[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 37, Number 18 (Monday, May 7, 2001)]
[Pages 685-688]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Remarks at the National Defense University

May 1, 2001

    Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate you being here. I 
also want to thank Secretary Powell for being here, as well. My National 
Security Adviser, Condi Rice, is here, as well as the Vice Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs, General Myers. I appreciate

[[Page 686]]

Admiral Clark and General Ryan here--for being here, as well. But most 
of all, I want to thank you, Admiral Gaffney, and the students for NDU 
for having me here today.
    For almost 100 years, this campus has served as one of our country's 
premier centers for learning and thinking about America's national 
security. Some of America's finest soldiers have studied here--Dwight 
Eisenhower and Colin Powell. Some of America's finest statesmen have 
taught here--George Kennan.
    Today, you're carrying on this proud tradition forward, continuing 
to train tomorrow's generals, admirals, and other national security 
thinkers, and continuing to provide the intellectual capital for our 
Nation's strategic vision.
    This afternoon I want us to think back some 30 years to a far 
different time in a far different world. The United States and the 
Soviet Union were locked in a hostile rivalry. The Soviet Union was our 
unquestioned enemy, a highly armed threat to freedom and democracy. Far 
more than that wall in Berlin divided us. Our highest ideal was--and 
remains--individual liberty; theirs was the construction of a vast 
Communist empire. Their totalitarian regime held much of Europe captive 
behind an Iron Curtain.
    We didn't trust them, and for good reason. Our deep differences were 
expressed in a dangerous military confrontation that resulted in 
thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other on hair trigger 
alert. Security of both the United States and the Soviet Union was based 
on a grim premise that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each 
other because doing so would mean the end of both nations.
    We even went so far as to codify this relationship in a 1972 ABM 
Treaty, based on the doctrine that our very survival would best be 
ensured by leaving both sides completely open and vulnerable to nuclear 
attack. The threat was real and vivid. The Strategic Air Command had an 
airborne command post called the Looking Glass aloft 24 hours a day, 
ready in case the President ordered our strategic forces to move towards 
their targets and release their nuclear ordnance.
    The Soviet Union had almost 1.5 million troops deep in the heart of 
Europe, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East Germany. We used 
our nuclear weapons not just to prevent the Soviet Union from using 
their nuclear weapons but also to contain their conventional military 
forces, to prevent them from extending the Iron Curtain into parts of 
Europe and Asia that were still free.
    In that world, few other nations had nuclear weapons and most of 
those who did were responsible allies, such as Britain and France. We 
worried about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, 
but it was mostly a distant threat, not yet a reality.
    Today, the Sun comes up on a vastly different world. The Wall is 
gone, and so is the Soviet Union. Today's Russia is not yesterday's 
Soviet Union. Its Government is no longer Communist. Its President is 
elected. Today's Russia is not our enemy but a country in transition 
with an opportunity to emerge as a great nation, democratic, at peace 
with itself and its neighbors. The Iron Curtain no longer exists. 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are free nations, and they are 
now our Allies in NATO, together with a reunited Germany.
    Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less 
predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have 
nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some 
already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow 
them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at 
incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these 
technologies around the world.
    Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of 
the world's least responsible states. Unlike the cold war, today's most 
urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet 
hands but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, 
states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek 
weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep 
the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and 
friends in strategic parts of the world.
    When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world joined forces 
to turn him back. But the international community would have faced a 
very different situation had

[[Page 687]]

Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons. Like Saddam 
Hussein, some of today's tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of 
the United States of America. They hate our friends. They hate our 
values. They hate democracy and freedom and individual liberty. Many 
care little for the lives of their own people. In such a world, cold war 
deterrence is no longer enough.
    To maintain peace, to protect our own citizens and our own allies 
and friends, we must seek security based on more than the grim premise 
that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. This is an important 
opportunity for the world to rethink the unthinkable and to find new 
ways to keep the peace.
    Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active 
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses. We must work 
together with other like-minded nations to deny weapons of terror from 
those seeking to acquire them. We must work with allies and friends who 
wish to join with us to defend against the harm they can inflict. And 
together we must deter anyone who would contemplate their use.
    We need new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and 
defensive forces. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat 
of nuclear retaliation. Defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing 
the incentive for proliferation.
    We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to 
counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, we must move 
beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This Treaty does 
not recognize the present or point us to the future; it enshrines the 
past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that 
prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our 
friends, and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world 
peace.
    This new framework must encourage still further cuts in nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security 
and that of our allies. We can and will change the size, the 
composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects 
the reality that the cold war is over.
    I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest 
possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security 
needs, including our obligations to our allies. My goal is to move 
quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example 
to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world.
    Several months ago, I asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to examine 
all available technologies and basing modes for effective missile 
defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, our 
friends, and our allies. The Secretary has explored a number of 
complementary and innovative approaches.
    The Secretary has identified near-term options that could allow us 
to deploy an initial capability against limited threats. In some cases, 
we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land-
based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in midcourse or 
after they reenter the atmosphere. We also recognize the substantial 
advantages of intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in 
the boost phase.
    The preliminary work has produced some promising options for 
advanced sensors and interceptors that may provide this capability. If 
based at sea or on aircraft, such approaches could provide limited but 
effective defenses.
    We have more work to do to determine the final form the defenses 
might take. We will explore all these options further. We recognize the 
technological difficulties we face and we look forward to the challenge. 
Our Nation will assign the best people to this critical task. We will 
evaluate what works and what does not. We know that some approaches will 
not work. We also know that we will be able to build on our successes. 
When ready, and working with Congress, we will deploy missile defenses 
to strengthen global security and stability.
    I've made it clear from the very beginning that I would consult 
closely on any important subject with our friends and allies who are 
also threatened by missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Today I'm 
announcing the dispatch of high level representatives to allied capitals 
in Europe, Asia, Australia, and Canada to discuss our common 
responsibility to create a new framework for security and stability that 
reflects the world of today. They will begin leaving next week.

[[Page 688]]

    The delegations will be headed by three men on this stage: Rich 
Armitage, Paul Wolfowitz, and Steve Hadley; Deputies of the State 
Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security staff. 
Their trips will be part of an ongoing process of consultation involving 
many people and many levels of government, including my Cabinet 
Secretaries.
    These will be real consultations. We are not presenting our friends 
and allies with unilateral decisions already made. We look forward to 
hearing their views, the views of our friends, and to take them into 
account.
    We will seek their input on all the issues surrounding the new 
strategic environment. We'll also need to reach out to other interested 
states, including China and Russia. Russia and the United States should 
work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security 
in the 21st century. We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM 
Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual 
vulnerability. This Treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in 
technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all 
options for defending against the threats that face us, our allies, and 
other countries.
    That's why we should work together to replace this Treaty with a new 
framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past and 
especially from the adversarial legacy of the cold war. This new 
cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to the past. It 
should be reassuring rather than threatening. It should be premised on 
openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for cooperation, 
including the area of missile defense. It should allow us to share 
information so that each nation can improve its early warning capability 
and its capability to defend its people and territory. And perhaps one 
day, we can even cooperate in a joint defense.
    I want to complete the work of changing our relationship from one 
based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common 
responsibilities and common interests. We may have areas of difference 
with Russia, but we are not and must not be strategic adversaries. 
Russia and America both face new threats to security. Together, we can 
address today's threats and pursue today's opportunities. We can explore 
technologies that have the potential to make us all safer.
    This is a time for vision, a time for a new way of thinking, a time 
for bold leadership. The Looking Glass no longer stands its 24-a-hour-
day vigil. We must all look at the world in a new, realistic way to 
preserve peace for generations to come.
    God bless.

Note: The President spoke at 2:40 p.m. outside Eisenhower Hall at Fort 
McNair. In his remarks, he referred to Vice Adm. Paul G. Gaffney II, 
USN, president, National Defense University; and President Saddam 
Hussein of Iraq.