[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 35, Number 18 (Monday, May 10, 1999)]
[Pages 805-807]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Interview With Tom Brokaw of the National Broadcasting Corporation 
Aboard Air Force One

May 4, 1999

Russian Peace Initiative

    Tom Brokaw. Mr. President, diplomatic flurry may be an 
overstatement--there's something percolating, obviously. Is there 
anything that you find encouraging at all in what we've seen in the last 
couple of days with the Russian connection?
    The President. Yes. I am encouraged because, first of all, I think 
it's a good thing for the Russians to be aggressively involved in trying 
to find a diplomatic solution, as long as it's a real solution to the 
problem. The conditions that we and our NATO Allies have laid out are 
not designed to win some victory over Serbia; they're designed to 
establish the minimum necessary for the mission to succeed, for the 
Kosovars to go home to live in security and autonomy.
    To do that, you've got to get the Serb forces out, and you have to 
have an international force there with NATO at its core, so it will 
work, so the Serbs will come back, so the armed elements within the 
Kosovar Albanians--excuse me, so the Albanians will come back, the 
Kosovars will come back--and so the armed elements there will disarm and 
will accept the peace.
    Now, that's what's necessary to happen. And I think if the Russians 
get to the point where they can truly embrace that position and argue it 
to the Serbs, I think that will be very helpful.
    Mr. Brokaw. But does Chernomyrdin buy your scenario?
    The President. Well, what he's tried to do, obviously, is to assess 
what he thinks Mr. Milosevic will buy. But there's a subtext here I 
think is important to get out, too, which is this shows that the 
Russians are more than willing, themselves, to be involved in a 
peacekeeping force, and that others coming out of that neck of the woods 
who share religious and ethnic ties to the Serbs may be willing to 
participate, as well, which will give the right feel and look and 
substance to this.
    You know, I've always said we would only go in there if we were 
permitted to protect the Serb minority, as well as the Kosovar 
Albanians. So I think that this is basically helpful. But I don't want 
to oversell it because there's been no kind of diplomatic breakthrough 
here. It cannot be a bad thing to have a man of Mr. Chernomyrdin's 
stature, his obvious closeness to President Yeltsin, vigorously doing 
what he's doing out there. I think that's important.
    Mr. Brokaw. But there's not even a small light at the end of the 
tunnel at this point?
    The President. I wouldn't say that. I think the Russians have a much 
clearer understanding of why we have taken the position we have taken. 
And as they've gotten into the details of it, I think they understand 
what it would take actually to have this work. As I said to Mr. 
Chernomyrdin, I said, ``You

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know, if we try to do this the way Mr. Milosevic originally said he 
wanted it done, we'd be back here in 8 months having the same meeting 
all over again.''
    Mr. Brokaw. If you were an Albanian refugee--and there are now about 
a million, we think, altogether--would you go back home without the 
United States as the guarantor of your safety?
    The President. No. I wouldn't go back home without the United States 
and NATO, without our allies being involved there, not after what 
they've been through.
    And it's very important--I keep saying this to the American people--
it's very important, you can't divorce what happened in Kosovo from what 
happened for 4 years in Bosnia. These people know what not just ethnic 
cleansing, but religious cleansing is. The Muslims know what they've 
been subject to. And they want to go home, and it's soon enough from the 
expulsions that they will go home, eagerly, if they know they're going 
to be safe, if they know they're going to have their autonomy.
    And I think it's just imperative to the Russians, the more they come 
to grips with what it would take to make this work--instead of thinking 
about winners and losers--what would it take to make this work? Because 
they say they're for having the Kosovars go home, being safe, having 
autonomy--they understand that--then these conditions are what is 
necessary to make it work.
    You say, well, what's in it for the Serbs? Well, first

 of all, they shouldn't be rewarded for ethnic cleansing. But secondly, 
there is something in it. What's in it is that the Russians and others can 
be involved in the peacekeeping force, so it's not just the United States 
and NATO. Secondly, there's going to have to be a huge effort not only at 
rebuilding but at building a whole different future for the Balkans and 
southeastern Europe that bring these folks together around common economic 
goals. None of that can happen until this gets done.

Expenses Incurred in Kosovo Action

    Mr. Brokaw. Do you think that the United States--do you think that 
the American people have a full appreciation of just how long and 
expensive now our investment in the Balkans will be as a result of 
what's happened just in the last few months?
    The President. Well, I believe that they--first of all, the lion's 
share of our expense is being borne out because they're carrying a 
majority of the military burden, and we're paying quite a lot for the 
humanitarian assistance, which I think the American people want us to 
do, and the American citizens have been very generous in their private 
donations. I believe that the Europeans will carry the lion's share of 
the burden, the rebuilding and building an economic unit there that can 
relate to the EU and grow together.
    But it's in our interest to participate in that. That's a lot 
cheaper than having another European war. This is a lot cheaper than 
having another European war of the kind that we saw in the 20th century. 
And so I wish we didn't have to spend the money on this. I'll be happy 
to support contributing to the reconstruction of the area, and I think 
it will repay itself many times over in avoided problems and in new 
economic partners.
    Mr. Brokaw. A lot of people in the United States are now saying, how 
in the world can we have the Russians represent our interests there? 
We've spent 50 years trying to keep them out of the Balkans; now we're 
inviting them in. It's not in the interest of the United States to do 
that, they say.
    The President. But it is, if we all have the same goals. The 
Russians have worked with us side-by-side, our militaries, in Bosnia. We 
have worked well there together. We have served in the same area. The 
Russians have been willing to work with an American commander; they have 
related well to each other. The Russians have a relationship with NATO. 
We've done joint training exercises together.
    So if the Russians, who, after all, are now a democracy, will 
embrace the same objectives and will go in there in a way that ensures 
that there's no discrimination against the Serb minority in Kosovo, we 
can make a lot of progress, and we can work together.
    That's what we want. I've been working for a partnership for a 
democratic Russia since the day I got here, and I believe before I was 
here--I think that's what President Bush wanted to achieve with 
President Yeltsin. That enables us to keep reducing our

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nuclear stockpile. That enables us to secure the safety of their nuclear 
weapons. That enables us to work with them in positive ways to keep the 
transfer of dangerous technology from countries that shouldn't have it.
    So all these things I think are very important. There is a way that 
we could get a very large benefit here by strengthening our partnership 
with Russia over the long-run. But the basic conditions have to be met, 
because without the basic conditions being met, the mission will not 
succeed; we'll never get the Kosovars back home. We'll never have real 
security and autonomy. We'll have continuing military uprisings among 
the Kosovars, unless the basic conditions are met.

Note: The interview began at 6:36 p.m. aboard Air Force One en route to 
Brussels, Belgium. In his remarks, he referred to Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
Special Envoy and former Prime Minister, and President Boris Yelstin of 
Russia; and President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This interview was released by the 
Office of the Press Secretary on May 6. A tape was not available for 
verification of the content of this interview.