[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 32, Number 8 (Monday, February 26, 1996)]
[Pages 356-358]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Drug Producing and Drug Transit 
Countries

February 22, 1996

Dear Mr. Chairman:  (Dear Ranking Member:)

    In accordance with the provisions of section 490(h) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, I have determined that the 
following countries are major illicit drug producing or drug transit 
countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Venezuela, and Vietnam. These countries have been selected on the basis 
of information from the March 1, 1995, International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report and from other United States Government sources.
    No countries on the 1995 list have been removed from the list this 
year. I have added Belize and Cambodia to the list for the following 
reasons:
        Belize. In my letter of February 2, 1995, which removed Belize 
      from last year's list of major drug-producing countries, I stated, 
      ``We will be watching to determine whether it becomes a major 
      transit point for drugs moving to the United States.'' I did so 
      because Belize's geographical location south of Mexico's Yucatan 
      peninsula makes it an ideal strategic drug transshipment point for 
      U.S.-bound cocaine shipments. The country's long, unprotected 
      coastline, large tracts of rain forest, many inland waterways and 
      large unpopulated areas make Belize an inviting feeder site for 
      moving drugs into the mainstream Mexican trafficking routes that 
      carry the bulk of South American cocaine to U.S. markets. Despite 
      a demonstrated commitment to cut off access to these routes, the 
      Government of Belize lacks the human and material resources to

[[Page 357]]

      control its borders adequately. In earlier years, the British 
      Defense Forces stationed in Belize were a partial deterrent to 
      drug traffic, though cocaine transited the country even then. 
      Their withdrawal in late 1994 cleared the way for new trafficking 
      opportunities.
        There is little doubt that traffickers are exploiting Belize's 
      vulnerable antidrug infrastructure, particularly as other 
      countries have strengthened their counternarcotics efforts. The 
      very factors that make Belize attractive as a backdoor to the 
      Mexican cocaine route to the United States preclude a precise 
      estimate of the volume of drugs transiting Belize. But it is clear 
      from a number of airdrops off Belize's coast and important 
      seizures that the trafficking organizations view it as a valuable 
      transit point. Mexico's disruption of the large jets carrying 
      multi-ton loads of cocaine (``cargas'') has made Belize even more 
      attractive as a feed-in point for U.S.-bound cocaine.
        While shipments transiting Belize are smaller than those 
      entering Mexico directly, they can still be sizable. For example, 
      in a single operation in 1995, Belizean authorities seized more 
      than half a ton (636 kilograms) of U.S.-bound cocaine and arrested 
      two Colombians and a Belizean believed to be connected to the Cali 
      cartel. In all of 1995, Belizean authorities seized a total of 840 
      kilograms of cocaine, which probably represents only a small 
      fraction of the cocaine actually finding its way to the Mexican 
      conduit to the United States. Moreover, this route is not new, 
      since Belizean authorities reported seizing 850 kilograms of 
      cocaine in 1993, and 650 kilograms in 1990. Consequently, I am now 
      adding Belize to the list as a major drug transit country.
        Cambodia. Over the past year we have seen numerous indicators 
      that the heroin trafficking problem in Cambodia is severe. Newly 
      formed and undertrained drug enforcement units have made large 
      seizures of heroin. Cambodian police and customs sources have 
      uncovered narcotics cases that involve the Cambodian military and 
      police. Narcotics-related corruption also seems to be a problem in 
      government and business circles. Cambodia shares borders with 
      Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam--all countries on the list of major 
      drug producing and drug transit countries.
        The Cambodian government formally acknowledged that drug 
      transshipment was a significant problem in a royal decree 
      establishing an interministerial committee against narcotics 
      signed by the King on September 7. The head of the Phnom Penh 
      Municipal Counternarcotics Bureau has stated to the press that as 
      much as 600 kilograms of heroin is smuggled through Cambodia each 
      week. While we have no evidence to corroborate this figure, which 
      seems high, seizures in Cambodia give us reason to believe there 
      is a significant volume of heroin transiting the country. On 
      August 11, the Cambodian Customs Service seized 71 kilograms of 
      heroin hidden in a speedboat in Koh Kong province. This is the 
      largest seizure ever made in Cambodia and one of the largest made 
      in Southeast Asia this year. Two west African traffickers 
      apprehended by the Cambodian authorities in July have admitted 
      smuggling heroin to the United States and other destinations.
        The extent of narcotics-related corruption suggests that the 
      overall drug transshipment problem in Cambodia may be even greater 
      than recent seizures suggest. There have been investigations and 
      arrests involving both police and military suspects. Local police 
      were arrested in the 71-kilogram heroin seizure in Koh Kong 
      province. In August, Thai police arrested several Cambodians 
      including members of the Cambodian military for attempting 
      marijuana smuggling. For all the reasons listed above, I believe 
      it is appropriate for Cambodia to be added to the list as a 
      transit country.
        Major Cannabis Producers. While Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, 
      the Philippines, and South Africa are impor- 

[[Page 358]]

  tant cannabis producers, they do not appear on this list since I have 
determined that in all cases the illicit cannabis is either consumed 
locally or exported to countries other than the United States, and thus 
such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the 
United States. (FAA 481(e)(2) states that a country that cultivates and 
harvests more than 5,000 hectares per year of illicit cannabis falls 
within the definition of a ``major illicit drug producing country,'' 
unless I determine that such illicit cannabis production does not 
significantly affect the United States.)
        Turkey and Other Balkan Route Countries. Turkey and its 
      neighboring countries play a key role as a major transit route for 
      much of the Southwest Asian heroin moving to Western and Central 
      Europe along the so-called Balkan Route. We know that some of this 
      heroin also flows to the United States, but thus far our 
      information has been limited and we have traced only relatively 
      small quantities. We will be looking further into this issue over 
      the next year. Insofar as we determine that heroin transiting 
      Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, 
      Bosnia, Croatia, the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, or 
      other European countries on the Balkan Route significantly affects 
      the United States, I will add such countries to the list.
        Cuba. We still do not have sufficient evidence that Cuba plays 
      an active role in the drug trade affecting the United States to 
      add it to the list at this time. However, Cuba's geographic 
      location and evidence of some movement of drugs around the island 
      indicate it could become a target for greater trafficking activity 
      in the future.
        Central Asia. During 1995, we conducted probe efforts in 
      Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, traditional opium poppy growing areas 
      of the former Soviet Union. These probes did not show significant 
      opium poppy cultivation. If ongoing analysis reveals cultivation 
      of 1,000 hectares or more of poppy, I will add the relevant 
      countries to the list.
    Sincerely,
                                            William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to Jesse Helms, chairman, and 
Claiborne Pell, ranking member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; 
Mark O. Hatfield, chairman, and Robert C. Byrd, ranking member, Senate 
Committee on Appropriations; Benjamin A. Gilman, chairman, and Lee H. 
Hamilton, ranking member, House Committee on International Relations; 
and Bob Livingston, chairman, and David R. Obey, ranking member, House 
Committee on Appropriations. This letter was released by the Office of 
the Press Secretary on February 23.