[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 33, Number 39 (Monday, September 29, 1997)]
[Pages 1390-1395]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Message to the Senate Transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty and Documentation

September 22, 1997

To the Senate of the United States:

    I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the ``Treaty'' 
or ``CTBT''), opened for signature and signed by the United States at 
New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty includes two Annexes, a 
Protocol, and two Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral 
parts of the Treaty. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, 
the report of the Department of State on the Treaty, including an 
Article-by-Article analysis of the Treaty.
    Also included in the Department of State's report is a document 
relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on the Establishment of 
a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization, adopted by the Signatory States to the Treaty on November 
19, 1996. The Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in 
preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and making 
arrangements for the first session of the Conference

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of the States Parties to the Treaty. In particular, by the terms of the 
Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will be responsible for ensuring that 
the verification regime established by the Treaty will be effectively in 
operation at such time as the Treaty enters into force. My 
Administration has completed and will submit separately to the Senate an 
analysis of the verifiability of the Treaty, consistent with section 37 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended. Such legislation as 
may be necessary to implement the Treaty also will be submitted 
separately to the Senate for appropriate action.
    The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a 
signal event in the history of arms control. The subject of the Treaty 
is one that has been under consideration by the international community 
for nearly 40 years, and the significance of the conclusion of 
negotiations and the signature to date of more than 140 states cannot be 
overestimated. The Treaty creates an absolute prohibition against the 
conduct of nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion 
anywhere. Specifically, each State Party undertakes not to carry out any 
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion; to 
prohibit and prevent any nuclear explosions at any place under its 
jurisdiction or control; and to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in 
any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
    The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, based on 
the provision of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound 
data by a global network (the ``International Monitoring System'') 
consisting of the facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data 
provided by the International Monitoring System will be stored, 
analyzed, and disseminated, in accordance with Treaty-mandated 
operational manuals, by an International Data Center that will be part 
of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty Organization. The verification regime includes rules for the 
conduct of on-site inspections, provisions for consultation and 
clarification, and voluntary confidence-building measures designed to 
contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising 
from possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to chemical 
explosions that a State Party intends to or has carried out. Equally 
important to the U.S. ability to verify the Treaty, the text 
specifically provides for the right of States Parties to use information 
obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with 
generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of 
verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site 
inspection request. The verification regime provides each State Party 
the right to protect sensitive installations, activities, or locations 
not related to the Treaty. Determinations of compliance with the Treaty 
rest with each individual State Party to the Treaty.
    Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the 
Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978-1980, negotiations 
among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR (the 
Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but ended without agreement. Thereafter, 
as the nonnuclear weapon states called for test-ban negotiations, the 
United States urged the Conference on Disarmament (the ``CD'') to devote 
its attention to the difficult aspects of monitoring compliance with 
such a ban and developing elements of an international monitoring 
regime. After the United States, joined by other key states, declared 
its support for comprehensive test-ban negotiations with a view toward 
prompt conclusion of a treaty, negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban 
were initiated in the CD, in January 1994. Increased impetus for the 
conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996 
resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in conjunction 
with the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty, of 
``Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament'' that listed the conclusion of a CTBT as the highest 
measure of its program of action.
    On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a ``zero 
yield'' CTBT, I stated that:
      ``. . . As part of our national security strategy, the United 
      States must and will

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      retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future 
      hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces 
      from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that 
      seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I 
      consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile 
      to be a supreme national interest of the United States.
      ``I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our 
      nuclear weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining 
      our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based 
      Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear testing. I directed 
      the implementation of such a program almost 2 years ago, and it is 
      being developed with the support of the Secretary of Defense and 
      the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This program will now 
      be tied to a new certification procedure. In order for this 
      program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must 
      provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship 
      program over the next decade and beyond. I am committed to working 
      with the Congress to ensure this support.
      ``While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program 
      will be successful, as President I cannot dismiss the possibility, 
      however unlikely, that the program will fall short of its 
      objectives. Therefore, in addition to the new annual certification 
      procedure for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also 
      establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the 
      conditions under which the United States can enter into a CTBT . . 
      .''
    The safeguards that were established are as follows:
<bullet>    The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program 
            to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and 
            reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, 
            including the conduct of a broad range of effective and 
            continuing experimental programs.
<bullet>    The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and 
            programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology 
            that will attract, retain, and ensure the continued 
            application of our human scientific resources to those 
            programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology 
            depends.
<bullet>    The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear 
            test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United 
            States cease to be bound to adhere to this Treaty.
<bullet>    The continuation of a comprehensive research and development 
            program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and 
            operations.
<bullet>    The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence 
            gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to 
            ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide 
            nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and 
            related nuclear programs.
<bullet>    The understanding that if the President of the United States 
            is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
            Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the 
            Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories, and the 
            Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--that a high level 
            of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear 
            weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be critical 
            to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the 
            President, in consultation with the Congress, would be 
            prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard 
            ``supreme national interests'' clause in order to conduct 
            whatever testing might be required.
    With regard to the last safeguard:
<bullet>    The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the safety and 
            reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter 
            affecting the supreme interests of the country and will 
            regard any events calling that confidence into question as 
            ``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the 
            treaty.'' It will exercise its rights under the ``supreme 
            national interests'' clause if it judges that the

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            safety or reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile 
            cannot be assured with the necessary high degree of 
            confidence without nuclear testing.
<bullet>     To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of Defense 
            and Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council or 
            ``NWC'' (comprising represen-tatives of DOD, JCS, and DOE), 
            the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the 
            Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--will report to the 
            President annually, whether they can certify that the 
            Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and all critical elements 
            thereof are, to a high degree of confidence, safe and 
            reliable, and, if they cannot do so, whether, in their 
            opinion and that of the NWC, testing is necessary to assure, 
            with a high degree of confidence, the adequacy of corrective 
            measures to assure the safety and reliability of the 
            stockpile, or elements thereof. The Secretaries will state 
            the reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the NWC, 
            reporting any minority views.
<bullet>     After receiving the Secretaries' certification and 
            accompanying report, including NWC and minority views, the 
            President will provide them to the appropriate committees of 
            the Congress, together with a report on the actions he has 
            taken in light of them.
<bullet>     If the President is advised, by the above procedure, that a 
            high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a 
            nuclear weapon type critical to the Nation's nuclear 
            deterrent could no longer be certified without nuclear 
            testing, or that nuclear testing is necessary to assure the 
            adequacy of corrective measures, the President will be 
            prepared to exercise our ``supreme national interests'' 
            rights under the Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.
<bullet>    The procedure for such annual certification by the 
            Secretaries, and for advice to them by the NWC, U.S. 
            Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear weapons laboratories 
            will be embodied in domestic law.
    As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became apparent that 
one member of the CD, India, would not join in a consensus decision to 
forward the text to the United Nations for its adoption. After 
consultations among countries supporting the text, Australia requested 
the President of the U.N. General Assembly to convene a resumed session 
of the 50th General Assembly to consider and take action on the text. 
The General Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of 158 to 3 the 
Treaty was adopted. On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for 
signature and I had the privilege, on behalf of the United States, of 
being the first to sign the Treaty.
    The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its implementation 
to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the 
``Organization''), to be established in Vienna. The Organization, of 
which each State Party will be a member, will have three organs: the 
Conference of the States Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the 
Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will supervise the 
operation of and provide technical support for the International 
Monitoring System, operate the International Data Center, and prepare 
for and support the conduct of on-site inspections. The Treaty also 
requires each State Party to establish a National Authority that will 
serve as the focal point within the State Party for liaison with the 
Organization and with other States Parties.
    The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of 
instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to 
the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years after its being opened 
for signature. If, 3 years from the opening of the Treaty for signature, 
the Treaty has not entered into force, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will 
convene a conference of the states that have deposited their instruments 
of ratification if a majority of those states so requests. At this 
conference the participants will consider what measures consistent with 
international law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification 
process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty.

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Their decision on such measures must be taken by consensus.
    Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the Treaty 
are not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and its 
Annexes so long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose 
of the Treaty. Amendment of the Treaty requires the positive vote of a 
majority of the States Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened 
Amendment Conference at which no State Party casts a negative vote. Such 
amendments would enter into force 30 days after ratification by all 
States Parties that cast a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
    The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a ``supreme 
interests'' clause entitling any State Party that determines that its 
supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related 
to the subject matter of the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon 6-
month's notice.
    Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a Review 
Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty's entry into force 
and may be held at 10-year intervals thereafter if the Conference of the 
States Parties so decides by a majority vote (or more frequently if the 
Conference of the States Parties so decides by a two-thirds vote).
    The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular 
significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and 
strengthen regional and global stability. Its conclusion marks the 
achievement of the highest priority item on the international arms 
control and nonproliferation agenda. Its effective implementation will 
provide a foundation on which further efforts to control and limit 
nuclear weapons can be soundly based. By responding to the call for a 
CTBT by the end of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the 
nuclear weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their 
commitment to meaningful arms control measures.
    The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the CTBT 
exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-related treaty. Our 
current capability to monitor nuclear explosions will undergo 
significant improvement over the next several years to meet these 
challenges. Even with these enhancements, though, several conceivable 
CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National 
Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's verification regime 
and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the means to 
make the CTBT effectively verifiable. By this, I mean that the United 
States:
<bullet>     will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the totality of 
            information available in public and private channels, and 
            the mechanisms established by the Treaty) for addressing 
            compliance concerns and imposing sanctions in cases of 
            noncompliance; and
<bullet>     will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether the 
            Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear explosions (in 
            terms of yields and number of tests) that could damage U.S. 
            security interests and constraining the proliferation of 
            nuclear weapons, and (b) take prompt and effective 
            counteraction.
    My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects 
the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be undermined by 
possible nuclear testing that the United States might fail to detect 
under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the United States will derive 
substantial confidence from other factors--the CTBT's ``supreme national 
interests'' clause, the annual certification procedure for the U.S. 
nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program.
    I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the 
best interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly 
further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and 
strengthen international security. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give 
early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and 
consent to ratification as soon as possible.
                                            William J. Clinton
The White House,
September 22, 1997.

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