    [Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 36, Number 35 (Monday, September 4, 2000)]
    [Pages 1988-1993]
    [Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <R04>
    Remarks at Georgetown University

    September 1, 2000

        Thank you very much. When you gave us such a warm welcome and then
    you applauded some of Dean Gallucci's early lines, I thought to myself,
    ``I'm glad he can get this sort of reception, because I gave him a lot
    of thankless jobs to do in our administration where no one ever
    applauded.'' And he did them brilliantly. I'm delighted to see him here
    succeeding so well as the dean. And Provost Brown, thank you for
    welcoming me here.
        I told them when I came in I was sort of glad Father O'Donovan
    wasn't here today, because I come so often, I know that at some point,
    if I keep doing this, he will tell me that he's going to send a bill to
    the U.S. Treasury for the Georgetown endowment. [Laughter]
        I was thinking when we came out here and Bob talked about the
    beginning of the school year that it was 35 years ago when, as a
    sophomore, I was in charge of the freshman orientation. So I thought I
    should come and help this year's orientation of freshmen get off to a
    good start. I also was thinking, I confess, after your rousing welcome,
    that if I were still a candidate for public office, I might get up and
    say hello and sit down and quit while I'm ahead. [Laughter]

    [[Page 1989]]

        For I came today to talk about a subject that is not fraught with
    applause lines but one that is very, very important to your future: the
    defense of our Nation. At this moment of unprecedented peace and
    prosperity, with no immediate threat to our security or our existence,
    with our democratic values ascendant and our alliances strong, with the
    great forces of our time, globalization and the revolution in
    information technology, so clearly beneficial to a society like ours
    with our diversity and our openness and our entrepreneurial spirit, at a
    time like this, it is tempting but wrong to believe there are no serious
    long-term challenges to our security. The rapid spread of technology
    across increasingly porous borders raises the specter that more and more
    states, terrorists, and criminal syndicates could gain access to
    chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons and to the means of
    delivering them, whether in small units deployed by terrorists within
    our midst or ballistic missiles capable of hurtling those weapons
    halfway around the world.
        Today I want to discuss these threats with you, because you will
    live with them a lot longer than I will. Especially, I want to talk
    about the ballistic missile threat. It is real and growing and has given
    new urgency to the debate about national missile defenses, known in the
    popular jargon as NMD.
        When I became President, I put our effort to stop the proliferation
    of weapons of mass destruction at the very top of our national security
    agenda. Since then, we have carried out a comprehensive strategy to
    reduce and secure nuclear arsenals, to strengthen the international
    regime against biological and chemical weapons and nuclear testing, and
    to stop the flow of dangerous technology to nations that might wish us
    harm.
        At the same time, we have pursued new technologies that could
    strengthen our defenses against a possible attack, including a terrorist
    attack here at home.
        None of these elements of our national security strategy can be
    pursued in isolation. Each is important, and we have made progress in
    each area. For example, Russia and the United States already have
    destroyed about 25,000 nuclear weapons in the last decade. And we have
    agreed that in a START III treaty, we will go 80 percent below the level
    of a decade ago.
        In 1994, we persuaded Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, three of the
    former Soviet Republics, to give up their nuclear weapons entirely. We
    have worked with Russia and its neighbors to dispose of hundreds of tons
    of dangerous nuclear materials, to strengthen controls on illicit
    exports, and to keep weapon scientists from selling their services to
    the highest bidder.
        We extended the nuclear nonproliferation treaty indefinitely. We
    were the very first nation to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an
    idea first embraced by Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower. Sixty nations
    now have ratified the test ban treaty. I believe the United States
    Senate made a serious error in failing to ratify it last year, and I
    hope it will do so next year.
        We also negotiated and ratified the international convention to ban
    chemical weapons and strengthened the convention against biological
    weapons. We've used our export controls to deny terrorists and potential
    adversaries access to materials and equipment needed to build these
    kinds of weapons.
        We've imposed sanctions on those who contribute to foreign chemical
    and biological weapons programs. We've invested in new equipment and
    medical countermeasures to protect people from exposure. And we're
    working with State and local medical units all over our country to
    strengthen our preparedness in case of a chemical or biological
    terrorist attack, which many people believe is the most likely new
    security threat of the 21st century.
        We have also acted to reduce the threat posed by states that have
    sought weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, while
    pursuing activities that are clearly hostile to our long-term interests.
    For over a decade--for almost a decade, excuse me--we have diverted
    about 90 percent of Iraq's oil revenues from the production of weapons
    to the purchase of food and medicine. This is an important statistic for
    those who believe that our sanctions are only a negative for the people,
    and particularly the children, of Iraq. In 1989, Iraq earned $15 billion
    from oil exports and spent $13 billion of that money on its military.
    This year Iraq is projected to earn

    [[Page 1990]]

    $19 billion from its legal oil-for-food exports but can spend none of
    those revenues on the military.
        We worked to counter Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and
    missile technology, convincing China to provide no new assistance to
    Iran's nuclear program, and pressing Russia to strengthen its controls
    on the export of sensitive technologies.
        In 1994, 6 years after the United States first learned that North
    Korea had a nuclear weapons program, we negotiated the agreement that
    verifiably has frozen its production of plutonium for nuclear weapons.
    Now, in the context of the United States negotiations with the North, of
    the diplomatic efforts by former Defense Secretary Bill Perry, and most
    lately, the summit between the leaders of North and South Korea, North
    Korea has refrained from flight testing a new missile that could pose a
    threat to America. We should be clear: North Korea's capability remains
    a serious issue, and its intentions remain unclear. But its missile
    testing moratorium is a good development worth pursuing.
        These diplomatic efforts to meet the threat of proliferation are
    backed by the strong and global reach of our Armed Forces. Today, the
    United States enjoys overwhelming military superiority over any
    potential adversary. For example, in 1985 we spent about as much on
    defense as Russia, China, and North Korea combined. Today, we spend
    nearly 3 times as much, nearly $300 billion a year. And our military
    technology clearly is well ahead of the rest of the world.
        The principle of deterrence served us very well in the cold war, and
    deterrence remains imperative. The threat of overwhelming retaliation
    deterred Saddam Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction during
    the Gulf war. Our forces in South Korea have deterred North Korea in
    aggression for 47 years.
        The question is, can deterrence protect us against all those who
    might wish us harm in the future? Can we make America even more secure?
    The effort to answer these questions is the impetus behind the search
    for NMD. The issue is whether we can do more, not to meet today's threat
    but to meet tomorrow's threats to our security.
        For example, there is the possibility that a hostile state with
    nuclear weapons and long-range missiles may simply disintegrate, with
    command over missiles falling into unstable hands, or that in a moment
    of desperation, such a country might miscalculate, believing it could
    use nuclear weapons to intimidate us from defending our vital interests
    or from coming to the aid of our allies or others who are defenseless
    and clearly in need. In the future, we cannot rule out that terrorist
    groups could gain the capability to strike us with nuclear weapons if
    they seized even temporary control of a state with an existing nuclear
    weapons establishment.
        Now, no one suggests that NMD would ever substitute for diplomacy or
    for deterrence. But such a system, if it worked properly, could give us
    an extra dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has
    complicated the task of preserving the peace. Therefore, I believe we
    have an obligation to determine the feasibility, the effectiveness, and
    the impact of a national missile defense on the overall security of the
    United States.
        The system now under development is designed to work as follows. In
    the event of an attack, American satellites would detect the launch of
    missiles. Our radar would track the enemy warheads, and highly accurate,
    high-speed ground-based interceptors would destroy them before they
    could reach their targets in the United States.
        We have made substantial progress on a system that would be based in
    Alaska and that, when operational, could protect all 50 States from the
    near-term missile threats we face, those emanating from North Korea and
    the Middle East. The system could be deployed sooner than any of the
    proposed alternatives. Since last fall, we've been conducting flight
    tests to see if this NMD system actually can reliably intercept a
    ballistic missile. We've begun to show that the different parts of this
    system can work together.
        Our Defense Department has overcome daunting technical obstacles in
    a remarkably short period of time, and I'm proud of the work that
    Secretary Cohen, General Shelton, and their teams have done.
        One test proved that it is, in fact, possible to hit a bullet with a
    bullet. Still, though the

    [[Page 1991]]

    technology for NMD is promising, the system as a whole is not yet
    proven. After the initial test succeeded, our two most recent tests
    failed, for different reasons, to achieve an intercept. Several more
    tests are planned. They will tell us whether NMD can work reliably under
    realistic conditions. Critical elements of the program, such as the
    booster rocket for the missile interceptor, have yet to be tested. There
    are also questions to be resolved about the ability of the system to
    deal with countermeasures. In other words, measures by those firing the
    missiles to confuse the missile defense into thinking it is hitting a
    target when it is not.
        There is a reasonable chance that all these challenges can be met in
    time. But I simply cannot conclude with the information I have today
    that we have enough confidence in the technology and the operational
    effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward to deployment.
    Therefore, I have decided not to authorize deployment of a national
    missile defense at this time. Instead, I have asked Secretary Cohen to
    continue a robust program of development and testing. That effort still
    is at an early stage. Only 3 of the 19 planned intercept tests have been
    held so far. We need more tests against more challenging targets and
    more simulations before we can responsibly commit our Nation's resources
    to deployment.
        We should use this time to ensure that NMD, if deployed, would
    actually enhance our overall national security. And I want to talk about
    that in a few moments.
        I want you to know that I have reached this decision about not
    deploying the NMD after careful deliberation. My decision will not have
    a significant impact on the date the overall system could be deployed in
    the next administration, if the next President decides to go forward.
    The best judgment of the experts who have examined this question is that
    if we were to commit today to construct the system, it most likely would
    be operational about 2006 or 2007. If the next President decides to move
    forward next year, the system still could be ready in the same
    timeframe.
        In the meantime, we will continue to work with our allies and with
    Russia to strengthen their understanding and support for our efforts to
    meet the emerging ballistic missile threat and to explore creative ways
    that we can cooperate to enhance their security against this threat as
    well.
        An effective NMD could play an important part of our national
    security strategy, but it could not be the sum total of that strategy.
    It can never be the sum total of that strategy for dealing with nuclear
    and missile threats. Moreover, ballistic missiles, armed with nuclear
    weapons, as I said earlier, do not represent the sum total of the
    threats we face. Those include chemical and biological weapons and a
    range of deadly technologies for deploying them. So it would be folly to
    base the defense of our Nation solely on a strategy of waiting until
    missiles are in the air and then trying to shoot them down.
        We must work with our allies and with Russia to prevent potential
    adversaries from ever threatening us with nuclear, chemical, and
    biological weapons of mass destruction in the first place, and to make
    sure they know the devastating consequences of doing so. The elements of
    our strategy cannot be allowed to undermine one another. They must
    reinforce one another and contribute to our national defense in all its
    dimensions. That includes the profoundly important dimension of arms
    control.
        Over the past 30 years, Republican and Democratic Presidents alike
    have negotiated an array of arms control treaties with Russia. We and
    our allies have relied on these treaties to ensure strategic stability
    and predictability with Russia, to get on with the job of dismantling
    the legacy of the cold war, and to further the transition from
    confrontation to cooperation with our former adversary in the most
    important arena, nuclear weapons.
        A key part of the international security structure we have built
    with Russia and, therefore, a key part of our national security, is the
    Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by President Nixon in 1972. The ABM
    Treaty limits antimissile defenses according to a simple principle:
    neither side should deploy defenses that would undermine the other
    side's nuclear deterrent and thus tempt the other side to strike first
    in a crisis or to take countermeasures that would make both our
    countries less secure.

    [[Page 1992]]

        Strategic stability, based on mutual deterrence, is still important,
    despite the end of the cold war. Why? Because the United States and
    Russia still have nuclear arsenals that can devastate each other. And
    this is still a period of transition in our relationship.
        We have worked together in many ways: signed an agreement of
    cooperation between Russia and NATO, served with Russian troops in
    Bosnia and Kosovo. But while we are no longer adversaries, we are not
    yet real allies. Therefore, for them as well as for us, maintaining
    strategic stability increases trust and confidence on both sides. It
    reduces the risk of confrontation. It makes it possible to build an even
    better partnership and an even safer world.
        Now, here's the issue. NMD, if deployed, would require us either to
    adjust the treaty or to withdraw from it, not because NMD poses a
    challenge to the strategic stability I just discussed but because by its
    very words, NMD prohibits any national missile defense.
        What we should want is to both explore the most effective defenses
    possible, not only for ourselves but for all other law-abiding states,
    and to maintain our strategic stability with Russia. Thus far, Russia
    has been reluctant to agree, fearing, I think, frankly, that in some
    sense, this system, or some future incarnation of it, could threaten the
    reliability of its deterrence and, therefore, strategic stability.
        Nevertheless, at our summit in Moscow in June, President Putin and I
    did agree that the world has changed since the ABM treaty was signed 28
    years ago, and that the proliferation of missile technology has resulted
    in new threats that may require amending that treaty. And again I say,
    these threats are not threats to the United States alone.
        Russia agrees that there is an emerging missile threat. In fact,
    given its place on the map, it is particularly vulnerable to this
    emerging threat. In time, I hope the United States can narrow our
    differences with Russia on this issue. The course I have chosen today
    gives the United States more time to pursue that, and we will use it.
        President Putin and I have agreed to intensify our work on strategic
    defense while pursuing, in parallel, deeper arms reductions in START
    III. He and I have instructed our experts to develop further cooperative
    initiatives in areas such as theater missile defense, early warning, and
    missile threat discussions for our meeting just next week in New York.
        Apart from the Russians, another critical diplomatic consideration
    in the NMD decision is the view of our NATO Allies. They have all made
    clear that they hope the United States will pursue strategic defense in
    a way that preserves, not abrogates, the ABM Treaty. If we decide to
    proceed with NMD deployment we must have their support, because key
    components of NMD would be based on their territories. The decision I
    have made also gives the United States time to answer our allies'
    questions and consult further on the path ahead.
        Finally, we must consider the impact of a decision to deploy on
    security in Asia. As the next President makes a deployment decision, he
    will need to avoid stimulating an already dangerous regional nuclear
    capability from China to South Asia. Now, let me be clear. No nation can
    ever have a veto over American security, even if the United States and
    Russia cannot reach agreement, even if we cannot secure the support of
    our allies at first, even if we conclude that the Chinese will respond
    to NMD by increasing their arsenal of nuclear weapons substantially,
    with a corollary inevitable impact in India and then in Pakistan.
        The next President may nevertheless decide that our interest in
    security in 21st century dictates that we go forward with deployment of
    NMD. But we can never afford to overlook the fact that the actions and
    reactions of others in this increasingly interdependent world do bear on
    our security. Clearly, therefore, it would be far better to move forward
    in the context of the ABM Treaty and allied support. Our efforts to make
    that possible have not been completed.
        For me, the bottom line on this decision is this: Because the
    emerging missile threat is real, we have an obligation to pursue a
    missile defense system that could enhance our security. We have made
    progress, but we should not move forward until we have absolute
    confidence that the system will work, and until we have made every
    reasonable diplomatic effort to minimize the cost of deployment and
    maximize the benefit, as I said,

    [[Page 1993]]

    not only to America's security but to the security of law-abiding
    nations everywhere subject to the same threat.
        I am convinced that America and the world will be better off if we
    explore the frontiers of strategic defenses, while continuing to pursue
    arms control, to stand with our allies, and to work with Russia and
    others to stop the spread of deadly weapons. I strongly believe this is
    the best course for the United States, and therefore the decision I have
    reached today is in the best security interest of the United States. In
    short, we need to move forward with realism, with steadiness, and with
    prudence, not dismissing the threat we face or assuming we can meet it
    while ignoring our overall strategic environment, including the
    interests and concerns of our allies, friends, and other nations. A
    national missile defense, if deployed, should be part of a larger
    strategy to preserve and enhance the peace, strength, and security we
    now enjoy and to build an even safer world.
        I have tried to maximize the ability of the next President to pursue
    that strategy. In so doing, I have tried to maximize the chance that all
    you young students will live in a safer, more humane, more positively
    interdependent world. I hope I have done so. I believe I have.
        Thank you very much.

     Note:  The President spoke at 11:23 a.m. in Gaston Hall. In his
    remarks, he referred to School of Foreign Service Dean Bob Gallucci,
    Provost Dorothy Brown, and President Leo J. O'Donovan, Georgetown
    University; President Saddam Hussein of Iraq; and President Vladimir
    Putin of Russia.