[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 26 (Monday, July 4, 1994)]
[Pages 1384-1385]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Message to the Congress on Continuation of Export Control Regulations

June 30, 1994

To the Congress of the United States:

    Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(b), I hereby report to the Congress that I 
have today exercised the authority granted by this Act to continue in 
effect the system of controls contained in 15 C.F.R., Parts 768-799, 
including restrictions on participation by U.S. persons in certain 
foreign boycott activities, which heretofore have been maintained under 
the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, 50 
U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq. In addition, I have made provision for the 
administration of section 38(e) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 
U.S.C. 2778(e).
    The exercise of this authority is necessitated by the expiration of 
the Export Administration Act on June 30, 1994, and the lapse that would 
result in the system of controls maintained under that Act.
    In the absence of control, foreign parties would have unrestricted 
access to U.S. commercial products, technology, technical data, and 
assistance, posing an unusual and extraordinary threat to national 
security, foreign policy, and economic objectives critical to the United 
States. In addition, U.S. persons would not be prohibited from complying 
with certain foreign boycott requests. This would seriously harm our 
foreign policy interests, particularly in the Middle East.
    Controls established in 15 C.F.R. 768-799, and continued by this 
action, include the following:

[[Page 1385]]

    --National security export controls aimed at restricting the export 
      of goods and technologies, which would make a significant 
      contribution to the military potential of certain other countries 
      and which would prove detrimental to the national security of the 
      United States.
    --Foreign policy controls that further the foreign policy objectives 
      of the United States or its declared international obligations in 
      such widely recognized areas as human rights, antiterrorism, 
      regional stability, missile technology nonproliferation, and 
      chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation.
    --Nuclear nonproliferation controls that are maintained for both 
      national security and foreign policy reasons, and which support 
      the objectives of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.
    --Short supply controls that protect domestic supplies, and 
      antiboycott regulations that prohibit compliance with foreign 
      boycotts aimed at countries friendly to the United States.
    Consequently, I have issued an Executive order (a copy of which is 
attached) to continue in effect all rules and regulations issued or 
continued in effect by the Secretary of Commerce under the authority of 
the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, and all orders, 
regulations, licenses, and other forms of administrative actions under 
the Act, except where they are inconsistent with sections 203(b) and 206 
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
    The Congress and the Executive have not permitted export controls to 
lapse since they were enacted under the Export Control Act of 1949. Any 
termination of controls could permit transactions to occur that would be 
seriously detrimental to the national interests we have heretofore 
sought to protect through export controls and restrictions on compliance 
by U.S. persons with certain foreign boycotts. I believe that even a 
temporary lapse in this system of controls would seriously damage our 
national security, foreign policy, and economic interests and undermine 
our credibility in meeting our international obligations.
    The countries affected by this action vary depending on the 
objectives sought to be achieved by the system of controls instituted 
under the Export Administration Act. Potential adversaries may seek to 
acquire sensitive U.S. goods and technologies. Other countries serve as 
conduits for the diversion of such items. Still other countries have 
policies that are contrary to U.S. foreign policy or nonproliferation 
objectives, or foster boycotts against friendly countries. For some 
goods or technologies, controls could apply even to our closest allies 
in order to safeguard against diversion to potential adversaries.
    It is my intention to terminate the Executive order upon enactment 
into law of a bill reauthorizing the authorities contained in the Export 
Administration Act.
                                            William J. Clinton
The White House,
June 30, 1994.