[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 29, Number 47 (Monday, November 29, 1993)]
[Pages 2452-2455]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

<R04>
Message to the Congress Transmitting the Chemical Weapons Convention

 November 23, 1993

To the Senate of the United States:

    I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruc- 

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tion (the ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or CWC). The Convention 
includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the 
Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification, and 
the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information. The Convention 
was opened for signature and was signed by the United States at Paris on 
January 13, 1993. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, 
the Report of the Department of State on the Convention.
    In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate, 
two documents relevant to, but not part of, the Convention: the 
Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Text on the 
Establishment of a Preparatory Commission (with three Annexes), adopted 
by acclamation by Signatory States at Paris on January 13, 1993. These 
documents provide the basis for the Preparatory Commission for the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Preparatory 
Commission), which is responsible for preparing detailed procedures for 
implementing the Convention and for laying the foundation for the 
international organization created by the Convention. In addition, the 
recommended legislation necessary to implement the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, environmental documentation related to the Convention, and 
an analysis of the verifiability of the Convention consistent with 
Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, will be 
submitted separately to the Senate for its information.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention is unprecedented in its scope. The 
Convention will require States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons 
and chemical weapons production facilities under the observation of 
international inspectors; subject States Parties' citizens and 
businesses and other nongovernmental entities to its obligations; 
subject States Parties' chemical industry to declarations and routine 
inspection; and subject any facility or location in the territory or any 
other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party to 
international inspection to address other States Parties' compliance 
concerns.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention is also unique in the number of 
countries involved in its development and committed from the outset to 
its nonproliferation objectives. This major arms control treaty was 
negotiated by the 39 countries in the Geneva-based Conference on 
Disarmament, with contributions from an equal number of observer 
countries, representing all areas of the world. To date, more than 150 
countries have signed the Convention since it was opened for signature 
in January of this year.
    The complexities of negotiating a universally applicable treaty were 
immense. Difficult issues such as the need to balance an adequate degree 
of intrusiveness, to address compliance concerns, with the need to 
protect sensitive nonchemical weapons related information and 
constitutional rights, were painstakingly negotiated. The international 
chemical industry, and U.S. chemical industry representatives, in 
particular, played a crucial role in the elaboration of landmark 
provisions for the protection of sensitive commercial and national 
security information.
    The implementation of the Convention will be conducted by the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW 
will consist of the Conference of the States Parties, which will be the 
overall governing body composed of all States Parties, the 41-member 
Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat, an international body 
responsible for conducting verification activities, including on-site 
inspections. The OPCW will provide a forum in and through which members 
can build regional and global stability and play a more responsible role 
in the international community.
    The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of 
the 65th instrument of ratification, but not earlier than 2 years after 
it was opened for signature. Thus, the Convention can enter into force 
on January 13, 1995, if 65 countries have deposited their instruments of 
ratification with the depositary for the Convention (the Secretary 
General of the United Nations) by July 1994. The 2-year delay before the 
earliest possible entry into force of the Convention was intended to 
allow Signatory States time to undertake

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the necessary national legislative and procedural preparations and to 
provide time for the Preparatory Commission to prepare for 
implementation of the Convention.
    The Convention is designed to exclude the possibility of the use or 
threat of use of chemical weapons, thus reflecting a significant step 
forward in reducing the threat of chemical warfare. To this end, the 
Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, 
stockpiling, retention, and, direct or indirect, transfer to anyone of 
chemical weapons; the use of chemical weapons against anyone, including 
retaliatory use; the engagement in any military preparations to use 
chemical weapons; and the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of 
anyone to engage in activities prohibited to States Parties. The 
Convention also requires all chemical weapons to be declared, 
declarations to be internationally confirmed, and all chemical weapons 
to be completely eliminated within 10 years after its entry into force 
(15 years in extraordinary cases), with storage and destruction 
monitored through on-site international inspection. The Convention 
further requires all chemical weapons production to cease within 30 days 
of the entry into force of the Convention for a State Party and all 
chemical weapons production facilities to be eliminated (or in 
exceptional cases of compelling need, and with the permission of the 
Conference of the States Parties, converted to peaceful purposes). 
Cessation of production, and destruction within 10 years after the entry 
into force of the Convention (or conversion and peaceful production), 
will be internationally monitored through on-site inspection.
    In addition, the Convention prohibits the use of riot control agents 
as a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition in international law 
on the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for the 
possibility for protection against and assistance in the event of use or 
threat of use of chemical weapons against a State Party. The 
Administration is reviewing the impact of the Convention's prohibition 
on the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare on Executive 
Order No. 11850, which specifies the current policy of the United States 
with regard to the use of riot control agents in war. The results of the 
review will be submitted separately to the Senate.
    The Convention contains a number of provisions that make a major 
contribution to our nonproliferation objectives. In addition to 
verification of the destruction of chemical weapons, the Convention 
provides a regime for monitoring relevant civilian chemical industry 
facilities through declaration and inspection requirements. States 
Parties are also prohibited from providing any assistance to anyone to 
engage in activities, such as the acquisition of chemical weapons, 
prohibited by the Convention. Exports to non-States Parties of chemicals 
listed in the Convention are prohibited in some instances and subject to 
end-user assurances in others. Imports of some chemicals from non-States 
Parties are also banned. These restrictions will also serve to provide 
an incentive for countries to become parties as soon as possible. 
Finally, each State Party is required to pass penal legislation 
prohibiting individuals and businesses and other nongovernmental 
entities from engaging in activities on its territory or any other place 
under its jurisdiction that are prohibited to States Parties. Such penal 
legislation must also apply to the activities of each State Party's 
citizens, wherever the activities occur. Through these provisions, the 
Convention furthers the important goal of preventing the proliferation 
of chemical weapons, while holding out the promise of their eventual 
worldwide elimination.
    The Convention contains two verification regimes to enhance the 
security of States Parties to the Convention and limit the possibility 
of clandestine chemical weapons production, storage, and use. The first 
regime provides for a routine monitoring regime involving declarations, 
initial visits, systematic inspections of declared chemical weapons 
storage, production and destruction facilities, and routine inspections 
of the relevant civilian chemical industry facilities. The second 
regime, challenge inspections, allows a State Party to have an 
international inspection conducted of any facility or location in the 
territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of 
another State Party in order to clarify and resolve questions of 
possible noncompliance. The Convention obligates the challenged State 
Party to accept the inspec- 

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tion and to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the compliance 
concern. At the same time, the Convention provides a system for the 
inspected State Party to manage access to a challenged site in a manner 
that allows for protection in its national security, proprietary, and 
constitutional concerns. In addition, the Convention contains 
requirements for the protection of confidential information obtained by 
the OPCW.
    The Convention prohibits reservations to the Articles. However, the 
CWC allows reservations to the Annexes so long as they are compatible 
with the object and purpose of the Convention. This structure prevents 
States Parties from modifying their fundamental obligations, as some 
countries, including the United States, did with regard to the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925 when they attached reservations preserving the right to 
retaliate with chemical weapons. At the same time, it allows States 
Parties some flexibility with regard to the specifics of their 
implementation of the Convention.
    Beyond the elimination of chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is of major importance in providing a foundation for 
enhancing regional and global stability, a forum for promoting 
international cooperation and responsibility, and a system for 
resolution of national concerns.
    I believe that the Chemical Weapons Convention is in the best 
interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly 
strengthen United States, allied and international security, and enhance 
global and regional stability. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give 
early and favorable consideration to the Convention, and to give advice 
and consent to its ratification as soon as possible in 1994.
                                            William J. Clinton
The White House,
November 23, 1993.