[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 36, Number 35 (Monday, September 4, 2000)]
[Pages 1988-1993]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Remarks at Georgetown University

September 1, 2000

    Thank you very much. When you gave us such a warm welcome and then 
you applauded some of Dean Gallucci's early lines, I thought to myself, 
``I'm glad he can get this sort of reception, because I gave him a lot 
of thankless jobs to do in our administration where no one ever 
applauded.'' And he did them brilliantly. I'm delighted to see him here 
succeeding so well as the dean. And Provost Brown, thank you for 
welcoming me here.
    I told them when I came in I was sort of glad Father O'Donovan 
wasn't here today, because I come so often, I know that at some point, 
if I keep doing this, he will tell me that he's going to send a bill to 
the U.S. Treasury for the Georgetown endowment. [Laughter]
    I was thinking when we came out here and Bob talked about the 
beginning of the school year that it was 35 years ago when, as a 
sophomore, I was in charge of the freshman orientation. So I thought I 
should come and help this year's orientation of freshmen get off to a 
good start. I also was thinking, I confess, after your rousing welcome, 
that if I were still a candidate for public office, I might get up and 
say hello and sit down and quit while I'm ahead. [Laughter]

[[Page 1989]]

    For I came today to talk about a subject that is not fraught with 
applause lines but one that is very, very important to your future: the 
defense of our Nation. At this moment of unprecedented peace and 
prosperity, with no immediate threat to our security or our existence, 
with our democratic values ascendant and our alliances strong, with the 
great forces of our time, globalization and the revolution in 
information technology, so clearly beneficial to a society like ours 
with our diversity and our openness and our entrepreneurial spirit, at a 
time like this, it is tempting but wrong to believe there are no serious 
long-term challenges to our security. The rapid spread of technology 
across increasingly porous borders raises the specter that more and more 
states, terrorists, and criminal syndicates could gain access to 
chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons and to the means of 
delivering them, whether in small units deployed by terrorists within 
our midst or ballistic missiles capable of hurtling those weapons 
halfway around the world.
    Today I want to discuss these threats with you, because you will 
live with them a lot longer than I will. Especially, I want to talk 
about the ballistic missile threat. It is real and growing and has given 
new urgency to the debate about national missile defenses, known in the 
popular jargon as NMD.
    When I became President, I put our effort to stop the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction at the very top of our national security 
agenda. Since then, we have carried out a comprehensive strategy to 
reduce and secure nuclear arsenals, to strengthen the international 
regime against biological and chemical weapons and nuclear testing, and 
to stop the flow of dangerous technology to nations that might wish us 
harm.
    At the same time, we have pursued new technologies that could 
strengthen our defenses against a possible attack, including a terrorist 
attack here at home.
    None of these elements of our national security strategy can be 
pursued in isolation. Each is important, and we have made progress in 
each area. For example, Russia and the United States already have 
destroyed about 25,000 nuclear weapons in the last decade. And we have 
agreed that in a START III treaty, we will go 80 percent below the level 
of a decade ago.
    In 1994, we persuaded Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, three of the 
former Soviet Republics, to give up their nuclear weapons entirely. We 
have worked with Russia and its neighbors to dispose of hundreds of tons 
of dangerous nuclear materials, to strengthen controls on illicit 
exports, and to keep weapon scientists from selling their services to 
the highest bidder.
    We extended the nuclear nonproliferation treaty indefinitely. We 
were the very first nation to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an 
idea first embraced by Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower. Sixty nations 
now have ratified the test ban treaty. I believe the United States 
Senate made a serious error in failing to ratify it last year, and I 
hope it will do so next year.
    We also negotiated and ratified the international convention to ban 
chemical weapons and strengthened the convention against biological 
weapons. We've used our export controls to deny terrorists and potential 
adversaries access to materials and equipment needed to build these 
kinds of weapons.
    We've imposed sanctions on those who contribute to foreign chemical 
and biological weapons programs. We've invested in new equipment and 
medical countermeasures to protect people from exposure. And we're 
working with State and local medical units all over our country to 
strengthen our preparedness in case of a chemical or biological 
terrorist attack, which many people believe is the most likely new 
security threat of the 21st century.
    We have also acted to reduce the threat posed by states that have 
sought weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, while 
pursuing activities that are clearly hostile to our long-term interests. 
For over a decade--for almost a decade, excuse me--we have diverted 
about 90 percent of Iraq's oil revenues from the production of weapons 
to the purchase of food and medicine. This is an important statistic for 
those who believe that our sanctions are only a negative for the people, 
and particularly the children, of Iraq. In 1989, Iraq earned $15 billion 
from oil exports and spent $13 billion of that money on its military. 
This year Iraq is projected to earn

[[Page 1990]]

$19 billion from its legal oil-for-food exports but can spend none of 
those revenues on the military.
    We worked to counter Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and 
missile technology, convincing China to provide no new assistance to 
Iran's nuclear program, and pressing Russia to strengthen its controls 
on the export of sensitive technologies.
    In 1994, 6 years after the United States first learned that North 
Korea had a nuclear weapons program, we negotiated the agreement that 
verifiably has frozen its production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. 
Now, in the context of the United States negotiations with the North, of 
the diplomatic efforts by former Defense Secretary Bill Perry, and most 
lately, the summit between the leaders of North and South Korea, North 
Korea has refrained from flight testing a new missile that could pose a 
threat to America. We should be clear: North Korea's capability remains 
a serious issue, and its intentions remain unclear. But its missile 
testing moratorium is a good development worth pursuing.
    These diplomatic efforts to meet the threat of proliferation are 
backed by the strong and global reach of our Armed Forces. Today, the 
United States enjoys overwhelming military superiority over any 
potential adversary. For example, in 1985 we spent about as much on 
defense as Russia, China, and North Korea combined. Today, we spend 
nearly 3 times as much, nearly $300 billion a year. And our military 
technology clearly is well ahead of the rest of the world.
    The principle of deterrence served us very well in the cold war, and 
deterrence remains imperative. The threat of overwhelming retaliation 
deterred Saddam Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction during 
the Gulf war. Our forces in South Korea have deterred North Korea in 
aggression for 47 years.
    The question is, can deterrence protect us against all those who 
might wish us harm in the future? Can we make America even more secure? 
The effort to answer these questions is the impetus behind the search 
for NMD. The issue is whether we can do more, not to meet today's threat 
but to meet tomorrow's threats to our security.
    For example, there is the possibility that a hostile state with 
nuclear weapons and long-range missiles may simply disintegrate, with 
command over missiles falling into unstable hands, or that in a moment 
of desperation, such a country might miscalculate, believing it could 
use nuclear weapons to intimidate us from defending our vital interests 
or from coming to the aid of our allies or others who are defenseless 
and clearly in need. In the future, we cannot rule out that terrorist 
groups could gain the capability to strike us with nuclear weapons if 
they seized even temporary control of a state with an existing nuclear 
weapons establishment.
    Now, no one suggests that NMD would ever substitute for diplomacy or 
for deterrence. But such a system, if it worked properly, could give us 
an extra dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has 
complicated the task of preserving the peace. Therefore, I believe we 
have an obligation to determine the feasibility, the effectiveness, and 
the impact of a national missile defense on the overall security of the 
United States.
    The system now under development is designed to work as follows. In 
the event of an attack, American satellites would detect the launch of 
missiles. Our radar would track the enemy warheads, and highly accurate, 
high-speed ground-based interceptors would destroy them before they 
could reach their targets in the United States.
    We have made substantial progress on a system that would be based in 
Alaska and that, when operational, could protect all 50 States from the 
near-term missile threats we face, those emanating from North Korea and 
the Middle East. The system could be deployed sooner than any of the 
proposed alternatives. Since last fall, we've been conducting flight 
tests to see if this NMD system actually can reliably intercept a 
ballistic missile. We've begun to show that the different parts of this 
system can work together.
    Our Defense Department has overcome daunting technical obstacles in 
a remarkably short period of time, and I'm proud of the work that 
Secretary Cohen, General Shelton, and their teams have done.
    One test proved that it is, in fact, possible to hit a bullet with a 
bullet. Still, though the

[[Page 1991]]

technology for NMD is promising, the system as a whole is not yet 
proven. After the initial test succeeded, our two most recent tests 
failed, for different reasons, to achieve an intercept. Several more 
tests are planned. They will tell us whether NMD can work reliably under 
realistic conditions. Critical elements of the program, such as the 
booster rocket for the missile interceptor, have yet to be tested. There 
are also questions to be resolved about the ability of the system to 
deal with countermeasures. In other words, measures by those firing the 
missiles to confuse the missile defense into thinking it is hitting a 
target when it is not.
    There is a reasonable chance that all these challenges can be met in 
time. But I simply cannot conclude with the information I have today 
that we have enough confidence in the technology and the operational 
effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward to deployment. 
Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national 
missile defense at this time. Instead, I have asked Secretary Cohen to 
continue a robust program of development and testing. That effort still 
is at an early stage. Only 3 of the 19 planned intercept tests have been 
held so far. We need more tests against more challenging targets and 
more simulations before we can responsibly commit our Nation's resources 
to deployment.
    We should use this time to ensure that NMD, if deployed, would 
actually enhance our overall national security. And I want to talk about 
that in a few moments.
    I want you to know that I have reached this decision about not 
deploying the NMD after careful deliberation. My decision will not have 
a significant impact on the date the overall system could be deployed in 
the next administration, if the next President decides to go forward. 
The best judgment of the experts who have examined this question is that 
if we were to commit today to construct the system, it most likely would 
be operational about 2006 or 2007. If the next President decides to move 
forward next year, the system still could be ready in the same 
timeframe.
    In the meantime, we will continue to work with our allies and with 
Russia to strengthen their understanding and support for our efforts to 
meet the emerging ballistic missile threat and to explore creative ways 
that we can cooperate to enhance their security against this threat as 
well.
    An effective NMD could play an important part of our national 
security strategy, but it could not be the sum total of that strategy. 
It can never be the sum total of that strategy for dealing with nuclear 
and missile threats. Moreover, ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear 
weapons, as I said earlier, do not represent the sum total of the 
threats we face. Those include chemical and biological weapons and a 
range of deadly technologies for deploying them. So it would be folly to 
base the defense of our Nation solely on a strategy of waiting until 
missiles are in the air and then trying to shoot them down.
    We must work with our allies and with Russia to prevent potential 
adversaries from ever threatening us with nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons of mass destruction in the first place, and to make 
sure they know the devastating consequences of doing so. The elements of 
our strategy cannot be allowed to undermine one another. They must 
reinforce one another and contribute to our national defense in all its 
dimensions. That includes the profoundly important dimension of arms 
control.
    Over the past 30 years, Republican and Democratic Presidents alike 
have negotiated an array of arms control treaties with Russia. We and 
our allies have relied on these treaties to ensure strategic stability 
and predictability with Russia, to get on with the job of dismantling 
the legacy of the cold war, and to further the transition from 
confrontation to cooperation with our former adversary in the most 
important arena, nuclear weapons.
    A key part of the international security structure we have built 
with Russia and, therefore, a key part of our national security, is the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by President Nixon in 1972. The ABM 
Treaty limits antimissile defenses according to a simple principle: 
neither side should deploy defenses that would undermine the other 
side's nuclear deterrent and thus tempt the other side to strike first 
in a crisis or to take countermeasures that would make both our 
countries less secure.

[[Page 1992]]

    Strategic stability, based on mutual deterrence, is still important, 
despite the end of the cold war. Why? Because the United States and 
Russia still have nuclear arsenals that can devastate each other. And 
this is still a period of transition in our relationship.
    We have worked together in many ways: signed an agreement of 
cooperation between Russia and NATO, served with Russian troops in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. But while we are no longer adversaries, we are not 
yet real allies. Therefore, for them as well as for us, maintaining 
strategic stability increases trust and confidence on both sides. It 
reduces the risk of confrontation. It makes it possible to build an even 
better partnership and an even safer world.
    Now, here's the issue. NMD, if deployed, would require us either to 
adjust the treaty or to withdraw from it, not because NMD poses a 
challenge to the strategic stability I just discussed but because by its 
very words, NMD prohibits any national missile defense.
    What we should want is to both explore the most effective defenses 
possible, not only for ourselves but for all other law-abiding states, 
and to maintain our strategic stability with Russia. Thus far, Russia 
has been reluctant to agree, fearing, I think, frankly, that in some 
sense, this system, or some future incarnation of it, could threaten the 
reliability of its deterrence and, therefore, strategic stability.
    Nevertheless, at our summit in Moscow in June, President Putin and I 
did agree that the world has changed since the ABM treaty was signed 28 
years ago, and that the proliferation of missile technology has resulted 
in new threats that may require amending that treaty. And again I say, 
these threats are not threats to the United States alone.
    Russia agrees that there is an emerging missile threat. In fact, 
given its place on the map, it is particularly vulnerable to this 
emerging threat. In time, I hope the United States can narrow our 
differences with Russia on this issue. The course I have chosen today 
gives the United States more time to pursue that, and we will use it.
    President Putin and I have agreed to intensify our work on strategic 
defense while pursuing, in parallel, deeper arms reductions in START 
III. He and I have instructed our experts to develop further cooperative 
initiatives in areas such as theater missile defense, early warning, and 
missile threat discussions for our meeting just next week in New York.
    Apart from the Russians, another critical diplomatic consideration 
in the NMD decision is the view of our NATO Allies. They have all made 
clear that they hope the United States will pursue strategic defense in 
a way that preserves, not abrogates, the ABM Treaty. If we decide to 
proceed with NMD deployment we must have their support, because key 
components of NMD would be based on their territories. The decision I 
have made also gives the United States time to answer our allies' 
questions and consult further on the path ahead.
    Finally, we must consider the impact of a decision to deploy on 
security in Asia. As the next President makes a deployment decision, he 
will need to avoid stimulating an already dangerous regional nuclear 
capability from China to South Asia. Now, let me be clear. No nation can 
ever have a veto over American security, even if the United States and 
Russia cannot reach agreement, even if we cannot secure the support of 
our allies at first, even if we conclude that the Chinese will respond 
to NMD by increasing their arsenal of nuclear weapons substantially, 
with a corollary inevitable impact in India and then in Pakistan.
    The next President may nevertheless decide that our interest in 
security in 21st century dictates that we go forward with deployment of 
NMD. But we can never afford to overlook the fact that the actions and 
reactions of others in this increasingly interdependent world do bear on 
our security. Clearly, therefore, it would be far better to move forward 
in the context of the ABM Treaty and allied support. Our efforts to make 
that possible have not been completed.
    For me, the bottom line on this decision is this: Because the 
emerging missile threat is real, we have an obligation to pursue a 
missile defense system that could enhance our security. We have made 
progress, but we should not move forward until we have absolute 
confidence that the system will work, and until we have made every 
reasonable diplomatic effort to minimize the cost of deployment and 
maximize the benefit, as I said,

[[Page 1993]]

not only to America's security but to the security of law-abiding 
nations everywhere subject to the same threat.
    I am convinced that America and the world will be better off if we 
explore the frontiers of strategic defenses, while continuing to pursue 
arms control, to stand with our allies, and to work with Russia and 
others to stop the spread of deadly weapons. I strongly believe this is 
the best course for the United States, and therefore the decision I have 
reached today is in the best security interest of the United States. In 
short, we need to move forward with realism, with steadiness, and with 
prudence, not dismissing the threat we face or assuming we can meet it 
while ignoring our overall strategic environment, including the 
interests and concerns of our allies, friends, and other nations. A 
national missile defense, if deployed, should be part of a larger 
strategy to preserve and enhance the peace, strength, and security we 
now enjoy and to build an even safer world.
    I have tried to maximize the ability of the next President to pursue 
that strategy. In so doing, I have tried to maximize the chance that all 
you young students will live in a safer, more humane, more positively 
interdependent world. I hope I have done so. I believe I have.
    Thank you very much.

 Note:  The President spoke at 11:23 a.m. in Gaston Hall. In his 
remarks, he referred to School of Foreign Service Dean Bob Gallucci, 
Provost Dorothy Brown, and President Leo J. O'Donovan, Georgetown 
University; President Saddam Hussein of Iraq; and President Vladimir 
Putin of Russia.