    [Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 16 (Monday, April 25, 1994)]
    [Pages 881-888]
    [Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <R04>
    The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou

    April 22, 1994

    Bosnia

        The President. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Before I
    comment on my meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou, I would like to
    make a brief statement about developments with regard to Bosnia today.
        About 2 hours ago in Brussels, NATO's North Atlantic Council reached
    agreement on new steps to address the crisis in Gorazde and to promote a
    negotiated settlement in Bosnia.
        As NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner just announced, the North
    Atlantic Council decided that continuing Bosnian Serb attacks against
    Gorazde justify firm action. Therefore, the North Atlantic Council
    decided that the commander in chief of NATO's Southern Command, United
    States Admiral Leighton Smith, is authorized to conduct air strikes
    against Serb heavy weapons and other military targets in the vicinity of
    Gorazde unless three conditions are met: First, unless the Bosnian Serbs
    immediately cease their attacks against Gorazde; second, unless by 8
    p.m. eastern daylight time tomorrow evening, the Bosnian Serbs pull back
    their forces at least 3 kilometers from the city's center; and third,
    unless by 8 p.m. to-

    [[Page 882]]

    morrow evening, the Bosnian Serbs allow United Nations forces,
    humanitarian relief convoys, and medical assistance teams freely to
    enter Gorazde and to permit medical evacuations.
        This decision provides NATO forces with broader authority to respond
    to Bosnian Serb attacks. The Bosnian Serbs should not doubt NATO's
    willingness to act.
        In addition, the North Atlantic Council has begun to meet again to
    decide on authorization for NATO action concerning other safe areas. I
    applaud NATO's decision, the resolve of our allies, and once again, the
    leadership of NATO Secretary General Woerner. The United States has an
    interest in helping to bring an end to this conflict in Bosnia. Working
    through NATO and working along with Russia and others, we are determined
    to save innocent lives, to raise the price for aggression, and to help
    bring the parties back to a negotiated settlement.

    Greece

        Now let me say what a pleasure and an honor it has been for me to
    welcome Prime Minister Papandreou back to the United States. Last night
    we celebrated the Prime Minister's arrival at a reception at Blair
    House, and today we had a very productive meeting here at the White
    House. It has been about 20 years since the Prime Minister has been to
    America, and he told me today that 50 years ago this year, as a young
    man, he saw President Roosevelt in a touring car right outside the White
    House.
        In a sense, every one of us in this country has roots in Greece.
    After all, the Periclean faith in freedom helped inspire our own
    revolution. The Athenian model of democracy helped to shape our own
    young republic. The common values that we share have made Greece and the
    United States allies. Half a century ago, our two nations stood together
    to launch a policy of containment. Now with the cold war over, we are
    joining to meet new challenges and seize new opportunities.
        Consider, for example, the U.S.-Greece Business Council which was
    just recently established. It will enhance the economic contacts between
    our two nations, contacts that generated nearly $1 billion in trade last
    year alone.
        Nowhere are the challenges of this era clearer than in the Balkans.
    Greece and the United States share an interest in working to resolve the
    conflict in Bosnia and to prevent it from spreading into a wider
    European war. The Prime Minister and I discussed the most recent
    developments, and I underscored my view that further NATO action is
    necessary to restore the momentum toward peace.
        We also talked about the effect the embargo on Serbia is having on
    other nations in the region. We discussed the Former Yugoslav Republic
    of Macedonia, and the United States understands the serious Greek
    concerns on this issue. Over the past week, both sides have been working
    with Cyrus Vance and my special envoy, Matthew Nimetz, to narrow their
    differences. We are hopeful that an agreement can soon be reached that
    will lead to the lifting of the trade embargo and a resumption of a
    dialog to resolve the legitimate differences which Greece is concerned
    with.
        The Prime Minister and I also discussed Cyprus. The United States
    supports the U.N. confidence-building measures. Those measures grew out
    of discussions with President Clerides soon after he took office, and we
    hope that both sides will support them. My coordinator for Cyprus, Bob
    Lamb, has just returned from talks with both sides. A settlement in
    Cyprus would benefit all the nations in the region, especially Greece
    and Turkey, two vital members of NATO.
        I have asked the Turkish Government to address the status and
    working conditions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. And I
    encourage Prime Minister Papandreou to ease his government's objections
    to the level of European Union assistance to Turkey. We must do what we
    can in these areas to promote greater understandings between these two
    critical nations and, in the process, to promote progress on Cyprus.
        As a former professor here in the United States, Prime Minister
    Papandreou personifies the durable ties between Greece and America. It's
    been a pleasure to welcome him here as the leader of his nation. And I
    look forward to continuing to work with him based on the good
    relationship we have established in the challenging period ahead.

    [[Page 883]]

    We face some thorny problems; together, I am convinced we can make some
    progress in dealing with them.
        Mr. Prime Minister.
        Prime Minister Papandreou. Mr. President, I want to express deep
    appreciation for your invitation to me to visit you in Washington, to
    continue a discussion that we started in Brussels a few months ago.
        I must say that I found our discussions to be extremely useful. We
    have a clear understanding of the issues before us, and I want to stress
    that we consider you a friend of Greece and in whatever Greece
    signifies, as you have said to the world.
        I am very honored and pleased to be here. For me, it's a return
    after many years of absence; it's been 20 years ago that I last visited
    the United States. And I must say, I'm quite moved by the fact that I'm
    here now standing next to the President of the United States in this
    room. It's a great honor and a great moment.
        No doubt we are going through a period of great international
    difficulties. There are many spots in the world that, after the fall of
    the Wall, the Iron Curtain, many spots of the world that challenge,
    again, peace. Wherever you look there is conflict. And indeed, in the
    area from which we come, the Balkans, the Balkan Peninsula, we have,
    really, dynamite on our hands.
        No doubt there is grave responsibility for having attempted to break
    apart ex-Yugoslavia. And all of us, all the 12 European members of the
    European Union, bear equal responsibility for this. It's a fire that can
    spread very fast. It is Bosnia today, a tragedy, indeed, a great
    tragedy. And there is undoubtedly danger also lurking ahead in Krajina;
    there is danger in Kosovo. There are plans of expansion on the part of
    some Balkan countries. Many interests are in conflict in that area, and
    one begins to sense already the development of zones of influence.
        The President has just announced the important decision of NATO to
    proceed with--to give an ultimatum to the Serbs either to withdraw or to
    face bombardment. The position of the Greek Government on this is that
    we do not block this decision; we do not veto this decision. We accept
    it, but we do express our reservations. And there is only one
    reservation, indeed: our fear that, step by step, we may be dragged into
    a land war which would be really, by modern standards, a tragedy much
    greater than we have seen in Bosnia.
        So far as the question of the Balkans is concerned, Greece is a
    country that seeks peace and wants to play an active role, economically
    and culturally, in that region. It was not with pleasure that we imposed
    an embargo, with the exception of food and pharmaceutical, on Skopje.
        Skopje is a country that must survive. It is in the interest of
    Greece that it survives. And this may sound to you a bit contradictory,
    and it is contradictory, that while we believe in this, we have imposed
    an embargo in the expectation and hope that an SOS signal will be
    understood. And this SOS signal is simply that it is a matter of
    security for Greece that the irredentist articles of the constitution of
    that state, that the flag with the Birgina Sun, that the daily
    newspapers and radio emissions--all of them are looking to an
    irredentist and aggressive position which involves Greece because they
    talk about the Macedonia of the Aegean, meaning Greek Macedonia.
        At this moment, of course, we are discussing with Mr. Vance and Mr.
    Nimetz. But fundamentally, I want you to understand one simple thing.
    What we say to Mr. Gligorov is that we are prepared to lift the embargo,
    to normalize economic relations fully, to vote for the membership of the
    state in CSCE, to support an agreement between the community, the
    European community and that state, provided simply that he does one act:
    remove the Sun of Birgina and declare that the constitution in those
    particular articles is not valid.
        We are not asking for anything more, and we are offering
    normalization, complete economic normalization, keeping the question of
    the name, which is a difficult one, as a matter of negotiation under Mr.
    Vance with the assistance of Mr. Nimetz, continuing discussions under
    question of the name. But we separate it out to simplify the issue.
        Sorry to have taken so much time on this particular issue, but
    because I know there will be questions, I thought it was important that
    I tell you what our point of view is. We

    [[Page 884]]

    hope that as soon as possible that the embargo will be removed and that
    will be an act on the part of Mr. Gligorov to signify his willingness to
    live in peace with us and to cooperate with us to develop truly a strong
    economic relationship.
        Ladies and gentlemen, I don't have anything else to say, except for
    Cyprus, I want to thank the President. Because the President has taken
    action not once but more than once to further the Cyprus cause, to get,
    finally, a resolution after 20 years of Turkish occupation of the north
    part of the island. He brought us some good news today, a member of the
    staff of the President, that possibly Mr. Denktash has accepted the
    confidence-building measures. This I did not know until I came to the
    White House. This, though, is a good sign. But in any case, our thanks
    to the President, who has stood by us on this important issue, not only
    for Greece but for the world.
        Thank you.
        The President. We'll start with Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press
    International], and then I'd like to alternate between the American and
    the Greek press.

    Bosnia

        Q. Mr. President, I'd like to ask you and the Prime Minister a
    question. Some of your officials, Mr. President, have indicated that you
    would no longer be adverse to sending in ground troops to Bosnia, and I
    think the Secretary of State's statement has been so interpreted. Mr.
    Prime Minister, even though you have accepted the NATO position, you
    obviously are against bombing the Serbs. How would you bring them to the
    negotiating table?
        Prime Minister Papandreou. Look, one, I don't have the magical
    answer; I wish I had it. But I know there is a lot of frustration. The
    question is this: Is there a military solution to the problem? For me,
    there is no military solution; there is no possible military solution to
    the problem. Accordingly, it has to be a political solution. And of
    course, the United States has made significant efforts to push us all
    forward to the negotiating table, and has no responsibility, may I add,
    for the initial developments in the region.
        The President. Helen, let me say, first of all, there has
    categorically been no discussion in which I have been involved, or which
    I have encouraged or approved, involving the introduction of American
    ground forces into Bosnia, with the exception that you already know, as
    I have said for more than a year now: If there is an agreement, then I
    believe the United States should be willing to be part of a
    multinational effort to enforce and help to support the peace agreement.
        I agree with the Prime Minister, we must be, all of us, very mindful
    of the fact that we are not in this business to enter this war on one
    side against another. But I would also remind you that we were seeing
    peace talks unfold in which at least the stated positions of the Bosnian
    Government and the Bosnian Serbs were not all that different just a few
    weeks ago.
        We had the peace zone around Sarajevo. We had the agreement between
    the Croatians and the Muslims, which was very, very important. And until
    this travesty in Bosnia occurred in an area in which the United Nations
    had declared a safe area, I thought we were on the way to a negotiated
    settlement. Will this have to be resolved through negotiations?
    Absolutely. Our objective is to restore that and to stop slaughter of
    the innocents and a dramatic alteration of the territorial balance which
    would make it almost impossible to restore that sort of negotiating
    environment. But that's our objective, to be firm with the Bosnian Serbs
    because they are trying to do something that is inconsistent with the
    position they, themselves, have taken as recently as just a couple of
    weeks ago.

    Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

        Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you whether you're more
    optimistic after the meeting with the Prime Minister on the resolution
    of the Macedonian issue, and also, what kind of steps you would like to
    see or expect to see from both sides in the near future?
        The President. I would say I am more optimistic about the
    possibility of the resolution of it. And what I would like to see is for
    both sides to work with Mr. Nimetz, who is here, and with Mr. Vance to
    try to resolve the legitimate concerns.

    [[Page 885]]

        As you know, the United States believes the embargo should be
    lifted, but we also believe Greece has some very legitimate concerns,
    some concerns which ought to be able to be allayed. They are rooted in
    history--they are rooted in recent history, not just ancient history--
    and we believe that these things have to be resolved.

    Bosnia

        Q. Mr. President, you say that you're not even considering at all
    the possibility of sending ground troops under any scenario in advance
    of a full peace arrangement on the ground.
        The President. That's correct.
        Q. Well, what do you say to the leaders of France and Canada and
    Britain? You're asking them to put their ground forces in harm's way, to
    send them into Bosnia and the United States will provide the funding.
    But the world's largest military, the world's greatest military, is
    refusing to put its soldiers in harm's way. I'm sure they've asked you
    about this.
        The President. But we have not asked them to put their soldiers into
    combat. We are trying to protect their soldiers. And if we have
    respected--over a year ago--reluctantly their conclusion that at that
    time the arms embargo should not be lifted because it might subject
    their soldiers to more danger. Their soldiers are there now, not to
    fight the war, not to take sides, but to be agents of peace.
        I talked with the Canadian Prime Minister just this morning, and he
    said to me again, he said, ``You know, in spite of all the tension
    there, I really believe if they would just let our troops back into
    Gorazde, it would tend to restore the conditions of humanity, because we
    have not been attacked when we have been present in substantial
    numbers.''
        When the United States goes into a situation like this, I think it
    fundamentally changes the character and nature of the engagement. That
    is why I have always said we would contribute a substantial number of
    troops, but it ought to be in the context of a peace agreement, and I
    still believe that. And I have no reason to believe that our allies
    understand differently.
        We don't want to create the impression that the United States or the
    U.N. is entering the conflict to try to win a military victory on the
    ground. We do want to create the clear and unambiguous impression that
    we are angry and disappointed at the aggression and the continued
    aggression of the Bosnian Serbs in the area of Gorazde and their refusal
    to return to the negotiating table on the terms that they, themselves,
    set just a few weeks ago.

    Greece-Turkey Relations

        Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you if you are aware of the
    tension that exists in the area of the Aegean and what the United States
    is going to do on this issue? Are you going to discuss with Turkey, or
    are you going to put any pressure there?
        The President. I have had extensive discussions with Turkey, with
    the Turkish Prime Minister just recently about the relationship of
    Greece and Turkey. And I might as well say to you in public what the
    Prime Minister and I discussed in private. I don't want to commit him.
    This is just my thinking.
        My thinking is that at this moment in history, we have better
    conditions to resolve the differences between Greeks and Turkey and to
    have a new basis of responsible and fair cooperation than at any time in
    a long while.
        The Turkish Government is concerned, obviously, about instability
    within its own borders, the rise in Islamic fundamentalism. The
    Government is interested in building a new and modern economy closely
    connected to Europe and maintaining a secular and responsible nation
    that is overwhelmingly Islamic. It seems to me that that is in the
    interest of all of us. And I think that Turkey understands that that can
    be achieved, and particularly, closer ties with Europe as a whole can be
    achieved only as the issues that divide Turkey and Greece are more
    nearly resolved.
        So I'm quite hopeful, and I've been pushing this line with the
    friends of the United States in Turkey for more than a year now, and I
    will continue to do so.

    Bosnia

        Q. Mr. President, the Serbs' past general behavior is that when
    they're faced with a specific demand, they'll duck and come into

    [[Page 886]]

    compliance, but then they'll turn around and they'll come back harder
    someplace else. What can be done while you're trying to achieve this
    negotiated settlement to be sure that they don't just turn and come into
    Tuzla or Bihac or someplace outside the safe areas?
        The President. Well, we're taking up--that's two different
    questions. We are taking up the question of the other safe areas through
    the North Atlantic Council. As a matter of fact, I imagine the debate is
    going on now. All of the members decided that the issue of Gorazde
    should be addressed first and separately, and then the other safe areas
    should be taken up. And as I explained--I think Mr. Hume asked a
    question yesterday or the day before--we're trying to create, in all the
    safe areas, more or less the conditions we have in Sarajevo.
        Now, in the nonsafe areas, let me remind you that there is fighting
    going on and initiative being taken, but not just by the Serbs. The
    Government forces are also engaging in them. We believe that they should
    both stop and go back to the negotiating table. But we also believe that
    there should not be a measurable and dramatic change of the situation on
    the ground and, specifically, that there should not be an assault on
    areas the United Nations, itself, has declared as safe areas. So our
    clear objective here is first to try to reverse the terrible things that
    have been happening in Gorazde; second, to try to make the safe areas,
    safe areas; and third, through the display of firm resoluteness, to
    encourage the parties to get back to the negotiating table and work this
    out.
        As you know, in addition to that, we are discussing with the
    Russians and the European Community--and Prime Minister Papandreou
    talked about it a little bit today--what the appropriate next diplomatic
    initiative ought to be on our part. The Russians and the French have put
    forward proposals, as has the Secretary General of the United Nations,
    and I think that you will see some progress on that front next week.
        Q. After your meeting with the Greek Prime Minister at the White
    House, would you like to say a few words about American foreign policy
    regarding the Balkan situation today?
        The President. Well, I think I just said all I have to say. We
    talked a lot about it, and Prime Minister Papandreou gave me some very
    good insight. And we both agreed that, in the end, we have to have a
    negotiated settlement. But the United States believes that we have to,
    in the meanwhile, be absolutely determined not to let the prospect of a
    negotiated settlement be destroyed by the actions of the Serbs on the
    ground.
        Q. Senator Nunn has said that we really need to dramatically
    escalate our bombing and go to Belgrade, go to Serbia. Why not? Why not
    take that step?
        The President. I think that step is not an appropriate thing to do
    at this time, for a number of reasons. For one, the Bosnian Serbs
    themselves, it seems to me, when confronted with the reality that we are
    serious and we continue to go forward, are likely to return to the
    negotiating table. Number two, the Serbian government in Belgrade could
    be, and should be, an ally of the peace process. We know already that
    they have suffered greatly from the sanctions, and we're trying to
    stiffen the enforcement of the sanctions at this time. Thirdly, our
    partnership with the Russians continues, and while the Russians are
    angry and frustrated that they have been misled by the Bosnian Serbs,
    they have continued to adopt our position that there must be a
    withdrawal of Serb forces from Gorazde and a cessation of shelling.
        In other words, I think there are still possibilities within the
    framework in which we are operating to achieve a return to the
    negotiating process and a legitimate return. So I think at this time, it
    would be inappropriate to escalate the bombing that much.
        Q. Would you consider that--if this does not work, sir, would that
    be the next step?
        The President. Well, I don't like to deal in contingencies in a
    matter like this. But I think my answer should stand on its own.

    Security of Greece

        Q. Mr. President, due to the Balkan crisis, could you please clarify
    the U.S. position vis-a-vis to the security of Greece on a bilateral
    level?
        The President. Well, Greece is also a member of NATO, sir. And so
    our obligation to the security of Greece, as well as our his-

    [[Page 887]]

    toric commitment to it, I think, is quite clear, and there should be no
    doubt about it today.

    Bosnia

        Q. Mr. President, how do you plan to avoid mission creep in Bosnia
    if expanding the air umbrella doesn't work? Will the United States push
    in further or pull out? In other words, what's your exit strategy here?
        The President. Well, our exit strategy is a return to the peace
    negotiations. In other words, this is a different thing. Keep in mind--
    it is difficult to analogize this conflict from the point of view of the
    United States and the United Nations to others which occurred during the
    cold war and which had some sort of cold war rationale which sometimes
    broke down.
        What we are trying to do now is to confine the conflict, first of
    all, stop it from spreading into a wider war and secondly, to get the
    parties back to the negotiating table where they were most recently. If
    what we are doing doesn't work, then I will consider other options. But
    there is more than one way for the mission to be altered in pursuit of
    the ultimate objective.
        I will reiterate what I said to you in the beginning: There has been
    absolutely no discussion that I have participated in, authorized, or
    approved, dealing with the introduction of our ground forces here before
    a peace settlement.
        Q. Mr. President, how do you account for the fact that peace in
    Bosnia has been so difficult to be achieved? And do you think that this
    could be due to conflicting messages the warring parts have received
    from different countries?
        The President. It could be due to that. But I think it's mostly due
    to the fact that they have profound differences over which they have
    been willing to fight and die and that there are differences,
    apparently, even within each camp about the extent to which they should
    seek advantages on the battlefield or at the negotiating table down to
    the present day.
        I think it's more about the internal dynamics, about what is going
    on there than about anything else. I think that it is important not to
    be too arrogant about our ability to totally dictate events so far from
    our shores. But I do think we can influence them in a positive way. I
    think we have when we've acted firmly and acted together; we should
    continue to try to do so.
        Press Secretary Myers. Two more questions.
        Q. Mr. President, you just spoke about divisions within the camps,
    and you mentioned a moment ago that you thought the Bosnian Serbs would
    be likely to go back to the negotiating table and my understanding is--
    --
        The President. No, I don't want to say that. I think that they have
    gone there before, and I hope that they will. I wouldn't say that--I
    have no information that indicates that they are likely to do that.
    That's the rational thing for them to do.
        Q. The assumption that a lot of policy-makers have made is that the
    Serbs have basically taken most of the territory that they want, but we
    hear repeatedly statements from the Serb militia leaders indicating that
    they have a much more militant, aggressive desire to seize more
    territory.
        I'd like to ask you two things. One is, do you have any sense as to
    who's really in control over there? Are we negotiating with the people
    who can make a deal? And secondly, is there anything that U.S. policy
    can do to try to influence which parties to that internal conflict come
    out on top?
        The President. I think from time to time there are differences
    between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia-proper and its government. I think
    from time to time there are differences between and among various
    factions in Bosnia, between political and military factions, and between
    command centers and people out in the country, as often happens in this
    kind of war with this level of decentralization and with the
    developments that can occur in community after community.
        And that means that we have to be--we have to take those things into
    account in developing our strategies. But we can't let the rumor of
    that, in effect, divide and weaken us; we just have to work ahead. Is
    there anything we can do to exploit those or to use those? I don't know
    yet. But I do know that maintaining a firm hand on these sanctions is a
    very important part of our policy now. And I would think that,
    particularly, that there may be people on the ground who,

    [[Page 888]]

    once they've been fighting, don't want to quit, especially if they think
    they are in a position to win in a place where they happen to be
    fighting. But that's what leadership is for.
        You know, you could say--look at this election that's about to
    unfold in South Africa. I mean, I could give you lots of other examples.
    I'm sure there are people on the ground that don't want to quit fighting
    because it's what they know, and they think maybe they can press an
    advantage. But that's what leadership is for. And the leaders of the
    Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs need to assert themselves at this moment and
    avoid further wreckage.

    Balkans

        Q. The Balkan question--there is also the issue of the recent
    tensions between Greece and Albania. Did you discuss this issue as well
    as the status of the Greek minority there and the alleged human rights
    violations?
        The President. Well, first of all, I think Greece has proceeded with
    real restraint and sound judgment. We are concerned about the status of
    the Greek minority there as we are concerned about the status of the
    Albanians in Kosovo. This whole area is a tinderbox, which is one of the
    reasons we have paid as much attention to it as we have and one of the
    reasons we are trying, within the limits of the United Nations and NATO,
    to confine the conflict.
        I think the plain answer to this is to tone down the rhetoric, to
    observe the rights of the minorities, and not to let the war which is
    raging in Bosnia spread to the surrounding areas where there are equally
    deep tensions.
        I'll take one last question.

    Health Care Reform

        Q. Mr. Rostenkowski made a speech in Boston today in which he said
    that he is unwilling, or will recommend against, in his committee,
    financing the health care bill through savings anticipated in future
    years from the health care, from the effects of the health care bill,
    and that he prefers to finance it through a broad-based tax issue. Could
    you give your response to that and tell us how you think it would go?
        The President. I think Mr. Rostenkowski is trying to achieve our
    common objectives, which he defined as: universal coverage, cost
    control, and 218 votes. [Laughter] And I think he has a strategy for
    pursuing that.
        I believe that our savings are good. I believe that obviously we
    intend--we always knew we'd have to make some modification once the
    Congressional Budget Office cost estimates came out. We are prepared to
    do that. But we have dealt with an awful lot of health economists. We've
    worked very hard on the numbers; we think they are good. But I'm going
    to have to let him characterize his strategy.
        All I can say is that, of all the things I'm worried about in
    dealing with Congress over the question of health care, the commitment
    of the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee to providing health care
    security to every American is not one of them.
        Thank you very much. We've got to go.

    Note: The President's 56th news conference began at 2:14 p.m. in the
    East Room at the White House. A tape was not available for verification
    of the content of this news conference.