[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 3 (Monday, January 24, 1994)]
[Pages 80-83]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
<R04>
Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
the Means of Their Delivery
January 14, 1994
President Clinton and President Yeltsin, during their meeting in
Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute
threat to international security in the period following the end of the
Cold War. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate
actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested
states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.
The Presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
creates a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed
their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such
proliferation.
--Considering the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
as the basis for efforts to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons, they called for its indefinite and uncondi-
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tional extension at conference of its participants in 1995, and
they urged that all states that have not yet done so accede to
this treaty.
--They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to
limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they
advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I
and START II treaties.
--They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen
security assurances for the states which have renounced the
possession of nuclear weapons and that comply strictly with their
nonproliferation obligations.
--They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy
Agency in its efforts to carry out its safeguards
responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide
assistance to the Agency in the safeguards field, including
through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve
safeguards.
--They supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed with the
need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope
IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports with the need
for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the
nuclear field.
--They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as
soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a
comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the
decision to begin negotiations at the conference on disarmament.
They declared their firm intention to provide political support
for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to
refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are
being held.
--They noted that an important contribution to the goal of
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable
ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and
by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to
this effect with the widest possible participation of states and
on a non-discriminatory basis.
--They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other
states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation
of excessive stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce
such stocks.
--They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:
--including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source
and special fissionable materials, excluding only those facilities
associated with activities having direct national security
significance;
--steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the
process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility
of putting a portion of fissionable material under IAEA
safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials
released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure
that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.
--The Presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the
long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of
plutonium, taking into account the issues of nonproliferation,
environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic
factors.
--They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the
two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the
possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade
plutonium.
--The Presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or
diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this
context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 Agreement
to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and
physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great
significance to further joint work on the separate but mutually
connected problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the
civilian and military fields.
Both Presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
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--As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest
stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular
responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons.
In this context, they declare their resolute support for the
Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and their
intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry
into force of the Convention not later than 1995.
--To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical
weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing
documents for the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and agreed
to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the
implementing documents for the Bilateral Agreement on the
Destruction of Chemical Weapons.
--The Presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe,
secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical
weapons in the Russian Federation and the United States. They
applauded the joint Chemical Weapons Destruction Work Plan
recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way
for the United States to provide an additional $30 million in
assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia
to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also
agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support
Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.
--They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the
Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons and
of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the
Russia-America-British Statement of September 1992, which provided
inter alia for the reciprocal visits of facilities and meetings
between experts in order to ensure confidence in the compliance
with the Convention.
--They supported convening a special conference of the states'
parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and
Toxin Weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute
to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the
Convention and its effectiveness.
The Presidents expressed the determination of their countries to
cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles
capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
--They welcomed the conclusion of the Bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning the
Export of Missile Equipment and Technologies, signed in September
1993, noted the importance of this Agreement for ensuring mutually
beneficial cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the field of
space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to
ensure its full and timely implementation.
--The U.S. welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile
Technology Control Regime and undertook to cooperate with Russia
in facilitation its membership at an early date. The Russian
Federation and the United States of America are certain that
further improving the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of
membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of
missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well.
The Presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to
strengthening global norms of nonproliferation and working out
agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to
develop policies on nonproliferation applicable to specific regions
posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their means of delivery.
--They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would
represent a grave threat to regional and international security,
and decided that their countries would consult with each other on
ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honor
fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the
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IAEA in connection with the Treaty, and to resolve the problems of
safeguards implementation, inter alia, through dialogue between
IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of
the Joint Declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula.
--They support efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a
multilateral form to consider measures in the filed of arms
control in nonproliferation that could strengthen security in
South Asia. They call on India and Pakistan to join in the
negotiation of and become original signatories to the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions and the proposed
Convention to Ban Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear
Explosives and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's
territories.
--They agreed that the U.S. and Russia, as co-chairs in the Middle
East peace process, would actively promote progress in the
activity of the working group for Arms Control and Regional
Security in the Middle East, striving for speedy implementation of
confidence-building measures and working toward turning the Middle
East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where
conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.
--They firmly supported the efforts of the UN Special Commission and
the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of
the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply
with all UN Security Council resolutions.
Note: An original was not available for verification of the content of
this communique. This item was not received in time for publication in
the appropriate issue.