[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 35, Number 40 (Monday, October 11, 1999)]
[Pages 1933-1937]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Remarks Following a Meeting With Supporters of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

October 6, 1999

    Thank you very much. Let me begin by saying a profound word of 
thanks to Senator Glenn, to General Shalikashvili, to Dr. Townes, and to 
Secretary Cohen for what they have said. I thank General Jones and 
Admiral Crowe for being here. I thank all the other Nobel laureates who 
are here; Secretary Richardson and General Shelton and the members of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Berger and Mr. Podesta, the other people 
from the White House. And I thank Senators Biden and Dorgan for their 
presence here and their enormous leadership on this issue, and other 
committed American citizens who are in this audience.
    Let me say that I was sitting here thinking two things when the 
previous speakers were speaking. One is, it made me very proud to be an 
American, to know that our country had been served by people like these 
four, without regard to party. The second is that

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each in their own way represent a different piece of the American 
experience over the last 50 years and bring a remarkable combination of 
intellect, knowledge, experience, and humanity to the remarks that they 
made.
    There's a reason that President
Eisenhower said we ought to do this and a reason that President Kennedy 
agreed. They saw World War II from slightly different angles and 
different ranks, but they experienced the horror of the atomic era's 
onset in much the same way. I think you could make a compelling argument 
that this treaty is more needed now than it was when they advocated it, 
when there were only two nuclear powers. I think you could make a 
compelling argument that, given the events of the last couple of years, 
this treaty is more needed than it was when I signed it at the United 
Nations 3 years ago. Nuclear technology and know-how continue to spread. 
The risk that more and more countries will obtain weapons that are 
nuclear is more serious than ever.
    I said yesterday--I'd like to just stop here and go off the script. 
I am very worried that the 21st century will see the proliferation of 
nuclear and chemical and biological weapons; that those systems will 
undergo a process of miniaturization, just as almost all other 
technological events have led us to, in good ways and bad; and that we 
will continue to see the mixing and blending of misconduct in the new 
century by rogue states, angry countries, and terrorist groups. It is, 
therefore, essential that the United States stay in the nonproliferation 
lead in a comprehensive way.
    Now, if you look at what we're trying to do with the Biological 
Weapons Convention, for example, in putting teeth in that while 
increasing our own ability to protect our own people and protect our 
friends who want to work with us from biological weaponry, you see a 
good direction. If you look at what we did with the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, working in good faith for months with the Congress to ask 
the same question we're asking here--are we better off with this or 
without it?--and how we added safeguard after safeguard after safeguard, 
both generated out of the administration and generated from leaders of 
both parties in the Congress, that's how we ought to look at this.
    But we have to ask ourselves just the same question they all 
presented, because the nuclear threat is still the largest one, and are 
we better off or not if we adopt this treaty?
    I think we start with the fact that the best way to constrain the 
danger of nuclear proliferation and, God forbid, the use of a nuclear 
weapon, is to stop other countries from testing nuclear weapons. That's 
what this test ban treaty will do. A vote, therefore, to ratify is a 
vote to increase the protections of our people and the world from 
nuclear war. By contrast, a vote against it risks a much more dangerous 
future.
    One of the interesting things--I'll bet you that people in other 
parts of the world, particularly those that have nuclear technology, are 
watching the current debate with some measure of bewilderment. I mean, 
today we enjoy unmatched influence, with peace and freedom ascendant in 
the world, with enormous prosperity, enormous technical advances. And by 
and large, on a bipartisan basis, we've done a pretty good job of 
dealing with this unique moment in history.
    We've seen the end of the cold war making possible agreements to cut 
U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals by more than 60 percent. We have 
offered the Russians the opportunity of further cuts if they will ratify 
START II. But we know the nuclear peril persists and that there's 
growing danger that these weapons could spread in the Middle East, in 
the Persian Gulf, in Asia, to areas where our troops are deployed. We 
know that they can be present in areas where there are intense rivalries 
and, unlike at least the latter years of the cold war, still very much 
the possibility of misunderstanding between countries with this 
capacity.
    Now, let me say the reason I say that I think other countries will 
be looking at this, one of the concerns that I have had all along is 
that the countries we need to get involved in this, India, Pakistan, all 
the other countries, will say, ``Well, gosh, when we all get in this 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Americans have a big advantage, 
because they're spending $4.5 billion maintaining the integrity of their 
nuclear stockpile.'' And I always thought that, too. And I think that's 
a good thing, because people around the

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world know we're not going to abuse this responsibility we have.
    But it is strange to me--and I'm sure strange for people in foreign 
capitals analyzing the debate going on in Washington--that there are 
people against this treaty who somehow think we will be disadvantaged by 
it. So instead, they propose to say, well, we--they don't, any of them, 
say we should start testing again. So the message of not ratifying this 
treaty is, ``Okay, we're not going to test, but you guys have a green 
light.''
    Now, forgive my less than elevated language, but I think we've got 
to put this down where everybody can get it. And I don't think we ought 
to give a green light to our friends in India and Pakistan, to the 
Chinese or the Russians, or to people who would be nuclear powers. I 
think that would be a mistake.
    I think we ought to give them an outstretched hand and say, let us 
show common restraint. And see this in the framework of our continuing 
work with the Russians to secure their own nuclear materials, to destroy 
nuclear weapons that are scheduled for destruction, and to continue our 
effort to reduce the nuclear threat.
    The argument, it seems to me, doesn't hold water, this argument that 
somehow we would be better off, even though we're not going to start 
testing again, to walk away from this treaty and give a green light to 
all these other countries in the world.
    Now, I sent this test ban treaty up to the Senate over 2 years ago. 
For 2 years, the opponents of the treaty refused to hold any hearings. 
Suddenly, they say, ``Okay, you've got to vote up or down in a week.'' 
Now, this is a tough fight without much time, and there are lots of 
technical arguments can be made to confuse the issue. But I would like 
to just reiterate what has already been said by previous speakers and 
make one other point.
    There are basically three categories of arguments against the 
treaty. Two have been dealt with. One is, ``Well, this won't detect 
every test that anybody could do at every level,'' and General 
Shalikashvili addressed that. We will have censors all over the world 
that will detect far more tests than will be detected if this treaty is 
not ratified and does not enter into force. And our military have 
repeatedly said that any test of a size that would present any kind of 
credible threat to what we have to do to protect the American people, we 
would know about, and we could respond in an appropriate and timely 
fashion.
    The second argument is, no matter what all these guys say, they can 
find three scientists somewhere who will say--or maybe 300, I don't 
know--that they just don't agree and maybe there is some scenario under 
which the security and reliability of the nuclear deterrent in America 
can be eroded. Well, I think that at some point, with all these Nobel 
laureates and our laboratory heads and the others that have endorsed 
this--say what they say, you have to say, what is the likelihood that 
America can maintain the security and reliability of its nuclear 
deterrent, as compared with every other country, if they come under the 
umbrella of this and the treaty enters into force?
    The same people say that we ought to build a national missile 
defense, notwithstanding the technological uncertainties, because our 
skill is so much greater, we can always find a technological answer to 
everything. And I would argue that our relative advantage in security, 
even if you have some smidgen of a doubt about the security and 
reliability issue, will be far greater if we get everybody under this 
tent and we're all living under the same rules, than it will be if we're 
all outside the tent.
    Now, there's a third sort of grab-bag set of arguments against it, 
and I don't mean to deprecate them. Some of them are actually quite 
serious and substantial questions that have been raised about various 
countries' activities in particular places and other things. The point I 
want to make about them is, go back and look at the process we adopted 
in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Every single other objection that 
has been raised or question that has been raised can be dealt with by 
adding an appropriately worded safeguard to this treaty. It either falls 
within the six we've already offered and asked for or could be crafted 
in a careful negotiation as a result of a serious process. So I do not 
believe that any of these things are serious stumbling blocks to the 
profound argument that this is in our interest.

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    Look, 154 countries have signed this treaty--Russia, China, Japan, 
South Korea, Israel, Iran, all our NATO Allies--51 have already 
ratified, 11 of our NATO Allies, including nuclear powers Britain and 
France. But it can't go into effect unless the U.S. and the other 
designated nations ratify it. And once again, we need American 
leadership to protect American interests and to advance the peace of the 
world.
    I say again, we're spending $4\1/2\ billion a year a protect the 
security and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. There is a reason 
that Secretary Cohen and Secretary Richardson and our laboratory heads 
believe that we can do this. Once again, I say the U.S. stopped testing 
in 1992. What in the world would prevent us from trying to have a regime 
where we want other people to join us in stopping testing?
    Let me just give one example. Last year the nuclear tests by India 
and Pakistan shook the world. After those tests occurred, they had a 
serious confrontation along the line of control in Kashmir. I spent our 
Independence Day, the Fourth of July, meeting with the Pakistani Prime 
Minister and his senior government officials in an intense effort to try 
to help defuse this situation.
    Now, both of these countries have indicated they will sign this 
treaty. If our Senate defeats it, do you think they'll sign it? Do you 
think they'll ratify it? Do you think for a minute that they will forgo 
further tests if they believe that the leading force in the world for 
nuclear nonproliferation has taken a U-turn? If our Senate defeats the 
treaty, will it encourage the Russians, the Chinese, and others to 
refrain from trying to find and test new, more sophisticated, more 
destructive nuclear weapons? Or will it give them a green light?
    Now, I said earlier we've been working with Congress on missile 
defense to protect us from a nuclear attack should one ever come. I 
support that work. And if we can develop a system we think will work, we 
owe it to the American people to work with the Russians and others to 
figure out a way to give our people the maximum protection. But our 
first line of defense should be preventing countries from having those 
weapons in the first place.
    It would be the height of irresponsibility to rely on the last line 
of defense to say, ``We're not going to test. You guys test. And we're 
in a race to get up a missile defense, and we sure hope it will work if 
the wheels run off 30 or 40 years from now.'' This argument doesn't hold 
water.
    People say, ``Well, but somebody might cheat.'' Well, that's true, 
somebody might cheat. Happens all the time, in all regimes. Question is, 
are we more likely to catch them with the treaty or without?
    You all know--and I am confident that people on the Hill have to 
know--that this test ban treaty will strengthen our ability to determine 
whether or not nations are involved in weapons activities. You've heard 
the 300 sensors mentioned. Let me tell you what that means in practical 
terms. If this treaty goes into effect, there will be 31 sensors in 
Russia, 11 in China, 17 in the Middle East alone, and the remainder of 
the 300-plus in other critical places around the world. If we can find 
cheating, because it's there, then we'll do what's necessary to stop or 
counter it.
    Let me again say I want to thank the former chairs of the Joint 
Chiefs who have endorsed this. I want to thank the current Chair, and 
all the Joint Chiefs, and the previous service chiefs who have been with 
us in this: Lawrence Eagleburger, the Secretary of State under President 
Bush; Paul Nitze, a top Presidential adviser from Presidents Truman to 
Reagan; former Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, many Republicans and 
Democrats who have dealt with this issue for years have stayed with us. 
John Glenn, from Mercury to Discovery--are you going up again, John?--
has always been at the cutting edge of technology's promise. But he's 
also flown fighter planes and seen war.
    The Nobel laureates who are here, Dr. Ramsey, Dr. Fitch, both part 
of the Manhattan Project; Dr. Ramsey, a young scientist, Dr. Fitch, a 
teenage soldier, witnessed the very first nuclear test 54 years ago in 
the New Mexico desert. Their letter says, ``It is imperative''--
underline ``imperative''--``that the test ban treaty be ratified.''
    Let me just say one other thing. There may be a suggestion here that 
our heart is overcoming our head and all that. I'd like to give

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you one example that I think refutes that on another topic. One of the 
biggest disappointments I've had as President, a bitter disappointment 
for me, is that I could not sign in good conscience the treaty banning 
landmines, because we have done more since I've been President to get 
rid of landmines than any country in the world by far. We spend half the 
money the world spends on demining. We have destroyed over a million of 
our own mines.
    I couldn't do it because the way the treaty was worded was unfair to 
the United States and to our Korean allies in meeting our 
responsibilities along the DMZ in South Korea and because it outlawed 
our antitank mines while leaving every other country's intact. And I 
thought it was unfair.
    But it just killed me. But all of us who are in charge of the 
Nation's security engage our heads, as well as our hearts. Thinking and 
feeling lead you to the conclusion that this treaty should be ratified.
    Every single serious question that can be raised about this kind of 
bomb, that kind of bomb, what this country has, what's going on here, 
there, and yonder--every single one of them can be dealt with in the 
safeguard structure that is normally a product of every serious treaty 
deliberation in the United States Senate. And I say again, from the time 
of President Eisenhower, the United States has led the world in the 
cause of nonproliferation. We have new, serious proliferation threats 
that our predecessors have not faced. And it is all the more imperative 
that we do everything we possibly can to minimize the risks our children 
will face.
    That is what you were trying to do. I thank the Senators who are 
here with us today and pray that they can swell their ranks by next 
week.
    Thank you very much.

Note: The President spoke at 3:43 p.m in the East Room at the White 
House. In his remarks, he referred to former Senator and astronaut John 
Glenn, who introduced the President; former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA (Ret.), Gen. Davis C. Jones, 
USA (Ret.), and Gen. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN (Ret.); and Nobel Prize 
for Physics recipients Charles H. Townes (1964), Noram F. Ramsey (1989), 
and Val L. Fitch (1980).