[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 35, Number 18 (Monday, May 10, 1999)]
[Pages 811-819]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Interview With European Journalists at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany

May 6, 1999

Objectives in Kosovo

    Q. Thank you for coming. It's great to have you here. We understand 
you do have a very tight schedule. For NATO it is a difficult and 
challenging time, so we do very much appreciate that you join us and 
discuss these matters and questions with us, and we share your views on 
it.
    Just last week you said, ``We know what the final outcome in Kosovo 
will be. Serbian forces will leave, and an international security force 
will be deployed. Refugees will return with security and self-
government.'' Why are you so optimistic? Have we actually come closer to 
that prospect?
    The President. I believe we have. First of all, we still have an 
Alliance that, if anything, is more united than ever, after we met in 
Washington. I was yesterday in Brussels to get a report from General 
Naumann and General Clark on the progress of the campaign. I'm convinced 
that we are making good progress, that we are coming closer to our 
objectives. I think that Mr. Milosevic's military and economic apparatus 
of control in Yugoslavia has been weakened.
    I believe we're coming closer on the diplomatic front. I met for a 
long time with Mr. Chernomyrdin, and he met with--several more hours 
with Vice President Gore in Washington this week. Russia had previously 
accepted political terms of the agreement in Rambouillet that there 
ought to be security and autonomy for the people of Kosovo.
    So we're not there yet, but I think it's important, too, for the 
world community, and especially for the people of Europe, to have some 
perspective here. The campaign that Mr. Milosevic has carried out in 
Kosovo was meticulously planned many months in advance. It was almost 
implemented in October last year. He decided not to do it then in the 
face of the NATO threats, but he had 40,000 troops on the ground and 
almost 300 tanks. So he could have done what he did at any time.
    What we have to do is to reverse the ethnic cleansing, and I believe 
it can be done. I am absolutely confident that as long as we all stay 
together, which we seem determined to do--I certainly am, and I feel 
very good about where the other European leaders are--this will prevail. 
It will happen. And it's just a question of our being patient and 
persistent and understanding what we're up against and what we have to 
do.

[[Page 812]]

Responsibility for Ethnic Cleansing

    Q. Mr. President, we're going to take it in turn, so it will swing 
back and forth. My question is about your attitude, your thoughts about 
President Milosevic in Belgrade, and it's in a couple of parts. My first 
simple question is, do you believe that Milosevic should be held 
personally, directly responsible for the ethnic cleansing that you've 
described many times and for the massacres that you've described many 
times?
    The President. Well, of course, that ultimately is a decision to be 
made by the war crimes tribunal itself. It's a legal question----
    Q. But morally, as well as legally.
    The President. But I think, morally, there is no question that, not 
only here but earlier in Bosnia, what happened was the direct result of 
a carefully calculated campaign to, first of all, bring Mr. Milosevic to 
power and then to enhance his power based on an idea of Greater Serbia, 
which required the dehumanization, the delegitimization of the Muslim 
people, first of Bosnia and then of Kosovo, and that, following from 
that, there are lots of records that the International Red Cross and 
other humanitarian agencies have amassed, that the U.N. has amassed 
about the practices of Serbian troops, of the paramilitaries. Just in 
Kosovo, we have story after story of horrible stories of people being--
men being tied up together and burned alive. And there has also been, 
beyond the murder and the rape and the dislocation, there's been a 
determined effort, first in Bosnia, now in Kosovo, to destroy the 
personal records of people's presence on their land, as well as the 
historical and cultural records and obviously the religious sites of a 
people. So I think we have a big record here.
    Q. But Mr. President, if that is the record and ultimately it lies 
at the doorstep of Mr. Milosevic, how can there be even an imagined 
settlement in which Mr. Milosevic essentially climbs down, accepts the 
conditions that you've laid

out and is still the President of Yugoslavia and, ultimately, still holds 
sovereignty over Kosovo and the people who will return to Kosovo? Because 
you say you want them to live with security and dignity, but how is that 
conceivable?

    The President. Well, if there is an international force that has 
NATO at its core, but also has other countries--I would welcome the 
Russians' participation there; I think it's important--so that there is 
genuine protection for the people of Kosovo, and they have the genuine 
autonomy that they enjoyed under the constitution that Mr. Tito put in 
and that was taken away by Mr. Milosevic 10 years ago, I think they can 
plainly do that.
    Q. Even with Milosevic in power?
    The President. Yes. Now, as long as he and Serbia pursue the course 
they have pursued and basically assert the right to destroy people's 
lives and heritage because of their religious and ethnic background, 
they will never be full partners in Europe. But we can protect the 
Kosovars, just as we have worked out a solution in Bosnia.
    And I think the alternative to your suggestion, sir, would be 
something that no one has suggested, and that is that the international 
community, in effect, declare war on Yugoslavia and march on Belgrade. 
If that is not to happen, and our goals never entail that--our goals 
were bring the Kosovars home, let them live in security, let them live 
with the autonomy that, clearly, they deserve and have to have now to 
have any sense of a normal life--then those goals can be achieved with 
an enforceable agreement with Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade.
    To what extent he bears personal responsibility as a matter of law, 
that has to be dealt with by the tribunal. But the main thing that I 
would like people to understand is that throughout history we have had 
examples, throughout all history, of ethnic cleansing. In my own 
country, we had horrible examples of Native American tribes being moved 
off their land and killed in large numbers, with people claiming a 
religious mandate, over a hundred years ago, and we're still paying for 
it. We're still trying to overcome it. We had the example of slavery 
that we're still trying to completely overcome.
    But this is the end of the 20th century, a century in which, if we 
didn't learn anything, we learned that we cannot tolerate this kind of 
behavior. We all have to live together, to cherish each other's common 
humanity and celebrate our differences, not use them

[[Page 813]]

to exterminate each other. No modern country can define its greatness by 
its ability to dehumanize a group of people. And I think we can achieve 
what we're trying to achieve here if these conditions can be met.
    You know, people ask me all the time how this can be done, but we, 
eventually--it took too long, and it's one of my great regrets that it 
did take so long in Bosnia, but it was done there. And we're acting far 
more quickly in Kosovo, and I think as a consequence of that, even 
though, now, it seems agonizingly slow, I think when this is over and 
you look back at it, you'll say it happened more quickly, and therefore, 
a higher percentage of the people did go home and went home much more 
quickly than has been the case in Bosnia.

Serbian Release of Ibrahim Rugova

    Q. Mr. President, I have a longer question than my colleague from 
the BBC. It's a four-part question. Obviously, the subject is Mr. 
Rugova. Mr. President, were you consulted by the Italian Government 
prior to this initiative? And how do you consider this Italian 
initiative, as a positive development? Are you interested in meeting Mr. 
Rugova, and is Mr. Rugova at this point the best political interlocutor 
for the Allies? And finally, do you see Rugova's departure from Pristina 
as a good will gesture by Milosevic that should be reciprocated by the 
Allies?
    The President. Well, first, let me say Prime Minister D'Alema 
attempted to call me yesterday when I was making my rounds with the 
American troops, and I spoke with him early this morning. We had a very 
good talk, and I think he will have more to say later today.
    I have also met with Mr. Rugova in the White House, and I have a 
very high opinion of him, so I was very pleased that he was released.
    Q. What did you say to Mr. D'Alema, Prime Minister D'Alema?
    The President. That I was very pleased that he was released; I felt 
good that he had come to Italy; that Prime Minister D'Alema has been a 
very strong partner in what we have tried to do together; that I think 
that this could turn out to be quite a positive development because, I 
believe, Mr. Rugova will again affirm his desire to see Kosovo be 
autonomous, be secure. I think he understands the need for an 
international security presence. So I see this as a positive 
development.
    I think--now, you ask me what were the motives. One of your 
questions was why did Mr. Milosevic do this. I think for two reasons, 
probably: one is, he may be moving closer to accepting the basic 
conditions necessary to resolve this matter. And if so, he may want as 
many leaders as possible with whom to deal, and Mr. Rugova is known for 
his devotion to nonviolence, and therefore, he may see that as a 
positive event if he is going to make an agreement. Secondly, I feel the 
same way I did when the American soldiers were released. I think this 
should be evidence to all of you that the determination and unity of 
NATO to persist until this matter is resolved is having an impact in 
Belgrade.
    Q. So should this good will gesture be reciprocated by the Allies?
    The President. Well, I don't know that it's a good will gesture to 
release a nonviolent leader of a country who never did anything wrong in 
the first place and shouldn't have been, in effect, under house arrest. 
I think that Mr. Milosevic did this because he thought it was in his 
interest. And I'm glad Mr. Rugova is free, but I want over one million 
Kosovars to be able to go home.
    And I think we should do what is necessary--the most important good 
will gesture NATO can make, and the European allies, the United States, 
and Canada can make, is to do whatever is necessary to resolve this as 
quickly as possible. That's the most humane thing we can do, and that's 
what I intend to do.
    Q. And will you meet Rugova again?
    The President. If he would like to, I would be happy to meet him. I 
like him very much. I appreciate what he's tried to do. He's been 
through a lot. I think that there are--you asked another question that I 
don't think is for the United States to answer, or even for NATO to 
answer, which is whether he or anyone else should be the designated 
spokesperson for the Kosovars. That is for the--we believe in democracy. 
We believe there has to be some way for the people themselves to decide 
who speaks for them.

[[Page 814]]

    And let me remind you, the thing that was important about the 
agreement that was reached in France is that all the elements of the 
Kosovars said, ``Okay, we'll lay down our arms. We'll stop the fighting. 
We will live in peace if we have the security of an international force 
to protect our autonomy and to protect our safety.'' If all elements do 
that--that is, if they also are still willing to meet our conditions, 
then the position of our country should be that we're trying to make 
self-government possible for these people, not to tell them who should 
govern. It's not the right thing to do.
    Q. Mr. President, as you know, they are divided, the Kosovar 
Albanians are divided----
    The President. Of course, they are.
    Q. The KLA have already said that Mr. Rugova has no mandate to 
negotiate. So whom do you regard as an interlocutor and as a 
representative of the Kosovar Albanians----
    The President. My position is that all the elements of leadership in 
Kosovo took a position at Rambouillet, and what we're trying to do is to 
fulfill the minimum conditions for that. After that, there is plenty of 
time after that for them to decide how to organize their internal 
political life, as long as all the parties remain committed to the 
principle that they will lay down their arms, and they will be 
nonviolent, if we have return of refugees, the security of an 
international force, and a withdrawal of the Serb forces. If those 
conditions are met--and then the other thing--I want to remind everyone 
of this--the other thing NATO committed to do, which is why I would 
welcome the Russians and others to participate, is we committed to 
protect the security and physical and personal integrity of all the 
people who live in Kosovo, including the Serb minority. Now, if 
everybody still wanted to live by that, then the Kosovars themselves 
will have to decide how to organize their political life after that is 
over. Our objective is to get them back, to get the Serb forces out, the 
Kosovars back in, and have the international security force there.

International Security Force for Kosovo

    Q. Mr. President, you are here as the Commander in Chief of the 
last, if only one, superpower. Can you assure us today that there will 
be an international security force in Kosovo, and when? How many 
soldiers do you need to be in that force, whoever they are? Do you agree 
with Jacques Chirac that this force should be under the mandate of the 
U.N. Security Council? And last, who will be the lead for the force, 
will it be a U.S., an American general, to lead the force in Kosovo?
    The President. First, I think it's important that there be an 
international security force, that NATO be at the core of it, because 
otherwise, I don't think the Kosovars will go

home. And it would be a terrible thing to set this up and not have it work.

    I think other nations should be involved because of all the 
historical, cultural, religious elements involved in this region. I hope 
the Russians will be there, and I hope others will be. I would welcome a 
U.N. sanction. It would be far better if the United Nations embraced 
this. And it would be most likely to work, I think, if it worked 
something has happened in Bosnia.
    So, in terms of how many and who does what, those are things that 
would have to be worked out by the people who are in a better position 
to do that and particularly the military people who would know what is 
necessary to maintain security not only for the Kosovars but for the 
people who will be asked to go there and whose lives will be put at 
risk. But I think that could be worked out rather easily if we can get 
broad agreement that it will be done, that there will be broad 
participation. And I think, if that can happen, then I believe the 
United Nations Security Council and the U.N. as a whole would endorse 
it.

Group of Eight Agreement

    Q. But when you will leave Germany tonight, can you be determined 
and can you be assured that they will be in agreement today? As you 
know, there will be a G-8 meeting. Do you think they will be in 
agreement on the principle of that force and that this force will go to 
Kosovo at some point before the end of the summer, or even----
    The President. Obviously, I don't know exactly what day it will 
occur, because that depends upon what happens in the days

[[Page 815]]

ahead, on the diplomatic front, on the military front, and that depends 
in part on what happens in the weather, in the skies above us. But I can 
tell you this: I have no intention of changing policies until the basic 
conditions are met.
    I will stay at it for as long as it takes. And therefore, I can tell 
you that, insofar as the United States and our Allies have anything to 
do about it, the Kosovars will go home.
    Now, you asked me today can I assure you that the G-8 will make an 
agreement today. I think they're getting closer. Obviously, it depends 
upon where the Russians will be today and because they're part of the G-
8. But they've worked very hard to reach a common understanding. They're 
getting closer, and I wouldn't be surprised if it happens today. If it 
doesn't happen today, I think it will happen soon. I think we're working 
very hard to work through this.
    And the thing I have asked the Russians to consider is not to treat 
these basic conditions of ours as if they are negotiable, because they 
are basically what is--it's not about politics. This is about what would 
be necessary to actually have this thing work. You have over a million 
people who have left their homes. Why would they go back? What will it 
take to get them back? What will it take to relieve the pressure on 
Macedonia, on Albania, on the other frontline states? What would it 
take, once they got back, for people to actually live in peace? That's 
all these conditions do. There are lots of other things that we can talk 
about, but these basic conditions are necessary to make it work.
    And since it is obvious that politically it would work better if the 
Russians were a part of it, just as they have been an integral part of 
what happened in Bosnia, giving real credibility to the international 
force there, I think there's a good chance we can get a G-8 agreement.

Conditions for Bombing Pause

    Q. There would be no pause then before this force will go to Kosovo 
in the bombing--there will be no pause in the campaign of bombing until 
there is agreement for that?
    The President. Well, at the NATO Summit we adopted a position on 
that, and I think I should just simply repeat our position. Our position 
is that in order to have a pause in bombing, there would have to be an 
agreement to an international force with NATO at the core, an agreement 
for the Serb forces to withdraw, for the refugees to return, and the 
beginning of a withdrawal. That is the position that NATO adopted. And I 
want to just restate what our common position is. Nineteen countries 
took it, and I have to honor it.

Vision for Southeast Europe

    Q. Mr. President, you are fully right saying this is not about 
politics. Something about politics, sir--people in Macedonia, both 
Albanians and Macedonians, are very much concerned for their future. And 
I think all nations from the Balkans are very much concerned for the 
perspectives of the region. We are seeing that you're confronting Mr. 
Milosevic for almost a decade on the tactical level. What we are not 
seeing is that anyone is offering to the region any kind of a plan for a 
wider integration.
    It's not only of money; it's not only a Marshall plan;

 it's something that people will have to hope for, something which will 
show their perspectives as a region. Do you think about some kind of 
developing a plan?

    The President. Yes.
    Q. Will you elaborate a little bit, sir?
    The President. Yes. As I have worked on this over the last 6 years, 
first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, it has become clear to me that the 
United States and Europe have spent perhaps--well, I wouldn't say too 
much time because we had to do it, but we have spent most of our time 
trying to keep bad things from happening or, if something bad happens, 
to try to either reverse it or minimize it. We have spent too little 
time imagining how to make good things happen in the Balkans and in 
southeastern Europe. And yet, much good has happened.
    The President of Bulgaria said at the NATO meeting, he said, ``The 
problem we have is that we have freedom, but we have no prosperity, and 
we don't have a vision of where we're all going together in the 
future.'' And I think that there are a lot of myths about your part of 
the world that have caught on in Europe and in the United States--you 
know, that, ``Well, the Balkans people have

[[Page 816]]

fought for centuries, and there will always be contention. It's just a 
problem to be managed.'' And that, I think, is a violation of, first of 
all, the accurate history of the region and, secondly, of the integrity 
and potential of the people.
    So several weeks ago, for about a week before the NATO Summit, I 
went out to San Francisco and talked to the American newspaper editors 
and said that we could never hope to have the right sort of future for 
all of Europe until we had a positive vision for southeastern Europe, 
that included not only an economic revitalization package that would 
embrace, obviously, the people who are in conflict today but the larger 
region of southeastern Europe, but a political package that would both 
tie the free nations closer to the rest of Europe and bring them closer 
to each other.
    I think that one of the things that we have learned in the aftermath 
of the cold war is that there are plenty of things, forces, that will 
pull people apart if they're exploited--religious and ethnic 
differences--and it's no good for me or anyone else just to stand up and 
keep giving a sermon about how, well, people should be nice to each 
other, and they should pull together. There needs to be a magnet, a 
stronger force pulling people together than the forces pulling people 
apart. That means there has to be an economic revitalization program 
that embraces the region. That means there has to be a political 
strategy to integrate the region more closely to Europe and to bring 
people together.
    Think about it. Think about Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Albania, 
all the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the independent republics 
within it. If you think about it, if they were working together, think 
how much better they would all be, including the Serbs, if they were 
working together and if they were making money together and if they 
thought they had a future with Europe, with the United States, and with 
Russia. If there was some integrated vision, then you would fight this 
total rush to disintegration we've seen over the last decade.
    Q. Are there any deadlines in this kind of vision----
    The President. Well, I think, first of all, to implement it, I think 
we should begin as soon as possible. And the Europeans are working on it 
now. We have to decide what will the role of the EU be, what will the 
role of the OSCE be, what will the role of the United States be. But I 
feel very strongly about it.
    You know, we spent--the United States has invested, just in the last 
month, almost $90 million in humanitarian aid. And we have a package 
moving through the Congress now that has about $700 million more. And I 
believe we should do this. And I worry very much about the burdens that 
this crisis impose on Macedonia and Albania in particular. But the truth 
is that is would be better for all of us if we were free to spend the 
money to build a long-term economic future for Macedonia, a long-term 
economic future for Albania. Especially--Macedonia has recently resolved 
a lot of its difficulties with Greece; there is more trade and 
investment going on here. This is the direction of the future.
    So when we get the Kosovo crisis behind us, we should be focusing 
much more on this future we imagined for southeastern Europe. This is 
also--to go back to your question--this is particularly important for 
Italy, because Italy has paid a big economic price for this crisis.
    Q. Is the plan going to include Serbia? Are you going to offer some 
kind of perspective for Serbia, as well, because it seems to be 
important?
    The President. Well, first of all, I think it would be better if it 
did long-term, because Serbia is a big part of southeastern Europe and a 
big part of the Balkans. I think the extent to which the plan includes 
Serbia depends almost entirely on how the Serbians behave.
    You're not going to have--let's just take Romania, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, and Albania, and Bosnia is still in a lot of trouble. Just 
take those countries. Here they are without anything like the industrial 
base of Serbia, anything like the wealth. And they're struggling to be 
democratic, to be free. Romania solves its problems with Hungary. They 
make their border and their ethnic resolution and under much more 
adverse circumstances. And the Serbs are continuing to promote ethnic 
cleansing when these other countries are

[[Page 817]]

promoting diversity, respect for human rights, democracy.
    Now, it would be much better--how can you have the Balkans without 
Belgrade? It would be much better if they were a part of it, but it 
depends on their conduct. They cannot be part of something that they 
don't share the values of. The principles of this cooperation have to 
be: respect for the independence of countries, respect for the integrity 
of people, respect for human rights, respect for religious and ethnic 
diversity, and then a common respect for economic cooperation, and then 
some framework for it.
    But I would far rather be in a position to see the United States 
investing in the growth and prosperity and cooperation of the region 
than building temporary housing for a million refugees. And unless we 
have a positive vision for the Balkans, we will be back with a crisis 
like this again in a few years.
    Q. In 5 years.
    The President. Yes.

Future Political Status of Kosovo

    Q. Mr. President, how does the American administration see the 
future political status of Kosovo? Do you still oppose independence?
    The President. The NATO Alliance voted to support, in effect, an 
international protected autonomous status for Kosovo. And I believe that 
that is the best thing to do now, because I believe that it would be 
very difficult--I see the struggles of Albania, I see the struggles of 
Macedonia. I think it would be even more difficult for Kosovo to be 
economically and politically self-sufficient. And I think that if there 
were a big independence movement now, you would have this whole 
counterfear that, ``Oh, well, we used to be worried about Greater 
Serbia; now is it Greater Albania?'' You would have all these arguments 
back and forth.
    And I believe the best outcome for Kosovo, the best outcome, would 
be to prove that the people of Kosovo could live together in peace and 
harmony and security. There is a Serb minority in Kosovo, as you know. I 
think this will be hard now because a lot of the people will go home, 
and they will say their neighbors turned their backs on me when I was 
run away. And the Kosovars will have to find a lot of forgiveness in 
their heart to live with their neighbors. I'm sure of that. But if you 
accept the vision for the future that we just discussed, that we want to 
try to bring the people of the Balkans and southeast Europe together, 
and then to bring them closer to the rest of Europe, economically and 
politically, I think we can more likely further that vision if Kosovo is 
protected by an international force in its integrity as an independent 
or autonomous part of Serbia. That's what I believe.
    Now, again, what happens over the long run in Kosovo will depend a 
great deal on how the Serbians behave and how the government behaves. 
But I believe that the position that the NATO Allies unanimously took to 
support autonomy and a protected status is the better course, based on 
where we are now and the kind of future we're trying to build. Whether 
it can be sustained over the long run--and I know what you're thinking 
by the implication of your question--whether it can be sustained over 
the long run will depend upon how the Serbs conduct themselves.
    Q. Mr. President, I understand, unfortunately, our time is up. So 
let me say thank you for joining us and answering our questions. And 
have a good day and visit.
    The President. I would just like to say one thing before I close, 
because you all represent, well, a broad spectrum of European opinion, 
and I know this has been a frustrating and difficult thing for Europe, 
as well as agony for the people of southeastern Europe. But I think 
there are a lot of things to be hopeful about here. After all, this 
endeavor in which NATO has been involved, we never had to do anything 
like this before. We had to do something like this in Bosnia, but not so 
much was involved by the time we actually moved in '95.
    I think that all of us felt when the Kosovo situation

came up, we had our nightmares of Bosnia. And we all wondered if we had 
moved more quickly, if we could have saved more lives and avoided more 
difficulty there. And so here you have this unusual situation where you're 
trying to get 19 countries, all with their own political situations, all 
with their own dynamics in the country, all with

[[Page 818]]

their history of relating to the various countries in the region, to get 
together and pursue a common policy consistent with the facts on the 
ground. And I don't think you should be discouraged by the fact that 
instant results were not obtained.

    But we are fighting for a very important principle. The 21st century 
world will either be dominated by greater economic and political 
cooperation and harmony among peoples of different background or it will 
be dominated by a disintegrationist vision of religious and racial and 
ethnic exclusivity. And you see it in most of the conflicts in the world 
today.
    So this is a very important thing that is being done here. And we 
have to prevail because I would like the troubles of the Balkans to be 
viewed as the last typical conflict of the 20th century, rather than the 
first typical conflict of the 21st century. So we have to be patient and 
firm and understand that this is a highly unusual thing for 19 countries 
to be trying to work their way through this.

End of the Kosovo Conflict

    Q. When do you see the need of the war, Mr. President? Everybody is 
worried in Europe, when is the war over?
    The President. Well, that's the wrong worry. That's the wrong worry. 
What the people of Europe need to know is that their governments are 
doing the right thing and that it will be over, and that when it 
finishes, it will finish in a way that will permit Europe to be united 
and democratic and free for the first time in the history of the 
continent.
    Now, that is quite an achievement. And it is worth waiting for. It 
will not drag on for years. We're not talking about endlessly. But we 
cannot expect an instantaneous result. This is worth--I would say to the 
people of Europe, support your leaders. After all, look at this: We have 
the governments of the left and governments of the right, all coming 
together to support this, because they understand they can make this the 
last war of Europe's 20th century, not the typical conflict of the 21st 
century. This is very important. It's worth waiting for. I'm not talking 
about years, but we shouldn't say, ``Well, it's not finished by next 
Wednesday, we want to quit.'' We can't do that.
    Q. Mr. President, some people would say it's worth not only fighting 
for, because of the principles you've outlined, but also fighting very 
hard for. And some people wonder if you have the right strategy and the 
right contingency plans if Milosevic proves more difficult to move.
    The President. Well, we're updating our contingency plan. We 
authorized the military committee of NATO to upgrade their assessment of 
what would be required if we had to send in forces in a nonpermissive 
environment, and what is happening.
    Q. You mean that's the ground force debate that everybody constantly 
talks about?
    The President. Yes. We authorized that. But you have to understand, 
we believe, I believe this strategy will work. This is not something, 
oh, we're doing this because we can't do that. And there are--what the 
NATO powers are struggling for is to achieve our objective in Kosovo, to 
do it in a way that brings Europe closer together, and, as I said, I 
think it's helpful to think--makes this the last typical conflict of the 
20th century, not the first representative conflict of the 21st century.
    That means we're trying to do it in a way that preserves our unity 
to the maximum extent possible. Keep in mind, we have Greece still in 
NATO. This is a very difficult problem. It's hard in Italy, but it's 
really hard in Greece. And they are staying in NATO, right there, going 
along here. And we are working with Russia to try to effect through 
diplomacy these basic conditions and then something like what we had in 
Bosnia. So the strategy we are pursuing is not because the United States 
or Britain or some other country says, ``Oh, we're afraid of ground 
forces.'' It's because we believe, a, it will work, and b, if it works, 
this is the method most likely to assure long-term European unity.
    And so again I say, be patient with your leaders and be persistent 
and be determined. This will work. And it is worth paying the price of a 
little time, because the stakes are very high.

Note: The interview began at approximately 9:23 a.m. In his remarks, the 
President referred to Gen. Klaus Naumann, chairman, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization Military Committee; Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe; President Slobodan Milosevic of

[[Page 819]]

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); Special 
Envoy and former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia; Prime 
Minister Massimo D'Alema of Italy; Ibrahim Rugova, leader, Democratic 
League of Kosovo; President Peter Stoyanov of Bulgaria. The President 
also referred to the European Union (EU); and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A tape was not available for 
verification of the content of this interview.