    [Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 19 (Monday, May 16, 1994)]
    [Pages 1010-1014]
    [Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <R04>
    Remarks Announcing William H. Gray III as Special Adviser on Haiti and
    an Exchange With Reporters

    May 8, 1994

        The President. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I want to speak
    for a few moments about the crisis in Haiti, the challenge it poses to
    our national interests, and the new steps I am taking to respond.
        Three and a half years ago, in free and fair elections, the people
    of Haiti chose Jean-Bertrand Aristide as their President. Just 9 months
    later, their hopes were dashed when Haiti's military leaders overthrew
    democracy by force. Since then, the military has murdered innocent
    civilians, crushed political freedom, and plundered Haiti's economy.
        From the start of this administration, my goal has been to restore
    democracy and President Aristide. Last year, we helped the parties to
    negotiate the Governors Island accord, a fair and balanced agreement
    which laid out a road map for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. But
    late last year, the Haitian military abrogated the agreement, and since
    then they have rejected every effort to achieve a political settlement.
        At the same time, the repression and bloodshed in Haiti have reached
    alarming new proportions. Supporters of President Aristide, and many
    other Haitians, are being killed and mutilated. This is why 6 weeks ago
    I ordered a review of our policy toward Haiti. As a result of this
    review, we are taking several steps to increase pressure on Haiti's
    military while addressing the suffering caused by their brutal misrule.
    We are stepping up our diplomatic efforts, we are intensifying
    sanctions, and we are adapting our migration policy.
        Let me describe these steps. First, to bring new vigor to our
    diplomacy, I am pleased to announce that Bill Gray, president of the
    United Negro College Fund, former House majority whip, and chair of the
    House Budget Committee, has accepted my invitation to serve as special
    adviser to me and to the Secretary of State on Haiti. Bill is here with
    his wife, on his way to the inauguration of President Mandela in South
    Africa, and I will ask him to speak in just a few moments. But let me
    just say that he is a man of vision and determination, of real strength
    and real creativity. And I appreciate his willingness to accept this
    difficult and challenging assignment. He will be the point man in our
    diplomacy and a central figure in our future policy deliberations.
        As part of our diplomatic efforts, we will work with the United
    Nations to examine the changes in the proposed U.N. military and police
    mission in Haiti. We want to ensure that once Haiti's military leaders
    have left, this mission can do its job effectively and safely.
        Second, the U.S. is leading the international community in a drive
    to impose tougher sanctions on Haiti. On Friday, the U.N. Security
    Council unanimously adopted a resolution we had proposed to tighten
    sanctions on everything but humanitarian supplies, to prevent Haiti's
    military leaders and their civilian allies from leaving the country, to
    promote a freeze of their assets worldwide, and to ban nonscheduled
    flights in and out of Haiti. U.S. naval vessels will continue to enforce
    these sanctions vigorously.

    [[Page 1011]]

        We are also working with the Dominican Republic to improve sanctions
    enforcement along that nation's border with Haiti. To shield the most
    vulnerable Haitians from the worst effects of the sanctions, we will
    increase both humanitarian aid and the number of U.N. and OAS human
    rights monitors in Haiti.
        While these stronger sanctions will cause more hardships for
    innocent Haitians, we must be clear: The military leaders bear full
    responsibility for this action. They can stop the suffering of their
    people by giving up power, as they themselves agreed to do, and allowing
    the restoration of democracy and the return of President Aristide.
        Third, I am announcing certain changes in our migration policy
    toward Haiti. Currently, Haitians seeking refugee status, including
    those interdicted at sea, are interviewed only in Haiti and not beyond
    its shores. Our processing centers, which have been dramatically
    expanded in this administration, are doing a good job under bad
    circumstances.
        In 1993, we processed and approved about 10 times the number of
    refugee applicants as in 1992. In recent months, however, I have become
    increasingly concerned that Haiti's declining human rights situation may
    endanger the safety of those who have valid fears of political
    persecution, who flee by boat, and who are then returned to Haiti where
    they are met at the docks by Haitian authorities before they can be
    referred to in-country processing.
        Therefore, I have decided to modify our procedures. We will continue
    to interdict all Haitian migrants at sea, but we will determine aboard
    ship or in other countries, which ones are bona fide political refugees.
    Those who are not will still be returned to Haiti, but those who are
    will be provided refuge. We will also approach other countries to seek
    their participation in this humanitarian endeavor.
        The new procedures will begin once we have the necessary
    arrangements in place. This will take some weeks. Until then, the
    Haitians must understand that we will continue to return all boat
    migrants to Haiti. Even under the new procedures, there will be no
    advantage for Haitians with fears of persecution to risk their lives at
    sea if and when they can assert their claims more safely at a processing
    center in Haiti.
        The ultimate solution to this crisis, however, is for the military
    leaders to keep their own commitment to leave, so that Haiti's people
    can build a peaceful and prosperous future in their own country.
        I am committed to making these new international sanctions work. At
    the same time, I cannot and should not rule out other options. The
    United States has clear interests at stake in ending this crisis. We
    have an interest in bolstering the cause of democracy in the Americas.
    We have an interest in ensuring the security of our citizens living and
    working in Haiti. We have an interest in stopping the gross human rights
    violations and abuses of the military and their accomplices. And we
    clearly have a humanitarian interest in preventing a massive and
    dangerous exodus of Haitians by sea.
        The steps I have announced today are designed to relieve suffering,
    redouble pressure, and restore democracy. Working with the Haitian
    people and the world community, we will try to advance our interests and
    give Haiti an opportunity to build a future of freedom and hope. They
    voted for it, and they deserve the chance to have it.
        Mr. Gray.

    [At this point, Mr. Gray accepted the President's appointment and stated
    that he would work with commitment and determination to end the
    suffering in Haiti.]

        Q. Mr. President, what makes you believe that these sanctions, these
    new policies on returning Haitian refugees to Haiti will work this time?
    Haven't they been tried before and found to be unreliable or to
    encourage people to----
        The President. Before, when they were tried, the circumstances were
    somewhat different. First of all, let me answer the question about why
    we would undertake to change the policy, even though there is clearly
    some logistical challenge involved in doing so.
        I ordered the review of this policy 6 weeks ago when we began first
    to get intelligence reports and then clear news reports that there was
    increasing violence against citizens of Haiti who did not agree with the
    policies

    [[Page 1012]]

    of the military regime--and indeed, some of them seem to not be
    political at all--of people not only being killed but being mutilated.
    It seems to me reasonable to assume that some of the people who are
    fleeing by boat are in that group of people who also are fearful of
    their lives. And the way the boat return has worked so far is that we
    take the people back, let them off at the dock at Port-au-Prince. They
    are then--by and large, they have been free to go to the in-country
    processing. But they are subject to the authority of the Haitian police
    at that moment. And I simply think that the risks of that cannot be
    justified, given the increased level of political violence in the
    country. Therefore, I think we have to change the policy.
        Now, why do I think it will work? First, we've studied what happened
    before when the policy of inspection of people at sea occurred, and we
    have determined that two things ought to be done. First, we ought to
    look for a third-country processing center. And second, if we do it at
    sea, we ought not to do it on the Coast Guard cutters, which can be
    quickly overrun in their capacity, but to do it on bigger ships.
        We believe if--given a little time to organize this logistically, we
    can handle it. Also, it will be clear that we are not changing our
    policy, which is the law of the United States with regard to economic
    refugees. People who seek to come to the United States for economic
    reasons only, are not eligible for this kind of status.
        So we will do these reviews. We think we can do them fairly quickly,
    in a matter of a few days, and then return those who should be returned
    and take those who should be taken into the United States.
        Ron [Ron Fournier, Associated Press].
        Q. Are you in danger, sir, of sending signals that could open the
    floodgates for Haitian refugees? And how much, if any, did the fast play
    into your decisionmaking process?
        The President. First, let me answer your first question. I hope that
    we will not have a flood of refugees, but we are increasing our naval
    resources to deal with them. We are not changing our policy about who
    can come and who cannot. That is a matter of American law. We are not
    able to do that, nor should we do that.
        But I don't believe the policy we have now is sustainable, given the
    level of political violence against innocent civilians in Haiti. We have
    to try to implement this policy. I believe we can, and I think, as we do
    it firmly, the Haitian people will see we are not opening the floodgates
    for indiscriminate refugee migration into the United States but that we
    are going to try to find those people who have left because they have a
    genuine fear.
        The review of this policy began before Mr. Robinson's fast, but if
    you will go back, and when I was first asked about it I said that I did
    not mind his criticism of our policy, it obviously had not worked. I
    said that from day one. And I respect his conviction and his courage and
    his conscience. And I was gratified by the comments that he said today.
    And I'm glad that on this Mother's Day he's going to be having dinner
    with his wife tonight.
        Q. Mr. President, on sanctions, your former envoy to Haiti warns
    that the stricter sanctions will--could also ruin the situation on the
    ground in Haiti. It would make it impossible for President Aristide or
    for anyone Mr. Gray works with to set up there to bring democracy back.
    What kind of confidence do you have that economic sanctions are going to
    bring the military leaders out?
        The President. Well, I think the economic sanctions will have to be
    coupled with a vigorous and aggressive and broad-based diplomatic
    effort. And we are exploring all alternatives.
        As you know, we have been reluctant to impose the more severe
    sanctions, although President Aristide and many of the Friends of Haiti
    group, the French, the Canadians, others who have worked with us on this
    for a long time, since, have advocated this course. In my view, we must
    exhaust all available alternatives as we try to resolve this
    diplomatically. And I think it is an appropriate thing to do now.
        If we are successful in trying to bring back democracy and to
    restore not only President Aristide but the concept, the spirit that was
    in the Governors Island accord, that is, a broad-based, functioning
    representative government that can relate to the business community as
    well as to the ordinary citizens of Haiti, then we will have to get
    ourselves in

    [[Page 1013]]

    gear to try to make sure that that economy comes back as quickly as
    possible. We're trying to do that with South Africa and others. I think
    we'll be able to do it.
        Q. Mr. President, I don't understand why the administration is
    saying that it does not expect a large influx of Haitian refugees now.
    Are you saying effectively that you expect the results of the new policy
    will be the same as the results of the old policy?
        The President. No, I'm saying--I think there will be more--some more
    people in the sense that we will be reviewing more people
    simultaneously. That is, we will be reviewing people not only in the in-
    country processing centers, but we'll be interviewing people either on
    boats or in a third country. But what I'm saying is that we have not
    broadened the criteria of eligibility for coming to the United States.
        I want to make this very clear. The problem with the present policy
    is--the present policy worked in 1993 up through the abrogation of the
    Governors Island accord and for some time thereafter in the sense that
    we did not have evidence of widespread indiscriminate killing of
    civilians. And we increased by tenfold, by tenfold, the number of people
    processed and the number of people approved for refuge in this country
    for 1993 over 1992.
        But when all this killing started, when it became obvious that the
    military leaders had no earthly intention of honoring Governors Island
    or anything approaching it or keeping their commitments, but instead
    were going to tolerate, organize, and abet increased killing in Haiti,
    it is logical to assume that some of those who get on the boats include
    not only economic refugees, who are the vast majority of them, but also
    some who genuinely fear for their lives. The only way we can get those
    people to the in-country processing is to let them off at the dock in
    Port-au-Prince where the police have jurisdiction. I do not believe that
    is a sustainable policy, either practically or morally, given the level
    of indiscriminate violence.
        So there may be some more people who get in because we'll be
    reviewing even more people. But it would be a great mistake for Haitians
    who want to come here for economic reasons to just take to the boats,
    because we are not changing the standard by which we admit people.
        Gwen [Gwen Ifill, New York Times].
        Q. It seems there are two outstanding problems. One is that
    Lieutenant General Cedras said this morning he doesn't really have any
    intention of stepping aside in order to replace--in order to make room
    for President Aristide, and that even your supporters on this policy are
    concerned that there is still no equivalency between what happens with
    the United States and Cuban immigrants and the United States and Haitian
    immigrants. How do you address those two things?
        The President. Well, I think we are going to have--we do have an
    equivalency in terms of people who get here. But we have an obligation
    to try to let the people who genuinely fear for their lives into this
    country. We are now going to do that without regard to whether they're
    processed in-country or on boats. Therefore, the legal standard is what
    it ought to be.
        The Cuban situation is unique in the sense that there is an act of
    Congress which has certain specifics about the Cuban situation which
    changes our relationship with Cuba to some extent. But this will
    alleviate the legitimate concern with regard to the Haitians, and I hope
    will minimize the likelihood that hundreds of people will die at sea
    innocently.
        Q. And about Lieutenant General Cedras?
        The President. Well, of course, he's going to say that. That's what
    he's been saying ever since--that's what he told us when he abrogated
    the Governors Island accord. ``I gave my word. I never expect President
    Aristide to keep his word. President Aristide called my bluff, kept his
    word, and so I'm going to shaft the agreement.'' That's what he said on
    September 30th. So he hasn't changed his mind since then. But we may be
    able to do better now. And I think the gentleman to my right is a person
    of extraordinary ability; maybe he can do some things we haven't done
    yet. We're going to give it our best shot.

    [At this point, a Cuban-American thanked the President for his new
    policy on Haiti.]

        The President. Thanks.
        One more.
        Q. How long are you willing to give sanctions to take the desired
    effect?

    [[Page 1014]]

        The President. I think I have to let Mr. Gray do a little work
    before I can answer that question.

    Note: The President spoke at 3:15 p.m. in the Rose Garden at the White
    House. In his remarks, he referred to Gen. Raoul Cedras, commander of
    the Haitian Army, and Randall Robinson, the executive director of
    TransAfrica Forum who fasted to protest U.S. policy in Haiti. A tape was
    not available for verification of the content of these remarks.