[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 29, Number 2 (Monday, January 18, 1993)]
[Pages 47-49]
[Online from the Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
<R04>
Message to the Senate Transmitting the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
January 15, 1993
To the Senate of the United States:
I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate
to ratification, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on January 3,
1993. The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral
parts thereof:
--the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs
and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (the Elimination and Conversion Protocol);
--the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and
--the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy
Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution).
In addition, I transmit herewith, for the information of the Senate,
the report of the Department of State and letters exchanged by
representatives of the Parties. The letters
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are associated with, but not integral parts of, the START II Treaty.
Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, these letters are provided because they are relevant to
the consideration of the Treaty by the Senate.
The START II Treaty is a milestone in the continuing effort by the
United States and the Russian Federation to address the threat posed by
strategic offensive nuclear weapons, especially multiple-warhead ICBMs.
It builds upon and relies on the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) signed at
Moscow on July 31, 1991. At the same time, the START II Treaty goes even
further than the START Treaty.
The START Treaty was the first treaty actually to reduce strategic
offensive arms of both countries, with overall reductions of 30-40
percent and reductions of up to 50 percent in the most threatening
systems. It enhances stability in times of crisis. It not only limits
strategic arms but also reduces them significantly below current levels.
In addition, the START Treaty allows equality of forces and is
effectively verifiable. Finally, commitments associated with the START
Treaty will result in the elimination of nuclear weapons and deployed
strategic offensive arms from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine within 7 years after entry into force, and accession of
these three states to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. As a result, after 7
years, only Russia and the United States will retain any deployed
strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty.
The START II Treaty builds upon and surpasses the accomplishments of
the START Treaty by further reducing strategic offensive arms in such a
way that further increases the stability of the strategic nuclear
balance. It bans deployment of the most destabilizing type of nuclear
weapons system--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with
multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads. At the same time,
the START II Treaty permits the United States to maintain a stabilizing
sea-based force.
The central limits of the START II Treaty require reductions by
January 1, 2003, to 3000-3500 warheads. Within this, there are sublimits
of between 1700-1750 warheads on deployed SLBMs for each Party, or such
lower number as each Party shall decide for itself; zero for warheads on
deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs; and zero for warheads on deployed heavy
ICBMs. Thus, the Treaty reduces the current overall deployments of
strategic nuclear weapons on each side by more than two-thirds from
current levels. These limits will be reached by the end of the year 2000
if both Parties reach agreement on a program of assistance to the
Russian Federation with regard to dismantling strategic offensive arms
within a year after entry into force of the Treaty. Acceptance of these
reductions serves as a clear indication of the ending of the Cold War.
In a major accomplishment, START II will result in the complete
elimination of heavy ICBMs (the SS-18s) and the elimination or
conversion of their launchers. All heavy ICBMs and launch canisters will
be destroyed. All but 90 heavy ICBM silos will likewise be destroyed and
these 90 silos will be modified to be incapable of launching SS-18s. To
address the Russians' stated concern over the cost of implementing the
transition to a single-warhead ICBM force, the START II Treaty provides
for the conversion of up to 90 of the 154 Russian SS-18 heavy ICBM silos
that will remain after the START Treaty reductions. The Russians have
unilaterally undertaken to use the converted silos only for the smaller,
SS-25 type single-warhead ICBMs. When implemented, the Treaty's
conversion provisions, which include extensive on-site inspection
rights, will preclude the use of these silos to launch heavy ICBMs.
Together with the elimination of SS-18 missiles, these provisions are
intended to ensure that the strategic capability of the SS-18 system is
eliminated.
START II allows some reductions to be taken by downloading, i.e.,
reducing the number of warheads attributed to existing missiles. This
will allow the United States to achieve the reductions required by the
Treaty in a cost-effective way by downloading some or all of our sea-
based Trident SLBMs and land-based Minuteman III ICBMs. The
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Treaty also allows downloading, in Russia, of 105 of the 170 SS-19
multiple-warhead missiles in existing silos to a single-warhead missile.
All other Russian launchers of multiple-warhead ICBMs--including the
remaining 65 SS-19s--must be converted for single-warhead ICBMs or
eliminated in accordance with START procedures.
START II can be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent
with U.S. national security. To ensure that we have the ability to
respond to worldwide conventional contingencies, it allows for the
reorientation, without any conversion procedures, of 100 START-
accountable heavy bombers to a conventional role. These heavy bombers
will not count against START II warhead limits.
The START Treaty and the START II Treaty remain in force
concurrently and have the same duration. Except as explicitly modified
by the START II Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty will be used
to implement START II.
The START II Treaty provides for inspections in addition to those of
the START Treaty. These additional inspections will be carried out
according to the provisions of the START Treaty unless otherwise
specified in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or in the
Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol. As I was convinced that the START
Treaty is effectively verifiable, I am equally confident that the START
II Treaty is effectively verifiable.
The START Treaty was an historic achievement in our long-term effort
to enhance the stability of the strategic balance through arms control.
The START II Treaty represents the capstone of that effort. Elimination
of heavy ICBMs and the effective elimination of all other multiple-
warhead ICBMs will put an end to the most dangerous weapons of the Cold
War.
In sum, the START II Treaty is clearly in the interest of the United
States and represents a watershed in our efforts to stabilize the
nuclear balance and further reduce strategic offensive arms. I therefore
urge the Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the
Treaty, including its Protocols and Memorandum on Attribution, and to
give its advice and consent to ratification.
George Bush
The White House,
January 15, 1993.