    [Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 40, Number 7 (Monday, February 16, 2004)]
    [Pages 216-221]
    [Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <R04>
    Remarks at the National Defense University

    February 11, 2004

        Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm honored to visit the National
    Defense University. For nearly a century, the scholars and students here
    have helped to prepare America for the changing threats to our national
    security. Today, the men and women of our National Defense University
    are helping to frame the strategies through which we are fighting and
    winning the war on terror. Your Center for Counterproliferation Research
    and your other institutes and colleges are providing vital insight into
    the dangers of a new era. I want to thank each one of you for devoting
    your talents and your energy to the service of our great Nation.
        I want to thank General Michael Dunn for inviting me here. I used to
    jog by this facility on a regular basis. Then my age kicked in.
    [Laughter] I appreciate Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, from Germany. Mr.
    Ambassador, thank you for being here today. I see my friend George
    Shultz, a distinguished public servant and true patriot, with us.
    George, thank you for coming, and Charlotte, it's good to see you. I'm
    so honored that Dick Lugar is here with us today. Senator, I appreciate
    you taking time and thanks for bringing Senator Saxby Chambliss with you
    as well. I appreciate the veterans who are here and those on active
    duty. Thanks for letting me come by.
        On September the 11th, 2001, America and the world witnessed a new
    kind of war. We saw the great harm that a stateless network could
    inflict upon our country, killers armed with box cutters, mace, and 19
    airline tickets. Those attacks also raised the prospect of even worse
    dangers, of other weapons in the hands of other men. The greatest threat
    before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack
    with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.
        In the past, enemies of America required massed armies and great
    navies, powerful air forces to put our Nation, our people, our friends
    at risk. In the cold war, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of
    mass destruction but believed that deterrents made those weapons a last
    resort. What has changed in the 21st century is that in the hands of
    terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort, the
    preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder.
    These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and
    transport. Armed with a single vial of a biological agent or a single
    nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics or failing states could gain
    the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace.
        America and the entire civilized world will face this threat for
    decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes and
    unbending purpose. I have made clear to all the policy of this Nation:
    America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us
    with the world's most deadly weapons.
        Meeting this duty has required changes in thinking and strategy.
    Doctrines designed to contain empires, deter aggressive states, and
    defeat massed armies cannot fully protect us from this new threat.
    America faces the possibility of catastrophic attack from ballistic
    missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction, so that is why we are
    developing and deploying missile defenses to guard our people. The best
    intelligence is necessary to win the war on terror and to stop
    proliferation, so that is why I have established a commission that will
    examine our intelligence capabilities and recommend ways to improve and
    adapt them to detect new and emerging threats.
        We're determined to confront those threats at the source. We will
    stop these weapons from being acquired or built. We'll block them from
    being transferred. We'll prevent them from ever being used.
        One source of these weapons is dangerous and secretive regimes that
    build weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and
    force their influence upon the

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    world. These nations pose different challenges; they require different
    strategies.
        The former dictator of Iraq possessed and used weapons of mass
    destruction against his own people. For 12 years, he defied the will of
    the international community. He refused to disarm or account for his
    illegal weapons and programs. He doubted our resolve to enforce our
    word, and now he sits in a prison cell, while his country moves toward a
    democratic future.
        To Iraq's east, the Government of Iran is unwilling to abandon a
    uranium enrichment program capable of producing material for nuclear
    weapons. The United States is working with our allies and the
    International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran meets its
    commitments and does not develop nuclear weapons.
        In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-
    range ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons,
    and now threatens to build more. Together with our partners in Asia,
    America is insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and
    irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.
        America has consistently brought these threats to the attention of
    international organizations. We're using every means of diplomacy to
    answer them. As for my part, I will continue to speak clearly on these
    threats. I will continue to call upon the world to confront these
    dangers and to end them.
        In recent years, another path of proliferation has become clear as
    well. America and other nations are learning more about black-market
    operatives who deal in equipment and expertise related to weapons of
    mass destruction. These dealers are motivated by greed or fanaticism or
    both. They find eager customers in outlaw regimes, which pay millions
    for the parts and plans they need to speed up their weapons programs.
    And with deadly technology and expertise on the market, there's the
    terrible possibility that terrorists groups could obtain the ultimate
    weapons they desire most.
        The extent and sophistication of such networks can be seen in the
    case of a man named Abdul Qadeer Khan. This is the story as we know it
    so far.
        A.Q. Khan is known throughout the world as the father of Pakistan's
    nuclear weapons program. What was not publicly known until recently is
    that he also led an extensive international network for the
    proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how. For decades, Mr. Khan
    remained on the Pakistani Government payroll, earning a modest salary.
    Yet, he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through the sale
    of nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from
    North Africa to the Korean Peninsula.
        A.Q. Khan, himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as
    director of the network, its leading scientific mind as well as its
    primary salesman. Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to
    consult with his clients and to sell his expertise. He and his
    associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium as well
    as nuclear designs stolen from the Pakistani Government. The network
    sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can
    transform into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and his
    associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for
    Pakistan's older centrifuges as well as designs for more advanced and
    efficient models. The network also provided these countries with
    components and, in some cases, with complete centrifuges.
        To increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a factory in
    Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts
    were purchased through network operatives based in Europe, in the Middle
    East, and Africa. These procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear
    technologies as a shortcut to personal wealth, and they set up front
    companies to deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly
    controlled materials.
        Khan's deputy, a man named B.S.A. Tahir, ran SMB Computers, a
    business in Dubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the
    proliferation activities of the A.Q. Khan network. Tahir acted as both
    the network's chief financial officer and money launderer. He was also
    its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of
    centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia
    facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs and then
    ordered the facility to ship

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    the components to Dubai. Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other
    European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to
    other customers.
        This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several
    years by American and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence
    services gradually uncovered this network's reach and identified its key
    experts and agents and money men. Operatives followed its transactions,
    mapped the extent of its operations. They monitored the travel of A.Q.
    Khan and senior associates. They shadowed members of the network around
    the world. They recorded their conversations. They penetrated their
    operations. We've uncovered their secrets. This work involved high risk,
    and all Americans can be grateful for the hard work and the dedication
    of our fine intelligence professionals.
        Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the
    Khan network and to put an end to his criminal enterprise. A.Q. Khan has
    confessed his crimes, and his top associates are out of business. The
    Government of Pakistan is interrogating the network's members, learning
    critical details that will help them prevent it from ever operating
    again. President Musharraf has promised to share all the information he
    learns about the Khan network and has assured us that his country will
    never again be a source of proliferation.
        Mr. Tahir is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his
    activities. Malaysian authorities have assured us that the factory the
    network used is no longer producing centrifuge parts. Other members of
    the network remain at large. One by one, they will be found, and their
    careers in the weapons trade will be ended.
        As a result of our penetration of the network, American and the
    British intelligence identified a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts
    manufactured at the Malaysian facility. We followed the shipment of
    these parts to Dubai and watched as they were transferred to the BBC
    China, a German-owned ship. After the ship passed through the Suez
    Canal, bound for Libya, it was stopped by German and Italian
    authorities. They found several containers, each 40 feet in length,
    listed on the ship's manifest as full of used machine parts. In fact,
    these containers were filled with parts of sophisticated centrifuges.
        The interception of the BBC China came as Libyan and British and
    American officials were discussing the possibility of Libya ending its
    WMD programs. The United States and Britain confronted Libyan officials
    with this evidence of an active and illegal nuclear program. About 2
    months ago, Libya's leader voluntarily agreed to end his nuclear and
    chemical weapons programs, not to pursue biological weapons, and to
    permit thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency
    and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We're now
    working in partnership with these organizations and with the United
    Kingdom to help the Government of Libya dismantle those programs and
    eliminate all dangerous materials.
        Colonel Qadhafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer
    once his commitment is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his
    example. Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better
    relations with the United States and other free nations. Continuing to
    seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige but
    only political isolation, economic hardship, and other unwelcomed
    consequences.
        We know that Libya was not the only customer of the Khan network.
    Other countries expressed great interest in their services. These
    regimes and other proliferators like Khan should know: We and our
    friends are determined to protect our people and the world from
    proliferation.
        Breaking this network is one major success in a broadbased effort to
    stop the spread of terrible weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to
    the threats of a new era. America and the nations of Australia, France
    and Germany, Italy and Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
    and the United Kingdom have launched the Proliferation Security
    Initiative to interdict lethal materials in transit. Our nations are
    sharing intelligence information, tracking suspect international cargo,
    conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared to search planes and
    ships, to seize weapons and missiles and equipment that raise
    proliferation concerns, just as we did

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    in stopping the dangerous cargo on the BBC China before it reached
    Libya. Three more governments, Canada and Singapore and Norway, will be
    participating in this initiative. We'll continue to expand the core
    group of PSI countries. And as PSI grows, proliferators will find it
    harder than ever to trade in illicit weapons.
        There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be
    tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into
    action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of
    weapons of mass destruction. These materials and technologies and the
    people who traffic in them cross many borders. To stop this trade, the
    nations of the world must be strong and determined. We must work
    together. We must act effectively.
        Today I announce seven proposals to strengthen the world's efforts
    to stop the spread of deadly weapons. First, I propose that the work of
    the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more than
    shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've developed to fight
    terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation networks. We
    need greater cooperation, not just among intelligence and military
    services but in law enforcement as well. PSI participants and other
    willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to
    justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to
    seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every
    lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers, and the buyers. Our
    message to proliferators must be consistent, and it must be clear: We
    will find you, and we're not going to rest until you are stopped.
        Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and
    international controls that govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall,
    I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to
    criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all
    sensitive materials within their borders. The Security Council should
    pass this proposal quickly. And when they do, America stands ready to
    help other governments to draft and enforce the new laws that will help
    us deal with proliferation.
        Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from the cold
    war and other dangerous materials out of the wrong hands. In 1991,
    Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Senator Lugar had a clear
    vision, along with Senator Nunn, about what to do with the old Soviet
    Union. Under this program, we're helping former Soviet states find
    productive employment for former weapons scientists. We're dismantling,
    destroying, and securing weapons and materials left over from the Soviet
    WMD arsenal. We have more work to do there. And as a result of the G-8
    Summit in 2002, we agreed to provide $20 billion over 10 years, half of
    it from the United States, to support such programs.
        We should expand this cooperation elsewhere in the world. We will
    retain WMD scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya.
    We will help nations end the use of weapons-grade uranium in research
    reactors. I urge more nations to contribute to these efforts. The
    nations of the world must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear
    and chemical and biological and radiological materials.
        As we track and destroy these networks, we must also prevent
    governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The
    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed more than 30 years ago to
    prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states which already
    possessed them. Under this treaty, nuclear states agreed to help non-
    nuclear states develop peaceful atomic energy if they renounced the
    pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the treaty has a loophole which has been
    exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran. These regimes are
    allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs
    under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.
        So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to close the loophole.
    The world must create a safe, orderly system to fuel civilian nuclear
    plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The
    world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have
    reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so
    long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment

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    and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness
    nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
        The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell
    enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that
    does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and
    reprocessing plants. This step will prevent new states from developing
    the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators
    must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the
    material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.
        For international norms to be effective, they must be enforced. It
    is the charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover
    banned nuclear activity around the world and report those violations to
    the U.N. Security Council. We must ensure that the IAEA has all the
    tools it needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America and other
    nations support what is called the Additional Protocol, which requires
    states to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities and
    allow the IAEA to inspect those facilities.
        As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states that have
    signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their
    civilian nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about fighting
    proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol. I've
    submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate. I urge the Senate to
    consent immediately to its ratification.
        We must also ensure that the IAEA is organized to take action when
    action is required. So, a sixth step, I propose the creation of a
    special committee of the IAEA Board which will focus intensively on
    safeguards and verification. This committee, made up of governments in
    good standing with the IAEA, will strengthen the capability of the IAEA
    to ensure that nations comply with their international obligations.
        And finally, countries under investigation for violating nuclear
    nonproliferation obligations are currently allowed to serve on the IAEA
    Board of Governors. For instance, Iran, a country suspected of
    maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons program, recently completed a
    2-year term on the Board. Allowing potential violators to serve on the
    Board creates an unacceptable barrier to effective action. No state
    under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to
    serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee.
    And any state currently on the Board that comes under investigation
    should be suspended from the Board. The integrity and mission of the
    IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules
    should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules.
        As we move forward to address these challenges, we will consult with
    our friends and allies on all these new measures. We will listen to
    their ideas. Together, we will defend the safety of all nations and
    preserve the peace of the world.
        Over the last 2 years, a great coalition has come together to defeat
    terrorism and to oppose the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the
    inseparable commitments of the war on terror. We've shown that
    proliferators can be discovered and can be stopped. We've shown that for
    regimes that choose defiance, there are serious consequences. The way
    ahead is not easy, but it is clear. We will proceed as if the lives of
    our citizens depend on our vigilance, because they do. Terrorists and
    terror states are in a race for weapons of mass murder, a race they must
    lose. Terrorists are resourceful. We're more resourceful. They're
    determined. We must be more determined. We will never lose focus or
    resolve. We'll be unrelenting in the defense of free nations and rise to
    the hard demands of dangerous times.
        May God bless you all.

    Note: The President spoke at 2:30 p.m. at Fort Lesley J. McNair. In his
    remarks, he referred to Lt. Gen. Michael Dunn, USAF, president, National
    Defense University; former Secretary of State George Shultz, and his
    wife, Charlotte; President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan; and Col.
    Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi, leader of Libya. The Office of the Press
    Secretary also released a Spanish language transcript of these remarks.

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