[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 38 (Monday, September 26, 1994)]
[Pages 1801-1802]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti

September 18, 1994

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)

    I am providing this report, consistent with the sense of Congress in 
section 8147(c) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994 
(Public Law 103-139), to advise you of the objectives and character of 
the planned deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti.
    (1) The deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti is justified by 
United States national security interests: to restore democratic 
government to Haiti; to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of 
thousands of Haitians; to secure our borders; to preserve stability and 
promote democracy in our hemisphere; and to uphold the reliability of 
the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us.
    From the very beginning of the coup against the democratic 
government of Haiti, the United States and the rest of the international 
community saw the regime as a threat to our interests in this 
hemisphere. Indeed President Bush declared that the coup ``constitute[d] 
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States.''
    The United States' interest in Haiti is rooted in a consistent U.S. 
policy, since the 1991 coup, to help restore democratic government to 
that nation. The United States has a particular interest in responding 
to gross abuses of human rights when they occur so close to our shores.
    The departure of the coup leaders from power is also the best way to 
stem another mass outflow of Haitians, with consequences for the 
stability of our region and control of our borders. Continuing 
unconstitutional rule in Haiti would threaten the stability of other 
countries in this hemisphere by emboldening elements opposed to 
democracy and freedom.
    The agreement regarding the transition between the de facto 
government and the elected government, negotiated by former President 
Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell, will achieve 
the objective of facilitating the departure of the coup leaders. Their 
departure will substantially decrease the likelihood of armed 
resistance.
    (2) Despite this agreement, this military operation is not without 
risk. Necessary steps have been taken to ensure the safety and security 
of U.S. Armed Forces. Our intention is to deploy a force of sufficient 
size to serve as a deterrent to armed resistance. The force will have a 
highly visible and robust presence with firepower ample to overwhelm any 
localized threat. This will minimize casualties and maximize our 
capability to ensure that essential civil order is maintained and the 
agreement arrived at is implemented. The force's rules of engagement 
allow for the use of necessary and proportionate force to protect 
friendly personnel and units and to provide for individual self-defense, 
thereby ensuring that our forces can respond effectively to threats and 
are not made targets by reason of their rules of engagement.
    (3) The proposed mission and objectives are most appropriate for 
U.S. Armed Forces, and the forces proposed for deployment are necessary 
and sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the proposed mission. 
Pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 940, a multinational 
coalition has been assembled to use ``all necessary means'' to restore 
the democratic government to Haiti and to provide a stable and secure 
environment for the implementation of the Governors Island Accords. The 
deployment of U.S. Armed Forces is required to ensure that United States 
national security interests with respect to Haiti remain unchallenged 
and to underscore the reliability of U.S. and UN commitments.
    This crisis affects the interests of the United States and other 
members of the world community alike, and thus warrants and has received 
the participation of responsible states in the coalition to redress the 
situation. The United States is playing a predominant role because it is 
the leading military power in the hemisphere, and accordingly, has the 
influence and military capability to lead such an operation. The 
coalition is made up of representatives from 25 member nations, 
including the United States. During the initial phase of the operation, 
the force will be of sufficient size to overwhelm any opposition

[[Page 1802]]

that might arise despite the existence of the agreement. In the follow-
on, transitional phase, forces from other members of the coalition will 
assume increasingly important roles. At all times when U.S. forces are 
deployed in whatever phase, they will be equipped, commanded, and 
empowered so as to ensure their own protection.
    (4) Clear objectives for the deployment have been established. These 
limited objectives are: to facilitate the departure of the military 
leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and 
the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of 
Haiti. We will assist the Haitian government in creating a civilian-
controlled security force. We will also ensure the protection of U.S. 
citizens and U.S. facilities.
    (5) An exit strategy for ending the deployment has been identified. 
Our presence in Haiti will not be open-ended. After a period of months, 
the coalition will be replaced by a UN peacekeeping force (UNMIH). By 
that time, the bulk of U.S. forces will have departed. Some U.S. forces 
will make up a portion of the UNMIH and will be present in Haiti for the 
duration of the U.N. mission. The entire U.N. mission will withdraw from 
Haiti after elections are held next year and a new Haitian Government 
takes office in early 1996, consistent with U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 940.
    (6) The financial costs of the deployment are estimated to be the 
following. A conservative, preliminary estimate of Department of Defense 
and Department of State incremental costs for U.S. military operations, 
U.S. support for the multinational coalition, and the follow-on U.N. 
peacekeeping operation is projected at $500-$600 million through 
February 1996. This covers potential costs to be incurred in FY 1994, FY 
1995, and FY 1996. Final deployment-related costs could vary from this 
estimate depending on how operations proceed in the first few weeks, how 
fast civic order is restored, and when the operation is replaced by a 
U.N. peacekeeping operation. A preliminary estimate of U.S. 
nondeployment-related costs--migrant operations, sanctions enforcement, 
police training, and economic reconstruction--will be provided 
separately. The Congress will be provided more complete estimates as 
they become available.
    Sincerely,
                                            William J. Clinton

Note: Identical letters were sent to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and Albert Gore, Jr., President of the Senate. 
This letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on 
September 19.