[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 35, Number 23 (Monday, June 14, 1999)]
[Pages 1050-1052]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
<R04>
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Decision To Send
Certain United States Forces to Albania
June 5, 1999
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Since my previous reports to the Congress under section 8115 of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-262), the
continuing humanitarian crisis created by Belgrade's repression of its
own citizens has resulted in thousands of additional refugees fleeing
into neighboring countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are now 443,000 Kosovar refugees
in Albania, 246,000 in Macedonia, and another 68,000 in Montenegro. In
addition, there could be as many as 700,000 displaced persons still
remaining within Kosovo. In both Albania and Macedonia, the number of
refugees continues to over-tax the limited resources of the host
countries. Efforts by military personnel, in support of civilian
assistance efforts, have been critical to establishing refugee camps and
necessary infrastructure.
In light of the continuing crisis, I have directed that additional
U.S. forces be deployed to Albania to assist in refugee relief
operations, including to improve airfield ramp and off-load
capabilities, upgrade key roads and bridges to facilitate movement of
refugees to safe areas and transportation of
[[Page 1051]]
relief supplies, and to assist in the provision of additional shelter
for refugees.
In parallel with the military support for refugee relief, we are
continuing to increase the pressure on Milosevic to accept NATO's
conditions, while simultaneously preparing for success. Belgrade's
recent acceptance of the document delivered by Finnish President
Ahtisaari and Russian Special Envoy Chernomyrdin is an encouraging
development, though we are taking a very cautious approach until the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY's) intentions are clear.
In line with this strategy, I have increased the number of U.S.
military personnel assigned to support Task Force HAWK, our deep strike
task force in Albania. I have authorized the deployment of a significant
contingent of military personnel to Kosovo as part of an international
security presence (KFOR), including some forces that may be pre-
positioned in Macedonia prior to entry into Kosovo, as well as the
deployment of other military personnel to the region, including
Macedonia, as a national support element for U.S. forces in KFOR.
However, forces will not enter Kosovo unless it is clear that Belgrade
has adopted NATO's conditions and is withdrawing its forces.
In regard to the elements of section 8115(a)(1)-(8), I am providing
the following information:
1. & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that the
deployment of additional forces to Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo as
described above is necessary in the national security interests of the
United States. The deployments will provide additional relief for the
refugees and help to return them to their homes with security and self-
government. In doing so, the deployments serve our national security
interests by promoting peace and stability in this volatile region, by
strengthening NATO, and by demonstrating to other would-be aggressors in
and around Europe that the United States and the Alliance will not stand
by idly while they commit war crimes or seek to spread instability.
3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel to be deployed cannot be
definitively provided at this time since planning for the deployments is
ongoing. For relief operations, it is anticipated that the number of
additional personnel should be approximately 4,000, bringing the total
number of U.S. personnel associated with relief operations in Albania to
approximately 5,000. This is in addition to the total of approximately
5,500 personnel that will be associated with the deep strike task force
now deployed to Albania. In addition, if it is clear that Belgrade has
adopted NATO's conditions and is withdrawing its forces, I anticipate
that approximately 7,000 personnel will be deployed as part of KFOR and
approximately 1,500 personnel will be deployed as part of the national
support element in the region, including Macedonia, to facilitate the
flow of support to KFOR.
I will ensure that the Congress is informed in a timely manner
concerning any significant changes to the deployments described in this
report when such information is available.
4. Mission/Objectives. Our overall objective is to return the
refugees to their homes with safety and security, to provide necessary
refugee relief in the interim, and to promote peace and stability in the
region. The specific missions of the forces involved are:
<bullet> Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE: To facilitate military
operations by assisting the UNHCR in providing emergency
relief to refugees in Albania.
<bullet> Task Force HAWK: To provide a deep strike force capability
in support of NATO air operations and to be ready for use
against FRY forces at a time and manner of our choosing.
<bullet> Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR): To deploy a military
presence in a permissive environment to deter renewed
hostilities, and, if necessary, enforce a cease-fire and the
demilitarization of Kosovo, and to establish a secure
environment for the stabilization of the humanitarian
situation and the establishment and operation of an
international provisional administration.
5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine how long
NATO operations in the region will need to continue, nor how long U.S.
forces will be needed to assist in refugee relief operations, and
therefore how long these deployments will need to be maintained.
[[Page 1052]]
6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S. military
presence will depend on the course of events, and in particular, on
Belgrade's actions.
<bullet> For Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE, military support to
refugee relief may need to continue for some time, even if a
settlement allows for refugees to begin to return.
Ultimately, responsibilities for refugee relief will be
transferred to the UNHCR, other humanitarian organizations,
and host countries.
<bullet>
Some elements of Task Force HAWK may deploy as initial
elements of KFOR. In this case, the exit strategy for Task
Force HAWK will become the same as that for KFOR. The
remaining elements will continue deployment in support of
NATO operations until no longer required.
<bullet>
For Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, after the withdrawal of all
Serb forces from Kosovo and an initial stabilization period,
KFOR will be progressively reduced as the security situation
permits and local police forces are established. At a time
to be determined, KFOR will transfer responsibilities to the
international provisional administration and local
institutions and ultimately transition to a different set of
security arrangements.
7. Costs. The costs of operations in the Kosovo region will
initially be paid from the FY 99 Defense appropriations in the
supplemental appropriations bill recently enacted. As we further refine
the detailed plans for KFOR, and as attendant costs become better known,
I will consult with Congress as to how any additional costs should be
covered.
8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. These deployments
affect morale, retention and readiness in a positive way because they
demonstrate U.S. commitment of necessary resources to maximize
operational effectiveness toward achievement of the important U.S.
objectives in Kosovo. Given the importance of these deployments, we
anticipate that U.S. forces would maintain the highest morale and
effectiveness while fulfilling the range of military objectives
encompassed by these deployments, including refugee relief operations
and the anticipated contribution to the international security force in
Kosovo. Indeed, it has been our experience that personnel serving in
these important and demanding positions experience higher retention
rates than in other, less challenging assignments. The Department of
Defense has underway extensive and effective programs to do what is
necessary to manage personnel and other resources so as to reduce
problems such as extended family separation and other burdens military
service. As with any operational deployment, the effects on readiness
are mixed. In this case, however, it is expected that many of the U.S.
forces will be conducting operations as they were trained to perform,
which will provide an unparalleled opportunity to apply their skills in
an active environment. The Administration is committed to ensuring that
America's armed forces maintain the high levels of readiness necessary
to safeguard America's national security.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate.
This letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on June 7.