[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 32, Number 46 (Monday, November 18, 1996)]
[Pages 2384-2388]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Weapons of Mass Destruction

November 12, 1996

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)

    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation 
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I 
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit 
to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose 
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am hereby 
advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on November 
14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995, must continue in effect 
beyond November 14, 1996. Accordingly, I have extended the national 
emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the attached 
notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section 
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding 
activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. 
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and 
biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the 
most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential 
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as 
the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the most recent annual report 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Con- 

[[Page 2385]]

trol and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182).
    During the last 6 months, the three export control regulations 
issued under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) 
remained fully in force and continue to be applied in order to control 
the export of items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons 
or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
    The threat of chemical weapons is one of the most pressing security 
challenges of the post-Cold War era. With bipartisan support from the 
Congress, the United States has long been a leader in the international 
fight against the spread of chemical weapons. Democrats and Republicans 
have worked hard together to strengthen our security by concluding the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the 
Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC).
    The CWC bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It is 
both an arms control and a nonproliferation treaty that requires total 
elimination of chemical weapons stocks, prohibits chemical weapons-
related activities, bans assistance for such activities and bars trade 
with non-Parties in certain relevant chemicals. This treaty denies us no 
option we would otherwise wish to exercise and is a critical instrument 
in our global fight against the spread of chemical weapons.
    The CWC provides concrete measures that will raise the costs and 
risks of engaging in chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's 
declaration and inspection requirements will improve our knowledge of 
possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by countries or 
terrorists. The treaty's provisions constitute the most comprehensive 
and intrusive verification regime ever negotiated, covering virtually 
every aspect of a chemical weapons program, from development through 
production and stockpiling. These provisions provide for access to 
declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making 
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, 
more risky and more expensive.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated 
and banned from trading with States Parties in certain key chemicals. 
Indeed, major chemical industry groups have testified before the Senate 
that our companies stand to lose millions of dollars in international 
sales if the United States is not a State Party when the treaty enters 
into force.
    That could happen if we fail to ratify the CWC promptly. It is 
nearly four years since the Bush Administration signed the Convention 
and three years since this Administration submitted the CWC to the 
Senate for its advice and consent. All our major NATO allies have 
deposited their instruments of ratification, as have all other G-7 
members. The CWC will enter into force 180 days after it has been 
ratified by 65 countries. By mid-October 1996, 64 of the 160 signatory 
countries had done so. It therefore seems likely the CWC will enter into 
force as early as April 1997.
    Further delay in securing U.S. ratification of this vital treaty 
serves only the interests of proliferators and terrorists. Delay may 
well also endanger the international competitiveness of the chemical 
industry, one of our largest exporters. In the interim, pressures are 
increasing in unstable regions to acquire and use chemical weapons. We 
need to ratify this convention urgently to strengthen our own security, 
affirm our leadership in nonproliferation and to protect our chemical 
industry. Ratification must be a top priority of the new Congress in 
early 1997.
    During the reporting period, the United States continued to be 
active in the work of the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in The 
Hague. The Prepcom is developing the vital technical and administrative 
procedures for implementation of the CWC through a strong organization 
to ensure compliance when the convention enters into force.
    The United States is working hard with the international community 
to end the threat from another terrible category of weapons of mass 
destruction--biological weapons. We are an active member of the Ad Hoc 
Group striving to create a legally binding instrument to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biologi- 

[[Page 2386]]

cal) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (The Biological Weapons 
Convention or BWC). The Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 
BWC Special Conference. The Group held meetings in July and September 
with the goal of preparing for the late November 1996 Fourth BWC Review 
Conference. Concluding a new BWC protocol is high on our list of 
nonproliferation goals. We should aim to complete such a protocol by 
1998.
    The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia Group 
(AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. The United 
States supported the entry of the Republic of Korea (South Korea)--a 
country with an important chemical industry--into the AG. The ROK became 
the group's 30th member in late September--a tribute to the continuing 
international recognition of the importance of the Group's effort in 
nonproliferation and to the commitment of the ROK to that goal.
    The United States attended the AG's annual plenary session from 
October 14-17, 1996, during which the Group continued to focus on 
strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address the 
threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG 
first began in-depth discussion of terrorism during the 1995 plenary 
session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack earlier that year.
    The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full 
adherence to the CWC and the BWC will be the best way to achieve 
permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all states adhering to 
these Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national 
activities support this goal.
    Australia Group participants continue to ensure that all relevant 
national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC and CWC, 
and will be fully consistent with the CWC upon its entry into force. The 
AG believes that national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-
related items fulfill the obligation established under Article I of the 
CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the acquisition of 
chemical weapons. Inasmuch as these measures are focused solely on 
preventing activities banned under the CWC, they are consistent with the 
undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible 
exchange of chemical materials and related information for purposes not 
prohibited by the CWC.
    The AG also agreed to continue its active program of briefings for 
non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on export 
controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of 
national policies in these areas.
    During the last year, the United States imposed chemical weapons 
proliferation sanctions on one individual. On November 17, 1995, 
sanctions were imposed under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control 
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 on Russian citizen Anatoliy 
Kuntsevich for knowingly providing material assistance to a foreign 
chemical weapons program.
    The United States carefully controlled exports that could contribute 
to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, exercising 
restraint in considering all such proposed transfers consistent with the 
Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In May 1996, 
the United States imposed missile technology proliferation sanctions 
against two entities in Iran and one entity in North Korea for transfers 
involving Category II MTCR Annex items.
    MTCR Partners continued to share information about proliferation 
problems with each other and with other potential supplier, consumer, 
and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized the need for 
implementing effective export control systems. This cooperation has 
resulted in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for 
use in missile programs of concern.
    The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its 
MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to encourage non-
members to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. 
Since my last report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation 
dialogue with the Republic of Korea and Ukraine. In the course of normal 
diplomatic relations, we also have pursued such discussions with other 
countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

[[Page 2387]]

    In June 1996, the United States was an active participant in 
discussions at the MTCR's Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting on 
Regional Missile Proliferation Issues. This meeting resulted in an in-
depth discussion of regional missile proliferation concerns and actions 
the Partners could take, individually and collectively, to address the 
specific concerns raised by missile proliferation in regions of 
tensions.
    In July 1996, the MTCR held a Seminar on Transshipment Issues. The 
Seminar was held in Washington and hosted by the United States on behalf 
of the Regime. It brought together foreign policy makers and experts 
from twelve MTCR Partner counties and seven non-MTCR countries for the 
first joint discussion of ways to address the proliferation threat posed 
by transshipment. The seminar was successful in focusing attention on 
the transshipment problem and fostered a productive exchange of ideas on 
how to impede proliferators' misuse of transshipment. Seminar 
participants also identified several areas for possible follow-up, which 
the United States pursued at the 1996 Edinburgh MTCR Plenary.
    The MTCR held its Eleventh Plenary Meeting at Edinburgh, Scotland, 
October 7-11. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners reaffirmed their 
commitment to controlling exports to prevent proliferation of delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction. They also reiterated their 
readiness for international cooperation in peaceful space activities 
that could not contribute to WMD delivery systems.
    The MTCR Partners also were supportive of U.S. initiatives to follow 
up on the success of the June 1996 Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting 
on the regional aspects of missile proliferation and the July 1996 
Seminar on transshipment issues. The Partners undertook to be proactive 
in encouraging key non-Partner transshippers to adhere to the MTCR 
Guidelines and Annex, and in providing them with practical assistance in 
implementing transshipment controls on missile technology. The Partners 
also agreed on steps they could take to enhance the MTCR's effectiveness 
in impending missile proliferation in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. 
Finally, the MTCR Partners agreed to increase the transparency of Regime 
aims and activities, and to continue their efforts to develop a dialogue 
with countries outside the Regime to encourage voluntary adherence to 
the MTCR Guidelines and heightened awareness of missile proliferation 
risks.
    We also continued vigorous pursuit of our nuclear nonproliferation 
goals. In May 1995, Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed at the NPT Review and Extension Conference 
to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions. Since the 
conference, more nations have acceded to the treaty. There now are more 
than 180 parties, making the NPT nearly universal.
    In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the spread of 
nuclear weapons, the 50th UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996, 
adopted and called for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) negotiated over the past two and a half years in the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this UN 
resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international 
support and marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On 
September 24, I and other national leaders signed the CTBT in New York.
    The United States played a leading role in promoting the negotiation 
of this agreement by declaring a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992 
and calling on all the other declared nuclear weapons states to enact 
their own moratoria, and by announcing in August of 1995 our support for 
a complete ban on all tests no matter how small their nuclear yield--a 
so-called ``zero-yield'' CTBT. The United States also insisted on an 
effective verification regime to ensure that the treaty enhances rather 
than reduces the security of its adherents.
    The CTBT will serve several United States national security 
interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the 
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the 
development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; contribute to the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear 
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT 
marks an historic milestone

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in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer world.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues efforts to upgrade 
control lists and export control procedures. By October 1996, NSG 
members confirmed their agreement to clarifications to the nuclear 
trigger list to accord with trigger list changes agreed to by the 
members of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee. The NSG also is 
actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime 
in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 NPT 
Review and Extension Conference. The NSG is also continuing efforts to 
enhance information sharing among members regarding the nuclear programs 
of proliferant countries.
    NSG membership increased to 34 with acceptance of Brazil, the 
Republic of Korea and Ukraine at the 1996 Buenos Aires Plenary. Members 
continued contacts with Belarus, China, Kazakstan and Lithuania 
regarding NSG activities and guidelines. The ultimate goal of the NSG is 
to obtain the agreement of all suppliers, including nations not members 
of the regime, to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in 
accordance with the NSG guidelines.
    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly 
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration 
of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the period 
from May 14, 1996, through November 14, 1996.

    Sincerely,
                                            William J. Clinton
      

Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate.