[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 33, Number 2 (Monday, January 13, 1997)]
[Pages 14-16]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Message to the Senate Transmitting Protocols to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention

January 7, 1997

To the Senate of the United States:

    I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification, the following Protocols to the 1980 Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects: the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
(Protocol II or the amended Mines Protocol); the Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol 
III or the Incendiary Weapons Protocol); and the Protocol on Blinding 
Laser Weapons (Protocol IV). Also transmitted for the information of the 
Senate is the report of the Department of State with respect to these 
Protocols, together with article-by-article analyses.
    The most important of these Protocols is the amended Mines Protocol. 
It is an essential step forward in dealing with the problem of anti-
personnel landmines (APL) and in minimizing the very severe casualties 
to civilians that have resulted from their use. It is an important 
precursor to the total prohibition of these weapons that the United 
States seeks.
    Among other things, the amended Mines Protocol will do the 
following: (1) expand the scope of the original Protocol to include 
internal armed conflicts, where most civilian mine casualties have 
occurred; (2) require that all remotely delivered anti-personnel mines 
be equipped with self-destruct devices and backup self-deactivation 
features to en

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sure that they do not pose a long-term threat to civilians; (3) require 
that all nonremotely delivered anti-personnel mines that are not 
equipped with such devices be used only within controlled, marked, and 
monitored minefields to protect the civilian population in the area; (4) 
require that all anti-personnel mines be detectable using commonly 
available technology to make the task of mine clearance easier and 
safer; (5) require that the party laying mines assume responsibility for 
them to ensure against their irresponsible and indiscriminate use; and 
(6) provide more effective means for dealing with compliance problems to 
ensure that these restrictions are actually observed. These objectives 
were all endorsed by the Senate in its Resolution of Ratification of the 
Convention in March 1995.
    The amended Mines Protocol was not as strong as we would have 
preferred. In particular, its provisions on verification and compliance 
are not as rigorous as we had proposed, and the transition periods 
allowed for the conversion or elimination of certain noncompliant mines 
are longer than we thought necessary. We shall pursue these issues in 
the regular meetings that the amended Protocol provides for review of 
its operation.
    Nonetheless, I am convinced that this amended Protocol will, if 
generally adhered to, save many lives and prevent many tragic injuries. 
It will, as well, help to prepare the ground for the total prohibition 
of anti-personnel landmines to which the United States is committed. In 
this regard, I cannot overemphasize how seriously the United States 
takes the goal of eliminating APL entirely. The carnage and devastation 
caused by anti-personnel landmines--the hidden killers that murder and 
maim more than 25,000 people every year--must end.
    On May 16, 1996, I launched an international effort to this end. 
This initiative sets out a concrete path to a global ban on anti-
personnel landmines and is one of my top arms control priorities. At the 
same time, the policy recognizes that the United States has 
international commitments and responsibilities that must be taken into 
account in any negotiations on a total ban. As our work on this 
initiative progresses, we will continue to consult with the Congress.
    The second of these Protocols--the Protocol on Incendiary Weapons--
is a part of the original Convention but was not sent to the Senate for 
advice and consent with the other 1980 Protocols in 1994 because of 
concerns about the acceptability of the Protocol from a military point 
of view. Incendiary weapons have significant potential military value, 
particularly with respect to flammable military targets that cannot so 
readily be destroyed with conventional explosives.
    At the same time, these weapons can be misused in a manner that 
could cause heavy civilian casualties. In particular, the Protocol 
prohibits the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against targets 
located in a city, town, village, or other concentration of civilians, a 
practice that caused very heavy civilian casualties in past conflicts.
    The executive branch has given very careful study to the 
Incendiaries Protocol and has developed a reservation that would, in our 
view, make it acceptable from a broader national security perspective. 
This proposed reservation, the text of which appears in the report of 
the Department of State, would reserve the right to use incendiaries 
against military objectives located in concentrations of civilians where 
it is judged that such use would cause fewer casualties and less 
collateral damage than alternative weapons.
    The third of these three Protocols--the new Protocol on Blinding 
Lasers--prohibits the use or transfer of laser weapons specifically 
designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision (that is, to 
the naked eye or to the eye with corrective devices). The Protocol also 
requires Parties to take all feasible precautions in the employment of 
other laser systems to avoid the incidence of such blindness.
    These blinding lasers are not needed by our military forces. They 
are potential weapons of the future, and the United States is committed 
to preventing their emergence and use. The United States supports the 
adoption of this new Protocol.
    I recommend that the Senate give its early and favorable 
consideration to these Protocols and give its advice and consent to 
ratification, subject to the conditions described in the accompanying 
report of the Department of State. The prompt ratification of the

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amended Mines Protocol is particularly important, so that the United 
States can continue its position of leadership in the effort to deal 
with the humanitarian catastrophe of irresponsible landmine use.
                                            William J. Clinton
The White House,
January 7, 1997.

Note: This letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on 
January 8.