[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 35, Number 23 (Monday, June 14, 1999)]
[Pages 1050-1052]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Decision To Send 
Certain United States Forces to Albania

June 5, 1999

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)

    Since my previous reports to the Congress under section 8115 of the 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-262), the 
continuing humanitarian crisis created by Belgrade's repression of its 
own citizens has resulted in thousands of additional refugees fleeing 
into neighboring countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are now 443,000 Kosovar refugees 
in Albania, 246,000 in Macedonia, and another 68,000 in Montenegro. In 
addition, there could be as many as 700,000 displaced persons still 
remaining within Kosovo. In both Albania and Macedonia, the number of 
refugees continues to over-tax the limited resources of the host 
countries. Efforts by military personnel, in support of civilian 
assistance efforts, have been critical to establishing refugee camps and 
necessary infrastructure.
    In light of the continuing crisis, I have directed that additional 
U.S. forces be deployed to Albania to assist in refugee relief 
operations, including to improve airfield ramp and off-load 
capabilities, upgrade key roads and bridges to facilitate movement of 
refugees to safe areas and transportation of

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relief supplies, and to assist in the provision of additional shelter 
for refugees.
     In parallel with the military support for refugee relief, we are 
continuing to increase the pressure on Milosevic to accept NATO's 
conditions, while simultaneously preparing for success. Belgrade's 
recent acceptance of the document delivered by Finnish President 
Ahtisaari and Russian Special Envoy Chernomyrdin is an encouraging 
development, though we are taking a very cautious approach until the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY's) intentions are clear.
    In line with this strategy, I have increased the number of U.S. 
military personnel assigned to support Task Force HAWK, our deep strike 
task force in Albania. I have authorized the deployment of a significant 
contingent of military personnel to Kosovo as part of an international 
security presence (KFOR), including some forces that may be pre-
positioned in Macedonia prior to entry into Kosovo, as well as the 
deployment of other military personnel to the region, including 
Macedonia, as a national support element for U.S. forces in KFOR. 
However, forces will not enter Kosovo unless it is clear that Belgrade 
has adopted NATO's conditions and is withdrawing its forces.
    In regard to the elements of section 8115(a)(1)-(8), I am providing 
the following information:
    1. & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that the 
deployment of additional forces to Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo as 
described above is necessary in the national security interests of the 
United States. The deployments will provide additional relief for the 
refugees and help to return them to their homes with security and self-
government. In doing so, the deployments serve our national security 
interests by promoting peace and stability in this volatile region, by 
strengthening NATO, and by demonstrating to other would-be aggressors in 
and around Europe that the United States and the Alliance will not stand 
by idly while they commit war crimes or seek to spread instability.
    3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel to be deployed cannot be 
definitively provided at this time since planning for the deployments is 
ongoing. For relief operations, it is anticipated that the number of 
additional personnel should be approximately 4,000, bringing the total 
number of U.S. personnel associated with relief operations in Albania to 
approximately 5,000. This is in addition to the total of approximately 
5,500 personnel that will be associated with the deep strike task force 
now deployed to Albania. In addition, if it is clear that Belgrade has 
adopted NATO's conditions and is withdrawing its forces, I anticipate 
that approximately 7,000 personnel will be deployed as part of KFOR and 
approximately 1,500 personnel will be deployed as part of the national 
support element in the region, including Macedonia, to facilitate the 
flow of support to KFOR.
    I will ensure that the Congress is informed in a timely manner 
concerning any significant changes to the deployments described in this 
report when such information is available.
    4. Mission/Objectives. Our overall objective is to return the 
refugees to their homes with safety and security, to provide necessary 
refugee relief in the interim, and to promote peace and stability in the 
region. The specific missions of the forces involved are:
<bullet>    Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE: To facilitate military 
            operations by assisting the UNHCR in providing emergency 
            relief to refugees in Albania.
<bullet>    Task Force HAWK: To provide a deep strike force capability 
            in support of NATO air operations and to be ready for use 
            against FRY forces at a time and manner of our choosing.
<bullet>    Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR): To deploy a military 
            presence in a permissive environment to deter renewed 
            hostilities, and, if necessary, enforce a cease-fire and the 
            demilitarization of Kosovo, and to establish a secure 
            environment for the stabilization of the humanitarian 
            situation and the establishment and operation of an 
            international provisional administration.
    5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine how long 
NATO operations in the region will need to continue, nor how long U.S. 
forces will be needed to assist in refugee relief operations, and 
therefore how long these deployments will need to be maintained.

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    6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S. military 
presence will depend on the course of events, and in particular, on 
Belgrade's actions.
<bullet>    For Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE, military support to 
            refugee relief may need to continue for some time, even if a 
            settlement allows for refugees to begin to return. 
            Ultimately, responsibilities for refugee relief will be 
            transferred to the UNHCR, other humanitarian organizations, 
            and host countries.
    <bullet>
             Some elements of Task Force HAWK may deploy as initial 
            elements of KFOR. In this case, the exit strategy for Task 
            Force HAWK will become the same as that for KFOR. The 
            remaining elements will continue deployment in support of 
            NATO operations until no longer required.
    <bullet>
             For Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, after the withdrawal of all 
            Serb forces from Kosovo and an initial stabilization period, 
            KFOR will be progressively reduced as the security situation 
            permits and local police forces are established. At a time 
            to be determined, KFOR will transfer responsibilities to the 
            international provisional administration and local 
            institutions and ultimately transition to a different set of 
            security arrangements.
    7. Costs. The costs of operations in the Kosovo region will 
initially be paid from the FY 99 Defense appropriations in the 
supplemental appropriations bill recently enacted. As we further refine 
the detailed plans for KFOR, and as attendant costs become better known, 
I will consult with Congress as to how any additional costs should be 
covered.
    8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. These deployments 
affect morale, retention and readiness in a positive way because they 
demonstrate U.S. commitment of necessary resources to maximize 
operational effectiveness toward achievement of the important U.S. 
objectives in Kosovo. Given the importance of these deployments, we 
anticipate that U.S. forces would maintain the highest morale and 
effectiveness while fulfilling the range of military objectives 
encompassed by these deployments, including refugee relief operations 
and the anticipated contribution to the international security force in 
Kosovo. Indeed, it has been our experience that personnel serving in 
these important and demanding positions experience higher retention 
rates than in other, less challenging assignments. The Department of 
Defense has underway extensive and effective programs to do what is 
necessary to manage personnel and other resources so as to reduce 
problems such as extended family separation and other burdens military 
service. As with any operational deployment, the effects on readiness 
are mixed. In this case, however, it is expected that many of the U.S. 
forces will be conducting operations as they were trained to perform, 
which will provide an unparalleled opportunity to apply their skills in 
an active environment. The Administration is committed to ensuring that 
America's armed forces maintain the high levels of readiness necessary 
to safeguard America's national security.
    Sincerely,
                                            William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate. 
This letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on June 7.