[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 39 (Monday, October 3, 1994)]
[Pages 1899-1901]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Joint Statement on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security

September 29, 1994

Joint statement on strategic stability and nuclear security by the 
Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation

    Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscored that, with the end of the 
Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening 
global strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States 
and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important 
steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. Multilateral 
negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban have begun. The 
Presidents noted the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 
ensuring global stability.
    President Yeltsin outlined the initiative Russia presented to the UN 
General Assembly for a treaty among the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council for a halt to the production of fissile materials for 
weapons, a ban on the reuse of fissile materials in weapons, further 
elimination of nuclear warheads, and reduction of strategic delivery 
systems.
    President Clinton outlined the ideas he described at the UN General 
Assembly for cooperation in advancing nuclear non-proliferation, 
particularly to enhance the security of nuclear materials and to prevent 
nuclear smuggling.
    The Presidents discussed these initiatives, of which they had 
informed each other in advance and which reflected shared goals and 
certain common proposals designed to contribute to nuclear non-
proliferation. In this regard, the Presidents agreed that the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, given their responsibilities as 
nuclear powers, have a special role to play.
    The United States and Russia will work with the other permanent 
members, as well

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as other countries, to ensure a successful outcome at the 1995 Non-
Proliferation Treaty conference that produces an indefinite and 
unconditional extension of the NPT, to conclude a comprehensive nuclear 
test ban treaty at the earliest possible date, and to achieve a global 
prohibition on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. 
The Presidents also agreed on the desirability of continuing their 
respective moratoria on nuclear weapon tests.
    The Presidents welcomed the ongoing deactivation and dismantlement 
of strategic nuclear systems by the parties to the START I Treaty and 
the implementation of the January 14, 1994 Trilateral Statement. They 
welcomed the real possibility to bring the START I Treaty and the Lisbon 
Protocol into force in the very near future and pledged full cooperation 
to this end. The Presidents agreed that their defense ministers would 
exchange information every three months on strategic systems that have 
been deactivated and eliminated.
    The Presidents confirmed their intention to seek early ratification 
of the START II Treaty, once the START I Treaty enters into force, and 
expressed their desire to exchange START II instruments of ratification 
at the next U.S.-Russia summit meeting.
    In an important new development, the Presidents concurred that, once 
the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia would 
proceed to deactivate all strategic delivery systems to be reduced under 
START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to 
remove them from alert status.
    The Presidents instructed their experts to intensify their dialogue 
to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt 
the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed 
international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-
Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of 
START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining 
nuclear forces. They also discussed the prospect for confidence-building 
and transparency measures in this area. The Presidents consider that, as 
the political partnership develops, there will be new opportunities to 
strengthen stability through openness and transparency.
    President Clinton described to President Yeltsin the unilateral 
adjustments the United States will make in its strategic and non-
strategic nuclear forces and safety, security and use control practices 
as a result of the recently completed nuclear posture review. President 
Yeltsin noted these U.S. changes as a manifestation of the new 
relationship between the United States and Russia and described the 
comparable review of measures underway in Russia to reduce Russian 
nuclear forces and improve their safety. The Presidents agreed that each 
side would independently consider further unilateral steps, as 
appropriate, with regard to their respective nuclear forces.
    The Presidents discussed the benefits of reduction and enhancements 
to the security of non-strategic nuclear forces.
    The Presidents agreed on the fundamental importance of preserving 
the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty. Noting the recent 
progress made on the issue of ABM/TMD demarcation and 
multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, the Presidents instructed their 
respective delegations, working with the other participating states, to 
complete agreement on remaining issues in the shortest possible time.
    Both sides have an interest in developing and fielding effective 
theater missile defense systems on a cooperative basis. The Presidents 
agreed that the two sides will conduct a joint exercise of theater 
missile defenses and early warning of missile launches. This exercise 
would contribute to providing a basis for U.S. and Russian forces to 
operate together, for example, in peacekeeping operations.
    Proceeding from the principles of partnership and reciprocity, the 
Presidents agreed to work together to develop broad bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation on assuring nuclear security as follows:
    Cooperate on a bilateral and multilateral basis, including through 
      the exchange of appropriate information, to prevent illegal trade 
      in nuclear materials and undertake measures to strengthen the 
      regime of control and physical protection of such materials.

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    Exchange detailed information at the next meeting of the Gore-
      Chernomyrdin Commission on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear 
      warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and 
      security. The sides will develop a process for exchanging this 
      information on a regular basis.
    Direct their joint working group on nuclear safeguards, transparency 
      and irreversibility to pursue by March 1995 further measures to 
      improve confidence in and increase the transparency and 
      irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons.
    Facilitate broad cooperation among appropriate agencies in both 
      countries to ensure effective control, accounting and physical 
      protection of nuclear materials.
    Facilitate cooperative programs between U.S. and Russian national 
      laboratories in the areas of safety, physical protection, control 
      and accounting of nuclear materials.
    Deepen cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense and the 
      Russian Ministry of Defense in the area of ensuring nuclear 
      security.
    Implement a joint plan to expedite construction of a new, long-term 
      storage facility for fissile materials from dismantled nuclear 
      weapons at Mayak.
    Taking a broad view of strategic stability and bearing in mind the 
      need to control all types of weapons of mass destruction, the 
      Presidents agreed on:
    The importance of continued, full, mutual and reciprocal 
      implementation of the September 1992 U.S.-Russian-UK statement on 
      Biological Weapons as a means of gaining confidence that offensive 
      biological weapons programs have been terminated.
    The need for adherence by all states to the Chemical Weapons 
      Convention and for universal application of its provisions, as 
      well as the need for adoption without delay of measures that make 
      it possible to bring the CWC into force; and the need to resolve 
      without delay the outstanding issues related to the Bilateral 
      Destruction Agreement and the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding.

Note: This joint statement also included a report of September presummit 
meetings on U.S.-Russian security issues.