma care. The Office shall coordinate with existing
executive departments and agencies that perform functions relating to
emergency medical systems in order to ensure unified strategy, policy,
and implementation.
National Health Security Strategy
(42) The PAHPA requires that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services submit in 2009, and quadrennially afterward, a National Health
Security Strategy (NHSS) to the Congress. The principles and actions in
this directive, and in the Implementation Plan required by section 43,
shall be incorporated into the initial NHSS, as appropriate, and shall
serve as a foundation for the preparedness goals contained therein.
Task Force and Implementation Plan
(43) In order to facilitate the implementation of the policy
outlined in this Strategy, there is established the Public Health and
Medical Preparedness Task Force (Task Force). Within 120 days after the
date of this directive, the Task Force shall submit to the President for
approval, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism, an Implementation Plan (Plan) for this Strategy,
and annually thereafter shall submit to the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism a status report on the
implementation of the Plan and any recommendations for changes to this
Strategy.
(a) The Task Force shall consist exclusively of the following
members (or their designees who shall be full-time officers or employees
of the members' respective agencies):
(i) The Secretary of Health and Human Services, who shall serve
as Chair;
(ii) The Secretary of State;
(ii) The Secretary of Defense;
(iii) The Attorney General;
(iv) The Secretary of Agriculture;
(v) The Secretary of Commerce;
(vi) The Secretary of Labor;
(vii) The Secretary of Transportation;
(viii) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs
(ix) The Secretary of Homeland Security;
(x) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
(xi) The Director of National Intelligence; and
(xii) such other officers of the United States as the Chair of
the Task Force may designate from time to time.
(b) The Chair of the Task Force shall, as appropriate to deal with
particular subject matters, establish subcommittees of the Task Force
that shall consist exclusively of members of the Task Force (or their
designees under subsection (a) of this section), and
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such other full-time or permanent part-time officers or employees of the
Federal Government as the Chair may designate.
(c) The Plan shall:
(i) provide additional detailed roles and responsibilities of
heads of executive departments and agencies relating to and
consistent with the Strategy and actions set forth in this
directive;
(ii) provide additional guidance on public health and medical
directives in Biodefense for the 21st Century; and
(iii) direct the full examination of resource requirements.
(d) The Plan and all Task Force reports shall be developed in
coordination with the Biodefense Policy Coordination Committee of the
Homeland Security Council and shall then be prepared for consideration
by and submitted to the more senior committees of the Homeland Security
Council, as deemed appropriate by the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
General Provisions
(44) This directive:
(a) shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and the
authorities of executive departments and agencies, or heads of such
departments and agencies, vested by law, and subject to the availability
of appropriations and within the current projected spending levels for
Federal health entitlement programs;
(b) shall not be construed to impair or otherwise affect the
functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budget, administrative, and legislative proposals; and
(c) is not intended, and does not, create any rights or benefits,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by a party
against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities,
or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Note: An original was not available for verification of the content of
this directive.