[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 35, Number 12 (Monday, March 29, 1999)]
[Pages 524-526]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Decision To Send 
Certain United States Forces to Macedonia

March 25, 1999

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)

    This is a report under section 8115 of the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-262), to inform you of my 
decision to send certain U.S. forces to Macedonia to enhance force 
protection for U.S. and other NATO forces in that nation, to support 
U.S. and NATO military activities in the region, to deter attacks on 
U.S. and NATO forces already in Macedonia, and to assist in preparing 
for a possible NATO peace implementation force in Kosovo. Over the past 
several weeks, non-U.S. NATO countries began a consensual deployment of 
national forces to Macedonia to prepare to implement a peace agreement 
in Kosovo, should one be signed. Approximately 10,000 non-U.S. NATO 
forces are now deployed to Macedonia and have been placed under NATO's 
operational control.
    As you know, the mandate for the U.N. Preventive Deployment 
(UNPREDEP) expired on February 28, 1999. Approximately 400 U.S. 
personnel are currently stationed in Macedonia in Task Force Able Sentry 
(TFAS). We expect that some elements of these forces will redeploy out 
of the area and that others, together with certain of the enabling 
forces described below, will continue to maintain the current TFAS 
infrastructure and will begin to prepare Camp Able Sentry as a potential 
staging area in Macedonia for a U.S. contribution to a NATO-led 
implementation force in Kosovo, if it is decided to provide one. 
Operational control of these forces for force protection purposes only 
has been transferred to NATO, as has been the case for the forces of 
certain other nations whose forces are participating in UNPREDEP.
    NATO, during the past month, decided to deploy elements of the 
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters (ARRC HQ) Rear Command Post to 
provide a command element in Macedonia and to ensure that there will be 
unity of command and a single NATO commander on the ground who will be 
in

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a position to allocate infrastructure, coordinate training facilities, 
and provide a single point of contact for liaison with the Macedonian 
authorities. In addition, the ARRC commander has been designated as the 
NATO commander responsible for protection of forces and reaction to 
possible threats in Macedonia. The ARRC HQ's Rear Command Post element 
includes approximately 30 U.S. personnel who occupy key positions on the 
staff, but who have not yet deployed to Macedonia to assume their roles 
there. Having those officers serving in their regular positions will 
enhance the safety of U.S. and other friendly military personnel and 
increase the effectiveness of the NATO presence.
    Sound military planning may also call for sending a limited number 
of additional U.S. military personnel to Macedonia in support of ongoing 
operations including Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), intelligence 
support, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, and 
logistical support, and selected forces and equipment to deter Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) attacks on NATO personnel in Macedonia. In 
addition, it may be become advisable to send U.S. military personnel to 
Macedonia as part of an enabling force in anticipation of the possible 
signing of a peace agreement, which remains our ultimate objective. 
These forces could include (besides those U.S. forces attached to the 
ARRC HQ), logistical support and survey elements and liaison officers, 
CSAR, intelligence support, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and 
control, as well as U.S. forces conducting rotational training at 
facilities in Macedonia. Their presence would not commit the United 
States to participating in a possible NATO-led peace implementation 
force; but prudent and limited preparatory activities in Macedonia would 
enhance the effectiveness of such a force, should we decide to 
participate, as well as enhance the effectiveness of NATO's air campaign 
and protection of the U.S. forces in TFAS that are already there. In 
regard to the elements of section 8115(a)(1)-(8), I am providing the 
following information:
    1 & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that the 
deployment of additional personnel to Macedonia as described above is 
necessary in the national security interests of the United States. These 
actions will preserve and protect critical infrastructure and Camp Able 
Sentry facilities, and will enhance the effectiveness of NATO's air 
campaign by ensuring U.S. forces are fully integrated into the ARRC HQ 
command and control structure; improving CSAR, reconnaissance and 
surveillance, and other capabilities to support the air operations by 
enhancing force protection from U.S. and other NATO personnel in 
Macedonia by helping deter attacks on Macedonia and NATO forces there, 
and by strengthening U.S. leadership in NATO.
    3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel who will assume their 
functions in the ARRC HQ is approximately 30. At this point, no 
decisions have been made on numbers of personnel who would be deployed 
for other functions. I will ensure that the Congress is informed in a 
timely manner about such additional deployments described in this report 
if these prove necessary. If U.S. personnel were sent as part of an 
enabling force, the number would likely not exceed 2,000.
    4. Mission/Objectives. The overall objective of our efforts with our 
allies is to maintain stability in the region and prevent a humanitarian 
disaster resulting from the ongoing FRY offensive against the people of 
Kosovo. The specific military mission of the forces to be deployed would 
be to enhance force protection both for NATO (including U.S. former 
UNPREDEP) military personnel in Macedonia and for allied fliers 
participating in the air operations, to contribute to the effectiveness 
of those operations, and to help deter FRY attacks on Macedonia and on 
NATO (including U.S.) forces in Macedonia. In addition, these forces 
will likely assist in preparations necessary for a NATO-led 
implementation force to be effective, if a decision were made to deploy 
one, after an agreement was reached.
    5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine how long 
NATO air operations will need to continue, and therefore how long the 
support and deterrence functions will need to be maintained. However, it 
is important to be clear that it is the U.S. position, shared by our 
allies, that NATO will continue air operations as long as necessary to 
meet

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the military objectives to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose 
so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing 
course; to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians 
in Kosovo; and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian military's 
capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.
    6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S. military 
presence in Macedonia will depend on the course of events, and in 
particular, on Belgrade's reaction to the air operations. So long as air 
operations continue, force protection, support for those operations, and 
deterrence from possible FRY acts of violence will continue to be 
required.
    7. Costs. The costs of the deployments covered by this notice like 
other costs of the air operations will be paid initially from FY99 
Defense O&M appropriations. An estimate of likely costs for these 
limited deployments is being prepared, and I will ensure that it is 
provided to the Congress as soon as it is available.
    8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. In the first instance, 
these deployments will have a positive effect on morale, retention and 
readiness because they will demonstrate the commitment of the necessary 
resources to maximize force protection for our personnel engaged in the 
air operations. United States forces participating in Task Force Able 
Sentry, as well as U.S. forces deployed to other locations in the 
region, are dedicated professionals serving with great pride and 
enthusiasm. Given the importance of the mission in Macedonia, we 
anticipate that U.S. forces would maintain the highest morale and 
effectiveness, just as they have in respect to other missions in the 
Balkans. Indeed, it has been our experience that personnel serving in 
these important and demanding positions experience higher retention 
rates than in other, less challenging assignments. However, we recognize 
that even deployments for the best of reasons increase the periods of 
separation from family and add other burdens to military service. The 
Department of Defense has underway extensive and effective programs to 
do what is necessary to manage personnel and other resources so as to 
reduce these problems. As with any operational deployment, the effects 
on readiness for other operations are mixed. On the one hand, the 
personnel involved gain invaluable real world experience. On the other 
hand, normal training programs are interrupted. The numbers of personnel 
covered by this report are sufficiently limited, however, that any 
effect on the overall readiness of our U.S. Armed Services to meet other 
requirements, including major theater war contingencies, will be 
marginal. Finally, in accordance with sections 8115(b)(2) and (c), I 
have determined that it is necessary to order a Marine FAST team to 
Skopje, Macedonia, to protect our Embassy and U.S. persons at the 
Embassy. This team will remain deployed for as long as is necessary to 
protect our Embassy and U.S. persons.
    Sincerely,
                                                  Bill Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate. 
This letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on March 
26.