[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 3 (Monday, January 24, 1994)]
[Pages 80-83]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
the Means of Their Delivery

January 14, 1994

    President Clinton and President Yeltsin, during their meeting in 
Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute 
threat to international security in the period following the end of the 
Cold War. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate 
actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested 
states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.
    The Presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
creates a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed 
their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such 
proliferation.
    --Considering the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
      as the basis for efforts to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear 
      weapons, they called for its indefinite and uncondi- 

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      tional extension at conference of its participants in 1995, and 
      they urged that all states that have not yet done so accede to 
      this treaty.
    --They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to 
      limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they 
      advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I 
      and START II treaties.
    --They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen 
      security assurances for the states which have renounced the 
      possession of nuclear weapons and that comply strictly with their 
      nonproliferation obligations.
    --They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy 
      Agency in its efforts to carry out its safeguards 
      responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide 
      assistance to the Agency in the safeguards field, including 
      through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve 
      safeguards.
    --They supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed with the 
      need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope 
      IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports with the need 
      for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the 
      nuclear field.
    --They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as 
      soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a 
      comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the 
      decision to begin negotiations at the conference on disarmament. 
      They declared their firm intention to provide political support 
      for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to 
      refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are 
      being held.
    --They noted that an important contribution to the goal of 
      nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable 
      ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and 
      by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to 
      this effect with the widest possible participation of states and 
      on a non-discriminatory basis.
    --They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other 
      states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation 
      of excessive stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce 
      such stocks.
    --They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:
      --including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source 
      and special fissionable materials, excluding only those facilities 
      associated with activities having direct national security 
      significance;
      --steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the 
      process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility 
      of putting a portion of fissionable material under IAEA 
      safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials 
      released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure 
      that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.
    --The Presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the 
      long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of 
      plutonium, taking into account the issues of nonproliferation, 
      environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic 
      factors.
    --They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the 
      two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the 
      possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade 
      plutonium.
    --The Presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or 
      diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this 
      context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 Agreement 
      to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and 
      physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great 
      significance to further joint work on the separate but mutually 
      connected problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the 
      civilian and military fields.
    Both Presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent 
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

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    --As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest 
      stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular 
      responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons. 
      In this context, they declare their resolute support for the 
      Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and their 
      intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry 
      into force of the Convention not later than 1995.
    --To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical 
      weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing 
      documents for the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and agreed 
      to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the 
      implementing documents for the Bilateral Agreement on the 
      Destruction of Chemical Weapons.
    --The Presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe, 
      secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical 
      weapons in the Russian Federation and the United States. They 
      applauded the joint Chemical Weapons Destruction Work Plan 
      recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way 
      for the United States to provide an additional $30 million in 
      assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia 
      to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also 
      agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support 
      Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.
    --They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the 
      Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons and 
      of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the 
      Russia-America-British Statement of September 1992, which provided 
      inter alia for the reciprocal visits of facilities and meetings 
      between experts in order to ensure confidence in the compliance 
      with the Convention.
    --They supported convening a special conference of the states' 
      parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and 
      Toxin Weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute 
      to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the 
      Convention and its effectiveness.
    The Presidents expressed the determination of their countries to 
cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles 
capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
    --They welcomed the conclusion of the Bilateral Memorandum of 
      Understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and 
      the Government of the United States of America Concerning the 
      Export of Missile Equipment and Technologies, signed in September 
      1993, noted the importance of this Agreement for ensuring mutually 
      beneficial cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the field of 
      space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to 
      ensure its full and timely implementation.
    --The U.S. welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile 
      Technology Control Regime and undertook to cooperate with Russia 
      in facilitation its membership at an early date. The Russian 
      Federation and the United States of America are certain that 
      further improving the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of 
      membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of 
      missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well.
    The Presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to 
strengthening global norms of nonproliferation and working out 
agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to 
develop policies on nonproliferation applicable to specific regions 
posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery.
    --They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would 
      represent a grave threat to regional and international security, 
      and decided that their countries would consult with each other on 
      ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honor 
      fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
      Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the

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      IAEA in connection with the Treaty, and to resolve the problems of 
      safeguards implementation, inter alia, through dialogue between 
      IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of 
      the Joint Declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on Denuclearization 
      of the Korean Peninsula.
    --They support efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a 
      multilateral form to consider measures in the filed of arms 
      control in nonproliferation that could strengthen security in 
      South Asia. They call on India and Pakistan to join in the 
      negotiation of and become original signatories to the Treaty 
      Banning Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions and the proposed 
      Convention to Ban Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear 
      Explosives and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles 
      capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's 
      territories.
    --They agreed that the U.S. and Russia, as co-chairs in the Middle 
      East peace process, would actively promote progress in the 
      activity of the working group for Arms Control and Regional 
      Security in the Middle East, striving for speedy implementation of 
      confidence-building measures and working toward turning the Middle 
      East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where 
      conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.
    --They firmly supported the efforts of the UN Special Commission and 
      the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of 
      the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply 
      with all UN Security Council resolutions.

Note: An original was not available for verification of the content of 
this communique. This item was not received in time for publication in 
the appropriate issue.