[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 29, Number 47 (Monday, November 29, 1993)]
[Pages 2452-2455]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
<R04>
Message to the Congress Transmitting the Chemical Weapons Convention
November 23, 1993
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruc-
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tion (the ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or CWC). The Convention
includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the
Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification, and
the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information. The Convention
was opened for signature and was signed by the United States at Paris on
January 13, 1993. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate,
the Report of the Department of State on the Convention.
In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate,
two documents relevant to, but not part of, the Convention: the
Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Text on the
Establishment of a Preparatory Commission (with three Annexes), adopted
by acclamation by Signatory States at Paris on January 13, 1993. These
documents provide the basis for the Preparatory Commission for the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Preparatory
Commission), which is responsible for preparing detailed procedures for
implementing the Convention and for laying the foundation for the
international organization created by the Convention. In addition, the
recommended legislation necessary to implement the Chemical Weapons
Convention, environmental documentation related to the Convention, and
an analysis of the verifiability of the Convention consistent with
Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, will be
submitted separately to the Senate for its information.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is unprecedented in its scope. The
Convention will require States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons
and chemical weapons production facilities under the observation of
international inspectors; subject States Parties' citizens and
businesses and other nongovernmental entities to its obligations;
subject States Parties' chemical industry to declarations and routine
inspection; and subject any facility or location in the territory or any
other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party to
international inspection to address other States Parties' compliance
concerns.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is also unique in the number of
countries involved in its development and committed from the outset to
its nonproliferation objectives. This major arms control treaty was
negotiated by the 39 countries in the Geneva-based Conference on
Disarmament, with contributions from an equal number of observer
countries, representing all areas of the world. To date, more than 150
countries have signed the Convention since it was opened for signature
in January of this year.
The complexities of negotiating a universally applicable treaty were
immense. Difficult issues such as the need to balance an adequate degree
of intrusiveness, to address compliance concerns, with the need to
protect sensitive nonchemical weapons related information and
constitutional rights, were painstakingly negotiated. The international
chemical industry, and U.S. chemical industry representatives, in
particular, played a crucial role in the elaboration of landmark
provisions for the protection of sensitive commercial and national
security information.
The implementation of the Convention will be conducted by the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW
will consist of the Conference of the States Parties, which will be the
overall governing body composed of all States Parties, the 41-member
Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat, an international body
responsible for conducting verification activities, including on-site
inspections. The OPCW will provide a forum in and through which members
can build regional and global stability and play a more responsible role
in the international community.
The Convention will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of
the 65th instrument of ratification, but not earlier than 2 years after
it was opened for signature. Thus, the Convention can enter into force
on January 13, 1995, if 65 countries have deposited their instruments of
ratification with the depositary for the Convention (the Secretary
General of the United Nations) by July 1994. The 2-year delay before the
earliest possible entry into force of the Convention was intended to
allow Signatory States time to undertake
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the necessary national legislative and procedural preparations and to
provide time for the Preparatory Commission to prepare for
implementation of the Convention.
The Convention is designed to exclude the possibility of the use or
threat of use of chemical weapons, thus reflecting a significant step
forward in reducing the threat of chemical warfare. To this end, the
Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, retention, and, direct or indirect, transfer to anyone of
chemical weapons; the use of chemical weapons against anyone, including
retaliatory use; the engagement in any military preparations to use
chemical weapons; and the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of
anyone to engage in activities prohibited to States Parties. The
Convention also requires all chemical weapons to be declared,
declarations to be internationally confirmed, and all chemical weapons
to be completely eliminated within 10 years after its entry into force
(15 years in extraordinary cases), with storage and destruction
monitored through on-site international inspection. The Convention
further requires all chemical weapons production to cease within 30 days
of the entry into force of the Convention for a State Party and all
chemical weapons production facilities to be eliminated (or in
exceptional cases of compelling need, and with the permission of the
Conference of the States Parties, converted to peaceful purposes).
Cessation of production, and destruction within 10 years after the entry
into force of the Convention (or conversion and peaceful production),
will be internationally monitored through on-site inspection.
In addition, the Convention prohibits the use of riot control agents
as a method of warfare, reaffirms the prohibition in international law
on the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, and provides for the
possibility for protection against and assistance in the event of use or
threat of use of chemical weapons against a State Party. The
Administration is reviewing the impact of the Convention's prohibition
on the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare on Executive
Order No. 11850, which specifies the current policy of the United States
with regard to the use of riot control agents in war. The results of the
review will be submitted separately to the Senate.
The Convention contains a number of provisions that make a major
contribution to our nonproliferation objectives. In addition to
verification of the destruction of chemical weapons, the Convention
provides a regime for monitoring relevant civilian chemical industry
facilities through declaration and inspection requirements. States
Parties are also prohibited from providing any assistance to anyone to
engage in activities, such as the acquisition of chemical weapons,
prohibited by the Convention. Exports to non-States Parties of chemicals
listed in the Convention are prohibited in some instances and subject to
end-user assurances in others. Imports of some chemicals from non-States
Parties are also banned. These restrictions will also serve to provide
an incentive for countries to become parties as soon as possible.
Finally, each State Party is required to pass penal legislation
prohibiting individuals and businesses and other nongovernmental
entities from engaging in activities on its territory or any other place
under its jurisdiction that are prohibited to States Parties. Such penal
legislation must also apply to the activities of each State Party's
citizens, wherever the activities occur. Through these provisions, the
Convention furthers the important goal of preventing the proliferation
of chemical weapons, while holding out the promise of their eventual
worldwide elimination.
The Convention contains two verification regimes to enhance the
security of States Parties to the Convention and limit the possibility
of clandestine chemical weapons production, storage, and use. The first
regime provides for a routine monitoring regime involving declarations,
initial visits, systematic inspections of declared chemical weapons
storage, production and destruction facilities, and routine inspections
of the relevant civilian chemical industry facilities. The second
regime, challenge inspections, allows a State Party to have an
international inspection conducted of any facility or location in the
territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of
another State Party in order to clarify and resolve questions of
possible noncompliance. The Convention obligates the challenged State
Party to accept the inspec-
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tion and to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the compliance
concern. At the same time, the Convention provides a system for the
inspected State Party to manage access to a challenged site in a manner
that allows for protection in its national security, proprietary, and
constitutional concerns. In addition, the Convention contains
requirements for the protection of confidential information obtained by
the OPCW.
The Convention prohibits reservations to the Articles. However, the
CWC allows reservations to the Annexes so long as they are compatible
with the object and purpose of the Convention. This structure prevents
States Parties from modifying their fundamental obligations, as some
countries, including the United States, did with regard to the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 when they attached reservations preserving the right to
retaliate with chemical weapons. At the same time, it allows States
Parties some flexibility with regard to the specifics of their
implementation of the Convention.
Beyond the elimination of chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons
Convention is of major importance in providing a foundation for
enhancing regional and global stability, a forum for promoting
international cooperation and responsibility, and a system for
resolution of national concerns.
I believe that the Chemical Weapons Convention is in the best
interests of the United States. Its provisions will significantly
strengthen United States, allied and international security, and enhance
global and regional stability. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give
early and favorable consideration to the Convention, and to give advice
and consent to its ratification as soon as possible in 1994.
William J. Clinton
The White House,
November 23, 1993.