[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 33, Number 46 (Monday, November 17, 1997)]
[Pages 1786-1790]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
<R04>
Message to the Congress on Weapons of Mass Destruction
November 12, 1997
To the Congress of the United States:
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit
to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am advising the
Congress that the national emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and
extended on November 14, 1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in
effect beyond November 14, 1997. Accordingly, I have extended the
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the
attached notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)),
regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency
declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical
and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in
the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and
Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law
102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most
recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of
the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act
of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force and
continue to be applied in order to control the export of items with
potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical weapons continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of countries friendly to us. On April 29, 1997, the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or (CWC)) entered into force with 87 of
the
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CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties. The United States was
among their number, having deposited its instrument of ratification on
April 25. As of November 5, 104 countries had become States Parties.
Russia did not complete its legislative approval process in time to
be among the original CWC States Parties. In our March meeting in
Helsinki, President Yeltsin did, however, assure me of his understanding
of the importance of the CWC to Russia's own security. On October 31,
1997, the Russian Duma (lower house) approved ratification of the CWC.
On November 5, 1997, the Russian Federation Council unanimously approved
the CWC and the Russian government deposited its instrument of
ratification. Russia's ratification makes it possible for Russia to join
the United States in playing a leadership role in ensuring that all of
the Convention's benefits are realized.
Given Russia's financial situation during this difficult period of
transition to a market economy, serious concerns have been raised about
the high costs of environmentally sound destruction of the large stocks
of chemical weapons Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union.
Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we are working with
Russia to help address these complex problems, and we will continue to
do so now that Russia has ratified the CWC.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has
been established to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to ensure
the implementation of its provisions and provide a forum for
consultation and cooperation among States Parties. The executive organ
of the OPCW, the Executive Council, has met five times since May to
oversee decisions related to inter alia data declarations, inspections,
and organizational issues. The United States plays an active role in
ensuring effective implementation of the Convention.
The CWC is an ambitious undertaking by the world community to ban an
entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Its members have committed
themselves to totally eliminating chemical weapons stocks and production
facilities, prohibiting chemical weapons-related activities, banning
assistance for such activities and restricting trade with non-Parties in
certain relevant chemicals. Destruction of U.S. chemical weapons stocks
is moving forward. Other CWC States Parties have now taken on a similar
task, and we are working hard with the other members of the CWC to make
membership in this treaty universal.
The United States is determined to ensure full implementation of the
concrete measures in the CWC that will raise the costs and the risks for
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related
activities. The CWC's declaration requirements will improve our
knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by
countries or terrorists. Its inspection provisions provide for access to
declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult,
more risky, and more expensive.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated
and banned from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals.
The relevant Treaty provision is specifically designed to penalize in a
concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in
eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons. We
are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a
legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance with the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the ``Biological Weapons Convention'' or (BWC)). This
Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference.
The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November 1996, commended the
work done by the Ad Hoc Group and urged it to complete the protocol as
soon as possible but not later than the next Review Conference to be
held in 2001. A draft rolling text was introduced by the Chairman at the
July Ad Hoc Group session. Work is progressing on insertion of national
views and clarification of existing text, largely drawn from the
consultative phase of Ad Hoc
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Group work since 1994. Three-week sessions are scheduled for January,
July, and September of 1998. Another 2-week
session will be scheduled for either March or December of 1998. Early
completion of an effective BWC protocol is high on our list of
nonproliferation goals.
The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia Group
(AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. Last year,
the United States supported the entry into the AG of the Republic of
Korea, which became the group's 30th member in time for the October 1996
plenary.
The United States attended this year's annual AG plenary session
from October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group continued to focus on
strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address the
threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG
first began in-depth political-level discussion of CBW terrorism during
the 1995 plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack
earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the United States urged AG
members to exchange national points of contact for AG terrorism matters.
At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S. proposal to survey all AG
members on efforts each has taken to counter this threat.
The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full
adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent
global elimination of CBW, and that all states adhering to these
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities
support this goal.
AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all relevant
national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC and CWC.
The AG nations reaffirmed their belief that existing national export
licensing policies on chemical weapons-related items fulfill the
obligation established under Article I of the CWC that States Parties
never assist, in any way, the acquisition of chemical weapons. Given
this understanding, the AG members also reaffirmed their commitment to
continuing the Group's activities now that the CWC has entered into
force.
The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue to provide
briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on
export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and
understanding of national policies in these areas.
During the last 6 months, we continue to examine closely
intelligence and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-related
material and technology that might require action, including
evaluating whether sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 were warranted. In May 1997, we
imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities and one Hong Kong company for
knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW program through the
export of dual-use chemical precursors and/or chemical production equipment
and technology. In September 1997, we imposed sanctions on a German citizen
and a German company determined to have been involved in the export of
chemical production equipment to Libya's CW program.
The United States continues to cooperate with its AG partners in
stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By sharing information
through diplomatic and other channels, we and our AG partners have been
successful in interdicting various shipments destined to CBW programs.
Missiles for Weapons of Mass Destruction Delivery
During the reporting period, the United States carefully controlled
exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction and closely monitored activities of potential
missile proliferation concern. We also continued to implement U.S.
missile sanctions law, in cases where sanctionable activity was
determined to have occurred. In August 1997, we imposed sanctions
against two North Korean entities determined to have engaged in missile
proliferation activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996 remain
in effect against two entities in Iran and one entity in North Korea for
transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Annex items.
During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share
information about proliferation problems with each other and with other
potential supplier, consumer, and
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transshipment states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted in the
interdiction of missile-related materials intended for use in missile
programs of concern.
The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's June 1997
Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners
engaged in useful discussions of regional missile proliferation
concerns, as well as steps the Partners could take to increase
transparency and outreach to nonmembers.
In July 1997, the United States also played a leading role at the
Swiss-hosted MTCR workshop on the licensing and enforcement aspects of
transshipment. The workshop was successful in focusing attention on the
enforcement problems raised by proliferators' misuse of transshipment
and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on how countries can better
address such activity.
The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its
MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage
nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines.
Since the last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation
dialogue with China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK),
and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic relations, we also have
pursued such discussions with other countries in Central Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia.
In June 1997, the United States and the DPRK held a second round of
missile talks, aimed at freezing the DPRK's indigenous missile
development program and curtailing its missile-related export
activities. The DPRK appeared willing to consider limits on its missile-
related exports, in return for sanctions-easing measures, but did not
engage in discussion of limits on its missile development program. We
intend to pursue further missile talks with the DPRK.
In July 1997, we held another round of nonproliferation talks with
the ROK. These talks were productive and made progress toward
facilitating ROK membership in the MTCR.
In response to reports that Iran had acquired sensitive items from
Russian entities for use in Iran's missile development program, the
United States intensified its high-level dialogue with Russia on this
issue. We held a number of productive discussions with senior Russian
officials aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work
together to prevent Iran's ballistic missile development program from
acquiring Russian technology and equipment. This process is continuing.
Nuclear Weapons
In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of
nuclear weapons, the 50th U.N. General Assembly on September 10, 1996,
adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), negotiated over the previous 2\1/2\ years in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this
U.N. resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's
strong international support and marks a major success for United States
foreign policy. On September 24, 1996, I and other international leaders
signed the CTBT in New York.
During 1997, CTBT signatories have conducted numerous meetings of
the Preparatory Commission in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid
completion of the International Monitoring System established by the
Treaty. On September 23, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate,
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification.
The CTBT will serve several United States national security
interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the
development of advanced new types; contribute to the prevention of
nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament; and
strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks an historic
milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer
world.
Formal preparations for the year 2000 Review Conference for the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began in 1997
with the first of three annual
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Preparatory Committee meetings of the Parties to the Treaty. The United
States is committed to working to ensure that the 2000 NPT review
Conference will further strengthen the NPT and reinforce global nuclear
nonproliferation objectives. Since the 1995 NPT Conference, eight
additional states have joined the NPT, leaving only five states
worldwide currently outside the NPT regime. The NPT Exporters (Zangger)
Committee added China to its membership in 1997.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts to upgrade
control lists and export control procedures. NSG members confirmed their
agreement to clarifications to the nuclear trigger list to accord with
trigger list changes agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters
(Zangger) Committee, and the International Atomic Energy Agency
published these understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is
actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime
in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 NPT
Review and Extension Conference.
The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October 8 and 9,
1997, which described and explained the role of the NSG (and the Zangger
Committee) in preventing nuclear proliferation. The NSG also continued
efforts to enhance information sharing among members regarding the
nuclear programs of proliferant countries by (1) ``officially'' linking
the NSG members through a dedicated computer network allowing for real-
time distribution of license denial information, and by (2) creating a
separate session for exchange of information on the margins of the NSG
plenary meeting.
NSG membership will increase to 35 with the acceptance of Latvia.
The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all
suppliers, including nations not members of the regime, to control
nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance with the NSG
guidelines.
Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration
of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the semiannual
reporting period.
William J. Clinton
The White House,
November 12, 1997.