[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 35, Number 12 (Monday, March 29, 1999)]
[Pages 519-520]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
<R04>
Remarks Prior to a Briefing With the National Security Team and an
Exchange With Reporters
March 25, 1999
Airstrikes on Serbian Targets
The President. I'm about to receive a briefing from the national
security team, as you can see. I'm very grateful that our crews returned
home safely after their work last night. And I'm very grateful that the
United States Congress has expressed its support for them.
I want to say again that our purpose here is to prevent a
humanitarian catastrophe or a wider war. Our objective is to make it
clear that Serbia must either choose peace or we will limit its ability
to make war. And we're going to get a briefing and lay further plans
today.
Q. Mr. President, yesterday you listed in the briefing room three
objectives of the airstrikes, but among them was not a demand that
Milosevic return to the negotiating table if he signed a peace
agreement. Yet, others in the administration are saying this morning
that is a precondition for ending the strike. What are the facts?
The President. Well, he has to choose peace, or we have to try to
limit his ability to make war. That's what we're trying to do. And I
think that's been very clear. If you look at what happened at the
Rambouillet talks, the arrangement was basically supported by all of
Europe, the United States, the Kosovars. The Russians agreed that it was
a fair agreement. They did not agree to the military involvement of
NATO, but they agreed that it was a fair agreement. Only Mr. Milosevic
and the Serbs declined to deal with the evident responsibility they have
to choose the path of peace instead of the path of aggression and war.
So I think that it is clear--I don't know how to make it any
clearer--that we either have to have a choice for peace by Serbia, not
just stopping the killing for an hour or two but a choice for peace, or
we will do our best to limit their ability to make war on those people.
Exit Strategy
Q. What is the exit strategy?
The President. The exit strategy is what it always is in a military
operation. It's when the mission is completed.
NATO Ground Troops
Q. Do you believe the Kosovars can be safe without the intervention
of ground troops from NATO? Can your goals be achieved just through
airstrikes?
The President. I do. I believe we can create a situation in which we
have limited their ability to make war and thereby increase the
prospects that they can protect themselves better. I do believe that.
Russia
Q. What about Russians threatening to arm Belgrade?
The President. Well, you know, they have quite a lot of arms on
their own. They made a lot of arms in the former Yugoslavia. I told the
American people they had a very impressive air defense system, and they
had lots of other arms and weapons. I have no intention of supporting
any lifting of the arms embargo on Serbia. I think that would be a
terrible mistake. We would be far better off if they didn't have as many
arms as they do; then they would be out there making peace and
accommodating these ethnic differences and figuring out ways they can
live together.
Domestic Support
Q. Are you concerned that the American people aren't more strongly
behind you on this?
The President. No. I believe that many Americans really had not
thought a lot about this until the last 2 days. I hope that a lot of
them heard my presentation last night. I did my very best to explain
what we were doing and why, and I believe that a majority of them will
support what we're trying to do here. I also believe very strongly that
it is my responsibility to make this judgment based on what I think is
in the long-term interests of the American people.
Kosovo Peace Process
Q. [Inaudible]--achieve peace or you will limit his ability to make
war, but need he come back to the conference table?
The President. I think he knows what needs to be done.
[[Page 520]]
Note: The President spoke at 12:10 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White
House. In his remarks, he referred to President Slobodan Milosevic of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). A tape was
not available for verification of the content of these remarks.