    [Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 30, Number 3 (Monday, January 24, 1994)]
    [Pages 80-83]
    [Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

    <R04>
    Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
    the Means of Their Delivery

    January 14, 1994

        President Clinton and President Yeltsin, during their meeting in
    Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute
    threat to international security in the period following the end of the
    Cold War. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate
    actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested
    states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.
        The Presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
    creates a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed
    their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such
    proliferation.
        --Considering the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
          as the basis for efforts to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear
          weapons, they called for its indefinite and uncondi-

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          tional extension at conference of its participants in 1995, and
          they urged that all states that have not yet done so accede to
          this treaty.
        --They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to
          limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they
          advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I
          and START II treaties.
        --They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen
          security assurances for the states which have renounced the
          possession of nuclear weapons and that comply strictly with their
          nonproliferation obligations.
        --They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy
          Agency in its efforts to carry out its safeguards
          responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide
          assistance to the Agency in the safeguards field, including
          through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve
          safeguards.
        --They supported the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and agreed with the
          need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope
          IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports with the need
          for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the
          nuclear field.
        --They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as
          soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a
          comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the
          decision to begin negotiations at the conference on disarmament.
          They declared their firm intention to provide political support
          for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to
          refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are
          being held.
        --They noted that an important contribution to the goal of
          nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable
          ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and
          by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to
          this effect with the widest possible participation of states and
          on a non-discriminatory basis.
        --They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other
          states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation
          of excessive stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce
          such stocks.
        --They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:
          --including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source
          and special fissionable materials, excluding only those facilities
          associated with activities having direct national security
          significance;
          --steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the
          process of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility
          of putting a portion of fissionable material under IAEA
          safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials
          released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure
          that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.
        --The Presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the
          long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of
          plutonium, taking into account the issues of nonproliferation,
          environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic
          factors.
        --They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the
          two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the
          possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade
          plutonium.
        --The Presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or
          diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this
          context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 Agreement
          to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and
          physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great
          significance to further joint work on the separate but mutually
          connected problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the
          civilian and military fields.
        Both Presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent
    the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

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        --As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest
          stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular
          responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons.
          In this context, they declare their resolute support for the
          Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and their
          intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry
          into force of the Convention not later than 1995.
        --To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical
          weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing
          documents for the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and agreed
          to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the
          implementing documents for the Bilateral Agreement on the
          Destruction of Chemical Weapons.
        --The Presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe,
          secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical
          weapons in the Russian Federation and the United States. They
          applauded the joint Chemical Weapons Destruction Work Plan
          recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way
          for the United States to provide an additional $30 million in
          assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia
          to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also
          agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support
          Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.
        --They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the
          Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons and
          of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the
          Russia-America-British Statement of September 1992, which provided
          inter alia for the reciprocal visits of facilities and meetings
          between experts in order to ensure confidence in the compliance
          with the Convention.
        --They supported convening a special conference of the states'
          parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and
          Toxin Weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute
          to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the
          Convention and its effectiveness.
        The Presidents expressed the determination of their countries to
    cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles
    capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
        --They welcomed the conclusion of the Bilateral Memorandum of
          Understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and
          the Government of the United States of America Concerning the
          Export of Missile Equipment and Technologies, signed in September
          1993, noted the importance of this Agreement for ensuring mutually
          beneficial cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in the field of
          space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to
          ensure its full and timely implementation.
        --The U.S. welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile
          Technology Control Regime and undertook to cooperate with Russia
          in facilitation its membership at an early date. The Russian
          Federation and the United States of America are certain that
          further improving the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of
          membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of
          missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well.
        The Presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to
    strengthening global norms of nonproliferation and working out
    agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to
    develop policies on nonproliferation applicable to specific regions
    posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
    and their means of delivery.
        --They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would
          represent a grave threat to regional and international security,
          and decided that their countries would consult with each other on
          ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honor
          fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
          Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the

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          IAEA in connection with the Treaty, and to resolve the problems of
          safeguards implementation, inter alia, through dialogue between
          IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of
          the Joint Declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on Denuclearization
          of the Korean Peninsula.
        --They support efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a
          multilateral form to consider measures in the filed of arms
          control in nonproliferation that could strengthen security in
          South Asia. They call on India and Pakistan to join in the
          negotiation of and become original signatories to the Treaty
          Banning Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions and the proposed
          Convention to Ban Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear
          Explosives and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles
          capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's
          territories.
        --They agreed that the U.S. and Russia, as co-chairs in the Middle
          East peace process, would actively promote progress in the
          activity of the working group for Arms Control and Regional
          Security in the Middle East, striving for speedy implementation of
          confidence-building measures and working toward turning the Middle
          East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where
          conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.
        --They firmly supported the efforts of the UN Special Commission and
          the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of
          the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply
          with all UN Security Council resolutions.

    Note: An original was not available for verification of the content of
    this communique. This item was not received in time for publication in
    the appropriate issue.