[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 34, Number 46 (Monday, November 16, 1998)]
[Pages 2301-2307]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Continuation of the Emergency 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

November 12, 1998

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)

    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation 
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction''--WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I 
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit 
to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. 
Indeed, on July 28, 1998, I issued Executive Order 13094 to strengthen 
Executive Order 12938 by, inter alia, broadening the types of 
proliferation activity that is subject to potential penalties. I am, 
therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on 
November 14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998. 
Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in 
Executive Order 12938, as amended, and have sent the attached notice of 
extension to the Federal Register for publication.
    On July 28, 1998, I amended section 4 of Executive Order 12938 so 
that the United States Government could more effectively respond to the 
worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation 
activities. The amendment to section 4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 
in several significant ways. The amendment broadens the type of 
proliferation activity that subjects entities to potential penalties 
under the Executive order. The original Executive order provided for 
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign country, 
project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or stockpile 
chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive order also covers 
contributions to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles 
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the 
amendment expands the original Executive order to include attempts to 
contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as well as actual 
contributions, and broadens the range of potential penalties to 
expressly include the prohibition of United States Government assistance 
to foreign persons, as well as the prohibition of United States 
Government procurement and imports into the United States.
    The following report, which covers activities on or before October 
31, 1998, is made pursuant to section 204 of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section 401(c) of the National 
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding activities taken and 
money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional 
information on nuclear, missile, and/

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or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation concerns and 
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual Report 
on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to 
section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation 
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the Congress 
pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control 
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as 
the ``CBW Report.''

Nuclear Weapons

    In May, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear tests. 
In response, I imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as required by 
the Glenn Amendment. Beyond our unilateral response, world reaction was 
pronounced and included nearly universal condemnation across a broad 
range of international fora and a broad range of sanctions, including 
new restrictions on lending by international financial institutions 
unrelated to basic human needs and aid from the G-8 and other countries.
    Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. sanctions, we have worked 
unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the United 
Nations to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps toward 
creating operational nuclear forces, to urge them to join multilateral 
arms control efforts, to persuade them to prevent an arms race and build 
confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve 
their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security 
Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of 
concrete actions. The United States has over the past 5 months focused 
most intensely on several objectives that can be met over the short and 
medium term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional 
adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); a 
moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and 
other explosive devices, and engagement in productive negotiations on a 
fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); restraint in deployment of 
nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and adoption of controls meeting 
international standards on exports of sensitive materials and 
technology.
    Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and 
Pakistan, U.S. high-level dialogue with Indian and Pakistani officials 
has yielded some progress. Both governments, having already declared 
testing moratoria, indicated publicly that they are prepared to adhere 
to the CTBT under certain conditions. Both withdrew their opposition to 
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on 
Disarmament session. They have also pledged to institute strict control 
of sensitive exports that meet internationally accepted standards. In 
addition, they have resumed bilateral dialogue on outstanding disputes, 
including Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary level.
    In recognition of these positive steps and to encourage further 
progress, I decided on November 3 to exercise my authority under the 
Brownback provision of the 1999 Omnibus Appropriations bill (Public Law 
105-277) to waive some of the Glenn sanctions. Through this action, I 
have authorized the resumption of Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, Trade and Development Agency, and International 
Military Education and Training programs in India and Pakistan and have 
lifted restrictions on U.S. banks in these countries. We will continue 
discussions with both governments at the senior and expert levels, and 
our diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5 and in international 
fora.
    So far, 150 countries have signed and 21 have ratified the CTBT. 
During 1998, CTBT signatories conducted numerous meetings of the 
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid 
completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by 
the Treaty.
    On September 23, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, 
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. The CTBT will 
serve several U.S. national security interests by prohibiting all 
nuclear explosions. It will constrain the development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of advanced new 
types;

[[Page 2303]]

contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of 
nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. 
The CTBT marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear 
threat and to build a safer world.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its 1998 Plenary in 
Edinburgh, Scotland, March 30 to April 2, on the twentieth anniversary 
of the publication of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. With 35 member 
states, the NSG is a mature, effective, and widely accepted export-
control arrangement. Over the past 7 years the NSG has established a 
Dual-Use Regime (DUR), agreed to require full-scope safeguards as a 
condition of nuclear supply, created an effective Joint Information 
Exchange, and strengthened controls over technology and retransfers. The 
NSG is considering further activities to promote regime transparency, 
following the success of the 1997 Vienna transparency seminar, and is 
preparing for a transparency seminar in New York during the run-up to 
the 1999 NPT PrepCom.
    The NSG is considering membership for Belarus, China, Cyprus, 
Kazakhstan and Turkey. China is the only major nuclear supplier that is 
not a member of the NSG, although China did join the Zangger Committee 
last year and recently has expressed an interest in learning more about 
the NSG.
    The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee has demonstrated its continued 
relevance to the multilateral nonproliferation regime as the interpreter 
of Article III-2 of the NPT by the membership of China in October 1997 
by recently agreeing to a statement deploring the Indian and Pakistani 
nuclear tests. This is the first time the Zangger Committee has ever 
issued a statement not directly related to publication of its 
Guidelines. Furthermore, the Zangger Committee is considering a U.S. 
proposal to add conversion technology to the Trigger List.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

    The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and 
continue to be applied by the Department of Commerce in order to control 
the export of items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons 
or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
    Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our 
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons 
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 
signatories as original States Parties. The United States was among 
their number, having deposited its instrument of ratification on April 
25. Russia ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State 
Party on December 5, 1997. As of October 31, 1998, 120 countries 
(including Iran, Pakistan, and Ukraine) have become States Parties.
    The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established at the entry 
into force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located 
in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States Parties) for 
implementing the CWC. It collects declarations, conducts inspections, 
and serves as a forum for consultation and cooperation among States 
Parties. It consists of the Conference of the States Parties, the 
Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS).
    The EC consists of 41 States Parties (including the United States) 
and acts as the governing body for the OPCW between annual meetings of 
the Conference of the States Parties. Since EIF, the EC has met numerous 
times to address issues such as scale of assessments, CW production 
facility conversion requests, facility and transitional verification 
arrangements, and staff regulations.
    The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and 
presently has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 
inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial 
facilities throughout the world. The OPCW has conducted nearly 300 
inspections in some 20 countries. It conducted nearly 100 such 
inspections in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent 
inspector presence at operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in 
Utah, Nevada, and Johnston Island.

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    The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the 
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for 
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related 
activities. The CWC's declaration requirements improve our knowledge of 
possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide 
for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus 
making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more 
difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was 
enacted into law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus Consolidated 
and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277). 
Accordingly, we anticipate rapid promulgation of implementing 
regulations on submission of U.S. industrial declarations to the OPCW. 
Submission of these declarations will bring the United States into full 
compliance with the CWC. United States noncompliance to date has, among 
other things, undermined U.S. leadership in the organization as well as 
our ability to encourage other States Parties to make complete, 
accurate, and timely declarations.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated 
and prohibited under the CWC from trading with States Parties in certain 
key chemicals. The relevant treaty provision is specifically designed to 
penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the 
world in eliminating the threat of chemical weapons. We anticipate rapid 
promulgation of U.S. regulations implementing these CWC trade 
restrictions.
    The United States also continues to play a leading role in the 
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW). 
We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) striving to 
complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance 
with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or 
BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special 
Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November/December 
1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon as possible but not 
later than the next Review Conference to be held in 2001. Work is 
progressing on a draft rolling text through insertion of national views 
and clarification of existing text. We held four AHG negotiating 
sessions in 1998, and five are scheduled for 1999.
    On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union Address, I 
announced that the United States would take a leading role in the effort 
to erect stronger international barriers against the proliferation and 
use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to 
detect and deter cheating. The United States will work closely with U.S. 
industry to develop U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach 
international agreement on: declarations, nonchallenge clarifying 
visits, and challenge investigations. Other key issues to be resolved in 
the Ad Hoc Group in 1999 are details on mandatory declarations, 
placement of definitions related to declarations, and questions related 
to assistance and export controls.
    On the margins of the 1998 U.N. General Assembly, senior United 
States Government representatives attended a Ministerial meeting hosted 
by the Government of New Zealand and sponsored by the Government of 
Australia to promote intensified work on the Compliance Protocol. I will 
continue to devote personal attention to this issue and encourage other 
heads of state to do the same.
    The United States continued to be a leading participant in the 30-
member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime. The United 
States attended the most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October 
12-15, 1998, during which the Group continued to focus on strengthening 
AG export controls and sharing information to address the threat of CBW 
terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG first began in-
depth political-level discussion of CBW proliferation and terrorism 
during the 1995 Plenary Session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas 
attack earlier that year. At the 1998 plenary, at the behest of the 
United States, AG participants shared information on legal and 
regulatory efforts each member has taken to counter this threat. The AG 
also reaffirmed

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its commitment to continue its active outreach program of briefings for 
non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on export 
controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of 
national policies in these areas.
    The Group also reaffirmed the participants' shared belief that full 
adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent 
global elimination of CBW, and that all States adhering to these 
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities 
support this goal. The AG participants continue to seek to ensure that 
all relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of the 
BWC and CWC. The AG participants reaffirmed their belief that existing 
national export licensing policies on chemical weapons- and biological 
weapons-related items help to fulfill their obligations established 
under Article I of the CWC and Article III of the BWC that States 
Parties not assist, in any way, the acquisition, manufacture, or use of 
chemical or biological weapons. Given this understanding, the AG 
participants also reaffirmed their commitment to continuing the Group's 
activities, now that the CWC has entered into force.
    During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely 
intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and 
technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 
1991. No new sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting 
period. The United States also continues to cooperate with its AG 
partners and other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation 
concern.

Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    The United States continues to carefully control exports that could 
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction 
and to closely monitor activities of potential missile proliferation 
concern. We also continue to implement the U.S. missile sanctions law. 
In April 1998, we imposed Category I missile sanctions against North 
Korean and Pakistani entities for the transfer from North Korea to 
Pakistan of equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile. 
Sanctions imposed against two North Korean entities in August 1997 for 
transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
Annex items also remain in effect.
    During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to work with 
each other and with potential non-Partner supplier and transshipment 
states to curb proliferation. Partners emphasized the need for 
implementing effective export control systems and cooperated to 
interdict shipments intended for use in missile programs of concern.
    The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's highly 
productive May 1998 Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting. At the 
RPOC, MTCR Partners engaged in an in-depth discussion of regional 
missile proliferation concerns, focusing in particular on South Asia. 
They also discussed steps Partners could take to increase transparency 
and outreach to nonmembers, and reached consensus to admit the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Ukraine to membership in the MTCR. (Reports on 
their membership have been submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 
73A of the Arms Export Control Act.)
    In May 1998, the United States was an active participant in the 
German-hosted MTCR workshop on brokering, catch-all controls, and other 
export control issues. In June, the United States played a leading role 
at the Swiss-hosted MTCR workshops on risk assessment in MTCR licensing 
decisions. The workshops involved the participation of MTCR Partners, as 
well as several non-MTCR members, and were successful in providing 
practical insights on export control and licensing issues. In 
particular, it helped participants identify risk factors and ways to 
assess them.
    The MTCR held its Thirteenth Plenary Meeting in Budapest, Hungary on 
October 5-9. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners shared information about 
activities and programs of missile proliferation concern and considered 
additional steps they can take, individually and collectively, to 
prevent the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction, focusing in particular on

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the threat posed by missile-related activities in South and North East 
Asia and the Middle East.
    During their discussions, the Partners gave special attention to 
North Korean (DPRK) missile activities, expressing serious concern about 
the DPRK's missile export practices and its efforts to acquire 
increasingly long-range missiles. The MTCR Plenary Chairman issued a 
statement reflecting the Partners' concerns, noting in particular that 
the Partners urged the DPRK to refrain from further flight tests of WMD-
capable missiles and to cease exports of equipment and technology for 
such missiles. The Partners also agreed to maintain special scrutiny 
over their missile-related exports in order not to support North Korean 
missile development in any way.
    At Budapest, the Partners also discussed ways to further the MTCR's 
efforts to promote openness and outreach to nonmembers, including by 
sponsoring additional seminars and workshops for members and nonmembers. 
The Partners supported a U.S. proposal for an MTCR-sponsored workshop in 
1999 on ``intangible transfers of technology,'' in order to develop a 
greater understanding of how proliferators misuse the Internet, 
scientific conferences, plant visits, and student exchange programs to 
acquire sensitive technology and to identify steps countries can take to 
address this problem. They also agreed to give further consideration to 
a technical-level workshop for border guards and Customs authorities on 
export control enforcement. In addition, the Partners noted China's 
increased willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue on missile 
nonproliferation and export control issues, and renewed their previous 
invitation in principle to China to take the steps necessary to join the 
Regime.
    The Partners also made additional progress at Budapest toward 
reformatting the MTCR Annex (the list of MTCR-controlled items) to 
improve clarity and uniformity of implementation while maintaining the 
coverage of the current Annex. They hope to complete this process in the 
near future.
    During this reporting period, the United States also worked 
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat 
missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly 
and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have 
continued missile nonproliferation discussions with China and North 
Korea and other countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
    In October 1998, the United States and the DPRK held a third round 
of missile talks, aimed at constraining DPRK missile production, 
deployment, flight-testing, and exports. The United States expressed 
serious concerns about North Korea's missile exports and indigenous 
missile activities, and made clear that we regard as highly 
destabilizing the DPRK's attempt on August 31 to use a Taepo Dong 1 
missile to orbit a small satellite. We voiced strong opposition to North 
Korea's missile exports to other countries and made clear that further 
launches of long-range missiles or further exports of such missiles or 
their related technology would have very negative consequences for 
efforts to improve U.S.-North Korean relations. The talks concluded with 
an agreement to hold another round at the earliest practical date.
    In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire 
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile 
development program, the United States continued its high-level dialogue 
with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work 
together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's ballistic 
missile development program. This effort has netted some positive 
results. For example, during this reporting period, Russia began 
implementing ``catch-all'' provisions imposing controls over the export 
of any material destined for a WMD or missile program, and provided 
detailed implementing guidance on these controls for Russian entities. 
Russia also agreed to meet regularly with the United States to discuss 
export control issues. In addition, at the summit in September, 
President Yeltsin and I announced the formation of seven bilateral 
working groups--nuclear, missile, catch-all and internal compliance, 
conventional weapons, law enforcement, licensing, and customs--for the 
rapid exchange of information on the wide range of nonproliferation 
issues.

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    In July, Russia launched special investigations of nine entities 
suspected of cooperating with foreign programs to acquire WMD and 
missile delivery systems. Russia subsequently took steps to end exports 
to Iran by three of these entities and to pursue two of the cases as 
smuggling issues. Consistent with the Russian action, the United States 
took action against seven of the nine entities in July pursuant in part 
to Executive Order 12938, as amended. We suspended all United States 
Government assistance to these seven entities and banned all U.S. 
exports to them and all of their imports to the United States.

Expenses

    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly 
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration 
of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the period 
from May 14, 1998, through October 31, 1998.
    Sincerely,
                                            William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate.