[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 34, Number 26 (Monday, June 29, 1998)]
[Pages 1198-1200]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the 
``Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998''

June 23, 1998

To the House of Representatives:

    I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2709, the ``Iran 
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998.''

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    H.R. 2709 would require sanctions to be imposed on foreign 
individuals and companies if there is ``credible information indicating 
that'' they transferred certain items or provided certain types of 
assistance that contributed to Iran's missile program, or attempted more 
than once to transfer such items or provide such assistance. These 
sanctions would last at least 2 years and would prohibit sales of 
defense articles and services; exports of certain dual-use items; and 
United States Government assistance.
    My Administration unequivocally supports the critical objectives of 
fighting terrorism and taking steps to halt the transfer of missile 
technology to nations whose foreign policy practices and 
nonproliferation policies violate international norms. This legislation, 
however, is indiscriminate, inflexible, and prejudical to these efforts, 
and would in fact undermine the national security objectives of the 
United States. Taken together, the flaws in H.R. 2709 risk a 
proliferation of indiscriminate sanctioning worldwide.
    Such indiscriminate sanctioning would undermine the credibility of 
U.S. nonproliferation policy without furthering U.S. nonproliferation 
objectives. Indeed, the sweeping application of sanctions likely would 
cause serious friction with many governments, diminishing vital 
international cooperation across the range of policy areas--military, 
political, and economic--on which U.S. security and global leadership 
depend.
    Specifically, H.R. 2709 would require the imposition of sanctions 
based on an unworkably low standard of evidence: ``credible information 
indicating that'' certain transfers or attempted transfers had occurred. 
Such a low standard of evidence could result in the erroneous imposition 
of sanctions on individuals and business entities worldwide--even in 
certain instances when they did not know the true end user of the items. 
The bill would also hinder U.S. efforts to enlist the support of other 
countries to halt the objectionable activities by imposing an 
unreasonable standard for waiving the bill's sanctions. In addition, the 
sanctions proposed by the legislation are disproportionate. A minor 
violation (e.g., the transfer of a few grams of aluminum powder) would 
carry the same penalty as a transfer of major proliferation 
significance. This, too, undermines U.S. credibility and increases 
foreign opposition to U.S. policy.
    H.R. 2709 does not specifically refer to Russia, but it will affect 
that country. The legislation does not allow flexibility sufficient to 
reflect the progress made by the Russian government in formulating 
policies and processes whose goal is to sever links between Russian 
entities and Iran's ballistic missile program. At the urging of the 
United States, President Yeltsin, the Prime Minister, Russian security 
services Chief Kovalev, and Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev have all 
made clear that proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction is a serious threat to Russia's security. They have called 
for strict control of sensitive technologies and stressed the strict 
penalties that will be imposed for violations of Russian law. On January 
22 of this year, the Russian government issued a ``catch all'' executive 
order providing authority to stop all transfers of dual-use goods and 
services for missiles and weapons of mass destruction programs, and on 
May 15 published detailed regulations to implement that order. They have 
recently developed and circulated a list of end users of concern in 
Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. In the course of regular and 
active discussion of this issue with the Russian government, the United 
States has raised problem cases involving cooperation between Russian 
entities and the Iranian missile program. We have seen progress in this 
area, and a number of these cases are no longer active concerns.
    Precisely because Russia needs to take effective enforcement steps 
to control the flow of technology, the United States needs to be able to 
work cooperatively with the Russian government to assure further 
progress. H.R. 2709 would undercut the cooperation we have worked to 
achieve with the Russian government without helping us solve the problem 
of technology transfer. The legislation's unilateral nature could also 
hurt our increasing cooperation with Russian government agencies in 
other vital areas such as law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and 
combating transnational crime. Furthermore, Russia would interpret this 
law as an infringement of its sovereignty, affecting our ability to work

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with Russia on broader U.S. policy goals and on regional and global 
issues.
    Finally, Title I of H.R. 2709 is not needed. Existing law, such as 
the missile technology control provisions of the Arms Export Control 
Act, provides a sufficient basis for imposing sanctions to prevent 
missile proliferation to Iran and elsewhere.
    I also note that it is disappointing that the Congress attached 
Title II, the ``Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 
1997,'' to this problematic and counterproductive bill. Because Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) implementation legislation has not been 
enacted, the United States has not yet fully carried out its obligations 
under the CWC. The CWC implementing legislation has strong bipartisan 
support, and should be passed by the Congress as a free-standing bill 
without further delay. I note, however, that sections 213(e)(2)(B)(iii), 
213(e)(3)(B)(v), and 213(f) of Title II could interfere with certain of 
my exclusive constitutional powers, and I urge the Congress to correct 
these constitutional deficiencies.
    For the reasons stated, I am compelled to return H.R. 2709 without 
my approval.
                                            William J. Clinton
The White House,
June 23, 1998.