[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 31, Number 45 (Monday, November 13, 1995)]
[Pages 1991-1994]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Message to the Congress on Weapons of Mass Destruction

November 8, 1995

To the Congress of the United States:

    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation 
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction'') and of the means of delivering such weapons, I issued 
Executive Order No. 12938, and declared a national emergency under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 
Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit 
to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to pose 
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States. Therefore, I am hereby 
advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on November 
14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1995. Accordingly, 
I have extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 
12938 and have sent the attached notice of extension to the Federal 
Register for publication.
    As I described in the report transmitting Executive Order No. 12938, 
the Executive order consolidated the functions of and revoked Executive 
Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, which declared a national 
emergency with respect to the proliferation of chemical and biological 
weapons, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, which 
declared a national emergency with respect to nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons, and their means of delivery.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section 
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding 
activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. 
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and 
biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the 
annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components 
of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress 
pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the 
``Nonproliferation Report,'' and the annual report provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Control and Warfare

[[Page 1992]]

Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182).
    The three export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) are fully in force and continue 
to be used to control the export of items with potential use in chemical 
or biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction.
    In the 12 months since I issued Executive Order No. 12938, 26 
additional countries ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (CWC) for a total of 42 of the 159 signatories; the 
CWC must be ratified by 65 signatories to enter into force. I must 
report my disappointment that the United States is not yet among those 
who have ratified. The CWC is a critical element of U.S. 
nonproliferation policy and an urgent next step in our effort to end the 
development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical 
weapons. As we have seen this year in Japan, chemical weapons can 
threaten our security and that of our allies, whether as a instrument of 
war or of terrorism. The CWC will make every American safer, and we need 
it now.
    The international community is watching. It is vitally important 
that the United States continue to lead the fight against weapons of 
mass destruction by being among the first 65 countries to ratify the 
CWC. The Senate recognized the importance of this agreement by adopting 
a bipartisan amendment on September 5, 1995, expressing the sense of the 
Senate that the United States should promptly ratify the CWC. I urge the 
Senate to give its advice and consent as soon as possible.
    In parallel with seeking Senate ratification of the CWC, the United 
States is working hard in the CWC Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in 
The Hague to draft administrative and implementing procedures for the 
CWC and to create a strong organization for verifying compliance once 
the CWC enters into force.
    The United States also is working vigorously to end the threat of 
biological weapons (BW). We are an active participant in the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction (BWC) Ad Hoc Group, 
which was commissioned September 1994 by the BWC Special Conference to 
draft a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and 
improve the implementation of the Convention. The Group convened its 
first meeting in January 1995 and agreed upon a program of work for this 
year. The first substantive meeting took place in July, making important 
progress in outlining the key issues. The next meeting is scheduled for 
November 27 to December 8, 1995. The U.S. objective is to have a draft 
protocol for consideration and adoption at the Fourth BWC Review 
Conference in December 1996.
    The United States continues to be active in the work of the 29-
member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime, and attended 
the October 16-19 AG consultations. The Group agreed to a United States 
proposal to ensure the AG export controls and information-sharing 
adequately address the threat of CBW terrorism, a threat that became all 
too apparent in the Tokyo subway nerve gas incident. This U.S. 
initiative was the AG's first policy-level action on CBW terrorism. 
Participants also agreed to several amendments to strengthen the AG's 
harmonized export controls on materials and equipment relevant to 
biological weapons, taking into account new developments since the last 
review of the biological weapons lists and, in particular, new insights 
into Iraq's BW activities.
    The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief that full 
adherence to the CWC and the BCW will be the only way to achieve a 
permanent global ban on CBW, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities 
support these goals.
    Australia Group participants are taking steps to ensure that all 
relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC 
and CWC, and will be fully consistent with the CWC upon its entry into 
force. The AG considers that national export licensing policies on 
chemical weapons-related items fulfill the obligation established under 
Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the 
acquisition of chemical weapons. Moreover, inasmuch as

[[Page 1993]]

these measures are focused solely on preventing activities banned under 
the CWC, they are consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the 
CWC to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials 
and related information for purposes not prohibited by the CWC.
    The AG agreed to continue its active program of briefings for non-AG 
countries, and to promote regional consultations on export controls and 
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national 
policies in these areas.
    The United States Government determined that two foreign companies--
Mainway Limited and GE Plan--had engaged in chemical weapons 
proliferation activities that required the imposition of sanctions 
against them, effective May 18, 1995. Additional information on this 
determination is contained in a classified report to the Congress, 
provided pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.
    The United States carefully controlled exports which could 
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, 
exercising restraint in considering all such proposed transfers 
consistent with the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR). The MTCR Partners continued to share information about 
proliferation problems with each other and with other possible supplier, 
consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also emphasized the need 
for implementing effective export control systems.
    The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination with its 
MTCR partners in multilateral efforts to combat missile proliferation by 
nonmembers and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to 
adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Three new Partners were admitted to the 
MTCR with U.S. support: Russia, South Africa, and Brazil.
    In May 1995, the United States participated in an MTCR team visit to 
Kiev to discuss missile nonproliferation and MTCR membership criteria. 
Under Secretary of State Davis met with Ukraine's Deputy Foreign 
Minister Hryshchenko in May, July, and October to discuss 
nonproliferation issues and MTCR membership. As a result of the July 
meeting, a United States delegation traveled to Kiev in October to 
conduct nonproliferation talks with representatives of Ukraine, brief 
them on the upcoming MTCR Plenary, and discuss U.S. criteria for MTCR 
membership. From August 29--September 1, the U.S. participated in an 
informal seminar with 18 other MTCR Partners in Montreux, Switzerland, 
to explore future approaches to strengthening missile nonproliferation.
    The MTCR held its Tenth Plenary Meeting in Bonn October 10-12. The 
Partners reaffirmed their commitment to controlling exports to prevent 
proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. They 
also reiterated their readiness for international cooperation in 
peaceful space activities consistent with MTCR policies. The Bonn 
Plenary made minor amendments to the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex 
in the light of technical developments. Partners also agreed to U.S. 
initiatives to deal more effectively with missile-related aspects of 
regional tensions, coordinate in impeding shipments of missile 
proliferation concern, and deal with the proliferation risks posed by 
transshipment. Finally, MTCR Partners will increase their efforts to 
develop a dialogue with countries outside the Regime to encourage 
voluntary adherence to the MTCR Guidelines and heightened awareness of 
missile proliferation risks.
    The United States has continued to pursue my Administration's 
nuclear nonproliferation goals with success. Parties to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed last May at the 
NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely and 
without conditions. Since the conference, more nations have acceded to 
the Treaty. There now are 180 parties, making the NPT nearly universal.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues its efforts to improve 
member states' export policies and controls. Nuclear Suppliers Group 
members have agreed to apply technology controls to all items on the 
nuclear trigger list and to adopt the principle that the intent of the 
NSG Guidelines should not be undermined by the export of parts of 
trigger list and dual-use items without ap- 

[[Page 1994]]

propriate controls. In 1995, the NSG agreed to over 30 changes to update 
and clarify the list of controlled items in the Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 
Annex. The NSG also pursued efforts to enhance information sharing among 
members by establishment of a permanent Joint Information Exchange group 
and by moving toward adoption of a United States Department of Energy-
supplied computerized automated information exchange system, which is 
currently being tested by most of the members.
    The increasing number of countries capable of exporting nuclear 
commodities and technology is a major challenge for the NSG. The 
ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of all suppliers, 
including nations not members of the regime, to control nuclear exports 
in accordance with the NSG guidelines. Members continued contacts with 
Belarus, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), and Ukraine regarding NSG activities. Ambassador Patokallio of 
Finland, the current NSG Chair, led a five-member NSG outreach visit to 
Brazil in early November 1995 as part of this effort.
    As a result of such contacts, the ROK has been accepted as a member 
of the NSG. Ukraine is expected to apply for membership in the near 
future. The United States maintains bilateral contacts with emerging 
suppliers, including the New Independent States of the former Soviet 
Union, to encourage early adherence to NSG guidelines.
    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly 
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration 
of the national emergency in Executive Order No. 12938 during the period 
from May 14, 1995, through November 14, 1995.
                                            William J. Clinton
The White House,
November 8, 1995.

Note: This message was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on 
November 9.