[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 35, Number 44 (Monday, November 8, 1999)]
[Pages 2242-2244]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Message to the Congress Transmitting the Australia-United States 
Agreement on Technology for the Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by 
Laser Excitation With Documentation

November 3, 1999

To the Congress of the United States:

    I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 123 
b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2153(b), (d)), the text of a proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between 
the United States of America and Australia Concerning Technology for the 
Separation of Isotopes of Uranium by Laser Excitation, with accompanying 
annexes and agreed minute. I am also pleased to transmit my written 
approval, authorization, and determination concerning the Agreement, and 
an unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) 
concerning the Agreement. (In accordance with section 123 of the Act, as 
amended by title XII of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act 
of 1998 (Public Law 105-277), a classified annex to the NPAS, prepared 
by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Director of Central 
Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified information, will be 
submitted to the Congress separately.) The joint memorandum submitted to 
me by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy, which includes 
a summary of the provisions of the Agreement and the views of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is also enclosed.
    A U.S. company and an Australian company have entered into a 
contract jointly to develop and evaluate the commercial potential of a 
particular uranium enrichment process (known as the ``SILEX'' process) 
invented by the Australian company. If the commercial viability of the 
process is demonstrated, the U.S. company may adopt it to enrich uranium 
for sale to U.S. and foreign utilities for use as reactor fuel.
    Research on and development of the new enrichment process may 
require transfer from the United States to Australia of technology 
controlled by the United States as sensitive nuclear technology or 
Restricted Data. Australia exercises similar controls on the transfer of 
such technology outside Australia. There is currently in force an 
Agreement Between the United States of America and Australia Concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, signed at Canberra July 5, 1979 (the 
``1979 Agreement''). However, the 1979 Agreement does not permit 
transfers of sensitive nuclear technology and Restricted Data between 
the parties unless specifically provided for by an amendment or by a 
separate agreement.
    Accordingly, the United States and Australia have negotiated, as a 
complement to the 1979 Agreement, a specialized agreement for peaceful 
nuclear cooperation to provide the necessary legal basis for transfer of 
the relevant technology between the two countries for peaceful purposes.
    The proposed Agreement provides for cooperation between the parties 
and authorized persons within their respective jurisdictions in research 
on and development of the SILEX process (the particular process for the 
separation of isotopes of uranium by laser excitation). The Agreement 
permits the transfer for peaceful purposes from Australia to the United 
States and from the United States to Australia, subject to the 
nonproliferation

[[Page 2243]]

conditions and controls set forth in the Agreement, of Restricted Data, 
sensitive nuclear technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, and major 
critical components of such facilities, to the extent that these relate 
to the SILEX technology.
    The nonproliferation conditions and controls required by the 
Agreement are the standard conditions and controls required by section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), for all new U.S. agreements for 
peaceful nuclear cooperation. These include safeguards, a guarantee of 
no explosive or military use, a guarantee of adequate physical 
protection, and rights to approve re-transfers, enrichment, 
reprocessing, other alterations in form or content, and storage. The 
Agreement contains additional detailed provisions for the protection of 
sensitive nuclear technology, Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear 
facilities, and major critical components of such facilities transferred 
pursuant to it.
    Material, facilities, and technology subject to the Agreement may 
not be used to produce highly enriched uranium without further agreement 
of the parties.
    The Agreement also provides that cooperation under it within the 
territory of Australia will be limited to research on and development of 
SILEX technology, and will not be for the purpose of constructing a 
uranium enrichment facility in Australia unless provided for by an 
amendment to the Agreement. The United States would treat any such 
amendment as a new agreement pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act, including the requirement for congressional review.
    Australia is in the forefront of nations supporting international 
efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional 
countries. It is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has an agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of full-scope safeguards to its 
nuclear program. It subscribes to the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) 
Guidelines, which set forth standards for the responsible export of 
nuclear commodities for peaceful use, and to the Zangger (NPT Exporters) 
Committee Guidelines, which oblige members to require the application of 
IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports to nonnuclear weapons states. In 
addition, Australia is a party to the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material, whereby it has agreed to apply 
international standards of physical protection to the storage and 
transport of nuclear material under its jurisdiction or control
    The proposed Agreement with Australia has been negotiated in 
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and other 
applicable law. In my judgment, it meets all statutory requirements and 
will advance the nonproliferation, foreign policy, and commercial 
interests of the United States.
    A consideration in interagency deliberations on the Agreement was 
the potential consequences of the Agreement for U.S. military needs. If 
SILEX technology is successfully developed and becomes operational, then 
all material produced by and through this technology would be precluded 
from use in the U.S. nuclear weapons and naval nuclear propulsion 
programs. Furthermore, all other military uses of this material, such as 
tritium production and material testing, would also not be possible 
because of the assurances given to the Government of Australia. Yet, to 
ensure the enduring ability of the United States to meet its common 
defense and security needs, the United States must maintain its military 
nuclear capabilities. Recognizing this requirement and the restrictions 
being placed on the SILEX technology, the Department of Energy will 
monitor closely the development of SILEX but ensure that alternative 
uranium enrichment technologies are available to meet the requirements 
for national security.
    I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested 
agencies in reviewing the proposed Agreement and have determined that 
its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable 
risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved 
the Agreement and authorized its execution and urge that the Congress 
give it favorable consideration.
    Because this Agreement meets all applicable requirements of the 
Atomic Energy Act,

[[Page 2244]]

as amended, for agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation, I am 
transmitting it to the Congress without exempting it from any 
requirement contained in section 123 a. of that Act. This transmission 
shall constitute a submittal for purposes of both sections 123 b. and 
123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act. My Administration is prepared to begin 
immediately the consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and House International Relations Committee as provided in 
section 123 b. Upon completion of the 30-day continuous session period 
provided for in section 123 b., the 60-day continuous session period 
provided for in section 123 d. shall commence.
                                            William J. Clinton
The White House,
November 3, 1999.