[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 40, Number 7 (Monday, February 16, 2004)]
[Pages 216-221]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Remarks at the National Defense University

February 11, 2004

    Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm honored to visit the National 
Defense University. For nearly a century, the scholars and students here 
have helped to prepare America for the changing threats to our national 
security. Today, the men and women of our National Defense University 
are helping to frame the strategies through which we are fighting and 
winning the war on terror. Your Center for Counterproliferation Research 
and your other institutes and colleges are providing vital insight into 
the dangers of a new era. I want to thank each one of you for devoting 
your talents and your energy to the service of our great Nation.
    I want to thank General Michael Dunn for inviting me here. I used to 
jog by this facility on a regular basis. Then my age kicked in. 
[Laughter] I appreciate Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, from Germany. Mr. 
Ambassador, thank you for being here today. I see my friend George 
Shultz, a distinguished public servant and true patriot, with us. 
George, thank you for coming, and Charlotte, it's good to see you. I'm 
so honored that Dick Lugar is here with us today. Senator, I appreciate 
you taking time and thanks for bringing Senator Saxby Chambliss with you 
as well. I appreciate the veterans who are here and those on active 
duty. Thanks for letting me come by.
    On September the 11th, 2001, America and the world witnessed a new 
kind of war. We saw the great harm that a stateless network could 
inflict upon our country, killers armed with box cutters, mace, and 19 
airline tickets. Those attacks also raised the prospect of even worse 
dangers, of other weapons in the hands of other men. The greatest threat 
before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack 
with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.
    In the past, enemies of America required massed armies and great 
navies, powerful air forces to put our Nation, our people, our friends 
at risk. In the cold war, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of 
mass destruction but believed that deterrents made those weapons a last 
resort. What has changed in the 21st century is that in the hands of 
terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort, the 
preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder. 
These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and 
transport. Armed with a single vial of a biological agent or a single 
nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics or failing states could gain 
the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace.
    America and the entire civilized world will face this threat for 
decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes and 
unbending purpose. I have made clear to all the policy of this Nation: 
America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us 
with the world's most deadly weapons.
    Meeting this duty has required changes in thinking and strategy. 
Doctrines designed to contain empires, deter aggressive states, and 
defeat massed armies cannot fully protect us from this new threat. 
America faces the possibility of catastrophic attack from ballistic 
missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction, so that is why we are 
developing and deploying missile defenses to guard our people. The best 
intelligence is necessary to win the war on terror and to stop 
proliferation, so that is why I have established a commission that will 
examine our intelligence capabilities and recommend ways to improve and 
adapt them to detect new and emerging threats.
    We're determined to confront those threats at the source. We will 
stop these weapons from being acquired or built. We'll block them from 
being transferred. We'll prevent them from ever being used.
    One source of these weapons is dangerous and secretive regimes that 
build weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and 
force their influence upon the

[[Page 217]]

world. These nations pose different challenges; they require different 
strategies.
    The former dictator of Iraq possessed and used weapons of mass 
destruction against his own people. For 12 years, he defied the will of 
the international community. He refused to disarm or account for his 
illegal weapons and programs. He doubted our resolve to enforce our 
word, and now he sits in a prison cell, while his country moves toward a 
democratic future.
    To Iraq's east, the Government of Iran is unwilling to abandon a 
uranium enrichment program capable of producing material for nuclear 
weapons. The United States is working with our allies and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran meets its 
commitments and does not develop nuclear weapons.
    In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-
range ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons, 
and now threatens to build more. Together with our partners in Asia, 
America is insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and 
irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.
    America has consistently brought these threats to the attention of 
international organizations. We're using every means of diplomacy to 
answer them. As for my part, I will continue to speak clearly on these 
threats. I will continue to call upon the world to confront these 
dangers and to end them.
    In recent years, another path of proliferation has become clear as 
well. America and other nations are learning more about black-market 
operatives who deal in equipment and expertise related to weapons of 
mass destruction. These dealers are motivated by greed or fanaticism or 
both. They find eager customers in outlaw regimes, which pay millions 
for the parts and plans they need to speed up their weapons programs. 
And with deadly technology and expertise on the market, there's the 
terrible possibility that terrorists groups could obtain the ultimate 
weapons they desire most.
    The extent and sophistication of such networks can be seen in the 
case of a man named Abdul Qadeer Khan. This is the story as we know it 
so far.
    A.Q. Khan is known throughout the world as the father of Pakistan's 
nuclear weapons program. What was not publicly known until recently is 
that he also led an extensive international network for the 
proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how. For decades, Mr. Khan 
remained on the Pakistani Government payroll, earning a modest salary. 
Yet, he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through the sale 
of nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from 
North Africa to the Korean Peninsula.
    A.Q. Khan, himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as 
director of the network, its leading scientific mind as well as its 
primary salesman. Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to 
consult with his clients and to sell his expertise. He and his 
associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium as well 
as nuclear designs stolen from the Pakistani Government. The network 
sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can 
transform into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and his 
associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for 
Pakistan's older centrifuges as well as designs for more advanced and 
efficient models. The network also provided these countries with 
components and, in some cases, with complete centrifuges.
    To increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a factory in 
Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts 
were purchased through network operatives based in Europe, in the Middle 
East, and Africa. These procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear 
technologies as a shortcut to personal wealth, and they set up front 
companies to deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly 
controlled materials.
    Khan's deputy, a man named B.S.A. Tahir, ran SMB Computers, a 
business in Dubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the 
proliferation activities of the A.Q. Khan network. Tahir acted as both 
the network's chief financial officer and money launderer. He was also 
its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of 
centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia 
facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs and then 
ordered the facility to ship

[[Page 218]]

the components to Dubai. Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other 
European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to 
other customers.
    This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several 
years by American and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence 
services gradually uncovered this network's reach and identified its key 
experts and agents and money men. Operatives followed its transactions, 
mapped the extent of its operations. They monitored the travel of A.Q. 
Khan and senior associates. They shadowed members of the network around 
the world. They recorded their conversations. They penetrated their 
operations. We've uncovered their secrets. This work involved high risk, 
and all Americans can be grateful for the hard work and the dedication 
of our fine intelligence professionals.
    Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the 
Khan network and to put an end to his criminal enterprise. A.Q. Khan has 
confessed his crimes, and his top associates are out of business. The 
Government of Pakistan is interrogating the network's members, learning 
critical details that will help them prevent it from ever operating 
again. President Musharraf has promised to share all the information he 
learns about the Khan network and has assured us that his country will 
never again be a source of proliferation.
    Mr. Tahir is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his 
activities. Malaysian authorities have assured us that the factory the 
network used is no longer producing centrifuge parts. Other members of 
the network remain at large. One by one, they will be found, and their 
careers in the weapons trade will be ended.
    As a result of our penetration of the network, American and the 
British intelligence identified a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts 
manufactured at the Malaysian facility. We followed the shipment of 
these parts to Dubai and watched as they were transferred to the BBC 
China, a German-owned ship. After the ship passed through the Suez 
Canal, bound for Libya, it was stopped by German and Italian 
authorities. They found several containers, each 40 feet in length, 
listed on the ship's manifest as full of used machine parts. In fact, 
these containers were filled with parts of sophisticated centrifuges.
    The interception of the BBC China came as Libyan and British and 
American officials were discussing the possibility of Libya ending its 
WMD programs. The United States and Britain confronted Libyan officials 
with this evidence of an active and illegal nuclear program. About 2 
months ago, Libya's leader voluntarily agreed to end his nuclear and 
chemical weapons programs, not to pursue biological weapons, and to 
permit thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We're now 
working in partnership with these organizations and with the United 
Kingdom to help the Government of Libya dismantle those programs and 
eliminate all dangerous materials.
    Colonel Qadhafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer 
once his commitment is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his 
example. Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better 
relations with the United States and other free nations. Continuing to 
seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige but 
only political isolation, economic hardship, and other unwelcomed 
consequences.
    We know that Libya was not the only customer of the Khan network. 
Other countries expressed great interest in their services. These 
regimes and other proliferators like Khan should know: We and our 
friends are determined to protect our people and the world from 
proliferation.
    Breaking this network is one major success in a broadbased effort to 
stop the spread of terrible weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to 
the threats of a new era. America and the nations of Australia, France 
and Germany, Italy and Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom have launched the Proliferation Security 
Initiative to interdict lethal materials in transit. Our nations are 
sharing intelligence information, tracking suspect international cargo, 
conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared to search planes and 
ships, to seize weapons and missiles and equipment that raise 
proliferation concerns, just as we did

[[Page 219]]

in stopping the dangerous cargo on the BBC China before it reached 
Libya. Three more governments, Canada and Singapore and Norway, will be 
participating in this initiative. We'll continue to expand the core 
group of PSI countries. And as PSI grows, proliferators will find it 
harder than ever to trade in illicit weapons.
    There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be 
tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into 
action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction. These materials and technologies and the 
people who traffic in them cross many borders. To stop this trade, the 
nations of the world must be strong and determined. We must work 
together. We must act effectively.
    Today I announce seven proposals to strengthen the world's efforts 
to stop the spread of deadly weapons. First, I propose that the work of 
the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more than 
shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've developed to fight 
terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation networks. We 
need greater cooperation, not just among intelligence and military 
services but in law enforcement as well. PSI participants and other 
willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to 
justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to 
seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every 
lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers, and the buyers. Our 
message to proliferators must be consistent, and it must be clear: We 
will find you, and we're not going to rest until you are stopped.
    Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and 
international controls that govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall, 
I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to 
criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all 
sensitive materials within their borders. The Security Council should 
pass this proposal quickly. And when they do, America stands ready to 
help other governments to draft and enforce the new laws that will help 
us deal with proliferation.
    Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from the cold 
war and other dangerous materials out of the wrong hands. In 1991, 
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Senator Lugar had a clear 
vision, along with Senator Nunn, about what to do with the old Soviet 
Union. Under this program, we're helping former Soviet states find 
productive employment for former weapons scientists. We're dismantling, 
destroying, and securing weapons and materials left over from the Soviet 
WMD arsenal. We have more work to do there. And as a result of the G-8 
Summit in 2002, we agreed to provide $20 billion over 10 years, half of 
it from the United States, to support such programs.
    We should expand this cooperation elsewhere in the world. We will 
retain WMD scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya. 
We will help nations end the use of weapons-grade uranium in research 
reactors. I urge more nations to contribute to these efforts. The 
nations of the world must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear 
and chemical and biological and radiological materials.
    As we track and destroy these networks, we must also prevent 
governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed more than 30 years ago to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states which already 
possessed them. Under this treaty, nuclear states agreed to help non-
nuclear states develop peaceful atomic energy if they renounced the 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the treaty has a loophole which has been 
exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran. These regimes are 
allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs 
under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.
    So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to close the loophole. 
The world must create a safe, orderly system to fuel civilian nuclear 
plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The 
world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have 
reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so 
long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment

[[Page 220]]

and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
    The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell 
enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that 
does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and 
reprocessing plants. This step will prevent new states from developing 
the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators 
must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the 
material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.
    For international norms to be effective, they must be enforced. It 
is the charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover 
banned nuclear activity around the world and report those violations to 
the U.N. Security Council. We must ensure that the IAEA has all the 
tools it needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America and other 
nations support what is called the Additional Protocol, which requires 
states to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities and 
allow the IAEA to inspect those facilities.
    As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states that have 
signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their 
civilian nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about fighting 
proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol. I've 
submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate. I urge the Senate to 
consent immediately to its ratification.
    We must also ensure that the IAEA is organized to take action when 
action is required. So, a sixth step, I propose the creation of a 
special committee of the IAEA Board which will focus intensively on 
safeguards and verification. This committee, made up of governments in 
good standing with the IAEA, will strengthen the capability of the IAEA 
to ensure that nations comply with their international obligations.
    And finally, countries under investigation for violating nuclear 
nonproliferation obligations are currently allowed to serve on the IAEA 
Board of Governors. For instance, Iran, a country suspected of 
maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons program, recently completed a 
2-year term on the Board. Allowing potential violators to serve on the 
Board creates an unacceptable barrier to effective action. No state 
under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to 
serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee. 
And any state currently on the Board that comes under investigation 
should be suspended from the Board. The integrity and mission of the 
IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules 
should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules.
    As we move forward to address these challenges, we will consult with 
our friends and allies on all these new measures. We will listen to 
their ideas. Together, we will defend the safety of all nations and 
preserve the peace of the world.
    Over the last 2 years, a great coalition has come together to defeat 
terrorism and to oppose the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the 
inseparable commitments of the war on terror. We've shown that 
proliferators can be discovered and can be stopped. We've shown that for 
regimes that choose defiance, there are serious consequences. The way 
ahead is not easy, but it is clear. We will proceed as if the lives of 
our citizens depend on our vigilance, because they do. Terrorists and 
terror states are in a race for weapons of mass murder, a race they must 
lose. Terrorists are resourceful. We're more resourceful. They're 
determined. We must be more determined. We will never lose focus or 
resolve. We'll be unrelenting in the defense of free nations and rise to 
the hard demands of dangerous times.
    May God bless you all.

Note: The President spoke at 2:30 p.m. at Fort Lesley J. McNair. In his 
remarks, he referred to Lt. Gen. Michael Dunn, USAF, president, National 
Defense University; former Secretary of State George Shultz, and his 
wife, Charlotte; President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan; and Col. 
Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi, leader of Libya. The Office of the Press 
Secretary also released a Spanish language transcript of these remarks.

[[Page 221]]