    [Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 16 (Monday, April 25, 1994)]
    [Pages 856-861]
    [Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <R04>
    The President's News Conference

    April 20, 1994

        The President. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to
    begin by saying that I want to join all the American people as Hillary
    and I pray for the health and the recovery of President Nixon. I want to
    again say how much I have appreciated the wise

    [[Page 857]]

    counsel he has given me on the question of Russia and many other issues
    since I have been President.
        I spoke with a member of his family just a few moments ago, and I
    did speak with Reverend Billy Graham shortly after President Nixon was
    admitted to the hospital when Reverend Graham was on the way to the
    hospital. And I have nothing public to report about that, except to say
    that his condition remains serious, and I hope he will be in the prayers
    of all Americans.
        Over the last several days, the situation in Gorazde has become
    increasingly grim. The Serb forces have broken their own truce
    agreements, persisted in brutal attacks on civilians, United Nations
    personnel, and NATO forces protecting those personnel. These events are
    clearly a setback for the momentum achieved in recent months. The NATO
    ultimatum brought a reprieve to Sarajevo: humanitarian routes were
    reopened, agreements between Muslims and Croats changed the balance of
    power on the ground and offered new diplomatic opportunity.
        There are reports that the Serbs have released more U.N. personnel
    and returned heavy weapons seized from U.N. control near Sarajevo, and
    they are welcome. But the imperative now is not only to address the
    latest Serb transgressions, it is to renew the momentum toward peace.
        Let me be clear about our objective. Working with our allies, the
    Russians, and others, we must help the warring parties in Bosnia to
    reach a negotiated settlement. To do that, we must make the Serbs pay a
    higher price for continued violence so it will be in their own
    interests, more clearly, to return to the negotiating table. That is,
    after all, why we pushed for NATO's efforts to enforce a no-fly zone and
    the Sarajevo ultimatum and to provide close air support for U.N. forces
    who come under attack.
        In pursuit of that policy, we must take further action. Therefore,
    the United States has today undertaken the following initiatives:
        First, we are proposing to our NATO allies that we extend the
    approach used around Sarajevo to other safe areas, where any violations
    would be grounds for NATO attacks. I have insisted that NATO commit
    itself to achievable objectives. NATO's air power alone cannot prevent
    further Serb aggressions or advances or silence every gun. Any military
    expert will tell you that. But it can deny the Serbs the opportunity to
    shell safe areas with impunity.
        Second, we will work with others to pursue tighter sanctions through
    stricter enforcements. The existing sanctions on Serbia have crippled
    Serbia's economy. In light of recent events, there must be no relief.
        Third, we are taking other steps to relieve suffering and support
    the peace process. We are offering the United Nations assistance in
    addressing the humanitarian crisis that is now severe in Gorazde. And we
    expect the Security Council to take up a resolution authorizing
    additional U.N. peacekeepers, which we will support.
        These steps support our intensive work, along with others, to secure
    a negotiated settlement.
        I have just spoken at some length with President Yeltsin, as well as
    with President Mitterrand. I spoke earlier today with Prime Minister
    Chretien. I have not yet spoken with Chancellor Kohl or Prime Minister
    Major today. I have attempted to do so, but I have spoken with them in
    the last couple of days about this important issue. President Yeltsin
    and I agreed to work closely together to pursue peace in Bosnia.
    President Mitterrand expressed his agreement with the general approach.
        I was very encouraged by President Yeltsin's statement yesterday,
    calling on the Serbs to honor their commitments, insisting that they
    withdraw from Gorazde and that they resume talks and that they permit
    U.N. personnel to return to Gorazde.
        I think you can look forward to a major diplomatic initiative coming
    out of our common efforts, but I cannot discuss the details of the
    outlines of that with you at this moment because we have agreed, all of
    us, that our foreign ministers need to talk and flesh out the details
    before we say exactly what approach we will take. The telephone
    conversations themselves were an insufficient basis for the kind of
    specific detailed approach that I think would be required.
        In any case, it is clear that our test of Serb intent must be their
    actions, not their words. Those words have often proved empty.

    [[Page 858]]

        Let me reiterate what I have said often before. The United States
    has interests at stake in Bosnia: an interest in helping to stop the
    slaughter of innocents; an interest in helping to prevent a wider war in
    Europe; an interest in maintaining NATO as a credible force for peace in
    the post-cold-war era and in helping to stem the flow of refugees. These
    interests justify continued American leadership and require us to
    maintain a steady purpose, knowing that there will be difficulties and
    setbacks and that in this world where we have a set of cooperative
    arrangements, not only with NATO but with the United Nations, there will
    often be delays that would not be there were we acting alone or in a
    context in which our security were more immediately threatened.
        Ultimately, this conflict still must be settled by the parties
    themselves. They must choose peace. The agreement between the Croatians
    and the Muslims was a very important first step, but there is so much
    more to be done. By taking firm action consistent with our interests,
    the United States and our NATO allies can, and must, attempt to
    influence that choice.
        Thank you. Go ahead.

    Bosnia

        Q. Mr. President, did President Yeltsin raise any objections to this
    expanded use of NATO air power? And are all the NATO allies on board on
    this, such as Britain and Canada?
        The President. Well, first of all, we are still involved in our
    consultations about it. Secondly, I don't think I can commit President
    Yeltsin to a course until he sees our proposal in writing.
        I can tell you, in general, what he said, however, which was that he
    agreed that the present understandings for air power were ineffective
    and that the Serbs plainly violated their agreement and overreached in
    Gorazde, something he's already said publicly. But he feels, as everyone
    does, that over the long run, NATO air power alone will not settle this
    conflict; this conflict will have to be settled by negotiations.
        Let me tell you the argument I made to him and the argument I want
    to make to you, because I know a lot of you have been as frustrated as
    have we by what happened in Gorazde.
        We have, through NATO, three separate authorizations for the use of
    air power, and air power has been used under two of those three. And
    arguably, the possibility of air power has been successful under two of
    those three, but they're not the same.
        Authorization number one is to enforce the no-fly zone. We have done
    that and planes have been shot down, as you know. And I think the no-fly
    zone clearly has been successful in preventing the war from spreading
    further into the air and the slaughter from coming from the airplanes.
        Option number two was the Sarajevo option. That is, a safe zone was
    created around Sarajevo, and all heavy weapons either had to be
    withdrawn from the safe zone or turned over to United Nations personnel.
    Then any heavy weapons shelling within the Sarajevo safe zone by anybody
    could trigger NATO air strikes. There were no NATO air strikes under
    that, but it clearly worked, and it was clearly more enforceable.
        Option number three is what you saw at Gorazde. Option number three
    gives the United Nations commander the authority to ask for United
    Nations civilian approval to ask for NATO air support to support the
    U.N. forces on the ground when they're under duress.
        Now, consider what the difference is between that and the Sarajevo
    option and all the conflicts that came along. First of all, you have to
    go through the approval process, which came quickly the first time when
    the NATO planes went in, the United States planes, and took the first
    action. But then you have to keep coming back for that approval. And
    you're always subject to an argument about who started what fight and
    what the facts were. And then what happened to us in Gorazde was, if an
    assault results in having the NATO forces close at hand with the
    aggressing forces or if NATO forces are captured, then any use of air
    power may lead to the killing of the very people we're there trying to
    protect. Whereas under the Sarajevo model, you can just say, ``Okay,
    here's the safe zone. All the heavy weaponry has to be withdrawn or put
    under U.N. control,

    [[Page 859]]

    and if there's any violation by anybody, there can be air action.'' It
    is a much clearer thing.
        That is a point I made very strongly to President Yeltsin. I think
    he was quite sympathetic with it. His only point was the same point that
    everyone makes, which is that in the end, the use of air power by NATO
    cannot bring this war to an end. Only a negotiated settlement can do
    that. I think that, generally, you will see the United States and Russia
    working together, and I've been impressed by how aggressive the Russians
    have been with regard to the Serbs in this.
        Yes, go ahead. I'll take it.
        Q. Mr. President, do you think that now the Serbs should be prepared
    for strategic air strikes, as well as tactical, that you would need to
    go after their supply lines or their ammo dumps? And secondly, are you
    also pressing the allies to try to lift the arms embargo, as many in
    Congress are demanding?
        The President. Let me answer the first question first by simply
    saying that I do not think it is appropriate for me to discuss the
    tactical details of our policy--not ever probably--but certainly not
    until they have been worked out with our allies. We have to do that
    through NATO.
        Secondly, as you know, I have always favored lifting the arms
    embargo. And I am glad that there is so much support for it in the
    Congress now from--much of it coming from people who've not said it
    before. And I think that's encouraging. But many of them are saying that
    somehow we should not be in a cooperative effort with the United Nations
    and NATO but instead should just, on our own, lift the arms embargo,
    make sure the arms get there, and then, with no danger to ourselves we
    can permit these people to fight against their own abuses. That has a
    great deal of appeal. There are certain practical problems with it.
        First, I would say that if we ignore a United Nations embargo
    because we think it has no moral basis or even any legal validity but
    everyone else feels contrary, then what is to stop our United Nations
    allies from ignoring embargoes that we like, such as the embargo against
    Saddam Hussein? How can we ever say again to all of the other people in
    the United Nations, you must follow other embargoes? That's a serious
    question for me because there are a lot of things that we want to do
    through the United Nations.
        Secondly, what are the practical problems with raising the arms
    embargo? Do the Croats, who now have this agreement with the Muslims,
    support it? Will it be facilitated? How long would it take to get there?
    Would that increase Serb aggression in the short run while we're waiting
    for the arms to be delivered? There are a lot of practical problems with
    it. Do I favor lifting it? I do. Do I believe the allies with whom we
    are working now would vote to support it? I don't. Will there be
    continuing discussions about it? Yes, there will. I will say this: I
    think the more the Serbs turn away from this opportunity for peace, the
    more the allies are likely to be willing to vote to raise the arms
    embargo. But I don't think they're there right now.
        Yes, Rita [Rita Braver, CBS News].
        Q. President Clinton, it seems as though, frequently, you have
    characterized this as a civil war; yet the Serbs seem to be the main
    aggressors here. How would you define the Serbs for the American people?
    Are the Serbs villains in this piece?
        The President. Well, first of all, I think it is a civil war in the
    sense that people who live within the confines of a nation we have
    recognized are fighting each other for territory and power and control.
    So in that sense, it is clearly a civil war.
        I have always felt that the Serbs were the primary aggressors, even
    though at various times there have been three different factions
    fighting, and at various times in various specific instances, you could
    make an argument that the Serbs were not always the initiators of a
    particular aggression.
        The Serbs have gotten a lot of what they wanted, which was more
    territory to create a greater Serbia in areas where Serbs were
    ethnically either exclusively occupying the territory or dominant. And
    so I've always felt that they were the primary problem there. But in the
    end, there's going to have to be an agreement. Not very long ago, I
    would remind you, the parties didn't seem too far apart on an agreed-
    upon territorial division, and then this fighting resumed, I think, with
    quite unfortunate consequences.

    [[Page 860]]

        Q. Are you reluctant to condemn the Serbs' behavior?
        The President. No, I've been condemning their behavior for 2 years
    now. And let me just say this: I think--you asked me in general terms--
    in general terms do I consider them to be the primary aggressor? The
    answer to that is yes.
        More specifically, and far more importantly, were they wrong in
    Gorazde? Yes, terribly wrong. What is their defense? That the Muslims
    shot at them. Did they overreact to that, even if it's true?
    Unbelievably. Does that justify shelling a hospital, shelling the U.N.
    headquarters, taking United Nations hostages when we have never been
    involved in the war against them, when all we did was to do what we said
    we would do all along, which is if they threatened our people, we would
    use air power? They are the complete aggressors and wrongdoers in the
    case of Gorazde.
        Q. [Inaudible]--suggesting there is some reluctance to support air
    strikes in the House?
        Q. Is it too late for Gorazde?
        The President. Is it too late for Gorazde? No, it's too late for--
    you know, a lot of people have been killed there. But if the Serbs would
    do what the Russians demanded, as well as what we demand, if they would
    get out, withdraw, let the United Nations come back in, and then we
    could resume the aggressive humanitarian relief effort that we have
    offered to help in, it would not be too late for Gorazde in the sense
    that it could be restored as a genuine safe area and the town could be
    safe.
        Brit [Brit Hume, ABC News].
        Q. Nothing that you are proposing today is intended to deal
    specifically with Gorazde, is it? And just a second thing is, have you
    thought through what you would propose to do if your attempt to recreate
    the Sarajevo model elsewhere does not deter the Serbs and they keep
    coming, much as they did at Gorazde?
        The President. Let me answer your first question first. Our proposal
    would create Sarajevo-like conditions, that is, sort of safe zones
    around all the safe areas, including Gorazde. So we would assume that as
    a part of this, if our allies will agree with us, that any heavy
    weaponry, any heavy firing in and around that area would be subject to
    the same action as Srebrenica or any other safe zone.
        So, that's that. The second question is, have I thought about what
    would happen if this doesn't work? I have. But I think we should stick
    with this policy, and if the Serbs continue their aggression in an
    irresponsible way, then there are other things that can be done. I have
    given a lot of thought to it, but I don't want to talk about it now. I
    want to talk about this policy.
        Go ahead, Sarah [Sarah McClendon, McClendon News Service].

    Admiral Frank Kelso

        Q. Mr. President, you've had a lot of other things on your mind
    besides this war. Would you please do something about Admiral Kelso? Can
    you veto that bill that gives him pay for four stars when all he needs
    is pay for two. And that is in the traditions of the past. The military
    men only got their own regular pay. They didn't have to go to Congress
    and get paid for two more stars. That's spending Government money that
    we can't afford now.
        The President. No, that's not what happened.
        Q. If he didn't know what was going on in Tailhook, then he should
    have known because he's head of naval operations.
        The President. Well, the--I agree with the decision made by the
    Pentagon and ratified by the Senate. So I can't agree to do it because I
    agree with it.
        Q. Why do you agree with it because--why do you agree with spending
    more money on this man's salary?
        The President. Because I believe--because I disagree with you. I
    believe the evidence does not condemn the conduct or knowledge of
    Admiral Kelso sufficient to justify taking the two stars away from him.
        Wolf [Wolf Blitzer, Cable News Network].

    Bosnia

        Q. Mr. President, can I just follow up on this Sarajevo model? How
    long will it take, in your opinion, in your military advisers' opinions
    to (A) expand this model to protect the five other safe areas,
    especially because

    [[Page 861]]

    you say you need another U.N. Security Council resolution? So it seems
    that that process could take a long time.
        The President. Well, no, no. We believe that the United Nations has
    the authority under Resolution 836 to do this or that you could have a
    Presidential statement from the head of the Security Council. There are
    lots of ways to do it.
        Q. But in terms of expanding the U.N. personnel who are required----
        The President. We believe that what's been lacking there is just an
    agreement on how many more people, where they'll come from, and how the
    money will be provided. But General Rose has wanted 10,000 more. There
    was agreement among those of us who contribute but do not provide troops
    but who provide money, for something like 3,700 more recently. And my
    announcement today should be read as our willingness to play a major
    role in contributing to a larger peacekeeping force.
        Thank you.
        Q. Mr. President, are you going to put U.S. troops in?
        The President. No.

    Note: The President's 55th news conference began at 4:49 p.m. in the
    Briefing Room at the White House. In his remarks, he referred to
    evangelist Billy Graham; Russian President Boris Yeltsin; French
    President Francois Mitterrand; Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien;
    German Chancellor Helmut Kohl; British Prime Minister John Major; Iraqi
    President Saddam Hussein; Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, USN, Chief of Naval
    Operations; and Lt. Gen. Michael Rose, Commander of U.N. Forces in
    Bosnia.