[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 36, Number 30 (Monday, July 31, 2000)]
[Pages 1672-1678]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Remarks on Returning From Camp David, Maryland, and an Exchange With 
Reporters

July 25, 2000

Air France Concorde Tragedy

    The President.  First of all, let me say, like all of you, I just 
heard the news of the crash of the Concorde outside Paris, and I wanted 
to extend the deepest condolences of the American people to the families 
of those who were lost.

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Conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit

    After 14 days of intensive negotiations between Israelis and 
Palestinians, I have concluded with regret that they will not be able to 
reach an agreement at this time. As I explained on the eve of the 
summit, success was far from guaranteed given the historical, religious, 
political, and emotional dimensions of the conflict.
    Still, because the parties were not making progress on their own and 
the September deadline they set for themselves was fast approaching, I 
thought we had no choice. We can't afford to leave a single stone 
unturned in the search for a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace.
    Now, at Camp David, both sides engaged in comprehensive discussions 
that were really unprecedented because they dealt with the most 
sensitive issues dividing them, profound and complex questions that long 
had been considered off limits.
    Under the operating rules that nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed, they are, of course, not bound by any proposal discussed at the 
summit. However, while we did not get an agreement here, significant 
progress was made on the core issues. I want to express my appreciation 
to Prime Minister Barak, Chairman Arafat, and their delegations for the 
efforts they undertook to reach an agreement.
    Prime Minister Barak showed particular courage, vision, and an 
understanding of the historical importance of this moment. Chairman 
Arafat made it clear that he, too, remains committed to the path of 
peace. The trilateral statement we issued affirms both leaders' 
commitment to avoid violence or unilateral actions which will make peace 
more difficult and to keep the peace process going until it reaches a 
successful conclusion.
    At the end of this summit, I am fully aware of the deep 
disappointment that will be felt on both sides. But it was essential for 
Israelis and Palestinians, finally, to begin to deal with the toughest 
decisions in the peace process. Only they can make those decisions, and 
they both pledged to make them, I say again, by mid-September.
    Now, it's essential that they not lose hope, that they keep working 
for peace, they avoid any unilateral actions that would only make the 
hard task ahead more difficult. The statement the leaders have made 
today is encouraging in that regard.
    Israelis and Palestinians are destined to live side by side, 
destined to have a common future. They have to decide what kind of 
future it will be. Though the differences that remain are deep, they 
have come a long way in the last 7 years, and notwithstanding the 
failure to reach an agreement, they made real headway in the last 2 
weeks.
    Now the two parties must go home and reflect, both on what happened 
at Camp David and on what did not happen. For the sake of their 
children, they must rededicate themselves to the path of peace and find 
a way to resume their negotiations in the next few weeks. They've asked 
us to continue to help, and as always, we'll do our best. But the 
parties themselves, both of them, must be prepared to resolve profound 
questions of history, identity, and national faith as well as the future 
of sites that are holy to religious people all over the world who are 
part of the Islamic, Christian, and Judaic traditions.
    The children of Abraham, the descendants of Isaac and Ishmael, can 
only be reconciled through courageous compromise in the spirit of those 
who have already given their lives for peace and all Israelis, 
Palestinians, friends of peace in the Middle East and across the world 
who long for peace and deserve a Holy Land that lives for the values of 
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.
    Thank you.
    Q.  Was Jerusalem--Mr. President, was Jerusalem the main stumbling 
block? And where do you go from here?
    The President.  It was the most difficult problem. And I must tell 
you that we tried a lot of different approaches to it, and we have not 
yet found a solution. But the good news is that there is not a great 
deal of disagreement--and I want to emphasize this--it seemed to me, 
anyway, there was not a great deal of disagreement in many of these 
areas about what the facts on the ground would be after an agreement was 
made--that is, how people would live.
    For example, everyone conceded that Jerusalem is a place that 
required everyone to have access to the holy sites, and the kinds

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of things you've heard, and lot of other things in terms of how, 
operationally, the Israelis and the Palestinians have worked together; 
there was actually more agreement than I had thought there would be.
    But obviously, the questions around Jerusalem go to the core 
identity of both the Palestinians and the Israelis. There were some 
very, as I said--it has been reported Prime Minister Barak took some 
very bold decisions, but we were in the end unable to bridge the gaps. I 
think they will be bridged, because I think the alternative is 
unthinkable.
    Tom [Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times].
    Q.  There is a striking contrast between the way you described Prime 
Minister Barak's courageous and visionary approach to this, and Mr. 
Arafat seemed to be still committed to the path of peace. It sounds like 
that at the end of the day, Prime Minister Barak was ready to really 
step up to something that President Arafat wasn't yet ready to step up 
to.
    The President.  Let me be more explicit. I will say again, we made 
progress on all of the core issues. We made really significant progress 
on many of them. The Palestinian teams worked hard on a lot of these 
areas. But I think it is fair to say that at this moment in time, maybe 
because they had been preparing for it longer, maybe because they had 
thought through it more, that the Prime Minister moved forward more from 
his initial position than Chairman Arafat, on--particularly surrounding 
the questions of Jerusalem.
    Now, these are hard questions. And as I said to both of them, none 
of us, no outsider can judge for another person what is at the core of 
his being, at the core of his sense of national essence. But we cannot 
make an agreement here without a continuing effort of both sides to 
compromise.
    I do believe that--let me say this--and you will appreciate this, 
Tom, because you've been covering this a long time--but I want to give 
credit to both sides in the sense that they were really coming to grips 
with things they had never seriously come to grips with before.
    Oh, yes, there were always side papers--even going back to 1993--
about how these final issues would be solved. There were always 
speculation. There were always the odd conversation between Palestinians 
and Israelis who were friends and part of the various--the different 
government operations. But these folks really never had to come together 
before, and in an official setting put themselves on the line. And it is 
profoundly difficult.
    So I said what I said, and my remarks should stand for themselves, 
because--not so much as a criticism of Chairman Arafat, because this is 
really hard and never been done before, but in praise of Barak. He came 
there knowing that he was going to have to take bold steps, and he did 
it. And I think you should look at it more as a positive toward him than 
as a condemnation of the Palestinian side.
    This is agonizing for them--both of them. And unless you have lived 
there and lived with them and talked to them or lived with this problem 
a long time, it is hard to appreciate it. But I do think--I stand by the 
statement as written. I think they both remain committed to peace. I 
think they will both find a way to get there if they don't let time run 
away with them so that external events rob them of their options. And 
that's why I decided to call the summit in the first place.
    I got worried that--this is like going to the dentist without having 
your gums deadened, you know. I mean, this is not easy. And I got 
worried that if we didn't do the summit and we didn't force a process to 
begin, which would require people to come to grips with this in a 
disciplined, organized way, as well as to face--look themselves in the 
mirror and look into the abyss and think, ``What can I do, and what 
can't I do,'' that we would never get there. Now, I believe because of 
the work that was done within both teams and what they did with each 
other, we can still do it. Let me just make one other observation, and 
then I'll answer your question.
    You know, when we worked--I remember when we went to Dayton over 
Bosnia, when we went to Paris over Bosnia. After the Kosovo conflict--
and I went there and met with all the people who were going to have to 
work on Kosovo's future--even when we first started the Irish peace 
talks, we were dealing with people who would hardly speak

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to each other. We were dealing with people who still often wouldn't 
shake hands. We were dealing with people who thought they were from 
another planet from one another, whose wounds were open.
    Let me give you some good news. Of all the peace groups I ever 
worked with, these people know each other. They know the names of each 
other's children. They know how many grandchildren the grandparents 
have. They know their life stories. They have a genuine respect and 
understanding for each other. It is truly extraordinary and unique in my 
experience in almost 8 years of dealing with it.
    So I'm not trying to put a funny gloss on this. They couldn't get 
there. That's the truth. They couldn't get there. But this was the first 
time in an organized, disciplined way they had to work through, both for 
themselves and then with each other, how they were going to come to 
grips with issues that go to the core of their identity.
    And I think, on balance, it was very much the right thing to do, and 
it increases the chance of a successful agreement, and it increases the 
chances of avoiding a disaster.
    Now, I promised you, you could ask now.
    Q.  What is your assessment of whether Arafat's going to go through 
with the threat to declare statehood unilaterally? Did you get any sort 
of sense on whether he's going to go through with that? Did you have 
any----
    The President.  Well, let me say this. One of the reasons that I 
wanted to have this summit is that they're both under, will be under 
conflicting pressures as we go forward. One of the things that often 
happens in a very difficult peace process is that people, if they're not 
careful, will gravitate to the intense position rather than the position 
that will make peace. And it's very often that people know that a 
superficially safe position is to say no, that you won't get in trouble 
with whoever is dominating the debate back home, wherever your home is, 
as long as you say no.
    One of the reasons I called this summit is so that we could set in 
motion a process that would give the Palestinians the confidence that 
all of us--and most of all, the Israelis--really did want to make peace, 
so that it would offset the pressure that will be increasingly on 
Chairman Arafat as we approach the September 13th deadline.
    Q.  Are you implying that he should give up his claim to East 
Jerusalem--the Palestinians should?
    The President.  No, I didn't say that.
    Q.  Or any kind of a foothold?
    The President.  I didn't say that. I didn't say that. I didn't say 
that. And let me say, I presume, I am bound--I'm going to honor my 
promise not to leak about what they talked about, but I presume it will 
come out. No, I didn't say that. I said only this: I said--I will say 
again--the Palestinians changed their position. They moved forward. The 
Israelis moved more from the position they had. I said what I said; I 
will say again: I was not condemning Arafat; I was praising Barak. But I 
would be making a mistake not to praise Barak because I think he took a 
big risk. And I think it sparked, already, in Israel a real debate, 
which is moving Israeli public opinion toward the conditions that will 
make peace. So I thought that was important, and I think it deserves to 
be acknowledged.
    But the overriding thing you need to know is that progress was made 
on all fronts, that significant progress was made on some of the core 
issues, that Jerusalem, as you all knew it would be, remains the biggest 
problem for the reasons you know.
    But what we have to find here, if there is going to be an 
agreement--by definition, an agreement is one in which everybody is a 
little disappointed and nobody is defeated, in which neither side 
requires the other to say they have lost everything, and they find a way 
to--a shared result.
    And there's no place in the world like Jerusalem. There is no other 
place in the world like Jerusalem, which is basically at the core of the 
identity of all three monotheistic religions in the world, at the core 
of the identity of what it means to be a Palestinian, at the core of the 
identity of what it means to be an Israeli. There is no other place like 
this in the world. So they have to find a way to work through this.
    And it shouldn't surprise you that when they first come to grips 
with this in an official, disciplined way where somebody has to actually 
say something instead of sort of be off in a corner having a 
conversation over a cup

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of coffee that no one ever--that has no--it just vanishes into air, that 
it's hard for them to do.
    Q.  But did they make enough progress, sir, to now go back home, 
check with their people, and possibly come back during your 
administration--next month or in September--to come back to Camp David 
and try again?
    The President.  I don't know if they need to come back to Camp 
David. I think that it rained up there so much, I'm not sure I'll ever 
get them back there. [Laughter] But I think if you asked me, did they 
make enough progress to get this done? Yes. But they've got to go home 
and check; they've got to feel around. And what I want to say to you is, 
the reason I tried to keep them there so long--and I feel much better 
about this than I did when we almost lost it before--and you remember, 
and I got them and we all agreed to stay--I didn't feel that night like 
I feel today.
    Today I feel that we have the elements here to keep this process 
going. But it's important that the people who both leaders represent, 
support their continuing involvement in this and stick with them, and 
understand that this is a script that's never been written before. They 
have to write a script, and they've got to keep working at it.
    But yes, I think it can happen----
    Q.  During your administration?
    The President.  Yes. Not because it's my administration; that's 
irrelevant. They're operating on their timetable, not mine. It has 
nothing to do with the fact that it's my administration. I think it can 
happen because they set for themselves a September 13th deadline. And if 
they go past it, every day they go past it will put more pressure on the 
Palestinians to declare a Palestinian state unilaterally and more 
pressure on the Israelis to have some greater edge in conflict in their 
relations as a result of that.
    Neither one of them want that; so I think they will find a way to 
keep this going. And the only relevance of my being here is that I've 
been working with them for 8 years, and I think they both trust us and 
believe that Secretary Albright and Dennis and Sandy and our whole team, 
that we will heave to to make peace.
    Q.  But, Mr. President, the Prime Minister came here in quite a 
precarious position to begin with back home. And some of the things you 
call bold and courageous, his critics back home have called treason. Can 
he go home, and do you believe he will have the political stability to 
come back at this, and did he voice any concerns to you about that?
    The President.  First of all, this is not a weak man. It's not for 
nothing that he's the most decorated soldier in the history of Israel. 
He didn't come over here to play safe with his political future. He came 
over here to do what he thought was right for the people of Israel, and 
I think that he--he knows that he would never do anything to put the 
security of Israel at risk, and that the only long-term guarantee of 
Israel's security is a constructive peace that's fair with her 
neighbors--all of them--starting with the Palestinians.
    So I think the people of Israel should be very proud of him. He did 
nothing to compromise Israel's security, and he did everything he 
possibly could within the limits that he thought he had, all the kinds 
of constraints that operate on people in these circumstances, to reach a 
just peace. So I would hope the people of Israel will support him and 
let this thing percolate, not overreact, and say, ``Keep trying.''
    I want the people on both sides to tell their leaders to keep 
trying--to keep trying. You know, that's the only real answer here--is 
just to bear down and go on.
    Q.  Mr. President, couldn't you have gotten a partial agreement and 
left Jerusalem for later? Was that a possibility at all?
    The President.  That possibility was explored and rejected.
    Q.  Why?
    The President.  I can't talk about it. If they want to talk about 
it, that's their business, but I can't.
    Q.  Have you done all you can do, sir, or would you be making more 
proposals?
    The President.  Oh, I think--well, first of all, we all agreed to 
reassess here. So the first thing we're going do to is, we're going to 
let each side go home and try to get a little sleep. I mean, we've all 
been sort of--

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we're kind of--nobody knows what time it is, I don't think, on either 
team.
    Last night we quit at 3; the night before, we went all night long. 
And so, we've been working very hard at this. So what I'm going to do is 
let them take a deep breath and then our side, Madeleine and Sandy and 
all of our team and I and Dennis, we'll try to think what we think we 
ought to do. Then we'll ask them what they want to do, and then we'll 
figure out what we're going to do.
    We don't have a lot of time, and I wouldn't rule out the possibility 
that all of us will be coming up with new ideas here. I wouldn't rule 
anything out. The clock is still working against us. The bad news is, we 
don't have a deal. The good news is, they are fully and completely and 
comprehensively engaged in an official way for the first time on these 
fundamental issues.
    Keep in mind, when the Oslo agreement was drafted, these things were 
put down as final status issues because the people that drafted them 
knew it would be hard. And they took a gamble. And their gamble was that 
if the Israelis and the Palestinians worked together over a 7-year 
period and they began to share security cooperation, for example, they 
began to--we had some land transfers, and we saw how they would work in 
a different geographical way, and if they kept making other specific 
agreements, that by the time we got to the end of the road, there would 
be enough knowledge and trust and understanding of each other's 
positions that these huge, epochal issues could be resolved.
    Now, we started the process, and we've got to finish. And so, and 
again I say, the thing I hope most of all is that the people in the 
Middle East will appreciate the fact that a lot was done here, and we'll 
support their leaders in coming back and finishing the job. The venue is 
not important. The mechanisms aren't important. But we know what the 
state of play is now, and if we'll keep at it, I still think we can get 
it done.
    Q.  Can you describe what type of U.S. role was discussed in sealing 
the agreement financially and otherwise?
    The President.  Let me say, first of all, anything that would 
require our participation, other than financial, was not finalized. But 
there were a lot of ideas floated around. None of it amounted to large 
numbers of people. But they were potentially significant in terms of the 
psychology of the situation. But there was no decision made about that.
    On the money, basically, you know, I think that the United States 
should be prepared to make a significant contribution to resolving the 
refugee problem. You've got refugees that have to be resettled. You've 
got some compensation which has to be given. And there are lots of 
issues in that refugee pot that cost money. And then there's the whole 
question of working out the economic future of the Palestinians, and the 
whole question of working out what the security relationships will be 
and the security needs will be for Israel and in this new partnership 
that they will have--the Palestinians. How is that going to work, and 
what should we do?
    I also, when I went to the G-8, I gave a briefing to the G-8, and I 
asked the people who were there to help pay, too. I said, you know, this 
is going to have to be a worldwide financial responsibility, but because 
of the United States' historic involvement, which goes back many decades 
in the Middle East--we were the first country under President Truman to 
recognize Israel; we've had Republicans and Democrats alike up to their 
ears in the Middle East peace process for a long time--and because we 
have such a lot of strategic interest over there, if there could be an 
agreement, I think we ought to lead the way in financial contributions, 
but the others who are able to do so should play their part as well.
    Thank you.

 Note:  The President spoke at 12:07 p.m. in the James S. Brady Press 
Briefing Room at the White House. In his remarks, he referred to Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak of Israel; Chairman Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian 
Authority; National Security Adviser Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger; and 
Ambassador Dennis B. Ross, Special Middle East Coordinator.

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