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UNITED STATES
REPORTS
586
OCT. TERM 2018
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UNITED STATES REPORTS
VOLUME 586
CASES ADJUDGED
IN
THE SUPREME COURT
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Beginning of Term
October 1, 2018, Through March 25, 2019
CHRISTINE LUCHOK FALLON
reporter of decisions
WASHINGTON : 2026
Printed on Uncoated Permanent Printing Paper
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Publishing Offce
JUSTICES
of the
SUPREME COURT
during the time of these reports*
JOHN G. ROBERTS, Jr., Chief Justice.
CLARENCE THOMAS, Associate Justice.
RUTH BADER GINSBURG, Associate Justice.
STEPHEN BREYER, Associate Justice.
SAMUEL A. ALITO, Jr., Associate Justice.
SONIA SOTOMAYOR, Associate Justice.
ELENA KAGAN, Associate Justice.
NEIL M. GORSUCH, Associate Justice.
BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, Associate Justice.1
retired
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice.
SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice.
ANTHONY M. KENNEDY, Associate Justice.2
DAVID H. SOUTER, Associate Justice.
ofcers of the court
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General.3
MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General.4
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General.5
NOEL J. FRANCISCO, Solicitor General.
SCOTT S. HARRIS, Clerk.
CHRISTINE LUCHOK FALLON, Reporter of
Decisions.
PAMELA TALKIN, Marshal.
LINDA S. MASLOW, Librarian.
* For notes, see p. iv.
iii
NOTES
1 The Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh, of Maryland, formerly a Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
was nominated by President Trump on July 9, 2018, to be an Associate
Justice of this Court; the nomination was confrmed by the Senate on October
6, 2018; he was commissioned and took the oaths and his seat on the
same date. He was presented to the Court on November 8, 2018. See
post, p. v.
2 Justice Kennedy retired effective July 31, 2018. See post, p. ix.
3 Attorney General Sessions resigned effective November 7, 2018.
4 Mr. Whitaker became Acting Attorney General effective November 7,
2018.
5 The Honorable William P. Barr, of Virginia, was nominated by President
Trump on December 7, 2018, to be Attorney General; the nomination
was confrmed by the Senate on February 14, 2019; he was commissioned
and took the oath of offce on the same date.
iv
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Allotment of Justices
It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits,
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such
allotment be entered of record, effective August 1, 2018, viz.:
For the District of Columbia Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Chief Justice.
For the First Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate
Justice.
For the Third Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, Elena Kagan, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, Elena Kagan, Associate Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
For the Tenth Circuit, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice.
For the Eleventh Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice.
For the Federal Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
August 1, 2018.
(For next previous allotment, see 585 U. S., p. v.)
(For next subsequent allotment, see post, p. vi.)
v
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Allotment of Justices
It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits,
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such
allotment be entered of record, effective October 19, 2018, viz.:
For the District of Columbia Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Chief Justice.
For the First Circuit, Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice.
For the Second Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate
Justice.
For the Third Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Fourth Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
For the Fifth Circuit, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice.
For the Sixth Circuit, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice.
For the Seventh Circuit, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Associate
Justice.
For the Eighth Circuit, Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice.
For the Ninth Circuit, Elena Kagan, Associate Justice.
For the Tenth Circuit, Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice.
For the Eleventh Circuit, Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice.
For the Federal Circuit, John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice.
October 19, 2018.
(For next previous allotment, see ante, p. v.)
vi
APPOINTMENT OF JUSTICE KAVANAUGH
Supreme Court of the United States
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2018
Present: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice
Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice
Kagan, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh.
The Chief Justice said:
This special sitting of the Court is held today to receive the
Commission of the newly appointed Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Brett M. Kavanaugh.
We are pleased to have with us today the President of the
United States. On behalf of the Court, Mr. President, I extend
to you and the First Lady a warm welcome. We are also
pleased to have with us our retired colleague, Justice Kennedy.
The Court now recognizes the Acting Attorney General of
the United States, Matthew Whitaker.
Acting Attorney General Whitaker said:
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. I have
the Commission which has been issued to the Honorable Brett
M. Kavanaugh, as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Commission has been duly signed
by the President of the United States and attested by the Attorney
General of the United States. I move that the Clerk
read the Commission and that it be made part of the permanent
record of the Court.
vii
viii APPOINTMENT OF JUSTICE KAVANAUGH
The Chief Justice said:
Thank you, Attorney General Whitaker, your motion is
granted. Mr. Clerk, will you please read the Commission.
The Clerk read the Commission:
Donald J. Trump,
president of the united states of america,
To all who shall see these Presents, Greeting:
Know Ye; That reposing special trust and confdence in the
Wisdom, Uprightness, and Learning of Brett M. Kavanaugh,
of Maryland, I have nominated, and, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, do appoint him Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, and do authorize and
empower him to execute and fulfll the duties of that Offce
according to the Constitution and Laws of the said United
States, and to Have and to Hold the said Offce, with all the
powers, privileges and emoluments to the same of right appertaining,
unto him, the said Brett M. Kavanaugh, during his
good behavior.
In testimony whereof, I have caused these Letters to be
made patent and the seal of the Department of Justice to be
hereunto affxed.
Done at the City of Washington, this sixth day of October,
in the year of our Lord two thousand and eighteen, and of the
Independence of the United States of America the two hundred
and forty-third.
[seal] Donald J. Trump
By the President:
Jefferson B. Sessions, iii,
Attorney General
APPOINTMENT OF JUSTICE KAVANAUGH ix
The Chief Justice said:
I now ask the Deputy Clerk of the Court to escort Justice
Kavanaugh to the bench.
The Chief Justice said:
Please repeat after me.
Justice Kavanaugh said:
I, Brett M. Kavanaugh, do solemnly swear that I will administer
justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to
the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me
as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
So help me God.
Brett M. Kavanaugh
Subscribed and sworn to before me this eighth day of November,
2018.
John G. Roberts, Jr.
Chief Justice
The Chief Justice said:
Congratulations. Justice Kavanaugh, on behalf of all
the members of the Court, it is my pleasure to extend to you a
very warm welcome as the 102nd Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. We wish for you a long and
happy career in our common calling.
Justice Kavanaugh said:
Thank you.
RETIREMENT OF JUSTICE KENNEDY
Supreme Court of the United States
MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2018
Present: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas,
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice
Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice Gorsuch, and
Justice Kavanaugh.
The Chief Justice said:
Before we commence this morning's business, I would like
to acknowledge the presence in the courtroom of Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, and I would like to read into the records
of the Court an exchange of correspondence.
The frst letter is dated today, December 3, 2018. It is to
Justice Kennedy from my colleagues and me, and it reads
as follows:
Supreme Court of the United States,
Chambers of The Chief Justice,
Washington, D. C., December 3, 2018.
Dear Tony:
Although our new Term is well underway, we remain
keenly aware of your absence on the Bench and in our Conference.
From the time each of us came to know you, you
have enriched our lives through your kindness, comradery,
and generosity. We are heartened that you have maintained
an active presence in the building, and we take great comfort
that you remain our valued colleague here.
No one leaves Sacramento to become a prospector. But
your labors since moving east have yielded a treasure of
xi
xii RETIREMENT OF JUSTICE KENNEDY
thoughtful decisions. This legacy will guide the understanding
of judges, lawyers, and citizens for years to come.
Your example of ceaseless civility inspires us as we go forward
with the work of the Court that you have so vitally
advanced. We wish you and Mary well in your muchdeserved
retirement, and we look forward to many more years
in this new chapter of our shared friendships.
Affectionately,
John G. Roberts, Jr.
Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer
Samuel A. Alito, Jr.
Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan
Neil M. Gorsuch
Brett M. Kavanaugh
John Paul Stevens
Sandra Day O’Connor
David H. Souter
The Chief Justice said:
The next letter is to myself and the colleagues on the
bench and it is from Justice Kennedy. It reads:
Supreme Court of the United States,
Chambers of Anthony M. Kennedy,
Washington, D. C., December 3, 2018.
Dear Chief Justice and Dear Colleagues,
Please accept this expression of deepest appreciation for
the uplifting words and sentiments in your most gracious
letter. It will be treasured by our family.
This reply is not to say farewell, for it is my hope to linger
here to be with all of you in the days and years to come. It
is necessary, of course, to say farewell to being on the bench
and in the conference room. There, for the past thirty years,
it was a high honor to join with our colleagues in seeking
RETIREMENT OF JUSTICE KENNEDY xiii
how best to defne and interpret an idea and a reality—the
idea and the reality of the law. Even if we disagreed in a
particular case, we admired and respected each other as we
sought to explain the law as we found it to be and to ensure
that, over the course of time, the law and the freedoms it
sustains will be ever more secure, ever more revered.
We frst came to Washington knowing few who lived here,
but the members of the Court at once reached out to Mary
and me with gifts of guidance, understanding, and above all,
the priceless bond of friendship. It seems proper to quote
from the Poet and to say that for all these gifts ``I can no
other answer make but thanks, and thanks, and ever thanks.''
With assurances of my continued highest regards, I
remain,
Yours sincerely,
Tony
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code
are to the 2012 edition, one of its supplements, or both.
Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of
the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 801 et seq.
are those in which orders were entered.
Page
A. v. D. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
A. v. Gregory M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
A. v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Aase v. Schnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Abbott v. Pastides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Abbott; Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Abbott Laboratories; N. K. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Abdullah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Abdul-Salaam v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Abdul-Salaam v. Wetzel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109
Abdur-Rahiim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Abel Grimaldo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Aberant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Abercrombie; Beam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Ables v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Abouelmagd v. Newell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Abraham; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Abreu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Absolute Rigging v. Ordos City Hawtai Autobody Co. . . . . . . . . . 815
Abud; Saxena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Abul Hosn v. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Abulkhair v. Google LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Accasvek LLC; Jakks Pacifc, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Accord Healthcare, Inc. v. UCB, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Accounts Receivable Services, LLC; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Ace Partners, LLC v. East Hartford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Ackels v. Olsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Acker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Ackerman v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1122
Acklin v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
xv
xvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Acosta; Koresko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1119
Acosta; Oskoui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Addictive Behavioral Change Health Group; Kuri v. . . . . . . . 1159,1259
Aetna Health Inc.; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Acosta v. Raemisch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Acosta; Wade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Acosta-Joaquin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Acting Attorney General; Bueno-Muela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Acting Attorney General; Choizilme v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Acting Attorney General; Duplessis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Acting Attorney General; Duplessis-Jean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Acting Attorney General; Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Acting Attorney General; Hussein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Acting Attorney General; Jean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Acting Attorney General; Lara-Aguilar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Acting Attorney General; Lemus Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Acting Attorney General; Lucio-Rayos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Acting Attorney General; Mapuatuli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Acting Attorney General; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Acting Attorney General; Michaels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Acting Attorney General; Onduso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Acting Attorney General; Ramirez-Barajas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Acting Attorney General; Uribe-Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Acting Comm'r of Social Security; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Acting Secretary of Defense; Webster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Acting Warden; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Acuna Valenzuela v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Adams v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Adams v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Adams; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Adams v. Netfix, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Adams v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Adams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Adams; Womack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Adburahman v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Addison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Adetiloye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Adkins v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1188
Administrative Offce of the Courts, Del. Judiciary; Alston v. . . . . 1193
Adoption Star Agency; Feldman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Advanced Audio Devices, LLC v. HTC Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Advanced Pharmacy Services; RPD Holdings, L. L. C. v. . . . . . . . 1225
Advanced Video Technologies LLC v. HTC Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xvii
Page
Aftermath Public Adjusters, Inc.; Bloom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Agbonifo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Agolli v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.; Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. . . . . 908
Aguiar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Aguilar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Aguinaga, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Ahmed; Kife v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Ahmed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Ahsan v. Staples the Offce Superstore East, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Inc. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. . . . . . . 965
Aime v. JTH Tax, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Aime v. Liberty Tax Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Airbnb, Inc.; McGuirk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Ajvazi v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Akel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1218
Aker Biomarine Antarctic AS v. Nam Chuong Huynh . . . . . . . . . 815
A. L. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Alabama; Acklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Alabama; Burton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Alabama; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Alabama; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Alabama; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Alabama; Madison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Alabama; McMillan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Alabama; M. P. F. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Alabama; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
Alabama; Rieber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Alabama; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Alabama; Rodgers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Alabama; Stuart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Alabama; Townes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
Alabama; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Alabama; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Alabama; Yancey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Alabama Dept. of Revenue v. CSX Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . 1113
Alabama Dept. of Revenue; CSX Transportation, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1114
Alabama Dept. of Revenue; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Alabama State Univ.; Cromartie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Alanis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Alarcon v. Nielson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Albert v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Alberto Rojaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
xviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Albra v. Board of Trustees of Miami Dade College . . . . . . . . . 1109,1218
Albrecht; Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Albright v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Alcequiecz v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Aldana v. Santoro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Aldana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Aldona B. v. Nicholas S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Aldridge, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Aldridge; Burney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Aldridge; Van Le v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Alejandro Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Alejandro Radillo v. Ndoh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Alexander, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Alexander v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1205
Alexander v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Alexander v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Alexander v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Alexander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,952,1060
Alexsam, Inc. v. Wildcard Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Alfaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Alfetlawi v. Klee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Alfred v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Ali v. Allbaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Ali v. Interactive Brokers LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Alias v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Alimanestianu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Alires v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Aljoe; Spitzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Allah, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Allah v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Allan v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Allbaugh; Ali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Allbaugh; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Allbaugh; Lovin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Allbrooks v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Allegheny Cty. Offce of Children, Youth & Families; T. H. -H. v. 1158
Allegiant Air LLC; Dema v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Allen v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Allen; Givens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1186
Allen v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Allen v. Superior Court of Ga., Camden Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Allen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1078,1186,1255,1257
Allen; Watts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1071
Allen; Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xix
Page
Allen & Overy, LLP; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Alleyne v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Alliance for Cal. Business v. California Air Resources Bd. . . . . . . 1075
Alliant Techsystems Corp.; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Allied Nev. Gold Corp.; Tuttle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1134
Allison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Allstate Indemnity Co.; Doherty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Allstate Ins. Co.; DePietro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Almond v. Singing River Health System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Aloha Bed & Breakfast v. Cervelli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Alperovich; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,1245
Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Alston v. Administrative Offce of the Courts, Del. Judiciary . . . . 1193
Alston v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Alston v. Mississippi Dept. of Employment Security . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Alston v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Alston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Altstatt v. Fruendt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Aluiso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Alvarez; California State Teachers' Retirement System v. . . . . . . 825
Alvarez v. Spearman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Alvarez; Tortora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1044
Alvarez-Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Alvis v. Schilling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Amador v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Amador-Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Amalgamated. For labor union, see name of trade.
Amankrah v. Anglea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Ambrose v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Ambrose v. Trierweiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109
Amerada Petroleum Corp.; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
American Airlines Inc.; Prosterman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
American Airlines, Inc.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
American Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla.; DeGennaro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
American Cable Assn. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
American Exploration & Mining Assn. v. Zinke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
American Humanist Assn.; American Legion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1125
American Humanist Assn.; Maryland-Nat. Capital Park v. . . . . 985,1125
American K-9 Detection Services, LLC; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . 1225
American Legion v. American Humanist Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,1125
American Media, Inc.; Anderson News, L. L. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
American National Life Ins. Co.; Laschkewitsch v. . . . . . . 914,1041,1188
xx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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American Technical Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio Components . . . . 816
AmeriCare MedServices, Inc. v. Anaheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
AmeriCulture, Inc. v. Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC . . . . . . 1034
Amerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Amin v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Amor v. United States ex rel. Pena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Amsberry; Easter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Amsberry; Templeton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1111
Amun Re El, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Anaheim; AmeriCare MedServices, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Anchundia-Espinoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Andersen v. Planned Parenthood of Kan. and Mid-Mo. . . . . . . . . . 1057
Anderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Anderson; Credit One Bank, N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Anderson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1029
Anderson; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Anderson v. Herbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Anderson v. Larsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Anderson v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Anderson v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Anderson v. North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Anderson v. Rainsdon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Anderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,906,1195,1240
Anderson v. Venture Express . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Anderson v. Walrath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Anderson Lumber Co., Inc.; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Anderson News, L. L. C. v. American Media, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Anderton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Andrade Hernandez v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Andrews; Chang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Andrews; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Andrews v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Andrews v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Angeles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Angel Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Angel Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Angel Rondon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1061
Angel Rosario v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Anglea; Amankrah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Anglea; Contreras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Anguiano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Angulo Riascos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxi
Page
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV; DeHoog v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Department of Homeland Security 1035
Animashaun v. Schmidt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Annabel v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Annamalai v. Sivanadiyan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Anne Arundel County; Dabbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Annucci; Isasi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Anqui; Schuermann v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Anthony v. Boyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Anthony v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Antonelli; Witchard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Antonin v. Baltimore Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Antonio Aguilar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Antonio Aldana v. Santoro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Antonio Bonilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Antonio Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Antonio Haro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Antonio Ibarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Antonio Jimenez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1061
Antonio Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Antonio Rodriguez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Antonio Zambrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Apodaca v. Raemisch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
Aponte; Joaquin Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1187
Aponte v. Tice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Appellate Div., Supreme Ct. of N. Y., Third Jud. Dept.; Dinsio v. 1040
Apple Inc. v. Pepper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Apple Inc.; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Applications in Internet Time, LLC; RPX Corp. v. . . . . . . . . 1142,1226
Applied Materials, Inc.; Teamah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assur. v. Citizens of Humanity 875
Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Citizens of Humanity . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Aptim Corp.; McCall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062
Aquilina v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Aquino-Florenciani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,977
A. R. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Arabian American Development Co.; El-Khalidi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Arambul-Duran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Aranda; McCabe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Aranoff v. Aranoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Archer & White Sales, Inc.; Henry Schein, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 63,810
Arcila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Arctic Cat Inc.; Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. v. . . . . . . 822
xxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Arctic Slope Regional Corp.; Pederson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Ardaneh v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Arevalo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813,1061
Argentine Republic v. Petersen Energia Inversora S. A. U. . . . . . 1066
Argon v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . . 838
Argus Leader; Food Marketing Institute v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Argus Leader Media; Food Marketing Institute v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Arias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Arif v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Arizona; Acuna Valenzuela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Arizona; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Arizona; Beaulieu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Arizona; Bush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Arizona; Dennison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Arizona; Gallardo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Arizona v. Goodman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Arizona; Greenway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Arizona; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Arizona; Ibeabuchi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Arizona; Jacobson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Arizona; Lambright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Arizona; Manley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Arizona; Mayhew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Arizona; Merrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Arizona; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Arizona v. Rushing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Arizona; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Arizona; Sibley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Arizona; Tacquard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1187
Arizona; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,1030
Arizona Dept. of Revenue; Bosch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1187
Arjune v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Arkansas; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Arkansas; Lacy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Arkansas; Larry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Arkansas; McClinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Arkansas; Mouton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Arkansas; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Arkansas; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Arkansas; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Arkansas; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Arkansas; Wooten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n; Pennington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxiii
Page
Arlotta v. Bank of America, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1030
Arlotta v. Cook Moving System, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Arlotta v. Diocese of Buffalo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Armando v. Whitfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Armenta v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Armenta; Leonel Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Armenta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Armistead v. Bowen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Armstrong, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1046,1144
Armstrong v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Army Corps of Engineers; White Oak Realty, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . 1147
Arnaldo Rodrigues v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Arnaud v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Arnett v. Covello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Arnold; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Arnold v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Arnold; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Aronstein v. Thompson Creek Metals Co., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Arp; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Arp; Knuth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Arrington v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Arroyo v. Torres-Sanchez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Artrip v. Ball Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Artus; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
ARUP Laboratories; Hankishiyev v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Ary v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
Arzate v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Asar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Ash; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Ashbourne v. Hansberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Ashley v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Asiello; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Aspen Ins. (UK) Ltd. v. Black & Veatch Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Aspen Pitkin County Housing Authority; Mulcahy v. . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Asrari v. Department of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Assa'ad-Faltas v. Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1039,1109
Assadian v. Parsi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1029
Associated Press Telecom; Brady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Associates for Renewal in Ed., Inc.; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185
Association. For labor union, see name of trade.
Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies v. Becerra . . . . . . 1067
Association for Accessible Medicines; Frosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Association of Apartment Owners; Sakuma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1046
Assurance Group, Inc.; Ghiringhelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
xxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Asuncion; Bridgette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1111
Asuncion; Diakite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Asuncion; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Asuncion; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Atelier Esthetique Institute of Esthetics, Inc.; Cain v. . . . . . . . . . 1161
Atkins v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Atkinson; Cornelius v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Atkinson; Zater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Atlanta City Court; Burch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Atlanta Medical Center v. Care Imp. Plus South Central Ins. Co. 814
Atlantic Records; Matelyan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1111
Atlantic Richfeld Co. v. Christian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
AT&T Inc. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Attorney Gen.; Alias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Attorney Gen.; Amin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Attorney Gen.; Andrade Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Attorney Gen.; Carmenate-Palencia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Attorney Gen.; Chasson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Attorney Gen.; Chavez-Juarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Attorney Gen.; Correa-Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Attorney Gen.; Dennis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Attorney Gen.; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Attorney Gen.; Drummond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1030
Attorney Gen.; Gicharu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Attorney Gen.; Giulian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Attorney Gen.; Hason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Attorney Gen.; Jian Long Dong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Attorney Gen.; Jian Rong Dong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Attorney Gen.; Kerr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Attorney Gen.; Ledesma-Conchas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Attorney Gen.; Luis Pineda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Attorney Gen.; Martinez Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Attorney Gen.; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Attorney Gen.; Ortega-Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Attorney Gen.; Singh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,974
Attorney Gen.; Vella v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Attorney Gen.; Villegas-Sarabia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Attorney Gen.; Wei Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Attorney Gen.; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Attorney Gen. of Ariz.; Karban v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Attorney Gen. of Ariz.; Merrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Attorney Gen. of Cal.; Association des Eleveurs de Canards v. . . 1067
Attorney Gen. of Fla.; DePriest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Attorney Gen. of Fla.; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxv
Page
Attorney Gen. of Fla.; Torres Ortega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Attorney Gen. of Ill.; Parmar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Attorney Gen. of La.; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Association for Accessible Medicines . . . 1145
Attorney Gen. of Mass.; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Attorney Gen. of N. J.; Kushner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Attorney Gen. of N. J.; Petit-Clair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Attorney Gen. of N. Y.; Brady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Attorney Gen. of N. Y.; Triestman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Attorney Gen. of N. Y.; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Attorney Gen. of N. Y.; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Attorney Gen. of Utah; Singson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Attorney Grievance Comm. for First Jud. Dept.; Pierre v. . . . . . . 850
Atwater v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Atwater; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Atwell v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Atwood v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Aubuchon v. Maricopa Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Austin v. District Attorney of Phila. Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,1218
Austin v. Hanover Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Austin v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Austin v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Austin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Austin; Zimmerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Autobee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Automotive Industries Pension Trust Fund; Toshiba Corp. v. . . . 1114
Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc.; Kohn Law Group, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 1060
Avalos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Avery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Aviation & General Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Aviles Salguero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Axcess Financial; Preston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Ayala; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Ayanbadejo v. Siegl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Ayers; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Azar; Breckinridge Health, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Azar; Glorioso-Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Azar; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1030
Aziz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
B. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
B. v. Fischgrund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
B. v. Nicholas S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
B. v. P. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
B. v. Prince George's County Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
xxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
B. v. Wicomico County Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Bacon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993,1202
Bacquie v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Baer; Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
BAE Sys. Solution; Republic of Korea's Defense Acq. Prog. v. . . . 869
Bagby v. Hyatte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1217
Bagdis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Bagi v. Parma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Bagwell v. Southern National Assets, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Bailey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Bailey v. Gardner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Bailey; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Bailey; Loor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Bailey v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Bailey v. Nagy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Bailey v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1046
Baker v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Baker v. Cheatham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Baker; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
Baker; Hundley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Baker; Libby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Baker v. Microsoft Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Baker; O'Keefe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Baker; Rhodes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Baker; Rosky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Baker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1025,1217,1245
Balcarcel; Brockman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Balding v. Sunbelt Steel Tex., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Baldwin; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1087,1187,1259
Balfour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Ball v. LeBlanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
Ballard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Ball Corp.; Artrip v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Ballesteros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Bally's Las Vegas; Starks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Balmes-Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Baltazar; Grigsby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Baltazar Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Baltimore v. Buck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1031
Baltimore Police Dept.; Antonin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Bamdad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988,1110
Banca UBAE, S. p. A. v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Bangiyev v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Bank Markazi v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxvii
Page
Bank of America; Dolacinski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Bank of America; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Bank of America Corp.; Pender v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Bank of America, N. A.; Arlotta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1030
Bank of America, N. A. v. Lusnak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Bank of America, N. A.; Ornstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Bank of America, N. A.; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Bank of America, N. A.; Schneider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Bank of America, N. A.; Sheely v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Bank of N. Y.; Marin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Bank of N. Y. Mellon; Ackerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1122
Bank of N. Y. Mellon; Baroni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Bank of N. Y. Mellon; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Bank of N. Y. Mellon; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Bank of N. Y. Mellon Trust Co.; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Bank of Nova Scotia; Winston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Banks v. Gore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Banks; Keyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1035
Banks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
Banner Life Ins. Co.; Laschkewitsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1187
Bannister v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801,1191,1256
Baptiste v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Baranski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Barbee v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Barber; Gladden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Barber v. Sherman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Barber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
Barbosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Bargo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Barinas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Barker v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Barlow v. Garman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Barnabas Health System; Canete v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Barnes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Barnes v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Barnes v. Gerhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Barnes v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Barnes v. Landry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Barnes v. Masters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Barnes v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956
Barnes; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Barnett v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Barnett v. Gastonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Barnett v. Laurel Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
xxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Barnett v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Barnett v. Sullivan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Barnhart; Tillman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Barone v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1029,1193
Baroni v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Baroni v. CIT Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Barr; Chavez-Juarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Barr; Kerr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Barr; Ledesma-Conchas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Barr; Ortega-Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Barr; Vella v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Barraquias v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1246
Barreiro v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Barrella v. Freeport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Barrett v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Barrett v. Minor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Barrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Barrick v. Parker-Migliorini Int'l., LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Barrie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Barrios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1258
Barris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Barry School of Law; Cooney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1029
Bart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1030
Bartelt v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Barth v. Bernards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Bartlett v. Gorsalitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Bartlett v. Honeywell International, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Bartlett v. Kalamazoo County Community Mental Health Bd. . . . 1228
Bartlett v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1218
Bartlett; Nieves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,959
Bartlett v. Pineda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,970,1061,1064,1111
Bartlett v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Barton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Bartunek, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Bartunek v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Barwick v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Basi; Reece v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Baskin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Bates v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Bates; Metropolitan Interpreters & Translators Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1148
Bates v. Pentwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823,1029
BATS Global Markets, Inc. v. Providence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Batterton; Dutra Group v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049,1113
Battis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
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Bauch v. Richland County Children Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1205
Baum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Baxter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995,1191
Baylay v. Etihad Airways P. J. S. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Baynes; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Baywood Home Care v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Bazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Bazargani v. Latch's Lane Owners Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
B&B Airparts, Inc.; Christmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Beachum v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Beam v. Abercrombie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Beam v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Beamon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Bean v. Hamilton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Beard; Elias Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Beasley v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Beasley; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Beason v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Beattie v. Romero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Beatty v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Beaty v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Beauchamp v. Doglietto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Beaulieu v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Beavers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1217
Bebo v. Medeiros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Becerra; Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d'Oies v. . . . . . 1067
Becerra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1171
Beck v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Beckham v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Beckman v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Beckman v. Match.com, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Becton v. Social Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Bedell v. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Bedford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Beeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Behr Dayton Thermal Products LLC v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Bell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Bell v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Bell v. Inova Fairfax Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Bell v. Inova Health Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Bell v. Keeton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Bell; Keister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
xxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Bell v. Orlando Health, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Benisek; Lamone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1112
Bennett; Viola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1030
Berkeley; Ghosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1196,1220
Berry; Terrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Bell v. PLM L. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Bell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Bell v. U. S. Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Bell v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Bell v. Winnie Palmer Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Bellinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Bell Sports USA; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Ben-Ari v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Ben-Ari v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Bender v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991,1259
Benham; Ozark Materials River Rock, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Benitez v. Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Benitez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1077
Bennett v. Jefferson County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Bennett v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1171
Bennett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Bennett v. Wolfe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,1061
Benoit v. St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Bent v. Strange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Bent v. Talkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Bentley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Benton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Berg; Checksfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Berg v. SSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Bergh; Unger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Berghuis; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Berghuis; Hastings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Berghuis; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Bergrin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Berhe v. Oleseha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Berkheimer; HP Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Berkley v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Bernards; Barth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Bernhardt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Berninger v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Bernstein v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Berry; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Berry v. McGinley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Berry v. Nicholson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
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Page
Berry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Berryhill; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Berryhill; Biestek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Berryhill; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1205
Berryhill; Chalfant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Berryhill; Chavez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Berryhill; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Berryhill; Cruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1061
Berryhill; Culbertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,809
Berryhill; Daley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Berryhill; Doremus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Berryhill; Freer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Berryhill; Gaines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Berryhill; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Berryhill; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1111
Berryhill; Kerr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Berryhill; Librace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Berryhill; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1217
Berryhill; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Berryhill; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Berryhill; Seda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Berryhill; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,986,1189
Berryhill; Stanley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Berryhill; Vennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Berryhill; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Bertram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Best v. Kimble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Best Auto Repair, Inc. v. Universal Ins. Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Bethea v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Bethune-Hill; Virginia House of Delegates v. . . . . . . . . . . 996,1112,1143
Bevan v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Beverly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191
Bey, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Bey v. Elmwood Place Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Bey v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Beyah v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
Beyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Bhagat v. Iancu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Bhatt; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Bhawnani v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Bida v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Bielefeld; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Bien v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Bieri, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
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Biestek v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Biggins v. Danberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Biggins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956
Bilbo v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1217
Bingham; Hendricks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996
Binns v. Marietta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Biogen, Inc.; Lei Yin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Bisbee v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Bishop; Kelly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Bishop; McKnight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Bishop; Nash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Bismarck; Brekhus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Bissoon; Coulter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1245
Biszczanik v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Bivins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Black v. Larimer County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Black v. Lindsay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Black v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Black v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Black v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Blackburn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Blackledge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Blackman v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Blackmon; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Blackmon v. Eaton Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1245
Black & Veatch Corp.; Aspen Ins. (UK) Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Blackwell v. Dooley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Blackwell v. Hansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Blades; Griffth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Blagmon v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Blair v. McClinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Blair v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Blair; Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1062
Blair v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Blair v. Yum! Brands, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Blake v. Fish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Blakeney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1061
Blalock v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Blanas; Rothery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Blanc v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Blanco-Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Bland v. Gellman, Brydges & Schroff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Bland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Blankenship; McGlocklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
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Blankenship v. Pastrana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Blankumsee v. Circuit Court of Md., Wash. Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Blanton v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Blauch v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Blaylock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Blevins v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Blevins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Block; Powers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Bloom v. Aftermath Public Adjusters, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Blount v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Blythe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962
BMO Harris Bank; Nationwide Biweekly Administration v. . . . . . 1195
BMP Family Ltd. Partnership v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
BNSF R. Co. v. Loos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310,809
Board of County Comm'rs of Jefferson Cty.; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . 1068
Board of Professional Responsibility; Parrish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Board of Trustees of Miami Dade College; Albra v. . . . . . . . . 1109,1218
Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.; Carmody v. . . . . . . 987,1079,1205
Boatman v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Boatright; Philip Morris USA Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Bobby; Lang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Boe; Gibson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Bohannan v. Griffn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1253
Bohlman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Bolanos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Bolden v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Bolton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Bolze, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. v. Arctic Cat Inc. . . . . . . 822
Bommerito v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Bondi; DePriest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Bondi; McGee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Bondi; Torres Ortega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Bonds; Craft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Bonet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Bonilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Bonner v. Cumberland Regional High School Dist. . . . . . . . . . 837,1061
Bonner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Bonowitz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Boogaard v. NHL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Book v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Booker v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Booker v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Boone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
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Booth v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Bordelon; Runnels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1110
BP America, Inc.; Wentzell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,1030
Booth v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Booth; Raghavendra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Booze v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Borders v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Boren; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Borgos v. Medeiros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Borhan v. Lizarraga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Borough. See name of borough.
Borrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Bosch v. Arizona Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1187
Bostic v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Boston Scientifc Corp.; Jang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Boudreaux v. Hooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Boughton; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Bouziden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Bove v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Bowen; Armistead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Bowens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1211
Bowersox; Harden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Bowles v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Bowman; Indiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Boyd; Anthony v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Boyd v. Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Boyd v. Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Boyd v. Quintana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204
Boyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Boyd v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Boyer v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Boykin v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Boyle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Boylen, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Bozell v. Skipper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
BP, P. L. C.; Pineiro Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
B. R. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
Bradley v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Bradley; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Bracy; Rock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Bracy; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Bradach; Pharmavite LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Braddy v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Bradfeld v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1046
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Bradley v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Bradley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Bradley v. West Chester Univ. of Penn. State Sys., Higher Ed. 824
Bradshaw v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Brady v. Associated Press Telecom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Brady v. Goldman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Brady v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Brady; Ritter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Brady v. Underwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Brake v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Brakebill v. Jaeger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Bramwell; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Branch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Branch Banking & Trust Co.; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Brand v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Brandon v. Brandon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Brandon v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Brandt; Turzai v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Brank v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Brannon; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Brantley v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Branum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Brasher; Dixit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Braun; Rencountre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Braun; Solgado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Bravebull v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Breckinridge Health, Inc. v. Azar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Breeden v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Brekhus v. Bismarck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Bremerton School Dist.; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Brennan; Dyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Brennan; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Brennan; Hatch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Brevard Police Testing and Selection Center; Pickens v. . . . . . . . 946
Brewer; Danielak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Brewer; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Brewer; Rooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Brewer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160,1245,1256
Brewster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Brice, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Brice v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Bridgeloan Investors, Inc.; Tavares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Bridges; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Bridgette v. Asuncion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1111
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Briggs v. Rendlen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Briggs v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Brigham and Women's Hospital; Rafi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1040,1111
Bright v. Bryson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Bright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185
Briley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Brindley; Fiedler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1061
Bringman v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Briscoe v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Britton-Harr, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1034
Britton-Harr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1038
Brnovich; Karban v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Brnovich; Merrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Broadcom Corp.; Wi-Fi One, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Brockman v. Balcarcel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Brookdale Senior Living v. United States ex rel. Prather . . . . . . 1223
Brooklyn Law School; Daniel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,999
Brooks v. Frauenheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Brooks v. Pinnacle Financial Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Brooks v. Raemisch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
Brooks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824,921,1256
Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade.
Brown, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,813,1033
Brown v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,886
Brown v. Contra Costa Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Brown; Crockett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Brown v. Del Norte Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1030,1084,1205
Brown; Ebron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Brown v. Elite Modeling Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1218
Brown v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,921
Brown v. Gonzalez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Brown v. Hatton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Brown; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Brown v. Illinois Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1061
Brown; Ismaiyl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Brown; Jervis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Brown v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Brown v. Mansukhani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Brown; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Brown v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Brown v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Brown; Philip Morris USA Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Brown v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Brown v. Tanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
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Brown; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Brown v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Brown v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,
878,886,887,904,951,953,964,1046,1092,1166,1185,1237,1249,
1258
Brown v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Brown v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1234
Brown v. Wellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Brown & Dortch LLC; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Browne; McCormick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Browne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Browning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Brown-Williams v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County 1036
Bruce v. Potomac Electric Power Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Bruette v. Zinke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Brunetti; Iancu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Bruno v. Schenectady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Brunson v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Bruton v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Bryant, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Bryant v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Bryant v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Bryant; Yerton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Bryson; Bright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Buchanan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Buck; Baltimore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1031
Bucklew v. Precythe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,1019
Buckner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1213
Buendia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Bueno Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Bueno-Muela v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Bueno-Sierra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Buenrostro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Bugg v. Honey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Bullock v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Bullock v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Bullock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
Bulovic v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1110
Bummer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Bundy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Burch v. Atlanta City Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Burciaga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Bureau of Prof. Affairs, Penn. State Bd. of Pharm.; Lasher v. 1128,1259
Burgess v. Elliott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
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Burgess v. English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Burgett v. Porter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Burke v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Burke; McCurtis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Burke v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Burke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Burks v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Burks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co.; Snapp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Burmaster v. Herman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Burmaster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Burnett v. Panasonic Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Burney v. Aldridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Burningham v. Raines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Burns v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Burns v. Horton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Burns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Burris; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Burris v. Ramey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Burris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Burse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
Burt v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Burt; Fritz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Burt; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Burt; McCray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Burt; Sheffeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Burt; Strong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Burton v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Burton; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Burton; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1123
Burton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1169,1238
Burwell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Busch v. Nappier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Bush v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Bush v. Department of Agriculture, Risk Management Agency 1149
Bush; Myzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Bussell v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Bussing v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Bustamante v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824,847
Buth v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Butler; Moreno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Butler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950,989
Butler Law Firm; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1066
Buttercase v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1030
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Button v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Buxton v. Estock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Byers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Byers v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Byler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Bynum v. DeKalb County Sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Byrd v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Byrd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870,1075
Byrd; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Byrne; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Byrne; Rosky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
C. v. Oregon Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
C. v. Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Services . . . . . . . . . . 1229
C. v. West Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Cabbagestalk v. Sterling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Cabello, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Cabello v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Cabrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1031
Cabrera-Rangel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Cadena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Caesar's Entertainment Operating Co.; Marro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Cain v. Atelier Esthetique Institute of Esthetics, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1161
Cain; Dasa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Cain v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Cain; Fortin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Cain; Hogue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Cain; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Cain; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Cain v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Caines v. Gastelo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1061
Calderin v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Caldwell; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Caldwell; Deveaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1204
Caldwell; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Caldwell; Hurst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Caldwell; Neidermeyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Caldwell v. Payne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Caldwell v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Caldwell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Calhoun v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Calhoun v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Caliber Home Loans, Inc.; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
California; Barker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
California; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,886
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California; Burt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
California; Carlos Mendez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
California; Case v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
California; Ceballos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
California; Chuang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
California; Ciria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
California; Colbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
California; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
California; ConAgra Grocery Products Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
California; Farooqi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
California; Garton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
California; Ghobrial v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
California; Gleason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
California; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
California; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
California; Hardy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
California; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
California; Henriquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
California; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
California; Hicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
California; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
California; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
California; Hurd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
California; Israel Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
California; Jacome v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
California; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160,1170
California; Lew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
California; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1086
California; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
California; Lugo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1187
California; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
California; Maxwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
California; McNamara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
California; Mehta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1110
California; Michaud v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
California; Missouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
California; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
California; Mora v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
California; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
California; Penunuri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
California; Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,969
California; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
California; Pulley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
California; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
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California; Rangel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
California; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
California; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
California; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
California; Rios Soto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
California; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
California; Sakoman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
California; Salgado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
California; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
California; Serna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
California; Sherwin-Williams Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
California; Snyder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
California; Soon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
California; Soon Young Kim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
California; Souza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
California; Stein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
California; Taylor B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
California; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
California; Todd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
California; Tua v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
California; Wall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
California; Wang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
California; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
California; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
California; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1054,1162,1167,1186,1206
California Air Resources Bd.; Alliance for Cal. Business v. . . . . . 1075
California Air Resources Bd.; Cody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
California Cas. Indem. Exch.; Mua v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation; Argon v. . . . . 838
California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation; Snyder v. . . . 920
California Sea Urchin Comm'n v. Combs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
California State Teachers' Retirement System v. Alvarez . . . . . . 825
California State Water Resources; Northern Cal. Water Assn. v. 945
California Table Grape Comm'n; Delano Farms Co. v. . . . . . . . . . 1020
California Trucking Assn. v. Su . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Callahan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Callins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017
Callwood v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Camacho v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Camilo Lopez v. Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Camp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Campbell v. Mendez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Campbell v. New York City Transit Auth., Adjudication Bureau 837,1046
Campbell v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1187
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Campbell; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Campbell County Library Bd. of Trustees; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . 1004
Campie; Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Campillo Restrepo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Campise v. New York Comm'r of Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1051
Camran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Canada v. Miles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Canadate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Canadian National R. Co.; Lyon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822,943,1070
Canete v. Barnabas Health System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Canete v. Keeton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Cannady v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Cannici v. Melrose Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Cannon v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Cannon v. Iowa District Court, Des Moines Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Cannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166,1239,1253
Cantil-Sakauye; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Canuto v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Caple; Springer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Capozza; Lazar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Capra; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Capra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Carapia Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Cardona v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1046
Care Imp. Plus South Central Ins. Co.; Atlanta Medical Center v. 814
Carlin; Grist v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Carlos Mendez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Carlos Ocasio v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Carlos Vazquez v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Carlton & Harris Chiropractic; PDR Network v. . . . . . . . 996,1125,1207
Carman v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Carmel; Pulte Homes of N. Y. LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Carmell v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Carmenate-Palencia v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. . . . . . . . 987,1079,1205
Carnation Building Services, Inc.; Rolland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1123
Carnes; Oduok v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Carney v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Carpenter; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Carpenter v. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Carpenter v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,959,1046
Carpenter; Underwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Carpenter v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
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Carpenter-Barker v. Ohio Dept. of Medicaid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Carrasco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Carrasquilla-Lombada v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Carrillo v. U. S. Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1110
Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc.; Liberty Int'l Underwriters v. . . . . . . . . . 1060
Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc.; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
Carroll v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Carruthers v. Mays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Carson; Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Carson; Golz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Carter, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Carter v. Ayala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Carter v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1205
Carter v. Blackmon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Carter v. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Carter v. Kane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1061
Carter v. Labor Ready Mid-Atlantic, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Carter v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Carter v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Carter v. Sherrill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Carter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1239
Carter; Ward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Carter; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Cartledge; Wiley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Carty v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Caruso; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Caruso; Tippins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Casale, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1142
Casamayor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191
Casanova v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Case v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Casey; Gharib v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Cash Biz, LP; Henry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Cassady v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Cassiano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Cassidy v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Castaneda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Castellano-Benitez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Castellanos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1159
Castillo-Murion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Castillo Valerio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Castleman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Castro; Connor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
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Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167,1234
Caterbone v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Caterbone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Catholic Charity; Khoshmood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Caudill v. Conover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Caukin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Causey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Cavalieri v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1111
Cave Consulting Group, LLC v. OptumInsight, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Cazares v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Cazares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
C. B. v. Fischgrund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
CBS6; Horne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
CD Baby Distribution Co.; Matelyan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
C&D Zodiac, Inc.; B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Ceballos v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Cebreros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railways Co.; Griffoen v. . . . . . . . . 1222
CEH Energy, LLC v. Kean Miller, LLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Celaya-Cartajena v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Celli v. New York City Dept. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Centennial Ranch and Aspen Mountain Ranch Assn.; Klein v. . . . 1080
Central Bank of Iran v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Century Surety Co.; Seidel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Cepeda-Cortes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Cerna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Cervantes Valencia v. Davey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Cervelli; Aloha Bed & Breakfast v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Cesar Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Cesar Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
C. G. v. Deborah Heart and Lung Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Chacon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Chafe, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Chaidez Campos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Chairez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Chalfant v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Chambers v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Chambers v. Green Tree Servicing, L. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Chambers v. Sarcone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Chambers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1164
Chan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
ChanBond LLC; RPX Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Chancellor; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Chandler; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
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Chandler v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Chandran; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1031
Chanel; Pezhman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Chaney v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Chang v. Andrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Channon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Chanthunya v. Maryland Attorney Grievance Comm'n . . . . . . . 964,1052
Chapdelaine; Golder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Chapdelaine; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Chapman v. Lampert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1218
Chappell; Rowland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Chappell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Chapters Health System, Inc.; United States ex rel. Chase v. . . . 816
Charles v. McCain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Charlton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Chase v. Chapters Health System, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Chasson v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Chatfeld, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Chatman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Chavez v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Chavez v. LeGrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
Chavez v. Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Chavez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1043
Chavez-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Chavez-Juarez v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Chavira-Nunez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Cheatham; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Cheatham; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Cheatham; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Checksfeld v. Berg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Cheeseboro v. Little Richie Bus Service, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Chen v. Suffolk County Community College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Cheng Le v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Cherniavsky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Chesapeake Operating, LLC; Nichols v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Chestnut v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Chhay Lim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Chhea v. DelBalso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Chhim v. Golden Nuggett Lake Charles, L. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Chi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1111
Chiddo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Chief Judge, N. Y. State Unifed Court System; Koziol v. . . . . . . . 987
Chief Justice, Ark. Supreme Court, et al.; Griffen v. . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Chief of Police, City of Hartford, Conn.; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . 1150
xlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Chieftain Royalty Co. v. Nutley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Chien v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074,1205
Chien v. LeClairRyan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Children's Aid Society; Cynthia R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Children's Hospital Los Angeles v. N. L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Chin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Chinchilla v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Chirino Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,1123
Chivoski v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Choctaw County v. Jauch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Choizilme v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Chon v. Obama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Chong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Christian; Atlantic Richfeld Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Christian v. Payne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Christian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1163
Christiansen; Varner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Christmon v. B&B Airparts, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Chronister v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Chuang v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Chubb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
Chung v. Silva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Chuong Huynh; Aker Biomarine Antarctic AS v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Churchwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Chute; Minnesota v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Cibolo v. Green Valley Special Utility Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Cincinnati Ins. Co.; Winters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Cintron v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Ciotta v. Holland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1019
Circuit Court of Md., Wash. Cty.; Blankumsee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Circuit Court of Wisc., Racine Cty.; Dressler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Ciria v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Cisco Systems, Inc.; Capella Photonics, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Cisco Systems, Inc.; SSL Services, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Cisneros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
CIT Bank; Colebrook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
CIT Bank N. A.; Baroni v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Citibank, N. A.; Sabeniano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,1017
Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Citizens for Fair Representation, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Citizens of Humanity; Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assur. v. 875
Citizens of Humanity; Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 876
City. See name of city.
City of County of Denver; Tatten v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvii
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Clack v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Clack v. United Services Automobile Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Clark, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Clark v. Allen & Overy, LLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Clark v. Berry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Clark; Chien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074,1205
Clark; Dockery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Clark v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1040
Clark; Hiramanek v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Clark; Hollenback v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Clark; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1071,1072
Clark; Pennington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Clark v. Ramey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Clark; Rowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Clark v. Southwest Airlines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Clark; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Clark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1095
Clark; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Clarke; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Clarke; Blanton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Clarke; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Clarke; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Clarke; Eason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1186
Clarke; Fauconier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Clarke; Fawley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Clarke; Ferebee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Clarke; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Clarke; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Clarke v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Clarke; Knox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Clarke; Loughner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Clarke; McKay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Clarke; O'Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046
Clarke; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Clarke; Solano Godoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Clarke; Toghill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Clarke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Clarke; Villafana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Clay v. Papik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Clay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Clayborne v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Clearstream Banking S. A. v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Clemens; Stratton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Clements v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
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Clemons v. Kasich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Clerk, Ct. of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.; Kinney v. . . 1072
Clerk of Courts of the Ct. of Common Pleas, Phila., Pa.; Ross v. 990
Cleveland v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Clinard; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Cline; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
Clinton v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Clinton; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Clopton v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1046
Cloud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Clowdis v. Virginia Bd. of Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Coakley; Fontanez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Coats v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1197
Cobas v. Lindsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Cobb v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Cobb v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Cobia v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Coble v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Coble v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Cobo-Cobo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt . . . . . 1018,1190
Coddington v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Cody v. California Air Resources Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Cody v. ManTech International Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Coffman v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Cohen v. Grievance Administrator, Attorney Grievance Comm'n 1194
Cohen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Colbert v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Colbry v. Von Pier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Cole, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Cole v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Colebrook v. CIT Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Colello; Yagman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Coleman v. Campbell County Library Bd. of Trustees . . . . . . . . . 1004
Coleman v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Coleman v. Hakala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Coleman v. Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Coles County; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Collier; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
Collings v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Collins v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Collins v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Collins v. Epstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Collins v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
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Collins v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Collins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Colon v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Colon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Colonial School Dist. v. Rena C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. Carson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Colorado; Blauch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Colorado; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Colorado; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Colorado; Halper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Colorado; Laurson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Colorado; Nichol v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Colorado; Pebley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Colorado; Quintana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Colorado Dept. of Corrections; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Colorado Ind. v. District Court for the 18th Judicial Dist. of Colo. 1182
Colson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Colton v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Columbia; Assa'ad-Faltas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1039,1109
Combs; California Sea Urchin Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Comcast Cable Communications; Two-Way Media Ltd. v. . . . . . . . 945
Comercializadora Travel Advisory, S. A. de C. V.; Nayshtut v. 1020,1079
Commander v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Commissioner; Diamond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964,1052
Commissioner; Farr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1196
Commissioner; Francis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Commissioner; Hylton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Commissioner; MacPherson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Commissioner; Melot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Commissioner; Orth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Commissioner; Slone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Commissioner; Weiss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Commissioner, Conn. Dept. of Children & Families; Morsy E. v. 818
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner.
Commission for Lawyer Discipline; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Commission for Lawyer Discipline; Tirrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Commodores Entertainment Corp.; McClary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Common Cause; Rucho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1112,1219
Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth.
Community Health Systems v. New York City Emp. Ret. System 815
Compass Chemical International, LLC; Failon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
ConAgra Grocery Products Co. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Concepcion v. McGinley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Conde v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
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Condon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Conestoga Trust Services v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada . . . . . 945
Conforto v. Spencer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Congregation Jeshuat Israel v. Congregation Shearith Israel . . . . 1222
Congregation Shearith Israel; Congregation Jeshuat Israel v. . . . 1222
Connecticut; Allan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Connecticut; Cornelio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Connecticut; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Connecticut; Lanteri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1081
Connecticut v. Skakel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Connecticut; Taupier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Connecticut; Vivo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
Connecticut General Assembly; Seniw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Conner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1046
Conner v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Connor v. Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
ConocoPhillips Co.; Noble Energy, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Conover; Caudill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Conrad v. Mays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Consolidation Coal v. Director, Offce of Workers' Comp. Progs. 814,1033
Consulate of Nigeria; Nwoke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Continental Towers Condominiums Assn.; May v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Contra Costa Cty.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Contra Costa Cty.; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Contreras v. Anglea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Contreras Mejia v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Contreras-Rebollar v. Obenland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Cook v. Harding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Cook v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1218
Cook v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Cook v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1111
Cook Moving System, Inc.; Arlotta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Cooley v. Director, Offce of Workers' Comp. Progs. . . . . . . . . 1053,1188
Cooley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Coomes v. Maryland Ins. Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Cooney v. Barry School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1029
Cooney v. Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1029
Cooper, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1142
Cooper v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Cooper v. Court of Appeal of Cal., First Appellate Dist. . . . . . . . 898
Cooper v. Haq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Cooper v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Cooper; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
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Cooper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,965,1096
Copeland; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1187
Copenhaver; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Corbett v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Corbin v. Federal Express . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Corbin v. FedEx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Corcoran; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
CoreLogic, Inc.; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Corizon Health Care Services; Walck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Corizon Health Services; Shank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Corker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Cornelio v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Cornelius v. Atkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Corning Optical Comm. RF LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc. . . . . . . 1051
Cornwell v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Correa-Diaz v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Correct Care Solutions; Wabuyabo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Corrections Commissioner. See name of commissioner.
Corrections Corp. of America; Nyabwa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Corsbie; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1073
Cortez-Luna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Cosby v. Dickinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Cosby; McKee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Cosme v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Costelon v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1046
Costic v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Cotman v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Cotner v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Cottingham v. Washington State Bar Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Cottman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191
Cotton; Jacob v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Cotton v. San Bernardino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Cottrell v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Couchman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Cougar Den, Inc.; Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. . . . . . 347,915
Coulter, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Coulter v. Bissoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1245
Coulter v. Forrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Coulter v. Tatananni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Counts v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
County. See name of county.
County Court of Tex., Coleman County; Dreyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Court of Appeal of Cal., First Appellate Dist.; Cooper v. . . . . . . . 898
Court of Appeal of Cal., Second Appellate Dist.; Lipsey v. . . . . . . 1198
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Page
Court of Appeals. See U. S. Court of Appeals.
Couturier v. Presiding Judge, Super. Ct. of Cal., Los Angeles Cty. 1148
Covello; Arnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Cowlitz County v. Crowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Cox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1207
Cox; Utah Republican Party v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Cox; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Coxe v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1205
Cozzi; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Craft v. Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Craft v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Crain v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134
Crain v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Crane v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP; Kiobel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Crawford v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Crawford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Creative Vision Resources, L. L. C. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Credico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Credio; Magana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Credit One Bank, N. A. v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Crew v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Crider v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Crockett v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Croft v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Cromartie v. Alabama State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Cromartie v. Sellers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Crosby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Cross v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Crossett v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Cross State Moving; Hardaway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Crow v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Crow; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1065
Crowder v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Crowell; Cowlitz Cty. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Cruickshank v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Crum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Crumble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Crump v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Crump; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Crunch San Diego, LLC v. Marks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205
Crutsinger v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Cruz v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865,1061
Cruz v. Hallenbeck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
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Cruz v. Kailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Cruz v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Cruz-Colocho v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Cruz Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Cruz-Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . 1114
CSX Transportation, Inc.; Alabama Dept. of Revenue v. . . . . . . . 1113
CTIA–The Wireless Assn. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Cubero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Cuevas v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1170
Cuevas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Culbertson v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,809
Cullens v. Curtin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Culley; Padilla-Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Culver v. Zatecky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Cumbee v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Cumberland Regional High School Dist.; Bonner v. . . . . . . . . . 837,1061
Cummins v. Lollar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Cunningham v. General Dynamics Information Technology . . . . . 966
Cuomo; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Cureton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Curry v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Curry v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Curry v. Klee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Curry v. Mansfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1033
Curry v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Curry v. Supreme Court of United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Curry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928,1068,1212
Curshen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1259
Curtin; Cullens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Curtin; Sturges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1109
Curtin; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Curtis v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Cutulle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
CVS Caremark Corp.; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
CVS Pharmacy; Herbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1204
CVS Pharmacy; Jossie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1081,1205
Cynthia R. v. Children's Aid Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
D. v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040
D. A. v. D. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Dabbs v. Anne Arundel County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Dabney v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
D'Addario v. D'Addario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
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D'Addario; D'Addario v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Dailey v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Dailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Dale; Dunkle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Dale v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Daley v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Daley v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Dallas Morning News, Inc.; Tatum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Dambelly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Damren v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Danberg; Biggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Dancy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Daniel v. Brooklyn Law School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,999
Danielak v. Brewer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Daniels, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Daniels v. Dowling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Daniels v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Daniels; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Daniels; Tanksley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Daniels v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,904,1096
Danilovich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Danmola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Dannatt; Gross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Darby v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Darby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Darden; Fort Worth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Dasa v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Dastmalchian v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Daud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Daugherty v. Sheer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Davey; Cervantes Valencia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
David v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Davidson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Davidson; Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Davies v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Davila-Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Davis; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Davis; Ajvazi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Davis v. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Davis; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1029
Davis v. Andrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Davis; Aquilina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Davis v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Davis; Arnaldo Rodrigues v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
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Davis; Barbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Davis; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Davis; Bender v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991,1259
Davis v. Bhatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Davis; Bilbo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1217
Davis; Blackman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Davis; Bostic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Davis; Bradshaw v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Davis v. Brown & Dortch LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Davis; Bruton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Davis; Cain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Davis; Carmell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Davis; Chambers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Davis; Chaney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Davis; Coble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Davis; Contreras Mejia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Davis; Crow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Davis; Crutsinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Davis; Cumbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Davis; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Davis; Deem v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Davis; DeGrate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Davis v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Davis; Dove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Davis; Earnest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Davis; Earp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Davis; Escobedo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Davis; Esparza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Davis; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Davis; Farr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1209
Davis v. Fiat Chrysler Automobiles U. S., LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Davis v. Florence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Davis; Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Davis v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1117
Davis; Fort Bend Cty. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Davis; Fratta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1205
Davis; Galbraith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Davis; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
Davis; Gonzalez Delacruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Davis; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1019
Davis; Griffth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Davis; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Davis; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1186
Davis; Hines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
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Davis; Honish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Davis; Hood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Davis; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Davis; Ibenyenwa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Davis; Ingram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Davis; Inman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Davis; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,948
Davis; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135
Davis; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1030,1249
Davis v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Davis; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Davis v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Davis; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Davis; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Davis; Kingham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Davis; Kyles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Davis; Linden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1259
Davis; Mack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Davis v. Maddie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Davis; Mamou v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Davis; Marquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Davis; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Davis; Mata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Davis; McGhee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1053
Davis; Medina Ortiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Davis; Mejia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Davis; Merryman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Davis; Milam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Davis; Mincey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Davis v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Davis; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1186
Davis; Moreno Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
Davis; Morrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1187
Davis; Murphy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1193
Davis v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Davis; Oatman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Davis; Padilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Davis; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Davis; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Davis; Reilly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Davis; Roberson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Davis; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Davis; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Davis; Rubi Ibarra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii
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Davis; Runnels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Davis; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,925,1123,1154
Davis; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1079,1217
Davis; Schaefer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Davis; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Davis; Sherry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1030
Davis; Slater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Davis; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1218
Davis; Story v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Davis; Stroble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Davis; Swan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Davis; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Davis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,
1043,1093,1120,1152,1169,1190,1192,1194,1235,1249
Davis; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1143
Davis; Uranga v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Davis v. Valsamis, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Davis; Waddleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1110
Davis; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Davis; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Davis; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Davis; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Davis; Weisner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1134
Davis; Wheeler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Davis; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Davis v. York County Bd. of Supervisors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Dawkins v. Eckert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Dawson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1205
Dawson v. Board of County Comm'rs of Jefferson Cty. . . . . . . . . . 1068
Dawson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Dawson v. Steager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171,915
Dawson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Day v. Offce of President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Day v. Oregon Comm'n on Judicial Fitness and Disability . . . . . . 937
Deal; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Deal; McKissick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1083
Deal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1259
Dean; Searcey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Dean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
DeAngelis v. Plumley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Deason v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Debeikes v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,996
Debolt, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1205
Deborah Heart and Lung Center; C. G. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
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DeCarlo v. True . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
DeCaro, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1018
De Castro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
DeCiancio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Decker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Decosimo v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Deem v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Deere & Co.; Gramm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
DeGennaro v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
DeGrate v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Degrate v. Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1018
DeHoog v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Deibert; Kozich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Deichert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Deiter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
DeJesus v. Godinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
De Jesus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
De Jesus Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
DeKalb County Sanitation; Bynum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Delacruz v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
De La Cruz v. Kailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Delancy v. Pastrana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Delano Farms Co. v. California Table Grape Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Delaware; Crump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Delaware; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,987
Delaware; Everett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Delaware; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
DelBalso; Chhea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Deleon Colon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Delferro v. Hermann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Delferro v. Pensco Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Dellinger v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Delmarva Power & Light Co.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Del Monte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Del Norte Cty.; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1030,1084,1205
Delprado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Del Rosario v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
Delta Airlines; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Delta Air Lines, Inc.; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Delta Air Lines, Inc.; Siegel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Delva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Dema v. Allegiant Air LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Demers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix
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Demerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
De Min Gu v. FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1245
Demirjian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Demoura; Roby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Dempsey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Deng v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Denmark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Dennis v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1110
Dennis v. Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Dennison v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Dennison v. Hooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1046
DeNoma v. Kasich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1017
Deol v. Depreta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1187
Deorio v. Flournoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
DeOrio v. Yee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Department of Agriculture, Risk Management Agency; Bush v. 1149
Department of Army; Erwin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1061
Department of Commerce, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956,984,995,1018
Department of Commerce v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140,1188,1219
Department of Defense; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Department of Defense; Canuto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Department of Defense; Duggan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Department of Energy; Nolan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Department of Health and Human Servs.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Department of Homeland Security; Animal Legal Defense Fund v. 1035
Department of Homeland Security; Asrari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Department of Housing & Urban Dev.; Fort Peck Housing Auth. v. 908
Department of Housing & Urban Dev.; Soniat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Department of Interior; Amador v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Department of Interior; Stand Up for Cal.! v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107
Department of Justice; Dastmalchian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Department of Justice; Emanuel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Department of Justice; Lampon-Paz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Department of Justice; Marino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Department of Justice; Pickard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Department of State; Abul Hosn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Department of State; Detroit Int'l Bridge Co., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . 943
Department of Transportation; Grimsrud v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Department of Veterans Affairs; Styles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,1110
Department of Veterans Affairs; West's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
DePietro v. Allstate Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Depreta; Deol v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1187
DePriest v. Bondi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Deronceler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
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Derose; Mantepan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Derrick v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Derry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Deschutes Cty.; Grimstad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Desert Healthcare Dist.; Solomon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
DeShazior v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
Desilien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Desir v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Des Moines Police Dept.; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
DeSoto County School Bd.; Prunty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Detroit; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Detroit East Community Mental Health; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Detroit Int'l Bridge Co., Inc. v. Department of State . . . . . . . . . . 943
Deuman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Deuschel v. USC Faculty Dental Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1231
Deutsch v. Phil's Icehouse, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.; Drake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.; Marquis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Deveaux v. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1204
De Vera v. United Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,996,1186
Devlin v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
DeVore v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
DeVos; Nesselrode v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
DeVries; Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
DEX Systems, Inc.; DHL Supply Chain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
DHL Supply Chain v. DEX Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
DHL Supply Chain (USA); Travis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Diagnostic Laboratories v. Sorensen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Diakite v. Asuncion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Diallo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Diamond v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964,1052
Diamond v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Diaz; Armenta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Diaz; Boatman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Diaz; Bommerito v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Diaz; Crane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Diaz; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Diaz; Hood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Diaz v. Hurwitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Diaz; Ingram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1205
Diaz; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
Diaz v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
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Diaz; Ortega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Diaz; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Diaz; Ruiz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Diaz v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Diaz; Thornberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Diaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1201
Diaz v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185
Diaz; Yanez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Diaz; Yun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Diaz-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Dickinson; Cosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Dickinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Dickinson Wright, PLLC; New Products Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Diemer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
Diez v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
DiFiore; Koziol v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Digital Ally, Inc. v. Taser International, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Dillard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Dillbeck v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Dillon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Dimond Rigging Co. v. Ordos City Hawtai Autobody Co., Ltd. . . 815
DiNapoli; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Dinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Dingler v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Dingler v. Milestone Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Dinsio v. Appellate Div., Supreme Ct. of N. Y., Third Jud. Dept. 1040
Diocese of Buffalo; Arlotta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Director, Offce of Workers' Comp. Progs.; Consolidation Coal v. 814,1033
Director, Offce of Workers' Comp. Progs.; Cooley v. . . . . . . . 1053,1188
Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title
of director.
Director, Patent and Trademark Offce; Webtrends, Inc. v. . . . . . 1148
Director, Va. Dept. of Corrections; Villafana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Penn.; Tuerk v. . . . . 874,1030
Dish Network L. L. C.; Ghosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
District Attorney of Lancaster Cty.; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
District Attorney of Phila. Cty.; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938,1218
District Attorney of Westmoreland Cty.; Richard v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
District Court. See U. S. District Court.
District Court for the 18th Judicial Dist. of Colo.; Colorado Ind. v. 1182
District Hospital Partners, L. P.; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
District Judge. See U. S. District Judge.
District Lodge. For labor union, see name of trade.
District of Columbia; Agolli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
lxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
District of Columbia; Bullock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
District of Columbia; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
District of Columbia Housing Auth. Headquarters; Khoshmood v. 1118
Dittman; Mayberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Diveglia v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Dixit v. Brasher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Dixit v. Dixit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1031
Dixon v. East Coast Music Mall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Dixon v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Dixon v. LeGrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Dixon v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Dixon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,944,994
Dizak v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
D. L. v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Docaj v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Dockery v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Doe; First Presbyterian Church U. S. A. of Tulsa, Okla. v. . . . . . . 1126
Doe; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Doe v. Holcomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Doe v. Kaweah Delta Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1111
Doe; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134
Doe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1065,1166
Doe; Watford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Doglietto; Beauchamp v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Doherty v. Allstate Indemnity Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Dolacinski v. Bank of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Dominguez v. Spearman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Donaldson v. Michigan Dept. of Health and Human Services . . . . 1159
Donat v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Donato v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Dong v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Dong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Donjuan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Dooley; Blackwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Dooley; Hopkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Dooley; Udoh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Doremus v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Dorethy; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Dorethy; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Dorton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Dorvilus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Dotson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Dougherty v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Douglas County; N. E. L. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxiii
Page
Douglass; Missouri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Dove v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Dowling; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Doyle, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
D. P.; D. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Drake v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Drake v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1046
Drane v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Drane v. Sellers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Dread, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1220
Dreslin; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Dressler v. Circuit Court of Wisc., Racine Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Dressler v. Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Dreyer v. County Court of Tex., Coleman County . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Dreyfuse v. Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Driessen v. Royal Bank of Scotland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
Drivas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Driver; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
DRK Photo v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Droplets, Inc. v. Iancu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force; Gaspard v. . . . . . 857
Drummond v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1030
Dry v. Steele . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Dubarry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
DuBois v. MWV Healthcare Assn., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Ducart; Horton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Duggan v. Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Duggan; Reyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Duhamel v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Duhe v. Little Rock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Duma v. WMATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Duncan v. GEICO General Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Duncan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Dunkle v. Dale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Dunn; Hammonds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Dunn v. Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
Dunn; Veteto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Dunn; Waldrop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Dunning v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Dunning v. Ware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Duplessis v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Duplessis-Jean v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Duran v. Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Duran v. Muse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
lxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Durban, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Durham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109
Dury v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1056
Dusenbery v. Holt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Dutra Group v. Batterton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049,1113
Dutschke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907,1046
Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; Cooney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825,1029
Dyson v. Brennan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Dyson; Rountree v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
E. v. Commissioner, Conn. Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . 818
E. v. Oregon Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Eagle Logistics; Weakley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Earley; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Earnest v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Earp v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Easley v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Eason v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1186
East Bay; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062
East Cleveland v. Wheatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
East Coast Music Mall; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Easter v. Amsberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Easterling; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Easterly v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Eastern Market Management; Khoshmood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
East Hartford; Ace Partners, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
East Hartford; TC's Pawn Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Eaton Corp.; Blackmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1245
E. B. v. Wicomico Cty. Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Ebbert; Husband v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Ebron v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
E. C. v. Oregon Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Eckert; Dawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
ECP Commercial II LLC; Town Center Flats, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . 823
Ector County Appraisal Dist.; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
E. D. v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040
Edenstrom v. Thurston Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Edlind v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Edmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Edstrom v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Educational Testing Service; Elghannam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,1030
Edwards v. Gene Salter Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Edwards v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Edwards v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,878,929,1090,1166
Eidson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxv
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EIG Energy Fund XIV, L. P.; Petroleo Brasileiro S. A. v. . . . . . . 1223
Eighth Judicial Dist. for Nev., Clark Cty.; Hartfeld v. . . . . . . . . . 823
E. L. v. Douglas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
E. L. v. Gildner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Elbeblawy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
El Bey v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
El-Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
Eldorado Casino Shreveport Joint Venture; James v. . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Election Systems & Software LLC; Voter Verifed, Inc. v. . . . . . . 1073
Electronic Privacy Info. Center v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n 1108
Elghannam v. Educational Testing Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,1030
Elia; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Elias Sanchez v. Beard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Elijah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Elite Modeling Agency; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1218
El-Khalidi v. Arabian American Development Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Elliott; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
Elliott v. Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Ellis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Ellis v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Ellis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Ellison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Elmhirst v. McLaren Northern Mich. Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Elmhirst v. Northern Mich. Emergency Medicine Center . . . . . . . 919
Elmwood Place Police Dept.; Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
E-Loan, Inc.; Szmania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
El Omari v. Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone Authority . . . . . . 1145
El-Saba v. University of South Ala. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Emanuel v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Emanuel v. Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
EMED Technologies Corp. v. Repro-Med Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . 966
Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Orange Cty. . . . . 944
Emineth v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Emmons; Escondido v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Empire Distribution v. Twentieth Century Fox Television . . . . . . 815
Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Encana Oil & Gas (USA) Inc.; Zaremba Family Farms v. . . . . 943,1126
Eneh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
England v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Englewood; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1030
English; Burgess v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
English; Guerrero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
English; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Entergy Miss., Inc.; Marquette Transportation Co., L. L. C. v. . . . 1127
lxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Enterprise Rent-A-Car-Company of R. I.; Tavares v. . . . . . . . . . . 816
EPA; Marquette County Road Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
EPA; Taunton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Epperson v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Epperson v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109
Eppes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Eppinger; Fortson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Eppinger; Fuller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Eppinger; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Epstein; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Equifax Workforce Solutions; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Erdos; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Erie Ins.; Min Kwon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Erkerd; Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Ervin v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Ervin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Erwin v. Department of Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1061
Esco, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Escobar v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Escobar De Jesus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
Escobedo v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Escobedo-Coronado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Escobedo Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Escondido v. Emmons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Escoto; Hillsman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Esparza v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Espinoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Espinoza-Mendoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Esqueda; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Estate. See name of estate.
Estes; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Estock; Buxton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Estrada-Corrales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Estrella; Koch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074,1245
Estremera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Etihad Airways P. J. S. C.; Baylay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Eugene, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Eure v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Evans, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Evans v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Evans v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Evans v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,987
Evans v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxvii
Page
Evans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817,848,881,1095,1192
Everett v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Everette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd.; Nichia Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Evers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Everson v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Ewalan v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Ewing v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Executive Offce Park of Durham Assn., Inc.; Rock v. . . . . . . . 858,1017
Exel, Inc.; Travis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Ex parte. See name of party.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Ezeah, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
F. v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Fabian-Baltazar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Fabricant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Fahie v. McDowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Failon v. Compass Chemical International, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Fairchild-Littlefeld, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1205
Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc.; Power Integrations Inc. v. . . . 1193
Fairfeld County, Ohio v. Morgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Fairley v. Lakeside Assisted Living by Trisun Healthcare . . . . . . 1083
Fairley v. PM Management-San Antonio AL, L. L. C. . . . . . . . . . 1083
Fairley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Faison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Falkenhorst v. Harris County Children's Protective Services . . . . 846
Farah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Farkas v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Farmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,1078,1123
Farooq v. Russell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Farooqi v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Farr v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1196
Farr v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114,1209
Farrad v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Farrar v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Farrish v. Navy Federal Credit Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Father v. Maine Dept. of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . 807,964
Fattah v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Fauconier v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Faulkner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Fauntleroy v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Faurisma v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Fausnaught v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Faust v. Illinois Workers Compensation Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
lxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Fawley v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
FBI; De Min Gu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1245
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles U. S., LLC; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Faye v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
FCA US LLC v. Flynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Fearing v. United States Trustee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Federal Bureau of Prisons; Davidson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Federal Bureau of Prisons; Sarhan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
FCC; American Cable Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
FCC; AT&T Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
FCC; Berninger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
FCC; CTIA–The Wireless Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
FCC; NCTA–The Internet and Television Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
FCC; PMCM TV, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
FCC; Royce International Broadcasting Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
FCC; Stolz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
FCC; TechFreedom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
FCC; United States Telecom Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Federal Correctional Institution at Cumberland; Wilson v. . . . . . 895
Federal Correctional Institution, Gilmer; Gutierrez-Jaramillo v. 885
FERC; Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
FERC; Berkley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
FERC; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
FERC; Old Dominion Electric Cooperative v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Federal Express; Corbin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Federal National Mortgage Assn.; Woide v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
FedEx; Corbin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
FedLoan Servicing v. Silver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Fejfar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Feldman v. Adoption Star Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Felix v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Feng v. Komenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Ferebee v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Ferguson; Atwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Ferguson; Cintron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Ferguson; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Ferguson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Ferguson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1213
Ferguson-Cassidy v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1030
Ferguson Florissant School Dist. v. Missouri State Conf., NAACP 1074
Ferm v. Offce of the Attorney General of Nev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Fernandez v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Ferranti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
FGPJ Apartments and Development v. Tucson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxix
Page
Fidel Flores v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Fidelity National Financial, Inc.; Sewell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.; Germinaro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Fiedler v. Brindley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1061
Fields; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Fields; Makdessi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1031
Fifth Third Bank; Veltre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Figueroa v. Ramirez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
Figueroa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Fikrou v. Montgomery Cty. Offce of Child Support Enf. Div. . . . . 1084
Fillmore v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Filson; Marquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Financial Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P. R.; Peaje Investments v. 1145
Fink v. Kirchner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036,1187
Finney v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Finney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
First Advantage Background Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court of Cal. 1241
First American Title Co. of Mont., Inc.; Stokes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
First Internet Bank; Integrated Technological Systems v. . . . . . . 820
First Presbyterian Church U. S. A. of Tulsa, Okla. v. Doe . . . . . . 1126
First Solar, Inc.; Geragos & Geragos, APC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
First Solar, Inc. v. Mineworkers' Pension Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Fisch v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Fischgrund; C. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Fish; Blake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Fishback v. Parris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Fisher; McQueen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Fisher v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,1017
Fisher; Pellum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Fisher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Fitts v. Goodrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Fitzgerald v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Fiumano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Five Star Senior Living Inc. v. Lefevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
FJC Security Services, Inc.; Pierre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Flagstaff; Malnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1071
Fleck v. Wetch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Fleming; Uzzle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Flenoid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Fletcher v. Honeywell International, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Fletcher v. Lengerich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Flinn v. Parris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Florence; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Flores v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
lxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Flores v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1212
Flores-Botello v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Flores Gonzalez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Florida; Alston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Florida; Antonio Jimenez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1061
Florida; Antonio Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Florida; Atwater v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Florida; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Florida; Barwick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Florida; Bates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Florida; Beckman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Florida; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Florida; Bevan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Florida; Blevins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Florida; Booker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Florida; Bowles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Florida; Braddy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Florida; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,921
Florida; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Florida; Burns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Florida; Byrd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Florida; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1040
Florida; Cobb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Florida; Crain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134
Florida; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Florida; Dailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Florida; Damren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Florida; Daniels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Florida; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1117
Florida; Derrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Florida; Desir v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Florida; Diamond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Florida; Dillbeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Florida; Easterly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Florida; Evans v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Florida; Finney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Florida; Flores Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Florida; Foster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,882
Florida; Fotopoulos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Florida; Frank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Florida; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Florida; Gamble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Florida; Gary v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxi
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Florida; Gaskin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Florida; Geralds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Florida; Gil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Florida; Gonzalez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Florida; Goodman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Florida; Goraya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Florida; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Florida; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Florida; Grim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Florida; Guardado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Florida; Guerrero Lozano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Florida; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Florida; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Florida; Hartley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Florida; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Florida; Heath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Florida; Hodges v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Florida; Hoffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Florida; Hutchinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Florida; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1079
Florida; Jeffries v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Florida; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Florida; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,882,887
Florida; Johnston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1111
Florida; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1052,1232
Florida; Kelley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Florida; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Florida; Kokal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Florida; Lamarca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Florida; Lawrence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Florida; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Florida; Leonard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,947,1111,1118,1231,1245
Florida; Lightbourne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Florida; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Florida; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Florida; Mansfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Florida; Marquard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Florida; Marquardt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Florida; Mattis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Florida; Melton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,867
Florida; Metayer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Florida; Michel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Florida; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Florida; Miranda Luna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
lxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Florida; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Florida; Morales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Florida; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Florida; Morrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Florida; Morton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Florida; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,867
Florida; Nix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Florida; Occhicone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Florida; Overton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Florida; Owen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Florida; Pace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Florida; Peede v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Florida; Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Florida; Peterka v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Florida; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Florida; Philmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Florida; Pietri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Florida; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Florida; Puiatti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Florida; Quince v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,878
Florida; Raleigh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Florida; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Florida; Rhodes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Florida; Roberts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1187
Florida; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Florida; Rodgers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Florida; Rojas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Florida; Safford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Florida; Sandifer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Florida; San Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Florida; Shere v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Florida; Sireci v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Florida; Sliney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Florida; Small v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,892,1064
Florida; Stein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Florida; Stephens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Florida; Suggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,921
Florida; Sweet v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Florida; Sylince v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Florida; Tanzi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Florida; Tappen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Florida; Tarver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Florida; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Florida; Thier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1046
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii
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Florida; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Florida; Towbridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1134
Florida; Trease v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Florida; Victorino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Florida; Wall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1046
Florida; Walls v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Florida; Walton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Florida; Whitfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Florida; Whitton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Florida; Willacy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Florida; Wilmot v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Florida; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Florida; Windom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Florida; Wyatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Florida; Wyche v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Florida Bar; Spano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Florida Dept. of Children and Families; A. L. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Florida Dept. of Children and Families; A. R. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Florida Dept. of Children and Families; Israel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Clements v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Florida Dept. of Corrections; Whipple v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Florida Dept. of Juvenile Justice; Wade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Florida Dept. of Revenue; Luma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Florissant County; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Flournoy; Deorio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Flowers v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Flowers v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
Flowers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,850,1055,1111
Floyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Floyd; Vannoy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029
Flute v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,805
Flynn; FCA US LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Focia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Foley; Santos LaGaite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Follansbee v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Foltz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Fonseca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Fontanez v. Coakley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Food Bank of Eastern Mich.; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943
Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Ford, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Ford v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
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Ford v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Ford; Morrow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Ford; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Ford; Tharpe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Ford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170,1186,1212
Ford; Wagner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Ford Global Technologies; New World International, Inc. v. . . . . . 877
Forest v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Former Secretary of Defense; Hobson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Forrest; Coulter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Forte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Fortin v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Fort Peck Housing Auth. v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev. 908
Fortson v. Eppinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Fortune v. Herring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Fort Worth v. Darden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Fossum; Watford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Foster v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,882
Foster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1077,1211
Foster; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Fotopoulos v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Fountain v. Rupert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Fountain Circle Health and Rehabilitation v. Wellner . . . . . . . . . 917
Fourth Estate Pub. Beneft Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC . . . . 296,959
Fowlkes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Fox v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Fox v. Powell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Fox v. Tripp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Fox v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Fox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,991
Fox News Network, LLC; TVEyes, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Fox 11; Matelyan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Foxx v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204
Foxx; Vasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Frakes; Jacob v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,1020
Frakes; Leonor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
France v. Patrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824,1017
Franceschi v. Yee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Francis v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Francis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Francisco Maldonado v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Francisco Puentes v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Francisco Vega v. Germaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
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Francisco Vega v. Kapusta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Franco-De La Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Frank v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Frank v. Gaos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,995
Frank v. Goas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Frank v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Frank v. Rackley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Franke; Pope v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Franklin v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Franklin v. Hawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Franklin v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Franklin; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Franklin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1189
Franklin v. Valenzuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Fraticelli v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Fratta v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1205
Frauenheim; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Frauenheim; Valdivia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Frauenheim; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1259
Frazier v. Crump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Frazier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,883,913,1258
Frazier v. Warden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Frederick; Sullivan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Frederick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Frederiksen v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Free v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Freedom From Religion; Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholder v. 1213
Freedom From Religion Foundation; Presbyterian Church v. . . . 1213
Freeman v. American K-9 Detection Services, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Freeman v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Freeman v. North Carolina Dept. of HHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1030
Freeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211,1235
Freeport; Barrella v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Freer v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Fremin v. Tanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
French v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
French v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Frenz; Stevens-Rucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216
Fresno County; Pellegrini v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1205
Frett v. Virgin Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Frey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Frias v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Frie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Friendship Pavilion Acquisition Co., LLC; Sundy v. . . . . . . . . . . . 925
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Frisch's Restaurant; Satterwhite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1061
Fritz v. Burt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Frosh v. Association for Accessible Medicines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Frost; Sturgeon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,915
Frost Brown Todd, LLC; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1110
Fruendt; Altstatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Fry; Lei Ke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Fuchs; Hoskins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Fuentes v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1239
Fuentes-Canales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Fuller v. Eppinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Fuller; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Fulton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Fulton Cty.; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Fulton State Hospital; Luh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
Furminger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
FX Networks, LLC; de Havilland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
G. v. Deborah Heart and Lung Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Gabriel Contreras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Gagnon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1055
Gaines v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Gaitan Benitez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Gaitor, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813,1067,1259
Galbraith v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Galbreath v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1091
Gallardo v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Galvan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Galvan v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Gamble v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Gamble v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019
Gamez Mendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Gammon; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Gant v. Winn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Gaos; Frank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,995
Garber; Menendez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
Garcia, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
Garcia v. Burt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Garcia v. Collier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
Garcia v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
Garcia v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
Garcia; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Garcia; Moya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Garcia v. Pickett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
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Garcia v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1047
Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,
862,886,928,930,1077,1092,1125,1169,1191,1204
Garcia v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Garcia-Carillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Garcia-Echaverria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017
Garcia-Esparza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Garcia-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Garcia Licon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Garcia-Lima v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Garcia-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
Garcia-Montejo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Garcia-Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Garden v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Gardner; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Gardner v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Gardner; Pryer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Gardner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Garibay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Garman; Barlow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Garman; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Garmong v. Supreme Court of Nev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Garnett v. Remedi Seniorcare of Va., LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Garrett v. Brennan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Garrett v. Paramo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Garrett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1169
Garringer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Garry v. Trane Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1123
Garton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Garvey; Young Sung Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Garvin v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Gary v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Garza v. Idaho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232,915
Garza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Gaskin v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Gaspard v. Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force . . . . . . 857
Gasparini; Rotondo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Gastelo; Caines v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832,1061
Gaston; McKinzy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Gastonia; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Gaston McKinzy; McKinzy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Gates v. Khokhar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Gates v. Reed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Gates v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
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Gates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Gathings v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Gavidia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Gay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Gebhardt v. Nielsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Geddes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Gee; June Medical Services, L. L. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135
Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Gehrmann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
GEICO General Ins. Co.; Duncan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Gellman, Brydges & Schroff; Bland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
General Dynamics Information Technology; Cunningham v. . . . . . 966
General Electric Co.; Oleksy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Gene Salter Properties; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Genovese; Grogger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Gentile v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Gentry v. Judge, Circuit Court of Tenn., Sumner Cty. . . . . . . . 816,1017
Gentry; Salerno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Gentry v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1017
Gentry v. Thompson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816,1017
GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
George v. Hargett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
George v. Kent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
George v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
George Wash. Univ. Hospital; Leonard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244
Georgia; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Georgia; Burke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Georgia; Carman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Georgia; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Georgia; Cotman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Georgia; Dingler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Georgia; Grant-Farley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Georgia; Gregory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Georgia; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1109
Georgia; Lockhart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Georgia; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Georgia; Obeginski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Georgia; Pierce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Georgia; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Georgia; Rayan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1259
Georgia; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817,867
Georgia; Veal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Georgia; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Geotcha v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
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Geragos & Geragos, APC v. First Solar, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Gerald v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Geralds v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. . . . . 908
Geray v. Muniz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1258
Gerebizza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Gerhart; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Germaine; Francisco Vega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
German Aerospace Center; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Germinaro v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Gerrard v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Gessler v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Ghailani v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Gharib v. Casey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Ghiringhelli v. Assurance Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Ghobrial v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Ghosh v. Berkeley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066,1196,1220
Ghosh v. Dish Network L. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Giancarlo v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Gibbons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Gibbs v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Gibson v. Boe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Gibson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1186
Gibson v. Wetzel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Gicharu v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Gieswein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1188
Gil v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Gilbert v. Daniels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Gilbert v. Washington Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Gildner; N. E. L. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Gilead Sciences, Inc.; AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Inc. v. . . . . . 965
Gilead Sciences, Inc.; Merck & Co., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Campie . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Gilgenbach, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Gilkers v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Gillard v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Gillespie v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Gillespie v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Gills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Gilmore; Dougherty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Gilmore; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Gilstrap v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Gipson v. Tampkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Gipson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
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Girard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Gish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Gist v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Giulian v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Giurbino; Hutson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Givens v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1186
Gjuraj v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Gladden v. Barber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Glass v. Hainsworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Glass v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062
Gleason v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Glenewinkel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC v. Wetzel . . . . . . . . . . 1140
Glick v. Premo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Gloor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Glorioso-Brandt v. Azar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Glover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Glover; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Glover v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Glover v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
GMAC Mortgage Corp.; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Goas; Frank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Godbee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
Godinez; DeJesus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Godoy v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Gola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Goldberg's Estate v. Nimoityn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Golden v. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Golden v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Golden v. Pfster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Golden Nuggett Lake Charles, L. L. C.; Chhim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Golder v. Chapdelaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Goldman; Brady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Golz v. Carson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Gomez v. Berghuis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Gomez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Gomez v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Gomez-Saavedra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Gonzales v. Santoro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Gonzalez v. Armenta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Gonzalez; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Gonzalez v. Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
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Gonzalez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,912
Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,862,1169
Gonzalez; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Gonzalez Delacruz v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Gonzalez Garibay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Gonzalez-Negron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Gonzalez Tovar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Goodman; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Goodman v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Goodrich; Fitts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Goodrich; Packard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Good Will Steam Fire Engine Co. No. 1; Yoder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Goodwin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Google LLC; Abulkhair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Goolsby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Goplin; WeConnect, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Goraya v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Gorbey v. McCall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Gordon v. Lafer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Gordon; Orange v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Gordon; Samson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Gore; Banks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Gore v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Gore; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Gorion v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Goris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Goriz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Gorsalitz; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Gossett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Gotech International Technology Ltd. v. Nagravision SA . . . . . . . 997
Gouch-Onassis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Goudelock; Sixty-01 Assn. of Apartment Owners v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Governor of Ga.; McKissick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1083
Governor of Ind.; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Governor of N. Y.; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Governor of Ohio; Clemons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Governor of Ohio; DeNoma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1017
Governor of Ohio; Ohio ex rel. Walgate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Governor of Ohio; Tibbetts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Governor of Tenn.; Zagorski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Governor of W. Va.; Dreyfuse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Gowadia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Grable v. Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Grace of God Presby. Church; Pure Presby. Church of Wash. v. 1123
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Gracia-Cantu, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Graham v. Hainsworth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Graham v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Graham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Graham v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
Gramm v. Deere & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
Grand Canyon Univ.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Grandison v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Grand Jury Subpoena, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112,1125,1143,1258
Grand Valley State Univ.; GwanJun Kim v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Grant v. Alperovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,1245
Grant v. Carpenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Grant v. Kelly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Grant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Grant v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1245
Grant-Farley v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Granton v. Washington State Lottery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Graves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1238
Gray; Baptiste v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Gray v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1019
Gray v. Dorethy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Gray v. Gilmore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Gray; Schwarzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Gray v. Sorrels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Gray; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Gray v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
Grazzini-Rucki v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Grazzini-Rucki v. Rucki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Great Lakes Specialty Finance, Inc.; Preston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Green v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Green v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Green v. Horry County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Green v. McGill-Johnston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
Green v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,887,977,1186
Greene v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Greene v. Frost Brown Todd, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1110
Greene v. Huffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Greene v. Semple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Greene v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Green Tree Servicing, L. L. C.; Chambers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Green Tree Servicing LLC; Greer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Green Valley Special Utility Dist.; Cibolo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Greenway v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Greenwood v. Tennessee Bd. of Parole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxiii
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Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Greer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 953,1202
Gregory v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Gregory v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823,883,910
Gregory M.; Jennifer A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Grewal; Kushner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Grewal; Petit-Clair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Griem; Henson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Grievance Administrator, Attorney Grievance Comm'n; Cohen v. 1194
Griffen v. Kemp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Griffn v. Aetna Health Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Griffn v. Amerada Petroleum Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Griffn v. Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Griffn; Bohannan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830,1253
Griffn v. DiNapoli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Griffn v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Griffn v. Hess Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Griffn v. Teamcare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Griffn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Griffn v. Verizon Communications Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Griffoen v. Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railways Co. . . . . . . . . . 1222
Griffth v. Blades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Griffth v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Griffth; Shockley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Grigas; LaPena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Grigsby v. Baltazar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Grigsby v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Grigsby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1143
Grim v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Grim; McNeil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Grimaldo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Grimm v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Grimsley v. McGinley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Grimsrud v. Department of Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Grimstad v. Deschutes Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Grist v. Carlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Grogger v. Genovese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Gros v. Kent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Groschen; Kraskey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Grose v. Outlaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Gross v. Dannatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Grounds; Duran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Grounds; Sadowski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
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Gu v. FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Guadarrama v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Guardado v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Gubanic v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Guerra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Guerrero v. English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Guerrero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Guerrero Lozano v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Guevara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Guevara-Guevara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Guido; Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Guizamano-Cortes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Gulbrandson v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Gulick Trucking, Inc. v. Washington State Emp. Security Dept. 1036
Gullett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1188
Gunderson v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Gunn; Keyes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Gunn v. North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Guterres; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Gutierrez; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Gutierrez v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Gutierrez-Jaramillo v. Federal Correctional Institution, Gilmer 885
Gutierrez-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Guzall v. Romulus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Guzman v. Madden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
GwanJun Kim v. Grand Valley State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
H. v. West Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Habeck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Hacheney v. Obenland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Hadari; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Haffer v. New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1205
Haight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Hailey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Haines-Marchel v. Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Bd. . . 1252
Hainsworth; Glass v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Hainsworth; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Hakala; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Hall v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Hall v. Ayers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Hall; Cassady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Hall v. Chandler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
Hall v. Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxxv
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Hall v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Hall; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Hall v. Paramo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Hall v. Terris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Hall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1055,1191,1239,1257
Halleck; Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942
Hallenbeck; Cruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Halley; Huckaby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Halper v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Hamidullin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Hamilton v. Allbaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Hamilton; Bean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Hamilton v. Brannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Hamilton v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Hamilton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Hamilton v. Strahota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Hamilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Hamlin; Vasconcellos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Hammond v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Hammond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Hammonds v. Dunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Hampton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Hampton v. Straiger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Hampton; Sydnor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Hancock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Handy v. Johnson & Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Hankishiyev v. ARUP Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Hanna v. LeBlanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Hanover Ins. Co.; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Hansberry; Ashbourne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Hansen; Blackwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Hansen; Quintana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Hanson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Happy Valley Municipal Ct.; Linh Thi Minh Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Haq; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Hardaway v. Cross State Moving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Hardeman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Harden v. Bowersox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Harden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Hardin; Lofgren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Hardin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Harding; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Hardy v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Hardy v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
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Hardy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,868,1191
Haren v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Hargett; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Harihar v. U. S. Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Harkonen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Harloff v. Koenig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Harman v. Trinity Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Harmon; Rudzavice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Harmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Harnden v. Michigan Dept. of Health and Human Services . . . . . 829
Harnden v. St. Clair Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Haro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Harper v. Crow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1065
Harper v. Leahy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist. . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Harper v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1065
Harper v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,1026,1129
Harrell; Naylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Harrington, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Harrington v. Winn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Harris v. Deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Harris; Degrate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1018
Harris v. Easterling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Harris v. Estes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Harris v. Fuller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Harris; McFarlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1110
Harris; Sultaana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Harris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,845,893,1192,1233
Harris v. Vigil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Harris County Children's Protective Services; Falkenhorst v. . . . 846
Harrison v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Harrison v. Fulton Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Harrison v. Huggins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Harrison; Republic of Sudan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Harrison v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Harrison; Webb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Harry; Ozier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Harry; Susalla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Harry; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
Hart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Hartfeld v. Eighth Judicial Dist. for Nev., Clark Cty. . . . . . . . . . . 823
Hartford Super 8; Reed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Hartley v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Hartley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
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Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation 1067
Harvey County Sheriff's Dept.; Mayfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Harwell v. Schweitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Hashimi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943
Haskin v. US Airways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Haslam; Zagorski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Hason v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Hassell v. Yelp, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Hastings v. Berghuis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Hatch v. Brennan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Hatcher v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Hatfeld Enterprizes v. Washington State Emp. Security Dept. 1036
Hatt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Hatton; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Hatton; Zeledon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Haviland; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Haviland; Linder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.; Debeikes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,996
Hawaii Residency Programs, Inc.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Hawaii Wildlife Fund; Maui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1144
Hawes v. Reilly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Hawkins v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Hawkins v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Hawkins v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Hawkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Hawks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Hawley; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Haws; Kitlas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Haycraft v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Hayes v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Hayes v. Plumley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Hayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Hayhoe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Haymond; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1065
Haymore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Haynes v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Haynes v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Haynes; Morton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1111
Haynes v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision . . . . 1170
Haynes; Senior v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Haynes Timberland, Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Haynesworth v. South Carolina Dept. of Mental Health . . . . . . . . 1252
Hays v. Soto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
lxxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Hayward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Heagy v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1134
Healey; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Heartland Employment Services, LLC; Opengeym v. . . . . . 811,999,1187
Heath v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Heath v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Hebert v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
H. E. Butt Grocery Co.; Peel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Hedgemon; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1110
Hedrick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Heffernan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Heffngton v. Puleo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Heikkila v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. . . . 123,916
Helton v. Pash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Helwig; Torkornoo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1038,1187
Hemsher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Henderson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1029
Henderson v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Henderson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Henderson v. VIP Taxi LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040
Hendricks v. Bingham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996
Hendrix v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Henke; Vue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Henkin; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Henley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Hennepin; Nicolaison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Hennepin; Serna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Henrico Cty.; Medvedev v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Henriquez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Henry v. Caruso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Henry v. Cash Biz, LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Henry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Henry; Vinnie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 63,810
Henson v. Griem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Herbert; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Herbert v. CVS Pharmacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1204
Herbin v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Heredia v. Walmart Stores Tex., LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Heredia-Silva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Herman; Burmaster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Herman v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Hermann; Delferro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
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Hernandez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1188
Hernandez v. Bailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Herrera; Reilly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1218
Hernandez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Hernandez v. Mesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Hernandez v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Hernandez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . 843,902,1003,1185,1212,1240,1254
Hernandez; Zinkand v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Herr; SWC, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Herrera v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Herring; Fortune v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Herrington v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Hess Corp.; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Hesse v. Howell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Hester v. Sprayberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Hester v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104
Heximer v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
H. -H. v. Allegheny County Offce of Children, Youth & Families 1158
Hickerson v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Hickman-Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Hicks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1142
Hicks v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Higgins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Higgs v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Higley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA v. Vanda Pharmaceuticals . . . . . . . 1220
Hill v. Accounts Receivable Services, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Hill v. Associates for Renewal in Ed., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185
Hill v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1186
Hill v. Gammon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Hill v. Lizarraga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Hill v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Hill v. PBL Multi-Strategy Fund, L. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Hill; Polk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Hill v. Reinke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Hill; Shoop v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Hill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1055,1092,1245,1257
Hillsman v. Escoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Hilton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Hilts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Himes v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Hinds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1029
Hines v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
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Hinojosa v. Horn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Hinton v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Hinton v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Hiramanek v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Hirsch v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Hobson v. Mattis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1110,1248
Hodge v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Hodges v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Hoffman v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Hogan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Hogue v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Hohman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Hokenstrom v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Ho Kwon v. Hyoun Phil Won . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Holcomb; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Holder v. Sepanek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Holder; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1110
Holder v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Holkesvig v. North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1029
Holland; Ciotta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803,1019
Holland; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Holland v. Rosen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Hollenback v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Hollis v. Pfster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Hollis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Holmes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Holt v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
Holt; Dusenbery v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Holt v. Terris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Holt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Hom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Homrich v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
Honey; Bugg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Honeywell International, Inc.; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Honeywell International, Inc.; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Honeywell International, Inc. v. Mexichem Fluor Inc. . . . . . . . . . 918
Honish v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Honish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1205
Hood v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Hood v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Hooks; Dennison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,1046
Hooks; Olivo Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Hooper; Boudreaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Hooper; Poupart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci
Page
Hoopskirt Lofts Condominium Assn.; Vurimindi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
Hopkins v. Dooley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Hopkins v. Language Testing Int'l. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Hopkins v. Warden, Ventress Correctional Facility . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Hopper; Plummer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Hopson v. Stark County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1117
Hopson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Horn; Hinojosa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Horn v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Horn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Horne v. CBS6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Horne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Horne v. WTVR, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Horry County; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Horsley v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Horton v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Horton; Burns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Horton v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Horton v. Ducart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Horton; Nettles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Horton; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Horton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Horvatt v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Hoskins, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Hoskins v. Fuchs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Hoskins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1045
Hospital Espanol Auxilio Mutuo de P. R.; Silva-Ramirez v. . . . 876,1030
Hostetler v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Hough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Houk v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Houng Le v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Houpe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Houston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Houston Auto M. Imports Greenway, Ltd. v. Zastrow . . . . . . . . . 1151
Howard v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Howard v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Howard v. McCready . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Howard v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Howard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,843,885,950,993,1201
Howell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Howell v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Howell; Hesse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Howell v. NuCar Connection, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084,1210
Howell; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
xcii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Howlett v. Richardson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
HP Inc. v. Berkheimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
HRI Hospital, Inc.; Schwartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
HTC Corp.; Advanced Audio Devices, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
HTC Corp.; Advanced Video Technologies LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
HTC Corp. v. 3G Licensing, S. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Hubbard v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Hubbard v. Haviland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Hubbard; Ivory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Hubbard v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Huckaby v. Halley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Hudgins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Hudnall, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Hudson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Hudson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Huebner v. Midland Credit Mgmt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Huffman; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Huffman v. Nielsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
Huggans v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Huggins; Harrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Huggins; Prillerman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Hulen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Huling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Hull v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Humphrey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Humphreys v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Hundley v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Hungary; de Csepel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Hunt; Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018,1190
Hunter; A-1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Hunter v. District of Columbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Hunter v. North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Hunter v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1003
Huntington; Mamakos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Hurd v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Hurd v. Lizarraga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1205
Hurst v. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Hurt; Vantlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Hurt; Wise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Hurwitz; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Hurwitz; Webb-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Husband v. Ebbert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Huss v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Hussein v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xciii
Hutchinson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hutson v. Giurbino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
897
834
Hutton v. Shoop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,830
Huynh; Aker Biomarine Antarctic AS v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Hyatte; Bagby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1217
Hyde-el v. Poole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Hylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Hylton v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Hyman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Hyoun Phil Won; Min Ho Kwon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Hyppolite v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Hyundai Motor America, Inc.; Adburahman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Iancu; Bhagat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Iancu v. Brunetti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Iancu; Droplets, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Iancu; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Iancu; Theresa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Iancu; Wang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Iancu; Webtrends, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Ibarra v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Ibarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Ibeabuchi v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Ibenyenwa v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Ibragimov v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Idaho; Garza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232,915
Idlett, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Ignacio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Ildefonso v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Illarramendi v. SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Illinois; Boykin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Illinois; Bryant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Illinois; Calderin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Illinois; Colon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Illinois; Cooper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Illinois; Costic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Illinois; Croft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Illinois; Ellis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Illinois; Escobar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Illinois; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Illinois; French v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Illinois; Gillard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Illinois; Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
xciv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Illinois; Gore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Illinois; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Illinois; Haynes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Illinois; Hudson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Illinois; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Illinois; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1087
Illinois; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,838
Illinois; Juresic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Illinois; Keene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Illinois; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Illinois; Lacey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Illinois; LaPointe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Illinois; Mares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Illinois; Merritt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Illinois; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,949
Illinois; Newton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Illinois; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Illinois; Pence v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Illinois; Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Illinois; Peterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Illinois; Rankins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Illinois; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Illinois; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Illinois; Streeter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Illinois; Sykes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Illinois; Wester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Illinois; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n; Miner v. 998
Illinois Dept. of Human Services; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1061
Illinois Workers Compensation Comm'n; Faust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Illumina, Inc.; Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Inch; Button v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Inch; Hawkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Inch; Ingram v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Inch; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Inch; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Indiana; Beason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Indiana v. Bowman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Indiana; Brantley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Indiana; Gunderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Indiana; Haycraft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Indiana; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Indiana; Karr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Indiana v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcv
Page
Indiana; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Indiezone, Inc. v. Rooke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1110
In re. See name of party.
International Finance Corp.; Jam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199,809
ION Geophysical Corp.; WesternGeco LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1151
Ivey; Saunders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Ivey; Wappler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Indiana; Timbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc.; Fillmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Ingebretsen v. Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Ingegneri; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Ingram v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Ingram v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1205
Ingram v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Ingram v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Ink v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Inman v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. NLRB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
Inova Fairfax Hospital; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Inova Health Care; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Integrated Technological Systems v. First Internet Bank . . . . . . 820
Interactive Brokers LLC; Ali v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Interactive College of Technology; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
International. For labor union, see name of trade.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emp.; Nu Image, Inc. v. 1145
International Club Homeowners Assn., Inc.; Jarmuth v. . . . . . . . . 1194
Ioane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Iowa; Coffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Iowa; Houk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Iowa; LaJeunesse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Iowa; Yates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219
Iowa District Court, Des Moines Cty.; Cannon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Irizarry-Rosario v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Isaiah v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Isasi v. Annucci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Isbell v. Merlak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Ishee v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Iskander v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Islas-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Ismaiyl v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Ismay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
Israel v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Israel v. North Miami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Israel Sanchez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
xcvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Ivory v. Hubbard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Ivy v. Moran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Ivy v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Ivy Tower Minneapolis; Streambend Properties II v. . . . . . . . . . . 822
Izatt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
J. A. v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Jackson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Jackson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,948
Jackson v. Equifax Workforce Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Jackson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867,1079
Jackson v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1109
Jackson v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Jackson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Jackson v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Jackson; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Jackson v. Labor Ready Southwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Jackson v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1230
Jackson; Prince v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Jackson; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Jackson; Starnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Jackson; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Jackson; Thomason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Jackson v. United States . . . . . . . 860,900,1055,1152,1191,1192,1227,1249
Jackson; Vinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Jackson; Wellborn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Jackson's Estate v. Schron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Jacob v. Cotton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Jacob v. Frakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807,1020
Jacob v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Jacobi v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Jacobs v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Jacobson v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Jacoby v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Jacoby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204
Jacome v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Jaeger; Brakebill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Jaime Jimenez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Jaisinghani v. Sharma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Jakks Pacifc, Inc. v. Accasvek LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Jam v. International Finance Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199,809
Jama v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Jamerson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
James v. Asuncion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
James v. Eldorado Casino Shreveport Joint Venture . . . . . . . . . . 1049
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcvii
Page
James v. Kapusta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
James v. Krueger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
James v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
James v. Montgomery Regional Airport Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
James v. Snyder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
James v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,903,1202
Janangelo v. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Admin. . . . . . . . 999
Janatsch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Jang v. Boston Scientifc Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Janssen Research & Development, LLC; Liu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Jaramillo v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1109
Jarmuth v. International Club Homeowners Assn., Inc. . . . . . . . . 1194
Jarvis; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Jason K. v. Maine Dept. of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . 807,963
Jasso v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Jauch; Choctaw County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Javier Jasso v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Javier Vergara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
J. B. R. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
J. C. v. Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Services . . . . . . . . . 1229
Jean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Jean v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Jeanty v. New York City Dept. of Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,996
J. E. C. v. Oregon Dept. of Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Jedediah C. v. West Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Jeep v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1050
Jefferson; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Jefferson County; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Offce; Weisler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Jeffrey v. West Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Jeffries v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Jenewicz v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Jenkins; Steele v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Jenkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,860,1024,1042,1056
Jenkins v. WMC Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Jenks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Jenn-Ching Luo v. Owen J. Roberts School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Jennifer A. v. Gregory M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Jennings v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135
Jennings v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Jennings v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Jennings v. Jennings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Jennings v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134
Jensen v. Madden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
xcviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Jeremias v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Jervis v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Jesus Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Jewell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Jiang v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Jian Long Dong v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Jian Rong Dong v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Jian Sun v. Asiello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Jian Sun v. Mullkoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Jian Sun v. Newman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Jian Sun v. New York City Human Resources Admin. . . . . . . . . . 822
Jian Sun v. Pollak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Jian Sun v. Schneiderman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Jian Sun v. Supreme Court of N. Y., Queens Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Jian Sun v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Jian Sun v. Zeve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Jian-yun Dong v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Jiau v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Jiles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Jimenez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1061
Jingyuan Feng v. Komenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Jiyao Jiang v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
J. M. v. Matayoshi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Jneso Dist. Council 1; Juan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Joaquin Ramirez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Joaquin Ramirez v. Aponte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1187
Joaquin Ramirez v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Jofaz Transportation, Inc.; Mehmeti v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
John Bean Technologies Corp.; Morris & Associates, Inc. v. . . . . . 1071
Johnson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067,1220
Johnson v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Johnson v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Johnson; Bida v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Johnson v. Bradley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Johnson; Bringman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Johnson v. Butler Law Firm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1066
Johnson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160,1170
Johnson v. Copenhaver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Johnson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1030,1249
Johnson v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
Johnson; Docaj v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Johnson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868,882,887
Johnson v. German Aerospace Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Johnson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1087
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcix
Page
Johnson v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Johnson v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Johnson; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
Johnson v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Johnson v. Mackie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Johnson v. McDermott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Johnson v. McDowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Johnson; Medina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Johnson v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Johnson v. Offce of Children, Youth and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Johnson v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Johnson; Pennsylvania v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Johnson v. Queen Elizabeth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Johnson v. Rothschild . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Johnson; Stone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Johnson v. Storix, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Johnson v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Johnson; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Johnson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814,
829,853,861,900,914,927,975,992,993,1030,1043,1054,1090,
1121,1130,1200,1256
Johnson v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Johnson; Vega Duron v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Johnson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,947
Johnson v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Johnson v. Wylie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Johnson & Johnson; Handy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Johnston, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Johnston v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004,1111
Johnston; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204
Johnston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; DRK Photo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Joliet; New West, L. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Jonas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1142
Jonassen v. Shartle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961
Jonassen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Jones; Alfred v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Jones; Arnold v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Jones; Ashley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Jones; Atkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Jones; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Jones v. Bank of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Jones; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Jones; Barreiro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
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Jones; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1171
Jones v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1111
Jones; Booker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Jones; Booth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Jones; Bradley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Jones; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Jones v. Byrne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Jones; Callwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Jones; Chestnut v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Jones; Clarke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Jones; Cobb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Jones; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1218
Jones; Crawford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Jones v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Jones; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Jones v. Dept. of HHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Jones; Diez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802
Jones; Ferguson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Jones v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1052,1232
Jones; Ford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Jones; Fuentes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Jones; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1047
Jones v. Grand Canyon Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Jones v. Hawaii Residency Programs, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Jones; Himes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Jones; Horn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Jones; Horsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Jones; Horvatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Jones; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Jones v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,838
Jones v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Jones; Isaiah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Jones; Jamerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Jones v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
Jones v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Jones; Knight v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Jones; Kokal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Jones; Krawczuk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Jones; Latimore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Jones v. LeBlanc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Jones; Lenz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Jones; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Jones v. Life Ins. Co. of North America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Jones; Lupian-Barajas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
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Jones; Mackenzie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Jones; Marquardt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Jones; Matthews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Jones; McCloud v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Jones; Melvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Jones v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Jones; Michigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Jones; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Jones; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Jones; Nairn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Jones v. Offce of Administrative Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Jones v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Jones; Paige v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Jones v. Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Jones; Pavon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Jones; Pedraza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Jones; Pelto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Jones; Pinkney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Jones; Pittman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Jones; Pompee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Jones; Prison Legal News v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Jones; Puente v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Jones; Rentas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Jones; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Jones v. Samson Resources Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Jones v. Schwarzenegger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Jones v. Sedita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Jones; Seed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Jones; Solis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Jones; Soza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Jones v. Superior Court of Conn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Jones; Swinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Jones; Tappen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Jones; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1110
Jones v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,
864,901,976,989,992,1025,1044,1121,1162,1166,1190,1259
Jones; Villavicencio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1217
Jones; Ware v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Jones; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Jones; Welch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Jones; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Jones; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Jones; Zack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
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Jones; Zenquis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Jordan; Bedell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Jordan; Carpenter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Jordan v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Jordan v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Jordan; Philip Morris USA Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Jordan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038,1060
Joseph, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Joseph v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Joshlin v. Neven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Jossie v. CVS Pharmacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1081,1205
Jouette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Joyner; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Joyner; Schumaker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Joyner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
JPMorgan Chase Bank N. A.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A.; Schwartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
JTH Tax, Inc.; Aime v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Juan v. Jneso Dist. Council 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Judge, Cir. Ct. of Ore. v. Oregon Comm'n on Judicial Fitness . . . . 937
Judge, Cir. Ct. of Tenn., Sumner Cty.; Gentry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 816,1017
Judge, Ct. of Appeals of La., Second Cir.; Williams v.. . . . . . . . . . 914
Judge, Ct. of Common Pleas, Hamilton Cty., Ohio; Simpson v. . . . 1237
Judge, Dist. Ct. for the First Judicial Dist. of Colo.; Knuth v. . . . 1197
Judge, District Ct. of Grayson Cty., Tex.; Clopton v. . . . . . . . . 834,1046
Judge, Judicial Cir. Ct. of Fla., Hillsborough Cty.; Torres v. . . . . . 1040
Judge, Super. Ct. of Ariz.; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . 837,970,1061,1064,1111
Judge, Super. Ct. of Ariz.; Salerno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Judge, Super. Ct. of Cal., Los Angeles Cty.; Stevenson v. . . . . . . . 1155
Judge, Super. Ct. of Ga., Atlanta Judicial Circuit; Dixit v. . . . . . . 1209
Judge, United States Brktcy. Ct. Eastern Dist. of Mo.; Briggs v. 988
Judge, U. S. Ct. of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Davis v. . . . . 1194
Judge, U. S. Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Fla.; Selden v. . . . 805,1019
Judge, U. S. Dist. Ct. for the Northern Dist. of Ohio; Mason v. 947,1187
Judge, U. S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Pa.; Coulter v. . . . . . 1037,1245
Judy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Judy v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
June Medical Services, L. L. C. v. Gee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135
Jungwirth v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Junod v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1110
Juresic v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Justice; Dreyfuse v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
K. v. Abbott Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
K. v. Maine Dept. of Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . 807,963
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Kachina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Kahler v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Kailer; De La Cruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc.; Hubbard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals Technology Risk Offce; Palmer v. 1251
Kalaba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Kalamazoo County Community Mental Health Bd.; Bartlett v. . . . 1228
Kaldawi v. Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1111
Kallis; Millis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Kamara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Kamkar; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Kan-Di-Ki, LLC v. Sorensen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Kane; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910,1061
Kane; Webb-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Kansas; Albright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Kansas v. Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Kansas; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Kansas; Kahler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Kansas v. Morales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Kansas; Morgan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Kansas v. Ochoa-Lara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Kansas; Rambo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Kansas; Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Kansas; Woodward v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1046
Kansas Dept. of Labor, Emp. Security Bd.; Kuri v. . . . . . . . . . 991,1111
Kapahu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Kaplan; Stankevich v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Kaprelian v. Tegels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Kapusta; Francisco Vega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Kapusta; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Karban v. Brnovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Karnoski; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1134
Karr v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Kashani; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1187
Kasich; Clemons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Kasich; DeNoma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1017
Kasich; Ohio ex rel. Walgate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Kasich; Tibbetts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Kassab v. Skinner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Katavich; Mezzles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Katz v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Kauffman; Ratushny v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Kauffman; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Kavandi v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017,1188
civ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Kaweah Delta Hospital; Doe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1111
Kay v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
KBC Bank N. V.; Midamines SPRL Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
KBR, Inc.; Metzgar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Ke v. Fry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Kean Miller, LLP; CEH Energy, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Kearny v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority . . . . . . . 823
Keen v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Keenan v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Keene v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Keeton; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Keeton; Canete v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Kegler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Kehoe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Keister v. Bell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Keithly v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Kelleher v. New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation 1115
Keller; Zaitsev v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Keller; Zirus v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Kelley v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Kelley; Booth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Kelley; Breeden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Kelley; Burks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Kelley; Camacho v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Kelley v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Kelley; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Kelley; Nunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Kelley; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Kelley; Walden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Kelley; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Kellogg, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Kelly v. Bishop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Kelly; Cuevas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1170
Kelly; DeVore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Kelly; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Kelly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Kemp; Griffen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Kemp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Kendall v. Olsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Kennedy, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Kennedy v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Kennedy v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Kennedy v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections . . . 1199
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Kennedy v. Michigan State Treasurer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Kent; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1134
Kife v. Ahmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Killen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Kennedy v. Pollock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Kennedy v. Schneider Electric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Kennedy v. Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP . . . . . . . . 815
Kennedy v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Kennedy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Kenner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Kent; George v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Kent; Gros v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Kent; Richardson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Kentucky; Bussell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Kentucky; Clack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Kentucky; Epperson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Kentucky; Hostetler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Kentucky; Masters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
Kentucky; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Kentucky; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Kentucky Bd. of Medical Licensure; Strauss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Kerr v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Kerr v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Kerr v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Kerrigan v. QBE Ins. Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
Kersey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Kesari v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Kessler v. Overmyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Kessling; Monte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Kevra-Shiner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Key; Benitez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
Key; Camilo Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Key v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Keyes v. Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986,1035
Keyes v. Gunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Keys v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Khan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Khokhar; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Khoshmood v. Catholic Charity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Khoshmood v. District of Columbia Housing Auth. Headquarters 1118
Khoshmood v. Eastern Market Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Khouanmany v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Khoury v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
cvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Killian; Qazi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Killingbeck v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Kilmartin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Kilpatrick v. Arp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Kilpatrick v. Cuomo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Kilpatrick v. Dreslin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Kilpatrick v. Elia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Kilpatrick v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Kilpatrick v. Henkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Kilpatrick v. Kamkar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Kilpatrick; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Kilpatrick v. Kondaveeti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Kilpatrick v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Kilpatrick v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Kilpatrick v. Volterra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Kilpatrick v. Weiss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Kilpatrick v. Zucker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Kim v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040,1188
Kim v. Grand Valley State Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Kim v. United States Customs and Border Protection . . . . . . . . . 899
Kimball v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Kimberley Rice Kaestner; 1992 Family Trust N. C. Dept. of Rev. v. 1112
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Davidson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Kimble; Best v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Kimmell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Kinchen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P. v. Upstate Forever . . . . . 1033
Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Wellner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
King v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
King v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
King v. Erdos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
King v. Kilpatrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
King v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1046
King v. Neall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
King; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
King v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1166,1192,1255
King v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Kingham v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
King Law Group, PLLC v. M2 Technology, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Kingston; Mira v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Kinkel v. Laney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Kinney v. Anderson Lumber Co., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Kinney v. Boren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Kinney v. Cantil-Sakauye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
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Kinney v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1071,1072
Kinney v. Clerk, Ct. of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. . . . 1072
Kinney v. Gutierrez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Kinney v. Rothschild . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Kinney v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Kinney v. Takeuchi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Kinney v. Three Arch Bay Community Services Dist. . . . . . . . . . 1224
Kinney v. U. S. Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Kiobel v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Kirby v. Offce of Attorney General of N. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Kirchner; Fink v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036,1187
Kirkegard; Rose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Kirkland v. Progressive Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1245
Kirkland v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Kirkpatrick v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Kirk Tang Yuk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Kirsch v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Kirsh v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Kisor v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Kissner v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1024
Kitlas v. Haws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Klayman v. Luck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Klee; Alfetlawi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Klee; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Klein v. Centennial Ranch and Aspen Mountain Ranch Assn. . . . 1080
Klein v. O'Brien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1110
Klein v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Klein v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Kleinman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Klemm; Rotkiske v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Klikno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
Klingelhafer; Zell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Knapp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Knick v. Scott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
Kniffey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Knight v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Knight v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Knight; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Knowles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Knox v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Knox v. Plowden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Knox v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Knuth v. Arp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Koch v. Estrella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074,1245
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Koenig; Harloff v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Kohn Law Group, Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1060
Kokal v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Kokal v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Komenda; Jingyuan Feng v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Konarski v. Tucson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Kondaveeti; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Kondrat'yev; Pensacola v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Korea's Defense Acq. Program Admin. v. BAE Systems Solution 869
Koresko v. Acosta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1119
Kornse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Kossie, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Kostich, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Kott v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Koutentis v. New York City Police Dept., Licensing Div. . . . . . . . 997
Kovachevich; Selden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1019
Kowalski; Villa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Koyle v. Sand Canyon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Kozich v. Deibert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Koziol v. DiFiore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Kramer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Kraskey v. Groschen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Krawczuk v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Kriegman; Perry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1030
Krohe v. Steinhardt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Krott v. May . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Krueger; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Kruskal v. Meltzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1187
Kruskal v. Sprunt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Kryger v. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Kulick v. Leisure Village Assn., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1143,1188,1220
Kulick v. Rein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1205
Kun v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Kuri v. Addictive Behavioral Change Health Group . . . . . . . . 1159,1259
Kuri v. Kansas Dept. of Labor, Emp. Security Bd. . . . . . . . . . . 991,1111
Kushner v. Grewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Kuwait; Kaldawi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946,1111
Kwasnik, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962
Kwok v. Mingo Energy, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Kwon v. Erie Ins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Kwon v. Hyoun Phil Won . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Kwushue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Kye-El, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Kyles v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
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L.; Children's Hospital Los Angeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
L. v. Douglas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
L. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
L. v. Gildner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
L. v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Laake v. Turning Stone Resort Casino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Laber v. Milberg LLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
LabMD, Inc. v. Tiversa, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Labor Ready Mid-Atlantic, Inc.; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Labor Ready Southwest; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Labor Union. See name of trade.
Labrador v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Lacayo v. Tanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Lacaze v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Lacey v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
LaConte v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,1111
La Cruz v. Kailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Lacy v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Lafer; Gordon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
LaFleur v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
LaFond; Watford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Laguna Beach; Porto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Laguna-Gomez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Lair v. Mangan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
LaJeunesse v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Lakeside Assisted Living by Trisun Healthcare; Fairley v. . . . . . 1083
Lakewood Ranch Gymnastics LLC; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Lamanna; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Lamar v. O'Dell, Colo. Parole Bd. Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Lamarca v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Lambert; Nutraceutical Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Lambright v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Lamone v. Benisek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063,1112
Lampert; Chapman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1218
Lampert; Yellowbear v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Lampon-Paz v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Lampon-Paz v. Offce of Personnel Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Lance v. Sellers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Landrum v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Landry; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Lane v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Lane; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Laney; Kinkel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Lang v. Bobby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
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Langford; Vandemerwe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Langley v. Premo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Langley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Language Line LLC; Van v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Language Testing Int'l; Hopkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Lanier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,1046
Lanieux v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Lanteri v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020,1081
Laoutaris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
LaPena v. Grigas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
LaPointe v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
LaPrade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Lara v. Madden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Lara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Lara-Aguilar v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Larimer County; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Larios-Villatoro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Larive v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Larose v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
La Rose; Stoutamire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Larrabee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Larry v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Larsen; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Larson v. Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
Larson; Munt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Larson v. Wallace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Laschkewitsch v. American National Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . 914,1041,1188
Laschkewitsch v. Banner Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1187
Laschkewitsch v. Legal & General America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1187
Laschkewitsch v. Lincoln Financial Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Laschkewitsch v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Distributors, Inc. . . . . . 1246
Laschkewitsch v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040,1187
Laschkewitsch v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1046
Lashbrook; Reeves v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Lashbrook; Torres-Medel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Lasher v. Bur. of Prof. Affairs, Penn. State Bd. of Pharm. . . . 1128,1259
Lasher v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1110
Lassend v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Latch's Lane Owners Assn.; Bazargani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Latimer v. Macomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Latimore v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Latney v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Laureano-Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Laurel Cty.; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
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Laurson v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Laux v. Zatecky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
LaVergne v. United States House of Rep. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
Lawrence v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Lawson v. Bell Sports USA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Lawson v. Speight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Lawson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Lazar v. Capozza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
LCP-Maui, LLC; Tucker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Le v. Aldridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Le v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1199
Leahy; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
LeBlanc; Ball v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
LeBlanc; Hanna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
LeBlanc; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
LeBlanc-Simpson v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Lebron v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1207
LeClairRyan; Chien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Lecuona v. Lecuona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Ledesma-Conchas v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Lee, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1144
Lee v. Cheatham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Lee v. Clinard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Lee; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Lee v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Lee v. Garvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Lee; Jungwirth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Lee v. Muniz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
Lee v. Peery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Lee v. Pirko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Lee; Shampine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Lee v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Lee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Leed HR, LLC v. Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Lefevre; Five Star Senior Living Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Leffebre, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1247
Legacy Community Health Services, Inc. v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Legal & General America, Inc.; Laschkewitsch v. . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1187
LeGrand; Chavez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
LeGrand; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
LeGrand; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Leibach; Rayford v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Lei Ke v. Fry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Leisure Village Assn., Inc.; Kulick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128,1143,1188,1220
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Leitner-Wise v. LWRC International, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Lei Yin v. Biogen, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Lei Yin v. Thermo Fisher Scientifc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1259
Lemeunier-Fitzgerald v. Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Lemoine v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Lemon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Lemus Alfaro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Lemus Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Lemus Cerna v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Lemus Martinez v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Lengerich; Fletcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Lenihan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Lenz v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Leon v. New York City Dept. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Leon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,860,1045
Leonard v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,947,1111,1118,1231,1245
Leonard v. George Wash. Univ. Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1244
Leone v. Maui County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Leone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Leonel Gonzalez v. Armenta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Leonor v. Frakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
LeRoux v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Lett v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Levine v. State Bar of Ga. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Levy v. Parris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Levy; YAI National Institute for People with Disabilities v. . . . . 1195
Levy; Young Adult Institute, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Lew v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Lewallyn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Lewis; Chinchilla v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Lewis v. English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Lewis; Forest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Lewis v. Hadari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Lewis v. Hedgemon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1110
Lewis; Javier Jasso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Lewis v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Lewis; Morant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Lewis v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Lewis v. Nogan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Lewis v. Pennsylvania Higher Ed. Assistance Agency . . . . . . . . . 825
Lewis; Polk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Lewis v. Quiros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Lewis; Saldivar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Lewis; Shoate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1205
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Lewis; Teamer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Lewis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,953,975,1094,1165,1192,1202
Lewis; Weeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Leyva v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Liang v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Libby v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Liberty Bell Bank; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Liberty Int'l Underwriters v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . 1060
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.; Hyland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
Liberty Tax Service; Aime v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Librace v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Librace v. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Licea v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Licea Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Licon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Liddell v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Lieba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Liebherr Min. & Constr.; MCC (Xiangtan) Heavy Indus. Equip. v. 945
Lieutenant Governor of Utah; Utah Republican Party v. . . . . . . . 1207
Life Ins. Co. of North America; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Life Technologies Corp.; Promega Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Lightbourne v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Lightbourne; Prasad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Lim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Limon-Urenda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Lincoln Financial Group; Laschkewitsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Lincoln Life & Annuity Distributors, Inc.; Laschkewitsch v. . . . . 1246
Lindamood; Small v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Lindamood; Vizcaino-Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Linden v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1259
Linder v. Haviland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Lindsay; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Lindsey; Cobas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Lindsey; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Linh Thi Mihn Tran v. Pham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Linh Thi Minh Tran v. Happy Valley Municipal Ct. . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Linh Thi Minh Tran v. Pham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Link; Oliver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Lipscomb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Lipsey v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Second Appellate Dist. . . . . . . 1198
Lister v. McGinley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Litteral; Milliner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Little v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
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Littlejohn v. Royal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Little Richie Bus Service, Inc.; Cheeseboro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Little Rock; Duhe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Littles v. Roundtree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Liu v. Janssen Research & Development, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Liu v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Liu v. University of Miami School of Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887,1123
Living Essentials, LLC; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1046
Livnat v. Palestinian Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
Livnat v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority . . . . . . 952
Lizarraga; Borhan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Lizarraga; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Lizarraga; Hurd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,1205
Lizarraga; Provencio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Lizarraga-Leyva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Llerenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Llompart Zeno; Pabon Ortega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069,1187
Llorens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Lloyd v. Moats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Lloyd v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Lobo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121,1246
Local. For labor union, see name of trade.
Locke v. Paramo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Locke v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Lockett; Waters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Lockhart v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Lockhart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Lockheed Martin Corp.; Starrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Lodge. For labor union, see name of trade.
Lofgren v. Hardin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Lofton v. SP Plus Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019
Lohmeier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Lollar; Cummins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Lomax v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026,1121
Lomax v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Lombard v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Long v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Long v. Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Long v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918,976,1109
Long Dong v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Longoria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842,899
Looman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Loor v. Bailey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Loos; BNSF R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310,809
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Lopez, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Lopez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1086
Lopez v. Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Lopez v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Lopez v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Lopez v. Noble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Lopez; Sharnese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,897,1089,1161
Lopez-Castillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Lopez Chavez v. Martinez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Lopez-Cotto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Lopez-Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Lopez-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Lopez Lara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Lopez-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Lopez-Mendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Lopez Moreno; Zank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Lopez-Pacheco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Lopez-Vaal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Loren v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1123
Lorenzen; Taggart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Lorenzo v. SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959
Los Angeles; Ferguson-Cassidy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,1030
Los Angeles v. Mendez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Los Angeles; Richards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Los Angeles; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
Los Angeles Cty. Dept. of Public Social Servs.; Williams v. . . . 882,1031
Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC; AmeriCulture, Inc. v. . . . . . . 1034
Lothian Cassidy v. Lothian Explor. & Dev. II, L. P. (LEAD II) 919
Lothian Explor. & Dev. II, L. P. (LEAD II); Lothian Cassidy v. 919
Lott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Lott v. Warren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Loudoun County Public Schools; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Lough v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Loughner v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Louisiana; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Louisiana; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Louisiana; GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062
Louisiana; Grigsby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Louisiana; Jordan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Louisiana; Kirsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Louisiana; Lacaze v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Louisiana; Lanieux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Louisiana; Meaux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
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Louisiana; Owens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Louisiana; Prince v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Louisiana; Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Louisiana; Robertson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Louisiana; Vail v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Louisiana; Van Nortrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Louisiana; Walcott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections; Kennedy v. . . . 1199
Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Love v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Lovelace Medical Center; Vallejos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Lovin v. Allbaugh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Lowe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Lowe v. Raemisch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
Lowe v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088,1188
Lowe v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Lowe v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Lowe v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Lower Southampton; Sauers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Loytsker; Marranca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819,1029
Lozano v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Lozano v. Superior Court of Mass., Suffolk Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Lubetkin; Wong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Lucero v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Lucero v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Lucero v. Holland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Lucero v. Turco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Lucio-Rayos v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Luck; Klayman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Lucy Activewear Inc.; Munro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Ludovici v. Marsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Lugo v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1187
Lugo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Lugo-Santiago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Luh v. Fulton State Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
Luis Arevalo, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813,1061
Luis Buenrostro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Luis Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Luis Pineda v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Luma v. Florida Dept. of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States . . . . . . 815
Luna-Barragan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Luna Valdez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Luo v. Owen J. Roberts School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
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Page
Lupian-Barajas v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Lusnak; Bank of America, N. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Luster v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Luther; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
LWRC International, LLC; Leitner-Wise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Lykins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Lyles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Lynch v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Lynch v. Hall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Lynch v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Lynchburg Dept. of Social Services; Moreland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
Lyndon v. SEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Lyon v. Canadian National R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822,943,1070
M.; Jennifer A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
M. v. Matayoshi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
M.; T. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Mabry v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
MacDonald v. Singer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Mack v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Mackenzie v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Mackey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Mackie; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
MacLaren; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
MacMillan-Piper, Inc. v. Washington State Emp. Security Dept. 1037
Macomber; Latimer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
MacPherson v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Madadi; Masomi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1245
Madden; Guzman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Madden; Jensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Madden; Ortega Lara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Madden; Prestegui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Maddie; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Maddox; Sandpoint v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Madigan; Parmar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Madison v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Madrid v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Madrigal v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Magana v. Credio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Magnifcent-El v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Magno Zamora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Mahally; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Mahally; Soldridge v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Mahan; Rinaldo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1110
Mahdi v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
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Maine; LeBlanc-Simpson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Maine Dept. of Health and Human Services; Father v. . . . . . . . . 807,964
Maine Dept. of Health and Human Services; Jason K. v. . . . . . . 807,963
Main Industries, Inc.; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1259
Mandelbaum, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1142
Mansfeld; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1033
Maine; Lemeunier-Fitzgerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Maizes; Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Majalca-Aguilar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Majid v. Noble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Majors v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Makah Indian Tribe v. Quileute Indian Tribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Makdessi v. Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894,1031
Makell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Makonnen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Makower Abatte Guerra Wegner Vollmer, PLLC; Pletos v. . . . . . 1035
Maldonado v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Maldonado-Zelaya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Mallory v. Simon & Schuster, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Malnes v. Flagstaff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1071
Malone, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Malone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Maloy v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1046
Malvo; Mathena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Mamakos v. Huntington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Mamou v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Mandel; Mastrogiovanni Schorsch & Mersky, P. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Mandel v. Thrasher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Mandrell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Mangan; Lair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Mangan; Montanans for Community Development v. . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Mangual-Rosado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942
Manley v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Manlove v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Mann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Manners v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Manning v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Mansfeld v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Mansukhani; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
ManTech International Corp.; United States ex rel. Cody v. . . . . . 1208
Mantepan v. Derose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Manzo-Rios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Maplewood v. Webb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
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Page
Mapuatuli v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Marcin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963,1142
Marshack; Yan Sui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,822
Martin; Mayfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Marberry v. State Bar of Cal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Marcoski v. Rath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Mares v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Margheim, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Maricopa Cty.; Aubuchon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Maricopa Cty. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Marietta; Binns v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Marin v. Bank of N. Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Marino v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Marino v. Rickard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Mark v. Rabeau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Markham v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Markiewicz-Qualkinbush; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Markle Interests, L. L. C. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv. 1031
Marks; Crunch San Diego, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205
Marquard v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Marquardt v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Marquardt v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Marquette County Road Comm'n v. EPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Marquette Transportation Co., L. L. C. v. Entergy Miss., Inc. . . . 1127
Marquez v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Marquez v. Filson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Marquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056,1128
Marquis v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Marranca v. Loytsker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819,1029
Marro v. Caesar's Entertainment Operating Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Marro v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System . . . . . . . 968
Marsh; Ludovici v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Marsh; McNeil v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Marshall v. Ash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Marshall v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Marshall v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1088,1151,1240
Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors; Kerr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Marshal, Supreme Court of the United States; Bent v. . . . . . . . . . 1224
Martin; Behr Dayton Thermal Products LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Martin v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Martin v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Martin v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Martin v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Martin v. Living Essentials, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1046
cxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Martin v. McLaughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Martin v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1079
Martin v. Terry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Martin v. Trierweiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1110
Martin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,842,890,1070,1120,1164,1255
Martin v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1046
Martin v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Martin; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Martinez; Lopez Chavez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Martinez v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Martinez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Martinez v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Martinez-Barrientos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
Martinez-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Martinez-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Martinez-Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Martinez Perez v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Martinez-Rey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Martins Beach 1, LLC v. Surfrider Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Maryland; Daley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Maryland; Grandison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Maryland; Grimm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Maryland; Moody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Maryland; Mua v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Maryland; Pena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Maryland; Prailow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Maryland; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Maryland; Ross v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Maryland; Stevenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Maryland; Tate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991,1187
Maryland; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Maryland; Torkornoo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Maryland; Traverso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Maryland; Weese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Maryland Attorney Grievance Comm'n; Chanthunya v. . . . . . . 964,1052
Maryland Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Servs.; McCoy v. 881
Maryland Ins. Administration; Coomes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Maryland-Nat. Capital Park v. American Humanist Assn. . . . . 985,1125
Mascarena v. Montana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Masomi v. Madadi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127,1245
Mason v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Mason v. Lindsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Mason v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
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Mason v. Polster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1187
Massachusetts; Ardaneh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Massachusetts; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Massachusetts; Buth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Massachusetts; Cassidy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Massachusetts; Cruz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Massachusetts; Dabney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Massachusetts; Garden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Massachusetts; Indiana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Massachusetts; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Massachusetts; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Massachusetts; Rodwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1088
Massachusetts; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co.; Austin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Massachusetts Dept. of Correction; Poirier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1022
Massey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Mastercard Int'l. Inc.; Stambler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Masters; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Masters v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
Mastrogiovanni Schorsch & Mersky, P. C. v. Mandel . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Mata v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Matayoshi; J. M. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Match.com, LLC; Beckman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Matelyan v. Atlantic Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1111
Matelyan v. CD Baby Distribution Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Matelyan v. Fox 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Mathena v. Malvo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Mathis v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Mathis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1170
Mathurin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1029
Matthew v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Matthews v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Matthews; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Mattiaccio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Mattis v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Mattis; Hobson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1110,1248
Maturino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033,1144
Maui County; Leone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Maxberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Maxi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Maxwell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Maxwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,1257
Maxwell & Morgan, P. C. v. McNair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
cxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
May v. Continental Towers Condominiums Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
May; Krott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Mayberg; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Mayberry v. Dittman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Maye; Staples v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017
Mayer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Mayes v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Mayes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Mayfeld v. Harvey County Sheriff's Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Mayfeld v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Mayhew v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Mayle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Mayo v. Oppman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Mays; Carruthers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Mays; Conrad v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Mays; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Mays; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Mays v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191
Mays v. Zagorski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
Mays; Zagorski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
MAZ Partners, LP; Shear v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
McAlister v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
McBride v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
McBride v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
McCabe v. Aranda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
McCain; Charles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
McCain; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
McCall v. Aptim Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062
McCall; Gorbey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
McCall v. Morant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
McCarns v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
McCarthy & Holthus LLP; Obduskey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496,1033
McClary v. Commodores Entertainment Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
McClinton v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
McClinton; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
McCloud v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
McClure v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision . . . 866
McClure v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
McCollum; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1030
McCormick v. Browne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
McCoy v. Maryland Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Servs. 881
McCoy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
McCranie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
McCrary, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
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McCray v. Burt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
McCready; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
McCree, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
McCullars v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
McCurtis v. Burke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
MCC (Xiangtan) Heavy Indus. Equip. v. Liebherr Min. Equip. . . . 945
McDaniel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
McDermott; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
McDonald, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
McDonald v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
McDonald v. Wichita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
McDonough v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
McDowell; Fahie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
McDowell; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
McDowell; Pinder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
McDuffy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
McElroy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
McFarlin v. Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,1110
McGee v. Bondi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
McGee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,968
McGhee v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1053
McGhee v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
McGill-Johnston; Green v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
McGinley; Berry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
McGinley; Concepcion v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
McGinley; Grimsley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1202
McGinley; Lister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
McGinley v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
McGinley; Renchenski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
McGlocklin v. Blankenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
McGowan v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
McGuire v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
McGuirk v. Airbnb, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
McGuirk v. Swiss Re Financial Services Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
McIntosh v. Turner's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
McIntosh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096,1119
McKay v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
McKay; Steshenko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1245
McKee v. Cosby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
McKeesport Police Dept.; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
McKeever; Philip Morris USA Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
McKinney; Middletown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
McKinney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
McKinzy v. Gaston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
cxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
McKinzy v. Gaston McKinzy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
McKissick v. Deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1083
McKnight v. Bishop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
McLain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1031
McLamb v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
McLaren Northern Mich. Hospital; Elmhirst v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
McLaughlin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
McLaughlin; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
McLaughlin; Nolley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
McLaughlin v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Services . . . . . . . . . . 887
McLaughlin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
McLaughlin; Warner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
McLaurin v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
McLean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1249
McMahan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
McMahon v. Neven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
McMahon; Vargas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
McMahon; Vargas Romero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
McManis Faulkner, LLP; Shao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1134,1194
McMillan v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
McNair; Maxwell & Morgan, P. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
McNamara v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
McNeil, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
McNeil v. Grim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
McNeil v. Marsh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
McNeill v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
McNemar v. Terry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
McQuarry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
McQueen v. Fisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Meador v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Mearing v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Mears v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Meaux v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
M. E. D. v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040
Medeiros; Bebo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Medeiros; Montalvo Borgos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Medina v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,991,997
Medina-Avalos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Medina Del Rosario v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
Medina Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Medina Ortiz v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Medina Osorio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Medina-Reyes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
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Medvedev v. Henrico Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Meeks v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Meeks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Mehmeti v. Jofaz Transportation, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Mehmood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Mehta v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1110
Mejia v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1170
Mejia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Mekowulu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Melgar-Cabrera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Melot v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Melrose Park; Cannici v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Melton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,867
Meltzer; Kruskal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1187
Melvin v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Melvin v. O'Rourke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Membreno-Arevalo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Menard; Sands v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Mendez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Mendez; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Mendez; Los Angeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Mendez v. Swarthout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Mendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Mendoza v. Whitfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Menendez v. Garber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
Menlo Park; Podaras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Menocal; GEO Group, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Mercedes-Benz of Houston Greenway v. Zastrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Mercedes-Rijo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Meredith v. O'Rourke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Merit Systems Protection Bd.; Carlos Ocasio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Merlak; Isbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Merrick v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Merrick v. Attorney General of Ariz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Merrick v. Brnovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Merrick v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.; Schafer v. . . . . . . . . 870
Merritt v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Merriweather v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Merryman v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Merus N. V.; Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Mesa; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
cxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Metayer v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Metcalf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 980
Metropolitan Dev. & Housing; Nashville Downtown Platinum v. 824
Metropolitan Interpreters & Translators Inc. v. Bates . . . . . . . . . 1148
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.; Conner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833,1046
Metzgar v. KBR, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Mexichem Fluor, Inc.; Honeywell International Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 918
Mexichem Fluor, Inc.; Natural Resources Defense Council v. . . . . 918
Mezzles v. Katavich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Miami v. Smart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135
Miami Fire Fighters' & Police Offcers' Ret. Tr.; Quality Systems v. 1031
Michael, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Michaels v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Michaud v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Michel v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Micheo-Acevedo v. Stericycle of P. R., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Michigan; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Michigan; Armstrong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Michigan; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1218
Michigan; Beam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Michigan; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Michigan; Bussing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Michigan; Casanova v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Michigan; Crossett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Michigan; Curtis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Michigan; Drane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Michigan; Ervin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Michigan; Heximer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Michigan; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Michigan; Jacobs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Michigan v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Michigan; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Michigan; Kissner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1024
Michigan; McGhee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Michigan; Naseman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Michigan; Powell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Michigan; Tubbs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Michigan; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Michigan; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Michigan; Zemke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Michigan Children's Institute; Partin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Michigan Dept. of Corrections; Annabel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Michigan Dept. of Health and Human Services; Donaldson v. . . . . 1159
Michigan Dept. of Health and Human Services; Harnden v. . . . . . 829
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Michigan State Treasurer; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Microsoft Corp.; Baker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Midamines SPRL Ltd. v. KBC Bank N. V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Middleton v. Pash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Middleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Middletown v. McKinney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Midland Credit Mgmt.; Huebner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Milam v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Milberg LLP; Laber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Miles; Canada v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Milestone Management; Dingler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Miller; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Miller; Beckham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Miller; Duhamel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Miller v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Miller v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Miller v. Kashani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1187
Miller v. MacLaren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Miller v. Mays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Miller v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Miller v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048
Miller; Rodgers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1187
Miller; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Miller v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Miller v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,949,1185
Miller v. Wetzel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Miller-Degase; Satterlee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Milliner v. Litteral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Millis v. Kallis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Mills v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Mills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Miltier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc.; Grussgott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Mims v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Mincey v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Miner v. Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n 998
Mineworkers' Pension Scheme; First Solar, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Mingo Energy, LLC; Kwok v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Min Gu v. FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Min Ho Kwon v. Hyoun Phil Won . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Minh Tran v. Happy Valley Municipal Ct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Minh Tran v. Pham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1039
Min Kwon v. Erie Ins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Minnesota v. Chute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
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Minnesota; Edstrom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Minnesota; Flowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Minnesota; Grazzini-Rucki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Minnesota; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Minnesota; Markham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Minnesota; Pederson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Minnesota; Schnagl v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Minnesota; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Minnesota Living Assistance, Inc. v. Peterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Minor; Barrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Minor v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Minor; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Mira v. Kingston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Miranda Luna v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Miranda-Mondragon v. Nautilus Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Old Cold LLC . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1125
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC . . . . . . . . 960,1125
Mississippi; Ambrose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Mississippi; Booze v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Mississippi; Chandler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Mississippi; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Mississippi; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Mississippi; Flowers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
Mississippi; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Mississippi; Ishee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Mississippi; Lett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Mississippi; Minor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Mississippi; Mixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Mississippi; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Mississippi; Randle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Mississippi; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Mississippi; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Mississippi; Tarvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Mississippi; Wren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Mississippi Dept. of Employment Security; Alston v. . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Missouri; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Missouri v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Missouri; Collings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Missouri v. Douglass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Missouri; Fisher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,1017
Missouri; Larose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Missouri; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Missouri; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxix
Page
Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Missouri State Conf., NAACP; Ferguson Florissant School Dist. v. 1074
Mitchell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Mitchell v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1186
Mitchell; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Mitchell; Leed HR, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Mitchell v. Mahally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Mitchell v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1205
Mitchell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,968,1121
Mitchell v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Mitrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Mitrovic v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Mixon v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Mixon v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
MMA Consultants 1, Inc. v. Republic of Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Mnuchin; State National Bank of Big Spring v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Moats; Lloyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Mock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Moesch v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Moffett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Mohamed v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Molette v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
Molina v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,976
Molinar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Molina-Varela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
Monie v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Monroe Cty.; Tedesco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084,1218
Monsegue v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Mont v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
Montalvo Borgos v. Medeiros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Montana; Devlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Montana; Mascarena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Montana v. Tipton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Montanans for Community Development v. Mangan . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Montanez-Quinones v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Montazer v. Montazer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Monte v. Kessling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Monteiro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Montero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Montgomery; Andrews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Montgomery; Crew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Montgomery; Fidel Flores v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Montgomery; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
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Montgomery; Rice v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Montgomery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973,1193
Montgomery Cty. Offce of Child Support Enf.; Fikrou v. . . . . . . . 1084
Montgomery Cty. Offce of Child Support Enf.; Rhoe v. . . . . . . . . 1149
Montgomery Regional Airport Authority; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Montoya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Montoya v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Moody v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Moody v. NFL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036,1187
Moore v. Bramwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Moore v. Brewer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Moore v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Moore v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862,949
Moore; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
Moore v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Moore v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Moore v. Stephan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Moore v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Moore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Moorer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Mora v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Mora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Moragne-El v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Morales v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Morales; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Morales v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888,1142,1198
Morales-Velez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Moran; Ivy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Moran; Quiroz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Morant v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Morant; McCall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Morel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Moreland v. Lynchburg Dept. of Social Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
Morello v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Moreno v. Butler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Moreno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Moreno; Zank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Moreno-Alvarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Moreno Molina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Moreno Ramos v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
Moreno Ramos v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
Morgan; Fairfeld County, Ohio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Morgan v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Morillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
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Morrill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Morris v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Morris v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Morris v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Morris v. Mays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Morris v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Morris v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Morris v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1201,1202
Morris & Associates, Inc. v. John Bean Technologies Corp. . . . . . 1071
Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholder v. Freedom From Religion 1213
Morrison v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1187
Morrison v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Morrison v. Quest Diagnostics Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1029
Morrobel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Morrow v. Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Morsy E. v. Commissioner, Conn. Dept. of Children & Families 818
Morton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Morton v. Haynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1111
Morton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Mosby; Nero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Mosby v. Parilla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Moses v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Mosley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892,929
Moss v. Pollard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Moss v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Motherless, Inc.; Ventura Content, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Mouton v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Move, Inc.; Real Estate Alliance Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987,1066
Mowery v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Moya v. Garcia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
M. P. F. v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Mr. P. v. West Hartford Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
M2 Technology, Inc.; King Law Group, PLLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Mua v. California Cas. Indem. Exch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Mua v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Muckle v. Wells Fargo Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Mujahid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Mulcahy v. Aspen Pitkin County Housing Authority . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Mulder v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Mulenga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Mulet v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Mulhern v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Mullkoff; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
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Multnomah County v. Updike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Mundle v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Muniz; Geray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849,1258
Muniz; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
Muniz; Solorio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Munro v. Lucy Activewear Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Munro; University of Southern Cal. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Munt v. Larson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Munt v. Schnell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
Murillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Murphy; Carpenter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,959,1046
Murphy; Clopton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1046
Murphy v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022,1193
Murphy; Rosetto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Murphy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,968
Murra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Murray v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,968
Murray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Musa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Muse; Duran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Musgrove v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Muskingum Watershed Dist.; United States ex rel. Harper v. . . . 1070
MWV Healthcare Assn., Inc.; DuBois v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Myers v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Myers v. Osborne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Myhre v. Seventh-Day Adventist Church Reform Movement . . . . 861
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. UCB, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Myoungchul Shin v. Uni-Caps, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Myrick; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Myrthil v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
My Tong v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1123
My Van Tran v. Sheldon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Myzer v. Bush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Nagravision SA; Gotech International Technology Ltd. v. . . . . . . 997
Nagy; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Nairn v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Nakhleh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Nally; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Nam Chuong Huynh; Aker Biomarine Antarctic AS v. . . . . . . . . . 815
Nance v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124
Nanda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
NantKwest, Inc.; Iancu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Naphaeng v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Nappier; Busch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
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Naseman v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Nash v. Bishop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Nash v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Nash v. Wachovia Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Nash Mfg., Inc.; ZUP, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Nashville Downtown Platinum v. Metropolitan Dev. & Housing 824
Nassar v. Nassar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
National Bd. of Medical Examiners; Katz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
National Credit Union Administration Bd.; Zovko v. . . . . . . . . . . 873
National Football League; Moody v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036,1187
National Gallery, London; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
NHL; Boogaard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
NLRB; Craft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
NLRB; Creative Vision Resources, L. L. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
NLRB; In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
National Loan Acquisitions Co.; Weinacker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
National Mining Assn. v. Zinke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC; Beck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC; Biszczanik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Nationwide Biweekly Administration v. BMO Harris Bank . . . . . 1195
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. . . . . 918
Nautilus Ins. Co.; Miranda-Mondragon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Navy Federal Credit Union; Farrish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Naylor v. Harrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Nayshtut v. Comercializadora Travel Advisory, S. A. de C. V. 1020,1079
NCL (Bahamas), Ltd.; LeRoux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.; Pizzino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
NCTA–The Internet and Television Assn. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Ndaula v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Ndoh; Alejandro Radillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Neal v. Baer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Neal v. Wayne County Treasurer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Neall; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Neba v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Nebinger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Nebraska; Buttercase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1030
Nebraska; Clayborne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Nebraska; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Nebraska; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Nebraska; Thieszen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Negatu v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Negron-Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Neidermeyer v. Caldwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
N. E. L. v. Douglas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
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N. E. L. v. Gildner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Nelson v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1217
Nelson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,867
Nelson v. Norwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Nepal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Nero v. Mosby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Nesselrode v. DeVos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Netfix; Whitehead v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Netfix, Inc.; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Nettles v. Horton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Network of Neighbors, Inc.; Pendergraft v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Netzer v. Shell Oil Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073,1187
Neuman v. Nooth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Neuman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
Nevada; Coddington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Nevada; Crain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Nevada; Jeremias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Nevada; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Nevada; Mixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Nevada; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Nevada; Mulder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Nevada; Qazi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Nevada; Quintero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Nevada; Shue v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Nevada System of Higher Ed.; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Neven; Joshlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Neven; McMahon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Newberg v. Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Newell; Abouelmagd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
New Hampshire; Haffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1205
New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections; Hokenstrom v. . . . . . . . . . 1250
New Jersey; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
New Jersey; Beachum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
New Jersey; Beyah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
New Jersey; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
New Jersey; Higgs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
New Jersey; Hinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
New Jersey; J. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
New Jersey; Jenewicz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
New Jersey; Keenan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
New Jersey; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
New Jersey; M. E. D. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040
New Jersey; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
New Jersey; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
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New Jersey; Weiss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
New Jersey; Wilcox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
New Jersey Dept. of Corrections; Liddell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection; Yadav v. . . . 1076,1245
New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority; Kearny v. . . . . . . . 823
Newman; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
New Mexico; Costelon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1046
New Mexico; Gardner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
New Mexico; Texas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
New Mexico; Tu My Tong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1123
Newmiller v. Raemisch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
New Products Corp. v. Dickinson Wright, PLLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
New Products Corp. v. Tibble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Newton v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Newton; Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . 1112
New West, L. P. v. Joliet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
New World International, Inc. v. Ford Global Technologies . . . . . 877
New York; Arjune v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
New York; Bacquie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
New York; Brady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
New York; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
New York; Department of Commerce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140,1188,1219
New York; Everson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
New York; Felix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
New York; Garvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
New York; Heath v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
New York; Jaramillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835,1109
New York; Maloy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844,1046
New York; McLaurin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
New York; Pruitt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
New York; Wagoner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
New York; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
New York; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
New York City; Joaquin Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
New York City; Loren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029,1123
New York City; New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. . . . . 1126
New York City; Yan Ping Xu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
New York City; Ziming Shen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
New York City Admin. for Children's Services; Rasko v. . . . . . . . 1075
New York City Dept. of Ed.; Celli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
New York City Dept. of Ed.; Leon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
New York City Dept. of Finance; Jeanty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,996
New York City Emp. Ret. System; Community Health Systems v. 815
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New York City Human Resources Admin.; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . 822
New York City Police Dept., Licensing Div.; Koutentis v. . . . . . . 997
New York City Transit Auth., Adjudication Bur.; Campbell v. 837,1046
New York Comm'r of Labor; Campise v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1051
New York Methodist Hospital; Penn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
New York State Dept. of Environmental Conservation; Kelleher v. 1115
New York State Rife & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. New York City . . . . 1126
New York State Teachers' Ret. Sys.; Marro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
New York Tax Appeals Tribunal; Jacobi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Nguyen v. Nielsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1220
Niang v. Tomblinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Electronics Co., Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Nichol v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Nicholas S.; Aldona B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Nichols v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Nichols v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
Nicholson; Berry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Nicholson; Weaver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Nicolaison v. Hennepin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Nielsen; Gebhardt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Nielsen; Huffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
Nielsen; Nguyen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1220
Nielsen v. Preap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
Nielson; Pineda Alarcon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Nielson; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Nieves v. Bartlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915,959
Nieves-Galarza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Nike, Inc.; Rentmeester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Nimoityn; Goldberg's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Nina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Nino-Flores v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Nix v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
N. K. v. Abbott Laboratories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
N. L.; Children's Hospital Los Angeles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Noble; Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Noble; Majid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Noble; Oberacker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Noble; Taulbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Noble Energy, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Noel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Nogan; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Nolan v. Department of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Nolley v. McLaughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Nomax, Inc.; St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
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Nooth; Neuman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Nora v. Wisconsin Offce of Lawyer Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1187
Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Parsons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Norman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Norman; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
North Carolina; Allbrooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
North Carolina; Bethea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
North Carolina; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
North Carolina; Brunson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
North Carolina; Bullock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
North Carolina; Mathis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
North Carolina; McNeill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
North Carolina; Philips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
North Carolina; Ragland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
North Carolina; Reid El Bey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
North Carolina; Saldierna v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
North Carolina; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
North Carolina; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1218
North Carolina; Surratt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
North Carolina; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
North Carolina Dept. of HHS; Freeman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875,1030
North Dakota; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
North Dakota; Gunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
North Dakota; Holkesvig v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1029
North Dakota; Hunter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
North Dakota; Yahnke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Northern Cal. Water Assn. v. California State Water Resources 945
Northern Mich. Emergency Medicine Center; Elmhirst v. . . . . . . 919
Northern Trust Co.; Teufel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
North Miami; Israel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Norton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Nortrick v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Norwegian Cruise Line; Pizzino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Norwood; Nelson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Norwood v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,1237
Nowlin v. Shannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Noziska v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
NRG Solar Alpine LLC; Vilutis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
NuCar Connection, Inc.; Howell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084,1210
Nu Image, Inc. v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emp. 1145
Nunn v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Nunn v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Nutley; Chieftain Royalty Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
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Nutzman; Weddle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
NWI–1, Inc.; Tippins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Nwoke v. Consulate of Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Nyabwa v. Corrections Corp. of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Oatman v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Obama; Chon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496,1033
Obeginski v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Obenland; Contreras-Rebollar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Obenland; Hacheney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Oberacker v. Noble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
O'Brian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
O'Brien; Klein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1110
O'Brien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905,1043
Ocasio v. Merit Systems Protection Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Ocasio; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Occhicone v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Ocean v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Ochoa-Lara; Kansas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
O'Connor; Romain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC; Farkas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC; Vicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
O'Dell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
O'Dell, Colo. Parole Bd. Member; Lamar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Oden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Odermatt v. Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Odom; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
Odom v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Odom v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1201
Odums v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Oduok v. Carnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
O'Fallon; Passmore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Offce of Administrative Hearings; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Offce of Attorney General of Nev.; Ferm v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Offce of Attorney General of N. C.; Kirby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Offce of Chief Discip. Counsel, Supreme Ct. of Mo.; Zahnd v. . . . 877
Offce of Children, Youth and Families; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Offce of Comm'r of the Revenue of Stafford Cty.; Wilson v. . . . . . 1148
Offce of Personnel Management; Lampon-Paz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Offce of President; Day v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
O'Hara; Sankara v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Ohio; Beasley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Ohio; Blalock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxxxix
Page
Ohio; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Ohio; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Ohio; Clinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Ohio; Cobia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Ohio; Hammond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Ohio; Herrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Ohio; Jackson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1230
Ohio; Landrum v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Ohio; Lynch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Ohio; Madrigal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Ohio; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Ohio; McGuire v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Ohio; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Ohio; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Ohio; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Ohio; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Ohio; Rinehart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Ohio; Springer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Ohio; Terrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Ohio; Wesson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Ohio; Wilks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Ohio; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Ohio; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Services; McLaughlin v. . . . . . . . . . . 887
Ohio Dept. of Medicaid; Carpenter-Barker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Ohlendorf v. United Food & Commercial Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Okafor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1110
Okam v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
O'Keefe v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Oklahoma; Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Oklahoma; Dennis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1110
Oklahoma; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Oklahoma; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Oklahoma; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Oklahoma; Manning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Oklahoma; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1079
Oklahoma; Ray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Oklahoma; Tryon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Oklahoma; Walters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Oklahoma; Wood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Okoh v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Old Cold LLC; Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 960,1125
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative v. FERC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Oldham; Sappington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956
cxl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Oldham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Oleksy v. General Electric Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Oleseha; Berhe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Olic v. Spearman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
Olivar v. Public Service Emp. Credit Union Long Term Disab. Plan 818
Olivares-Cepeda v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
Oliveira; New Prime Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Oliver v. Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Oliver v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
Olivo Ramirez v. Hooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Olsen; Ackels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Olsen; Kendall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Olvera-Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Olympic Stewardship Found. v. Washington Env'l Hearings Offce 817
Omari v. Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone Authority . . . . . . . . . 1145
Omidi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Onduso v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
O'Neal v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1046
O'Neal; Rollyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
O'Neil v. Warden, Federal Correctional Complex Coleman . . . . . . 1153
1992 Family Trust N. C. Dept. of Rev. v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1112
Opengeym v. Heartland Employment Services, LLC . . . . . 811,999,1187
Oppman; Mayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
OptumInsight, Inc.; Cave Consulting Group, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Oracle USA, Inc.; Rimini Street, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334,1062
Orange v. Gordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Ordos City Hawtai Autobody Co.; Absolute Rigging v. . . . . . . . . 815
Ordos City Hawtai Autobody Co.; Dimond Rigging Co. v. . . . . . . 815
Oregon; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Oregon; Easley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Oregon; Emineth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Oregon; Walsh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; Haynes v. . . . 1170
Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; McClure v. . . 866
Oregon Comm'n on Judicial Fitness and Disability; Day v. . . . . . . 937
Oregon Dept. of Corrections; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Oregon Dept. of Human Services; J. E. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Oriakhi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Orlando Health, Inc.; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Ormond; Romo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Ornstein v. Bank of America, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
O'Rourke; Melvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
O'Rourke; Meredith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxli
Orr v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ortega v. Bondi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ortega v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
1202
1119
1083
Ortega v. Llompart Zeno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069,1187
Ortega Lara v. Madden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Ortega-Morales v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Orth v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Ortiz v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Ortiz-Fagot v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Ortiz-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Ortiz-Uresti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Osage Minerals Council; Osage Wind, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Osage Wind, LLC v. Osage Minerals Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Osborne; Myers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
O'Shaughnessy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Oskoui v. Acosta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Osorio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Otworth v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Outlaw; Grose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Overly; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Overmyer; Kessler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Overmyer; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Overton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Overton v. Tennessee Dept. of Children's Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Owen v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Owen J. Roberts School Dist.; Jenn-Ching Luo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Owens v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Owens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120,1256
Oxner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Ozark Materials River Rock, LLC v. Benham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Ozier v. Harry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
P. v. West Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Pablo Arreola v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Pabon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Pabon Ortega v. Llompart Zeno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069,1187
Pace v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Pace v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191
Pacetta, LLC v. Ponce Inlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Pacha; Viggers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Pacheco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Pacheco Estudillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
Packard v. Goodrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Padilla v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Padilla v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
cxlii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Padilla-Ramirez v. Culley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Pagan-Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Paige v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Paixao v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Paiz Guevara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Palacios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Paladin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Palestinian Authority; Livnat v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority; Livnat v. . . . . . . 952
Palmer; Elliott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Palmer; Ingebretsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Palmer; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Palmer v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals Technology Risk Offce . . 1251
Palmer; Newberg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Palmer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Palmer; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Palomino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Palomo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Panasonic Corp.; Burnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Paniagua-Paniagua v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Pannullo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Papierfabrik August Koehler SE v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Papik; Clay v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Paracha v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Paramo; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Paramo; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Paramo; Locke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Paramo; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Paramo; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Parball Corp.; Starks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Pardue; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Parilla; Mosby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Parish. See name of parish.
Parker v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Parker v. Iancu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Parker; Latney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Parker; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048
Parker v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Parker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Parker; Zagorski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton . . . . . . . . 1112
Parker-Migliorini Int'l, LLC; United States ex rel. Barrick v. . . . 817
Parma; Bagi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Parmar v. Madigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxliii
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Parnell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Parrales-Guzman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Parra-Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Parris; Fishback v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Parris; Flinn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Parris; Levy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Parrish v. Board of Professional Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Parrish v. Wainwright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Parsi; Assadian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,1029
Parsons; Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Partin v. Michigan Children's Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Partman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Partnership for Children's Rights; Pastor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1123
Parum v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Pash; Helton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Pash; Middleton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Passmore v. O'Fallon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Pastides; Abbott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Pastor v. Partnership for Children's Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1123
Pastrana; Blankenship v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Pastrana; Delancy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Pate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Patel v. Patel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Patel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Patino v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Patmon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Patrick; France v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824,1017
Patterson v. Asuncion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Patterson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Patterson v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Patterson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Patterson; Shelton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Patterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,905
Patterson v. Walgreen Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Patton v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Paul v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Pavan v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Pavon v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Payne, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Payne; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Payne; Christian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Payne v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Payne v. Publishers Clearing House, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Payne v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
cxliv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
PBL Multi-Strategy Fund, L. P.; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
PDR Network v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic . . . . . . . . 996,1125,1207
Peaje Investments v. Financial Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P. R. 1145
Pebley v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
PECO Energy Co.; Zapata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Pederson v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Pederson v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Pedraza v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Peebles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Peede v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Peel v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Peery; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Peffer v. Stephens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Pellegrini v. Fresno County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1205
Pello v. Zatecky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Pellum v. Fisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Pelto v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Pemberton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Pembrook v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Pena; Amor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Pena v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Pence v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Pender v. Bank of America Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Pendergraft v. Network of Neighbors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Pendleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Penn v. New York Methodist Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Pennington v. Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Pennington v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Pennington-Thurman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1033
Pennsylvania; Abdul-Salaam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Pennsylvania; Alleyne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Pennsylvania; Bolden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Pennsylvania; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Pennsylvania; Edwards v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Pennsylvania; Frank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Pennsylvania; Fraticelli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Pennsylvania; Heagy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1134
Pennsylvania; Jacoby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Pennsylvania v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Pennsylvania; McGinley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Pennsylvania; McGowan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Pennsylvania; Molina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Pennsylvania; Moragne-El v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Pennsylvania; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlv
Page
Pennsylvania; Mulhern v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Pennsylvania; Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Pennsylvania; Rivas-Rivera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1046
Pennsylvania; Rivera-Quinones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Pennsylvania; Sadik v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Pennsylvania; Sanutti-Spencer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Pennsylvania; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Pennsylvania; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Pennsylvania; Sperber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Pennsylvania; Uschock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Pennsylvania; Wesling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Pennsylvania; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Pennsylvania; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Pennsylvania; Yong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation; Diveglia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Pennsylvania Higher Ed. Assistance v. Silver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Pennsylvania Higher Ed. Assistance Agency; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . 825
Pensacola v. Kondrat'yev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Pensco Trust Co.; Delferro v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Pentwater; Bates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823,1029
Penunuri v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
PEO; Zapata v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Pepper; Apple Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Peragine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Perez v. Attorney General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Perez v. BP, P. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Perez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,969
Perez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Perez v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Perez v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Perez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1091,1196
Perez-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Perez Soto v. Supreme Court of P. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Perez-Trevino v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Perkins v. US Airways, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Perrone; Torres v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Perrone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Perry v. Coles County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Perry v. Kriegman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873,1030
Perry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845,1159
Perry; Workman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Persaud v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Persico v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Person v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
cxlvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Peru; MMA Consultants 1, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Peterka v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Peters v. Baldwin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039,1087,1187,1259
Peters v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Peters; Farrar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Peters v. Satkiewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Peters; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Petersen Energia Inversora S. A. U.; Argentine Republic v. . . . . 1066
Petersen Energia Inversora S. A. U.; YPF S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Peterson; Banca UBAE, S. p. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Peterson; Bank Markazi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Peterson; Baywood Home Care v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Peterson v. Burris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Peterson; Central Bank of Iran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Peterson; Clearstream Banking S. A. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Peterson v. Franklin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Peterson; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Peterson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Peterson; Minnesota Living Assistance, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Petit-Clair v. Grewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Petitioner; Willan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Petras v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Petroleo Brasileiro S. A. v. EIG Energy Fund XIV, L. P. . . . . . . 1223
Pettigrew v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Pettis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Pezhman v. Chanel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
P. F. v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Phillips v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Phillips; Nash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Pfeffer v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Pfeiffer; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Pfster; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Pfster; Hollis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Pham; Linh Thi Mihn Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Pham; Linh Thi Minh Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Pharmavite LLC v. Bradach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Phelps v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Philadelphia Taxi Assn., Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc. . . . . . . . . 870
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Boatright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. McKeever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Philips v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Phillips v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlvii
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Phillips v. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Pineda; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837,970,1061,1064,1111
Plascencia-Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Plasencia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Phillips v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,1165,1257
Phillips v. Washburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Philmore v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Phil's Icehouse, Inc.; Deutsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Phil Won; Min Ho Kwon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Pickard v. Department of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Pickens v. Brevard Police Testing and Selection Center . . . . . . . . 946
Pickett; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Pierce v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Pierce v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Pierre v. Attorney Grievance Comm. for First Jud. Dept. . . . . . . 850
Pierre v. FJC Security Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Pierre v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Pietri v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Pimentel-Soto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Pina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Pinchuk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Pinder v. McDowell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Pineda v. Nielson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Pineda v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Pineda Alarcon v. Nielson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Pineda-Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Pineiro Perez v. BP, P. L. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Pinellas County; Richman Group of Fla., Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Pinet-Fuentes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Ping Xu v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Pinkney v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Pinkney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219
Pinnacle Financial Corp.; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Pinnavaria v. Trout Valley Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Pirela v. Wetzel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Pirko; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Pittman v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Pittman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881,1041
Pizzino v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Pizzino v. Norwegian Cruise Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Placeres-Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Placide v. Supreme Court of Wash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc.; Gee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1057
Planned Parenthood of Kan. and Mid-Mo.; Andersen v. . . . . . . . . 1057
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Pletos v. Makower Abatte Guerra Wegner Vollmer, PLLC . . . . . 1035
Pliego-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
PLM L. P.; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Plowden; Knox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Plumb v. U. S. Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1030
Plumley; DeAngelis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Plumley; Hayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Plummer v. Hopper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
P. M.; T. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
PMCM TV, LLC v. Federal Communications Comm'n . . . . . . . . . 1184
PM Management-San Antonio AL, L. L. C.; Fairley v. . . . . . . . . . 1083
Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Podaras v. Menlo Park . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Poff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1022
Polk v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 867
Polk v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Polk; Sinegal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Pollak; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Pollard; Moss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Pollock; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Polshyn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Polster; Mason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1187
Pompee v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Ponce Inlet; Pacetta, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Poole; Hyde-el v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Pope v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Pope v. Franke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Portela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Porter; Burgett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Porter v. Joyner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Porter v. Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Porter v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Portillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043,1121
Porto v. Laguna Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Posa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
Posey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Postmaster General; Dyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Postmaster General; Garrett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Postmaster General; Hatch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Potenciano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Potomac Electric Power Co.; Bruce v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Potter; Wells v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxlix
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Pounds; Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Poupart v. Hooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Powell, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 962,1142
Powell v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Powell; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Powell v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Powell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044,1092
Power v. Publishers Clearing House, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Power Integrations Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc. . . . 1193
Powers v. Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
PPC Broadband, Inc.; Corning Optical Comm. RF LLC v. . . . . . . 1051
Prailow v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Prasad v. Lightbourne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Prather; Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 1223
Preap; Nielsen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
Precythe; Bucklew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,1019
Premo; Glick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Premo; Langley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Premo; Sparks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Prep Sportswear v. Savannah College of Art & Design, Inc. . . . . 814
Presbyterian Church v. Freedom From Religion Foundation . . . . 1213
Presidential Advisory Comm'n; Electronic Privacy Info. Center v. 1108
President of U. S.; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
President of U. S.; Caterbone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
President of U. S. v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134
President of U. S. v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant . . . . . . . . . . . 1062
President of U. S. v. Karnoski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1134
President of U. S.; Otworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
President of U. S.; Paracha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
President of U. S. v. Stockman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1134
President of U. S.; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
President of U. S.; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Presiding Judge, Super. Ct. of Cal., Los Angeles Cty.; Couturier v. 1148
Presidio Components v. American Technical Ceramics Corp. . . . . 816
Presley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Prestegui v. Madden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Preston v. Axcess Financial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Preston v. Great Lakes Specialty Finance, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Preston v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Price v. Overmyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Price v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872,975,1201
Price v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Pride Mobility Products Corp.; Talley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Pridgen v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
cl TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Prillerman v. Huggins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Prince v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Prince v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Prince v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Prince George's County Bd. of Ed.; T. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Prison Legal News v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Pritchett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Proa-Dominguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Probandt v. Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Proctor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Progressive Ins. Co.; Kirkland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1245
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Prosterman v. American Airlines Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Provencio v. Lizarraga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Providence; BATS Global Markets, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Prow v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Prudential Ins. Co. of America; Kersey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Pruitt v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Prunty v. DeSoto County School Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Prutting v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Pryer v. Gardner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Public Employment Relations Bd.; San Diego v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Public Service Emp. Credit Union Long Term Disab. Plan; Olivar v. 818
Publishers Clearing House, Inc.; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Publishers Clearing House, Inc.; Power v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Puente v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Puentes v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Puiatti v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Puleo; Heffngton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Pulham v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Pulido-Nolazco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Pulley v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Pulte Homes of N. Y. LLC v. Carmel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Pupo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Pure Presby. Church of Wash. v. Grace of God Presby. Church . . 1123
Purnell v. St. Mary's Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Pyles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Qazi v. Killian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Qazi v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Qazi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,896
QBE Ins. Corp.; Kerrigan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
Quality Systems v. Miami Fire Fighters' & Police Offcers' Ret. Tr. 1031
Qualls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Quarles v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
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Quattrocchi, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Queen Elizabeth; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Queen's Univ. at Kingston v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. . . . . 876
Quest Diagnostics Inc.; Morrison v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818,1029
Quileute Indian Tribe; Makah Indian Tribe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Quince v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858,878
Quinn; Sams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Quinn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,883
Quinones Leyva v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Quintana; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204
Quintana v. Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Quintana v. Hansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Quintana-Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Quintero v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Quinto, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Quiros; Lewis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Quiroz v. Moran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
R. v. Children's Aid Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
R. v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
R. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1192
R. v. West Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources . . . . . . . . . 1159
Rab v. Superior Court of Cal., Sacramento Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1110
Rabeau; Mark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Racette; Swinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1122
Rachal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Rackley; Frank v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Rackley; Redic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Radillo v. Ndoh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Radnothy; Wicks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Raemisch; Acosta v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Raemisch; Apodaca v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
Raemisch; Brooks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
Raemisch; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
Raemisch; Newmiller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Rafi v. Brigham and Women's Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1040,1111
Rafi v. Yale Univ. School of Medicine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1111
Raghavendra v. Booth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Raghavendra v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
Ragland v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Rahim v. South Carolina Dept. of Prob., Parole, and Pardon . . . . 1052
Rahim v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Rahmany; Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Raines; Burningham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Rainsdon; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
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Raisbeck v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Raleigh v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Raleigh; Shoshana Trust v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Rambo v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Ramey; Burris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Ramey; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Ramey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1030
Ramirez v. Aponte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Ramirez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Ramirez; Figueroa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
Ramirez v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Ramirez v. Hooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Ramirez v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Ramirez v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Ramirez v. Superior Court of Cal., El Dorado Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Ramirez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856,903,1256
Ramirez v. Walmart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Ramirez-Barajas v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Ramirez-Cruz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Ramirez-De Jesus v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Ramnaraine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Ramon Zuniga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Ramos v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
Ramos v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Ramos v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847,901,950,1041
Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals Inc.; RP Healthcare, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . 917
Randle v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Rangel v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Rangel v. Tippecanoe County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Rankins v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone Authority; El Omari v. . . . . . . 1145
Rasberry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Rasko v. New York City Admin. for Children's Services . . . . . . . 1075
Ratcliff v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Rath; Marcoski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Ratledge; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Ratushny v. Kauffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Ray v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1140
Ray v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Ray v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Ray v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Ray; Dunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1138
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Ray v. Jefferson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Real Estate Alliance Ltd. v. Move, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987,1066
Redstone Federal Credit Union; Russell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989,1187
Ray v. McCollum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,1030
Ray v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Ray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185,1212
Rayan v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1259
Rayford v. Leibach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Rayo-Espinoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Rayyan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Razz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Reading; Vasquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
ReadyOne Industries, Inc.; Rodriguez Lopez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Reardon v. Zonies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Rebmann v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Redden, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Redic v. Rackley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Redifer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911
Reece v. Basi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Reece v. Whitley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Reed v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Reed v. Florissant County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Reed v. Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Reed v. Garman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Reed; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Reed v. Hartford Super 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Reeder v. Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Reel v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Reese v. Zatecky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Reeves v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Reeves v. Lashbrook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Reeves v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Merus N. V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Register v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Rehaif v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Reid v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,943,1226
Reid v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1110
Reid v. Warden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Reid El Bey v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Reilly v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Reilly; Hawes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Reilly v. Herrera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079,1218
Rein; Kulick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081,1205
Reiner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961
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Reiner, In re Disbarment of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Reinke; Hill v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Reinvestment Zone No. 17; Residents Against Flooding v. . . . . . . 1037
ReliaStar Life Ins. Co.; Laschkewitsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040,1187
Remedi Seniorcare of Va., LLC; Garnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Rena C.; Colonial School Dist. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Renchenski v. McGinley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Rencountre v. Braun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Rendlen; Briggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Rendon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Renesas Electronics; Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions v. 1066
Rentas v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Reodica v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Repress v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191
Repro-Med Systems, Inc.; EMED Technologies Corp. v. . . . . . . . 966
Republic of Korea's Defense Acq. Prog. v. BAE Sys. Solution . . . 869
Republic of Peru; MMA Consultants 1, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Requena v. Roberts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Residents Against Flooding v. Reinvestment Zone No. 17 . . . . . . 1037
Restrepo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
Retiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Return Mail, Inc. v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1050,1143
Reverse Mortgage Solutions; Gillespie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc.; Gillespie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Rewerts; Rush v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Reyes v. Artus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Reyes v. Duggan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Reyes; Singson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Reyes-Quintero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Reyes-Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1201
Rey Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Reynolds v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Reynolds v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Reynolds; Reeder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Reynolds v. Stewart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Reynolds v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Reza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Rhode Island; Patino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Rhode Island; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Rhodes v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Rhodes v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Rhoe v. Montgomery Cty. Offce of Child Support Enf. . . . . . . . . 1149
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Rhymes v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Riascos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Rice; Dressler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Rice v. Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Richard v. District Attorney of Westmoreland County . . . . . . . . . 1064
Richards v. Des Moines Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Richards v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Richardson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Richardson; Howlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Richardson v. Kent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Richardson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929,1116,1145
Richitelli v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Richland County Children Services; Bauch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Richman; Stevenson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Richman Group of Fla., Inc. v. Pinellas County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Richmond v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Rickard; Marino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Rieber v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Riley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Riley v. Dorethy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Riley v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Riley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Riley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334,1062
Rinaldo v. Mahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1110
Rinehart v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Rios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Rios; Zavala v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Rios-Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Rios Soto v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Rippl v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Ritter v. Brady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Rivas v. Spearman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Rivas-Rivera v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1046
Rivera, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Rivera v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939,1123,1168,1190
Rivera Fonseca v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Rivera-Quinones v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Rivera-Ruperto v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Rivera-Solis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Rivero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Rivers v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Rivertown Dev., LLC; West Congress Street Partners, LLC v. 998
Rizo; Yovino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
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R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Johnston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Nally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Odom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1218
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Pardue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Searcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Roach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Roberson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Roberson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Roberts, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1142
Roberts v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Roberts; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Roberts v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971,1187
Roberts; Keithly v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Roberts; Requena v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Roberts v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897,1110,1253
Robertson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Robertson v. Interactive College of Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Robertson v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Robertson; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Robertson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Robertson; Valenzuela Arzate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Robey v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1111
Robin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Robinett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191
Robinson v. American Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Robinson v. Baynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Robinson v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Robinson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Robinson; Huss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Robinson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Robinson; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Robinson; Long v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Robinson v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Robinson v. Nevada System of Higher Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Robinson v. Shaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Robinson v. South Carolina Dept. of Prob., Parole, and Pardon . . 859
Robinson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,
879,883,893,909,951,1050,1109,1152,1161,1236
Robinson v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Robles-Avalos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Roby v. Demoura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Rochelle v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Rock v. Bracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Rock v. Executive Offce Park of Durham Assn., Inc. . . . . . . . . 858,1017
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Rodgers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1065
Rodgers v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Rodgers v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Rodgers v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951,1187
Rodgers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Rodrigues v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Rodriguez v. Bank of America, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Rodriguez v. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001,1123
Rodriguez v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Rodriguez v. Gore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Rodriguez v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Rodriguez v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Rodriguez v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
Rodriguez v. Paramo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Rodriguez v. Ratledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Rodriguez v. San Diego County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Rodriguez; Swartz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Rodriguez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,834,977,1166,1168,1213
Rodriguez-Aparicio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Rodriguez-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Rodriguez Lopez v. ReadyOne Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Rodriguez-Mantos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Rodwell v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1088
Roe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Rogers, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Rogers v. Beasley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 804
Rogers; Hebert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Rogers v. Liberty Bell Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Rogers; Valle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Rogers v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Rojas v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Rojas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Rojas-Cisneros v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Rojaz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Rolland v. Carnation Building Services, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1123
Rollyson v. O'Neal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Rolon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Romain v. O'Connor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Roman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Romero; Beattie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Romero v. McMahon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Romero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Romo v. Ormond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Romulus; Guzall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
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Rondon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1061
Rong Dong v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Rooke; Indiezone, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1110
Roy; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088,1188
Rooks v. Brewer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Rosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Rosales-Aguilar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Rosario v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041,1055
Rosario v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
Rosas Cuellar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Rose, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Rose v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Rose v. Horton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Rose v. Kirkegard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Rose v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Rosen; Holland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Rosetto v. Murphy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Rosky v. Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Rosky v. Byrne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Ross v. Apple Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Ross v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Ross v. Clerk of Courts of the Ct. of Common Pleas, Phila., Pa. 990
Ross v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Ross v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Rossi v. The Crown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Rothery v. Blanas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Rothschild; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Rothschild; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Rotkiske v. Klemm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1190
Rotondo v. Gasparini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Roukis, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Roundtree; Littles v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Roundtree v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Rountree v. Dyson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Rouse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Rovella; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Rowe v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Rowland v. Chappell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Roy; Prow v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Roy; Vang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Royal; Littlejohn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Royal Bank of Scotland; Driessen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.; Marshall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Royce International Broadcasting Co. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
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Royston v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
RPD Holdings, L. L. C. v. Advanced Pharmacy Services . . . . . . . 1225
RPD Holdings, L. L. C. v. Tech Pharmacy Services . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
RP Healthcare, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals Inc. . . . . . . . . . 917
RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time, LLC . . . . . . . . . 1142,1226
RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Rubens v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Rubi Ibarra v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Rucho v. Common Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062,1112,1219
Rucki; Grazzini-Rucki v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Rudnick, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Rudzavice v. Harmon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Ruelas-Martinez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Ruiz v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Ruiz-Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Ruiz-Rivera, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Ruiz-Ruiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1212
Rumanek, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Runnels v. Bordelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1110
Runnels v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Rupert; Fountain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Rush v. Rewerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Rushing; Arizona v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Russell v. Bielefeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Russell; Farooq v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Russell v. Ingegneri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Russell v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Russell v. Redstone Federal Credit Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989,1187
Russell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130
Russian v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Russo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Rutland; Sobel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Rutledge Maintenance Corp.; Saunders-Gomez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Ryan; Alcequiecz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Ryan; Atwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Ryan; Bisbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Ryan; Cook v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972,1111
Ryan; Follansbee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Ryan; Francisco Puentes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Ryan; Gulbrandson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Ryan; Liu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036
Ryan; Merrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Ryan; Murray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,968
clx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Ryan; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Ryan; Stuart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Ryan; Swoopes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Ryan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Ryan; Wilborn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
S.; Aldona B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
S. v. S. T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Sabeniano v. Citibank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,1017
Sacks, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Sadik v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Sadowski v. Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Safford v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Safford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Safre; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Sage v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Sailor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
St. Amour v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
St. Bernard Parish v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Term. Dist.; Violet Dock Port v. . . . . 952
St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc.; Benoit v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
St. Clair County; Harnden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
St. Hubert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,1256
Saint Louis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
St. Mary's Bank; Taal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
St. Mary's Hospital; Purnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
St. Vallier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Sakoman v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Sakuma v. Association of Apartment Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1046
Salameh; Wishnefsky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Salas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Saldierna v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Saldivar v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Salemi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Salerno v. Gentry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Salgado v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Salguero v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Salinas v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Sample v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Sams v. Quinn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Samson v. Gordon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Samson Resources Corp.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Samson Resources Corp.; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.; Smartfash LLC v. . . . . . . . . 876
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxi
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.; Queen's Univ. at Kingston v. . . . .
Samuel; South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
876
1068
Samuel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088,1218
San Bernardino; Cotton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Sanchez v. Beard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1257
Sanchez v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Sanchez v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924,925,1123,1154
Sanchez v. Pfeiffer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Sanchez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078,1201,1211
Sanchez v. Young Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Sanchez-Jara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Sanchez Lopez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Sanchez Molinar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Sanchez Rolon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Sand Canyon Corp.; Koyle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Sanders v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Sanders v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1079,1217
Sanders v. Esqueda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Sanders v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Sanders v. Uribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
San Diego v. Public Employment Relations Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
San Diego County; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
Sandifer v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Sandoval v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Sandoval Dominguez v. Spearman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Sandoval-Ramos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Sandoz, Inc.; Allergan Sales, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Sandpoint v. Maddox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Sands v. Menard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Sanford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
San Joaquin General Hospital; Sheikh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Sankara v. O'Hara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
San Martin v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Sanof; Amgen Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Santamaria v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Santiago v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903,1090
Santoro; Antonio Aldana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Santoro; Gonzales v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Santos v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Santos LaGaite v. Foley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Santos Murillo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Sanutti-Spencer v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Sappington v. Oldham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956
Sarcone; Chambers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
clxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Sarhan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Sarmiento v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Sarras v. Unknown Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Sarres Mendoza v. Whitfeld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
SAS Institute, Inc.; World Programming Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Satkiewicz; Peters v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
Satterlee v. Miller-Degase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Satterwhite v. Frisch's Restaurant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,1061
Sauers v. Lower Southampton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Saunders v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Saunders v. Ivey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Saunders-Gomez v. Rutledge Maintenance Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Savage v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Savanh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906
Savannah College of Art & Design, Inc.; Prep Sportswear v. . . . . 814
Savannah College of Art & Design, Inc.; Sportswear, Inc. v. . . . . 814
Sawyer v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Saxena v. Abud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Sayed v. Trani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Schaefer v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Schafer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.. . . . . . . . . 870
Schenectady; Bruno v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Schenkel v. Xyngular Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Schilling; Alvis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Schlieve v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Schmidt; Animashaun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Schnagl v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Schneider, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813,964
Schneider v. Bank of America, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Schneider v. Welker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Schneider Electric; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Schneiderman; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Schnell; Aase v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Schnell; Munt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
Schock v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1183
School Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty.; Fernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Schron; Jackson's Estate v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Schuermann v. Anqui . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Schumaker v. Joyner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Schwartz v. HRI Hospital, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Schwartz v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Schwarzenegger; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Schwarzman v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Schweitzer; Harwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED clxiii
Page
Schweitzer; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Scotia Bank; Winston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Scott v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Scott v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Scott v. District Hospital Partners, L. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Scott v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Scott; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Scott; Knick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
Scott v. Tellez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Scott v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,994,1025,1109
Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Sealed Appellee v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1152
Sealed Defendant v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1096,1164
Sealed Petitioner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Seals v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Searcey v. Dean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Searcy; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1203
Searcy v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Sebert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Secretary, Fla. Dept. of Corrections; Matthews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Secretary Gen. of U.N.; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Secretary of Defense; Hobson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1110
Secretary of Ed.; Nesselrode v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Secretary of HHS; Breckinridge Health, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Secretary of HHS; Glorioso-Brandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Secretary of HHS; Washington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1030
Secretary of Homeland Security; Gebhardt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Secretary of Homeland Security; Huffman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060
Secretary of Homeland Security; Nguyen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034,1220
Secretary of Homeland Security; Pineda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Secretary of Homeland Security; Pineda Alarcon v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Secretary of Homeland Security; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; Golz v. . . . . . . . . 1141
Secretary of Interior; American Exploration & Mining Assn. v. 814
Secretary of Interior; Bruette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Secretary of Interior; National Mining Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Secretary of Interior; Tanner-Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Secretary of Labor; Koresko v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085,1119
Secretary of Labor; Oskoui v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Secretary of Labor; Wade v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Secretary of Navy; Conforto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Secretary of Navy; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Secretary of Treasury; State National Bank of Big Spring v. . . . . 1122
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Barraquias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1246
clxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Kisor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Melvin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Meredith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Secretary, Vt. Agency of Natural Resources; Supeno v. . . . . . . . . 876
Securiforce International America, LLC v. United States . . . . . . 997
SEC; Illarramendi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
SEC; Lorenzo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959
SEC; Lyndon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Seda v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Sedita; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Seed v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Segbers; Snelling v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Segovia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Segoviano-Briseno v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Seidel v. Century Surety Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Selden v. Judge, U. S. Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Fla. . . . 805,1019
Selden v. Kovachevich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805,1019
Selfa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Sellers; Cromartie v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Sellers; Drane v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Sellers; Lance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097
Sellers v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Semien v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Semple; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Senior v. Haynes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Seniw v. Connecticut General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Senthilnathan, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Sepanek; Holder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Serna v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 898
Serna v. Hennepin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1213
Serrano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Serrato-Navarro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Session; Dennis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Sessions; Alias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Sessions; Amin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Sessions; Andrade Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Sessions; Carmenate-Palencia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Sessions; Chasson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Sessions; Correa-Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Sessions; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Sessions; Drummond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877,1030
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Sessions; Gicharu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Sessions; Giulian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Sessions; Hason v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1030
Sessions; Jian Long Dong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Sessions; Jian Rong Dong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Sessions; Luis Pineda v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801
Sessions; Martinez Perez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Sessions; Mills v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Sessions; Singh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,974
Sessions; Villegas-Sarabia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Sessions; Wei Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Sessions; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Seui v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Seungjin Kim v. United States Customs & Border Protection . . . 899
Seventh-Day Adventist Church Reform Movement; Myhre v. . . . 861
Sewell v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Sexton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
SGK Properties, L. L. C. v. U. S. Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Shaman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Shampine v. Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Shanahan; Webster v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Shank v. Corizon Health Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Shannon; Nowlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Shannon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902,929,1111
Shao v. McManis Faulkner, LLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1134,1194
Shao v. Tsan-Kuen Wang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073,1187
Shapiro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210,1231
Sharma; Jaisinghani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Sharma v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088,1205
Sharnese v. Lopez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Sharp v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Shartle; Jonassen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961
Shauger v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Shaw; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Shaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
Shea v. Winnebago County Sheriff's Offce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Shear v. MAZ Partners, LP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Sheely v. Bank of America, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Sheer; Daugherty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Sheffeld v. Burt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Sheikh v. San Joaquin General Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Shekhem El-Bey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 960
Sheldon; My Van Tran v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Shell Oil Co.; Netzer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073,1187
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Shelton v. Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Shen v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Shephard, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Shere v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Sherman; Barber v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Sherrill; Carter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Sherry v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882,1030
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Shields v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Shin v. Uni-Caps, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Shoate v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052,1205
Shockley v. Griffth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Shoop v. Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Shoop; Hutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828,830
Shoop; Stojetz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Shoshana Trust v. Raleigh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Shotwell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1191
Shove v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
Shue v. Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
Shults v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Shuman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Shumpert v. Tupelo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Sibley v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Siegel v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Siegl; Ayanbadejo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Sills v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Silva; Chung v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Silva v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Silva-Ibarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Silva Medina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Silva-Ramirez v. Hospital Espanol Auxilio Mutuo de P. R. . . . . 876,1030
Silver; FedLoan Servicing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Silver; Pennsylvania Higher Ed. Assistance v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Silverman; Teamsters Local 210 Affliated Health & Ins. Fund v. 1194
Simmons v. Capra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Simmons v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Simmons v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Simmons v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Simmons v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927,1213,1257
Simon & Schuster, Inc.; Mallory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Simpson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Simpson v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Simpson v. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
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Simpson v. Erkerd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Sims v. King . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Sims v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Sinegal v. Polk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Singer; MacDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Singh v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921,974
Singh v. U. S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Singh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Singing River Health System; Almond v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Singleton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Singson v. Attorney General of Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Singson v. Reyes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Sireci v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Sivanadiyan; Annamalai v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Sixty-01 Assn. of Apartment Owners v. Goudelock . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . 815
Skakel; Connecticut v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Skillern v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 952,1123
Skinner; Kassab v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Skipper; Bozell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Slater v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Sleugh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Sliney v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Slone v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Slusser v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Small v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,892,1064
Small v. Lindamood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Smalls v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Smallwood's Estate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Smart; Miami v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135
Smartfash LLC v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. . . . . . . . . 876
Smith, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Smith; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Smith v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Smith v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985,986,1189
Smith v. Cain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Smith v. Cline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 805
Smith v. Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Smith v. Corcoran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Smith; Dizak v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Smith v. Eppinger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Smith v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1087
Smith v. Food Bank of Eastern Mich. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943
Smith; Gessler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
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Smith v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Smith v. Lakewood Ranch Gymnastics LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Smith; Legacy Community Health Services, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 871
Smith v. Loudoun County Public Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Smith; McDonough v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1112
Smith v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Smith v. Myrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Smith v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Smith; Pavan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Smith v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Smith; Preston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Smith; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Smith v. Tennessee National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Smith v. Terris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Smith; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Smith v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834,
851,852,951,952,1042,1067,1077,1088,1121,1142,1163,1196,
1226,1227
Smith v. Valentine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Smith; Villaverde v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Smith v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Smith v. Weber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Smith v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Smithback, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1031
Smithback v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Smotherman, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916
Smotherman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Snapp v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Snead; TLSL, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Snelling v. Segbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Snyder v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Snyder v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . . 920
Snyder; James v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Sobel v. Rutland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Soccolich v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB . . . . . . . . . . 1021
SSA; Becton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
SSA; Berg v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
SSA; York v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Solano Godoy v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Soldridge v. Mahally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Solgado v. Braun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Solis v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Solis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Solis-Alonzo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
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Solomon v. Desert Healthcare Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Solorio v. Muniz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Solow Management Corp.; Vaigasi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Soniat v. Department of Housing and Urban Development . . . . . . 836
Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.; Briggs v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Sood; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Soon Young Kim v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
Sorensen; Diagnostic Laboratories v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Sorensen; Kan-Di-Ki, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Sorensen v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Sorrels; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Sosa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088
Sosa-Gonzalez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Soto; Hays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Soto v. Supreme Court of P. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Soto v. Sweetman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Soto; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Soto; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
South Carolina; Alston v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
South Carolina; Beaty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
South Carolina; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
South Carolina; Carlos Vazquez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
South Carolina; Chronister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
South Carolina; Cleveland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
South Carolina; Cottrell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861
South Carolina; Greene v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
South Carolina; Mahdi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
South Carolina v. Samuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
South Carolina v. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
South Carolina Dept. of Mental Health; Haynesworth v. . . . . . . . 1252
South Carolina Dept. of Prob., Parole, and Pardon; Rahim v. . . . . 1052
South Carolina Dept. of Prob., Parole, and Pardon; Robinson v. 859
South Dakota; Kryger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
South Dakota; Yackel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Southeast Mich. Surgical Hospital; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Southern National Assets, LLC; Bagwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Southwest Airlines Co.; Clark v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Souza v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Sowell v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Soza v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Spain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Spano v. Florida Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Sparks v. Premo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Spaulding v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961
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Spearman; Alvarez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Spearman; Olic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
Spearman; Rivas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Spearman; Sandoval Dominguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Spearman; Verduzco v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Spears v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167
Speight; Lawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Speights; In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961,1141
Spencer, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1125
Spencer v. Abbott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
Spencer; Conforto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Spencer; West v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Spengler, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Sperber v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Sperfslage; Willock v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Spight v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Spitzer v. Aljoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Spokane; Straub v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Spoor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Sportswear, Inc. v. Savannah College of Art & Design, Inc. . . . . . 814
Spottsville, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1125
SP Plus Corp.; Lofton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019
Spraggins v. Washburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Sprayberry; Hester v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Springer v. Caple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969
Springer v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Sprunt; Kruskal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
S. R. v. West Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources . . . . . . . 1159
SSL Services, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
S. T.; W. S. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Stambler v. Mastercard Int'l. Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Stancik v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170
Stand Up for Cal.! v. Department of Interior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1107
Stankevich v. Kaplan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Stanley, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Stanley v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Staples v. Maye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017
Staples the Offce Superstore East, Inc.; Ahsan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Stark v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076,1205
Stark County; Hopson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1117
Starks v. Bally's Las Vegas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Starks v. Parball Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Starnes v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
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Starrett v. Lockheed Martin Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
State. See name of State.
State Bar of Cal.; Albert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
State Bar of Cal.; Bartlett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
State Bar of Cal.; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
State Bar of Cal.; Kun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
State Bar of Cal.; Marberry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
State Bar of Ga.; Levine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
State National Bank of Big Spring v. Mnuchin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Steager; Dawson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171,915
Steele v. Cheatham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Steele; Dry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Steele v. Jenkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Steele v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045,1051,1168
Stein v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Stein v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Steinhardt; Krohe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Steinmetz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Stephan; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Stephens v. Alliant Techsystems Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Stephens v. Englewood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860,1030
Stephens v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Stephens; Peffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Stepp-Zafft v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Stericycle of P. R., Inc.; Micheo-Acevedo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Sterling; Cabbagestalk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Sterling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1204
Steshenko v. McKay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1245
Stevens v. CoreLogic, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Stevens v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1090
Stevens v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Stevens; Zappos.com, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Stevenson v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Stevenson v. Richman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Stevens-Rucker v. Frenz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216
Stewart; Galvan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Stewart v. Holder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883,1110
Stewart v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093,1218
Stewart; Raisbeck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Stewart; Reynolds v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Stewart v. Stukey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Stewart v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968,994,1069,1254
Stickle v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Stinnett v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
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Page
Stitt; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Stockman; Trump v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1134
Stojetz v. Shoop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Stokeling v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Stokes, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Stokes v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Stokes v. Corsbie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070,1073
Stokes v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086,1218
Stokes v. First American Title Co. of Mont., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Stokes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1217
Stoller v. Wilmington Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Stoltzfoos v. Wetzel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Stolz v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Stone v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Stone v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Stonebreaker; Terry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Stoney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC; Bulovic v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1110
Storix, Inc.; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Story v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Stoutamire v. La Rose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Strahota; Hamilton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Straiger; Hampton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Strange; Bent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Stratton v. Clemens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Stratton v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Straub v. Spokane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Strauss v. Kentucky Bd. of Medical Licensure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Streambend Properties II v. Ivy Tower Minneapolis . . . . . . . . . . 822
Streeter v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Streetman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
Stroble v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Strohmeyer v. Surface Transportation Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Strong v. Burt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Stuart v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
Stuart v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Stuckey v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Studhorse v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846
Stuhr v. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1046
Stukey; Stewart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185
Sturgeon v. Frost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809,915
Sturges v. Curtin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838,1109
Styles v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852,1110
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Su; California Trucking Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Suarez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 861,1092
Suarez Plasencia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Rahmany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Succession. See name of succession.
Sudan v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 915
Sudberry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Suffolk County Community College; Tu Ying Chen v. . . . . . . . . . 920
Suggs v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 846,921
Suhl v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Sui v. Marshack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,822
Suleitopa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Sullivan; Barnett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Sullivan v. Frederick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Sullivan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Sultaana, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1067
Sultaana v. Harris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Sun v. Asiello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Sun v. Mullkoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Sun v. Newman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Sun v. New York City Human Resources Admin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Sun v. Pollak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Sun v. Schneiderman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Sun v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Sun v. Supreme Court of N. Y., Queens Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Sun v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Sun v. Zeve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Sunbelt Steel Tex., Inc.; Balding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Sundy v. Friendship Pavilion Acquisition Co., LLC . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Sung Lee v. Garvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada; Conestoga Trust Services v. . . . . 945
Supeno v. Secretary, Vt. Agency of Natural Resources . . . . . . . . 876
Superintendent, State Corr. Institution at Fayette; Lazar v. . . . . 1152
Superintendent, State Corr. Institution at Graterford; Gonzalez v. 1250
Superior Court of Cal.; First Adv. Background Servs. Corp. v. . . 1241
Superior Court of Cal., Contra Costa Cty.; Zivot v. . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Superior Court of Cal., El Dorado Cty.; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles Cty.; Brown-Williams v. . . . . 1036
Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles Cty.; Williams v. . . . . . . 1036,1041
Superior Court of Cal., Orange Cty.; Emerson Electric Co. v. . . . 944
Superior Court of Cal., Sacramento Cty.; Rab v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1110
Superior Court of Cal., San Bernardino Cty.; Vargas v. . . . . . . . . 947
Superior Court of Conn.; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Superior Court of Ga., Camden Cty.; Allen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
clxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Superior Court of Mass., Suffolk Cty.; Lozano v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Supreme Court of Nev.; Garmong v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Supreme Court of N. Y., Queens Cty.; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . 817
Supreme Court of P. R.; Perez Soto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Supreme Court of United States; Curry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Supreme Court of Wash.; Placide v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf International, Inc. . . . . . 1224
Surface Transportation Bd.; Strohmeyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Surfrider Foundation; Martins Beach 1, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Surratt v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Susalla v. Harry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854
Sutton v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Swain v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Swan v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Swarthout; Mendez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Swartz v. Rodriguez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Swartz v. United States Patent and Trademark Offce . . . . . . . . . 1195
SWC, LLC v. Herr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
Sweeney v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 906,921
Sweet v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Sweetman; Soto v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 999
Swenson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
Swington v. Waterloo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Swinton v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Swinton v. Racette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863,1122
Swiss Re Financial Services Corp.; McGuirk v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Swoopes v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Swopes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1196
Sydnor v. Hampton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Sykes v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
Sykes v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 897
Sylince v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Szmania v. E-Loan, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Taal v. St. Mary's Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Tacquard v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948,1187
Tafoya v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Taggart v. Lorenzen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Taggart v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Takeuchi; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Talamayan; Velayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Talkin; Bent v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Talley v. Pride Mobility Products Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Tampa; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Tampkins; Gipson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
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Tanco-Pizarro v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
Tang Yuk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Tanksley v. Daniels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Tannehill v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Tanner; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Tanner; Fremin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Tanner; Lacayo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
Tanner; Wiggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Tanner-Brown v. Zinke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Tanzi v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004
Tapioa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Tappen v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Tappen v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Tarver v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Tarvin v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Taser International, Inc.; Digital Ally, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Taskov v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Tatananni; Coulter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Tatar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074,1245
Tate v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991,1187
Tate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Tatten v. City and County of Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Tatum v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Taulbee v. Noble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Taunton v. Environmental Protection Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1184
Taupier v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Tavares v. Bridgeloan Investors, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Tavares v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car-Company of R. I. . . . . . . . . . . 816
Tavares v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Tavia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Taylor v. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Taylor v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Taylor v. CVS Caremark Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Taylor v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Taylor v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817,867
Taylor v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Taylor v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Taylor v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1110
Taylor v. Lamanna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Taylor v. Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Taylor v. Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Taylor; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1205
Taylor v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Taylor v. Schweitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
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Taylor v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Taylor v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,977
Taylor v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1202
Taylor; Weidner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Taylor B. v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
T. B. v. P. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
T. B. v. Prince George's County Bd. of Ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
TC's Pawn Co. v. East Hartford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Teamah v. Applied Materials, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Teamcare; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Teamer v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Teamsters Local 210 Affliated Health & Ins. Fund v. Silverman 1194
Teaupa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
TechFreedom v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Tech Pharmacy Services; RPD Holdings, L. L. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Tedesco v. Monroe Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084,1218
Tegels; Kaprelian v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Telfair v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
Tellez; Scott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1249
Templeton v. Amsberry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901,1111
Templeton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Tempnology, LLC; Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . 960,1125
Tennessee; Collins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Tennessee; Cornwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Tennessee; Decosimo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Tennessee; Dellinger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Tennessee; Gentry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1017
Tennessee; Hirsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Tennessee; Ivy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Tennessee; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Tennessee; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Tennessee; Morris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Tennessee; Odom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
Tennessee; Payne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Tennessee; Sample v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Tennessee; Sims v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Tennessee; Sutton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Tennessee; Vick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1088
Tennessee; Wallace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Tennessee; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Tennessee Admin. Proc. Div.; Tri-Cities Holdings LLC v. . . . . . . . 822
Tennessee Bd. of Parole; Greenwood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Tennessee Dept. of Children's Services; Overton v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Tennessee Dept. of Correction; Meeks v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
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Tennessee Dept. of Correction; Nunn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Tennessee National Guard; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v. Blair . . . . . . . . . . 1062
Terrebonne Parish Jail Medical Dept.; Walcott v. . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1205
Terrell v. Berry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Terrell v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Terris; Hall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Terris; Holt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1172
Terris; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254
Territory. See name of Territory.
Terry, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Terry v. Abraham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Terry v. Earley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Terry; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Terry; McNemar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Terry v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Terry v. Stonebreaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Terry v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Teufel v. Northern Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. . . 123,916
Texas; Adams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Texas; Barnes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 956
Texas; Bien v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Texas; Black v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Texas; Briscoe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Texas; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Texas; Caldwell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Texas; Calhoun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Texas; Carney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Texas; Carty v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Texas; Cazares v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Texas; Coble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1206
Texas; Crowder v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Texas; Darby v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Texas; Dixon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Texas; Fisch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Texas; Francisco Maldonado v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
Texas; Frederiksen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Texas; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836,1047
Texas; Gates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Texas; Geotcha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Texas; Harper v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,1065
Texas; Hendrix v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Texas; Hernandez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
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Texas; Howard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853
Texas; Jaime Jimenez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Texas; Jennings v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134
Texas; Kennedy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Texas; Lee v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Texas; Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Texas; Mayes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Texas; McBride v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Texas; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Texas; Moesch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Texas; Moore v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Texas; Morello v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
Texas; Moreno Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1018
Texas v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
Texas; Parker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Texas; Patton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Texas; Pettigrew v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1037
Texas; Porter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Texas; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Texas; Rhymes v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Texas; Rivers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Texas; Salinas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Texas; Simmons v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Texas; Smithback v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Texas; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Texas; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Texas; Trevino v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Texas; Tyson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019
Texas; Valdez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Texas; Warnell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Texas; Warterfeld v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Texas; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1075
Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions v. Renesas Electronics 1066
Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops; Whole Woman's Health v. 1145
Texas Dept. of Family and Protective Services; J. C. v. . . . . . . . . 1229
Texas Tech Univ.; Udeigwe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Tharpe v. Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Tharps v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
The Crown; Rossi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Thelemaque v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,977
Theresa v. Iancu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Thermo Fisher Scientifc; Lei Yin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1259
T. H. -H. v. Allegheny Cty. Offce of Children, Youth & Families 1158
Thier v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1046
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Thieszen v. Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Thi Houng Le v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Thi Mihn Tran v. Pham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Thi Minh Tran v. Happy Valley Municipal Ct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Thi Minh Tran v. Pham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Thomas v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Thomas v. Chandran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889,1031
Thomas v. Cozzi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Thomas v. Delmarva Power & Light Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Thomas v. District Attorney of Lancaster County . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Thomas v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Thomas v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Thomas v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Thomas v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Thomas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,
844,890,906,920,976,1034,1042,1044,1094,1167,1168,1239
Thomas v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Thomas; Warren v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Thomas v. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1186
Thomas Nelson Community College; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Thomason v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Thompson v. Bank of N. Y. Mellon Trust Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
Thompson v. Copeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1187
Thompson v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Thompson; Gentry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816,1017
Thompson v. Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Thompson v. Nielson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Thompson v. Rovella . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Thompson v. Uehara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Thompson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864,907
Thompson Creek Metals Co., Inc.; Aronstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Thornberry v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Thorne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
Thornton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Thrasher; Mandel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Three Arch Bay Community Services Dist.; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . 1224
3G Licensing, S. A.; HTC Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1194
Thrift v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Thurman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Thurston Cty; Edenstrom v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Thyberg v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 854,1017
Tibbetts v. Kasich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Tibble; New Products Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
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Tice; Aponte v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
TiEnergy, LLC v. Wisconsin Central Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Tillman v. Barnhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Timbs v. Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Time Warner Cable, Inc.; Kavandi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1017,1188
Tinoco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Tippecanoe County; Rangel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1211
Tippens v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Tippins v. Caruso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Tippins v. NWI–1, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Tipton; Montana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Tirrez v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
Tiversa, Inc.; LabMD, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Tiznado-Valenzuela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
TLSL, Inc. v. Snead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
T-Mobile US, Inc.; Simply Wireless, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1114
Todd v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Toghill v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
Tolbert v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Tomblinson; Niang v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913
Tong v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1123
Topgolf International, Inc.; SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. . . . . . 1224
Topilina v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Torkornoo v. Helwig . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943,1038,1187
Torkornoo v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Torres v. Perrone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866,882
Torres-Medel v. Lashbrook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Torres Ortega v. Bondi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Torres-Sanchez; Arroyo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Tortora v. Alvarez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Tory v. Whited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Toshiba Corp. v. Automotive Industries Pension Trust Fund . . . . 1114
Tovar v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Tovar Pupo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1217
Towbridge v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840,1134
Town. See name of town.
Town Center Flats, LLC v. ECP Commercial II LLC . . . . . . . . . 823
Towne v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 991
Towne v. Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
Townes v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
Town Square Media West Central Radio Broadcasting; Wesley v. 1036
Tran v. Happy Valley Municipal Ct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Tran v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
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Tran v. Pham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1039
Tran v. Sheldon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Tran v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Trane Co.; Garry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,1123
Trani; Sayed v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Transamerica Life Ins. Co.; Laschkewitsch v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1046
Traverso v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Travis v. DHL Supply Chain (USA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Travis v. Exel, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Trease v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Admin.; Janangelo v. . . . . . . 999
Trejo v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Trent v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Trevino v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Tri-Cities Holdings LLC v. Tennessee Admin. Proc. Div. . . . . . . . 822
Trierweiler; Ambrose v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109
Trierweiler; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896,1110
Triestman v. Underwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Trimble v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Trinh v. Trinh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,997,1110
Trinity Industries, Inc.; United States ex rel. Harman v. . . . . . . . 1067
Triplett v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1187
Triplett v. Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1061
Tripp; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Troche-Alvarado v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Trost v. Trost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987,1110
Trout Valley Assn.; Pinnavaria v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
True; DeCarlo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Truelove v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Trump; Alexander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Trump; Caterbone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Trump v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1134
Trump v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1062
Trump v. Karnoski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1134
Trump; Otworth v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129
Trump; Paracha v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Trump v. Stockman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1124,1134
Trump; Whitney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Trump; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Tryon v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Tsan-Kuen Wang; Shao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073,1187
TSI Inc.; Yufa v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
T&T Rock Distribution, LLC v. Velasco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Tua v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
clxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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Tubbs v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Tu My Tong v. New Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884,1123
Uehara; Thompson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Tucker v. Atwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Tucker v. LCP-Maui, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Tucker v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Tucson; FGPJ Apartments and Development v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Tucson; Konarski v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Tuerk v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Penn. . . . . 874,1030
Tulin v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
Tunac v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Tunstall v. Wolfe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Tupelo; Shumpert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Turco; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 850
Turner, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996
Turner; Burke v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Turner; Fox v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Turner; Grable v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Turner v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 937
Turner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1172
Turner v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Turner's Estate; McIntosh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Turning Stone Resort Casino; Laake v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Turrieta v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Turzai v. Brandt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Tuton v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Tutt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Tuttle v. Allied Nev. Gold Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000,1134
Tu Ying Chen v. Suffolk County Community College . . . . . . . . . . 920
TVEyes, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Twelve Grand Jury Subpoenas, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Twentieth Century Fox Television; Empire Distribution v. . . . . . 815
Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications . . . . . . . 945
Tyler v. Main Industries, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119,1259
Tyler v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Tyler v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Tyson v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019
Uber Technologies, Inc.; Philadelphia Taxi Assn., Inc. v. . . . . . . . 870
UBS Financial Services, Inc.; Giancarlo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
UCB, Inc.; Accord Healthcare, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022
UCB, Inc.; Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Uces v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166
Udeigwe v. Texas Tech Univ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Udoh v. Dooley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
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Underwood; Brady v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Underwood v. Carpenter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Underwood; Triestman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Underwood; White v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
Unger v. Bergh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Uni-Caps, LLC; Myoungchul Shin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Union. For labor union, see name of trade.
Union Carbide Corp.; Waite v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
United. For labor union, see name of trade.
United Airlines, Inc.; De Vera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810,996,1186
United Arab Emirates; Sturdza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185
United Food & Commercial Workers; Ohlendorf v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 869
United Services Automobile Assn.; Clack v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
United States, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983
United States. See name of other party.
U. S. Bank N. A.; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
U. S. Bank N. A.; Carrillo v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966,1110
U. S. Bank N. A.; Harihar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
U. S. Bank N. A.; Plumb v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871,1030
U. S. Bank N. A.; SGK Properties, L. L. C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 876
U. S. Bank N. A.; Thole v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
U. S. Court of Appeals; Cotner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963
U. S. Court of Appeals; Kinney v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 875
United States Customs & Border Protection; Seungjin Kim v. . . 899
U. S. District Court; Ben-Ari v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
U. S. District Court; Bhawnani v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
U. S. District Court; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
U. S. District Court; Cabello v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
U. S. District Court; Colton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
U. S. District Court; Epperson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109
U. S. District Court; Graham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
U. S. District Court; Iskander v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
U. S. District Court; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
U. S. District Court; Quinones Leyva v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
U. S. District Court; Raghavendra v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
U. S. District Court; Reid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1110
U. S. District Court; Shove v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803
U. S. District Court; Spaulding v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 961
U. S. District Court; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
U. S. District Court; Wiest v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
United States ex rel. Cody v. ManTech International Corp. . . . . . 1208
United States ex rel. Hunt; Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. . . . . . . . 1190
United States ex rel. Prather; Brookdale Senior Living v. . . . . . . 1223
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv.; Markle Interests, L. L. C. v. 1031
clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
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United States Fish & Wildlife Serv.; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. . . . . . . 9
United States House of Rep.; LaVergne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
United States Patent and Trademark Offce; Swartz v. . . . . . . . . 1195
U. S. Postal Serv.; Conner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
U. S. Postal Serv.; Return Mail, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 959,1050,1143
U. S. Postal Serv.; Singh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
United States Trustee; Fearing v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
United States Trustee; Wagner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Universal Ins. Group; Best Auto Repair, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
University of Ark; Werbach v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
University of Miami School of Medicine; Wen Liu v. . . . . . . . . . 887,1123
University of South Ala.; El-Saba v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
University of Southern Cal. v. Munro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Unknown Party; Sarras v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Updike; Multnomah County v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Upshaw v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1091
Upstate Forever; Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P. v. . . . . . 1033
Uptergrove v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841
Uranga v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Urbina, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Uribe; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Uribe-Sanchez v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Urquia-Melendez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
US Airways; Haskin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
US Airways, Inc.; Perkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
USC Faculty Dental Practice; Deuschel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113,1231
Uschock v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Utah Republican Party v. Cox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation; Harvey v. 1067
Uzoechi v. Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Uzzle v. Fleming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Vaigasi v. Solow Management Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Vail v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
Valdez v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1035
Valdez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Valdez-Cejas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Valdivia v. Frauenheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Valencia Torres v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Valentine; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Valentine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Valenzuela v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Valenzuela; Franklin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Valenzuela Arzate v. Robertson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1171
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Valerio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Valle v. Rogers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Vallejos v. Lovelace Medical Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Vallier v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
Valsamis, Inc.; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Van v. Language Line LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
Vanda Pharmaceuticals; Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA v. . . . . . . . 1220
Vandemerwe v. Langford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Vandermosten; Workman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Vandivere v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Vang v. Roy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1117
Van Le v. Aldridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Van Nortrick v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Vannoy; Arnaud v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
Vannoy; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Vannoy; Boyer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826
Vannoy v. Floyd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1029
Vannoy; Gilkers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Vannoy; Hatcher v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Vannoy; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Vannoy; King v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Vannoy; Kott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Vannoy; Lemoine v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Vannoy; Lomax v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Vannoy; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 888
Vannoy; Madrid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Vannoy; Pierre v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Vannoy; Price v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Vannoy; Reel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1256
Vannoy; Robinson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893
Vannoy; Rochelle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
Vannoy; Rogers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Vannoy; Rubens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Vannoy; Stevens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880
Vannoy; Taylor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899,1202
Vannoy; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Vannoy; Trimble v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Vannoy; Triplett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024,1187
Vannoy; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Vanover v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Van Sach v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1188
Vantlin v. Hurt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Van Tran v. Sheldon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Vargas v. McMahon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
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Vargas v. Superior Court of Cal., San Bernardino Cty. . . . . . . . . . 947
Vargas Romero v. McMahon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1079
Varjabedian; Emulex Corp. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Varner v. Christiansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Vasconcellos v. Hamlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Vasquez v. Foxx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1070
Vasquez v. Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Vasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975,1202
Vaughan v. Vaughan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 893,1031
Vaughn; Wharton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Vazeen v. Vazin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Vazin; Vazeen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Vazin v. Vazin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Vazquez v. South Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Veal v. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Vega v. Germaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 945
Vega v. Kapusta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Vega v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Vega Duron v. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Vega-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 976
Vega-Jimenez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Vega-Orozco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Vega-Ortiz v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Vega-Zapata v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Vela v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
Velasco; T&T Rock Distribution, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Velasco v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Velasquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Velasquez-Rios v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003
Velayo v. Talamayan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Velazquez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Velez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
Vella v. Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Velo-Cano v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Vennings v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
Venture Express; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 810
Vera v. United Airlines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
Verduzco v. Spearman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Verduzco-Rangel v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 905
Vergara v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 829
Verizon Communications Inc.; Griffn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Vermont; Towne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
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Verwiebe v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828
Veteto v. Dunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Vick v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042,1088
Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823
Victorino v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Viggers v. Pacha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Viggers v. Viggers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Vigil; Harris v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 836
Villa v. Kowalski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Villa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1254
Villafana v. Clarke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Village. See name of village.
Villalva-Patricio v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Villanueva-Cardenas v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894
Villarreal v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Villa-Sariana v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Villaverde v. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Villavicencio v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023,1217
Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Vilutis v. NRG Solar Alpine LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Vinnie v. Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Vinson v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Viola v. Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1030
Violet Dock Port v. St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Term. Dist. . . . . 952
VIP Taxi LLC; Henderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808,1040
Virginia; Arrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1239
Virginia; Blagmon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1056
Virginia; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021,1234
Virginia; Campbell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970,1187
Virginia; Cavalieri v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 969,1111
Virginia; Crider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Virginia; Fauntleroy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165
Virginia; Gerald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1092
Virginia; Herbin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Virginia; Jacob v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Virginia; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922,947
Virginia; Mabry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Virginia; Okoh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
Virginia; Stickle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Virginia; Stratton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 818
Virginia; Tippens v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Virginia; Turner v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
Virginia; Watson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Virginia; Wilkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
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Virginia; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Virginia; Wolfe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Virginia; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Virginia Bd. of Medicine; Clowdis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 968
Virginia Dept. of Corrections; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Virginia Dept. of Corrections; Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill . . . . . . . . . . . 996,1112,1143
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Virgin Islands; Emanuel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Virgin Islands; Frett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Visconti v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1163
Vivo v. Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
Vizcaino-Ramos v. Lindamood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Volterra; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Von Pier; Colbry v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Voong; Young v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Voter Verifed, Inc., In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Voter Verifed, Inc. v. Election Systems & Software LLC . . . . . . 1073
Vue v. Henke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Vurimindi v. Hoopskirt Lofts Condominium Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . 986
Wabuyabo v. Correct Care Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Wachovia Bank; Nash v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Waddleton v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886,1110
Wade v. Acosta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Wade v. Florida Dept. of Juvenile Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Wade v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 910
Wagner v. Ford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Wagner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930
Wagner v. United States Trustee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Wagoner v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Wainwright; Parrish v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974
Wairi v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914,993
Waite v. Union Carbide Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1248
Walck v. Corizon Health Care Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
Walcott, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Walcott v. Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Walcott v. Terrebonne Parish Jail Medical Dept. . . . . . . . . . . 1080,1205
Walden v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Walden v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185
Waldrop v. Dunn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Walgate v. Kasich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Walgreen Co.; Patterson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Walker v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Walker; Hinton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
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Walker v. Howell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Walker; Probandt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Walker v. United States . . 826,855,904,938,952,1061,1145,1153,1192,1254
Walker v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Walker v. Weatherspoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Wall v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 865
Wall v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923,1046
Wallace v. Barnes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Wallace v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Wallace v. Kauffman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Wallace; Larson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Wallace v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Wallace v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1096
Walls v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Wall-Street.com, LLC; Fourth Estate Pub. Beneft Corp. v. . . . . 296,959
Walmart; Ramirez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
Walmart Stores Tex., LLC; Heredia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822
Walrath; Anderson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Walsh v. Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855
Walter-Eze v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Walters v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Walton v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
Walton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Wang v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1246
Wang v. Iancu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
Wang; Shao v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073,1187
Wappler v. Ivey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
Ward v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Ward v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Ward; Coleman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Ward v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 802,828
Warden. See also name of warden.
Warden; Andrews v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Warden; Carruthers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1146
Warden; Cobas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1251
Warden; Frazier v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Warden; Golden v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Warden; Jones v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Warden; Kitlas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Warden; Lucero v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Warden; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Warden; Poupart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1152
Warden; Reid v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Warden; Rivas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
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Warden; Rodriguez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Warden; Rosky v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154,1160
Warden; Sanders v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Warden; Sultaana v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Warden; Unger v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Warden; Vizcaino-Ramos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Warden; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Warden; Woods v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Warden, Federal Correctional Complex Coleman; O'Neil v. . . . . . 1153
Warden, Ventress Correctional Facility; Hopkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Wardlaw, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812
Ware; Dunning v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Ware v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1080
Warnell v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 923
Warner v. McLaughlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Warner v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Warren; Lott v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Warren v. Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Warren; Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Warterfeld v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159
Washburn; Phillips v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Washburn; Spraggins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
Washington v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1193
Washington v. Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Washington v. Azar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 869,1030
Washington v. Boughton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Washington; Boyd v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Washington; Cain v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Washington v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Washington; Corbett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973
Washington v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
Washington; Ewalan v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Washington v. Frauenheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129,1259
Washington; Free v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
Washington; Keen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Washington v. Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Washington; Robey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 974,1111
Washington; Sage v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1197
Washington; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 921
Washington; Sorensen v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 847
Washington v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003,1077
Washington; Wynn v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Washington Dept. of Corrections; Gilbert v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1210
Washington Env'l Hearings Offce; Olympic Stewardship Found. v. 817
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxci
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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit; Diaz v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1185
Washington State Bar Assn.; Cottingham v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. . . . . . 347,915
Washington State Emp. Security Dept.; Gulick Trucking, Inc. v. 1036
Washington State Emp. Security Dept.; Hatfeld Enterprizes v. 1036
Washington State Emp. Security Dept.; MacMillan-Piper, Inc. v. 1037
Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Bd.; Haines-Marchel v. 1252
Washington State Lottery; Granton v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Waterloo; Swington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
Waters v. Lockett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Waters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Waterson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Watford v. Doe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Watford v. Fossum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 884
Watford v. LaFond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Watkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Watson, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1221
Watson v. Byrd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Watson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Watson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878,1237,1254
Watson v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Watson; Wright v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
Watters v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Watts v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051,1071
Way; Odermatt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Wayne County Treasurer; Neal v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Weakley v. Eagle Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
Weatherspoon; Walker v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Weaver v. Nicholson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Webb v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 948
Webb v. Harrison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Webb; Maplewood v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 946
Webb-El v. Hurwitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Webb-El v. Kane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Webber v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1235
Weber; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224
Webster v. Shanahan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
Webtrends, Inc. v. Iancu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1148
WeConnect, Inc. v. Goplin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Weddle v. Nutzman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 877
Weeks v. Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Weese v. Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Weidner v. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Weinacker v. National Loan Acquisitions Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
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Weisler v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Offce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Weisner v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947,1134
Weiss v. Commissioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1045
Weiss; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Weiss v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Weiss v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1120
Wei Sun v. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
Welch v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
Welker; Schneider v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Wellborn v. Jackson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Well Luck Co., Inc. v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1207
Wellman; Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Wellner; Fountain Circle Health and Rehabilitation v. . . . . . . . . . 917
Wellner; Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Wellner; Winchester Centre for Health and Rehabilitation v. . . . . 917
Wells v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Wells v. Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Wells v. Harry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
Wells v. Peters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Wells v. Potter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC; Pfeffer v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Wells Fargo Bank; Muckle v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1154
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Barone v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820,1029,1193
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Bernstein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Humphreys v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Medina Del Rosario v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Montoya v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Negatu v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Riley v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 971
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Singh v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.; Taggart v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Welsh v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153
Wendy's Int'l, Inc.; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839,1046
Wen Liu v. University of Miami School of Medicine . . . . . . . . . 887,1123
Wentzell v. BP America, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874,1030
Werbach v. University of Ark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993
Werdene v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 896
Wertkin, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1141
Wesley v. Town Square Media West Central Radio Broadcasting 1036
Wesling v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Wesson v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
West, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1258
West v. Berghuis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxciii
West v. Georgia
West v. Missouri
West v. Sessions
West v. Spencer
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West v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827,1217
West Chester Univ. of Pa. State Sys., Higher Ed.; Bradley v. . . . 824
West Congress Street Partners, LLC v. Rivertown Dev., LLC . . 998
West Contra Costa Unifed School Dist.; Yates v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Wester v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1052
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065,1151
Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
West Hartford Bd. of Ed.; Mr. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Westine v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1186
West's Estate v. Department of Veterans Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
West Va.; Jedediah C. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
West Va.; Jeffrey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
West Va.; Wilfred H. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
West Va.; W. P. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
West Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources; S. R. v. . . . . . . . 1159
Wetch; Fleck v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1031
Wetzel; Abdul-Salaam v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109
Wetzel; Gibson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Wetzel; Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . 1140
Wetzel; Miller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
Wetzel; Pirela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
Wetzel; Stoltzfoos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. . . . . . 9
Wharton v. Vaughn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1038
Wheatt; East Cleveland v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Wheeler v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Wheeler v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245
Wheeler; United States v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Whipple v. Florida Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Whisby v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Whitaker; Bueno-Muela v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Whitaker; Choizilme v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1072
Whitaker; Duplessis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Whitaker; Duplessis-Jean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Whitaker; Gutierrez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Whitaker; Hussein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1075
Whitaker; Jean v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Whitaker; Lara-Aguilar v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Whitaker; Lemus Martinez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Whitaker; Lucio-Rayos v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1108
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Whitaker; Mapuatuli v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Whitaker; Martin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1164
Whitaker; Michaels v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1122
Whitaker; Onduso v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Whitaker; Ramirez-Barajas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1020
Whitaker; Uribe-Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Whitaker; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Whitaker; Williamson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
White v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
White; Bailey v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 841,1046
White v. Bracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1089
White; Byers v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1238
White; Carpenter v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 864
White; Coxe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1205
White v. Detroit East Community Mental Health . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
White v. Ector County Appraisal Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
White v. Foster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 874
White; Gerrard v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
White; Grant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857,1245
White v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1158
White v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
White v. Knight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 840
White v. Matthews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
White v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
White v. Southeast Mich. Surgical Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
White; Stuhr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 880,1046
White v. Underwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
White v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992,1164,1201
Whited; Tory v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118
Whitehead v. Netfix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 871
White Oak Realty, LLC v. Army Corps of Engineers . . . . . . . . . 1147
Whitfeld; Armando v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Whitfeld v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Whitfeld; Sarres Mendoza v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1231
Whitfeld v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
Whitley; Reece v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
Whitley v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168
Whitlow v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Whitman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200
Whitney v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 950
Whitney v. Chancellor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1189
Whitney v. Glover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1123
Whitney v. Guterres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Whitney v. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026
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Whitney v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Whitton v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 922
Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.; Adkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053,1188
Whole Woman's Health v. Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops 1145
Wichita; McDonald v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1127
Wicks v. Radnothy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209
Wicomico County Dept. of Social Services; E. B. v. . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Wiese v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Wiest v. U. S. District Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821
Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Wiggins v. Tanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Wilborn v. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1094
Wilcox v. New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1237
Wildcard Systems, Inc.; Alexsam, Inc. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 917
Wiley v. Cartledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1233
Wilford v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Wilfred H. v. West Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Wilkerson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 930,1061
Wilkerson v. Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Wilkes; Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 809
Wilkie; Barraquias v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 911,1246
Wilkie; Garcia v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Wilkie; Gray v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 985
Wilkie; Kisor v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Wilkie; Williams v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Wilkins v. Contra Costa Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Wilkins v. Gonzalez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1199
Wilkins v. Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Wilkins v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928
Wilkins v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Wilks v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Wilks v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Willacy v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 866
Willan v. Petitioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1025
Williams, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 916,1220
Williams v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843,1054,1162,1167,1186,1206
Williams v. Campbell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Williams v. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Williams v. Cox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 914
Williams v. Curtin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Williams v. Davis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1161
Williams v. Inch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Williams v. Jarvis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Williams; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
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Williams; Judy v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Williams v. Kent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848,1134
Williams; Klein v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Williams v. Los Angeles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
Williams v. Los Angeles Cty. Dept. of Public Social Servs. . . . 882,1031
Williams v. Mayberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Williams v. McCain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 830
Williams v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Williams v. Minor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Williams v. Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1041
Williams v. National Gallery, London . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1225
Williams v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Williams v. Norman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
Williams v. North Carolina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 881
Williams v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128
Williams v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 975
Williams v. Safre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1081
Williams v. Samson Resources Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
Williams v. Sood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 947
Williams v. Soto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Williams v. Superior Court of Cal., Los Angeles County . . . . 1036,1041
Williams v. Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Williams v. Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925,1075
Williams; Thomas v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050,1186
Williams v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926,
927,951,991,1056,1073,1078,1091,1121,1190,1192,1202,1235,
1257
Williams v. Vannoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1232
Williams v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084
Williams v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Williams v. Wilkie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1220
Williamson v. Luther . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Williamson v. Whitaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069
Willis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Willock v. Sperfslage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB; Soccolich v. . . . . . . . . . . 1021
Wilmington Trust; Stoller v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1085
Wilmore v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1088,1218
Wilmot v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
Wilson; Allah v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Wilson v. Berryhill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155
Wilson; Brandon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827
Wilson v. Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144
Wilson; Counts v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
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Wilson v. Delta Airlines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Wilson v. Federal Correctional Institution at Cumberland . . . . . . 895
Wilson v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1082
Wilson v. Illinois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
Wilson v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Wilson v. LeGrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1253
Wilson v. McKeesport Police Dept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 895
Wilson v. Offce of the Comm'r of the Revenue of Stafford Cty. 1148
Wilson v. Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Wilson v. Paramo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 882
Wilson v. Soto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
Wilson; Tyler v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1044
Wilson v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891,895,952,1042
Wilson; Uzoechi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024
Wilson v. Wisconsin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Wimberly v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Winchester Centre for Health and Rehabilitation v. Wellner . . . . 917
Windom v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
Wing v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1076
Wingate v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095
Winkles, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813
Winn; Gant v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Winn; Harrington v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837
Winnebago County Sheriff's Offce; Shea v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1149
Winnie Palmer Hospital; Bell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Winston v. Bank of Nova Scotia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Winston v. Scotia Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 838
Winters v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Wisconsin; Bartelt v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 819
Wisconsin; D. L. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Wisconsin; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1230
Wisconsin; Ibragimov v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1223
Wisconsin; Kerr v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Wisconsin; McAlister v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086
Wisconsin; Mitchell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1113
Wisconsin; Smith v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 832
Wisconsin; Wilson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Wisconsin Central Ltd.; TiEnergy, LLC v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1115
Wisconsin Offce of Lawyer Regulation; Nora v. . . . . . . . . . . . 1037,1187
Wise v. Hurt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964
Wishnefsky v. Salameh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1077
Witchard v. Antonelli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1090
Witherspoon v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 845
WMATA; Duma v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 839
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WMC Mortgage; Jenkins v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 891
Woide v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 997
Wolf v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255
Wolfe; Bennett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885,1061
Wolfe; Tunstall v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1002
Wolfe v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Womack v. Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
Won; Min Ho Kwon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
Wong v. Lubetkin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1142
Wood v. Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1055
Wood v. Oklahoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Woods, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 812,1033
Woods v. Arizona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859,1030
Woods; Glover v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
Woods v. Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054
Woods v. Warden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1049
Woods; Wilkerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1160
Woodside v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1226
Woodward v. Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1046
Wooten, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050
Wooten v. Arkansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1116
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.; Moss v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
Workman v. Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Workman v. Vandermosten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1228
World Programming Ltd. v. SAS Institute, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 815
W. P. v. West Va. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
Wray v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1186
Wren v. Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1240
Wright v. Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1039
Wright; Librace v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023
Wright v. Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Wright v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1043
Wright v. Thomas Nelson Community College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
Wright v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 853,889,1147,1164,1191
Wright v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Wright v. Watson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1222
W. S. v. S. T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
WTVR, LLC; Horne v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1074
Wu v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Wyatt v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862
Wyatt v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1078
Wyche v. Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Wylie; Johnson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Wynn v. Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cxcix
Page
Wyoming; Herrera v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032
Wyoming; Triplett v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 855,1061
Xiu Jian Sun v. Asiello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Xiu Jian Sun v. Mullkoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 987
Xiu Jian Sun v. Newman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Xiu Jian Sun v. New York City Human Resources Admin. . . . . . . 822
Xiu Jian Sun v. Pollak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 816
Xiu Jian Sun v. Schneiderman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825
Xiu Jian Sun v. Supreme Court of N. Y., Queens Cty. . . . . . . . . . . 817
Xiu Jian Sun v. Trump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Xiu Jian Sun v. Zeve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Xu v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Xyngular Corp.; Schenkel v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1071
Yackel v. South Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Yadav v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection . . . . 1076,1245
Yagman v. Colello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1073
Yahnke v. North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 885
YAI National Institute for People with Disabilities v. Levy . . . . . 1195
Yale Univ. School of Medicine; Rafi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990,1111
Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A.; Hickerson v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 820
Yancey v. Alabama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Yanez v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1083
Yan Ping Xu v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872
Yan Sui v. Marshack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 821,822
Yates v. Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1219
Yates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145
Yates v. West Contra Costa Unifed School Dist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811
Yawn v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
Ybarra v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 989
Yee; DeOrio v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Yee; Franceschi v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Yegiyan v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1042
Yellowbear v. Lampert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1121
Yelp, Inc.; Hassell v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126
Yerton v. Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
Yin v. Biogen, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1157
Yin v. Thermo Fisher Scientifc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1109,1259
Ying Chen v. Suffolk County Community College . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Yoder v. Good Will Steam Fire Engine Co. No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Yonamine, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811,1067,1188
Yong v. Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944
York v. SSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 807
York County Bd. of Supervisors; Davis v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 842
Young v. Chapdelaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1229
cc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED
Page
Young; Herman v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
Young v. New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834
Young v. Ocasio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Young v. Oregon Dept. of Corrections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 890
Young v. Overly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147
Young; South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 998
Young v. Tampa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Young v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 826,895,1056,1161,1257
Young v. Voong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1198
Young Adult Institute, Inc. v. Levy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1195
Young Cty.; Sanchez v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
Young Kim v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040,1188
Young Kim Soon v. California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040
Young Sung Lee v. Garvey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 870
Yovino v. Rizo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
YPF S. A. v. Petersen Energia Inversora S. A. U. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Yufa v. TSI Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Yuk v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Yum! Brands, Inc.; Blair v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 912
Yun v. Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844
Zack v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
Zagorski v. Haslam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Zagorski v. Mays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
Zagorski; Mays v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
Zagorski v. Parker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
Zahnd v. Offce of Chief Discip. Counsel, Supreme Ct. of Mo. . . . . 877
Zaitsev v. Keller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
Zamora v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Zank v. Lopez Moreno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1241
Zapata v. PECO Energy Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1156
Zapata v. PEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 808
Zapata-Ochoa v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
Zappos.com, Inc. v. Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1247
Zaremba Family Farms v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. . . . . . 943,1126
Zastrow; Houston Auto M. Imports Greenway, Ltd. v. . . . . . . . . . 1151
Zastrow; Mercedes-Benz of Houston Greenway v. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1151
Zatecky; Culver v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 925
Zatecky; Laux v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904
Zatecky; Pello v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 927
Zatecky; Reese v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234
Zater, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1034
Zater v. Atkinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1227
Zavala v. Rios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 990
Zeledon v. Hatton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cci
Page
Zell v. Klingelhafer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1208
Zemke v. Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1119
Zemlyansky v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1236
Zeno; Pabon Ortega v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1069,1187
Zenquis v. Jones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 868
Zepeda-Ramirez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900
Zeve; Xiu Jian Sun v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
Ziming Shen v. New York City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817
Zimmerman v. Austin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051
Zimmermann, In re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143
Zinkand v. Hernandez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1169
Zinke; American Exploration & Mining Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Zinke; Bruette v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053
Zinke; National Mining Assn. v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 814
Zinke; Tanner-Brown v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 824
Zirus v. Keller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1250
Zivot v. Superior Court of Cal., Contra Costa Cty. . . . . . . . . . . . . 887
Zodhiates v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064,1204
Zografdis v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858
Zonies; Reardon v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 919
Zovko v. National Credit Union Administration Bd. . . . . . . . . . . . 873
Zucker; Kilpatrick v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000
Zukerman v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019,1193
Zuniga v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904,1093
Zuniga-Garcia v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
Zuniga Hernandez v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1162
Zuniga-Zaragoza v. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1093
ZUP, LLC v. Nash Mfg., Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1150
CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DISTRICT v. GUIDO et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 17–587. Argued October 1, 2018—Decided November 6, 2018
John Guido and Dennis Rankin fled suit, alleging that the Mount Lemmon
Fire District, a political subdivision in Arizona, terminated their employment
as frefghters in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Fire District responded that it was
too small to qualify as an “employer” under the ADEA, which provides:
“The term `employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . . The term also
means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision
of a State . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 630(b).
Initially, both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA
applied solely to private sector employers. In 1974, Congress amended
the ADEA to cover state and local governments. A previous, 1972,
amendment to Title VII added States and their subdivisions to the
defnition of “person[s],” specifying that those entities are engaged in an
industry affecting commerce. The Title VII amendment thus subjected
States and their subdivisions to liability only if they employ a threshold
number of workers, currently 15. By contrast, the 1974 ADEA amendment
added state and local governments directly to the defnition of
“employer.” The same 1974 enactment also amended the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), on which many aspects of the ADEA are based,
to reach all government employers regardless of their size. 29 U. S. C.
§ 203(d), (x).
1
2 MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. v. GUIDO
Syllabus
Held: The definitional provision's two-sentence delineation, set out in
§ 630(b), and the expression “also means” at the start of § 630(b)'s
second sentence, combine to establish separate categories: persons
engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees;
and States or political subdivisions with no attendant numerosity
limitation.
The words “also means” in § 630(b) add new categories of employers
to the ADEA's reach. First and foremost, the ordinary meaning of
“also means” is additive rather than clarifying. See 859 F. 3d 1168, 1171
(case below) (quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 34). The
words “also means” occur dozens of times throughout the U. S. Code,
typically carrying an additive meaning. E. g., 12 U. S. C. § 1715z–1(i)(4).
Furthermore, the second sentence of the ADEA's defnitional provision,
§ 630(b), pairs States and their political subdivisions with agents, a discrete
category that carries no numerical limitation.
Reading the ADEA's defnitional provision, § 630(b), as written to
apply to States and political subdivisions regardless of size may give the
ADEA a broader reach than Title VII, but this disparity is a consequence
of the different language Congress chose to employ. The better
comparator for the ADEA is the FLSA, which also ranks States and
political subdivisions as employers regardless of the number of employees
they have. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has,
for 30 years, interpreted the ADEA to cover political subdivisions regardless
of size, and a majority of the States impose age discrimination
proscriptions on political subdivisions with no numerical threshold.
Pp. 6–8.
859 F. 3d 1168, affrmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except Kavanaugh, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
E. Joshua Rosenkranz argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Thomas M. Bondy, Christopher
J. Cariello, and Jeffrey C. Matura.
Jeffrey L. Fisher argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Don Awerkamp, Shannon Giles,
David T. Goldberg, and Pamela S. Karlan.
Jonathan C. Bond argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging affrmance. On the brief were Solicitor
General Francisco, Deputy Solicitor General Wall,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 1 (2018) 3
Opinion of the Court
Morgan L. Goodspeed, Jennifer S. Goldstein, and Anne
Noel Occhialino.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Faced with a budget shortfall, Mount Lemmon Fire District,
a political subdivision in Arizona, laid off its two oldest
full-time frefghters, John Guido (then 46) and Dennis Rankin
(then 54). Guido and Rankin sued the Fire District,
alleging that their termination violated the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. The Fire District sought
dismissal of the suit on the ground that the District was too
small to qualify as an “employer” within the ADEA's compass.
The Act's controlling defnitional provision, 29 U. S. C.
§ 630(b), reads:
“The term `employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees
. . . . The term also means (1) any agent of such
a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a
State . . . .”
The question presented: Does the ADEA's numerosity
specifcation (20 or more employees), applicable to “a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce,” apply as well
to state entities (including state political subdivisions)? We
hold, in accord with the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, that § 630(b)'s two-sentence delineation,
and the expression “also means” at the start of the second
sentence, combine to establish separate categories: persons
engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more
employees; and States or political subdivisions with no at-
*Collin O'Connor Udell and Lisa Soronen fled a brief for the National
Conference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Daniel B. Kohrman, Laurie A. McCann, Dara S. Smith, and William
Alvarado Rivera fled a brief for AARP et al. as amici curiae urging
affrmance.
4 MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. v. GUIDO
Opinion of the Court
tendant numerosity limitation. “[T]wenty or more employees”
is confning language, but the confnement is tied to
§ 630(b)'s frst sentence, and does not limit the ADEA's governance
of the employment practices of States and political
subdivisions thereof.
I
Initially, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., which prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin, applied solely to private sector
employers. The same was true of the ADEA, enacted three
years later to protect workers against “arbitrary age discrimination.”
29 U. S. C. § 621(b). As originally enacted,
both Title VII and the ADEA imposed liability on “employer[
s],” defned in both statutes to include “a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce” whose employees met a
numerical threshold, but specifcally to exclude governmental
entities. 78 Stat. 253 (Title VII); 81 Stat. 605 (ADEA).
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to reach state and
local employers. Under the revised provision of Title VII,
“[t]he term `person' includes one or more individuals, governments,
governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions,”
also certain other specifed entities, and “[t]he term `employer'
means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has ffteen or more employees . . . .” 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e(a)–(b). For this purpose, amended Title VII defnes
“industry affecting commerce” to “includ[e] any governmental
industry, business, or activity.” § 2000e(h). The 1972
amendment to Title VII thereby extended the statute's coverage
to state and local government entities by defning
them as “person[s].” In turn, as “person[s],” these entities
meet Title VII's defnition of “employer” and are subject to
liability only if they have at least 15 employees.1
1 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 defnes “employer” in materially
the same way as Title VII and accords “person . . . the same
meaning” as in Title VII. 42 U. S. C. § 12111(5), (7).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 1 (2018) 5
Opinion of the Court
Two years later, in 1974, Congress amended the ADEA to
cover state and local governments. Unlike in Title VII,
where Congress added such entities to the defnition of “person,”
in the ADEA, Congress added them directly to the
defnition of “employer.” Thus, since 1974, the ADEA's key
defnitional provision has read:
“The term `employer' means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more
employees . . . . The term also means (1) any agent of
such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of
a State . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 630(b).
In the same 1974 enactment, Congress amended the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), on which parts of the ADEA
had been modeled, to reach all government employers
regardless of their size. See 88 Stat. 58, 29 U. S. C.
§ 203(d), (x).
The parties dispute the proper reading of the ADEA following
the 1974 amendment. Does “also means” add new
categories to the defnition of “employer,” or does it merely
clarify that States and their political subdivisions are a type
of “person” included in § 630(b)'s frst sentence? If the former,
state and local governments are covered by the ADEA
regardless of whether they have as many as 20 employees.
If the latter, they are covered only if they have at least 20
employees. Federal courts have divided on this question.
Compare Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F. 2d 269 (CA7
1986) (state and local governments are covered by the
ADEA only if they have at least 20 employees); Cink v.
Grant County, 635 Fed. Appx. 470 (CA10 2015) (same);
Palmer v. Arkansas Council on Economic Educ., 154 F. 3d
892 (CA8 1998) (same); EEOC v. Monclova, 920 F. 2d 360
(CA6 1990) (same), with this case, 859 F. 3d 1168 (CA9 2017)
(state and local governments are covered by the ADEA regardless
of their number of employees). We granted certiorari
to resolve the confict. 583 U. S. 1155 (2018).
6 MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. v. GUIDO
Opinion of the Court
II
For several reasons, we conclude that the words “also
means” in § 630(b) add new categories of employers to the
ADEA's reach. First and foremost, the ordinary meaning
of “also means” is additive rather than clarifying. As the
Ninth Circuit explained, “ `also' is a term of enhancement; it
means `in addition; besides' and `likewise; too.' ” 859 F. 3d,
at 1171 (quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 34
(1973)). Indeed, reading “also” additively to create a separate
category of “employer” seemed to this Court altogether
ftting in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983). There,
we held that applying the ADEA to state and local governments
does not encroach on States' sovereignty or Tenth
Amendment immunity. Id., at 240–242. In the course of so
holding, we described the 1974 ADEA amendment as “extend[
ing] the substantive prohibitions of the Act to employers
having at least 20 workers [as opposed to 25 in the original
version], and to the Federal and State Governments.”
Id., at 233 (emphasis added). In this regard, we note, it is
undisputed that the ADEA covers Federal Government entities,
which our opinion in Wyoming grouped with state entities,
regardless of the number of workers they employ. 29
U. S. C. § 633a.
Instructive as well, the phrase “also means” occurs dozens
of times throughout the U. S. Code, typically carrying an
additive meaning. See Brief for Respondents 11–13, and
n. 2 (collecting citations). For example, 12 U. S. C. § 1715z–
1(i)(4), provides:
“[T]he term `elderly families' means families which consist
of two or more persons the head of which (or his
spouse) is sixty-two years of age or over or is handicapped.
Such term also means a single person who is
sixty-two years of age or over or is handicapped.”
“[A] single person” plainly adds to, rather than clarifes, the
preceding statutory delineation, “two or more persons.”
Cite as: 586 U. S. 1 (2018) 7
Opinion of the Court
Just so with States and their political subdivisions in the
ADEA's definition of “employer. ” Notably, in § 1715z–
1(i)(4), Congress repeated the “sixty-two years of age or over
or is handicapped” qualifer to render it applicable to “a single
person.” In the ADEA, by contrast, Congress did not
repeat the “twenty or more employees” qualifer when referencing
state and local government entities. This Court is
not at liberty to insert the absent qualifer.
Furthermore, the text of § 630(b) pairs States and their
political subdivisions with agents, a discrete category that,
beyond doubt, carries no numerical limitation. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 55–56. The Fire District does not gainsay that
the 20-employee restriction applies to § 630(b)'s frst sentence.
Its construction, however, would lift that restriction
for the agent portion of the second sentence, and then reimpose
it for the portion of that sentence addressing States and
their political subdivisions. We resist a reading so strange.2
The Fire District presses the argument that the ADEA
should be interpreted in line with Title VII, which, as noted
supra, at 4, applies to state and local governments only if
they meet a numerosity specifcation. True, reading the
ADEA as written to apply to States and political subdivisions
regardless of size gives the ADEA, in this regard, a
broader reach than Title VII. But this disparity is a consequence
of the different language Congress chose to employ.
See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167,
174 (2009) (differences between Title VII's and the ADEA's
language should not be ignored). The better comparator is
the FLSA, on which many aspects of the ADEA are based.
See 29 U. S. C. § 626(b) (ADEA incorporates the “powers,
remedies, and procedures” of the FLSA). Like the FLSA,
the ADEA ranks States and political subdivisions as “employer[
s]” regardless of the number of employees they have.
2 We need not linger over possible applications of the agent clause, for
no question of agent liability is before us in this case.
8 MOUNT LEMMON FIRE DIST. v. GUIDO
Opinion of the Court
The Fire District warns that applying the ADEA to small
public entities risks curtailment of vital public services such
as fre protection. Experience suggests otherwise. For 30
years, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has
consistently interpreted the ADEA as we do today. EEOC
Compliance Manual: Threshold Issues § 2–III(B)(1)(a)(i), and
n. 99. See also Kelly, 801 F. 2d, at 270, n. 1. And a majority
of States forbid age discrimination by political subdivisions
of any size; some 15 of these States subject private sector
employers to age discrimination proscriptions only if they
employ at least a threshold number of workers. See Brief
for Respondents 28–29, and n. 6 (collecting citations). No
untoward service shrinkages have been documented.
In short, the text of the ADEA's defnitional provision,
also its kinship to the FLSA and differences from Title VII,
leave scant room for doubt that state and local governments
are “employer[s]” covered by the ADEA regardless of their
size.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
Affrmed.
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 9
Syllabus
WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 17–71. Argued October 1, 2018—Decided November 27, 2018
The Fish and Wildlife Service administers the Endangered Species Act of
1973 on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. In 2001, the Service
listed the dusky gopher frog as an endangered species. See 16 U. S. C.
§ 1533(a)(1). That required the Service to designate “critical habitat”
for the frog. The Service proposed designating as part of that critical
habitat a site in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, which the Service
dubbed “Unit 1.” The frog had once lived in Unit 1, but the land had
long been used as a commercial timber plantation, and no frogs had been
spotted there for decades. The Service concluded that Unit 1 met the
statutory defnition of unoccupied critical habitat because its rare, highquality
breeding ponds and distance from existing frog populations
made it essential for the species' conservation. § 1532(5)(A)(ii). The
Service then commissioned a report on the probable economic impact of
its proposed critical-habitat designation. § 1533(b)(2). With regard to
Unit 1, the report found that designation might bar future development
of the site, depriving the owners of up to $33.9 million. The Service
nonetheless concluded that the potential costs were not disproportionate
to the conservation benefts and proceeded to designate Unit 1 as critical
habitat for the dusky gopher frog.
Unit 1 is owned by petitioner Weyerhaeuser and a group of family
landowners. The owners of Unit 1 sued, contending that the closedcanopy
timber plantation on Unit 1 could not be critical habitat for the
dusky gopher frog, which lives in open-canopy forests. The District
Court upheld the designation. The landowners also challenged the
Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1 from the frog's critical habitat,
arguing that the Service had failed to adequately weigh the benefts of
designating Unit 1 against the economic impact, had used an unreasonable
methodology for estimating economic impact, and had failed to consider
several categories of costs. The District Court approved the
Service's methodology and declined to consider the challenge to the
Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1. The Fifth Circuit affrmed,
rejecting the suggestion that the “critical habitat” defnition contains
any habitability requirement and concluding that the Service's decision
not to exclude Unit 1 was committed to agency discretion by law and
was therefore unreviewable.
10 WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Syllabus
Held:
1. An area is eligible for designation as critical habitat under
§ 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) only if it is habitat for the species. That provision, the
sole source of authority for critical-habit designations, states that when
the Secretary lists a species as endangered he must also “designate any
habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat.”
It does not authorize the Secretary to designate the area as critical
habitat unless it is also habitat for the species. The defnition allows
the Secretary to identify a subset of habitat that is critical, but leaves
the larger category of habitat undefned. The Service does not now
dispute that critical habitat must be habitat, but argues that habitat can
include areas that, like Unit 1, would require some degree of modifcation
to support a sustainable population of a given species. Weyerhaeuser
urges that habitat cannot include areas where the species
could not currently survive. The Service, in turn, disputes the premise
that the administrative record shows that the frog could not survive in
Unit 1. The Court of Appeals, which had no occasion to interpret the
term “habitat” in § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) or to assess the Service's administrative
fndings regarding Unit 1, should address these questions in the
frst instance. Pp. 19–21.
2. The Secretary's decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat
under § 1533(b)(2) is subject to judicial review. The Administrative
Procedure Act creates a “basic presumption of judicial review” of agency
action. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140. The Service
contends that the presumption is rebutted here because the action
is “committed to agency discretion by law,” 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2), because
§ 1533(b)(2) is one of those rare provisions “drawn so that a court would
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise
of discretion,” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 191.
Section 1533(b)(2) describes a unifed process for weighing the impact
of designating an area as critical habitat. The provision's frst sentence
requires the Secretary to “tak[e] into consideration” economic and other
impacts before designation, and the second sentence authorizes the Secretary
to act on his consideration by providing that he “may exclude
any area from critical habitat if he determines that the benefts of such
exclusion outweigh the benefts of ” designation. The word “may” certainly
confers discretion on the Secretary, but it does not segregate his
discretionary decision not to exclude from the mandated procedure to
consider the economic and other impacts of designation when making
his exclusion decisions. The statute is, therefore, not “drawn so that a
court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
[Secretary's] exercise of [his] discretion” not to exclude. Lincoln, 508
U. S., at 191. Weyerhaeuser's claim—that the agency did not appropriCite
as: 586 U. S. 9 (2018) 11
Syllabus
ately consider all the relevant statutory factors meant to guide the
agency in the exercise of its discretion—is the sort of claim that federal
courts routinely assess when determining whether to set aside an
agency decision as an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals should
consider in the frst instance the question whether the Service's assessment
of the costs and benefts of designation and resulting decision not
to exclude Unit 1 was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Pp. 21–26.
827 F. 3d 452, vacated and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except Kavanaugh, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
Timothy S. Bishop argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Chad M. Clamage, Richard C. Stanley,
James R. Johnston, and Zachary R. Hiatt. Mark
Miller, Christina M. Martin, Edward B. Poitevent II, Damien
M. Schiff, Anthony L. François, Oliver J. Dunford,
and Jonathan Wood fled a brief for Markle Interests, LLC,
et al., respondents under this Court's Rule 12.6 in support
of petitioner.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
federal respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Francisco, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Wood, Jeffrey E. Sandberg, Andrew C. Mergen, and J. David
Gunter II. David T. Goldberg, Pamela S. Karlan, John T.
Buse, and Collette L. Adkins fled a brief for intervenorrespondents
Center for Biological Diversity et al.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Alabama
et al. by Steve Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, and Eric
Palmer, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Jahna Lindemuth of Alaska, Leslie
Rutledge of Arkansas, Cynthia Coffman of Colorado, Christopher M. Carr
of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Jeff
Landry of Louisiana, Bill Schuette of Michigan, Tim Fox of Montana,
Doug Peterson of Nebraska, Adam Laxalt of Nevada, Michael DeWine of
Ohio, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Ken
Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, Patrick Morrisey of West Vir12
WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Endangered Species Act directs the Secretary of the
Interior, upon listing a species as endangered, to also desigginia,
Brad Schimel of Wisconsin, and Peter K. Michael of Wyoming; for
San Juan County, Utah, by Shawn T. Welch; for St. Tammany Parish Government
by Bernard S. Smith; for the American Exploration & Production
Council et al. by Andrew J. Turner, Karma B. Brown, Elbert Lin, Peter
Tolsdorf, Kerry L. McGrath, Stacy R. Linden, and Rae E. Cronmiller; for
the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Tyson C. Kade, William
R. Murray, Ellen Steen, and Rachel Lattimore; for the Building Industry
Legal Defense Foundation et al. by Paul J. Beard II; for the Cato Institute
et al. by Ilya Shapiro, Martin J. Newhouse, and John Pagliaro; for the
Cause of Action Institute by John J. Vecchione, Kara E. McKenna, and
Cynthia F. Crawford; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America by Aaron M. Streett and Shane Pennington; for the Coalition
for a Sustainable Delta et al. by Daniel J. O'Hanlon, Jon D. Rubin, Rebecca
R. Akroyd, Paul S. Weiland, and Robert D. Thornton; for the Energy
and Wildlife Action Coalition by Svend A. Brandt-Erichsen and Steven P.
Quarles; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by Thomas
J. Ward, Jeffrey B. Augello, and Lawson E. Fite; for the National Conference
of State Legislatures et al. by Bryan K. Weir, Thomas R. McCarthy,
J. Michael Connolly, and Lisa Soronen; for the National Federation of
Independent Business Small Business Legal Center et al. by Robert Henneke
and Theodore Hadzi-Antich; for the Southeastern Legal Foundation
by Kimberly S. Hermann; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by
Richard A. Samp and Cory L. Andrews; and for the Wyoming Stock Growers
Association et al. by Karen Budd-Falen.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Defenders of
Wildlife et al. by Jason C. Rylander; for Economists and Law Professors
by Amy J. Wildermuth, Amy Sinden, and Douglas R. Williams; for Environmental
Law Professors by Patrick Parenteau, Daniel Rohlf, and Hope
M. Babcock; for Evangelical Environmental Network et al. by Ian
Weinstein and Michael W. Martin; for Former Department of the Interior
Offcials by Ann E. Prezyna and Jessica N. Walder; for Gopher Frog Experts
by Lisa W. Jordan; for Landowners by Stuart Banner; for Scientists
by Sean B. Hecht; and for Small Business Owners by J. Carl Cecere and
Kevin J. Lynch.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
by Louis A. Chaiten, John C. Eastman, and Anthony T. Caso;
and for the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School
of Law by Richard L. Revesz and Jason A. Schwartz.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 9 (2018) 13
Opinion of the Court
nate the “critical habitat” of the species. A group of landowners
whose property was designated as critical habitat for
an endangered frog challenged the designation. The landowners
urge that their land cannot be critical habitat because
it is not habitat, which they contend refers only to
areas where the frog could currently survive. The court
below ruled that the Act imposed no such limitation on the
scope of critical habitat.
The Act also authorizes the Secretary to exclude an area
that would otherwise be included as critical habitat, if the
benefts of exclusion outweigh the benefts of designation.
The landowners challenged the decision of the Secretary not
to exclude their property, but the court below held that the
Secretary's action was not subject to judicial review.
We granted certiorari to review both rulings.
I
A
The amphibian Rana sevosa is popularly known as the
“dusky gopher frog”—“dusky” because of its dark coloring
and “gopher” because it lives underground. The dusky gopher
frog is about three inches long, with a large head, plump
body, and short legs. Warts dot its back, and dark spots
cover its entire body. Final Rule To List the Mississippi
Gopher Frog Distinct Population Segment of Dusky Gopher
Frog as Endangered, 66 Fed. Reg. 62993 (2001) (Final Listing).
It is noted for covering its eyes with its front legs
when it feels threatened, peeking out periodically until danger
passes. Markle Interests, LLC v. United States Fish
and Wildlife Serv., 827 F. 3d 452, 458, n. 2 (CA5 2016). Less
endearingly, it also secretes a bitter, milky substance to
deter would-be diners. Brief for Intervenor-Respondents
6, n. 1.
The frog spends most of its time in burrows and stump
holes located in upland longleaf pine forests. In such forests,
frequent fres help maintain an open canopy, which in
turn allows vegetation to grow on the forest foor. The veg14
WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Opinion of the Court
etation supports the small insects that the frog eats and provides
a place for the frog's eggs to attach when it breeds.
The frog breeds in “ephemeral” ponds that are dry for part
of the year. Such ponds are safe for tadpoles because predatory
fsh cannot live in them. Designation of Critical Habitat
for Dusky Gopher Frog, 77 Fed. Reg. 35129–35131
(2012) (Designation).
The dusky gopher frog once lived throughout coastal Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi, in the longleaf pine forests
that used to cover the southeast. But more than 98% of
those forests have been removed to make way for urban development,
agriculture, and timber plantations. The timber
plantations consist of fast-growing loblolly pines planted as
close together as possible, resulting in a closed-canopy forest
inhospitable to the frog. The near eradication of the frog's
habitat sent the species into severe decline. By 2001, the
known wild population of the dusky gopher frog had dwindled
to a group of 100 at a single pond in southern Mississippi.
That year, the Fish and Wildlife Service, which administers
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 on behalf of
the Secretary of the Interior, listed the dusky gopher frog
as an endangered species. Final Listing 62993–62995; see
87 Stat. 886, 16 U. S. C. § 1533(a)(1).
B
When the Secretary lists a species as endangered, he must
also designate the critical habitat of that species. § 1533(a)
(3)(A)(i). The ESA defnes “critical habitat” as:
“(i) the specifc areas within the geographical area occupied
by the species . . . on which are found those physical
or biological features (I) essential to the conservation
of the species and (II) which may require special management
considerations or protection; and
“(ii) specifc areas outside the geographical area occupied
by the species . . . upon a determination by the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 9 (2018) 15
Opinion of the Court
Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation
of the species.” § 1532(5)(A).
Before the Secretary may designate an area as critical
habitat, the ESA requires him to “tak[e] into consideration
the economic impact” and other relevant impacts of the designation.
§ 1533(b)(2). The statute goes on to authorize
him to “exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines
that the benefts of such exclusion outweigh the benefts
of [designation],” unless exclusion would result in extinction
of the species. Ibid.
A critical-habitat designation does not directly limit the
rights of private landowners. It instead places conditions
on the Federal Government's authority to effect any physical
changes to the designated area, whether through activities
of its own or by facilitating private development. Section 7
of the ESA requires all federal agencies to consult with the
Secretary to “[e]nsure that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency” is not likely to adversely affect
a listed species' critical habitat. 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2). If
the Secretary determines that an agency action, such as issuing
a permit, would harm critical habitat, then the agency
must terminate the action, implement an alternative proposed
by the Secretary, or seek an exemption from the
Cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee. See National
Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551
U. S. 644, 652 (2007); 50 CFR §402.15 (2017).
Due to resource constraints, the Service did not designate
the frog's critical habitat in 2001, when it listed the frog as
endangered. Designation, at 35118–35119. In the following
years, the Service discovered two additional naturally
occurring populations and established another population
through translocation. The frst population nonetheless remains
the only stable one and by far the largest. Dept. of
Interior, U. S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Dusky Gopher Frog
(Rana sevosa) Recovery Plan iv, 6–7 (2015).
16 WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Opinion of the Court
In 2010, in response to litigation by the Center for Biological
Diversity, the Service published a proposed criticalhabitat
designation. Designation, at 35119. The Service
proposed to designate as occupied critical habitat all four
areas with existing dusky gopher frog populations. The
Service found that each of those areas possessed the three
features that the Service considered “essential to the conservation”
of the frog and that required special protection:
ephemeral ponds; upland open-canopy forest containing the
holes and burrows in which the frog could live; and opencanopy
forest connecting the two. But the Service also determined
that designating only those four sites would not
adequately ensure the frog's conservation. Because the existing
dusky gopher frog populations were all located in two
adjacent counties on the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, local
events such as extreme weather or an outbreak of an infectious
disease could jeopardize the entire species. Designation
of Critical Habitat for Mississippi Gopher Frog, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31394 (2010) (proposed 50 CFR pt. 17).
To protect against that risk, the Service proposed to designate
as unoccupied critical habitat a 1,544-acre site in
St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. The site, dubbed “Unit 1”
by the Service, had been home to the last known population
of dusky gopher frogs outside of Mississippi. The frog had
not been seen in Unit 1 since 1965, and a closed-canopy timber
plantation occupied much of the site. But the Service
found that the site retained fve ephemeral ponds “of remarkable
quality,” and determined that an open-canopy forest
could be restored on the surrounding uplands “with reasonable
effort.” Although the uplands in Unit 1 lacked the
open-canopy forests (and, of course, the frogs) necessary for
designation as occupied critical habitat, the Service concluded
that the site met the statutory defnition of unoccupied
critical habitat because its rare, high-quality breeding
ponds and its distance from existing frog populations made
Cite as: 586 U. S. 9 (2018) 17
Opinion of the Court
it essential for the conservation of the species. Designation,
at 35118, 35124, 35133, 35135.
After issuing its proposal, the Service commissioned a report
on the probable economic impact of designating each
area, including Unit 1, as critical habitat for the dusky
gopher frog. See 16 U. S. C. § 1533(b)(2); App. 63. Petitioner
Weyerhaeuser Company, a timber company, owns part
of Unit 1 and leases the remainder from a group of family
landowners. Brief for Petitioner 16. While the criticalhabitat
designation has no direct effect on the timber operations,
St. Tammany Parish is a fast-growing part of the
New Orleans metropolitan area, and the landowners have
already invested in plans to more proftably develop the site.
App. 80–83. The report recognized that anyone developing
the area may need to obtain Clean Water Act permits from
the Army Corps of Engineers before flling any wetlands
on Unit 1. 33 U. S. C. § 1344(a). Because Unit 1 is designated
as critical habitat, Section 7 of the ESA would require
the Corps to consult with the Service before issuing any
permits.
According to the report, that consultation process could
result in one of three outcomes. First, it could turn out that
the wetlands in Unit 1 are not subject to the Clean Water
Act permitting requirements, in which case the landowners
could proceed with their plans unimpeded. Second, the
Service could ask the Corps not to issue permits to the landowners
to fll some of the wetlands on the site, in effect prohibiting
development on 60% of Unit 1. The report estimated
that this would deprive the owners of $20.4 million in
development value. Third, by asking the Corps to deny
even more of the permit requests, the Service could bar all
development of Unit 1, costing the owners $33.9 million.
The Service concluded that those potential costs were not
“disproportionate” to the conservation benefts of designation.
“Consequently,” the Service announced, it would not
18 WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Opinion of the Court
“exercis[e] [its] discretion to exclude” Unit 1 from the dusky
gopher frog's critical habitat. App. 188–190.
C
Weyerhaeuser and the family landowners sought to vacate
the designation in Federal District Court. They contended
that Unit 1 could not be critical habitat for the dusky gopher
frog because the frog could not survive there: Survival would
require replacing the closed-canopy timber plantation encircling
the ponds with an open-canopy longleaf pine forest.
The District Court nonetheless upheld the designation.
Markle Interests, LLC v. United States Fish and Wildlife
Serv., 40 F. Supp. 3d 744 (ED La. 2014). The court determined
that Unit 1 satisfed the statutory defnition of unoccupied
critical habitat, which requires only that the Service
deem the land “essential for the conservation [of] the species.”
Id., at 760.
Weyerhaeuser also challenged the Service's decision not to
exclude Unit 1 from the dusky gopher frog's critical habitat,
arguing that the Service had failed to adequately weigh the
benefts of designating Unit 1 against the economic impact.
In addition, Weyerhaeuser argued that the Service had used
an unreasonable methodology for estimating economic impact
and, regardless of methodology, had failed to consider
several categories of costs. Id., at 759. The court approved
the Service's methodology and declined to consider
Weyerhaeuser's challenge to the decision not to exclude.
See id., at 763–767, and n. 29.
The Fifth Circuit affrmed. 827 F. 3d 452. The Court of
Appeals rejected the suggestion that the defnition of critical
habitat contains any “habitability requirement.” Id., at 468.
The court also concluded that the Service's decision not to
exclude Unit 1 was committed to agency discretion by law
and was therefore unreviewable. Id., at 473–475. Judge
Owen dissented. She wrote that Unit 1 could not be “essential
for the conservation of the species” because it lacked the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 9 (2018) 19
Opinion of the Court
open-canopy forest that the Service itself had determined
was “essential to the conservation” of the frog. Id., at 480,
and n. 1.
The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Markle Interests,
LLC v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 848
F. 3d 635 (2017). Judge Jones dissented, joined by Judges
Jolly, Smith, Clement, Owen, and Elrod. They reasoned
that critical habitat must frst be habitat, and Unit 1 in its
present state could not be habitat for the dusky gopher frog.
Id., at 641. The dissenting judges also concluded that the
Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1 was reviewable for
abuse of discretion. Id., at 654, and n. 21.
We granted certiorari to consider two questions: (1)
whether “critical habitat” under the ESA must also be habitat;
and (2) whether a federal court may review an agency
decision not to exclude a certain area from critical habitat
because of the economic impact of such a designation. 583
U. S. 1101 (2018).1
II
A
Our analysis starts with the phrase “critical habitat.” According
to the ordinary understanding of how adjectives
work, “critical habitat” must also be “habitat.” Adjectives
modify nouns—they pick out a subset of a category that possesses
a certain quality. It follows that “critical habitat” is
1 Intervenor Center for Biological Diversity raises an additional question
in its brief, arguing that Weyerhaeuser lacks standing to challenge
the critical-habitat designation because it has not suffered an injury in
fact. We agree with the lower courts that the decrease in the market
value of Weyerhaeuser's land as a result of the designation is a suffciently
concrete injury for Article III purposes. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 386 (1926) (holding that a zoning ordinance that
“greatly . . . reduce[d] the value of appellee's lands and destroy[ed] their
marketability for industrial, commercial and residential uses” constituted
a “present invasion of appellee's property rights”).
20 WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Opinion of the Court
the subset of “habitat” that is “critical” to the conservation
of an endangered species.
Of course, “[s]tatutory language cannot be construed in a
vacuum,” Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U. S. 424, 438 (2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted), and so we must also consider
“critical habitat” in its statutory context. Section 4(a)(3)
(A)(i), which the lower courts did not analyze, is the sole
source of authority for critical-habitat designations. That
provision states that when the Secretary lists a species as
endangered he must also “designate any habitat of such species
which is then considered to be critical habitat.” 16
U. S. C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Only the “habitat”
of the endangered species is eligible for designation as
critical habitat. Even if an area otherwise meets the statutory
defnition of unoccupied critical habitat because the Secretary
fnds the area essential for the conservation of the
species, Section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) does not authorize the Secretary
to designate the area as critical habitat unless it is also habitat
for the species.
The Center for Biological Diversity contends that the statutory
defnition of critical habitat is complete in itself and
does not require any independent inquiry into the meaning
of the term “habitat,” which the statute leaves undefned.
Brief for Intervenor-Respondents 43–49. But the statutory
defnition of “critical habitat” tells us what makes habitat
“critical,” not what makes it “habitat.” Under the statutory
defnition, critical habitat comprises areas occupied by the
species “on which are found those physical or biological features
(I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II)
which may require special management considerations or
protection,” as well as unoccupied areas that the Secretary
determines to be “essential for the conservation of the species.”
16 U. S. C. § 1532(5)(A). That is no baseline defnition
of habitat—it identifes only certain areas that are indispensable
to the conservation of the endangered species.
The defnition allows the Secretary to identify the subset
Cite as: 586 U. S. 9 (2018) 21
Opinion of the Court
of habitat that is critical, but leaves the larger category of
habitat undefned.
The Service does not now dispute that critical habitat must
be habitat, see Brief for Federal Respondents 23, although it
made no such concession below. Instead, the Service argues
that habitat includes areas that, like Unit 1, would require
some degree of modifcation to support a sustainable population
of a given species. Id., at 27. Weyerhaeuser, for its
part, urges that habitat cannot include areas where the species
could not currently survive. Brief for Petitioner 25.
(Habitat can, of course, include areas where the species does
not currently live, given that the statute defnes critical habitat
to include unoccupied areas.) The Service in turn disputes
Weyerhaeuser's premise that the administrative record
shows that the frog could not survive in Unit 1. Brief
for Federal Respondents 22, n. 4.
The Court of Appeals concluded that “critical habitat” designations
under the statute were not limited to areas that
qualifed as habitat. See 827 F. 3d, at 468 (“There is no habitability
requirement in the text of the ESA or the implementing
regulations.”). The court therefore had no occasion
to interpret the term “habitat” in Section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) or
to assess the Service's administrative fndings regarding
Unit 1. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below and remand
to the Court of Appeals to consider these questions in
the frst instance.2
B
Weyerhaeuser also contends that, even if Unit 1 could be
properly classifed as critical habitat for the dusky gopher
2 Because we hold that an area is eligible for designation as critical habitat
under Section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) only if it is habitat for the species, it is
not necessary to consider the landowners' argument that land cannot be
“essential for the conservation of the species,” and thus cannot satisfy the
statutory defnition of unoccupied critical habitat, if it is not habitat for
the species. See Brief for Petitioner 27–28; Brief for Respondent Markle
Interests, LLC, et al. in Support of Petitioner 28–31.
22 WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Opinion of the Court
frog, the Service should have excluded it from designation
under Section 4(b)(2) of the ESA. That provision requires
the Secretary to “tak[e] into consideration the economic impact
. . . of specifying any particular area as critical habitat”
and authorizes him to “exclude any area from critical habitat
if he determines that the benefts of such exclusion outweigh
the benefts of specifying such area as part of the critical
habitat.” 16 U. S. C. § 1533(b)(2). To satisfy its obligation
to consider economic impact, the Service commissioned a
report estimating the costs of its proposed critical-habitat
designation. The Service concluded that the costs of designating
the proposed areas, including Unit 1, were not
“disproportionate” to the conservation benefts and, “[c]onsequently,”
declined to make any exclusions.
Weyerhaeuser claims that the Service's conclusion rested
on a faulty assessment of the costs and benefts of designation
and that the resulting decision not to exclude should
be set aside. Specifcally, Weyerhaeuser contends that the
Service improperly weighed the costs of designating Unit 1
against the benefts of designating all proposed critical habitat,
rather than the benefts of designating Unit 1 in particular.
Weyerhaeuser also argues that the Service did not fully
account for the economic impact of designating Unit 1 because
it ignored, among other things, the costs of replacing
timber trees with longleaf pines, maintaining an open canopy
through controlled burning, and the tax revenue that
St. Tammany Parish would lose if Unit 1 were never developed.
Brief for Petitioner 53–54. The Court of Appeals
did not consider Weyerhaeuser's claim because it concluded
that a decision not to exclude a certain area from critical
habitat is unreviewable.
The Administrative Procedure Act creates a “basic presumption
of judicial review [for] one `suffering legal wrong
because of agency action.' ” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (quoting 5 U. S. C. § 702). As
we explained recently, “legal lapses and violations occur, and
Cite as: 586 U. S. 9 (2018) 23
Opinion of the Court
especially so when they have no consequence. That is why
this Court has so long applied a strong presumption favoring
judicial review of administrative action.” Mach Mining,
LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 489 (2015). The presumption
may be rebutted only if the relevant statute precludes review,
5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(1), or if the action is “committed to
agency discretion by law,” § 701(a)(2). The Service contends,
and the lower courts agreed, that Section 4(b)(2) of
the ESA commits to the Secretary's discretion decisions not
to exclude an area from critical habitat.
This Court has noted the “tension” between the prohibition
of judicial review for actions “committed to agency discretion”
and the command in § 706(2)(A) that courts set aside
any agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 829 (1985). A court could never
determine that an agency abused its discretion if all matters
committed to agency discretion were unreviewable. To give
effect to § 706(2)(A) and to honor the presumption of review,
we have read the exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly, restricting
it to “those rare circumstances where the relevant
statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.”
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 191 (1993). The
Service contends that Section 4(b)(2) of the ESA is one of
those rare statutory provisions.
There is, at the outset, reason to be skeptical of the Service's
position. The few cases in which we have applied the
§ 701(a)(2) exception involved agency decisions that courts
have traditionally regarded as unreviewable, such as the
allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation, id., at
191, or a decision not to reconsider a fnal action, ICC v.
Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 282 (1987). By contrast,
this case involves the sort of routine dispute that federal
courts regularly review: An agency issues an order affecting
the rights of a private party, and the private party
24 WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Opinion of the Court
objects that the agency did not properly justify its determination
under a standard set forth in the statute.
Section 4(b)(2) states that the Secretary
“shall designate critical habitat . . . after taking into consideration
the economic impact, the impact on national
security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying
any particular area as critical habitat. The Secretary
may exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines
that the benefts of such exclusion outweigh the
benefts of specifying such area . . . unless he determines
. . . that the failure to designate such area as critical
habitat will result in the extinction of the species
concerned.” 16 U. S. C. § 1533(b)(2).
Although the text meanders a bit, we recognized in Bennett
v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154 (1997), that the provision describes
a unifed process for weighing the impact of designating
an area as critical habitat. The frst sentence of Section
4(b)(2) imposes a “categorical requirement” that the Secretary
“tak[e] into consideration” economic and other impacts
before such a designation. Id., at 172 (emphasis deleted).
The second sentence authorizes the Secretary to act on his
consideration by providing that he may exclude an area from
critical habitat if he determines that the benefts of exclusion
outweigh the benefts of designation. The Service followed
that procedure here (albeit in a fawed manner, according to
Weyerhaeuser). It commissioned a report to estimate the
costs of designating the proposed critical habitat, concluded
that those costs were not “disproportionate” to the benefts
of designation, and “[c]onsequently” declined to “exercis[e]
[its] discretion to exclude any areas from [the] designation of
critical habitat.” App. 190.
Bennett explained that the Secretary's “ultimate decision”
to designate or exclude, which he “arriv[es] at” after considering
economic and other impacts, is reviewable “for abuse of
discretion.” 520 U. S., at 172. The Service dismisses that
Cite as: 586 U. S. 9 (2018) 25
Opinion of the Court
language as a “passing reference . . . not necessarily inconsistent
with the Service's understanding,” which is that the
Secretary's decision not to exclude an area is wholly discretionary
and therefore unreviewable. Brief for Federal Respondents
50. The Service bases its understanding on the
second sentence of Section 4(b)(2), which states that the Secretary
“may exclude [an] area from critical habitat if he determines
that the benefts of such exclusion outweigh the
benefts of [designation].” (Emphasis added.)
The use of the word “may” certainly confers discretion on
the Secretary. That does not, however, segregate his discretionary
decision not to exclude from the procedure mandated
by Section 4(b)(2), which directs the Secretary to consider
the economic and other impacts of designation when
making his exclusion decisions. Weyerhaeuser's claim is the
familiar one in administrative law that the agency did not
appropriately consider all of the relevant factors that the
statute sets forth to guide the agency in the exercise of its
discretion. Specifcally, Weyerhaeuser contends that the
Service ignored some costs and confated the benefts of designating
Unit 1 with the benefts of designating all of the
proposed critical habitat. This is the sort of claim that federal
courts routinely assess when determining whether to
set aside an agency decision as an abuse of discretion under
5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U. S. 42,
53 (2011) (“When reviewing an agency action, we must assess
. . . whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Section 4(b)(2) requires the Secretary to consider economic
impact and relative benefts before deciding whether to exclude
an area from critical habitat or to proceed with designation.
The statute is, therefore, not “drawn so that a court
would have no meaningful standard against which to judge
the [Secretary's] exercise of [his] discretion” not to exclude.
Lincoln, 508 U. S., at 191.
26 WEYERHAEUSER CO. v. UNITED STATES FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERV.
Opinion of the Court
Because it determined that the Service's decisions not to
exclude were committed to agency discretion and therefore
unreviewable, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether
the Service's assessment of the costs and benefts of designation
was fawed in a way that rendered the resulting decision
not to exclude Unit 1 arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, we remand to the Court of Appeals
to consider that question, if necessary, in the frst instance.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 27
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. STITT
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 17–765. Argued October 9, 2018—Decided December 10, 2018*
Respondents Victor J. Stitt and Jason Daniel Sims were each convicted in
federal court of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18
U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The sentencing judge in each case imposed the
mandatory minimum 15-year prison term that the Armed Career Criminal
Act requires for § 922(g)(1) offenders who have at least three previous
convictions for certain “violent” or drug-related felonies, § 924(e)(1).
The Act defnes “violent felony” to mean, among other things, “any
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . .
that . . . is burglary.” § 924(e)(2)(B). Respondents' prior convictions
were for violations of state burglary statutes—a Tennessee statute in
Stitt's case and an Arkansas statute in Sims' case—that prohibit burglary
of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily
used for overnight accommodation. In both cases, the District Courts
found that the state statutory crimes fell within the scope of the federal
Act's term “burglary.” The relevant Court of Appeals in each case disagreed,
vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.
Held:
1. The term “burglary” in the Armed Career Criminal Act includes
burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily
used for overnight accommodation. Pp. 31–36.
(a) In deciding whether an offense qualifes as a violent felony
under the Act, the categorical approach frst adopted in Taylor v. United
States, 495 U. S. 575, requires courts to evaluate a prior state conviction
by reference to the elements of the state offense, rather than to the
defendant's behavior on a particular occasion. A prior state conviction
does not qualify as generic burglary under the Act where “the elements
of [the relevant state statute] are broader than those of generic burglary.”
Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. 500, 520. Taylor, which specifcally
considered the statutory term “burglary” and defned the elements
of generic burglary as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or
remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a
*Together with No. 17–766, United States v. Sims, on certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
28 UNITED STATES v. STITT
Syllabus
crime,” 495 U. S., at 598, governs and determines the outcome here.
Pp. 31–33.
(b) The state statutes at issue here fall within the scope of Taylor's
defnition of generic burglary. Congress intended that defnition to refect
“the generic sense in which the term [was] used in the criminal
codes of most States” when the Act was passed. 495 U. S., at 598. And
at that time, a majority of state burglary statutes covered vehicles
adapted or customarily used for lodging. Congress also viewed burglary
as an inherently dangerous crime that “creates the possibility of
a violent confrontation” between the offender and an occupant or someone
who comes to investigate. Id., at 588. An offender who breaks
into a mobile home, an RV, a camping tent, or another structure or
vehicle that is adapted or customarily used for lodging creates a similar
or greater risk of violent confrontation. Although the risk of violence
is diminished if the vehicle is only used for lodging part of the time, the
Court fnds no reason to believe that Congress intended to make a parttime/
full-time distinction. Respondents also argue that the vehicles
covered here are analogous to the nontypical structures and vehicles
that Taylor, Mathis, and other cases described as falling outside the
scope of generic burglary, but none of those prior cases presented the
question whether generic burglary includes structures or vehicles that
are adapted or customarily used for overnight use. Pp. 33–36.
2. Sims' case is remanded for further proceedings. His argument
that Arkansas' residential burglary statute is too broad to count as generic
burglary because it also covers burglary of “a vehicle . . . [w]here
any person lives,” Ark. Code Ann. § 5–39–101(1)(A), rests in part upon
state law, and the lower courts have not considered it. Those courts
remain free to determine whether Sims properly presented that argument
and, if so, to decide the merits. Pp. 36–37.
No. 17–765, 860 F. 3d 854, reversed; No. 17–766, 854 F. 3d 1037, vacated
and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Erica L. Ross argued the cause for the United States.
With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Francisco,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Cronan, Eric J. Feigin,
David M. Lieberman, and Francesco Valentini.
Jeffrey L. Fisher, by appointment of the Court in No. 17–
766, 585 U. S. 1057, argued the cause for respondents in both
cases. With him on the brief were Bradley N. Garcia, Chris
Cite as: 586 U. S. 27 (2018) 29
Opinion of the Court
Tarver, and Pamela S. Karlan. Stephen Newman, Timothy
C. Ivey, and Catherine Adinaro fled a brief for respondent
in No. 17–765.†
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Armed Career Criminal Act requires a federal sentencing
judge to impose upon certain persons convicted of
unlawfully possessing a frearm a 15-year minimum prison
term. The judge is to impose that special sentence if
the offender also has three prior convictions for certain
violent or drug-related crimes. 18 U. S. C. § 924(e). Those
prior convictions include convictions for “burglary.” § 924(e)
(2)(B)(ii). And the question here is whether the statutory
term “burglary” includes burglary of a structure or vehicle
that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight
accommodation. We hold that it does.
I
The consolidated cases before us involve two defendants,
each of whom was convicted in a federal court of unlawfully
possessing a frearm in violation of § 922(g)(1). The maximum
punishment for this offense is typically 10 years in
prison. § 924(a)(2). Each offender, however, had prior
state burglary convictions suffcient, at least potentially, to
require the sentencing judge to impose a mandatory 15-year
minimum prison term under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. That Act, as we have just said, requires an enhanced
sentence for offenders who have at least three previous
convictions for certain “violent” or drug-related felonies.
§ 924(e)(1). Those prior felonies include “any crime” that is
†David Debold and Jeffrey T. Green fled a brief for the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affrmance.
Michael C. Holley, Donna F. Coltharp, and Daniel L. Kaplan fled
a brief for the National Association of Federal Defenders as amicus
curiae.
30 UNITED STATES v. STITT
Opinion of the Court
“punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”
and that also
“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another;
or
“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
The question here concerns the scope of the statutory word
“burglary.”
The relevant prior convictions of one of the unlawful frearms
offenders, Victor J. Stitt, were for violations of a Tennessee
statute that defnes “[a]ggravated burglary” as “burglary
of a habitation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–403(a)
(1997). It further defnes “[h]abitation” to include: (1) “any
structure, including . . . mobile homes, trailers, and tents,
which is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation
of persons,” and (2) any “self-propelled vehicle that
is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation
of persons and is actually occupied at the time of initial
entry by the defendant.” §§ 39–14–401(1)(A), (B) (emphasis
added).
The relevant prior convictions of the other unlawful frearms
offender, Jason Daniel Sims, were for violations of an
Arkansas statute that prohibits burglary of a “residential
occupiable structure. ” Ark. Code Ann. § 5–39–201(a)(1)
(1997). The statute defnes “[r]esidential occupiable structure”
to include:
“a vehicle, building, or other structure:
“(A) [w]here any person lives; or
“(B) [w]hich is customarily used for overnight accommodation
of persons whether or not a person is actually
present.” § 5–39–101(1) (emphasis added).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 27 (2018) 31
Opinion of the Court
In both cases, the District Courts found that the state statutory
crimes fell within the scope of the word “burglary” in
the Armed Career Criminal Act and consequently imposed
that statute's mandatory sentence enhancement. In both
cases, the relevant Federal Court of Appeals held that the
statutory crimes did not fall within the scope of the word
“burglary,” vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.
See 860 F. 3d 854 (CA6 2017) (en banc) (reversing
panel decision to the contrary); 854 F. 3d 1037 (CA8 2017).
The Government asked us to grant certiorari to consider
the question “[w]hether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile
structure that is adapted or used for overnight
accommodation can qualify as `burglary' under the Armed
Career Criminal Act.” Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–765, p. I; Pet.
for Cert. in No. 17–766, p. I. And, in light of uncertainty
about the scope of the term “burglary” in the lower courts,
we granted the Government's request. Compare 860 F. 3d,
at 862–863; 854 F. 3d, at 1040; Uni ted States v. Whi te,
836 F. 3d 437, 446 (CA4 2016); Uni ted States v. Gr isel,
488 F. 3d 844 (CA9 2007) (en banc), with Smith v. United
States, 877 F. 3d 720, 724 (CA7 2017), cert. pending, No. 17–
7517; United States v. Spring, 80 F. 3d 1450, 1462 (CA10
1996).
II
A
The word “burglary,” like the word “crime” itself, is ambiguous.
It might refer to a kind of crime, a generic crime,
as set forth in a statute (“a burglary consists of behavior
that . . . ”), or it might refer to the way in which an individual
offender acted on a particular occasion (“on January 25, Jones
committed a burglary on Oak Street in South San Francisco”).
We have held that the words in the Armed Career
Criminal Act do the frst. Accordingly, we have held that
the Act requires us to evaluate a prior state conviction “in
terms of how the law defnes the offense and not in terms
32 UNITED STATES v. STITT
Opinion of the Court
of how an individual offender might have committed it on a
particular occasion.” Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137,
141 (2008). A prior state conviction, we have said, does not
qualify as generic burglary under the Act where “the elements
of [the relevant state statute] are broader than those
of generic burglary.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S.
500, 520 (2016). The case in which we frst adopted this
“categorical approach” is Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S.
575 (1990). That case, which specifcally considered the
statutory term “burglary,” governs here and determines
the outcome.
In Taylor, we did more than hold that the word “burglary”
refers to a kind of generic crime rather than to the defendant's
behavior on a particular occasion. We also explained,
after examining the Act's history and purpose, that Congress
intended a “uniform defnition of burglary [to] be applied to
all cases in which the Government seeks” an enhanced sentence
under the Act. Id., at 580–592. We held that this
uniform defnition includes “at least the `classic' common-law
defnition,” namely, breaking and entering a dwelling at
night with intent to commit a felony. Id., at 593. But we
added that it must include more. The classic defnition, by
excluding all places other than dwellings, we said, has “little
relevance to modern law enforcement concerns.” Ibid.
Perhaps for that reason, by the time the Act was passed in
1986, most States had expanded the meaning of burglary to
include “structures other than dwellings.” Ibid. (citing W.
LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 8.13(a)–(f)
(1986)).
In addition, the statute's purpose, revealed by its language,
ruled out limiting the scope of “burglary” to especially
serious burglaries, e. g., those having elements that
created a particularly serious risk of physical harm. If that
had been Congress' intent, adding the word “burglary”
would have been unnecessary, since the (now-invalid) residCite
as: 586 U. S. 27 (2018) 33
Opinion of the Court
ual clause “already include[d] any crime that `involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.' ” Taylor, 495 U. S., at 597 (quoting 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)); see Johnson v. Uni ted States, 576
U. S. 591, 597–602 (2015) (holding residual clause unconstitutionally
vague). We concluded that the Act's term “burglary”
must include “ordinary,” “run-of-the-mill” burglaries
as well as aggravated ones. Taylor, 495 U. S., at 597. And
we defned the elements of generic “burglary” as “an unlawful
or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or
other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Id., at 598.
B
The relevant language of the Tennessee and Arkansas
statutes falls within the scope of generic burglary's defnition
as set forth in Taylor. For one thing, we made clear in Taylor
that Congress intended the defnition of “burglary” to
refect “the generic sense in which the term [was] used in
the criminal codes of most States” at the time the Act
was passed. Ibid. In 1986, a majority of state burglary
statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used for
lodging—either explicitly or by defning “building” or
“structure” to include those vehicles. See, e. g., N. H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 635:1 (1974) (prohibiting burglary of an “[o]ccupied
structure,” defned to include “any structure, vehicle,
boat or place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons”);
Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.205, 164.215, 164.225 (1985) (prohibiting
burglary of a “building,” defned to include “any
booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons”); see also ALI, Model
Penal Code §§ 220.0(1), 221.1(1) (1980) (defning “ `occupied
structure' ” for purposes of burglary as “any structure, vehicle
or place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons,
or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person
is actually present”); Appendix, infra (collecting burglary
34 UNITED STATES v. STITT
Opinion of the Court
statutes from 1986 or earlier that covered either vehicles
adapted or customarily used for overnight accommodation or
a broader class of vehicles).
For another thing, Congress, as we said in Taylor, viewed
burglary as an inherently dangerous crime because burglary
“creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between
the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person
who comes to investigate.” 495 U. S., at 588; see also
James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 203 (2007). An offender
who breaks into a mobile home, an RV, a camping
tent, a vehicle, or another structure that is adapted for or
customarily used for lodging runs a similar or greater risk
of violent confrontation. See Spring, 80 F. 3d, at 1462 (noting
the greater risk of confrontation in a mobile home or
camper, where “it is more diffcult for the burglar to enter
or escape unnoticed”).
Although, as respondents point out, the risk of violence is
diminished if, for example, a vehicle is only used for lodging
part of the time, we have no reason to believe that Congress
intended to make a part-time/full-time distinction. After
all, a burglary is no less a burglary because it took place at
a summer home during the winter, or a commercial building
during a holiday. Cf. Model Penal Code § 221.1, Comment
3(b), p. 72 (burglary should cover places with the “apparent
potential for regular occupancy”).
Respondents make several additional arguments. Respondent
Stitt argues that the Tennessee statute is too broad
even under the Government's defnition of generic burglary.
That is so, Stitt contends, because the statute covers the burglary
of a “structure appurtenant to or connected with” a
covered structure or vehicle, a provision that Stitt reads to
include the burglary of even ordinary vehicles that are
plugged in or otherwise appurtenant to covered structures.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–401(1)(C). Stitt's interpretation,
however, ignores that the “appurtenant to” provision extends
only to “structure[s],” not to the separate statutory
Cite as: 586 U. S. 27 (2018) 35
Opinion of the Court
term “vehicle[s].” Ibid. We therefore disagree with Stitt's
argument that the “appurtenant to” provision sweeps more
broadly than generic burglary, as defned in Taylor, 495 U. S.,
at 598.
Respondents also point out that in Taylor, Mathis, and
other cases, we said that burglary of certain nontypical
structures and vehicles fell outside the scope of the federal
Act's statutory word “burglary.” See, e. g., Taylor, 495
U. S., at 599 (noting that some States “defne burglary more
broadly” than generic burglary by, for example, “including
places, such as automobiles and vending machines, other
than buildings”). And they argue that the vehicles covered
here are analogous to the nontypical structures and vehicles
to which the Court referred in those cases. Our examination
of those cases, however, convinces us that we did not
decide in either case the question now before us.
In Taylor, for example, we referred to a Missouri breaking
and entering statute that among other things criminalized
breaking and entering “ `any boat or vessel, or railroad car.' ”
Ibid. (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 560.070 (1969); emphasis
added). We did say that that particular provision was beyond
the scope of the federal Act. But the statute used the
word “any”; it referred to ordinary boats and vessels often
at sea (and railroad cars often flled with cargo, not people),
nowhere restricting its coverage, as here, to vehicles or
structures customarily used or adapted for overnight accommodation.
The statutes before us, by using these latter
words, more clearly focus upon circumstances where burglary
is likely to present a serious risk of violence.
In Mathis, we considered an Iowa statute that covered
“any building, structure, . . . land, water or air vehicle, or
similar place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons
[or used] for the storage or safekeeping of anything of
value.” Iowa Code § 702.12 (2013). Courts have construed
that statute to cover ordinary vehicles because they can be
used for storage or safekeeping. See State v. Buss, 325
36 UNITED STATES v. STITT
Opinion of the Court
N. W. 2d 384 (Iowa 1982); Weaver v. Iowa, 949 F. 2d 1049
(CA8 1991). That is presumably why, as we wrote in our
opinion, “all parties agree[d]” that Iowa's burglary statute
“covers more conduct than generic burglary does.” Mathis,
579 U. S., at 507. The question before us was whether federal
generic “burglary” includes within its scope a burglary
statute that lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying
one element, some of which fall within Taylor's generic
defnition and some of which fall outside it. We held, in light
of the parties' agreement that the Iowa statute covered some
“outside” behavior (i. e., ordinary vehicles), that the statute
did not count as a generic burglary statute. But for present
purposes, what matters is that the Court in Mathis did not
decide the question now before us—that is, whether coverage
of vehicles designed or adapted for overnight use takes
the statute outside the generic burglary defnition. We now
decide that latter question, and, for the reasons we have
stated, we hold that it does not.
III
Respondent Sims argues that Arkansas' residential burglary
statute is too broad to count as generic burglary for a
different reason, namely, because it also covers burglary of
“a vehicle . . . [in which] any person lives.” See supra, at
30. Sims adds that these words might cover a car in which
a homeless person occasionally sleeps. Sims' argument
rests in part upon state law, and the lower courts have not
considered it. As “we are a court of review, not of frst
view,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005),
we remand the Arkansas case to the lower courts for further
proceedings. Those courts remain free to determine
whether Sims properly presented the argument and to decide
the merits, if appropriate.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. We vacate the judgment of the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 27 (2018) 37
Appendix to opinion of the Court
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX
Alaska Stat. §§ 11.46.300, 11.46.310, 11.81.900(b)(3) (1989)
(effective 1978); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13–1501(7)–(8), 13–
1507, 13–1508 (1978); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 41–2001(1), 41–2002
(1977); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 459, 460 (West 1970); Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 18–4–101(1)–(2), 18–4–202, 18–4–203 (1978);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a–100(a), 53a–101, 53a–103 (1985
Cum. Supp.); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 222(1), 824, 825
(1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 810.011(2), 810.02 (1976); Ga. Code
Ann. § 16–7–1(a) (1984); Idaho Code Ann. § 18–1401 (1979); Ill.
Comp. Stat., ch. 38, § 19–1 (West 1985); Iowa Code §§ 702.12,
713.1 (1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21–3715, 21–3716 (1988) (effective
1970); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:62 (West 1974 Cum.
Supp.); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A, §§ 2(10), 2(24), 401
(1983); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 266, § 16A (West 1970);
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–2–101(40), 45–6–204 (1983); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 205.060 (1986); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635:1
(1974); N. J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:18–1, 2C:18–2 (West 1982); N. M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 30–16–3, 30–16–4 (2018) (effective 1978); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2909.01, 2911.11, 2911.12 (Lexis 1982);
Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 1435 (1983); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.205,
164.215, 164.225 (1985); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §§ 3501, 3502
(Purdon 1973); S. D. Codifed Laws §§ 22–1–2(49), 22–32–1,
22–32–3, 22–32–8 (1988) (effective 1976); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39–3–406 (1982); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 30.01, 30.02 (West
1989) (effective 1974); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76–6–201(1), 76–6–
202 (1978); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61–3–11 (Lexis 1984); Wis.
Stat. § 943.10(1) (1982).
38 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
CITY OF ESCONDIDO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v.
EMMONS
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 17–1660. Decided January 7, 2019
Outside the apartment of a reported domestic violence incident, Offcer
Robert Craig forcibly apprehended Marty Emmons and arrested him
for resisting and delaying a police offcer. Emmons later sued Offcer
Craig and Sergeant Kevin Toth (another offcer at the scene) for damages
under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging the offcers used
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District
Court held that the offcers had probable cause to arrest Emmons, and
the Ninth Circuit upheld that fnding. The District Court also granted
summary judgment to both offcers on Emmons' excessive force claim.
The District Court concluded there was no evidence that Sergeant Toth
used any force against Emmons at all. And the District Court found
Offcer Craig entitled to qualifed immunity because the law did not
clearly establish that he could not take down an arrestee as he did given
the circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial
on the excessive force claims against both offcers, stating that: “The
right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at the time of
the events in question. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F. 3d 1086,
1093 (9th Cir. 2013).” 716 Fed. Appx. 724, 726.
Held: The Ninth Circuit failed to conduct the analysis required by this
Court's precedents in determining whether the police offcers were entitled
to qualifed immunity. The Ninth Circuit's unexplained reinstatement
of the excessive force claim against Sergeant Toth was erroneous
and puzzling given the District Court's conclusion that “only Defendant
Craig was involved in the excessive force claim” and that Emmons
“fail[ed] to identify contrary evidence.” 168 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274, n. 4.
As to Offcer Craig, the Ninth Circuit also erred. “Qualifed immunity
attaches when an offcial's conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U. S. 100, 104 (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under the Court's cases, the clearly established
right must be defned with specifcity, particularly in excessive
force cases in which police offcers are entitled to qualifed immunity
absent existing precedent that “squarely governs” the specifc facts preCite
as: 586 U. S. 38 (2019) 39
Per Curiam
sented. Ibid. In this case, the Court of Appeals should have asked
whether clearly established law prohibited the offcers from stopping
and taking down a man in these circumstances. Under the Court's
precedents, the Court of Appeals' formulation of the clearly established
right as the “right to be free of excessive force” was far too general.
The Court of Appeals cited Gravelet-Blondin, which described only a
right to be “free from the application of non-trivial force for engaging
in mere passive resistance. . . .” 728 F. 3d, at 1093. Assuming without
deciding that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established
law for purposes of qualifed immunity, see City and County of
San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600, the Ninth Circuit made no
effort to explain how Gravelet-Blondin prohibited Offcer Craig's actions
in this case, as this Court's precedents require. See District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 64.
Certiorari granted; 716 Fed. Appx. 724, 726, reversed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded.
Per Curiam.
The question in this qualifed immunity case is whether
two police offcers violated clearly established law when they
forcibly apprehended a man at the scene of a reported domestic
violence incident.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
shows the following. In April 2013, Escondido police
received a 911 call from Maggie Emmons about a domestic
violence incident at her apartment. Emmons lived at the
apartment with her husband, her two children, and a roommate,
Ametria Douglas. Offcer Jake Houchin responded to
the scene and eventually helped take a domestic violence report
from Emmons about injuries caused by her husband.
The offcers arrested her husband. He was later released.
A few weeks later, on May 27, 2013, at about 2:30 p.m.,
Escondido police received a 911 call about another possible
domestic disturbance at Emmons' apartment. That 911 call
came from Ametria Douglas' mother, Trina Douglas. Trina
Douglas was not at the apartment, but she was on the phone
with her daughter Ametria, who was at the apartment.
Trina heard her daughter Ametria and Maggie Emmons yell40
ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS
Per Curiam
ing at each other and heard her daughter screaming for help.
The call then disconnected, and Trina Douglas called 911.
Offcer Houchin again responded, along with Offcer Robert
Craig. The dispatcher informed the offcers that two
children could be in the residence and that calls to the apartment
had gone unanswered.
Police body-camera video of the offcers' actions at the
apartment is in the record.
The offcers knocked on the door of the apartment. No
one answered. But a side window was open, and the offcers
spoke with Emmons through that window, attempting to
convince her to open the door to the apartment so that they
could conduct a welfare check. A man in the apartment also
told Emmons to back away from the window, but the offcers
said they could not identify the man. At some point during
this exchange, Sergeant Kevin Toth, Offcer Joseph Leffngwell,
and Offcer Huy Quach arrived as backup.
A few minutes later, a man opened the apartment door
and came outside. At that point, Offcer Craig was standing
alone just outside the door. Offcer Craig told the man not
to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried to
brush past Offcer Craig. Offcer Craig stopped the man,
took him quickly to the ground, and handcuffed him. Offcer
Craig did not hit the man or display any weapon. The video
shows that the man was not in any visible or audible pain as
a result of the takedown or while on the ground. Within a
few minutes, offcers helped the man up and arrested him for
a misdemeanor offense of resisting and delaying a police
offcer.
The man turned out to be Maggie Emmons' father, Marty
Emmons. Marty Emmons later sued Offcer Craig and Sergeant
Toth, among others, under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983. He raised several claims, including, as relevant here,
a claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The suit sought money damages for which Offcer
Craig and Sergeant Toth would be personally liable. The
Cite as: 586 U. S. 38 (2019) 41
Per Curiam
District Court held that the offcers had probable cause to
arrest Marty Emmons for the misdemeanor offense. The
Ninth Circuit did not disturb that fnding, and there is no
claim presently before us that the offcers lacked probable
cause to arrest Marty Emmons. The only claim before us is
that the offcers used excessive force in effectuating the
arrest.
The District Court rejected the claim of excessive force.
168 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (SD Cal. 2016). The District
Court stated that the “video shows that the offcers acted
professionally and respectfully in their encounter” at the
apartment. Id., at 1275. Because only Offcer Craig used
any force at all, the District Court granted summary judgment
to Sergeant Toth on the excessive force claim.
Applying this Court's precedents on qualifed immunity,
the District Court also granted summary judgment to Offcer
Craig. According to the District Court, the law did not
clearly establish that Offcer Craig could not take down an
arrestee in these circumstances. The court explained that
the offcers were responding to a domestic dispute, and that
the encounter had escalated when the offcers could not enter
the apartment to conduct a welfare check. The District
Court also noted that when Marty Emmons exited the apartment,
none of the offcers knew whether he was armed or
dangerous, or whether he had injured any individuals inside
the apartment.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial on
the excessive force claims against both Offcer Craig and Sergeant
Toth. 716 Fed. Appx. 724 (CA9 2018). The Ninth
Circuit's entire relevant analysis of the qualifed immunity
question consisted of the following: “The right to be free of
excessive force was clearly established at the time of the
events in question. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F. 3d
1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013).” Id., at 726.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to
Sergeant Toth, and vacate and remand as to Offcer Craig.
42 ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS
Per Curiam
With respect to Sergeant Toth, the Ninth Circuit offered
no explanation for its decision. The court's unexplained reinstatement
of the excessive force claim against Sergeant
Toth was erroneous—and quite puzzling in light of the District
Court's conclusion that “only Defendant Craig was involved
in the excessive force claim” and that Emmons
“fail[ed] to identify contrary evidence.” 168 F. Supp. 3d, at
1274, n. 4.
As to Offcer Craig, the Ninth Circuit also erred. As we
have explained many times: “Qualifed immunity attaches
when an offcial's conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U. S.
100, 104 (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 62–
63 (2018); White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 78–79 (2017)
(per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 7, 21 (2015) (per
curiam).
Under our cases, the clearly established right must be defned
with specifcity. “This Court has repeatedly told
courts . . . not to defne clearly established law at a high level
of generality.” Kisela, 584 U. S., at 104 (internal quotation
marks omitted). That is particularly important in excessive
force cases, as we have explained:
“Specifcity is especially important in the Fourth
Amendment context, where the Court has recognized
that it is sometimes diffcult for an offcer to determine
how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force,
will apply to the factual situation the offcer confronts.
Use of excessive force is an area of the law in which the
result depends very much on the facts of each case, and
thus police offcers are entitled to qualifed immunity unless
existing precedent squarely governs the specifc
facts at issue. . . .
“[I]t does not suffce for a court simply to state that
an offcer may not use unreasonable and excessive force,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 38 (2019) 43
Per Curiam
deny qualifed immunity, and then remit the case for a
trial on the question of reasonableness. An offcer cannot
be said to have violated a clearly established right
unless the right's contours were suffciently defnite that
any reasonable offcial in the defendant's shoes would
have understood that he was violating it.” Id., at 104–
105 (quotation altered).
In this case, the Court of Appeals contravened those settled
principles. The Court of Appeals should have asked
whether clearly established law prohibited the offcers from
stopping and taking down a man in these circumstances.
Instead, the Court of Appeals defned the clearly established
right at a high level of generality by saying only that the
“right to be free of excessive force” was clearly established.
With the right defned at that high level of generality, the
Court of Appeals then denied qualifed immunity to the offcers
and remanded the case for trial. 716 Fed. Appx.,
at 726.
Under our precedents, the Court of Appeals' formulation
of the clearly established right was far too general. To be
sure, the Court of Appeals cited the Gravelet-Blondin case
from that Circuit, which described a right to be “free from
the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere passive
resistance . . . .” 728 F. 3d, at 1093. Assuming without
deciding that a court of appeals decision may constitute
clearly established law for purposes of qualifed immunity,
see City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S.
600, 614 (2015), the Ninth Circuit's Gravelet-Blondin case
law involved police force against individuals engaged in passive
resistance. The Court of Appeals made no effort to explain
how that case law prohibited Offcer Craig's actions in
this case. That is a problem under our precedents:
“[W]e have stressed the need to identify a case where
an offcer acting under similar circumstances . . . was
held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. . . . While
44 ESCONDIDO v. EMMONS
Per Curiam
there does not have to be a case directly on point, existing
precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular
[action] beyond debate. . . . Of course, there can be the
rare obvious case, where the unlawfulness of the offcer's
conduct is suffciently clear even though existing precedent
does not address similar circumstances. . . . But a
body of relevant case law is usually necessary to clearly
establish the answer . . . .” Wesby, 583 U. S., at 64 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Court of Appeals failed to properly analyze whether
clearly established law barred Offcer Craig from stopping
and taking down Marty Emmons in this manner as Emmons
exited the apartment. Therefore, we remand the case for
the Court of Appeals to conduct the analysis required by our
precedents with respect to whether Offcer Craig is entitled
to qualifed immunity.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed in part and vacated in part, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 45
Syllabus
SHOOP, WARDEN v. HILL
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 18–56. Decided January 7, 2019
Respondent Danny Hill was sentenced to death in Ohio following his 1986
convictions for torture, rape, and murder. The Ohio courts upheld
Hill's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Hill then sought postconviction
relief in state and federal court, which was denied. Subsequently,
this Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, which held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence
on a defendant who is “mentally retarded.” Hill fled a new state petition
contending that his death sentence is illegal under Atkins. In
2006, the Ohio trial court denied this claim, and in 2008, the Ohio Court
of Appeals affrmed. After the Ohio Supreme Court denied further review
in 2009, Hill fled a federal habeas petition seeking review of the
denial of his Atkins claim under 28 U. S. C. § 2254. The District Court
denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed and granted habeas
relief under § 2254(d)(1) on the grounds that the Ohio courts' conclusion
that Hill is not intellectually disabled was contrary to Supreme Court
precedent that was clearly established at the time in question. In
reaching this decision, the Sixth Circuit repeatedly cited the Court's
2017 decision in Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged
that Supreme Court decisions that post-date a state court's determination
cannot ordinarily qualify as clearly established law for purposes
of federal habeas review, but reasoned that in pertinent respects
Moore merely applied what was clearly established by Atkins regarding
the assessment of adaptive skills.
Held: Because the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Moore was plainly improper
under § 2254(d)(1), the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas relief is vacated
and this case remanded for evaluation of Hill's claim regarding intellectual
disability under law clearly established at the relevant time.
Under § 2254(d)(1), federal habeas relief may be granted only if the state
court's adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of,” Supreme Court precedent that
was “clearly established” at the time of the adjudication. White v. Woodall,
572 U. S. 415, 419–420. The issue is what was clearly established
regarding the execution of the intellectually disabled in 2008, when the
Ohio Court of Appeals rejected Hill's Atkins claim. Atkins gave no
comprehensive defnition of “mental retardation” for Eighth Amend46
SHOOP v. HILL
Per Curiam
ment purposes. The Sixth Circuit did not explain how the rule it applied
can be teased out of the Atkins Court's brief comments about the
meaning of what it termed “mental retardation.” While Atkins noted
that standard defnitions of mental retardation included as “signifcant
limitations in adaptive skills . . . that became manifest before age 18,”
536 U. S., at 318, Atkins did not defnitively resolve how that element
was to be evaluated but instead left its application in the frst instance
to the States. Id., at 317. Because the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit
leans so heavily on Moore, its decision must be vacated. On remand,
the court should determine whether its conclusions can be sustained
based strictly on legal rules that were clearly established in the decisions
of this Court at the relevant time.
Certiorari granted; 881 F. 3d 483, vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that respondent Danny Hill, who has been sentenced to
death in Ohio, is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(1) because the decisions of the Ohio courts concluding
that he is not intellectually disabled were contrary to
Supreme Court precedent that was clearly established at the
time in question. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals
relied repeatedly and extensively on our decision in
Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1 (2017), which was not handed
down until long after the state-court decisions.
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Moore was plainly improper
under § 2254(d)(1), and we therefore vacate that decision
and remand so that Hill's claim regarding intellectual
disability can be evaluated based solely on holdings of this
Court that were clearly established at the relevant time.
I
In September 1985, 12-year-old Raymond Fife set out on
his bicycle for a friend's home. When he did not arrive, his
parents launched a search, and that evening his father found
Raymond—naked, beaten, and burned—in a wooded feld.
Although alive, he had sustained horrifc injuries that we
will not describe. He died two days later.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 45 (2019) 47
Per Curiam
In 1986, respondent Danny Hill was convicted for torturing,
raping, and murdering Raymond, and he was sentenced
to death. An intermediate appellate court affrmed his conviction
and sentence, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. We
denied certiorari. Hill v. Ohio, 507 U. S. 1007 (1993).
After unsuccessful efforts to obtain postconviction relief
in state and federal court, Hill fled a new petition in the
Ohio courts contending that his death sentence is illegal
under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002), which held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a
death sentence on a defendant who is “mentally retarded.”
In 2006, the Ohio trial court denied this claim, App. to Pet.
for Cert. 381a–493a, and in 2008, the Ohio Court of Appeals
affrmed, State v. Hill, 177 Ohio App. 3d 171, 2008-Ohio-3509,
894 N. E. 2d 108. In 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court denied
review. State v. Hill, 122 Ohio St. 3d 1502, 2009-Ohio-4233,
912 N. E. 2d 107.
In 2010, Hill fled a new federal habeas petition under 28
U. S. C. § 2254, seeking review of the denial of his Atkins
claim. The District Court denied the petition, App. to Pet.
for Cert. 77a–210a, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and
granted habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1), which applies when
a state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States,” see Hill v. Anderson,
881 F. 3d 483 (2018). The Sixth Circuit found two alleged
defciencies in the Ohio courts' decisions: First, they “overemphasized
Hill's adaptive strengths”; and second, they “relied
too heavily on adaptive strengths that Hill exhibited in
the controlled environment of his death-row prison cell.”
Id., at 492. In reaching these conclusions, the court relied
repeatedly on our decision in Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1.
See 881 F. 3d, at 486, 487, 488, n. 4, 489, 491, 492, 493, 495,
496, 498, 500. The court acknowledged that “[o]rdinarily,
Supreme Court decisions that post-date a state court's deter48
SHOOP v. HILL
Per Curiam
mination cannot be `clearly established law' for the purposes
of [the federal habeas statute],” but the court argued “that
Moore's holding regarding adaptive strengths [was] merely
an application of what was clearly established by Atkins.”
Id., at 487.
The State fled a petition for a writ of certiorari, contending
that the Sixth Circuit violated § 2254(d)(1) because a
fundamental underpinning of its decision was Moore, a case
decided by this Court well after the Ohio courts' decisions.
Against this, Hill echoes the Court of Appeals' argument
that Moore merely spelled out what was clearly established
by Atkins regarding the assessment of adaptive skills.
II
The federal habeas statute, as amended by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes
important limitations on the power of federal courts
to overturn the judgments of state courts in criminal cases.
The statute respects the authority and ability of state courts
and their dedication to the protection of constitutional rights.
Thus, under the statutory provision at issue here, 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(1), habeas relief may be granted only if the state
court's adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of,” Supreme
Court precedent that was “clearly established” at the time
of the adjudication. E. g., White v. Woodall, 572 U. S. 415,
419–420 (2014); Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U. S. 351, 357–358
(2013). This means that a state court's ruling must be “so
lacking in justifcation that there was an error well understood
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility
for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter,
562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011). We therefore consider what was
clearly established regarding the execution of the intellectually
disabled in 2008, when the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected
Hill's Atkins claim.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 45 (2019) 49
Per Curiam
Of course, Atkins itself was on the books, but Atkins gave
no comprehensive defnition of “mental retardation” for
Eighth Amendment purposes.1 The opinion of the Court
noted that the defnitions of mental retardation adopted by
the American Association on Mental Retardation and the
American Psychiatric Association required both “subaverage
intellectual functioning” and “signifcant limitations in adaptive
skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction
that became manifest before age 18.” 536 U. S., at 318; see
also id., at 308, n. 3 (quoting defnitions). The Court also
noted that state statutory defnitions of mental retardation
at the time “[were] not identical, but generally conform[ed]
to the[se] clinical defnitions.” Id., at 317, n. 22. The Court
then left “ `to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction' ” that the
Court adopted. Id., at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U. S. 399, 416 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
More than a decade later, we expounded on the defnition
of intellectual disability in two cases. In Hall v. Florida,
572 U. S. 701 (2014), we considered a rule restricting Atkins
to defendants with “an IQ test score of 70 or less.” 572
U. S., at 704. We held that this rule violated the Eighth
Amendment because it treated an IQ score higher than 70 as
conclusively disqualifying and thus prevented consideration
of other evidence of intellectual disability, such as evidence
of “defcits in adaptive functioning over [the defendant's] lifetime.”
Id., at 724.
Three years later in Moore, we applied Hall and faulted
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) for concluding
that the petitioner's IQ scores, some of which were at or
below 70, established that he was not intellectually disabled.
Moore, 581 U. S., at 13–15. We also held that the CCA
1 The Court explained that it was “fair to say that a national consensus”
had developed against the execution of “mentally retarded” offenders.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 316 (2002).
50 SHOOP v. HILL
Per Curiam
improperly evaluated the petitioner's adaptive functioning.
It erred, we concluded, in “overemphasiz[ing petitioner's]
perceived adaptive strengths,” despite the medical community's
focus on “adaptive defcits.” Id., at 15. And we found
that the CCA also went astray in “stress[ing petitioner's]
improved behavior in prison,” even though the medical community
“caution[ed] against reliance on adaptive strengths
developed in a controlled setting, as a prison surely is.” Id.,
at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
III
In this case, no reader of the decision of the Court of Appeals
can escape the conclusion that it is heavily based on
Moore, which came years after the decisions of the Ohio
courts. Indeed, the Court of Appeals, in fnding an unreasonable
application of clearly established law, drew almost
word for word from the two statements in Moore quoted
above. See 881 F. 3d, at 492 (“Contrary to Atkins, the Ohio
courts overemphasized Hill's adaptive strengths and relied
too heavily on adaptive strengths that Hill exhibited in the
controlled environment of his death-row prison cell. In so
doing, they unreasonably applied clearly established law”).
Although the Court of Appeals asserted that the holding in
Moore was “merely an application of what was clearly established
by Atkins,” 881 F. 3d, at 487, the court did not explain
how the rule it applied can be teased out of the Atkins
Court's brief comments about the meaning of what it termed
“mental retardation.” While Atkins noted that standard
defnitions of mental retardation included as a necessary element
“signifcant limitations in adaptive skills . . . that became
manifest before age 18,” 536 U. S., at 318, Atkins did
not defnitively resolve how that element was to be evaluated
but instead left its application in the frst instance to the
States. Id., at 317.
Moreover, the posture in which Moore reached this Court
(it did not arise under AEDPA) and the Moore majority's
Cite as: 586 U. S. 45 (2019) 51
Per Curiam
primary reliance on medical literature that postdated the
Ohio courts' decisions, 581 U. S., at 13–14, 20, provide additional
reasons to question the Court of Appeals' analysis.
Cf. Cain v. Chappell, 870 F. 3d 1003, 1024, n. 9 (CA9 2017)
(because “Moore is not an AEDPA case” and was “decided
just this spring,” “Moore itself cannot serve as `clearly established'
law at the time the state court decided Cain's claim”).
IV
The centrality of Moore in the Court of Appeals' analysis
is refected in the way in which the intellectual-disability
issue was litigated below. The Atkins portion of Hill's habeas
petition did not focus on § 2254(d)(1), the provision on
which the decision below is based.2 Instead, it began and
ended with appeals to a different provision of the habeas
statute, § 2254(d)(2), which supports relief based on a state
court's “unreasonable determination of the facts.” In particular,
Hill opened with the claim that the Ohio courts' fndings
on “adaptive functioning” “were an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence,” Amended Pet.
for Habeas Corpus in No. 96–CV–795 (ND Ohio), Doc. 94,
p. 15, ¶44 (citing § 2254(d)(2)), and he closed with the claim
that the state trial court's assessment that he is “not mentally
retarded” was based on “an unreasonable determination
of the facts,” id., at 36–37, ¶101 (citing § 2254(d)(2)). Indeed,
Hill's reply to the State's answer to his petition explicitly
“concur[red] . . . that it is proper to review [his Atkins claim]
under § 2254(d)(2).” Traverse in No. 96–CV–795 (ND Ohio),
2 While Hill's petition argued at one point that certain unidentifed “procedures”
used by the state courts in making the relevant decisions “violated
clearly established federal law of Ford/Panetti/Atkins,” Amended
Pet. for Habeas Corpus in No. 96–CV–795 (ND Ohio), Doc. 94, p. 15, ¶45,
the petition plainly did not encompass his current argument that the Ohio
Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established law under Atkins
by overemphasizing adaptive strengths and improperly considering
his prison behavior.
52 SHOOP v. HILL
Per Curiam
Doc. 102, p. 47. And so, unsurprisingly, the District Court
analyzed Hill's Atkins claim solely under § 2254(d)(2), noting
that “[a]s Hill concedes in his Traverse, his Atkins claim is
more appropriately addressed as it relates to the Ohio appellate
court's factual analysis under § 2254(d)(2).” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 121a.
Hill pressed the same § 2254(d)(2) argument in his opening
brief in the Sixth Circuit. There, he argued that the state
courts' fnding on “adaptive functioning . . . was an unreasonable
determination of the facts.” Brief for Petitioner–
Appellant in No. 14–3718 (CA6), p. 34 (citing § 2254(d)(2)); see
also id., at 65 (“As such, the state courts' fndings of fact that
[Hill] is not mentally retarded constitute an unreasonable
determination of facts in light of the evidence presented.
(§ 2254(d)(2))”).
It appears that it was not until the Court of Appeals asked
for supplemental briefng on Moore that Hill introduced the
§ 2254(d)(1) argument that the Court of Appeals adopted.
Although, as noted, the Court of Appeals ultimately disclaimed
reliance on Moore, it explicitly asked the parties for
supplemental briefng on how Moore “should be applied to
this case.” Because the reasoning of the Court of Appeals
leans so heavily on Moore, its decision must be vacated. On
remand, the court should determine whether its conclusions
can be sustained based strictly on legal rules that were
clearly established in the decisions of this Court at the relevant
time.
* * *
The petition for certiorari and Hill's motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is vacated,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 53
Syllabus
CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 17–773. Argued November 7, 2018—Decided January 8, 2019
The Social Security Act regulates the fees that attorneys may charge
claimants seeking Title II benefts for representation both before the
Social Security Administration and in federal court. For representation
in administrative proceedings, the Act provides two ways to determine
fees. If a fee agreement exists, fees are capped at the lesser of
25% of past-due benefts or a set dollar amount—currently $6,000. 42
U. S. C. § 406(a)(2)(A). Absent an agreement, the agency may set any
“reasonable” fee. § 406(a)(1). In either case, the agency is required to
withhold up to 25% of past-due benefts for direct payment of any fee.
§ 406(a)(4). For representation in court proceedings, fees are capped at
25% of past-due benefts, and the agency has authority to withhold such
benefts to pay these fees. § 406(b)(1)(A).
Petitioner Culbertson represented Katrina Wood in Social Security
disability beneft proceedings before the agency and in District Court.
The agency ultimately awarded Wood past-due benefts, withheld 25%
of those benefts to pay any attorney's fees, and awarded Culbertson
fees under § 406(a) for representation before the agency. Culbertson
then moved for a separate fee award under § 406(b) for the court proceedings,
requesting a full 25% of past-due benefts. The District Court
granted the request, but only in part, because Culbertson did not subtract
the amount he had already received under § 406(a) for his agencylevel
representation. The Eleventh Circuit affrmed, holding that the
25% limit under § 406(b) applies to the total fees awarded under both
§§ 406(a) and (b).
Held: Section 406(b)(1)(A)'s 25% cap applies only to fees for court representation
and not to the aggregate fees awarded under §§ 406(a) and (b).
Pp. 58–62.
(a) Section 406(b) provides that a court rendering a favorable judgment
to a claimant “represented before the court by an attorney” may
award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25
percent” of past-due benefts. Here, the adjective “such,” which means
“[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied,” refers to the only
form of representation “already described” in § 406(b)—i. e., “represent54
CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL
Syllabus
[ation] before the court.” Thus, the 25% cap applies only to fees for
representation before the court, not the agency.
Subsections (a) and (b) address different stages of the representation
and use different methods for calculating fees. Given this statutory
structure, applying § 406(b)'s 25% cap on court-stage fees to § 406(a)
agency-stage fees, or the aggregate of §§ 406(a) and (b) fees, would make
little sense. For example, such a reading would subject § 406(a)(1)'s reasonableness
limitation to § 406(b)'s 25% cap—a limitation not included
in the relevant provision of the statute. Had Congress wanted agencystage
fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably would have said so directly
in subsection (a). Pp. 58–60.
(b) The fact that the agency presently withholds a single pool of 25%
of past-due benefts for direct payment of agency and court fees does
not support an aggregate reading. The statutory text provides for two
pools of money for direct payment of fees. See §§ 406(a)(4), (b)(1)(A).
The agency's choice to withhold only one pool of 25% of past-due benefts
does not alter this text. More fundamentally, the amount of past-due
benefts that the agency can withhold for direct payment does not delimit
the amount of fees that can be approved for representation before
the agency or the court. Pp. 60–62.
861 F. 3d 1197, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Daniel R. Ortiz argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Richard A. Culbertson, pro se, Sarah
Fay, Mark T. Stancil, Matthew M. Madden, John P. Elwood,
Jeremy C. Marwell, Joshua S. Johnson, and Matthew X.
Etchemendy.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the briefs were Solicitor General Francisco, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Readler, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, and Charles W. Scarborough.
Amy Levin Weil, by invitation of the Court, 584 U. S.
999, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae in
support of the judgment below.*
*Eric Schnaufer and Charles L. Martin fled a brief for the National
Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives as amicus
curiae.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 53 (2019) 55
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law regulates the fees that attorneys may charge
Social Security claimants for representation before the Social
Security Administration and a reviewing court. See 42
U. S. C. §§ 406(a)–(b). The question in this case is whether
the statutory scheme limits the aggregate amount of fees for
both stages of representation to 25% of the claimant's pastdue
benefts. Because § 406(b) by its terms imposes a 25%
cap on fees only for representation before a court, and
§ 406(a) has separate caps on fees for representation before
the agency, we hold that the statute does not impose a 25%
cap on aggregate fees.
I
A
Title II of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 622, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq., “is an insurance program”
that “provides old-age, survivor, and disability benefts to insured
individuals irrespective of fnancial need.” Bowen v.
Galbreath, 485 U. S. 74, 75 (1988). A claimant's application
for Title II benefts can result in payments of past-due
benefts—i. e., benefts that accrued before a favorable decision,
20 CFR § 404.1703 (2018)—as well as ongoing monthly
benefts, see 42 U. S. C. § 423(a). A claimant who has been
denied benefts “in whole or in part” by the Social Security
Administration may seek administrative review of the initial
agency determination, § 405(b), and may then seek judicial
review of the resulting fnal agency decision, § 405(g).
As presently written, the Social Security Act “discretely”
addresses attorney's fees for the administrative and judicialreview
stages: Ҥ 406(a) governs fees for representation in
administrative proceedings; § 406(b) controls fees for representation
in court.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U. S. 789,
794 (2002). The original Social Security Act made no such
provision for attorney's fees in either proceeding. Id., at
56 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL
Opinion of the Court
793, n. 2. But in 1939, “Congress amended the Act to permit
the Social Security Board to prescribe maximum fees attorneys
could charge for representation of claimants before the
agency.” Ibid. In 1965, Congress added a new subsection
(b) to § 406 that explicitly prescribed fees for representation
before a court and “allow[ed] withholding of past-due benefts
to pay” these fees directly to the attorney. Social Security
Amendments of 1965, § 332, 79 Stat. 403; Bowen, 485
U. S., at 76. In 1968, Congress amended subsection (a) to
give the agency similar withholding authority to pay attorney's
fees incurred in administrative proceedings. Id., at 76.
Section 406(a) is titled “Recognition of representatives;
fees for representation before Commissioner” of Social Security.
It includes two ways to determine fees for representation
before the agency, depending on whether a prior fee
agreement exists. If the claimant has a fee agreement, subsection
(a)(2) caps fees at the lesser of 25% of past-due benefts
or a set dollar amount—currently $6,000. § 406(a)(2)(A);
Maximum Dollar Limit in the Fee Agreement Process, 74
Fed. Reg. 6080 (2009). Absent a fee agreement, subsection
(a)(1) gives the agency authority to “prescribe the maximum
fees which may be charged for services performed in connection
with any claim” before the agency. If the claimant obtains
a favorable agency determination, the agency may allot
“a reasonable fee to compensate such attorney for the services
performed by him.”
Subsection (a)(4) requires the agency to withhold up to
25% of past-due benefts for direct payment of any fee for
representation before the agency:
“[I]f the claimant is determined to be entitled to pastdue
benefts under this subchapter and the person representing
the claimant is an attorney, the Commissioner of
Social Security shall . . . certify for payment out of such
past-due benefts . . . to such attorney an amount equal
to so much of the maximum fee as does not exceed 25
percent of such past-due benefts . . . .”
Cite as: 586 U. S. 53 (2019) 57
Opinion of the Court
Section 406(b) is titled “Fees for representation before
court.” Subsection (b)(1)(A) both limits these fees to no
more than 25% of past-due benefts and allows the agency to
withhold past-due benefts to pay these fees:
“Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a
claimant under this subchapter who was represented before
the court by an attorney, the court may determine
and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for
such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the
total of the past-due benefts to which the claimant is
entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner
of Social Security may . . . certify the amount of
such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in
addition to, the amount of such past-due benefts.”
At issue is whether § 406(b)'s 25% cap limits the aggregate
fees awarded for representation before both the agency
under § 406(a) and the court under § 406(b), or instead limits
only the fee awarded for court representation under § 406(b).
B
Petitioner Richard Culbertson represented claimant Katrina
Wood in proceedings seeking Social Security disability
benefits. Af ter the agency denied Wood benefits, she
brought an action in district court. For the court action,
Wood signed a contingency-fee agreement “to pay a fee of 25
percent of the total of the past-due benefts to which [she]
is entitled” in consideration for Culbertson's “representation
of [her] in Federal Court.” App. 8–9. The agreement excludes
fees for “any representation before” the agency. Id.,
at 9.
The District Court reversed the agency's denial of benefts
and remanded for further proceedings. The court granted
Wood attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA), which authorizes an award against the Government
for reasonable fees in “civil action[s].” 28 U. S. C.
§§ 2412(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A).
58 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL
Opinion of the Court
On remand, the agency awarded Wood past-due disability
benefts and withheld 25% of those benefts to pay any attorney's
fees that might ultimately be awarded. The agency
also awarded Culbertson § 406(a) fees for representing Wood
before the agency.
Culbertson then moved the District Court for a separate
fee award under § 406(b) for representing Wood there.
After accounting for the EAJA award, see Gisbrecht, supra,
at 796; App. 9, this request amounted to a full 25% of pastdue
benefts. The court granted Culbertson's request only
in part because he did not subtract the amount he had already
received under § 406(a) for his agency-level representation.
The Eleventh Circuit affrmed, relying on Circuit
precedent to hold that “the 25% limit from § 406(b) applies
to total fees awarded under both § 406(a) and (b), `preclud-
[ing] the aggregate allowance of attorney's fees greater than
twenty-fve percent of the past due benefts received by the
claimant.' ” Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security, 861
F. 3d 1197, 1205 (2017) (quoting Dawson v. Finch, 425 F. 2d
1192, 1195 (CA5 1970); emphasis deleted).*
Given a confict between the Circuits on this question, see
861 F. 3d, at 1205–1206, we granted certiorari. 584 U. S. 992
(2018). Because no party defends the judgment, we appointed
Amy Weil to brief and argue this case as amicus
curiae in support of the judgment below. 584 U. S. 999
(2018). Amicus Weil has ably discharged her assigned
responsibilities.
II
A
We “begi[n] with the language of the statute itself, and
that is also where the inquiry should end, for the statute's
language is plain.” Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free
*See Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F. 2d 1206, 1209 (CA11 1981) (en banc)
(adopting all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced prior to October
1, 1981, as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 53 (2019) 59
Opinion of the Court
Trust, 579 U. S. 115, 125 (2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Under § 406(b), when a court “renders a judgment
favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the
court by an attorney,” the court may award “a reasonable
fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of
the total of the past-due benefts to which the claimant is
entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U. S. C. § 406(b)
(1)(A) (emphasis added). Both at the time of enactment and
today, the adjective “such” means “[o]f the kind or degree
already described or implied.” H. Fowler & F. Fowler, Concise
Oxford Dictionary of Current English 1289 (5th ed.
1964); Black's Law Dictionary 1661 (10th ed. 2014) (“[t]hat or
those; having just been mentioned”). Here, the only form
of representation “already described” in § 406(b) is “represent[
ation] before the court by an attorney.” Accordingly,
the 25% cap applies only to fees for representation before
the court, not the agency.
This interpretation is supported by “the structure of the
statute and its other provisions.” Maracich v. Spears, 570
U. S. 48, 60 (2013). As an initial matter, subsections (a) and
(b) address different stages of the representation. Section
406(a) addresses fees for representation “before the Commissioner,”
whereas § 406(b) addresses fees for representation
in court. Because some claimants will prevail before the
agency and have no need to bring a court action, it is unsurprising
that the statute contemplates separate fees for each
stage of representation.
These subsections also calculate fees differently. Section
406(b) applies a fat 25% cap on fees for court representation.
By contrast, § 406(a) provides two ways to determine fees for
agency proceedings. Subsection (a)(2) caps fees based on a
fee agreement at the lesser of 25% of past-due benefts or
$6,000. Supra, at 56. If there is no fee agreement, the
agency may set any fee, including a fee greater than 25%
of past-due benefts, so long as the fee is “reasonable.”
§ 406(a)(1).
60 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL
Opinion of the Court
Given this statutory structure, applying § 406(b)'s 25% cap
on court-stage fees to § 406(a) agency-stage fees, or the
aggregate of §§ 406(a) and (b) fees, would make little sense.
Many claimants will never litigate in court, yet under the
aggregate reading, agency fees would be capped at 25%
based on a provision related exclusively to representation in
court. Absent a fee agreement, § 406(a)(1) subjects agency
fees only to a reasonableness limitation, so applying § 406(b)'s
cap to such fees would add a limitation that Congress did not
include in the relevant provision of the statute. If Congress
had wanted these fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably
would have said so directly in subsection (a), instead of providing
for a “reasonable fee” in that subsection and adding a
25% cap in § 406(b) without even referencing subsection (a).
Thus, the structure of the statute confrms that § 406(b) caps
only court representation fees.
B
Amicus Amy Weil agrees that “§ 406(a) and § 406(b) provide
separate avenues for an award of attorney's fees for
representation of a Social Security claimant,” but emphasizes
that “these fees are certifed for payment out of a single
source: the 25% of past-due benefts withheld by the Commissioner.”
Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 10.
According to amicus, “[b]ecause the Commissioner withholds
only one pool of 25% of past-due benefts from which to
pay attorney's fees for both agency and court representation,
for an attorney to collect a fee that exceeds the
25% pool of withheld disability benefts,” the attorney may
“need to fle a lawsuit against his disabled client” to collect
the difference. Id., at 23–24. Therefore, amicus urges,
“[w]hen the statute is read as a whole,” “it is evident that
Congress placed a cumulative 25% cap on attorney's
fees payable for successful representation of a Social Security
claimant before both the agency and the court.” Id.,
at 10.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 53 (2019) 61
Opinion of the Court
Amicus is quite right that presently the agency withholds
a single pool of 25% of past-due benefts for direct payment
of agency and court fees. See SSA, Program Operations
Manual System (POMS), GN 03920.035(A) (June 22,
2009), https://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0203920035 (as last
visited Jan. 2, 2019); see also 20 CFR §§ 404.1730(a) and
(b)(1)(i). And amicus sensibly argues that if there is only a
single 25% pool for direct payment of fees, Congress might
not have intended aggregate fees higher than 25%. This argument
is plausible, but the statutory text in fact provides
for two pools of money for direct payment of fees. Any
shortage of withheld benefts for direct payment of fees is
thus due to agency policy.
Under § 406(a)(4), the agency “shall” certify for direct payment
of agency representation fees “an amount equal to so
much of the maximum fee as does not exceed 25 percent of ”
past-due benefts. In other words, this subsection requires
that the agency withhold the approved fees for work performed
in agency proceedings, up to 25% of the amount of
the claimant's past-due benefts. But this is not the only
subsection that enables the agency to withhold past-due
benefts for direct payment of fees. Section 406(b)(1)(A)
provides that the agency “may” certify past-due benefts for
direct payment of court representation fees. As the Government
explains, the agency has nevertheless “exercised its
discretion . . . to withhold a total of 25% of past-due benefts
for direct payment of the approved agency and court
fees.” Reply Brief for Respondent 8 (emphasis added).
The agency's choice to withhold only one pool of 25% of pastdue
benefts does not alter the statutory text, which differentiates
between agency representation in § 406(a) and court
representation in § 406(b), contains separate caps on fees for
each type of representation, and authorizes two pools of
withheld benefts.
More fundamentally, the amount of past-due benefts that
the agency can withhold for direct payment does not delimit
62 CULBERTSON v. BERRYHILL
Opinion of the Court
the amount of fees that can be approved for representation
before the agency or the court. The attorney might receive
a direct payment out of past-due benefts, but that payment
could be less than the fees to which the attorney is entitled.
Indeed, prior to 1968, the statute allowed fees for agency
representation but lacked a provision for direct payment of
such fees from past-due benefts. See supra, at 56. And
under the current §§ 406(a)(1) and (4), the agency can award
a “reasonable fee” that exceeds the 25% of past-due benefts
it can withhold for direct payment.
In short, despite the force of amicus' arguments, the statute
does not bear her reading. Any concerns about a shortage
of withheld benefts for direct payment and the consequences
of such a shortage are best addressed to the agency,
Congress, or the attorney's good judgment.
* * *
Because the 25% cap in § 406(b)(1)(A) applies only to fees
for court representation, and not to the aggregate fees
awarded under §§ 406(a) and (b), the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 63
Syllabus
HENRY SCHEIN, INC., et al. v. ARCHER & WHITE
SALES, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fth circuit
No. 17–1272. Argued October 29, 2018—Decided January 8, 2019
Respondent Archer & White Sales, Inc., sued petitioner Henry Schein,
Inc., alleging violations of federal and state antitrust law and seeking
both money damages and injunctive relief. The relevant contract between
the parties provided for arbitration of any dispute arising under
or related to the agreement, except for, among other things, actions
seeking injunctive relief. Invoking the Federal Arbitration Act,
Schein asked the District Court to refer the matter to arbitration, but
Archer & White argued that the dispute was not subject to arbitration
because its complaint sought injunctive relief, at least in part. Schein
contended that because the rules governing the contract provide
that arbitrators have the power to resolve arbitrability questions, an
arbitrator—not the court—should decide whether the arbitration agreement
applied. Archer & White countered that Schein's argument for
arbitration was wholly groundless, so the District Court could resolve
the threshold arbitrability question. The District Court agreed with
Archer & White and denied Schein's motion to compel arbitration. The
Fifth Circuit affrmed.
Held: The “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability is inconsistent
with the Federal Arbitration Act and this Court's precedent. Under
the Act, arbitration is a matter of contract, and courts must enforce
arbitration contracts according to their terms. Rent-A-Center, West,
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. 63, 67. The parties to such a contract may
agree to have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular
dispute but also “ `gateway' questions of `arbitrability.' ” Id., at 68–69.
Therefore, when the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability question
to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract, even if
the court thinks that the arbitrability claim is wholly groundless. That
conclusion follows also from this Court's precedent. See AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649–650.
Archer & White's counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, its
argument that §§ 3 and 4 of the Act should be interpreted to mean that
a court must always resolve questions of arbitrability has already been
addressed and rejected by this Court. See, e. g., First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944. Second, its argument that § 10
64 HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.
Syllabus
of the Act—which provides for back-end judicial review of an arbitrator's
decision if an arbitrator has “exceeded” his or her “powers”—
supports the conclusion that the court at the front end should also be
able to say that the underlying issue is not arbitrable is inconsistent
with the way Congress designed the Act. And it is not this Court's
proper role to redesign the Act. Third, its argument that it would be
a waste of the parties' time and money to send wholly groundless arbitrability
questions to an arbitrator ignores the fact that the Act contains
no “wholly groundless” exception. This Court may not engraft its own
exceptions onto the statutory text. Nor is it likely that the exception
would save time and money systemically even if it might do so in some
individual cases. Fourth, its argument that the exception is necessary
to deter frivolous motions to compel arbitration overstates the potential
problem. Arbitrators are already capable of effciently disposing of
frivolous cases and deterring frivolous motions, and such motions do not
appear to have caused a substantial problem in those Circuits that have
not recognized a “wholly groundless” exception.
The Fifth Circuit may address the question whether the contract at
issue in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, as well
as other properly preserved arguments, on remand. Pp. 67–72.
878 F. 3d 488, vacated and remanded.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Liam J. Montgomery, Charles
L. McCloud, William T. Marks, Paul F. Schuster, Cynthia
Keely Timms, Richard C. Godfrey, and Barack S. Echols.
Daniel L. Geyser argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief was Lewis T. LeClair.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Atlantic Legal
Foundation by Martin S. Kaufman; for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America by Andrew J. Pincus, Evan M. Tager, Archis
A. Parasharami, and Matthew A. Waring; for the New England Legal
Foundation by Benjamin G. Robbins and Martin J. Newhouse; and for
Anthony Michael Sabino by Mr. Sabino, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Association for Justice by Matthew Wessler, Deepak Gupta, and Jeffrey
R. White; for Public Citizen, Inc., by Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve;
and for George A. Bermann by J. Samuel Tenenbaum.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 63 (2019) 65
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties to a contract
may agree that an arbitrator rather than a court will resolve
disputes arising out of the contract. When a dispute arises,
the parties sometimes may disagree not only about the merits
of the dispute but also about the threshold arbitrability
question—that is, whether their arbitration agreement applies
to the particular dispute. Who decides that threshold
arbitrability question? Under the Act and this Court's
cases, the question of who decides arbitrability is itself a
question of contract. The Act allows parties to agree by
contract that an arbitrator, rather than a court, will resolve
threshold arbitrability questions as well as underlying merits
disputes. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S.
63, 68−70 (2010); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U. S. 938, 943−944 (1995).
Even when a contract delegates the arbitrability question
to an arbitrator, some federal courts nonetheless will shortcircuit
the process and decide the arbitrability question
themselves if the argument that the arbitration agreement
applies to the particular dispute is “wholly groundless.”
The question presented in this case is whether the “wholly
groundless” exception is consistent with the Federal Arbitration
Act. We conclude that it is not. The Act does not
contain a “wholly groundless” exception, and we are not at
liberty to rewrite the statute passed by Congress and signed
by the President. When the parties' contract delegates the
arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect
the parties' decision as embodied in the contract. We
vacate the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Archer and White is a small business that distributes dental
equipment. Archer and White entered into a contract
with Pelton and Crane, a dental equipment manufacturer, to
distribute Pelton and Crane's equipment. The relationship
66 HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
eventually soured. As relevant here, Archer and White
sued Pelton and Crane's successor-in-interest and Henry
Schein, Inc. (collectively, Schein), in Federal District Court
in Texas. Archer and White's complaint alleged violations
of federal and state antitrust law, and sought both money
damages and injunctive relief.
The relevant contract between the parties provided:
“Disputes. This Agreement shall be governed by the
laws of the State of North Carolina. Any dispute arising
under or related to this Agreement (except for actions
seeking injunctive relief and disputes related to
trademarks, trade secrets, or other intellectual property
of [Schein]), shall be resolved by binding arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration rules of the American
Arbitration Association [(AAA)]. The place of arbitration
shall be in Charlotte, North Carolina.” 878 F. 3d
488, 491 (CA5 2017).
After Archer and White sued, Schein invoked the Federal
Arbitration Act and asked the District Court to refer the
parties' antitrust dispute to arbitration. Archer and White
objected, arguing that the dispute was not subject to arbitration
because Archer and White's complaint sought injunctive
relief, at least in part. According to Archer and White, the
parties' contract barred arbitration of disputes when the
plaintiff sought injunctive relief, even if only in part.
The question then became: Who decides whether the antitrust
dispute is subject to arbitration? The rules of the
American Arbitration Association provide that arbitrators
have the power to resolve arbitrability questions. Schein
contended that the contract's express incorporation of
the American Arbitration Association's rules meant that
an arbitrator—not the court—had to decide whether the
arbitration agreement applied to this particular dispute.
Archer and White responded that in cases where the defendant's
argument for arbitration is wholly groundless—
as Archer and White argued was the case here—the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 63 (2019) 67
Opinion of the Court
District Court itself may resolve the threshold question of
arbitrability.
Relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, the District Court
agreed with Archer and White about the existence of a
“wholly groundless” exception, and ruled that Schein's argument
for arbitration was wholly groundless. The District
Court therefore denied Schein's motion to compel arbitration.
The Fifth Circuit affrmed.
In light of disagreement in the Courts of Appeals over
whether the “wholly groundless” exception is consistent
with the Federal Arbitration Act, we granted certiorari,
585 U. S. 1015 (2018). Compare 878 F. 3d 488 (case below);
Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 877 F. 3d 522
(CA4 2017); Douglas v. Regions Bank, 757 F. 3d 460 (CA5
2014); Turi v. Main Street Adoption Servs., LLP, 633 F. 3d
496 (CA6 2011); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F. 3d
1366 (CA Fed. 2006), with Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare, 844
F. 3d 1272 (CA10 2017); Jones v. Waffe House, Inc., 866 F. 3d
1257 (CA11 2017); Douglas, 757 F. 3d, at 464 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
II
In 1925, Congress passed and President Coolidge signed
the Federal Arbitration Act. As relevant here, the Act
provides:
“A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . .
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. § 2.
Under the Act, arbitration is a matter of contract, and
courts must enforce arbitration contracts according to their
terms. Rent-A-Center, 561 U. S., at 67. Applying the Act,
we have held that parties may agree to have an arbitrator
decide not only the merits of a particular dispute but also
68 HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
“ `gateway' questions of `arbitrability,' such as whether the
parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement
covers a particular controversy.” Id., at 68–69; see also
First Options, 514 U. S., at 943. We have explained that an
“agreement to arbitrate a gateway issue is simply an additional,
antecedent agreement the party seeking arbitration
asks the federal court to enforce, and the FAA operates on
this additional arbitration agreement just as it does on any
other.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U. S., at 70.
Even when the parties' contract delegates the threshold
arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the Fifth Circuit and
some other Courts of Appeals have determined that the
court rather than an arbitrator should decide the threshold
arbitrability question if, under the contract, the argument
for arbitration is wholly groundless. Those courts have reasoned
that the “wholly groundless” exception enables courts
to block frivolous attempts to transfer disputes from the
court system to arbitration.
We conclude that the “wholly groundless” exception is inconsistent
with the text of the Act and with our precedent.
We must interpret the Act as written, and the Act in turn
requires that we interpret the contract as written. When
the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability question to
an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract. In
those circumstances, a court possesses no power to decide
the arbitrability issue. That is true even if the court thinks
that the argument that the arbitration agreement applies to
a particular dispute is wholly groundless.
That conclusion follows not only from the text of the Act
but also from precedent. We have held that a court may not
“rule on the potential merits of the underlying” claim that
is assigned by contract to an arbitrator, “even if it appears
to the court to be frivolous.” AT&T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649–650 (1986). A
court has “ `no business weighing the merits of the grievance'
” because the “ `agreement is to submit all grievances
Cite as: 586 U. S. 63 (2019) 69
Opinion of the Court
to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem
meritorious.' ” Id., at 650 (quoting Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 568 (1960)).
That AT&T Technologies principle applies with equal
force to the threshold issue of arbitrability. Just as a court
may not decide a merits question that the parties have delegated
to an arbitrator, a court may not decide an arbitrability
question that the parties have delegated to an arbitrator.
In an attempt to overcome the statutory text and this
Court's cases, Archer and White advances four main arguments.
None is persuasive.
First, Archer and White points to §§ 3 and 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act. Section 3 provides that a court must stay
litigation “upon being satisfed that the issue” is “referable
to arbitration” under the “agreement.” Section 4 says that
a court, in response to a motion by an aggrieved party, must
compel arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the
agreement” when the court is “satisfed that the making of
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not in issue.”
Archer and White interprets those provisions to mean, in
essence, that a court must always resolve questions of arbitrability
and that an arbitrator never may do so. But that
ship has sailed. This Court has consistently held that parties
may delegate threshold arbitrability questions to the arbitrator,
so long as the parties' agreement does so by “clear
and unmistakable” evidence. First Options, 514 U. S., at
944 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Rent-A-Center, 561 U. S., at 69, n. 1. To be sure, before
referring a dispute to an arbitrator, the court determines
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. See 9 U. S. C.
§ 2. But if a valid agreement exists, and if the agreement
delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, a court may
not decide the arbitrability issue.
Second, Archer and White cites § 10 of the Act, which
provides for back-end judicial review of an arbitrator's deci70
HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
sion if an arbitrator has “exceeded” his or her “powers.”
§ 10(a)(4). According to Archer and White, if a court at the
back end can say that the underlying issue was not arbitrable,
the court at the front end should also be able to say
that the underlying issue is not arbitrable. The dispositive
answer to Archer and White's § 10 argument is that Congress
designed the Act in a specifc way, and it is not our
proper role to redesign the statute. Archer and White's § 10
argument would mean, moreover, that courts presumably
also should decide frivolous merits questions that have been
delegated to an arbitrator. Yet we have already rejected
that argument: When the parties' contract assigns a matter
to arbitration, a court may not resolve the merits of the dispute
even if the court thinks that a party's claim on the merits
is frivolous. AT&T Technologies, 475 U. S., at 649−650.
So, too, with arbitrability.
Third, Archer and White says that, as a practical and policy
matter, it would be a waste of the parties' time and
money to send the arbitrability question to an arbitrator if
the argument for arbitration is wholly groundless. In cases
like this, as Archer and White sees it, the arbitrator will
inevitably conclude that the dispute is not arbitrable and
then send the case back to the district court. So why waste
the time and money? The short answer is that the Act contains
no “wholly groundless” exception, and we may not engraft
our own exceptions onto the statutory text. See
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S.
546, 556−557 (2005).
In addition, contrary to Archer and White's claim, it is
doubtful that the “wholly groundless” exception would save
time and money systemically even if it might do so in some
individual cases. Archer and White assumes that it is easy
to tell when an argument for arbitration of a particular dispute
is wholly groundless. We are dubious. The exception
would inevitably spark collateral litigation (with briefng,
argument, and opinion writing) over whether a seemingly
Cite as: 586 U. S. 63 (2019) 71
Opinion of the Court
unmeritorious argument for arbitration is wholly groundless,
as opposed to groundless. We see no reason to create such
a time-consuming sideshow.
Archer and White further assumes that an arbitrator
would inevitably reject arbitration in those cases where a
judge would conclude that the argument for arbitration is
wholly groundless. Not always. After all, an arbitrator
might hold a different view of the arbitrability issue than a
court does, even if the court fnds the answer obvious. It
is not unheard-of for one fair-minded adjudicator to think a
decision is obvious in one direction but for another fairminded
adjudicator to decide the matter the other way.
Fourth, Archer and White asserts another policy argument:
that the “wholly groundless” exception is necessary to
deter frivolous motions to compel arbitration. Again, we
may not rewrite the statute simply to accommodate that policy
concern. In any event, Archer and White overstates
the potential problem. Arbitrators can effciently dispose of
frivolous cases by quickly ruling that a claim is not in fact
arbitrable. And under certain circumstances, arbitrators
may be able to respond to frivolous arguments for arbitration
by imposing fee-shifting and cost-shifting sanctions, which in
turn will help deter and remedy frivolous motions to compel
arbitration. We are not aware that frivolous motions to
compel arbitration have caused a substantial problem in
those Circuits that have not recognized a “wholly groundless”
exception.
In sum, we reject the “wholly groundless” exception. The
exception is inconsistent with the statutory text and with
our precedent. It confuses the question of who decides
arbitrability with the separate question of who prevails on
arbitrability. When the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability
question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect
the parties' decision as embodied in the contract.
We express no view about whether the contract at issue
in this case in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an
72 HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
arbitrator. The Court of Appeals did not decide that issue.
Under our cases, courts “should not assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is `clear and
unmistakable' evidence that they did so.” First Options,
514 U. S., at 944 (alterations omitted). On remand, the
Court of Appeals may address that issue in the frst instance,
as well as other arguments that Archer and White has properly
preserved.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 73
Syllabus
STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 17–5554. Argued October 9, 2018—Decided January 15, 2019
Petitioner Stokeling pleaded guilty to possessing a frearm and ammunition
after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(g)(1). Based on Stokeling's prior criminal history, the probation
offce recommended the mandatory minimum 15-year prison term that
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides for § 922(g) violators
who have three previous convictions “for a violent felony,” § 924(e). As
relevant here, Stokeling objected that his prior Florida robbery conviction
was not a “violent felony,” which ACCA defnes, in relevant part,
as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another,” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The
District Court held that Stokeling's actions during the robbery did
not justify an ACCA sentence enhancement, but the Eleventh Circuit
reversed.
Held:
1. ACCA's elements clause encompasses a robbery offense that requires
the defendant to overcome the victim's resistance. Pp. 77–85.
(a) As originally enacted, ACCA prescribed a sentence enhancement
for certain individuals with three prior convictions “for robbery
or burglary,” 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. II), and defned
robbery as an unlawful taking “by force or violence,” § 1202(c)(8)—a
clear reference to common-law robbery, which required a level of “force”
or “violence” suffcient to overcome the resistance of the victim, however
slight. When Congress amended ACCA two years later, it replaced
the enumerated crimes with the elements clause, an expanded
enumerated-offenses clause, and the now-defunct residual clause. The
new elements clause extended ACCA to cover any offense that has as
an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,”
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). By replacing robbery with a clause
that has “force” as its touchstone, Congress retained the same commonlaw
defnition that undergirded the defnition of robbery in the original
ACCA. This understanding is buttressed by the then widely accepted
defnitions of robbery among the States, a signifcant majority of which
74 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
defned nonaggravated robbery as requiring a degree of force suffcient
only to overcome a victim's resistance. Under Stokeling's reading,
many of those state robbery statutes would not qualify as ACCA predicates.
But federal criminal statutes should not be construed in ways
that would render them inapplicable in many States. Pp. 77–82.
(b) This understanding of “physical force” comports with Johnson
v. United States, 559 U. S. 133. The force necessary for misdemeanor
battery addressed in Johnson does not require resistance or even physical
aversion on the part of the victim. Rather, the “slightest offensive
touching” would qualify. Id., at 139. It is thus different in kind from
the force necessary to overcome resistance by a victim, which is inherently
“violent” in the sense contemplated by Johnson and “suggest[s] a
degree of power that would not be satisfed by the merest touching.”
Ibid. Johnson did not purport, as Stokeling suggests, to establish a
force threshold so high as to exclude even robbery from ACCA's scope.
Pp. 82–84.
(c) Stokeling's suggested defnition of “physical force”—force “reasonably
expected to cause pain or injury”—is inconsistent with the degree
of force necessary to commit robbery at common law. Moreover,
the Court declined to adopt this standard in Johnson. Stokeling's proposal
would prove exceedingly diffcult to apply, would impose yet another
indeterminable line-drawing exercise on the lower courts, and is
not supported by United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157. Pp. 84–85.
2. Robbery under Florida law qualifes as an ACCA-predicate offense
under the elements clause. The term “physical force” in ACCA encompasses
the degree of force necessary to commit common-law robbery.
And the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that the robbery statute
requires “resistance by the victim that is overcome by the physical force
of the offender.” Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886. Pp. 85–87.
684 Fed. Appx. 870, affrmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Breyer, Alito,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., fled a dissenting
opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Ginsburg and Kagan, JJ., joined,
post, p 87.
Brenda G. Bryn argued the cause for petitioner. With
her on the briefs were Andrew L. Adler and Amir H. Ali.
Frederick Liu argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, AsCite
as: 586 U. S. 73 (2019) 75
Opinion of the Court
sistant Attorney General Benczkowski, Eric J. Feigin, and
John M. Pellettieri.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide whether a robbery offense
that has as an element the use of force suffcient to overcome
a victim's resistance necessitates the use of “physical force”
within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). We conclude that it
does.
I
In the early hours of July 27, 2015, two people burgled
the Tongue & Cheek restaurant in Miami Beach, Florida.
Petitioner Denard Stokeling was an employee of the restaurant,
and the Miami Beach Police identifed him as a suspect
based on surveillance video from the burglary and witness
statements. After conducting a criminal background check,
police learned that Stokeling had previously been convicted
of three felonies—home invasion, kidnaping, and robbery.
When confronted, Stokeling admitted that he had a gun in
his backpack. The detectives opened the backpack and discovered
a 9-mm semiautomatic frearm, a magazine, and 12
rounds of ammunition.
Stokeling pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing a
frearm and ammunition after having been convicted of a felony,
in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The probation offce
recommended that Stokeling be sentenced as an armed
career criminal under ACCA, which provides that a person
who violates § 922(g) and who has three previous convictions
for a “violent felony” shall be imprisoned for a minimum of
15 years. § 924(e). ACCA defnes “violent felony” as “any
*Hyland Hunt, Ruthanne M. Deutsch, Jonathan D. Hacker, and Deanna
M. Rice fled a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal.
76 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year” that
“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
§ 924(e)(2)(B).
As relevant here, Stokeling objected that his 1997 Florida
robbery conviction was not a predicate offense under ACCA.
This conviction, he argued, did not qualify under the frst
clause—the “elements clause”—because Florida robbery
does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force.”*
Under Florida law, robbery is defned as “the taking of
money or other property . . . from the person or custody of
another, . . . when in the course of the taking there is the
use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Fla. Stat.
§ 812.13(1) (1995). The Florida Supreme Court has explained
that the “use of force” necessary to commit robbery
requires “resistance by the victim that is overcome by the
physical force of the offender.” Robinson v. State, 692
So. 2d 883, 886 (1997).
Instead of applying a categorical approach to the elements
clause, the District Court evaluated whether the facts of
Stokeling's robbery conviction were serious enough to warrant
an enhancement. The court concluded that, although
Stokeling “ `grabbed [the victim] by the neck and tried to
remove her necklaces' ” as she “ `held onto' ” them, his actions
did not “justify an enhancement.” Sentencing Hearing in
*The Government did not argue that Florida robbery should qualify
under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), presumably because robbery is not among the enumerated
offenses and the Court held the “residual clause” unconstitutionally
vague in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 73 (2019) 77
Opinion of the Court
No. 15–cr–20815 (SD Fla.), Doc. 45, pp. 10–11. The court
then sentenced Stokeling to less than half of the mandatory
minimum 15-year term of imprisonment provided by ACCA.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. 684 Fed. Appx. 870
(2017). It held that the District Court erred in making its
own factual determination about the level of violence involved
in Stokeling's particular robbery offense. Id., at 871.
The court also rejected Stokeling's argument that Florida
robbery does not categorically require suffcient force to constitute
a violent felony under ACCA's elements clause. Id.,
at 871–872.
We granted certiorari to address whether the “force” required
to commit robbery under Florida law qualifes as
“physical force” for purposes of the elements clause. 584
U. S. 915 (2018). We now affrm.
II
Construing the language of the elements clause in light of
the history of ACCA and our opinion in Johnson v. United
States, 559 U. S. 133 (2010), we conclude that the elements
clause encompasses robbery offenses that require the criminal
to overcome the victim's resistance.
A
As originally enacted, ACCA prescribed a 15-year minimum
sentence for any person who received, possessed, or
transported a frearm following three prior convictions “for
robbery or burglary.” 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a) (1982 ed.,
Supp. II). Robbery was defned in relevant part as “any
felony consisting of the taking of the property of another
from the person or presence of another by force or violence.”
§ 1202(c)(8) (1982 ed., Supp. II) (emphasis added).
The statute's defnition mirrored the elements of the
common-law crime of robbery, which has long required force
or violence. At common law, an unlawful taking was merely
larceny unless the crime involved “violence.” 2 J. Bishop,
78 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Criminal Law § 1156, p. 860 (J. Zane & C. Zollmann eds., 9th
ed. 1923). And “violence” was “committed if suffcient force
[was] exerted to overcome the resistance encountered.” Id.,
at 861.
A few examples illustrate the point. Under the common
law, it was robbery “to seize another's watch or purse, and
use suffcient force to break a chain or guard by which it is
attached to his person, or to run against another, or rudely
push him about, for the purpose of diverting his attention
and robbing him.” W. Clark & W. Marshall, Law of Crimes
554 (H. Lazell ed., 2d ed. 1905) (Clark & Marshall) (footnotes
omitted). Similarly, it was robbery to pull a diamond pin
out of a woman's hair when doing so tore away hair attached
to the pin. See 2 W. Russell, Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors
68 (2d ed. 1828). But the crime was larceny, not
robbery, if the thief did not have to overcome such resistance.
In fact, common-law authorities frequently used the terms
“violence” and “force” interchangeably. See ibid. (concluding
that “if any injury be done to the person, or there be any
struggle by the party to keep possession of the property before
it be taken from him, there will be a suffcient actual
`violence' ” to establish robbery); Clark & Marshall 553 (“Suffcient
force must be used to overcome resistance. . . . If
there is any injury to the person of the owner, or if he resists
the attempt to rob him, and his resistance is overcome, there
is suffcient violence to make the taking robbery, however
slight the resistance” (emphasis added)). The common law
also did not distinguish between gradations of “violence.” If
an act physically overcame a victim's resistance, “however
slight” that resistance might be, it necessarily constituted
violence. Ibid.; 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 242 (1769) (distinguishing “taking . . . by
force” from “privately stealing,” and stating that the use of
this “violence” differentiates robbery from other larcenies);
see also 3 id., at 120 (explaining, in the battery context, that
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Opinion of the Court
“the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of
violence, and therefore totally prohibits the frst and lowest
stage of it”).
The overlap between “force” and “violence” at common law
is refected in modern legal and colloquial usage of these
terms. “Force” means “[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed
against a person or thing,” Black's Law Dictionary
656 (7th ed. 1999), or “unlawful violence threatened or committed
against persons or property,” Random House Dictionary
of the English Language 748 (2d ed. 1987). Likewise,
“violence” implies force, including an “unjust or unwarranted
use of force.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 1564; accord, Random
House Dictionary, at 2124 (“rough or injurious physical
force, action, or treatment,” or “an unjust or unwarranted
exertion of force or power, as against rights or laws”).
Against this background, Congress, in the original ACCA,
defned robbery as requiring the use of “force or violence”—
a clear reference to the common law of robbery. See Samantar
v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 320, n. 13 (2010) (“Congress
`is understood to legislate against a background of commonlaw
. . . principles' ”). And the level of “force” or “violence”
needed at common law was by this time well established:
“Suffcient force must be used to overcome resistance . . .
however slight the resistance.” Clark & Marshall 553.
In 1986, Congress amended the relevant provisions of
ACCA to their current form. The amendment was titled
Expansion of Predicate Offenses for Armed Career Criminal
Penalties. See Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986,
§ 1402, 100 Stat. 3207–39. This amendment replaced the two
enumerated crimes of “robbery or burglary” with the current
elements clause, a new enumerated-offenses list, and
a (now-defunct) residual clause. See Johnson v. United
States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015). In the new statute, robbery
was no longer enumerated as a predicate offense. But the
newly created elements clause extended ACCA to cover
80 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
any offense that has as an element “the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)
(B)(i) (2012 ed.) (emphasis added).
“ `[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal
source, whether the common law or other legislation, it
brings the old soil with it.' ” Hall v. Hall, 584 U. S. 59, 73
(2018) (quoting Frankfurter, Some Refections on the Reading
of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)). That
principle supports our interpretation of the term “force”
here. By retaining the term “force” in the 1986 version of
ACCA and otherwise “[e]xpan[ding]” the predicate offenses
under ACCA, Congress made clear that the “force” required
for common-law robbery would be suffcient to justify an enhanced
sentence under the new elements clause. We can
think of no reason to read “force” in the revised statute to
require anything more than the degree of “force” required
in the 1984 statute. And it would be anomalous to read
“force” as excluding the quintessential ACCA-predicate
crime of robbery, despite the amendment's retention of the
term “force” and its stated intent to expand the number of
qualifying offenses.
The symmetry between the 1984 defnition of robbery (requiring
the use of “force or violence”) and the 1986 elements
clause (requiring the use of “physical force”) is striking. By
replacing robbery as an enumerated offense with a clause
that has “force” as its touchstone, Congress made clear that
“force” retained the same common-law defnition that undergirded
the original defnition of robbery adopted a mere two
years earlier. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that
the original 1984 statute defned “robbery” using terms with
well-established common-law meanings.
Our understanding of “physical force” is further buttressed
by the then widely accepted defnitions of robbery in
the States. In 1986, a signifcant majority of the States defned
nonaggravated robbery as requiring force that overCite
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Opinion of the Court
comes a victim's resistance. The Government counts 43
States that measured force by this degree, 5 States that required
“force” to cause bodily injury, and 2 States and the
District of Columbia that permitted force to encompass
something less, such as purse snatching. App. B to Brief for
United States. Stokeling counters that, at most, 31 States
defned force as overcoming victim resistance. Reply Brief
21. We need not declare a winner in this numbers game
because, either way, it is clear that many States' robbery
statutes would not qualify as ACCA predicates under Stokeling's
reading.
His reading would disqualify more than just basic-robbery
statutes. Departing from the common-law understanding of
“force” would also exclude other crimes that have as an
element the force required to commit basic robbery. For
instance, Florida requires the same element of “force” for
both armed robbery and basic robbery. See Fla. Stat.
§ 812.13(2)(a) (distinguishing armed robbery from robbery by
requiring the additional element of “carr[ying] a frearm or
other deadly weapon” during the robbery). Thus, as Stokeling's
counsel admitted at oral argument, “armed robbery in
Florida” would not qualify under ACCA if his view were
adopted. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3–4; see United States v. Lee, 886
F. 3d 1161, 1163, n. 1 (CA11 2018) (treating “Florida strongarm
robbery [i. e., basic robbery], armed robbery, and attempted
robbery . . . the same for purposes of analyzing the
ACCA's elements clause”).
Where, as here, the applicability of a federal criminal statute
requires a state conviction, we have repeatedly declined
to construe the statute in a way that would render it inapplicable
in many States. See, e. g., United States v. Castleman,
572 U. S. 157, 167 (2014) (reading “physical force” to include
common-law force, in part because a different reading would
render 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(9) “ineffectual in at least 10
States”); Voisine v. United States, 579 U. S. 686, 696 (2016)
82 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
(declining to interpret § 912(a)(33)(A) in a way that would
“ris[k] rendering § 922(g)(9) broadly inoperative” in 34 States
and the District of Columbia). That approach is appropriate
here as well.
B
Our understanding of “physical force” comports with Johnson
v. United States, 559 U. S. 133 (2010). There, the Court
held that “ `actua[l] and intentiona[l] touching' ”—the level
of force necessary to commit common-law misdemeanor
battery—did not require the “degree of force” necessary to
qualify as a “violent felony” under ACCA's elements clause.
Id., at 138, 140. To reach this conclusion, the Court parsed
the meaning of the phrase “physical force.” First, it explained
that the modifer “physical” “plainly refers to force
exerted by and through concrete bodies—distinguishing
physical force from, for example, intellectual force or emotional
force.” Id., at 138. The Court then considered
“whether the term `force' in [the elements clause] has the
specialized meaning that it bore in the common-law defnition
of battery.” Id., at 139. After reviewing the context of the
statute, the Court rejected the Government's suggestion
that “force” encompassed even the “slightest offensive touching.”
Ibid. Instead, it held that “physical force” means
“violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain
or injury to another person.” Id., at 140. Applying that
standard to a Florida battery law criminalizing “any intentional
physical contact,” the Court concluded that the law did
not require the use of “physical force” within the meaning of
ACCA. Ibid.
Stokeling argues that Johnson rejected as insuffcient the
degree of “force” required to commit robbery under Florida
law because it is not “substantial force.” We disagree. The
nominal contact that Johnson addressed involved physical
force that is different in kind from the violent force necessary
to overcome resistance by a victim. The force necessary
for misdemeanor battery does not require resistance or
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Opinion of the Court
even physical aversion on the part of the victim; the “unwanted”
nature of the physical contact itself suffces to render
it unlawful. See State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 216
(Fla. 2007).
By contrast, the force necessary to overcome a victim's
physical resistance is inherently “violent” in the sense contemplated
by Johnson, and “suggest[s] a degree of power
that would not be satisfed by the merest touching.” 559
U. S., at 139. This is true because robbery that must overpower
a victim's will—even a feeble or weak-willed victim—
necessarily involves a physical confrontation and struggle.
The altercation need not cause pain or injury or even be prolonged;
it is the physical contest between the criminal and
the victim that is itself “capable of causing physical pain or
injury.” Id., at 140. Indeed, Johnson itself relied on a
defnition of “physical force” that specifcally encompassed
robbery: “ `[f]orce consisting in a physical act, esp. a violent
act directed against a robbery victim.' ” Id., at 139 (quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 717 (9th ed. 2009); emphasis added).
Robbery thus has always been within the “ `category of violent,
active crimes' ” that Congress included in ACCA. 559
U. S., at 140.
To get around Johnson, Stokeling cherry picks adjectives
from parenthetical defnitions in the opinion, insisting that
the level of force must be “severe,” “extreme,” “furious,” or
“vehement. ” These adjectives cannot bear the weight
Stokeling would place on them. They merely supported
Johnson's actual holding: that common-law battery does not
require “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.”
Ibid. Johnson did not purport to establish a force threshold
so high as to exclude even robbery from ACCA's scope.
Moreover, Stokeling ignores that the Court also defned “violence”
as “ `unjust or improper force.' ” Ibid. (emphasis
added). As explained above, the common law similarly
linked the terms “violence” and “force.” Overcoming a victim's
resistance was per se violence against the victim, even
84 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
if it ultimately caused minimal pain or injury. See Russell,
Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors, at 68.
C
In the wake of Johnson, the Court has repeated its holding
that “physical force” means “ `force capable of causing physical
pain or injury.' ” Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. 148, 170
(2018) (quoting Johnson, supra, at 140); see also Castleman,
supra, at 173–174 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
Finding this defnition diffcult to square with his position,
Stokeling urges us to adopt a new, heightened reading of
physical force: force that is “reasonably expected to cause
pain or injury.” For the reasons already explained, that
defnition is inconsistent with the degree of force necessary
to commit robbery at common law. Moreover, the Court declined
to adopt that standard in Johnson, even after considering
similar language employed in a nearby statutory provision,
18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). 559 U. S., at 143. The
Court instead settled on “force capable of causing physical
pain or injury.” Id., at 140 (emphasis added). “Capable”
means “susceptible” or “having attributes . . . required for
performance or accomplishment” or “having traits conducive
to or features permitting.” Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 203 (1983); see also Oxford American Dictionary
and Thesaurus 180 (2d ed. 2009) (“having the ability
or quality necessary to do”). Johnson thus does not
require any particular degree of likelihood or probability
that the force used will cause physical pain or injury; only
potentiality.
Stokeling's proposed standard would also prove exceedingly
diffcult to apply. Evaluating the statistical probability
that harm will befall a victim is not an administrable
standard under our categorical approach. Crimes can be
committed in many different ways, and it would be diffcult
to assess whether a crime is categorically likely to harm the
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Opinion of the Court
victim, especially when the statute at issue lacks fne-tuned
gradations of “force.” We decline to impose yet another indeterminable
line-drawing exercise on the lower courts.
Stokeling next contends that Castleman held that minor
uses of force do not constitute “violent force,” but he misreads
that opinion. In Castleman, the Court noted that for
purposes of a statute focused on domestic-violence misdemeanors,
crimes involving relatively “[m]inor uses of force”
that might not “constitute `violence' in the generic sense”
could nevertheless qualify as predicate offenses. 572 U. S.,
at 165. The Court thus had no need to decide more generally
whether, under Johnson, conduct that leads to relatively
minor forms of injury—such as “ `a cut, abrasion,
[or] bruise' ”—“necessitate[s]” the use of “violent force.”
572 U. S., at 170. Only Justice Scalia's separate opinion addressed
that question, and he concluded that force as small
as “ `hitting, slapping, shoving, grabbing, pinching, biting,
and hair pulling,' ” id., at 182 (alterations omitted), satisfed
Johnson's defnition. He reasoned that “[n]one of those actions
bears any real resemblance to mere offensive touching,
and all of them are capable of causing physical pain or injury.”
572 U. S., at 182. This understanding of “physical
force” is consistent with our holding today that force is “capable
of causing physical injury” within the meaning of Johnson
when it is suffcient to overcome a victim's resistance.
Such force satisfes ACCA's elements clause.
III
We now apply these principles to Florida's robbery statute
to determine whether it “has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another.” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). We conclude
that it does.
As explained, Florida law defnes robbery as “the taking
of money or other property . . . from the person or custody
of another, . . . when in the course of the taking there is the
86 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Fla. Stat.
§ 812.13(1). The Florida Supreme Court has made clear that
this statute requires “resistance by the victim that is overcome
by the physical force of the offender.” Robinson v.
State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (1997). Mere “snatching of property
from another” will not suffce. Ibid.
Several cases cited by the parties illustrate the application
of the standard articulated in Robinson. For example, a defendant
who grabs the victim's fngers and peels them back
to steal money commits robbery in Florida. Sanders v.
State, 769 So. 2d 506, 507–508 (Fla. App. 2000). But a defendant
who merely snatches money from the victim's hand
and runs away has not committed robbery. Goldsmith v.
State, 573 So. 2d 445 (Fla. App. 1991). Similarly, a defendant
who steals a gold chain does not use “ `force,' within the
meaning of the robbery statute,” simply because the victim
“fe[els] his fngers on the back of her neck.” Walker v. State,
546 So. 2d 1165, 1166–1167 (Fla. App. 1989). It is worth noting
that, in 1999, Florida enacted a separate “sudden snatching”
statute that proscribes this latter category of conduct;
under that statute, it is unnecessary to show either that the
defendant “used any amount of force beyond that effort necessary
to obtain possession of the money or other property”
or that “[t]here was any resistance offered by the victim to
the offender.” Fla. Stat. § 812.131 (1999).
Thus, the application of the categorical approach to the
Florida robbery statute is straightforward. Because the
term “physical force” in ACCA encompasses the degree of
force necessary to commit common-law robbery, and because
Florida robbery requires that same degree of “force,” Florida
robbery qualifes as an ACCA-predicate offense under
the elements clause. Cf. Descamps v. United States, 570
U. S. 254, 261 (2013) (“If the relevant statute has the same
elemen[t],” “then the prior conviction can serve as an
ACCA predicate”).
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
IV
In sum, “physical force,” or “force capable of causing physical
pain or injury,” Johnson, 559 U. S., at 140, includes the
amount of force necessary to overcome a victim's resistance.
Robbery under Florida law corresponds to that level of force
and therefore qualifes as a “violent felony” under ACCA's
elements clause. For these reasons, we affrm the judgment
of the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom The Chief Justice,
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
In Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133 (2010), this
Court ruled that the words “physical force” in the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2), denote
a heightened degree of force rather than the minimal contact
that would have qualifed as “force” for purposes of the
common-law crime of battery. 559 U. S., at 139–140. This
case asks whether Florida robbery requires such “physical
force,” and thus qualifes as a “violent felony” under the
ACCA, even though it can be committed through use of only
slight force. See § 924(e)(2)(B). Under Johnson, the answer
to that question is no. Because the Court's contrary
ruling distorts Johnson, I respectfully dissent.
I
As the majority explains, petitioner Denard Stokeling
pleaded guilty in 2016 to being a felon in possession of a
frearm in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The Government
and the probation department argued for an increased
sentence under the ACCA. Stokeling objected.
The ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence
on any § 922(g) offender who has been convicted of
at least three qualifying predicate convictions. § 924(e)(1).
As relevant here, a past conviction can qualify as an ACCA
88 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
predicate if it is what the ACCA calls a “violent felony”—
that is, “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year” that
“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or
“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
§ 924(e)(2)(B).
Clause (i) is often called the “elements clause” (or “force
clause”), because it requires each qualifying crime to have
an element involving force. The frst part of clause (ii) is
often called the “enumerated clause,” because it enumerates
certain generic crimes—such as burglary—that Congress
sought to cover. The fnal part of clause (ii), often called
the “residual clause,” once offered a catchall to sweep in otherwise
uncovered convictions, but the Court struck it down
as unconstitutionally vague in 2015. See Johnson v. United
States, 576 U. S. 591, 605. So the elements clause and the
enumerated clause are now the only channels by which a
prior conviction can qualify as an ACCA “violent felony.”
Whether Stokeling is subject to the ACCA's 15-year mandatory
minimum hinges on whether his 1997 conviction for
Florida robbery, see App. 10, qualifes under the elements
clause. To determine whether a conviction qualifes as a violent
felony under the ACCA, courts apply a method called
the categorical approach. See Taylor v. United States, 495
U. S. 575, 600–602 (1990). In the elements-clause context,
that method requires asking whether the least culpable conduct
covered by the statute at issue nevertheless “has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another.” § 924(e)(2); see Johnson,
559 U. S., at 137. If it does not, then the statute is too
broad to qualify as a “violent felony.” In determining what
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
a state crime covers for purposes of this federal sentencing
enhancement, federal courts look to, and are constrained by,
state courts' interpretations of state law. See id., at 138.
As relevant here, Florida law defnes robbery as “the taking
of money or other property . . . from the person or custody
of another . . . when in the course of the taking there
is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Fla.
Stat. § 812.13(1) (2017). The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted
the statute's reference to force to require “force
suffcient to overcome a victim's resistance.” Robinson v.
State, 692 So. 2d 883, 887 (1997). Otherwise, the “degree of
force used is immaterial.” Montsdoca v. State, 84 Fla. 82,
86, 93 So. 157, 159 (1922). If the resistance is minimal, the
force need only be minimal as well.
II
Florida robbery, as interpreted and applied by the Florida
courts, covers too broad a range of conduct to qualify as a
“violent felony” under the ACCA. Both the text and purpose
of the ACCA—particularly as they have already been
construed by our precedents—demonstrate why.
A
In considering the text of the ACCA, we do not write on
a clean slate. As everyone seems to agree, the key precedent
here is this Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States, 559 U. S. 133. See ante, at 77, 82. But while the
majority claims to honor Johnson, ante, at 82–84, it does so
in the breach.
Johnson concerned whether Florida battery qualifed as
an ACCA predicate under the elements clause. This Court
held that it did not. To arrive at that answer, the Court was
required to interpret what exactly Congress meant when it
used the words “physical force” to defne the kind of “violent
felony” that should be captured by the ACCA's elements
clause. See 559 U. S., at 138–143.
90 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Rather than parsing “cherry pick[ed] adjectives,” ante,
at 83, it is instructive to look to how Johnson actually
answered that question. Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia explained:
“We think it clear that in the context of a statutory
defnition of `violent felony,' the phrase `physical force'
means violent force—that is, force capable of causing
physical pain or injury to another person. See Flores
v. Ashcroft, 350 F. 3d 666, 672 (CA7 2003) (Easterbrook,
J.). Even by itself, the word `violent' in § 924(e)
(2)(B) connotes a substantial degree of force. Webster's
Second 2846 (defning `violent' as `[m]oving, acting, or
characterized, by physical force, esp. by extreme and
sudden or by unjust or improper force; furious; severe;
vehement . . . '); 19 Oxford English Dictionary 656 (2d
ed. 1989) (`[c]haracterized by the exertion of great physical
force or strength'); Black's [Law Dictionary] 1706
[(9th ed. 2009)] (`[o]f, relating to, or characterized by
strong physical force'). When the adjective `violent' is
attached to the noun `felony,' its connotation of strong
physical force is even clearer. See id., at 1188 (defning
`violent felony' as `[a] crime characterized by extreme
physical force, such as murder, forcible rape, and assault
and battery with a dangerous weapon'); see also United
States v. Doe, 960 F. 2d 221, 225 (CA1 1992) (Breyer,
C. J.) (`[T]he term to be defned, “violent felony,” . . .
calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the possibility
of more closely related, active violence').” 559
U. S., at 140–141.
In other words, in the context of a statute delineating “violent
felon[ies],” the phrase “physical force” signifes a degree
of force that is “violent,” “substantial,” and “strong”—“that
is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
person.” See id., at 140; see also id., at 142 (“As we have
discussed . . . the term `physical force' itself normally conCite
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
notes force strong enough to constitute `power'—and all the
more so when it is contained in a defnition of `violent
felony' ”).
The majority, slicing Johnson up, concentrates heavily on
the phrase “capable of causing physical pain or injury” and
emphasizes the dictionary defnition of the word “capable” to
suggest that Johnson “does not require any particular degree
of likelihood or probability” of “pain or injury”—merely,
as with any law professor's eggshell-victim hypothetical, “potentiality.”
Ante, at 84. Our opinions, however, should not
be “parsed as though we were dealing with language of
a statute,” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341
(1979), and in any event, the majority's parsing goes astray.
It is clear in context that the Court in Johnson did not mean
the word “capable” in the way that the majority uses it
today, because Johnson rejected an interpretation of “physical
force” that would have included a crime of battery that
could be satisfed by “[t]he most `nominal contact,' such as a
`ta[p] . . . on the shoulder without consent.' ” 559 U. S., at
138. As any frst-year torts student (or person with a shoulder
injury) quickly learns, even a tap on the shoulder is “capable
of causing physical pain or injury” in certain cases.
So the Court could not have meant “capable” in the “potentiality”
sense that the majority, ante, at 84, ascribes to
it. Rather, it meant it in the sense that its entire text indicates:
“force capable of causing physical pain or injury” in
the sense that a “strong” or “substantial degree of force”
can cause physical pain or injury. See Johnson, 559 U. S.,
at 140. The phrase denoted, that is, a heightened degree of
force.
Florida robbery, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme
Court, cannot meet Johnson's defnition of physical force. As
noted above, Florida robbery requires “force suffcient to
overcome a victim's resistance.” Robinson, 692 So. 2d, at
887. But that can mean essentially no force at all. See Mc-
Cloud v. State, 335 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976) (“Any degree
92 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
of force suffces to convert larceny into a robbery”); Montsdoca,
84 Fla., at 86, 93 So., at 159 (“The degree of force used
is immaterial”). For example, the force element of Florida
robbery is satisfed by a pickpocket who attempts to pull free
after the victim catches his arm. See Robinson, 692 So. 2d,
at 887, n. 10 (citing Colby v. State, 46 Fla. 112, 113, 35 So.
189, 190 (1903)). Florida courts have held the same for a
thief who pulls cash from a victim's hand by “ `peel[ing his]
fngers back,' ” regardless of “[t]he fact that [the victim] did
not put up greater resistance.” Sanders v. State, 769 So. 2d
506, 507 (Fla. App. 2000). The Government concedes, similarly,
that a thief who grabs a bag from a victim's shoulder
also commits Florida robbery, so long as the victim instinctively
holds on to the bag's strap for a moment. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 32–34; see also Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d
320, 322–323 (Fla. App. 2011). And Stokeling points to at
least one person who was convicted of Florida robbery after
causing a bill to rip while pulling cash from a victim's hand.
See App. B to Brief for Petitioner.
While these acts can, of course, be accomplished with more
than minimal force, they need not be. The thief who loosens
an already loose grasp or (assuming the angle is right) tears
the side of a $5 bill has hardly used any force at all. Nor
does the thief who simply pulls his arm free from a store
employee's weak grasp or snatches a handbag onto which a
victim feetingly holds use “force capable of causing physical
pain or injury to another person” in the sense that Johnson
meant the phrase, because he does not use “a substantial
degree of force” or “strong physical force.” 559 U. S., at
140. By providing that “[a]ny degree of force suffces
to convert larceny into a robbery,” McCloud, 335 So. 2d,
at 258—and thus making robbers out of thieves who use
minimal force—Florida expands its law beyond the line
that Johnson drew. The least culpable conduct proscribed
by Fla. Stat. § 812.13 does not entail “physical force,”
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), as this Court properly construed that phrase
in Johnson.
B
The purpose underlying the ACCA confrms that a robbery
statute that sweeps as broadly as Florida's does not
qualify as an ACCA predicate.
As noted above, the ACCA prescribes a 15-year
mandatory-minimum prison term for anyone convicted of
being a felon in possession of a frearm so long as that person
has three qualifying past convictions. In Begay v. United
States, 553 U. S. 137 (2008), this Court explained that, “[a]s
suggested by its title, the Armed Career Criminal Act focuses
upon the special danger created when a particular type
of offender—a violent criminal or drug traffcker—possesses
a gun.” Id., at 146. The ACCA, that is to say, does not look
to past crimes simply to get a sense of whether a particular
defendant is generally a recidivist; rather, it looks to past
crimes to determine specifcally “the kind or degree of danger
the offender would pose were he to possess a gun.”
Ibid.
Begay considered whether a New Mexico felony conviction
for driving under the infuence of alcohol (DUI) qualifed as
an ACCA predicate under the now-defunct residual clause.
See id., at 141–142. Felony DUI, the Court explained, did
not ft with the types of crimes that Congress was trying to
capture, because while it “reveal[ed] a degree of callousness
toward risk,” it did not “show an increased likelihood that
the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately
point [a] gun and pull the trigger.” Id., at 146. The Court
had “no reason to believe that Congress intended a 15-year
mandatory prison term where that increased likelihood does
not exist.” Ibid.
The same is true here. The lower grade offenders whom
Florida still chooses to call “robbers” do not bear the hallmarks
of being the kind of people who are likely to point a
94 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
gun and pull the trigger, nor have they committed the more
aggravated conduct—pointing a weapon, inficting bodily
injury—that most people think of when they hear the colloquial
term “robbery.” Under Florida law, “robbers” can be
glorifed pickpockets, shoplifters, and purse snatchers. No
one disputes that such an offender, if later discovered illegally
in possession of a frearm, will in many cases merit
greater punishment as a result of the past offense; unless it
occurred far in the past, such a conviction will typically increase
that defendant's advisory sentencing range under the
U. S. Sentencing Guidelines. See Rosales-Mireles v. United
States, 585 U. S. 129, 133–134 (2018); United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 1B1.1(a)(6)–(7), 4A1.1,
4A1.2(e) (Nov. 2018). But there is “no reason to believe that
Congress intended a 15-year mandatory prison term”
for such offenders, who do not present the increased risk
of gun violence that more aggravated offenders present.
Begay, 553 U. S., at 146.
III
Unable to rely heavily on text, precedent, or purpose to
support its holding that Florida robbery qualifes as an
ACCA “violent felony,” the majority turns to the common
law, to legislative and statutory history, and fnally to what
it perceives as the consequences of ruling for Stokeling.
None of these rationales is persuasive.
A
The majority observes that Florida's statute requires no
less force than was necessary to commit common-law robbery.
That may well be true: The majority notes, for example,
that at common law “it was robbery to pull a diamond
pin out of a woman's hair when doing so tore away hair
attached to the pin,” ante, at 78, and as anyone who has ever
pulled a bobby pin out of her hair knows, hair can break from
even the most minimal force. In the majority's telling,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 73 (2019) 95
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
however, the ACCA itself “encompasses the degree of force
necessary to commit common-law robbery.” Ante, at 86.
That proposition is fatly inconsistent with Johnson.
In explaining its interpretation of “physical force,” the
Court in Johnson expressly rejected the common law's defnition
of “force,” see 559 U. S., at 139, instead recognizing
that the phrase should be “give[n] . . . its ordinary meaning,”
id., at 138. At common law, “force” could be “satisfed by
even the slightest offensive touching.” Id., at 139. But as
the Court observed, “[a]lthough a common-law term of art
should be given its established common-law meaning, we do
not assume that a statutory word is used as a term of art
where that meaning does not ft.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
Rather, “context determines meaning,” ibid., and, “in the
context of a statutory defnition of `violent felony,' ” the ordinary
rather than the common-law meaning of “force” was
what ft, id., at 140.
The majority now says that while Johnson rejected the
common-law meaning of force with regard to battery, it nevertheless
meant somehow to preserve the common-law
meaning of force with regard to robbery. See ante, at 77–80,
82–84. In other words, to reach its conclusion, the majority
must construe “physical force” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) to bear
two different meanings—Johnson's and the majority's—
depending on the crime to which it is being applied. That
is a radical and unsupportable step.
To be clear, the majority does not simply rule that the
phrase “physical force” carries the common-law meaning in
one place but a different meaning in another statutory provision.
There would certainly be precedent for that. See,
e. g., United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157, 162–168
(2014) (explaining why the phrase “physical force” took on a
common-law meaning, rather than its ACCA meaning under
Johnson, in the context of a statute defning a “ `misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence' ”). Johnson, in fact,
96 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
expressly reserved the question whether “physical force”
might mean something different in the context of a different
statutory defnition. See 559 U. S., at 143–144.
What Johnson did not do, however, was suggest that
“physical force” in a single clause—the elements clause—
that Johnson addressed might mean two different things for
two different crimes. See id., at 143 (“We have interpreted
the phrase `physical force' only in the context of a statutory
defnition of `violent felony' ”); see also id., at 138–142.
Johnson had good reason not to say so: because that is not
how we have said that statutory interpretation works. See,
e. g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 378 (2005) (observing
that a single statutory word or phrase “cannot . . . be
interpreted to do” two different things “at the same time”);
Ratzlaf v. Uni ted States, 510 U. S. 135, 143 (1994)
(similar).
Starting today, however, the phrase “physical force” in
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) will apparently lead a Janus-faced existence.
When it comes to battery, that phrase will look toward ordinary
meaning; when it comes to robbery, that same piece of
statutory text will look toward the common law. To the extent
that is a tenable construction, the majority has announced
a brave new world of textual interpretation. To
the extent that a phrase so divided cannot stand, meanwhile,
one could be forgiven for thinking that the majority, though
it claims to praise Johnson, comes instead to bury it.
B
To shore up its argument that the ACCA's use of the
phrase “physical force,” at least in the context of robbery,
takes on the common-law meaning of “force,” the majority
invokes the history of the ACCA. Statutory history is no
help to the majority here.
As the majority notes, a precursor to the ACCA prescribed
a mandatory-minimum sentence for people convicted
of frearm offenses who had three qualifying prior convictions
“for robbery or burglary.” 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a)
Cite as: 586 U. S. 73 (2019) 97
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
(1982 ed., Supp. II). That statute defned robbery, as relevant,
as “the taking of the property of another . . . by force
or violence.” § 1202(c)(8) (1982 ed., Supp. II). See ante, at
77. In other words, it is undisputed that at one point, in a
previous statute, Congress enumerated robbery as a qualifying
predicate and used the words “force or violence” to describe
a generic version of the crime.
Then, in 1986, Congress changed the statute, substituting
instead the language we know today. See Career Criminals
Amendment Act of 1986, § 1402, 100 Stat. 3207–39. Gone
was any explicit reference to “robbery”; in its place came
not only the elements clause (our focus here) but also the
enumerated clause (which retained an express reference to
“burglary” but omitted “robbery”) and the capacious residual
clause (struck down in 2015). See ante, at 79–80; supra, at
88; see also Taylor, 495 U. S., at 582–584. So Congress did
two salient things: It expanded the predicates in general,
and it deleted an express reference to robbery.
The majority reasons that because (1) the old law's defnition
of “robbery” as a taking involving “force or violence”
matched various common-law defnitions of robbery, (2) Congress
kept the word “force” (though not “or violence”) in the
new law's elements clause while deleting the word “robbery,”
and (3) Congress meant to expand the enhancement's reach
in a general sense, Congress must have meant for the phrase
“physical force” in the new law also to carry the commonlaw
meaning of robbery. See ante, at 77–80. The conclusion
that the majority draws from these premises does not
follow, for at least four reasons.
First, as already discussed, the question whether Congress'
use of the phrase “physical force” in the new law—
that is, in the ACCA's elements clause—carries the commonlaw
meaning of “force” was already asked and answered by
Johnson: It does not. See 559 U. S., at 138–143, 145; supra,
at 95–96. This part of the majority's argument may be
couched in statutory history, but it is no more than an attempt
to relitigate Johnson.
98 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Second, Congress deleted the word “robbery” from the
statute altogether while still enumerating robbery's former
neighbor, “burglary,” in the enumerated clause. See
supra, at 88, 97. When Congress keeps one piece of statutory
text while deleting another, we generally “have no trouble
concluding that” it does so with purpose, Director of
Revenue of Mo. v. CoBank ACB, 531 U. S. 316, 324 (2001),
absent some reason to believe that the missing term simply
got “lost in the shuffe,” United States v. Wilson, 503 U. S.
329, 336 (1992). See also, e. g., Russello v. United States,
464 U. S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where Congress includes limiting
language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior
to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was
not intended”). Here, it is inconceivable that Congress simply
lost track of robbery, one of only two generic crimes that
it enumerated in the old statute. Accordingly, if Congress
had wanted to retain the old statute's specifc emphasis
on robbery, the natural reading is that it would have accomplished
that goal the same way it did with burglary: by
making it an enumerated offense. That it did not do so is
telling.
Third, the fact that Congress wished to “expan[d] the
predicate offenses triggering the sentence enhancement,”
Taylor, 495 U. S., at 582, is entirely consistent with paring
back the statute's sweep with regard to robbery specifcally.
I may wish to expand the contents of my refrigerator, but
that does not mean that I will buy more of every single item
that is currently in it the next time that I go shopping.
Here, the ACCA—with its (new, generalized) elements
clause, its (augmented) enumerated clause, and (until recently)
its highly capacious residual clause—undeniably expanded
the precursor statute's bare enumeration of robbery
and burglary, regardless of how many robbery statutes qualify
as predicates specifcally under the elements clause.1
1 Of course, whether Congress wished to pull back the throttle with regard
to robbery across the whole ACCA is less certain. (Recall that Congress
also enacted the capacious residual clause.) But that is why the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 73 (2019) 99
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Fourth, even assuming that Congress wanted robbery to
remain largely encompassed by the ACCA despite deleting
the word from the precursor statute, that intent is fully consistent
with properly applying Johnson here. The majority,
by focusing on the elements clause, ignores the residual
clause, which—until it was declared unconstitutional in
2015—provided a home for many crimes regardless of
whether they included an element of violent “physical
force.” 2 Hewing to a proper reading of Johnson, in other
words, does not require assuming that Congress constricted
the precursor statute's application to robbery when it
enacted today's ACCA; whatever robberies would have qualifed
under the old statute presumably could have still qualifed
under the residual clause during its nearly 20-year
existence.
In short, the statutory history does not undermine the
conclusion that the ACCA's elements clause, under our precedents,
is not broad enough to encompass Florida's robbery
statutory history cannot tell us what the majority claims that it can about
the elements clause specifcally. Instead, the more reliable guide is the
new text that Congress enacted to replace the old. Cf. West Virginia
Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 98 (1991) (“The best evidence
of [Congress'] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of
Congress and submitted to the President”). And here, Congress omitted
generic robbery altogether and made the “violent felony” clause at issue
require “physical force.” See supra, at 88, 90–91, 97.
2 In fact, the case in which this Court ruled that its decision striking
down the residual clause applied retroactively on collateral review centered
on a Florida robbery conviction under Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1). See
Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120, 124–125 (2016). The Eleventh Circuit,
reviewing the defendant's ACCA enhancement on direct appeal, had
ruled that Florida robbery (including when, under previous law, it could
be accomplished merely “by sudden snatching”) qualifed as an ACCA
predicate under the residual clause without deciding whether it also qualifed
under the elements clause. See United States v. Welch, 683 F. 3d
1304, 1310–1314 (2012). Other Circuits likewise ruled, in the years before
the clause's demise, that other state robbery statutes qualifed under the
residual clause. See, e. g., United States v. Mitchell, 743 F. 3d 1054, 1062–
1063 (CA6 2014) (collecting cases).
100 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
statute. Congress deleted the word “robbery,” kept the
word “burglary,” supplemented burglary with the catchall
residual clause that still captured many robberies outside
the elements clause, and used the phrase “physical force” in
the elements clause to defne a type of “violent felony,”
which Johnson tells us requires more force than the term's
common-law meaning denotes. See 559 U. S., at 138–143,
145. Statutory history cannot get the majority past both
the text and the force of stare decisis here.
C
That leaves the majority with only the practical consequences
that it asserts would follow if this Court were to
hold that Florida robbery does not qualify under the ACCA's
elements clause. See ante, at 81. While looking to how an
interpretation of a federal statute would affect the applicability
of related state statutes can be a useful approach in
these cases, see, e. g., Castleman, 572 U. S., at 167, the results
that follow from a proper reading of Johnson are not nearly
as incongruous as the majority suggests.
To begin, take the majority's assertion “that many States'
robbery statutes would not qualify as ACCA predicates,”
ante, at 81, if the Court were to apply Johnson as it was
written. The accuracy of this statement is far less certain
than the majority's opinion lets on. While Stokeling and the
Government come close to agreeing that at least 31 States'
robbery statutes do have an overcoming-resistance requirement,
see ante, at 80–81, that number is not conclusive because
neither Stokeling nor the Government has offered an
accounting of how many of those States allow minimal force
to satisfy that requirement, as Florida does. Because robbery
laws vary from State to State, and because even similarly
worded statutes may be construed differently by different
States' courts, some of those 31 States may well require
more force than Florida does. See, e. g., United States v.
Doctor, 842 F. 3d 306, 312 (CA4 2016) (ruling that “there is
Cite as: 586 U. S. 73 (2019) 101
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
no indication that South Carolina robbery by violence”—a
statute cited by the Government here—“can be committed
with minimal actual force”); see also Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183, 193 (2007) (explaining that the categorical
approach “requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical
possibility, that the State would apply its statute to
conduct that falls outside the generic defnition of a crime”).3
Furthermore, even if it is true “that many States' robbery
statutes would not qualify as ACCA predicates” under a
faithful reading of Johnson, see ante, at 81, that outcome
would stem just as much (if not more) from the death of the
residual clause as from a decision in this case. As discussed
above, various state robbery statutes qualifed under that
expansive clause for nearly 20 years, until vagueness problems
led this Court to strike the clause down as unconstitutional.
See supra, at 99–100, and n. 2; see also Johnson
v. United States, 576 U. S. 591. The fall of that clause
would therefore be an independent cause of any drop in qualifying
predicates, regardless of what this Court decides
today. (A drop in robbery statutes qualifying as ACCA
predicates could also, of course, be traceable to Congress'
decision not to continue enumerating robbery when it
3 The majority is able to suggest that following Johnson would beget a
larger practical effect because it frames the question presented more
broadly than is warranted. The majority avers that “[t]his case requires
us to decide whether a robbery offense that has as an element the use of
force suffcient to overcome a victim's resistance necessitates the use of
`physical force' within the meaning of the [ACCA].” Ante, at 75. But
this case hinges on the fact that the Florida courts have ruled that the
amount of resistance offered—and therefore the amount of force necessary
to overcome it—is irrelevant. See supra, at 91–92. In other words, this
case presents only the narrower question whether a robbery offense that
has as an element the use of force suffcient to overcome a victim's resistance—
even if that resistance is minimal—necessitates the use of “physical
force” within the meaning of the ACCA. See also Brief for Petitioner
i. If a state robbery statute's overcoming-resistance requirement were
pegged under state law to more than minimal resistance, this would be a
different case.
102 STOKELING v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
enacted the ACCA in the frst place.) In short, the majority,
fearful for the camel, errs in blaming the most recent straw.4
Separately, even if a number of simple robbery statutes
were to cease qualifying as ACCA predicates, that does not
mean—as the majority implies, see ante, at 80–81—that the
same fate necessarily would befall most or even many
aggravated-robbery statutes. The majority offers the single
example of Florida aggravated robbery, noting that
“Florida requires the same element of `force' for both armed
robbery and basic robbery.” Ante, at 81. But while the
majority accurately describes Florida law, there is scant reason
to believe that a great many other States' statutes would
be similarly affected, because the effect that hewing to Johnson
would have on Florida aggravated robbery stems from the
idiosyncrasy that Florida aggravated robbery requires neither
displaying a weapon nor threatening or inficting bodily
injury.5 The result for Florida aggravated robbery therefore
sheds little light on what would happen to other aggravated-
4 The majority's doubling down on Johnson's “capable of causing physical
pain or injury” language, see ante, at 84, suggests nostalgia for the residual
clause (which reads: “otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another, ” 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)). Congress could, at any time, re-enumerate robbery (and
any other crimes it might have intended the residual clause to cover) if it
so chose. The majority's decision today, meanwhile—with its endorsement
of the mere “potentiality” of injury, ante, at 84—risks sowing confusion
in the lower courts for years to come.
5 Specifcally, hewing to a proper reading of Johnson would also affect
Florida's aggravated-robbery statute because the crime's only element involving
force is the one that it shares with Florida simple robbery. See
Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1). In Florida, robbery becomes aggravated if the defendant
“carrie[s]” a weapon, § 812.13(2), but that means that the crime
sweeps in offenders who never brandished, used, or otherwise intimated
that they were armed, see, e. g., State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 413 (Fla.
2004), and therefore prevents the crime from necessarily involving the
“threatened use of physical force,” 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). See also
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4 (explaining this point).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 73 (2019) 103
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
robbery statutes, the vast majority of which do (and did at
the time of the ACCA's enactment) appear to provide for
convictions on such grounds—and whose validity as ACCA
predicates would not necessarily turn on the question the
Court faces today.6 The majority mistakes one anomalous
result for a reason not to apply Johnson as it was written.
6 See, e. g., Ala. Code § 13A– 8– 41(a)(2) (2015); Alaska Stat.
§§ 11.41.500(a)(2)–(3) (2016); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–1904(A)(2) (2018);
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5–12–103(a)(2)–(3) (2013); Cal. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 12022.53, 12022.7 (West 2018 Cum. Supp.); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18–4–
302(1)(b) (2018); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a–134(a)(1), (3) (2017); Del. Code
Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 832(a)(1)–(3) (2015); Ga. Code Ann. § 16–8–41(a) (2018);
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 708–840(1)(a), (b)(ii) (2014); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720,
§§ 5/18–1(b)(1), 5/18–2(a)(3)–(4) (2018 Cum. Supp.); Ind. Code § 35–42–5–1
(2018 Cum. Supp.); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–5420(b)(2) (Supp. 2017); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 515.020(1)(a), (c) (Lexis 2014); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 14:64.1(A), 64.3, 64.4(A)(1) (West 2016); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17–A,
§ 651(1)(D) (2018 Cum. Supp.); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. § 3–403(a)(2)
(2012); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.529 (West 2004); Minn. Stat.
§ 609.245(2) (2018); Miss. Code Ann. § 97–3–79 (2014); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 570.023(1)(1), (3)–(4) (2016); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28–324, 28–1205 (2015);
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 636:1(III)(b) (2016); N. Y. Penal Law Ann.
§§ 160.10(2)(a)–(b), 160.15(1), (3)–(4) (West 2015); N. D. Cent. Code Ann.
§§ 12.1–22–01(1)–(2) (2012); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2911.01(A)(1), (3)
(Lexis 2014); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, §§ 797(1)–(3), 801 (2015); Ore.
Rev. Stat. §§ 164.405(1)(a), 164.415(1)(b)–(c) (2017); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§§ 3701(a)(1)(i)–(ii), (iv) (2015); R. I. Gen. Laws § 11–39–1(a) (2002); S. D.
Codifed Laws § 22–30–6 (2017); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39–13–402(a), 39–13–
403(a) (2011); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a) (West 2011); Utah Code
§§ 76–6–302(1)(a)–(b) (2017); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 608(c) (2009); Va.
Code Ann. §§ 18.2–53.1, 18.2–58 (2014); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.56.200
(1)(a)(ii)–(iii) (2015); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61–2–12(a) (Lexis 2014); Wis. Stat.
§ 943.32(2) (2005); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–2–401(c) (2017); see also Reply Brief
22–23; App. to Reply Brief 9a–18a (listing 29 States with aggravatedrobbery
statutes that could have qualified at the time of the ACCA's
enactment because of a weapon-using, weapon-displaying, or weaponrepresenting
element; an additional 10 States, excluding duplicates, that
could have potentially qualifed at that time because of a physical-injury
element; and an additional 15 States, some duplicative, with potentially
qualifying statutes that have been enacted since).
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
IV
This Court's decision in Johnson tells us that when Congress
wrote the words “physical force” in the context of
a statute targeting “violent felon[ies], ” it eschewed the
common-law meaning of those words and instead required a
higher degree of force. See 559 U. S., at 138–143, 145.
Johnson resolves this case. Florida law requires no more
than minimal force to commit Florida robbery, and Florida
law therefore defnes that crime more broadly than Congress
defned the elements clause.
The crime that most people think of when they think of
“robbery” is a serious one. That is all the more reason, however,
that this Court should not allow a dilution of the term
in state law to drive the expansion of a federal statute targeted
at violent recidivists. Florida law applies the label
“robbery” to crimes that are, at most, a half-notch above
garden-variety pickpocketing or shoplifting. The Court
today does no service to Congress' purposes or our own precedent
in deeming such crimes to be “violent felonies”—and
thus predicates for a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence
in federal prison.
I respectfully dissent.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 105
Syllabus
NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the rst circuit
No. 17–340. Argued October 3, 2018—Decided January 15, 2019
Petitioner New Prime Inc. is an interstate trucking company, and respondent
Dominic Oliveira is one of its drivers. Mr. Oliveira works under an
operating agreement that calls him an independent contractor and contains
a mandatory arbitration provision. When Mr. Oliveira fled a
class action alleging that New Prime denies its drivers lawful wages,
New Prime asked the court to invoke its statutory authority under the
Federal Arbitration Act to compel arbitration. Mr. Oliveira countered
that the court lacked authority because § 1 of the Act excepts from coverage
disputes involving “contracts of employment” of certain transportation
workers. New Prime insisted that any question regarding § 1's
applicability belonged to the arbitrator alone to resolve, or, assuming
the court could address the question, that “contracts of employment”
referred only to contracts that establish an employer-employee relationship
and not to contracts with independent contractors. The District
Court and First Circuit agreed with Mr. Oliveira.
Held:
1. A court should determine whether a § 1 exclusion applies before
ordering arbitration. A court's authority to compel arbitration under
the Act does not extend to all private contracts, no matter how emphatically
they may express a preference for arbitration. Instead, antecedent
statutory provisions limit the scope of a court's §§ 3 and 4 powers to
stay litigation and compel arbitration “accord[ing to] the terms” of the
parties' agreement. Section 2 provides that the Act applies only when
the agreement is set forth as “a written provision in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”
And § 1 helps defne § 2's terms, warning, as relevant here, that “nothing”
in the Act “shall apply” to “contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” For a court to invoke its statutory authority
under §§ 3 and 4, it must frst know if the parties' agreement is excluded
from the Act's coverage by the terms of §§ 1 and 2. This sequencing is
signifcant. See, e. g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350
U. S. 198, 201–202. New Prime notes that the parties' contract contains
a “delegation clause,” giving the arbitrator authority to decide threshold
questions of arbitrability, and that the “severability principle” requires
that both sides take all their disputes to arbitration. But a delegation
106 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Syllabus
clause is merely a specialized type of arbitration agreement and is enforceable
under §§ 3 and 4 only if it appears in a contract consistent with
§ 2 that does not trigger § 1's exception. And, the Act's severability
principle applies only if the parties' arbitration agreement appears in a
contract that falls within the feld §§ 1 and 2 describe. Pp. 110–112.
2. Because the Act's term “contract of employment” refers to any
agreement to perform work, Mr. Oliveira's agreement with New Prime
falls within § 1's exception. Pp. 112–121.
(a) “[I]t's a `fundamental canon of statutory construction' that
words generally should be `interpreted as taking their ordinary . . .
meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.' ” Wisconsin
Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. 274, 284 (quoting Perrin v.
United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42). After all, if judges could freely invest
old statutory terms with new meanings, this Court would risk amending
legislation outside the “single, fnely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure” the Constitution commands. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S.
919, 951. The Court would risk, too, upsetting reliance interests by
subjecting people today to different rules than they enjoyed when the
statute was passed. At the time of the Act's adoption in 1925, the
phrase “contract of employment” was not a term of art, and dictionaries
tended to treat “employment” more or less as a synonym for “work.”
Contemporaneous legal authorities provide no evidence that a “contract
of employment” necessarily signaled a formal employer-employee relationship.
Evidence that Congress used the term “contracts of employment”
broadly can be found in its choice of the neighboring term “workers,”
a term that easily embraces independent contractors. Pp. 113–116.
(b) New Prime argues that by 1925, the words “employee” and “independent
contractor” had already assumed distinct meanings. But
while the words “employee” and “employment” may share a common
root and intertwined history, they also developed at different times and
in at least some different ways. The evidence remains that, as dominantly
understood in 1925, a “contract of employment” did not necessarily
imply the existence of an employer-employee relationship. New
Prime's argument that early 20th-century courts sometimes used the
phrase “contracts of employment” to describe what are recognized today
as agreements between employers and employees does nothing to negate
the possibility that the term also embraced agreements by independent
contractors to perform work. And its effort to explain away
the statute's suggestive use of the term “worker” by noting that the
neighboring terms “seamen” and “railroad employees” included only employees
in 1925 rests on a precarious premise. The evidence suggests
that even “seamen” and “railroad employees” could be independent contractors
at the time the Arbitration Act passed. Left to appeal to the
Act's policy, New Prime suggests that this Court order arbitration to
Cite as: 586 U. S. 105 (2019) 107
Syllabus
abide Congress' effort to counteract judicial hostility to arbitration and
establish a favorable federal policy toward arbitration agreements.
Courts, however, are not free to pave over bumpy statutory texts in the
name of more expeditiously advancing a policy goal. Rather, the Court
should respect “the limits up to which Congress was prepared” to go
when adopting the Arbitration Act. United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S.
267, 298. This Court also declines to address New Prime's suggestion
that it order arbitration anyway under its inherent authority to stay
litigation in favor of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism of the
parties' choosing. Pp. 116–121.
857 F. 3d 7, affrmed.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members
joined, except Kavanaugh, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case. Ginsburg, J., fled a concurring opinion, post,
p. 121.
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Jason C. Schwartz, Joshua S.
Lipshutz, and Amanda C. Machin.
Jennifer Bennett argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief were Leah M. Nicholls, Andrew Schmidt,
and Hillary Schwab.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for American Trucking
Associations, Inc., by Richard Pianka; for the Cato Institute by Andrew
M. Grossman, John B. Lewis, Dustin M. Dow, and Ilya Shapiro; for
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Andrew
J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, Daniel E. Jones, and Warren
Postman; for the Customized Logistics and Delivery Association by Robert
G. Hulteng; and for the New England Legal Foundation by Benjamin
G. Robbins and Martin J. Newhouse.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts et al. by Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts,
and Karla E. Zarbo, Assistant Attorney General, and by the
Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Xavier Becerra
of California, George Jepsen of Connecticut, Karl A. Racine of the
District of Columbia, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Brian E. Frosh of Maryland,
Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Gurbir S. Grewal of New Jersey, Barbara
D. Underwood of New York, Josh Stein of North Carolina, Ellen
F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Thomas J. Donovan,
Jr., of Vermont, Mark R. Herring of Virginia, and Robert W. Ferguson
of Washington; for the American Association for Justice by Gerson
108 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Opinion of the Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce private
arbitration agreements. But like most laws, this one
bears its qualifcations. Among other things, § 1 says that
“nothing herein” may be used to compel arbitration in disputes
involving the “contracts of employment” of certain
transportation workers. 9 U. S. C. § 1. And that qualifcation
has sparked these questions: When a contract delegates
questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator, must a court leave
disputes over the application of § 1's exception for the arbitrator
to resolve? And does the term “contracts of employment”
refer only to contracts between employers and employees,
or does it also reach contracts with independent
contractors? Because courts across the country have disagreed
on the answers to these questions, we took this case
to resolve them.
I
New Prime is an interstate trucking company and Dominic
Oliveira works as one of its drivers. But, at least on paper,
Mr. Oliveira isn't an employee; the parties' contracts label
him an independent contractor. Those agreements also instruct
that any disputes arising out of the parties' relationship
should be resolved by an arbitrator—even disputes over
the scope of the arbitrator's authority.
H. Smoger, Elise Sanguinetti, and Jeffrey R. White; for the Constitutional
Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and
Brian R. Frazelle; for Employment Law Scholars by Anna P. Prakash
and John G. Albanese; for Historians by Sachin S. Pandya and Richard
Frankel; for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al. by Catherine
K. Ruckelshaus; for Public Citizen, Inc., by Scott L. Nelson and
Allison M. Zieve; for Statutory Construction Scholars by Peter Romer-
Friedman, Jahan Sagafi, and Nantiya Ruan; for Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse
by Mr. Whitehouse, pro se; and for Steve Viscelli et al. by D.
Michael Dale, Craig J. Ackermann, and Sam Vahedi.
Paul D. Cullen, Sr., and Paul D. Cullen, Jr., fled a brief for the Owner-
Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 105 (2019) 109
Opinion of the Court
Eventually, of course, a dispute did arise. In a class-action
lawsuit in federal court, Mr. Oliveira argued that New Prime
denies its drivers lawful wages. The company may call its
drivers independent contractors. But, Mr. Oliveira alleged,
in reality New Prime treats them as employees and fails to
pay the statutorily due minimum wage. In response to
Mr. Oliveira's complaint, New Prime asked the court to invoke
its statutory authority under the Act and compel arbitration
according to the terms found in the parties' agreements.
That request led to more than a little litigation of its own.
Even when the parties' contracts mandate arbitration,
Mr. Oliveira observed, the Act doesn't always authorize a
court to enter an order compelling it. In particular, § 1
carves out from the Act's coverage “contracts of employment
of . . . workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”
And at least for purposes of this collateral dispute, Mr. Oliveira
submitted, it doesn't matter whether you view him as
an employee or an independent contractor. Either way, his
agreement to drive trucks for New Prime qualifes as a “contrac[
t] of employment of [a] worke[r] engaged in . . . interstate
commerce.” Accordingly, Mr. Oliveira argued, the Act
supplied the district court with no authority to compel arbitration
in this case.
Naturally, New Prime disagreed. Given the extraordinary
breadth of the parties' arbitration agreement, the
company insisted that any question about § 1's application
belonged for the arbitrator alone to resolve. Alternatively
and assuming a court could address the question, New Prime
contended that the term “contracts of employment” refers
only to contracts that establish an employer-employee relationship.
And because Mr. Oliveira is, in fact as well as
form, an independent contractor, the company argued, § 1's
exception doesn't apply; the rest of the statute does; and the
district court was (once again) required to order arbitration.
Ultimately, the district court and the First Circuit sided
with Mr. Oliveira. 857 F. 3d 7 (2017). The court of appeals
110 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Opinion of the Court
held, frst, that in disputes like this a court should resolve
whether the parties' contract falls within the Act's ambit or
§ 1's exclusion before invoking the statute's authority to
order arbitration. Second, the court of appeals held that
§ 1's exclusion of certain “contracts of employment” removes
from the Act's coverage not only employer-employee contracts
but also contracts involving independent contractors.
So under any account of the parties' agreement in this case,
the court held, it lacked authority under the Act to order
arbitration. We granted certiorari. 583 U. S. 1155 (2018).
II
In approaching the frst question for ourselves, one thing
becomes clear immediately. While a court's authority under
the Arbitration Act to compel arbitration may be considerable,
it isn't unconditional. If two parties agree to arbitrate
future disputes between them and one side later seeks to
evade the deal, §§ 3 and 4 of the Act often require a court to
stay litigation and compel arbitration “accord[ing to] the
terms” of the parties' agreement. But this authority doesn't
extend to all private contracts, no matter how emphatically
they may express a preference for arbitration.
Instead, antecedent statutory provisions limit the scope of
the court's powers under §§ 3 and 4. Section 2 provides that
the Act applies only when the parties' agreement to arbitrate
is set forth as a “written provision in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”
And § 1 helps defne § 2's terms. Most relevant for
our purposes, § 1 warns that “nothing” in the Act “shall
apply” to “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.” Why this very particular qualifcation?
By the time it adopted the Arbitration Act in 1925,
Congress had already prescribed alternative employment
dispute resolution regimes for many transportation workers.
And it seems Congress “did not wish to unsettle” those
arrangements in favor of whatever arbitration procedures
the parties' private contracts might happen to contemCite
as: 586 U. S. 105 (2019) 111
Opinion of the Court
plate. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 121
(2001).
Given the statute's terms and sequencing, we agree with
the First Circuit that a court should decide for itself whether
§ 1's “contracts of employment” exclusion applies before ordering
arbitration. After all, to invoke its statutory powers
under §§ 3 and 4 to stay litigation and compel arbitration
according to a contract's terms, a court must frst know
whether the contract itself falls within or beyond the boundaries
of §§ 1 and 2. The parties' private agreement may be
crystal clear and require arbitration of every question under
the sun, but that does not necessarily mean the Act authorizes
a court to stay litigation and send the parties to an arbitral
forum.
Nothing in our holding on this score should come as a surprise.
We've long stressed the signifcance of the statute's
sequencing. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,
350 U. S. 198, 201–202 (1956), we recognized that “Sections 1,
2, and 3 [and 4] are integral parts of a whole. . . . [Sections]
1 and 2 defne the feld in which Congress was legislating,”
and §§ 3 and 4 apply only to contracts covered by those provisions.
In Circuit City, we acknowledged that “Section 1 exempts
from the [Act] contracts of employment of transportation
workers.” 532 U. S., at 119. And in Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 10–11, and n. 5 (1984), we noted that
“the enforceability of arbitration provisions” under §§ 3 and
4 depends on whether those provisions are “part of a written
maritime contract or a contract `evidencing a transaction involving
commerce' ” under § 2—which, in turn, depends on
the application of § 1's exception for certain “contracts of
employment.”
To be sure, New Prime resists this straightforward understanding.
The company argues that an arbitrator should
resolve any dispute over § 1's application because of the “delegation
clause” in the parties' contract and what is sometimes
called the “severability principle.” A delegation
clause gives an arbitrator authority to decide even the initial
112 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Opinion of the Court
question whether the parties' dispute is subject to arbitration.
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. 63, 68–
69 (2010). And under the severability principle, we treat a
challenge to the validity of an arbitration agreement (or a
delegation clause) separately from a challenge to the validity
of the entire contract in which it appears. Id., at 70–71.
Unless a party specifcally challenges the validity of the
agreement to arbitrate, both sides may be required to take
all their disputes—including disputes about the validity of
their broader contract—to arbitration. Ibid. Applying
these principles to this case, New Prime notes that Mr. Oliveira
has not specifcally challenged the parties' delegation
clause and submits that any controversy should therefore
proceed only and immediately before an arbitrator.
But all this overlooks the necessarily antecedent statutory
inquiry we've just discussed. A delegation clause is merely
a specialized type of arbitration agreement, and the Act “operates
on this additional arbitration agreement just as it does
on any other.” Id., at 70. So a court may use §§ 3 and 4 to
enforce a delegation clause only if the clause appears in a
“written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce” consistent with § 2. And only if the
contract in which the clause appears doesn't trigger § 1's
“contracts of employment” exception. In exactly the same
way, the Act's severability principle applies only if the parties'
arbitration agreement appears in a contract that falls
within the feld §§ 1 and 2 describe. We acknowledged as
much some time ago, explaining that, before invoking the
severability principle, a court should “determin[e] that the
contract in question is within the coverage of the Arbitration
Act.” Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U. S. 395, 402 (1967).
III
That takes us to the second question: Did the First Circuit
correctly resolve the merits of the § 1 challenge in this case?
Recall that § 1 excludes from the Act's compass “contracts of
employment of . . . workers engaged in . . . interstate comCite
as: 586 U. S. 105 (2019) 113
Opinion of the Court
erce.” Happily, everyone before us agrees that Mr. Oliveira
qualifes as a “worke[r] engaged in . . . interstate commerce.”
For purposes of this appeal, too, Mr. Oliveira is willing to
assume (but not grant) that his contracts with New Prime
establish only an independent contractor relationship.
With that, the disputed question comes into clear view:
What does the term “contracts of employment” mean? If it
refers only to contracts that refect an employer-employee
relationship, then § 1's exception is irrelevant and a court is
free to order arbitration, just as New Prime urges. But if
the term also encompasses contracts that require an independent
contractor to perform work, then the exception
takes hold and a court lacks authority under the Act to order
arbitration, exactly as Mr. Oliveira argues.
A
In taking up this question, we bear an important caution
in mind. “[I]t's a `fundamental canon of statutory construction'
that words generally should be `interpreted as taking
their ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted
the statute.' ” Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585
U. S. 274, 284 (2018) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444
U. S. 37, 42 (1979)). See also Sandifer v. United States Steel
Corp., 571 U. S. 220, 227 (2014). After all, if judges could
freely invest old statutory terms with new meanings, we
would risk amending legislation outside the “single, fnely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” the Constitution
commands. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951 (1983).
We would risk, too, upsetting reliance interests in the settled
meaning of a statute. Cf. 2B N. Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland
on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 56A:3 (rev. 7th
ed. 2012). Of course, statutes may sometimes refer to an external
source of law and fairly warn readers that they must
abide that external source of law, later amendments and
modifcations included. Id., § 51:8 (discussing the reference
canon). But nothing like that exists here. Nor has anyone
suggested any other appropriate reason that might allow us
to depart from the original meaning of the statute at hand.
114 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Opinion of the Court
That, we think, holds the key to the case. To many lawyerly
ears today, the term “contracts of employment” might
call to mind only agreements between employers and employees
(or what the common law sometimes called masters
and servants). Suggestively, at least one recently published
law dictionary defnes the word “employment” to mean “[t]he
relationship between master and servant.” Black's Law
Dictionary 641 (10th ed. 2014). But this modern intuition
isn't easily squared with evidence of the term's meaning at
the time of the Act's adoption in 1925. At that time, a “contract
of employment” usually meant nothing more than an
agreement to perform work. As a result, most people then
would have understood § 1 to exclude not only agreements
between employers and employees but also agreements that
require independent contractors to perform work.
What's the evidence to support this conclusion? It turns
out that in 1925 the term “contract of employment” wasn't
defned in any of the (many) popular or legal dictionaries the
parties cite to us. And surely that's a frst hint the phrase
wasn't then a term of art bearing some specialized meaning.
It turns out, too, that the dictionaries of the era consistently
afforded the word “employment” a broad construction,
broader than may be often found in dictionaries today.
Back then, dictionaries tended to treat “employment” more
or less as a synonym for “work.” Nor did they distinguish
between different kinds of work or workers: All work was
treated as employment, whether or not the common law criteria
for a master-servant relationship happened to be
satisfed.1
1 See, e. g., 3 H. Bradley, A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles
130 (J. Murray ed. 1891) (defning “employment” as, among other things,
“[t]he action or process of employing; the state of being employed. The
service (of a person). That on which (one) is employed; business; occupation;
a special errand or commission. A person's regular occupation or business;
a trade or profession”); 3 The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia 1904
Cite as: 586 U. S. 105 (2019) 115
Opinion of the Court
What the dictionaries suggest, legal authorities confrm.
This Court's early 20th-century cases used the phrase “contract
of employment” to describe work agreements involving
independent contractors.2 Many state court cases did the
same.3 So did a variety of federal statutes.4 And state
(1914) (defning “employment” as “[w]ork or business of any kind”); Webster's
New International Dictionary 718 (1st ed. 1909) (listing “[w]ork” as
a synonym for “employment”); Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 329 (3d ed.
1916) (same); Black's Law Dictionary 422 (2d ed. 1910) (“an engagement
or rendering services” for oneself or another); 3 Oxford English Dictionary
130 (1933) (“[t]hat on which (one) is employed; business; occupation; a special
errand or commission”).
2 See, e. g., Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U. S. 571, 575 (1923) (agreement
between trustee and attorney to recover bankrupt's property); Owen v.
Dudley & Michener, 217 U. S. 488, 494 (1910) (agreement between Indian
tribe and attorneys to pursue claims).
3 See, e. g., Lindsay v. McCaslin (Two Cases), 123 Me. 197, 200, 122 A.
412, 413 (1923) (“When the contract of employment has been reduced to
writing, the question whether the person employed was an independent
contractor or merely a servant is determined by the court as a matter of
law”); Tankersley v. Webster, 116 Okla. 208, 210, 243 P. 745, 747 (1925)
(“[T]he contract of employment between Tankersley and Casey was admitted
in evidence without objections, and we think conclusively shows
that Casey was an independent contractor ”); Waldron v. Garland
Pocahontas Coal Co., 89 W. Va. 426, 427, 109 S. E. 729 (1921) (syllabus)
(“Whether a person performing work for another is an independent contractor
depends upon a consideration of the contract of employment, the
nature of the business, the circumstances under which the contract was
made and the work was done”); see also App. to Brief for Respondent 1a–
12a (citing additional examples).
4 See, e. g., Act of Mar. 19, 1924, ch. 70, § 5, 43 Stat. 28 (limiting payment
of fees to attorneys “employed” by the Cherokee Tribe to litigate claims
against the United States to those “stipulated in the contract of employment”);
Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 300, §§ 2, 5, 43 Stat. 537–538 (providing
same for Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes); Act of Aug. 24, 1921, ch. 89, 42
Stat. 192 (providing that no funds may be used to compensate “any attorney,
regular or special, for the United States Shipping Board or the United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation unless the contract
of employment has been approved by the Attorney General of the United
116 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Opinion of the Court
statutes too.5 We see here no evidence that a “contract of
employment” necessarily signaled a formal employeremployee
or master-servant relationship.
More confrmation yet comes from a neighboring term in
the statutory text. Recall that the Act excludes from its
coverage “contracts of employment of . . . any . . . class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9
U. S. C. § 1 (emphasis added). Notice Congress didn't use
the word “employees” or “servants,” the natural choices if
the term “contracts of employment” addressed them alone.
Instead, Congress spoke of “workers,” a term that everyone
agrees easily embraces independent contractors. That word
choice may not mean everything, but it does supply further
evidence still that Congress used the term “contracts of employment”
in a broad sense to capture any contract for the
performance of work by workers.
B
What does New Prime have to say about the case building
against it? Mainly, it seeks to shift the debate from the
term “contracts of employment” to the word “employee.”
Today, the company emphasizes, the law often distinguishes
between employees and independent contractors. Employees
are generally understood as those who work “in the service
of another person (the employer) under an express or
implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the
States”). See also App. to Brief for Respondent 13a (citing additional
examples).
5 See, e. g., Act of Mar. 10, 1909, ch. 70, § 1, 1909 Kan. Sess. Laws p. 121
(referring to “contracts of employment of auditors, accountants, engineers,
attorneys, counselors and architects for any special purpose”); Act of
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 4, § 4, 1909 Okla. Sess. Laws p. 118 (“Should the amount
of the attorney's fee be agreed upon in the contract of employment, then
such attorney's lien and cause of action against such adverse party shall
be for the amount so agreed upon”); Act of Mar. 4, 1924, ch. 88, § 1, 1924
Va. Acts ch. 91 (allowing extension of “contracts of employment” between
the State and contractors with respect to the labor of prisoners); App. to
Brief for Respondent 14a–15a (citing additional examples).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 105 (2019) 117
Opinion of the Court
right to control the details of work performance.” Black's
Law Dictionary, at 639. Meanwhile, independent contractors
are sometimes described as those “entrusted to undertake
a specifc project but who [are] left free to do the assigned
work and to choose the method for accomplishing it.”
Id., at 888. New Prime argues that, by 1925, the words
“employee” and “independent contractor” had already assumed
these distinct meanings.6 And given that, the company
contends, the phrase “contracts of employment” should
be understood to refer only to relationships between employers
and employees.
Unsurprisingly, Mr. Oliveira disagrees. He replies that,
while the term “employment” dates back many centuries, the
word “employee” only made its frst appearance in English
in the 1800s. See Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., Mar.
2014), www.oed.com/view/Entry/61374 (all Internet materials
as last visited Jan. 9, 2019). At that time, the word from
which it derived, “employ,” simply meant to “apply (a thing)
to some defnite purpose.” 3 H. Bradley, A New English
Dictionary on Historical Principles 129 (J. Murray ed. 1891).
And even in 1910, Black's Law Dictionary reported that the
term “employee” had only “ `become somewhat naturalized
in our language.' ” Black's Law Dictionary 421 (2d ed. 1910).
Still, the parties do share some common ground. They
agree that the word “employee” eventually came into wide
circulation and came to denote those who work for a wage at
the direction of another. They agree, too, that all this came
to pass in part because the word “employee” didn't suffer
from the same “historical baggage” of the older common law
term “servant,” and because it proved useful when drafting
legislation to regulate burgeoning industries and their labor
forces in the early 20th century.7 The parties even agree
6 See, e. g., Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Coneys, 82 F. 177, 178 (CA2 1897);
Nyback v. Champagne Lumber Co., 109 F. 732, 741 (CA7 1901).
7 See Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L.
295, 309 (2001) (discussing the “historical baggage” of the term “servant”);
118 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Opinion of the Court
that the development of the term “employee” may have come
to infuence and narrow our understanding of the word “employment”
in comparatively recent years and may be why
today it might signify to some a “relationship between master
and servant.” 8
But if the parties' extended etymological debate persuades
us of anything, it is that care is called for. The words “employee”
and “employment” may share a common root and an
intertwined history. But they also developed at different
times and in at least some different ways. The only question
in this case concerns the meaning of the term “contracts
of employment” in 1925. And, whatever the word “employee”
may have meant at that time, and however it may
have later infuenced the meaning of “employment,” the evidence
before us remains that, as dominantly understood in
1925, a contract of employment did not necessarily imply
the existence of an employer-employee or master-servant
relationship.
When New Prime fnally turns its attention to the term in
dispute, it directs us to Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 13
(1915). There and in other cases like it, New Prime notes,
Broden, General Rules Determining the Employment Relationship Under
Social Security Laws: After Twenty Years an Unsolved Problem, 33 Temp.
L. Q. 307, 327 (1960) (describing use of the term “employer-employee,” in
contradistinction to “master-servant,” in the Social Security laws). Legislators
searched to fnd a term that fully encompassed the broad protections
they sought to provide and considered an “assortment of vague and
uncertain terms,” including “ `servant,' . . . `employee,' . . . `workman,'
`laborer,' `wage earner,' `operative,' or `hireling.' ” Carlson, 22 Berkeley
J. Emp. & Lab. L., at 308. Eventually “ `employee' prevailed, if only by
default, and the choice was confrmed by the next wave of protective
legislation—workers' compensation laws in the early years of the Twentieth
Century.” Id., at 309.
8 Black's Law Dictionary 641 (10th ed. 2014); see also P. Durkin, Release
Notes: The Changes in Empathy, Employ, and Empire (Mar. 13, 2014),
online at https://public.oed.com/ blog/march-2014-update-release-notes/
(“Over time” the meaning of several employ-related words have “refect[
ed] changes in the world of work” and their meaning “shows an increasingly
marked narrowing”).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 105 (2019) 119
Opinion of the Court
courts sometimes used the phrase “contracts of employment”
to describe what today we'd recognize as agreements between
employers and employees. But this proves little.
No one doubts that employer-employee agreements to perform
work qualifed as “contracts of employment” in 1925—
and documenting that fact does nothing to negate the
possibility that “contracts of employment” also embraced
agreements by independent contractors to perform work.
Coming a bit closer to the mark, New Prime eventually cites
a handful of early 20th-century legal materials that seem to
use the term “contracts of employment” to refer exclusively
to employer-employee agreements.9 But from the record
amassed before us, these authorities appear to represent at
most the vanguard, not the main body, of contemporaneous
usage.
New Prime's effort to explain away the statute's suggestive
use of the term “worker” proves no more compelling.
The company reminds us that the statute excludes “contracts
of employment” for “seamen” and “railroad employees” as
well as other transportation workers. And because “seamen”
and “railroad employees” included only employees in
1925, the company reasons, we should understand “any other
class of workers engaged in . . . interstate commerce” to bear
a similar construction. But this argument rests on a precarious
premise. At the time of the Act's passage, shipboard
surgeons who tended injured sailors were considered “seamen”
though they likely served in an independent contractor
capacity.10 Even the term “railroad employees” may have
9 See, e. g., 1 T. Conyngton, Business Law: A Working Manual of
Every-day Law 302–303 (2d ed. 1920); Newland v. Bear, 218 App. Div. 308,
309, 218 N. Y. S. 81, 81–82 (1926); Anderson v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n,
107 Ore. 304, 311–312, 215 P. 582, 583, 585 (1923); N. Dosker, Manual of
Compensation Law: State and Federal 8 (1917).
10 See, e. g., The Sea Lark, 14 F. 2d 201 (WD Wash. 1926); The Buena
Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799 (SDNY 1916); Holt v. Cummings, 102 Pa. 212,
215 (1883); Allan v. State S. S. Co., 132 N. Y. 91, 99, 30 N. E. 482, 485 (1892)
(“The work which the physician does after the vessel starts on the voyage
is his and not the ship owner's”).
120 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Opinion of the Court
swept more broadly at the time of the Act's passage than
might seem obvious today. In 1922, for example, the Railroad
Labor Board interpreted the word “employee” in the
Transportation Act of 1920 to refer to anyone “engaged in
the customary work directly contributory to the operation of
the railroads.” 11 And the Erdman Act, a statute enacted to
address disruptive railroad strikes at the end of the 19th
century, seems to evince an equally broad understanding of
“railroad employees.” 12
Unable to squeeze more from the statute's text, New
Prime is left to appeal to its policy. This Court has said
that Congress adopted the Arbitration Act in an effort to
counteract judicial hostility to arbitration and establish “a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983). To abide that policy, New Prime suggests,
we must order arbitration according to the terms of
the parties' agreement. But often and by design it is “hardfought
compromis[e],” not cold logic, that supplies the solvent
needed for a bill to survive the legislative process.
Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp.,
474 U. S. 361, 374 (1986). If courts felt free to pave over
bumpy statutory texts in the name of more expeditiously
advancing a policy goal, we would risk failing to “tak[e] . . .
account of ” legislative compromises essential to a law's passage
and, in that way, thwart rather than honor “the effectu-
11 Transportation Act of 1920, §§ 304, 307, 41 Stat. 456; Railway Employees'
Dept., A. F. of L. v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., Decision No. 982, 3
R. L. B. 332, 337 (1922).
12 The Act provided for arbitration between railroads and workers, and
defned “employees” as “all persons actually engaged in any capacity in
train operation or train service of any description.” Act of June 1, 1898,
ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424. The Act also specifed that the railroads would “be
responsible for the acts and defaults of such employees in the same manner
and to the same extent as if . . . said employees [were] directly employed
by it.” Id., at 425. See Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30
Transp. L. J. 235, 273 (2003).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 105 (2019) 121
Ginsburg, J., concurring
ation of congressional intent.” Ibid. By respecting the
qualifcations of § 1 today, we “respect the limits up to which
Congress was prepared” to go when adopting the Arbitration
Act. United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 298 (1970).
Finally, and stretching in a different direction entirely,
New Prime invites us to look beyond the Act. Even if the
statute doesn't supply judges with the power to compel arbitration
in this case, the company says we should order it
anyway because courts always enjoy the inherent authority
to stay litigation in favor of an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism of the parties' choosing. That, though, is an argument
we decline to tangle with. The courts below did not
address it, and we granted certiorari only to resolve existing
confusion about the application of the Arbitration Act, not to
explore other potential avenues for reaching a destination it
does not.
*
When Congress enacted the Arbitration Act in 1925, the
term “contracts of employment” referred to agreements to
perform work. No less than those who came before him,
Mr. Oliveira is entitled to the beneft of that same understanding
today. Accordingly, his agreement with New
Prime falls within § 1's exception, the court of appeals was
correct that it lacked authority under the Act to order arbitration,
and the judgment is
Affrmed.
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring.
“[W]ords generally should be `interpreted as taking their
ordinary . . . meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the
statute.' ” Ante, at 113 (quoting Wisconsin Central Ltd. v.
United States, 585 U. S. 274, 284 (2018)). The Court so reaffrms,
and I agree. Looking to the period of enactment to
122 NEW PRIME INC. v. OLIVEIRA
Ginsburg, J., concurring
gauge statutory meaning ordinarily fosters fdelity to the
“regime . . . Congress established.” MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512
U. S. 218, 234 (1994).
Congress, however, may design legislation to govern
changing times and circumstances. See, e. g., Kimble v.
Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 461 (2015) (“Congress
. . . intended [the Sherman Antitrust Act's] reference to
`restraint of trade' to have `changing content,' and authorized
courts to oversee the term's `dynamic potential.' ” (quoting
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485
U. S. 717, 731–732 (1988))); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U. S. 813,
819 (2002) (In enacting the Securities Exchange Act, “Congress
sought to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for
the philosophy of caveat emptor . . . . Consequently, . . . the
statute should be construed not technically and restrictively,
but fexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.” (internal
quotation marks and paragraph break omitted)); H. J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 243 (1989)
(“The limits of the relationship and continuity concepts that
combine to defne a [Racketeer Infuenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act] pattern . . . cannot be fxed in advance with
such clarity that it will always be apparent whether in a
particular case a `pattern of racketeering activity' exists.
The development of these concepts must await future
cases . . . .”). As these illustrations suggest, sometimes,
“[w]ords in statutes can enlarge or contract their scope as
other changes, in law or in the world, require their application
to new instances or make old applications anachronistic.”
West v. Gibson, 527 U. S. 212, 218 (1999).
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 123
Syllabus
HELSINN HEALTHCARE S. A. v. TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 17–1229. Argued December 4, 2018—Decided January 22, 2019
Petitioner Helsinn Healthcare S. A. makes a treatment for chemotherapyinduced
nausea and vomiting using the chemical palonosetron. While
Helsinn was developing its palonosetron product, it entered into two
agreements with another company granting that company the right to
distribute, promote, market, and sell a 0.25 mg dose of palonosetron in
the United States. The agreements required that the company keep
confdential any proprietary information received under the agreements.
Nearly two years later, in January 2003, Helsinn fled a provisional patent
application covering a 0.25 mg dose of palonosetron. Over the next
10 years, Helsinn fled four patent applications that claimed priority to
the January 2003 date. Relevant here, Helsinn fled its fourth patent
application in 2013. That patent (the '219 patent) covers a fxed dose
of 0.25 mg of palonosetron in a 5 ml solution and is covered by the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).
In 2011, respondents Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., and Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (collectively Teva), sought approval to market
a generic 0.25 mg palonosetron product. Helsinn sued Teva for infringing
its patents, including the '219 patent. Teva countered that the
'219 patent was invalid under the “on sale” provision of the AIA—which
precludes a person from obtaining a patent on an invention that was “in
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective
fling date of the claimed invention,” 35 U. S. C. § 102(a)(1)—because
the 0.25 mg dose was “on sale” more than one year before Helsinn fled
the provisional patent application in 2003. The District Court held that
the AIA's “on sale” provision did not apply because the public disclosure
of the agreements did not disclose the 0.25 mg dose. The Federal Circuit
reversed, holding that the sale was publicly disclosed, regardless of
whether the details of the invention were publicly disclosed in the terms
of the sale agreements.
Held: A commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the
invention confdential may place the invention “on sale” under § 102(a).
The patent statute in force immediately before the AIA included an onsale
bar. This Court's precedent interpreting that provision supports
124 HELSINN HEALTHCARE S. A. v. TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.
Syllabus
the view that a sale or offer of sale need not make an invention available
to the public to constitute invalidating prior art. See, e. g., Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U. S. 55, 67. The Federal Circuit had made
explicit what was implicit in this Court's pre-AIA precedent, holding
that “secret sales” could invalidate a patent. Special Devices, Inc. v.
OEA, Inc., 270 F. 3d 1353, 1357. Given this settled pre-AIA precedent,
the Court applies the presumption that when Congress reenacted the
same “on sale” language in the AIA, it adopted the earlier judicial construction
of that phrase. The addition of the catchall phrase “or otherwise
available to the public” is not enough of a change for the Court
to conclude that Congress intended to alter the meaning of “on sale.”
Paroline v. United States, 572 U. S. 434, and Federal Maritime Comm'n
v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, distinguished. Pp. 129–132.
855 F. 3d 1356, affrmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were David M. Krinsky, Amy Mason
Saharia, A. Joshua Podoll, Joseph M. O'Malley, Jr., Eric W.
Dittmann, Isaac S. Ashkenazi, Stephen B. Kinnaird, and
Charles M. Lizza.
Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him
on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Readler, Jenny C. Ellickson, Mark
R. Freeman, and Megan Barbero.
William M. Jay argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Steffen N. Johnson, Andrew C. Nichols,
David J. Zimmer, and Joshua J. Bone.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Intellectual Property Law Association by Lynn C. Tyler; for the Bar Association
of the District of Columbia by William F. Lawrence and Jonathan
A. Herstoff; for the Biotechnology Innovation Organization by Alice
O. Martin, Daniel P. Albers, Hans Sauer, Melissa A. Brand, and Brian
P. Barrett; for the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago by
Charles W. Shifey, Robert H. Resis, and Donald W. Rupert; for the Massachusetts
Biotechnology Council by Sophie F. Wang and Eric J. Marandett;
for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America by Scott
Cite as: 586 U. S. 123 (2019) 125
Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) bars a person
from receiving a patent on an invention that was “in
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before
the effective fling date of the claimed invention.” 35
U. S. C. § 102(a)(1). This case requires us to decide whether
the sale of an invention to a third party who is contractually
obligated to keep the invention confdential places the invention
“on sale” within the meaning of § 102(a).
More than 20 years ago, this Court determined that an
invention was “on sale” within the meaning of an earlier version
of § 102(a) when it was “the subject of a commercial offer
for sale” and “ready for patenting.” Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,
Inc., 525 U. S. 55, 67 (1998). We did not further require
that the sale make the details of the invention available to
the public. In light of this earlier construction, we deter-
E. Kamholz, James C. Stansel, and David E. Korn; and for US Inventor,
Inc., by Kathleen B. Carr, David G. Conlin, and Joseph D. Rutkowski.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Association
for Accessible Medicines by Matthew S. Hellman, Adam G. Unikowsky,
and Jeffrey K. Francer; for IEEE–USA by Maura K. Moran; for Intel
Corporation by Boris Bershteyn and John Neukom; for the R Street Institute
et al. by Charles Duan; for SPCM S. A. et al. by James W. Dabney,
Khue V. Hoang, Richard M. Koehl, Emma L. Baratta, Stefanie M. Lopatkin,
and John F. Duffy; for Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren by John C.
O'Quinn and Megan M. Wold; and for 45 Intellectual Property Professors
by Mark A. Lemley, and Michael A. Carrier, Ralph D. Clifford, Samuel
F. Ernst, Shubha Ghosh, Brian J. Love, Joseph Scott Miller, Michael S.
Mireles, Michael Risch, Sharon Sandeen, Joshua Sarnoff, Jason Schultz,
Ted Sichelman, and Katherine J. Strandburg, all pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Austin Intellectual Property
Law Association by Stephen R. Dartt and Lei Sun; for the Houston Intellectual
Property Law Association by Iftikhar Ahmed and L. Lee Eubanks
IV; for the Intellectual Property Owners Association by Robert M. Isackson,
Matthew Kaufman, Lauren Sabol, and Mark W. Lauroesch; for the
Naples Roundtable by Matthew J. Dowd and Andrew Baluch; and for Congressman
Lamar Smith by Robert A. Armitage.
126 HELSINN HEALTHCARE S. A. v. TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
mine that the reenactment of the phrase “on sale” in the AIA
did not alter this meaning. Accordingly, a commercial sale
to a third party who is required to keep the invention confdential
may place the invention “on sale” under the AIA.
I
Petitioner Helsinn Healthcare S. A. (Helsinn) is a Swiss
pharmaceutical company that makes Aloxi, a drug that treats
chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting. Helsinn acquired
the right to develop palonosetron, the active ingredient
in Aloxi, in 1998. In early 2000, it submitted protocols
for Phase III clinical trials to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), proposing to study a 0.25 mg and a 0.75 mg dose
of palonosetron. In September 2000, Helsinn announced
that it was beginning Phase III clinical trials and was seeking
marketing partners for its palonosetron product.
Helsinn found its marketing partner in MGI Pharma, Inc.
(MGI), a Minnesota pharmaceutical company that markets
and distributes drugs in the United States. Helsinn and
MGI entered into two agreements: a license agreement and
a supply and purchase agreement. The license agreement
granted MGI the right to distribute, promote, market, and
sell the 0.25 mg and 0.75 mg doses of palonosetron in the
United States. In return, MGI agreed to make upfront payments
to Helsinn and to pay future royalties on distribution
of those doses. Under the supply and purchase agreement,
MGI agreed to purchase exclusively from Helsinn any palonosetron
product approved by the FDA. Helsinn in turn
agreed to supply MGI however much of the approved doses
it required. Both agreements included dosage information
and required MGI to keep confdential any proprietary information
received under the agreements.
Helsinn and MGI announced the agreements in a joint
press release, and MGI also reported the agreements in its
Form 8–K fling with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Although the 8–K fling included redacted copies of
Cite as: 586 U. S. 123 (2019) 127
Opinion of the Court
the agreements, neither the 8–K fling nor the press releases
disclosed the specifc dosage formulations covered by the
agreements.
On January 30, 2003, nearly two years after Helsinn and
MGI entered into the agreements, Helsinn fled a provisional
patent application covering the 0.25 mg and 0.75 mg doses of
palonosetron. Over the next 10 years, Helsinn fled four
patent applications that claimed priority to the January 30,
2003, date of the provisional application. Helsinn fled its
fourth patent application—the one relevant here—in May
2013, and it issued as U. S. Patent No. 8,598,219 ('219 patent).
The '219 patent covers a fxed dose of 0.25 mg of palonosetron
in a 5 ml solution. By virtue of its effective date, the '219
patent is governed by the AIA. See § 101(i).
Respondents Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., and
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (Teva), are, respectively, an
Israeli company that manufactures generic drugs and its
American affliate. In 2011, Teva sought approval from the
FDA to market a generic 0.25 mg palonosetron product.
Helsinn then sued Teva for infringing its patents, including
the '219 patent. In defense, Teva asserted that the '219 patent
was invalid because the 0.25 mg dose was “on sale” more
than one year before Helsinn fled the provisional patent application
covering that dose in January 2003.
The AIA precludes a person from obtaining a patent on an
invention that was “on sale” before the effective fling date
of the patent application:
“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the
claimed invention was patented, described in a printed
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available
to the public before the effective fling date of the
claimed invention.” 35 U. S. C. § 102(a)(1) (emphasis
added).
See also § 102(b)(1) (exception for certain disclosures made
within a year before the effective fling date). Disclosures
128 HELSINN HEALTHCARE S. A. v. TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
described in § 102(a)(1) are of ten referred to as “prior
art.”
The patent statute in effect before the passage of the AIA
included a similar proscription, known as the “on-sale bar”:
“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
“(a) the invention was known or used by others in this
country, or patented or described in a printed publication
in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
“(b) the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public
use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States.” 35 U. S. C. §§ 102(a)–(b) (2006 ed.) (emphasis
added).
The District Court determined that the “on sale” provision
did not apply. It concluded that, under the AIA, an invention
is not “on sale” unless the sale or offer in question made the
claimed invention available to the public. Helsinn Healthcare
S. A. v. Dr. Reddy's Labs. Ltd., 387 F. Supp. 3d 439, 505
(NJ 2016). Because the companies' public disclosure of the
agreements between Helsinn and MGI did not disclose the
0.25 mg dose, the court determined that the invention was
not “on sale” before the critical date. Id., at 504–505.
The Federal Circuit reversed. 855 F. 3d 1356, 1360 (2017).
It concluded that “if the existence of the sale is public, the
details of the invention need not be publicly disclosed in the
terms of sale” to fall within the AIA's on-sale bar. Id., at
1371. Because the sale between Helsinn and MGI was publicly
disclosed, it held that the on-sale bar applied. Id., at
1364, 1371.
We granted certiorari to determine whether, under the
AIA, an inventor's sale of an invention to a third party who
is obligated to keep the invention confdential qualifes as
prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 123 (2019) 129
Opinion of the Court
invention. 585 U. S. 1015 (2018). We conclude that such a
sale can qualify as prior art.
II
A
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Art.
1, § 8, cl. 8. Under this grant of authority, Congress has
crafted a federal patent system that encourages “the creation
and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances
in technology and design” by granting inventors “the exclusive
right to practice the invention for a period of years.”
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S.
141, 151 (1989).
To further the goal of “motivating innovation and enlightenment”
while also “avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily
stife competition,” Pfaff, 525 U. S., at 63, Congress has imposed
several conditions on the “limited opportunity to obtain
a property right in an idea,” Bonito Boats, supra, at
149. One such condition is the on-sale bar, which refects
Congress' “reluctance to allow an inventor to remove existing
knowledge from public use” by obtaining a patent covering
that knowledge. Pfaff, supra, at 64; see also Pennock v.
Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 19 (1829) (explaining that “it would materially
retard the progress of science and the useful arts” to
allow an inventor to “sell his invention publicly” and later
“take out a patent” and “exclude the public from any farther
use than what should be derived under it”).
Every patent statute since 1836 has included an on-sale
bar. Pfaff, supra, at 65. The patent statute in force immediately
before the AIA prevented a person from receiving a
patent if, “more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States,” “the invention was
. . . on sale” in the United States. 35 U. S. C. § 102(b) (2006
130 HELSINN HEALTHCARE S. A. v. TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
ed.). The AIA, as relevant here, retained the on-sale bar
and added the catchall phrase “or otherwise available to the
public.” § 102(a)(1) (2012 ed.) (“A person shall be entitled to
a patent unless” the “claimed invention was . . . in public use,
on sale, or otherwise available to the public . . .”). We must
decide whether these changes altered the meaning of the “on
sale” bar. We hold that they did not.
B
Congress enacted the AIA in 2011 against the backdrop of
a substantial body of law interpreting § 102's on-sale bar. In
1998, we determined that the pre-AIA on-sale bar applies
“when two conditions are satisfed” more than a year before
an inventor fles a patent application. Pfaff, 525 U. S., at 67.
“First, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer
for sale.” Ibid. “Second, the invention must be ready for
patenting,” which we explained could be shown by proof
of “reduction to practice” or “drawings or other descriptions
of the invention that were suffciently specifc to enable a
person skilled in the art to practice the invention.” Id., at
67–68.
Although this Court has never addressed the precise question
presented in this case, our precedents suggest that a
sale or offer of sale need not make an invention available to
the public. For instance, we held in Pfaff that an offer for
sale could cause an inventor to lose the right to patent, without
regard to whether the offer discloses each detail of the
invention. E.g., id., at 67. Other cases focus on whether
the invention had been sold, not whether the details of the
invention had been made available to the public or whether
the sale itself had been publicly disclosed. E.g., Consolidated
Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U. S. 92, 94 (1877) (“[A]
single instance of sale or of use by the patentee may, under
the circumstances, be fatal to the patent . . .”); cf. Smith &
Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U. S. 249, 257 (1887) (“A single
sale to another . . . would certainly have defeated his
Cite as: 586 U. S. 123 (2019) 131
Opinion of the Court
right to a patent . . .”); Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U. S.
126, 136 (1878) (“It is not a public knowledge of his invention
that precludes the inventor from obtaining a patent for it,
but a public use or sale of it”).
The Federal Circuit—which has “exclusive jurisdiction”
over patent appeals, 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)—has made explicit
what was implicit in our precedents. It has long held that
“secret sales” can invalidate a patent. E.g., Special Devices,
Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F. 3d 1353, 1357 (2001) (invalidating
patent claims based on “sales for the purpose of the commercial
stockpiling of an invention” that “took place in secret”);
Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F. 3d 1368,
1370 (1998) (“Thus an inventor's own prior commercial use,
albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use or sale under
§ 102(b), barring him from obtaining a patent”).
In light of this settled pre-AIA precedent on the meaning
of “on sale,” we presume that when Congress reenacted the
same language in the AIA, it adopted the earlier judicial construction
of that phrase. See Shapiro v. United States, 335
U. S. 1, 16 (1948) (“In adopting the language used in the earlier
act, Congress `must be considered to have adopted also
the construction given by this Court to such language, and
made it a part of the enactment' ”). The new § 102 retained
the exact language used in its predecessor statute (“on sale”)
and, as relevant here, added only a new catchall clause (“or
otherwise available to the public”). As amicus United
States noted at oral argument, if “on sale” had a settled
meaning before the AIA was adopted, then adding the
phrase “or otherwise available to the public” to the statute
“would be a fairly oblique way of attempting to overturn”
that “settled body of law.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 27–28. The addition
of “or otherwise available to the public” is simply not
enough of a change for us to conclude that Congress intended
to alter the meaning of the reenacted term “on sale.” Cf.
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U. S. 583, 593 (2012) (determining
that a reenacted provision did not ratify an earlier
132 HELSINN HEALTHCARE S. A. v. TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
judicial construction where the provision omitted the word
on which the prior judicial constructions were based).
Helsinn disagrees, arguing that our construction reads
“otherwise” out of the statute. Citing Paroline v. United
States, 572 U. S. 434 (2014), and Federal Maritime Comm'n
v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726 (1973), Helsinn contends
that the associated-words canon requires us to read “otherwise
available to the public” to limit the preceding terms in
§ 102 to disclosures that make the claimed invention available
to the public.
As an initial matter, neither of the cited decisions addresses
the reenactment of terms that had acquired a wellsettled
judicial interpretation. And Helsinn's argument
places too much weight on § 102's catchall phrase. Like
other such phrases, “otherwise available to the public” captures
material that does not ft neatly into the statute's enumerated
categories but is nevertheless meant to be covered.
Given that the phrase “on sale” had acquired a well-settled
meaning when the AIA was enacted, we decline to read the
addition of a broad catchall phrase to upset that body of
precedent.
III
Helsinn does not ask us to revisit our pre-AIA interpretation
of the on-sale bar. Nor does it dispute the Federal Circuit's
determination that the invention claimed in the '219
patent was “on sale” within the meaning of the pre-AIA statute.
Because we determine that Congress did not alter the
meaning of “on sale” when it enacted the AIA, we hold that
an inventor's sale of an invention to a third party who is
obligated to keep the invention confdential can qualify as
prior art under § 102(a). We therefore affrm the judgment
of the Federal Circuit.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 133
Syllabus
MOORE v. TEXAS
on petition for writ of certiorari to the court of
criminal appeals of texas
No. 18–443. Decided February 19, 2019
A Texas trial court determined that Bobby James Moore had an intellectual
disability that rendered him ineligible for the death penalty under
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed. Ex parte Moore, 470 S. W. 3d 481, 527–528. This
Court vacated that decision and remanded the case for further consideration
“not inconsistent with” the Court's analysis. Moore v. Texas, 581
U. S. 1, 21. After remand, the Texas appeals court again concluded that
Moore had not demonstrated that he had an intellectual disability. Ex
parte Moore, 548 S. W. 3d 552. Moore fled a petition for certiorari
seeking reversal of that determination. The Texas district attorney
agrees that Moore is intellectually disabled and cannot be executed; the
Texas attorney general disagrees, moves to intervene, and asks the
Court to deny Moore's petition.
Held: Because the trial court record demonstrates that Moore is a person
with an intellectual disability, the Court reverses the appeals court's
contrary determination. The appeals court's opinion after remand
rests in critical parts on the same analysis that this Court previously
found wanting. First, the appeals court again relied less upon Moore's
adaptive defcits than upon Moore's apparent adaptive strengths. See
Moore, 581 U. S., at 15. And while the appeals court emphasized
Moore's capacity to communicate, read, and write based in part on pro se
papers Moore fled in court, that relevant evidence lacks convincing
strength without a determination that Moore wrote the papers on his
own, a fnding the appeals court declined to make. The appeals court
also relied heavily upon adaptive improvements made in prison, even
though this Court's prior opinion cautioned against doing so. See id.,
at 16. Further, the appeals court concluded that Moore failed to show
that the “cause of [his] defcient social behavior was related to any defcits
in general mental abilities” rather than “emotional problems.” Ex
parte Moore, 548 S. W. 3d, at 570. This Court previously stated that
the appeals court had “departed from clinical practice” when it followed
similar reasoning, however, and pointed to the position of the American
Psychological Association that a mental-health issue is “not evidence
that a person does not also have intellectual disability.” 581 U. S., at
17. Finally, the appeals court stated that it would abandon reliance
134 MOORE v. TEXAS
Per Curiam
on evidentiary factors set forth in a Texas case called Ex parte Briseno,
135 S. W. 3d 1, but the similarity between those factors and the appeals
court's statements suggests that Briseno continues to permeate that
court's analysis. The appeals court's opinion, taken as a whole and read
in light of both of the Court's prior opinion and the trial court record,
rests upon analysis that too closely resembles what the Court previously
found improper. On the basis of the record, Moore has shown he is a
person with intellectual disability.
Certiorari granted; 548 S. W. 3d 552, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
In 2015, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
petitioner, Bobby James Moore, did not have intellectual
disability and consequently was eligible for the death penalty.
Ex parte Moore, 470 S. W. 3d 481, 527–528 (Ex parte
Moore I). We previously considered the lawfulness of that
determination, vacated the appeals court's decision, and remanded
the case for further consideration of the issue.
Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1, 20–21 (2017). The appeals court
subsequently reconsidered the matter but reached the same
conclusion. Ex parte Moore, 548 S. W. 3d 552, 573 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018) (Ex parte Moore II). We again review its
decision, and we reverse its determination.
I
When we frst heard this case, in Moore, we noted that the
state trial court (a state habeas court) “received affdavits
and heard testimony from Moore's family members, former
counsel, and a number of court-appointed mental-health
experts.” 581 U. S., at 6. We described the evidence as
“reveal[ing]” the following:
“Moore had signifcant mental and social diffculties beginning
at an early age. At 13, Moore lacked basic understanding
of the days of the week, the months of the
year, and the seasons; he could scarcely tell time or comprehend
the standards of measure or the basic principle
that subtraction is the reverse of addition. At school,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 133 (2019) 135
Per Curiam
because of his limited ability to read and write, Moore
could not keep up with lessons. Often, he was separated
from the rest of the class and told to draw pictures.
Moore's father, teachers, and peers called him
`stupid' for his slow reading and speech. After failing
every subject in the ninth grade, Moore dropped out of
high school. Cast out of his home, he survived on the
streets, eating from trash cans, even after two bouts of
food poisoning.” Id., at 6–7 (citations omitted).
On the basis of this and other evidence, the trial court
found that Moore had intellectual disability and thus was ineligible
for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U. S. 304 (2002). App. to Pet. for Cert. 310a–311a. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed that determination,
Ex parte Moore I, 470 S. W. 3d 481, and we reviewed
its decision, Moore, 581 U. S. 1.
At the outset of our opinion, we recognized as valid the
three underlying legal criteria that both the trial court and
appeals court had applied. Id., at 7–8 (citing American Association
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities,
Intellectual Disability: Defnition, Classifcation, and Systems
of Supports (11th ed. 2010) (AAIDD–11); American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (DSM–5)). To make a fnding
of intellectual disability, a court must see: (1) defcits in
intellectual functioning—primarily a test-related criterion,
see DSM–5, at 37; (2) adaptive defcits, “assessed using both
clinical evaluation and individualized . . . measures,” ibid.;
and (3) the onset of these defcits while the defendant was
still a minor, id., at 38. With respect to the frst criterion,
we wrote that Moore's intellectual testing indicated his was
a borderline case, but that he had demonstrated suffcient
intellectual-functioning defcits to require consideration of
the second criterion—adaptive functioning. Moore, 581
U. S., at 13–15. With respect to the third criterion, we
136 MOORE v. TEXAS
Per Curiam
found general agreement that any onset took place when
Moore was a minor. Id., at 7, n. 3.
But there was signifcant disagreement between the state
courts about whether Moore had the adaptive defcits needed
for intellectual disability. “In determining the signifcance
of adaptive defcits, clinicians look to whether an individual's
adaptive performance falls two or more standard deviations
below the mean in any of the three adaptive skill sets (conceptual,
social, and practical).” Id., at 8 (citing AAIDD–11,
at 43). Based on the evidence before it, the trial court found
that “Moore's performance fell roughly two standard deviations
below the mean in all three skill categories.” 581
U. S., at 8; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 309a. Reversing that
decision, the appeals court held that Moore had “not proven
by a preponderance of the evidence” that he possessed the
requisite adaptive defcits, and thus was eligible for the death
penalty. Ex parte Moore I, 470 S. W. 3d, at 520. We disagreed
with the appeals court's adaptive-functioning analysis,
however, and identifed at least fve errors.
First, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “overemphasized
Moore's perceived adaptive strengths.” Moore, 581
U. S., at 15. “But the medical community,” we said, “focuses
the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive defcits.”
Ibid.
Second, the appeals court “stressed Moore's improved behavior
in prison.” Id., at 16. But “[c]linicians . . . caution
against reliance on adaptive strengths developed `in a controlled
setting,' as a prison surely is.” Ibid. (quoting DSM–
5, at 38).
Third, the appeals court “concluded that Moore's record of
academic failure, . . . childhood abuse[,] and suffering . . .
detracted from a determination that his intellectual and
adaptive defcits were related.” 581 U. S., at 16. But “in
the medical community,” those “traumatic experiences” are
considered “ `risk factors' for intellectual disability.” Ibid.
(quoting AAIDD–11, at 59–60).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 133 (2019) 137
Per Curiam
Fourth, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals required
“Moore to show that his adaptive defcits were not related to
`a personality disorder.' ” 581 U. S., at 17 (quoting Ex parte
Moore I, 470 S. W. 3d, at 488). But clinicians recognize that
the “existence of a personality disorder or mental-health
issue . . . is `not evidence that a person does not also have
intellectual disability.' ” 581 U. S., at 17 (quoting Brief for
American Psychological Association (APA) et al. as Amici
Curiae in Moore v. Texas, O. T. 2016, No. 15–797, p. 19).
Fifth, the appeals court directed state courts, when examining
adaptive defcits, to rely upon certain factors set forth
in a Texas case called Ex parte Briseno, 135 S. W. 3d 1 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). Ex parte Moore I, 470 S. W. 3d, at 486,
489. The Briseno factors were: whether “those who knew
the person best during the developmental stage” thought of
him as “mentally retarded”; whether he could “formulat[e]
plans” and “car[ry] them through”; whether his conduct
showed “leadership”; whether he showed a “rational and appropriate”
“response to external stimuli”; whether he could
answer questions “coherently” and “rationally”; whether he
could “hide facts or lie effectively”; and whether the commission
of his offense required “forethought, planning, and complex
execution of purpose.” 135 S. W. 3d, at 8–9.
We criticized the use of these factors both because they
had no grounding in prevailing medical practice and because
they invited “lay perceptions of intellectual disability” and
“lay stereotypes” to guide assessment of intellectual disability.
Moore, 581 U. S., at 18. Emphasizing the Briseno factors
over clinical factors, we said, “ `creat[es] an unacceptable
risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.'
” 581 U. S., at 17 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U. S.
701, 704 (2014)). While our decisions in “Atkins and Hall
left to the States `the task of developing appropriate ways
to enforce' the restriction on executing the intellectually disabled,”
581 U. S., at 13 (quoting Hall, 572 U. S., at 719), a
court's intellectual disability determination “must be `in138
MOORE v. TEXAS
Per Curiam
formed by the medical community's diagnostic framework,' ”
581 U. S., at 13 (quoting Hall, 572 U. S., at 721).
Three Members of this Court dissented from the majority's
treatment of Moore's intellectual functioning and with
aspects of its adaptive-functioning analysis, but all agreed
about the impropriety of the Briseno factors. As The
Chief Justice wrote in his dissenting opinion, the Briseno
factors were “an unacceptable method of enforcing the guarantee
of Atkins” and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
“therefore erred in using them to analyze adaptive defcits.”
Moore, 581 U. S., at 21 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.).
For the reasons we have described, the Court set aside the
judgment of the appeals court and remanded the case “for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” Id.,
at 21.
II
On remand the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reconsidered
the appeal and reached the same basic conclusion,
namely, that Moore had not demonstrated intellectual disability.
Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 555. The court
again noted the three basic criteria: intellectual-functioning
defcits, adaptive defcits, and early onset. Id., at 560–562.
But this time it focused almost exclusively on the second
criterion, adaptive defcits. The court said that, in doing so,
it would “abandon reliance on the Briseno evidentiary factors.”
Id., at 560. It would instead use “ `current medical
diagnostic standards' ” set forth in the American Psychiatric
Association's DSM–5. Id., at 559–560. In applying those
standards to the trial court record, it found the State's expert
witness, Dr. Kristi Compton, “ `far more credible and
reliable' ” than the other experts considered by the trial
court. Id., at 562. (As in our last opinion, we neither second
nor second-guess that judgment.) And, as we have said,
it reached the same conclusion it had before.
Moore has now fled a petition for certiorari in which he
argues that the trial court record demonstrates his intellecCite
as: 586 U. S. 133 (2019) 139
Per Curiam
tual disability. He asks us to reverse the appeals court's
contrary holding. Pet. for Cert. 2. The prosecutor, the district
attorney of Harris County, “agrees with the petitioner
that he is intellectually disabled and cannot be executed.”
Brief in Opposition 9. The APA, American Bar Association
(ABA), and various individuals have also fled amicus curiae
briefs supporting the position of Moore and the prosecutor.
Brief for APA et al. as Amici Curiae; Brief for ABA as
Amicus Curiae; Brief for Donald B. Ayer et al. as Amici
Curiae. The attorney general of Texas, however, has fled
a motion for leave to intervene and asks us to deny
Moore's petition. Motion for Leave To Intervene as a
Respondent.
III
After reviewing the trial court record and the court of
appeals' opinion, we agree with Moore that the appeals
court's determination is inconsistent with our opinion in
Moore. We have found in its opinion too many instances
in which, with small variations, it repeats the analysis we
previously found wanting, and these same parts are critical
to its ultimate conclusion.
For one thing, the court of appeals again relied less upon
the adaptive defcits to which the trial court had referred
than upon Moore's apparent adaptive strengths. See Moore,
581 U. S., at 15 (criticizing the appeals court's “overemphas[
is]” upon Moore's “perceived adaptive strengths”); supra,
at 136. The appeals court's discussion of Moore's “[c]ommunication
[s]kills” does not discuss the evidence relied upon by
the trial court. Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 563–
565. That evidence includes the young Moore's inability to
understand and answer family members, even a failure on
occasion to respond to his own name. App. to Pet. for Cert.
289a–290a. Its review of Moore's “[r]eading and [w]riting”
refers to defcits only in observing that “in prison, [Moore]
progressed from being illiterate to being able to write at a
140 MOORE v. TEXAS
Per Curiam
seventh-grade level.” Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at
565. But the trial court heard, among other things, evidence
that in school Moore was made to draw pictures when
other children were reading, and that by sixth grade Moore
struggled to read at a second-grade level. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 290a, 295a.
Instead, the appeals court emphasized Moore's capacity to
communicate, read, and write based in part on pro se papers
Moore fled in court. Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d,
at 565–566. That evidence is relevant, but it lacks convincing
strength without a determination about whether Moore
wrote the papers on his own, a fnding that the court of appeals
declined to make. Rather, the court dismissed the
possibility of outside help: Even if other inmates “composed”
these papers, it said, Moore's “ability to copy such documents
by hand” was “within the realm of only a few intellectually
disabled people.” Id., at 565. Similarly, the court of appeals
stressed Moore's “coherent” testimony in various proceedings,
but acknowledged that Moore had “a lawyer to
coach him” in all but one. Id., at 564, and n. 95. As for that
pro se hearing, the court observed that Moore read letters
into the record “without any apparent diffculty.” Ibid.
For another thing, the court of appeals relied heavily
upon adaptive improvements made in prison. See Moore,
581 U. S., at 16 (“caution[ing] against reliance on adaptive
strengths developed” in “prison”); supra, at 136. It concluded
that Moore has command of elementary math, but its examples
concern trips to the prison commissary, commissary purchases,
and the like. Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at
566–569. It determined that Moore had shown leadership
ability in prison by refusing, on occasion, “to mop up some
spilled oatmeal,” shave, get a haircut, or sit down. Id., at
570–571, and n. 149. And as we have said, it stressed correspondence
written in prison. Id., at 565. The length and
detail of the court's discussion on these points is diffcult to
Cite as: 586 U. S. 133 (2019) 141
Per Curiam
square with our caution against relying on prison-based
development.
Further, the court of appeals concluded that Moore failed
to show that the “cause of [his] defcient social behavior was
related to any defcits in general mental abilities” rather than
“emotional problems.” Id., at 570. But in our last review,
we said that the court of appeals had “departed from clinical
practice” when it required Moore to prove that his “problems
in kindergarten” stemmed from his intellectual disability
rather than “ `emotional problems. ' ” Moore, 581 U. S.,
at 17 (quoting Ex parte Moore I, 470 S. W. 3d, at 488, 526).
And we pointed to an amicus brief in which the APA explained
that a personality disorder or mental-health issue is
“ `not evidence that a person does not also have intellectual
disability.' ” 581 U. S., at 17 (quoting Brief for APA et al. as
Amici Curiae in No. 15–797, at 19).
Finally, despite the court of appeals' statement that it
would “abandon reliance on the Briseno evidentiary factors,”
Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 560, it seems to have
used many of those factors in reaching its conclusion. See
supra, at 137 (detailing those factors). Thus, Briseno asked
whether the “offense require[d] forethought, planning, and
complex execution of purpose.” 135 S. W. 3d, at 9. The
court of appeals wrote that Moore's crime required “a level
of planning and forethought.” Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W.
3d, at 572, 603 (observing that Moore “w[ore] a wig, conceal[
ed] the weapon, and fe[d]” after the crime).
Briseno asked whether the defendant could “respond coherently,
rationally, and on point to oral and written questions.”
135 S. W. 3d, at 8. The court of appeals found that
Moore “responded rationally and coherently to questions.”
Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 564.
And Briseno asked whether the defendant's “conduct
show[s] leadership or . . . that he is led around by others.”
135 S. W. 3d, at 8. The court of appeals wrote that Moore's
142 MOORE v. TEXAS
Per Curiam
“refus[al] to mop up some spilled oatmeal” (and other such
behavior) showed that he “infuences others and stands up
to authority.” Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 570–571.
Of course, clinicians also ask questions to which the court
of appeals' statements might be relevant. See AAIDD–11,
at 44 (noting that how a person “follows rules” and “obeys
laws” can bear on assessment of her social skills). But the
similarity of language and content between Briseno's factors
and the court of appeals' statements suggests that Briseno
continues to “pervasively infec[t] the [the appeals courts']
analysis.” Moore, 581 U. S., at 21.
To be sure, the court of appeals opinion is not identical to
the opinion we considered in Moore. There are sentences
here and there suggesting other modes of analysis consistent
with what we said. But there are also sentences here
and there suggesting reliance upon what we earlier called
“lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled.” Id., at 18.
Compare Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 570–571 (fnding
evidence that Moore “had a girlfriend” and a job as tending
to show he lacks intellectual disability), with AAIDD–11,
at 151 (criticizing the “incorrect stereotypes” that persons
with intellectual disability “never have friends, jobs, spouses,
or children”), and Brief for APA et al. as Amici Curiae 8
(“[I]t is estimated that between nine and forty percent of
persons with intellectual disability have some form of paid
employment”).
We conclude that the appeals court's opinion, when taken
as a whole and when read in the light both of our prior opinion
and the trial court record, rests upon analysis too much
of which too closely resembles what we previously found improper.
And extricating that analysis from the opinion
leaves too little that might warrant reaching a different conclusion
than did the trial court. We consequently agree
with Moore and the prosecutor that, on the basis of the trial
court record, Moore has shown he is a person with intellectual
disability.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 133 (2019) 143
Alito, J., dissenting
* * *
The petition for certiorari is granted. The attorney general
of Texas' motion to intervene is denied; we have considered
that fling as an amicus brief. The judgment of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring.
When this case was before us two years ago, I wrote in
dissent that the majority's articulation of how courts should
enforce the requirements of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304
(2002), lacked clarity. Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1, 29–30
(2017). It still does. But putting aside the diffculties of
applying Moore in other cases, it is easy to see that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals misapplied it here. On remand,
the court repeated the same errors that this Court
previously condemned—if not quite in haec verba, certainly
in substance. The court repeated its improper reliance on
the factors articulated in Ex parte Briseno, 135 S. W. 3d
1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), and again emphasized Moore's
adaptive strengths rather than his defcits. That did not
pass muster under this Court's analysis last time. It still
doesn't. For those reasons, I join the Court's opinion reversing
the judgment below.
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice
Gorsuch join, dissenting.
Two years ago, this Court vacated a judgment of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals holding that Bobby James Moore
was not intellectually disabled and was therefore eligible
for the death penalty. Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1 (2017).
While the Court divided on the appropriate disposition, both
the majority and the dissent agreed that the Court of Criminal
Appeals should have assessed Moore's claim of intellec144
MOORE v. TEXAS
Alito, J., dissenting
tual disability under contemporary standards rather than
applying the outdated evidentiary factors laid out in Ex
parte Briseno, 135 S. W. 3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Moore, 581 U. S., at 5–6; id., at 21 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
On remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted
the leading contemporary clinical standards for assessing intellectual
disability, applied those standards to the record,
and once again determined that Moore is eligible for the
death penalty. Ex parte Moore, 548 S. W. 3d 552, 555 (2018).
Today, the Court reverses that most recent decision, holding
that the Court of Criminal Appeals failed to follow our
decision in Moore. Such a failure would be understandable
given the “lack of guidance [Moore] offers to States seeking
to enforce the holding of Atkins.” Moore, 581 U. S., at 29
(Roberts, C. J., dissenting). Indeed, each of the errors that
the majority ascribes to the state court's decision is traceable
to Moore's failure to provide a clear rule. For example, the
majority faults the Court of Criminal Appeals for “rel[ying]
less upon the adaptive defcits . . . than upon Moore's apparent
adaptive strengths,” ante, at 139, and for “rel[ying] heavily
upon adaptive improvements made in prison,” ante, at
140. But in Moore, we said only that a court ought not
“overemphasiz[e]” adaptive strengths or place too much
“stres[s]” on improved behavior in prison. This left “[t]he
line between the permissible—consideration, maybe even
emphasis—and the forbidden—`overemphasis'—. . . not only
thin, but totally undefned . . . .” Moore, 581 U. S., at 31
(Roberts, C. J., dissenting). The majority's belief that the
state court failed to follow Moore on remand merely proves
that “[n]either the Court's articulation of this standard [in
Moore] nor its application sheds any light on what it means.”
Id., at 30 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
Having concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals
failed to apply the standard allegedly set out in Moore, the
Court today takes it upon itself to correct these factual fndCite
as: 586 U. S. 133 (2019) 145
Alito, J., dissenting
ings and reverse the judgment.* This is not our role. “We
do not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss specifc
facts.” United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 227
(1925); see also Salazar-Limon v. Houston, 581 U. S. 946,
947–948 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(“[W]e rarely grant review where the thrust of the
claim is that a lower court simply erred in applying a settled
rule of law to the facts of a particular case”). If the Court
is convinced that the Court of Criminal Appeals made a legal
error, it should vacate the judgment below, pronounce the
standard that we failed to provide in Moore, and remand for
the state court to apply that standard. The Court's decision,
instead, to issue a summary reversal belies our role as
“a court of review, not of frst view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).
The Court's foray into factfnding is an unsound departure
from our usual practice. The error in this litigation was not
the state court's decision on remand but our own failure to
provide a coherent rule of decision in Moore. I would deny
the petition for a writ of certiorari. I certainly would not
summarily reverse and make our own fnding of fact without
even giving the State the opportunity to brief and argue the
question. I therefore respectfully dissent.
*The Court excuses its usurpation of the factfnding role by contrasting
the conclusions of “the trial court,” ante, at 139–140, 142, with the views
of “the court of appeals,” ante, at 140–141. But in Texas habeas proceedings,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is “the ultimate factfnder” and
has authority to accept, alter, or reject the “recommendation” of the habeas
court. Ex parte Reed, 271 S. W. 3d 698, 727 (2008).
146 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
TIMBS v. INDIANA
certiorari to the supreme court of indiana
No. 17–1091. Argued November 28, 2018—Decided February 20, 2019
Tyson Timbs pleaded guilty in Indiana state court to dealing in a controlled
substance and conspiracy to commit theft. At the time of
Timbs's arrest, the police seized a Land Rover SUV Timbs had purchased
for $42,000 with money he received from an insurance policy
when his father died. The State sought civil forfeiture of Timbs's vehicle,
charging that the SUV had been used to transport heroin. Observing
that Timbs had recently purchased the vehicle for more than four
times the maximum $10,000 monetary fne assessable against him for
his drug conviction, the trial court denied the State's request. The vehicle's
forfeiture, the court determined, would be grossly disproportionate
to the gravity of Timbs's offense, and therefore unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The Court of
Appeals of Indiana affrmed, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the Excessive Fines Clause constrains only federal action
and is inapplicable to state impositions.
Held: The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated
protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Pp. 150–156.
(a) The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates
and renders applicable to the States Bill of Rights protections “fundamental
to our scheme of ordered liberty,” or “deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742,
767 (alterations omitted). If a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated,
there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits
or requires. P. 150.
(b) The prohibition embodied in the Excessive Fines Clause carries
forward protections found in sources from Magna Carta to the English
Bill of Rights to state constitutions from the colonial era to the present
day. Protection against excessive fnes has been a constant shield
throughout Anglo-American history for good reason: Such fnes undermine
other liberties. They can be used, e. g., to retaliate against or
chill the speech of political enemies. They can also be employed, not
in service of penal purposes, but as a source of revenue. The historical
and logical case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause is indeed overwhelming.
Pp. 151–154.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 147
Syllabus
(c) Indiana argues that the Clause does not apply to its use of civil
in rem forfeitures, but this Court held in Austin v. United States, 509
U. S. 602, that such forfeitures fall within the Clause's protection when
they are at least partially punitive. Indiana cannot prevail unless the
Court overrules Austin or holds that, in light of Austin, the Excessive
Fines Clause is not incorporated because its application to civil in rem
forfeitures is neither fundamental nor deeply rooted.
The frst argument, overturning Austin, is not properly before this
Court. The Indiana Supreme Court held only that the Excessive Fines
Clause did not apply to the States. The court did not address the
Clause's application to civil in rem forfeitures, nor did the State ask it
to do so. Timbs thus sought this Court's review only of the question
whether the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indiana attempted to reformulate the question to ask
whether the Clause restricted States' use of civil in rem forfeitures and
argued on the merits that Austin was wrongly decided. Respondents'
“right . . . to restate the questions presented,” however, “does not give
them the power to expand [those] questions,” Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 279, n. 10 (emphasis deleted),
particularly where the proposed reformulation would lead the Court to
address a question neither pressed nor passed upon below, cf. Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7.
The second argument, that the Excessive Fines Clause cannot be
incorporated if it applies to civil in rem forfeitures, misapprehends the
nature of the incorporation inquiry. In considering whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates a Bill of Rights protection, this Court
asks whether the right guaranteed—not each and every particular application
of that right—is fundamental or deeply rooted. To suggest otherwise
is inconsistent with the approach taken in cases concerning novel
applications of rights already deemed incorporated. See, e. g., Packingham
v. North Carolina, 582 U. S. 98, 101. The Excessive Fines Clause is
thus incorporated regardless of whether application of the Clause to civil
in rem forfeitures is itself fundamental or deeply rooted. Pp. 154–156.
84 N. E. 3d 1179, vacated and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh,
JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 157.
Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 157.
Wesley P. Hottot argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Samuel B. Gedge, Scott G. Bullock,
and Darpana M. Sheth.
148 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Opinion of the Court
Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General of Indiana, argued
the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Curtis
T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General, Kian J. Hudson, Deputy
Solicitor General, and Aaron T. Craft and Julia C. Payne,
Deputy Attorneys General.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Tyson Timbs pleaded guilty in Indiana state court to
dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit
theft. The trial court sentenced him to one year of home
detention and fve years of probation, which included a court-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American Bar
Association by Robert M. Carlson and Robert N. Weiner; for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Nusrat J. Choudhury, Orion Danjuma,
Dennis D. Parker, Ezekiel Edwards, David Cole, Charles Duan, Nila
Bala, and Samuel Brooke; for the American Civil Rights Union by Kenneth
A. Klukowski; for Cause of Action Institute by John J. Vecchione,
Julie A. Smith, and Cynthia F. Crawford; for the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America by Bert W. Rein, Carol A. Laham, Andrew
G. Woodson, and Daryl Joseffer; for the Constitutional Accountability
Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, David H. Gans, and
Brian R. Frazelle; for the DKT Liberty Project et al. by Jessica Ring
Amunson, Clark M. Neily III, Jay R. Schweikert, Shana-Tara O'Toole,
Timothy Sandefur, and Aditya Dynar; for the Drug Policy Alliance et al.
by Vincent Levy and Daniel M. Sullivan; for Indiana Criminal Defense
Lawyers by William B. Shields and James T. Giles; for the Institute for
Free Speech by Allen Dickerson, Zac Morgan, and Owen Yeates; for Judicial
Watch, Inc., et al. by Chris Fedeli; for the Juvenile Law Center et al.
by Marsha L. Levick and Jessica Feierman; for the NAACP Legal Defense
& Educational Fund, Inc., by Daniel S. Harawa, Sherrilyn A. Ifll,
Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers by Jeffrey T. Green; for the Pacifc Legal Foundation
by Christina M. Martin, Lawrence G. Salzman, and Anthony L. François;
for The Rutherford Institute by D. Alicia Hickok and John W. Whitehead;
and for Scholars by Eugene Volokh.
Lawrence Rosenthal and Lisa Soronen fled a brief for the National
Association of Counties et al. as amici curiae urging affrmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Eighth Amendment Scholars by
David Schulmeister; and for the Foundation for Moral Law by John A.
Eidsmoe.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 149
Opinion of the Court
supervised addiction-treatment program. The sentence also
required Timbs to pay fees and costs totaling $1,203. At the
time of Timbs's arrest, the police seized his vehicle, a Land
Rover SUV Timbs had purchased for about $42,000. Timbs
paid for the vehicle with money he received from an insurance
policy when his father died.
The State engaged a private law frm to bring a civil suit
for forfeiture of Timbs's Land Rover, charging that the
vehicle had been used to transport heroin. After Timbs's
guilty plea in the criminal case, the trial court held a hearing
on the forfeiture demand. Although fnding that Timbs's
vehicle had been used to facilitate violation of a criminal
statute, the court denied the requested forfeiture, observing
that Timbs had recently purchased the vehicle for $42,000,
more than four times the maximum $10,000 monetary fne
assessable against him for his drug conviction. Forfeiture
of the Land Rover, the court determined, would be grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs's offense, hence unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause. The Court of Appeals of Indiana affrmed
that determination, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed.
84 N. E. 3d 1179 (2017). The Indiana Supreme
Court did not decide whether the forfeiture would be excessive.
Instead, it held that the Excessive Fines Clause constrains
only federal action and is inapplicable to state impositions.
We granted certiorari. 585 U. S. 1002 (2018).
The question presented: Is the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause an “incorporated” protection applicable
to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause? Like the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions
of “cruel and unusual punishments” and “[e]xcessive
bail,” the protection against excessive fnes guards against
abuses of government's punitive or criminal-law-enforcement
authority. This safeguard, we hold, is “fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty,” with “dee[p] root[s] in [our] history
and tradition.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742,
150 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Opinion of the Court
767 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
deleted). The Excessive Fines Clause is therefore incorporated
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I
A
When ratifed in 1791, the Bill of Rights applied only to
the Federal Government. Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833). “The constitutional Amendments
adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War,” however,
“fundamentally altered our country's federal system.” Mc-
Donald, 561 U. S., at 754. With only “a handful” of exceptions,
this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause incorporates the protections contained
in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.
Id., at 764–765, and nn. 12–13. A Bill of Rights protection
is incorporated, we have explained, if it is “fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty,” or “deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.” Id., at 767 (internal quotation
marks omitted; emphasis deleted).
Incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees are “enforced
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according
to the same standards that protect those personal rights
against federal encroachment.” Id., at 765 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, if a Bill of Rights protection is
incorporated, there is no daylight between the federal and
state conduct it prohibits or requires.1
1 The sole exception is our holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
jury unanimity in federal, but not state, criminal proceedings. Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972). As we have explained, that “exception to
th[e] general rule . . . was the result of an unusual division among the
Justices,” and it “does not undermine the well-established rule that incorporated
Bill of Rights protections apply identically to the States and the
Federal Government.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 766, n. 14.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 151
Opinion of the Court
B
Under the Eighth Amendment, “[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fnes imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted. ” Taken together, these
Clauses place “parallel limitations” on “the power of those
entrusted with the criminal-law function of government.”
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U. S. 257, 263 (1989) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U. S. 651, 664 (1977)). Directly at issue here is the
phrase “nor excessive fnes imposed,” which “limits the government's
power to extract payments, whether in cash or in
kind, `as punishment for some offense.' ” United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 327–328 (1998) (quoting Austin v.
United States, 509 U. S. 602, 609–610 (1993)). The Fourteenth
Amendment, we hold, incorporates this protection.
The Excessive Fines Clause traces its venerable lineage
back to at least 1215, when Magna Carta guaranteed that
“[a] Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after
the manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness
thereof, saving to him his contenement . . . .” § 20, 9
Hen. 3, ch. 14, in 1 Eng. Stat. at Large 5 (1225).2 As relevant
here, Magna Carta required that economic sanctions
“be proportioned to the wrong” and “not be so large as to
deprive [an offender] of his livelihood.” Browning-Ferris,
492 U. S., at 271. See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England 372 (1769) (“[N]o man shall have a
larger amercement imposed upon him, than his circumstances
or personal estate will bear . . . .”). But cf. Bajakaj-
2 “Amercements were payments to the Crown, and were required of individuals
who were `in the King's mercy,' because of some act offensive to
the Crown.” Browning-Ferris, 492 U. S., at 269. “[T]hough fnes and
amercements had distinct historical antecedents, they served fundamentally
similar purposes—and, by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
the terms were often used interchangeably.” Brief for Eighth Amendment
Scholars as Amici Curiae 12.
152 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Opinion of the Court
ian, 524 U. S., at 340, n. 15 (taking no position on the question
whether a person's income and wealth are relevant considerations
in judging the excessiveness of a fne).
Despite Magna Carta, imposition of excessive fnes persisted.
The 17th century Stuart kings, in particular, were
criticized for using large fnes to raise revenue, harass their
political foes, and indefnitely detain those unable to pay.
E. g., The Grand Remonstrance ¶¶17, 34 (1641), in The Constitutional
Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660,
pp. 210, 212 (S. Gardiner ed., 3d ed. rev. 1906); Browning-
Ferris, 492 U. S., at 267. When James II was overthrown in
the Glorious Revolution, the attendant English Bill of Rights
reaffrmed Magna Carta's guarantee by providing that “excessive
Bail ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines
imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inficted.”
1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 2, § 10, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1689).
Across the Atlantic, this familiar language was adopted
almost verbatim, frst in the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
then in the Eighth Amendment, which states: “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fnes imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inficted.”
Adoption of the Excessive Fines Clause was in tune not
only with English law; the Clause resonated as well with
similar colonial-era provisions. See, e. g., Pa. Frame of
Govt., Laws Agreed Upon in England, Art. XVIII (1682), in
5 Federal and State Constitutions 3061 (F. Thorpe ed.
1909) (“[A]ll fnes shall be moderate, and saving men's
contenements, merchandize, or wainage.”). In 1787, the
constitutions of eight States—accounting for 70% of the U. S.
population—forbade excessive fnes. Calabresi, Agudo, &
Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791, 85 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1451, 1517 (2012).
An even broader consensus obtained in 1868 upon
ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment. By then, the
constitutions of 35 of the 37 States—accounting for over 90%
of the U. S. population—expressly prohibited excessive fnes.
Calabresi & Agudo, Individual Rights Under State ConstituCite
as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 153
Opinion of the Court
tions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratifed in
1868, 87 Texas L. Rev. 7, 82 (2008).
Notwithstanding the States' apparent agreement that the
right guaranteed by the Excessive Fines Clause was fundamental,
abuses continued. Following the Civil War, Southern
States enacted Black Codes to subjugate newly freed
slaves and maintain the prewar racial hierarchy. Among
these laws' provisions were draconian fnes for violating
broad proscriptions on “vagrancy” and other dubious offenses.
See, e. g., Mississippi Vagrant Law, Laws of Miss.
§ 2 (1865), in 1 W. Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction
283–285 (1950). When newly freed slaves were
unable to pay imposed fnes, States often demanded involuntary
labor instead. E. g., id. § 5; see Finkelman, John Bingham
and the Background to the Fourteenth Amendment, 36
Akron L. Rev. 671, 681–685 (2003) (describing Black Codes'
use of fnes and other methods to “replicate, as much as possible,
a system of involuntary servitude”). Congressional
debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the joint resolution
that became the Fourteenth Amendment, and similar measures
repeatedly mentioned the use of fnes to coerce involuntary
labor. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 443
(1866); id., at 1123–1124.
Today, acknowledgment of the right's fundamental nature
remains widespread. As Indiana itself reports, all 50 States
have a constitutional provision prohibiting the imposition
of excessive fnes either directly or by requiring proportionality.
Brief in Opposition 8–9. Indeed, Indiana explains
that its own Supreme Court has held that the Indiana Constitution
should be interpreted to impose the same restrictions
as the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 9 (citing Norris v. State,
271 Ind. 568, 576, 394 N. E. 2d 144, 150 (1979)).
For good reason, the protection against excessive fnes has
been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history:
Exorbitant tolls undermine other constitutional liberties.
Excessive fnes can be used, for example, to retaliate against
or chill the speech of political enemies, as the Stuarts' critics
154 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Opinion of the Court
learned several centuries ago. See Browning-Ferris, 492
U. S., at 267. Even absent a political motive, fnes may be
employed “in a measure out of accord with the penal goals
of retribution and deterrence,” for “fnes are a source of revenue,”
while other forms of punishment “cost a State money.”
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 979, n. 9 (1991) (opinion
of Scalia, J.) (“it makes sense to scrutinize governmental action
more closely when the State stands to beneft”). This
concern is scarcely hypothetical. See Brief for American
Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 7 (“Perhaps
because they are politically easier to impose than generally
applicable taxes, state and local governments nationwide increasingly
depend heavily on fnes and fees as a source of
general revenue.”).
In short, the historical and logical case for concluding that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Excessive
Fines Clause is overwhelming. Protection against excessive
punitive economic sanctions secured by the Clause is, to
repeat, both “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”
and “deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.”
McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted;
emphasis deleted).
II
The State of Indiana does not meaningfully challenge the
case for incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause as a general
matter. Instead, the State argues that the Clause does
not apply to its use of civil in rem forfeitures because, the
State says, the Clause's specifc application to such forfeitures
is neither fundamental nor deeply rooted.
In Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), however,
this Court held that civil in rem forfeitures fall within the
Clause's protection when they are at least partially punitive.
Austin arose in the federal context. But when a Bill of
Rights protection is incorporated, the protection applies
“identically to both the Federal Government and the States.”
McDonald, 561 U. S., at 766, n. 14. Accordingly, to prevail,
Indiana must persuade us either to overrule our decision in
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 155
Opinion of the Court
Austin or to hold that, in light of Austin, the Excessive
Fines Clause is not incorporated because the Clause's application
to civil in rem forfeitures is neither fundamental nor
deeply rooted. The frst argument is not properly before us,
and the second misapprehends the nature of our incorporation
inquiry.
A
In the Indiana Supreme Court, the State argued that forfeiture
of Timbs's SUV would not be excessive. See Brief
in Opposition 5. It never argued, however, that civil in rem
forfeitures were categorically beyond the reach of the Excessive
Fines Clause. The Indiana Supreme Court, for its part,
held that the Clause did not apply to the States at all, and it
nowhere addressed the Clause's application to civil in rem
forfeitures. See 84 N. E. 3d 1179. Accordingly, Timbs
sought our review of the question “[w]hether the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Pet. for Cert. i. In opposing review, Indiana attempted to
reformulate the question to ask “[w]hether the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause restricts States' use of
civil asset forfeitures.” Brief in Opposition i. And on the
merits, Indiana has argued not only that the Clause is not
incorporated, but also that Austin was wrongly decided.
Respondents' “right, in their brief in opposition, to restate
the questions presented,” however, “does not give them the
power to expand [those] questions.” Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 279, n. 10 (1993) (emphasis
deleted). That is particularly the case where, as
here, a respondent's reformulation would lead us to address
a question neither pressed nor passed upon below. Cf. Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005) (“[W]e are a
court of review, not of frst view . . . .”). We thus decline
the State's invitation to reconsider our unanimous judgment
in Austin that civil in rem forfeitures are fnes for purposes of
the Eighth Amendment when they are at least partially
punitive.
156 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Opinion of the Court
B
As a fallback, Indiana argues that the Excessive Fines
Clause cannot be incorporated if it applies to civil in rem
forfeitures. We disagree. In considering whether the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a protection contained
in the Bill of Rights, we ask whether the right guaranteed—
not each and every particular application of that right—is
fundamental or deeply rooted.
Indiana's suggestion to the contrary is inconsistent with
the approach we have taken in cases concerning novel applications
of rights already deemed incorporated. For example,
in Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U. S. 98 (2017),
we held that a North Carolina statute prohibiting registered
sex offenders from accessing certain commonplace social
media websites violated the First Amendment right to freedom
of speech. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause was “applicable
to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id., at 101. We did not, however, inquire
whether the Free Speech Clause's application specifcally
to social media websites was fundamental or deeply
rooted. See also, e. g., Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373
(2014) (holding, without separately considering incorporation,
that States' warrantless search of digital information
stored on cell phones ordinarily violates the Fourth Amendment).
Similarly here, regardless of whether application of
the Excessive Fines Clause to civil in rem forfeitures is itself
fundamental or deeply rooted, our conclusion that the Clause
is incorporated remains unchanged.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Indiana Supreme
Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 157
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
Justice Gorsuch, concurring.
The majority faithfully applies our precedent and, based
on a wealth of historical evidence, concludes that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause against the States. I agree with
that conclusion. As an original matter, I acknowledge, the
appropriate vehicle for incorporation may well be the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather
than, as this Court has long assumed, the Due Process
Clause. See, e. g., post, at 157–159 (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 805–858
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (documenting evidence that the “privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States” include, at minimum,
the individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights);
Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the
Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1866–67, 68 Ohio St. L. J. 1509 (2007); A. Amar, The Bill of
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 163–214 (1998); M. Curtis,
No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights (1986). But nothing in this case turns on
that question, and, regardless of the precise vehicle, there
can be no serious doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
the States to respect the freedom from excessive fnes
enshrined in the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive
fnes fully applicable to the States. But I cannot agree with
the route the Court takes to reach this conclusion. Instead
of reading the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
to encompass a substantive right that has nothing to do with
“process,” I would hold that the right to be free from excessive
fnes is one of the “privileges or immunities of citi158
TIMBS v. INDIANA
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
zens of the United States” protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States.” “On
its face, this appears to grant . . . United States citizens a
certain collection of rights—i. e., privileges or immunities—
attributable to that status.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561
U. S. 742, 808 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). But as I have previously explained,
this Court “marginaliz[ed]” the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in the late 19th century by defning the collection of
rights covered by the Clause “quite narrowly.” Id., at 808–
809. Litigants seeking federal protection of substantive
rights against the States thus needed “an alternative fount
of such rights,” and this Court “found one in a most curious
place,” id., at 809—the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, which prohibits “any State” from “depriv[ing]
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”
Because this Clause speaks only to “process,” the Court
has “long struggled to defne” what substantive rights it protects.
McDonald, supra, at 810 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
The Court ordinarily says, as it does today, that the Clause
protects rights that are “fundamental.” Ante, at 149, 150,
154, 156. Sometimes that means rights that are “ `deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' ” Ante, at 150,
154 (quoting McDonald, supra, at 767 (majority opinion)).
Other times, when that formulation proves too restrictive, the
Court defnes the universe of “fundamental” rights so broadly
as to border on meaningless. See, e. g., Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U. S. 644, 651–652 (2015) (“rights that allow persons,
within a lawful realm, to defne and express their identity”);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S.
833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to defne
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 159
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life”). Because the oxymoronic
“substantive” “due process” doctrine has no basis in the Constitution,
it is unsurprising that the Court has been unable
to adhere to any “guiding principle to distinguish `fundamental'
rights that warrant protection from nonfundamental
rights that do not.” McDonald, supra, at 811 (opinion of
Thomas, J.). And because the Court's substantive due process
precedents allow the Court to fashion fundamental rights
without any textual constraints, it is equally unsurprising
that among these precedents are some of the Court's most
notoriously incorrect decisions. E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 450 (1857).
The present case illustrates the incongruity of the Court's
due process approach to incorporating fundamental rights
against the States. Petitioner argues that the forfeiture of
his vehicle is an excessive punishment. He does not argue
that the Indiana courts failed to “ `proceed according to the
“law of the land”—that is, according to written constitutional
and statutory provisions,' ” or that the State failed to provide
“some baseline procedures.” Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U. S.
128, 150, n. 1 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting). His claim has
nothing to do with any “process” “due” him. I therefore
decline to apply the “legal fction” of substantive due process.
McDonald, 561 U. S., at 811 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
II
When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifed, “the terms
`privileges' and `immunities' had an established meaning as
synonyms for `rights.' ” Id., at 813. Those “rights” were
the “inalienable rights” of citizens that had been “long recognized,”
and “the ratifying public understood the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to protect constitutionally enumerated
rights” against interference by the States. Id., at 822, 837.
Many of these rights had been adopted from English law into
colonial charters, then state constitutions and bills of rights,
160 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
and fnally the Constitution. “Consistent with their English
heritage, the founding generation generally did not consider
many of the rights identifed in [the Bill of Rights] as new
entitlements, but as inalienable rights of all men, given legal
effect by their codifcation in the Constitution's text.” Id.,
at 818.
The question here is whether the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on excessive fnes was considered such a right.
The historical record overwhelmingly demonstrates that
it was.
A
The Excessive Fines Clause “was taken verbatim from the
English Bill of Rights of 1689,” United States v. Bajakajian,
524 U. S. 321, 335 (1998), which itself formalized a longstanding
English prohibition on disproportionate fines. The
Charter of Liberties of Henry I, issued in 1101, stated that
“[i]f any of my barons or men shall have committed an offence
he shall not give security to the extent of forfeiture of
his money, as he did in the time of my father, or of my
brother, but according to the measure of the offence so shall
he pay . . . .” Sources of English Legal and Constitutional
History ¶8, p. 50 (M. Evans & R. Jack eds. 1984) (emphasis
added). Expanding this principle, Magna Carta required
that “amercements (the medieval predecessors of fines)
should be proportioned to the offense and that they should
not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood,” Bajakajian,
supra, at 335:
“A free man shall be amerced for a small fault only according
to the measure thereof, and for a great crime
according to its magnitude, saving his position; and in
like manner, a merchant saving his trade, and a villein
saving his tillage, if they should fall under Our mercy.”
Magna Carta, ch. 20 (1215), in A. Howard, Magna Carta:
Text & Commentary 42 (rev. ed. 1998).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 161
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
Similar clauses levying amercements “only in proportion to
the measure of the offense” applied to earls, barons, and clergymen.
Chs. 21–22, ibid. One historian posits that, due to
the prevalence of amercements and their use in increasing
the English treasury, “[v]ery likely there was no clause
in Magna Carta more grateful to the mass of the people
than that about amercements.” Pleas of the Crown for
the County of Gloucester xxxiv (F. Maitland ed. 1884).
The principle was reiterated in the First Statute of Westminster,
which provided that no man should “be amerced,
without reasonable cause, and according to the quantity of
his Trespass.” 3 Edw., ch. 6 (1275). The English courts
have long enforced this principle. In one early case, for example,
the King commanded the bailiff “to take a moderate
amercement proper to the magnitude and manner of th[e]
offense, according to the tenour of the Great Charter of the
Liberties of England,” and the bailiff was sued for extorting
“a heavier ransom.” Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester,
Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (1316), reprinted in 52
Selden Society 3, 5 (1934); see also Richard Godfrey's Case,
11 Co. Rep. 42a, 44a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1199, 1202 (K. B. 1615)
(excessive fnes are “against law”).
During the reign of the Stuarts in the period leading up
to the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689, fnes were a fashpoint
“in the constitutional and political struggles between
the king and his parliamentary critics.” L. Schwoerer, The
Declaration of Rights, 1689, p. 91 (1981) (Schwoerer). From
1629 to 1640, Charles I attempted to govern without convening
Parliament, but “in the absence of parliamentary
grants,” he needed other ways of raising revenue. 4 H. Walter,
A History of England 135 (1834); see 1 T. Macaulay, History
of England 85 (1899). He thus turned “to exactions,
some odious and obsolete, some of very questionable legality,
and others clearly against law.” 1 H. Hallam, Constitutional
History of England: From the Accession of Henry VII to the
162 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
Death of George II 462 (1827) (Hallam); see 4 Walter, supra,
at 135.
The Court of Star Chamber, for instance, “imposed heavy
fnes on the king's enemies,” Schwoerer 91, in disregard “of
the provision of the Great Charter, that no man shall be
amerced even to the full extent of his means . . . .” 2 Hallam
*47. “[T]he strong interest of th[is] court in these fnes . . .
had a tendency to aggravate the punishment . . . .” 1 id.,
at 490. “The statute abolishing” the Star Chamber in 1641
“specifcally prohibited any court thereafter from . . . levying
. . . excessive fnes.” Schwoerer 91.
“But towards the end of Charles II's reign” in the 1670s
and early 1680s, courts again “imposed ruinous fnes on the
critics of the crown.” Ibid. In 1680, a committee of the
House of Commons “examined the transcripts of all the fnes
imposed in King's Bench since 1677,” ibid., and found that
“the Court of King's Bench, in the Imposition of Fines on
Offenders of late Years, hath acted arbitrarily, illegally, and
partially; favouring Papists, and Persons popishly affected;
and excessively oppressing his Majesty's Protestant Subjects,”
9 Journals of the House of Commons 692 (Dec. 23,
1680). The House of Commons determined that the actions
of the judges of the King's Bench, particularly the actions of
Chief Justice William Scroggs, had been so contrary to law
that it prepared articles of impeachment against him. The
articles alleged that Scroggs had “most notoriously departed
from all Rules of Justice and Equality, in the Imposition of
Fines upon Persons convicted of Misdemeanors” without
“any Regard to the Nature of the Offences, or the Ability of
the Persons.” Id., at 698.
Yet “[o]ver the next few years fnes became even more
excessive and partisan.” Schwoerer 91. The King's Bench,
presided over by the infamous Chief Justice Jeffreys, fned
Anglican cleric Titus Oates 2,000 marks (among other punishments)
for perjury. Id., at 93. For speaking against the
Duke of York, the sheriff of London was fned £100,000 in
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 163
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
1682, which corresponds to well over $10 million in presentday
dollars1—“an amount, which, as it extended to the ruin
of the criminal, was directly contrary to the spirit of [English]
law.” R. Vaughan, The History of England Under the
House of Stuart, pt. 2, p. 801 (1840). The King's Bench fned
Sir Samuel Barnadiston £10,000 for allegedly seditious letters,
a fne that was overturned by the House of Lords as
“exorbitant and excessive.” 14 Journals of the House of
Lords 210 (May 14, 1689). Several members of the committees
that would draft the Declaration of Rights—which included
the prohibition on excessive fnes that was enacted
into the English Bill of Rights of 1689—had themselves “suffered
heavy fnes.” Schwoerer 91–92. And in 1684, judges
in the case of John Hampden held that Magna Carta did not
limit “fnes for great offences” against the King, and imposed
a £40,000 fne. Trial of Hampden, 9 How. St. Tr. 1054, 1125
(K. B.); 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England
490 (1883).
“Freedom from excessive fnes” was considered “indisputably
an ancient right of the subject,” and the Declaration of
Rights' indictment against James II “charged that during his
reign judges had imposed excessive fnes, thereby subverting
the laws and liberties of the kingdom.” Schwoerer 90.
Article 10 of the Declaration declared “[t]hat excessive Bayle
ought not to be required nor excessive fynes imposed nor
cruel and unusuall Punishments inficted.” Id., at 297.
Shortly after the English Bill of Rights was enacted, Parliament
addressed several excessive fnes imposed before the
Glorious Revolution. For example, the House of Lords
overturned a £30,000 fne against the Earl of Devonshire as
“excessive and exorbitant, against Magna Charta, the common
right of the subject, and against the law of the land.”
Case of Earl of Devonshire, 11 How. St. Tr. 1354, 1371 (K. B.
1 See Currency Converter: 1270–2017 (estimating the 2017 equivalent of
£100,000 in 1680), http://nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency-converter (as
last visited Feb. 8, 2019)
164 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
1687). Although the House of Lords refused to reverse the
judgments against Titus Oates, a minority argued that his
punishments were “ `contrary to Law and ancient Practice' ”
and violated the prohibition on “ `excessive Fines.' ” Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 971 (1991) (opinion of
Scalia, J.); Trial of Oates, 10 How. St. Tr. 1080, 1325 (K. B.
1685). The House of Commons passed a bill to overturn
Oates' conviction, and eventually, after a request from Parliament,
the King pardoned Oates. Id., at 1329–1330.
Writing a few years before our Constitution was adopted,
Blackstone—“whose works constituted the preeminent authority
on English law for the founding generation,” Alden
v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999)—explained that the prohibition
on excessive fnes contained in the English Bill of
Rights “had a retrospect to some unprecedented proceedings
in the court of king's bench.” 4 Commentaries on the Laws
of England 372 (1769). Blackstone confrmed that this prohibition
was “only declaratory . . . of the old constitutional
law of the land,” which had long “regulated” the “discretion”
of the courts in imposing fnes. Ibid.
In sum, at the time of the founding, the prohibition on
excessive fnes was a longstanding right of Englishmen.
B
“As English subjects, the colonists considered themselves
to be vested with the same fundamental rights as other
Englishmen, ” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 816 (opinion of
Thomas, J.), including the prohibition on excessive fnes.
E. g., J. Dummer, A Defence of the New-England Charters
16–17 (1721) (“The Subjects Abroad claim the Privilege of
Magna Charta, which says that no Man shall be fn'd above
the Nature of his Offence, and whatever his Miscarriage be,
a Salvo Contenemento suo is to be observ'd by the Judge”).
Thus, the text of the Eighth Amendment was “ `based directly
on . . . the Virginia Declaration of Rights,' which
`adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 165
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
Rights.' ” Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U. S. 257, 266 (1989) (quoting Solem v.
Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 285, n. 10 (1983)); see Jones v. Commonwealth,
5 Va. 555, 557 (1799) (opinion of Carrington, J.) (explaining
that the clause in the Virginia Declaration of Rights
embodied the traditional legal understanding that any “fne
or amercement ought to be according to the degree of the
fault and the estate of the defendant”).
When the States were considering whether to ratify the
Constitution, advocates for a separate bill of rights emphasized
the need for an explicit prohibition on excessive fnes
mirroring the English prohibition. In colonial times, fnes
were “the drudge-horse of criminal justice,” “probably the
most common form of punishment.” L. Friedman, Crime
and Punishment in American History 38 (1993). To some,
this fact made a constitutional prohibition on excessive fnes
all the more important. As the well-known Anti-Federalist
Brutus argued in an essay, a prohibition on excessive fnes
was essential to “the security of liberty” and was “as necessary
under the general government as under that of the individual
states; for the power of the former is as complete
to the purpose of requiring bail, imposing fnes, inficting
punishments, . . . and seizing . . . property . . . as the other.”
Brutus II (Nov. 1, 1787), in The Complete Bill of Rights 621
(N. Cogan ed. 1997). Similarly, during Virginia's ratifying
convention, Patrick Henry pointed to Virginia's own prohibition
on excessive fnes and said that it would “depart from
the genius of your country” for the Federal Constitution to
omit a similar prohibition. Debate on Virginia Convention
(June 14, 1788), in 3 Debates on the Federal Constitution 447
(J. Elliot 2d ed. 1854). Henry continued: “[W]hen we come
to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence
put on the virtue of representatives” to “defne punishments
without this control.” Ibid.
Governor Edmund Randolph responded to Henry, arguing
that Virginia's charter was “nothing more than an investi166
TIMBS v. INDIANA
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
ture, in the hands of the Virginia citizens, of those rights
which belonged to British subjects.” Id., at 466. According
to Randolph, “the exclusion of excessive bail and fnes
. . . would follow of itself, without a bill of rights,” for such
fnes would never be imposed absent “corruption in the
House of Representatives, Senate, and President,” or judges
acting “contrary to justice.” Id., at 467–468.
For all the debate about whether an explicit prohibition on
excessive fnes was necessary in the Federal Constitution, all
agreed that the prohibition on excessive fnes was a wellestablished
and fundamental right of citizenship. When the
Excessive Fines Clause was eventually considered by Congress,
it received hardly any discussion before “it was agreed
to by a considerable majority.” 1 Annals of Cong. 754 (1789).
And when the Bill of Rights was ratifed, most of the States
had a prohibition on excessive fnes in their constitutions.2
Early commentary on the Clause confrms the widespread
agreement about the fundamental nature of the prohibition
on excessive fnes. Justice Story, writing a few decades before
the ratifcation of the Fourteenth Amendment, explained
that the Eighth Amendment was “adopted, as an admonition
to all departments of the national government, to
warn them against such violent proceedings, as had taken
2 Del. Const., Art. I, § 11 (1792), in 1 Federal and State Constitutions 569
(F. Thorpe ed. 1909); Md. Const., Decl. of Rights, Art. XXII (1776), in 3
id., at 1688; Mass. Const., pt. 1, Art. XXVI (1780), in id., at 1892; N. H.
Const., pt. 1, Art. 1, § XXXIII (1784), in 4 id., at 2457; N. C. Const., Decl.
of Rights, Art. X (1776), in 5 id., at 2788; Pa. Const., Art. IX, § 13 (1790),
in id., at 3101; S. C. Const., Art. IX, § 4 (1790), in 6 id., at 3264; Va. Const.,
Bill of Rights, § 9 (1776), in 7 id., at 3813. Vermont had a clause specifying
that “all fnes shall be proportionate to the offences.” Vt. Const.,
ch. II, § XXIX (1786), in id., at 3759. Georgia's 1777 Constitution had an
excessive-fnes clause, Art. LIX, but its 1789 Constitution did not. And
the Northwest Territory Ordinance provided that “[a]ll fnes shall be moderate;
and no cruel or unusual punishments inficted.” Art. II, 1 Stat. 52,
n. (a) (1787).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 167
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts,”
when “[e]normous fnes and amercements were . . .
sometimes imposed.” 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States § 1896, pp. 750–751 (1833).
Story included the prohibition on excessive fnes as a right,
along with the “right to bear arms” and others protected by
the Bill of Rights, that “operates, as a qualifcation upon
powers, actually granted by the people to the government”;
without such a “restrict[ion],” the government's “exercise or
abuse” of its power could be “dangerous to the people.” Id.,
§ 1858, at 718–719.
Chancellor Kent likewise described the Eighth Amendment
as part of the “right of personal security . . . guarded
by provisions which have been transcribed into the constitutions
in this country from magna carta, and other fundamental
acts of the English Parliament.” 2 J. Kent, Commentaries
on American Law 9 (1827). He understood the Eighth
Amendment to “guard against abuse and oppression,” and
emphasized that “the constitutions of almost every state in
the Unio[n] contain the same declarations in substance, and
nearly in the same language.” Ibid. Accordingly, “they
must be regarded as fundamental doctrines in every state,
for all the colonies were parties to the national declaration
of rights in 1774, in which the . . . rights and liberties of
English subjects were peremptorily claimed as their undoubted
inheritance and birthright. ” Ibid.; accord, W.
Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of
America 125 (1825) (describing the prohibition on excessive
fnes as “founded on the plainest principles of justice”).
C
The prohibition on excessive fnes remained fundamental
at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1868, 35 of
37 state constitutions “expressly prohibited excessive fnes.”
Ante, at 152. Nonetheless, as the Court notes, abuses of
168 TIMBS v. INDIANA
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
fnes continued, especially through the Black Codes adopted
in several States. Ante, at 153. The “centerpiece” of the
Codes was their “attempt to stabilize the black work force
and limit its economic options apart from plantation labor.”
E. Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfnished Revolution
1863–1877, p. 199 (1988). Under the Codes, “the state would
enforce labor agreements and plantation discipline, punish
those who refused to contract, and prevent whites from competing
among themselves for black workers.” Ibid. The
Codes also included “ `antienticement' measures punishing
anyone offering higher wages to an employee already under
contract.” Id., at 200.
The 39th Congress focused on these abuses during its debates
over the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, and the Freedmen's Bureau Act. During those
well-publicized debates, Members of Congress consistently
highlighted and lamented the “severe penalties” inficted by
the Black Codes and similar measures, Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess., 474 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull), suggesting that
the prohibition on excessive fnes was understood to be a
basic right of citizenship.
For example, under Mississippi law, adult “freedmen, free
negroes and mulattoes” “without lawful employment” faced
$50 in fnes and 10 days' imprisonment for vagrancy. Reports
of Assistant Commissioners of Freedmen, and Synopsis of
Laws on Persons of Color in Late Slave States, S. Exec. Doc.
No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., 192 (1867). Those convicted had
fve days to pay or they would be arrested and leased to “any
person who will, for the shortest period of service, pay said
fne and forfeiture and all costs.” Ibid. Members of Congress
criticized such laws “for selling [black] men into slavery
in punishment of crimes of the slightest magnitude.” Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1123 (Rep. Cook); see id., at
1124 (“It is idle to say these men will be protected by the
States”).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 146 (2019) 169
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
Similar examples abound. One congressman noted that
Alabama's “aristocratic and anti-republican laws, almost
reenacting slavery, among other harsh infictions impose . . .
a fne of ffty dollars and six months' imprisonment on any
servant or laborer (white or black) who loiters away his time
or is stubborn or refractory.” Id., at 1621 (Rep. Myers).
He also noted that Florida punished vagrants with “a fne not
exceeding $500 and imprison[ment] for a term not exceeding
twelve months, or by being sold for a term not exceeding
twelve months, at the discretion of the court.” Ibid. At
the time, such fnes would have been ruinous for laborers.
Cf. id., at 443 (Sen. Howe) (“A thousand dollars! That sells
a negro for his life”).
These and other examples of excessive fnes from the historical
record informed the Nation's consideration of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Even those opposed to civil-rights
legislation understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause
to guarantee those “fundamental principles” “fxed” by the
Constitution, including “immunity from . . . excessive fnes.”
2 Cong. Rec. 384–385 (1874) (Rep. Mills); see also id., at App.
241 (Sen. Norwood). And every post-1855 state constitution
banned excessive fnes. S. Calabresi & S. Agudo, Individual
Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth
Amendment Was Ratifed in 1868, 87 Texas L. Rev. 7, 82
(2008). The attention given to abusive fnes at the time of
the Fourteenth Amendment, along with the ubiquity of state
excessive-fnes provisions, demonstrates that the public continued
to understand the prohibition on excessive fnes to be
a fundamental right of American citizenship.
* * *
The right against excessive fnes traces its lineage back in
English law nearly a millennium, and from the founding of
our country, it has been consistently recognized as a core
right worthy of constitutional protection. As a constitution170
TIMBS v. INDIANA
Thomas, J., concurring in judgment
ally enumerated right understood to be a privilege of American
citizenship, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive
fnes applies in full to the States.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 171
Syllabus
DAWSON et ux. v. STEAGER, WEST VIRGINIA
STATE TAX COMMISSIONER
certiorari to the supreme court of appeals of west
virginia
No. 17–419. Argued December 3, 2018—Decided February 20, 2019
After petitioner James Dawson retired from the U. S. Marshals Service,
his home State of West Virginia taxed his federal pension benefts as it
does all former federal employees. The pension benefts of certain
former state and local law enforcement employees, however, are exempt
from state taxation. See W. Va. Code Ann. § 11–21–12(c)(6). Mr. Dawson
sued, alleging that the state statute violates the intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine as codifed at 4 U. S. C. § 111. Under that
statute, the United States consents to state taxation of the pay or compensation
of federal employees, but only if the state tax does not
discriminate on the basis of the source of the pay or compensation. A
West Virginia trial court found no signifcant differences between
Mr. Dawson's job duties as a federal marshal and those of the state and
local law enforcement offcers exempted from taxation and held that the
state statute violates § 111's antidiscrimination provision. Reversing,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals emphasized that the state
tax exemption applies only to a narrow class of state retirees and was
never intended to discriminate against former federal marshals.
Held: The West Virginia statute unlawfully discriminates against
Mr. Dawson as § 111 forbids. A State violates § 111 when it treats retired
state employees more favorably than retired federal employees
and no “signifcant differences between the two classes” justify the differential
treatment. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S.
803, 814–816. Here, West Virginia expressly affords state law enforcement
retirees a tax beneft that federal retirees cannot receive, and
there are no “signifcant differences” between Mr. Dawson's former job
responsibilities and those of the tax-exempt state law enforcement
retirees.
The narrow preference should be permitted, the State argues, because
it affects too few people to meaningfully interfere with federal government
operations. Section 111, however, disallows any state tax that
discriminates against a federal offcer or employee—not just those that
seem especially cumbersome. And in Davis, the Court refused a similar
invitation to add unwritten qualifcations to § 111. That is not to say
172 DAWSON v. STEAGER
Syllabus
that the narrowness of a state tax exemption is irrelevant. If a State
exempts only a narrow subset of state retirees, it can comply with § 111
by exempting only the comparable class of federal retirees. The State
also argues that the statute is not intended to harm federal retirees
but to help certain state retirees. The “State's interest in adopting
the discriminatory tax,” however, “is simply irrelevant.” Davis, 489
U. S., at 816.
For reasons other than job responsibilities, the State insists, retired
U. S. Marshals and tax-exempt state law enforcement retirees are not
“similarly situated.” But the State's statute does not draw any such
lines. It singles out for preferential treatment retirement plans associated
with particular state law enforcement offcers. The distinguishing
characteristic of the retirement plans is the nature of the jobs previously
held by retirees who may participate in them. The state trial court
found no “signifcant differences” between Mr. Dawson's former job responsibilities
as a U. S. Marshal and those of the state law enforcement
retirees who qualify for the tax exemption, and the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals did not upset that fnding. By submitting
that Mr. Dawson's former job responsibilities are also similar to those
of other state law enforcement retirees who do not qualify for a tax
exemption, the State mistakes the nature of the inquiry. The relevant
question under § 111 is not whether federal retirees are similarly situated
to state retirees who do not receive a tax break; it is whether they
are similarly situated to those who do. Finally, the State says that the
real distinction may not be based on job duties at all but on the relative
generosity of pension benefts. The statute as enacted, however, does
not classify persons or groups on that basis. And an implicit but lawful
distinction cannot save an express and unlawful one. See, e. g., id., at
817. Pp. 175–180.
Reversed and remanded.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Lawrence D. Rosenberg argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Victoria Dorfman, Mark C.
Savignac, Meghan Sweeney Bean, Anne Marie Lofaso, John
M. Allan, and David E. Cowling.
Michael R. Huston argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Acting Solicitor General Wall, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor
Cite as: 586 U. S. 171 (2019) 173
Opinion of the Court
General Stewart, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Bruce R. Ellisen,
and Nathaniel S. Pollock.
Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General of West Virginia, argued
the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Patrick
Morrisey, Attorney General of West Virginia, Katherine
A. Schultz, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and
Thomas T. Lampman and Sean M. Whelan, Assistant Attorneys
General.*
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
If you spent your career as a state law enforcement offcer
in West Virginia, you're likely to be eligible for a generous
tax exemption when you retire. But if you served in federal
law enforcement, West Virginia will deny you the same beneft.
The question we face is whether a State may discriminate
against federal retirees in that way.
For most of his career, James Dawson worked in the U. S.
Marshals Service. After he retired, he began looking into
the tax treatment of his pension. It turns out that his home
State, West Virginia, doesn't tax the pension benefts of
certain former state law enforcement employees. But it
does tax the benefts of all former federal employees. So
Mr. Dawson brought this lawsuit alleging that West Virginia
violated 4 U. S. C. § 111. In that statute, the United States
has consented to state taxation of the “pay or compensation”
of “offcer[s] or employee[s] of the United States,” but only
if the “taxation does not discriminate against the offcer or
employee because of the source of the pay or compensation.”
§ 111(a).
Section 111 codifes a legal doctrine almost as old as the
Nation. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819),
this Court invoked the Constitution's Supremacy Clause to
invalidate Maryland's effort to levy a tax on the Bank of the
United States. Chief Justice Marshall explained that “the
*Michael A. Vatis fled a brief for NARFE as amicus curiae urging
reversal.
174 DAWSON v. STEAGER
Opinion of the Court
power to tax involves the power to destroy,” and he reasoned
that if States could tax the Bank they could “defeat” the
federal legislative policy establishing it. Id., at 431–432.
For the next few decades, this Court interpreted McCulloch
“to bar most taxation by one sovereign of the employees
of another.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S.
803, 810 (1989). In time, though, the Court softened its
stance and upheld neutral income taxes—those that treated
federal and state employees with an even hand. See Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938); Graves v. New York
ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939). So eventually the intergovernmental
tax immunity doctrine came to be understood
to bar only discriminatory taxes. It was this understanding
that Congress “consciously . . . drew upon” when adopting
§ 111 in 1939. Davis, 489 U. S., at 813.
It is this understanding, too, that has animated our application
of § 111. Since the statute's adoption, we have upheld
an Alabama income tax that did not discriminate on the basis
of the source of the employees' compensation. Jefferson
County v. Acker, 527 U. S. 423 (1999). But we have invalidated
a Michigan tax that discriminated “in favor of retired
state employees and against retired federal employees.”
Davis, 489 U. S., at 814. We have struck down a Kansas
law that taxed the retirement benefts of federal military
personnel at a higher rate than state and local government
retirement benefts. Barker v. Kansas, 503 U. S. 594, 599
(1992). And we have rejected a Texas scheme that imposed
a property tax on a private company operating on land leased
from the federal government, but a “less burdensome” tax
on property leased from the State. Phillips Chemical Co.
v. Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U. S. 376, 378, 380
(1960).
Mr. Dawson's own attempt to invoke § 111 met with mixed
success. A West Virginia trial court found it “undisputed”
that “there are no signifcant differences between Mr. Dawson's
powers and duties as a US Marshal and the powers and
Cite as: 586 U. S. 171 (2019) 175
Opinion of the Court
duties of the state and local law enforcement offcers” that
West Virginia exempts from income tax. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 22a. In the trial court's judgment, the State's statute
thus represented “precisely the type of favoritism” § 111
prohibits. Id., at 23a. But the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals saw it differently. In reversing, the court
emphasized that relatively few state employees receive the
tax break denied Mr. Dawson. The court stressed, too, that
the statute's “intent . . . was to give a beneft to a narrow
class of state retirees,” not to harm federal retirees. Id., at
15a. Because cases in this feld have yielded inconsistent
results, much as this one has, we granted certiorari to afford
additional guidance. 585 U. S. 1015 (2018).
We believe the state trial court had it right. A State
violates § 111 when it treats retired state employees more
favorably than retired federal employees and no “signifcant
differences between the two classes” justify the differential
treatment. Davis, 489 U. S., at 814–816 (internal quotation
marks omitted); Phillips Chemical Co., 361 U. S., at 383.
Here, West Virginia expressly affords state law enforcement
retirees a tax beneft that federal retirees cannot receive.
And before us everyone accepts the trial court's factual
fnding that there aren't any “signifcant differences”
between Mr. Dawson's former job responsibilities and those
of the tax-exempt state law enforcement retirees. Given all
this, we have little diffculty concluding that West Virginia's
law unlawfully “discriminate[s]” against Mr. Dawson “because
of the source of [his] pay or compensation,” just as
§ 111 forbids.
The State offers this ambitious rejoinder. Even if its
statute favors some state law enforcement retirees, the favored
class is very small. Most state retirees are treated
no better than Mr. Dawson. And this narrow preference,
the State suggests, should be permitted because it affects so
few people that it couldn't meaningfully interfere with the
operations of the federal government.
176 DAWSON v. STEAGER
Opinion of the Court
We are unpersuaded. Section 111 disallows any state tax
that discriminates against a federal offcer or employee—not
just those that seem to us especially cumbersome. Nor are
we inclined to accept West Virginia's invitation to adorn
§ 111 with a new and judicially manufactured qualifcation
that cannot be found in its text. In fact, we have already
refused an almost identical request. In Davis, we rejected
Michigan's suggestion that a discriminatory state income tax
should be allowed to stand so long as it treats federal employees
or retirees the same as “the vast majority of voters
in the State.” 489 U. S., at 815, n. 4. We rejected, too, any
suggestion that a discriminatory tax is permissible so long
as it “does not interfere with the Federal Government's ability
to perform its governmental functions.” Id., at 814. In
fact, as long ago as McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall
warned against enmeshing courts in the “perplexing” business,
“so unft for the judicial department,” of attempting to
delineate “what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and
what degree may amount to the abuse of the power.” 4
Wheat., at 430.
That's not to say the breadth or narrowness of a state tax
exemption is irrelevant. Under § 111, the scope of a State's
tax exemption may affect the scope of its resulting duties.
So if a State exempts from taxation all state employees, it
must likewise exempt all federal employees. Conversely, if
the State decides to exempt only a narrow subset of state
retirees, the State can comply with § 111 by exempting only
the comparable class of federal retirees. But the narrowness
of a discriminatory state tax law has never been enough
to render it necessarily lawful.
With its primary argument lost, the State now proceeds
more modestly. Echoing the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, the State argues that we should uphold its statute
because it isn't intended to harm federal retirees, only to
help certain state retirees. But under the terms of § 111,
the “State's interest in adopting the discriminatory tax, no
Cite as: 586 U. S. 171 (2019) 177
Opinion of the Court
matter how substantial, is simply irrelevant.” Davis, 489
U. S., at 816. We can safely assume that discriminatory laws
like West Virginia's are almost always enacted with the
purpose of benefting state employees rather than harming
their federal counterparts. Yet that wasn't enough to save
the state statutes in Davis, Barker, or Phillips, and it can't
be enough here. Under § 111 what matters isn't the intent
lurking behind the law but whether the letter of the law
“treat[s] those who deal with” the federal government “as
well as it treats those with whom [the State] deals itself.”
Phillips Chemical Co., 361 U. S., at 385.
If treatment rather than intent is what matters, the State
suggests that it should still prevail for other reasons. Section
111 prohibits “discriminat[ion],” something we've often
described as treating similarly situated persons differently.
See Davis, 489 U. S., at 815–816; Phillips Chemical Co., 361
U. S., at 383. And before us West Virginia insists that even
if retired U. S. Marshals and tax-exempt state law enforcement
retirees had similar job responsibilities, they aren't
“similarly situated” for other reasons. Put another way, the
State contends that the difference in treatment its law commands
doesn't qualify as unlawful discrimination because it
is “directly related to, and justifed by,” a lawful and “signifcant
differenc[e]” between the two classes. Davis, 489 U. S.,
at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In approaching this argument, everyone before us agrees
on at least one thing. Whether a State treats similarly situated
state and federal employees differently depends on how
the State has defned the favored class. See id., at 817. So
if the State defnes the favored class by reference to job responsibilities,
a similarly situated federal worker will be one
who performs comparable duties. But if the State defnes
the class by reference to some other criteria, our attention
should naturally turn there. If a State gives a tax beneft
to all retirees over a certain age, for example, the comparable
federal retiree would be someone who is also over that age.
178 DAWSON v. STEAGER
Opinion of the Court
So how has West Virginia chosen to defne the favored
class in this case? The state statute singles out for preferential
treatment retirement plans associated with West
Virginia police, frefghters, and deputy sheriffs. See W. Va.
Code Ann. § 11–21–12(c)(6) (Lexis 2017). The distinguishing
characteristic of these plans is the nature of the jobs previously
held by retirees who may participate in them; thus,
a similarly situated federal retiree is someone who had similar
job responsibilities to a state police offcer, frefghter, or
deputy sheriff. The state trial court correctly focused on
this point of comparison and found no “signifcant differences”
between Mr. Dawson's former job responsibilities
as a U. S. Marshal and those of the state law enforcement
retirees who qualify for the tax exemption. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 22a. Nor did the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals upset this factual fnding. So looking to how the
State has chosen to defne its favored class only seems to
confrm that it has treated similarly situated persons differently
because of the source of their compensation.
Of course, West Virginia sees it otherwise. It accepts (for
now) that its statute distinguishes between persons based on
their former job duties. It accepts, too, the trial court's
fnding that Mr. Dawson's former job responsibilities are
materially identical to those of state retirees who qualify for
its tax exemption. But, the State submits, Mr. Dawson's
former job responsibilities are also similar to those of other
state law enforcement retirees who don't qualify for its tax
exemption. And, the State insists, the fact that it treats
federal retirees no worse than (some) similarly situated state
employees should be enough to save its statute.
But this again mistakes the nature of our inquiry. Under
§ 111, the relevant question isn't whether federal retirees are
similarly situated to state retirees who don't receive a tax
beneft; the relevant question is whether they are similarly
situated to those who do. So, for example, in Phillips we
compared the class of federal lessees with the favored class
Cite as: 586 U. S. 171 (2019) 179
Opinion of the Court
of state lessees, even though the State urged us to focus instead
on the disfavored class of private lessees. 361 U. S.,
at 381–382. In Davis, we likewise rejected the State's effort
to compare the class of federal retirees with state residents
who did not beneft from the tax exemption rather than
those who did. See 489 U. S., at 815, n. 4.
At this point the State is left to play its fnal card. Now,
it says, maybe the real distinction its statute draws isn't
based on former job duties at all. Maybe its statute actually
favors certain state law enforcement retirees only because
their pensions are less generous than those of their federal
law enforcement counterparts. At the least, the State suggests,
we should remand the case to the West Virginia courts
to explore this possibility.
The problem here is fundamental. While the State was
free to draw whatever classifcations it wished, the statute
it enacted does not classify persons or groups based on the
relative generosity of their pension benefts. Instead, it extends
a special tax beneft to retirees who served as West
Virginia police offcers, frefghters, or deputy sheriffs—and
it categorically denies that same beneft to retirees who
served in similar federal law enforcement positions. Even
if Mr. Dawson's pension turned out to be identical to a state
law enforcement offcer's pension, the law as written would
deny him a tax exemption. West Virginia's law thus discriminates
“because of the source of . . . pay or compensation”
in violation of § 111. Whether the unlawful classifcation
found in the text of a statute might serve as some sort
of proxy for a lawful classifcation hidden behind it is neither
here nor there. No more than a benefcent legislative intent,
an implicit but lawful distinction cannot save an express
and unlawful one.
Our precedent confrms this too. In Davis, Michigan
argued that a state law expressly discriminating between
federal and state retirees was really just distinguishing between
those with more and less generous pensions. Id., at
180 DAWSON v. STEAGER
Opinion of the Court
816. We rejected this attempt to rerationalize the statute,
explaining that “[a] tax exemption truly intended to account
for differences in retirement benefts would not discriminate
on the basis of the source of those benefts” but “would discriminate
on the basis of the amount of benefts received by
individual retirees.” Id., at 817. The fact is, when States
seek to tax the use of a fellow sovereign's property, the Constitution
and Congress have always carefully constrained
their authority. Id., at 810–814. And in this sensitive feld
it is not too much to ask that, if a State wants to draw a
distinction based on the generosity of pension benefts, it
enact a law that actually does that.
Because West Virginia's statute unlawfully discriminates
against Mr. Dawson, we reverse the judgment of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and remand the case for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including
the determination of an appropriate remedy.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 181
Syllabus
YOVINO, FRESNO COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS v. RIZO
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 18–272. Decided February 25, 2019
Aileen Rizo brought suit against the Fresno County superintendent of
schools claiming, among other things, that the county was violating the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 56–57, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d). After the
District Court denied the county's motion for summary judgment, the
Ninth Circuit granted the county's petition for interlocutory review. A
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision of the District
Court based on a prior Ninth Circuit decision, Kouba v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 691 F. 2d 873, and the court granted en banc review. Subsequently,
on March 29, 2018, a Ninth Circuit judge, the Honorable Stephen
Reinhardt, died. On April 9, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued its en
banc opinion in this case, and included the following footnote: “Prior to
his death, Judge Reinhardt fully participated in this case and authored
this opinion. The majority opinion and all concurrences were fnal, and
voting was completed by the en banc court prior to his death.” 887
F. 3d 453, 456, n. *.
Held: Because Judge Reinhardt was no longer a judge when the en banc
decision in this case was fled, the Ninth Circuit erred in counting him
as a member of the majority. The Ninth Circuit's statement that the
votes and opinions in the en banc case were inalterably fnal at least 12
days prior to the date on which the decision was “fled” and released to
the public is inconsistent with well-established judicial practice, federal
statutory law, and judicial precedent. As for judicial practice, the
Court is not aware of any rule or decision of the Ninth Circuit that
renders judges' votes and opinions immutable prior to their public release.
And it is generally understood that a judge may change his or
her position up to the very moment when a decision is released. The
Court endorsed this rule in United States v. American-Foreign S. S.
Corp., 363 U. S. 685, which interpreted an earlier version of 28 U. S. C.
§ 46(c), the statutory provision authorizing the courts of appeals to hear
cases en banc. The current version of this provision permits a circuit
to adopt a rule allowing a senior circuit judge to sit on an en banc case
under certain circumstances, but at the time of the Court's decision in
American-Foreign S. S. Corp., only active judges could sit en banc.
See 28 U. S. C. § 46(c) (1958 ed.). In American-Foreign S. S. Corp.,
182 YOVINO v. RIZO
Per Curiam
Judge Harold Medina was one of the fve active judges on the Second
Circuit when the court granted a petition for rehearing en banc. After
briefng was complete but before an opinion issued, Judge Medina took
senior status. When the en banc court issued its decision, the majority
opinion was joined by Judge Medina and two active Circuit Judges; the
two other active Circuit Judges dissented. This Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case, holding that “[a]n `active' judge is a
judge who has not retired `from regular active service,' ” and “[a] case
or controversy is `determined' when it is decided.” 363 U. S., at 688.
Similarly here, when the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in this case,
Judge Reinhardt was neither an active judge nor a senior judge. For
that reason, by statute he was without power to participate in the en
banc court's decision at the time it was rendered. The Ninth Circuit's
error is also shown by the innumerable courts of appeals that have invoked
§ 46(c) and § 46(d) to hold that when one of the judges on a threejudge
panel dies, retires, or resigns after an appeal is argued or is submitted
for decision without argument, the other two judges on the panel
may issue a decision if they agree. The Court is not aware of any case
still on the books in which a court of appeals panel has purported to
issue a binding decision that was joined at the time of release by less
than a quorum of the judges who were alive at that time. By counting
Judge Reinhardt as a member of the majority here, the Ninth Circuit
effectively allowed a judge to exercise the judicial power of the United
States after his death. But federal judges are appointed for life, not
for eternity.
Certiorari granted; 887 F. 3d 453, vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
The petition in this case presents the following question:
May a federal court count the vote of a judge who dies before
the decision is issued?
A judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt, died on
March 29, 2018, but the Ninth Circuit counted his vote in
cases decided after that date.* In the present case, Judge
*In Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 2018 WL 3542989 (CA9, July 24,
2018), decided four months after Judge Reinhardt died, his vote was
initially counted as one of the two judges in the majority. A footnote in
the opinion stated: “Judge Reinhardt fully participated in this case and
formally concurred in the majority opinion prior to his death.” Id., at
Cite as: 586 U. S. 181 (2019) 183
Per Curiam
Reinhardt was listed as the author of an en banc decision
issued on April 9, 2018, 11 days after he passed away. By
counting Judge Reinhardt's vote, the court deemed Judge
Reinhardt's opinion to be a majority opinion, which means
that it constitutes a precedent that all future Ninth Circuit
panels must follow. See United States v. Caperna, 251 F. 3d
827, 831, n. 2 (2001). Without Judge Reinhardt's vote, the
opinion attributed to him would have been approved by only
5 of the 10 members of the en banc panel who were still
living when the decision was fled. Although the other fve
living judges concurred in the judgment, they did so for different
reasons. The upshot is that Judge Reinhardt's vote
made a difference. Was that lawful?
I
Aileen Rizo, an employee of the Fresno County Offce of
Education, brought suit against the superintendent of
schools, claiming, among other things, that the county was
violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 56–57, 29
U. S. C. § 206(d). The District Court denied the county's motion
for summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit granted
the county's petition for interlocutory review. A threejudge
panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision of the
District Court based on a prior Ninth Circuit decision,
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F. 2d 873 (1982), that the panel
“believed it was compelled to follow.” 887 F. 3d 453, 459
(2018) (en banc). The court then granted en banc review “to
clarify the law, including the vitality and effect of Kouba.”
Ibid. Like other courts of appeals, the Ninth Circuit takes
the position that a panel decision like that in Kouba can be
overruled only by a decision of the en banc court or this
Court, see Naruto v. Slater, 888 F. 3d 418, 421 (2018), and
therefore a clear purpose of the en banc decision issued on
*1, n. **. Later, however, the court vacated the opinion and issued an
order reconstituting the panel. Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 898 F. 3d
1266 (CA9 2018). No similar action was taken in this case.
184 YOVINO v. RIZO
Per Curiam
April 9 was to announce a new binding Ninth Circuit interpretation
of the Equal Pay Act issue previously addressed
by Kouba. The opinion authored by Judge Reinhardt and
issued 11 days after his death purports to do that, but its
status as a majority opinion of the en banc court depends on
counting Judge Reinhardt's vote.
The opinions issued by the en banc Ninth Circuit state
that they were “Filed April 9, 2018,” and they were entered
on the court's docket on that date. A footnote at the beginning
of the en banc opinion states:
“Prior to his death, Judge Reinhardt fully participated
in this case and authored this opinion. The majority
opinion and all concurrences were fnal, and voting was
completed by the en banc court prior to his death.” 887
F. 3d, at 456, n. *.
II
The Ninth Circuit did not expressly explain why it concluded
that it could count Judge Reinhardt's opinion as “[t]he
majority opinion” even though it was not endorsed by a majority
of the living judges at the time of issuance, but the
justifcation suggested by the footnote noted above is that
the votes and opinions in the en banc case were inalterably
fxed at least 12 days prior to the date on which the decision
was “fled,” entered on the docket, and released to the public.
This justifcation is inconsistent with well-established judicial
practice, federal statutory law, and judicial precedent.
As for judicial practice, we are not aware of any rule or
decision of the Ninth Circuit that renders judges' votes and
opinions immutable at some point in time prior to their public
release. And it is generally understood that a judge may
change his or her position up to the very moment when a
decision is released.
We endorsed this rule in United States v. American-
Foreign S. S. Corp., 363 U. S. 685 (1960), which interpreted
an earlier version of 28 U. S. C. § 46(c), the statutory proviCite
as: 586 U. S. 181 (2019) 185
Per Curiam
sion authorizing the courts of appeals to hear cases en banc.
The current version of this provision permits a circuit to
adopt a rule allowing a senior circuit judge to sit on an en
banc case under certain circumstances, but at the time of
our decision in American-Foreign S. S. Corp., this was not
allowed. Instead, only active judges could sit en banc. See
28 U. S. C. § 46(c) (1958 ed.).
In American-Foreign S. S. Corp., Judge Harold Medina
was one of the fve active judges on the Second Circuit when
the court granted a petition for rehearing en banc. After
briefng was complete but before an opinion issued, Judge
Medina took senior status. When the en banc court issued
its decision, the majority opinion was joined by Judge Medina
and two active Circuit Judges; the two other active Circuit
Judges dissented. We vacated the judgment and remanded
the case, holding that “[a]n `active' judge is a judge
who has not retired `from regular active service,' ” and “[a]
case or controversy is `determined' when it is decided.” 363
U. S., at 688. Because Judge Medina was not in regular active
service when the opinion issued, he was “without power
to participate” in the en banc decision. Id., at 687, 691; cf.
id., at 691–692 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Our holding in American-Foreign S. S. Corp. applies with
equal if not greater force here. When the Ninth Circuit issued
its opinion in this case, Judge Reinhardt was neither an
active judge nor a senior judge. For that reason, by statute
he was without power to participate in the en banc court's
decision at the time it was rendered.
In addition to § 46(c), § 46(d) also shows that what the
Ninth Circuit did here was unlawful. That provision states:
“A majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute
a court or panel thereof, as provided in paragraph
(c), shall constitute a quorum.”
Under § 46(c), a court of appeals case may be decided by
a panel of three judges, and therefore on such a panel
186 YOVINO v. RIZO
Per Curiam
two judges constitute a quorum and are able to decide an
appeal—provided, of course, that they agree. Invoking this
rule, innumerable court of appeals decisions hold that when
one of the judges on a three-judge panel dies, retires, or resigns
after an appeal is argued or is submitted for decision
without argument, the other two judges on the panel may
issue a decision if they agree. See, e. g., United States v.
Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F. 2d 925, 927 (CA2 1957);
Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 35 F. 3d 45, 47 (CA2
1994); Singh v. Ashcroft, 121 Fed. Appx. 471, 472, n. (CA3
2005); ASW Allstate Painting & Constr. Co. v. Lexington
Ins. Co., 188 F. 3d 307, 309, n. (CA5 1999); Clark v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 67 F. 3d 299, n. ** (CA6 1995); Kulumani
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Assn, 224 F. 3d 681, 683, n. **
(CA7 2000). See also Nguyen v. United States, 539 U. S. 69,
82 (2003) (“[S]ettled law permits a quorum to proceed to
judgment when one member of the panel dies or is disqualifed”).
With the exception of one recent decision issued
by the Ninth Circuit after Judge Reinhardt's death but
subsequently withdrawn, see supra, at 182–183, n., we are
aware of no cases in which a court of appeals panel has purported
to issue a binding decision that was joined at the time
of release by less than a quorum of the judges who were
alive at that time.
* * *
Because Judge Reinhardt was no longer a judge at the
time when the en banc decision in this case was fled, the
Ninth Circuit erred in counting him as a member of the majority.
That practice effectively allowed a deceased judge to
exercise the judicial power of the United States after his
death. But federal judges are appointed for life, not for
eternity.
We therefore grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 181 (2019) 187
Per Curiam
Ninth Circuit, and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor concurs in the judgment.
188 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 17–1094. Argued November 27, 2018—Decided February 26, 2019
Respondent Troy Lambert fled a class action in federal court alleging
that petitioner Nutraceutical Corporation's marketing of a dietary supplement
ran afoul of California consumer-protection law. On February
20, 2015, the District Court ordered the class decertifed. Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f ), Lambert had 14 days from that
point to ask the Court of Appeals for permission to appeal the order.
Instead, he fled a motion for reconsideration on March 12, which the
District Court denied on June 24. Fourteen days later, Lambert petitioned
the Court of Appeals for permission to appeal the decertifcation
order. Nutraceutical objected that Lambert's petition was untimely because
it was fled far more than 14 days from the February 20 decertifcation
order. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that Rule 23(f )'s deadline
should be tolled under the circumstances because Lambert had
“acted diligently.” On the merits, the court reversed the decertifcation
order.
Held: Rule 23(f ) is not subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 191–198.
(a) Rule 23(f ) is properly classifed as a nonjurisdictional claimprocessing
rule, but that does not render it malleable in every respect.
Whether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on its jurisdictional
character but rather on whether its text leaves room for such fexibility.
See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 421. Here, the governing
rules speak directly to the issue of Rule 23(f )'s fexibility and make clear
that its deadline is not subject to equitable tolling. While Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 2 authorizes a court of appeals for good cause to
“suspend any provision . . . in a particular case,” it does so with a caveat:
“except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).” Rule 26(b), which generally
authorizes extensions of time, in turn includes the carveout that a
court of appeals “may not extend the time to fle . . . a petition for
permission to appeal”—the precise type of fling at issue here. The
Rules thus express a clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of
Rule 23(f )'s deadline, even where good cause for equitable tolling might
otherwise exist. Precedent confrms this understanding. See Carlisle,
517 U. S. 416, and United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220.
Pp. 191–194.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 188 (2019) 189
Opinion of the Court
(b) Lambert's counterarguments do not withstand scrutiny. Lambert
argues that Rule 26(b)'s prohibition on extending the time to fle a
petition for permission to appeal should be understood to foreclose only
formal extensions granted ex ante and to leave courts free to excuse late
flings on equitable grounds after the fact. But this Court has already
rejected an indistinguishable argument concerning Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 45(b) in Robinson, and Lambert offers no sound
basis for reading Rule 26(b) differently. Further, the 1998 Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 23(f ) speak to a court of appeals' discretion to
decide whether a particular certifcation decision warrants review in an
interlocutory posture, not to its determination whether a petition is
timely. Finally, Lambert notes that every Court of Appeals to have
considered the question would accept a Rule 23(f ) petition fled within
14 days of the resolution of a motion for reconsideration that was itself
fled within 14 days of the original order. Although his own reconsideration
motion was not fled until after the initial 14 days had run, he cites
the lower courts' handling of such cases as evidence that Rule 23(f ) is
amenable to tolling. However, a timely motion for reconsideration affects
the antecedent issue of when the 14-day limit begins to run, not
the availability of tolling. See United States v. Ibarra, 502 U. S. 1, 4,
n. 2. Pp. 194–197.
(c) On remand, the Court of Appeals can address other preserved
arguments about whether Lambert's Rule 23(f ) petition was timely even
without resort to tolling. Pp. 197–198.
870 F. 3d 1170, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John C. Hueston argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Steven N. Feldman and Joseph A.
Reiter.
Jonathan A. Herstoff argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Ronald A. Marron and Michael
Houchin.
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
To take an immediate appeal from a federal district court's
order granting or denying class certifcation, a party must
frst seek permission from the relevant court of appeals
190 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT
Opinion of the Court
“within 14 days after the order is entered.” Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23(f). This case poses the question whether a court of
appeals may forgive on equitable tolling grounds a failure to
adhere to that deadline when the opposing party objects that
the appeal was untimely. The applicable rules of procedure
make clear that the answer is no.
I
In March 2013, respondent Troy Lambert sued petitioner
Nutraceutical Corporation in federal court, alleging that its
marketing of a dietary supplement ran afoul of California
consumer-protection law. The District Court for the Central
District of California initially permitted Lambert to litigate
on behalf of a class of similarly situated consumers. On
February 20, 2015, however, the District Court revisited
that decision and ordered the class decertifed. From that
point, Lambert had 14 days to ask the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit for permission to appeal the order.
See ibid.
Instead of fling a petition for permission to appeal, Lambert
informed the District Court at a status conference on
March 2 (10 days after the decertifcation order) that he
would “want to fle a motion for reconsideration” in the near
future. App. to Pet. for Cert. 74. The court told Lambert
to fle any such motion “no later than” March 12. Id., at
76. Neither Lambert nor the District Court mentioned the
possibility of an appeal.
Lambert fled his motion for reconsideration, in compliance
with the District Court's schedule, on March 12 (20 days
after the decertifcation order). The District Court denied
the motion on June 24, 2015. Fourteen days later, on July 8,
Lambert petitioned the Court of Appeals for permission to appeal
the decertifcation order. Nutraceutical's response argued
that Lambert's petition was untimely because more than
four months had elapsed since the District Court's February
Cite as: 586 U. S. 188 (2019) 191
Opinion of the Court
20 order decertifying the class, far more than the 14 days
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) allows. App. 41.
Notwithstanding the petition's apparent untimeliness, the
Court of Appeals “deem[ed] Lambert's petition timely” because,
in its view, the Rule 23(f) deadline should be “tolled”
under the circumstances. 870 F. 3d 1170, 1176 (CA9 2017).
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Rule 23(f)'s time limit
is “non-jurisdictional, and that equitable remedies softening
the deadline are therefore generally available.” Ibid. Tolling
was warranted, the court concluded, because Lambert
“informed the [District Court] orally of his intention to seek
reconsideration” within Rule 23(f)'s 14-day window, complied
with the District Court's March 12 deadline, and “otherwise
acted diligently.” Id., at 1179. On the merits, the Court of
Appeals held that the District Court abused its discretion in
decertifying the class. Id., at 1182–1184. It reversed the
decertifcation order. Id., at 1184.
In accepting Lambert's petition, the Court of Appeals
“recognize[d] that other circuits would likely not toll the
Rule 23(f) deadline in Lambert's case.” 1 Id., at 1179. We
granted certiorari. 585 U. S. 1015 (2018).
II
When Lambert fled his petition, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f) authorized courts of appeals to “permit an
appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certifcation
. . . if a petition for permission to appeal is fled . . .
within 14 days after the order is entered.” 2 The Court of
1 See Nucor Corp. v. Brown, 760 F. 3d 341, 343 (CA4 2014); Fleischman
v. Albany Med. Ctr., 639 F. 3d 28, 31 (CA2 2011); Gutierrez v. Johnson &
Johnson, 523 F. 3d 187, 193, and n. 5 (CA3 2008); McNamara v. Felderhof,
410 F. 3d 277, 281 (CA5 2005); Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F. 3d 891, 892 (CA7
1999).
2 Rule 23(f ) has since been amended and now reads, in relevant part: “A
court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying
class-action certifcation . . . . A party must fle a petition for permission
192 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT
Opinion of the Court
Appeals held that Rule 23(f)'s time limitation is nonjurisdictional
and thus, necessarily, subject to equitable tolling.
While we agree that Rule 23(f) is nonjurisdictional, we conclude
that it is not subject to equitable tolling.
Because Rule 23(f)'s time limitation is found in a procedural
rule, not a statute, it is properly classifed as a
nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. See Hamer v.
Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, 25
(2017).3 It therefore can be waived or forfeited by an opposing
party. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 456 (2004).
The mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdictional force,
however, does not render it malleable in every respect.
Though subject to waiver and forfeiture, some claimprocessing
rules are “mandatory”—that is, they are “ `unalterable'
” if properly raised by an opposing party. Manrique
v. United States, 581 U. S. 116, 121 (2017) (quoting Eberhart
v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 15 (2005) (per curiam)); see
also Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 456. Rules in this mandatory
camp are not susceptible of the equitable approach that the
Court of Appeals applied here. Cf. Manrique, 581 U. S., at
125 (“By defnition, mandatory claim-processing rules . . . are
not subject to harmless-error analysis”).
Whether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on its
jurisdictional character but rather on whether the text of the
rule leaves room for such fexibility. See Carlisle v. United
States, 517 U. S. 416, 421 (1996). Where the pertinent rule
or rules invoked show a clear intent to preclude tolling,
to appeal . . . within 14 days after the order is entered . . . .” The difference
is immaterial for purposes of this case.
3 To be sure, this Court has previously suggested that time limits for
taking an appeal are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Budinich v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 486 U. S. 196, 203 (1988). As our more recent precedents
have made clear, however, this Court once used that phrase in a
“ `less than meticulous' ” manner. Hamer, 583 U. S., at 27; Kontrick v.
Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004). Those earlier statements did not necessarily
signify that the rules at issue were formally “jurisdictional” as we
use that term today.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 188 (2019) 193
Opinion of the Court
courts are without authority to make exceptions merely because
a litigant appears to have been diligent, reasonably
mistaken, or otherwise deserving. Ibid.; see Kontrick, 540
U. S., at 458; United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229
(1960). Courts may not disregard a properly raised procedural
rule's plain import any more than they may a statute's.
See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U. S. 250,
255 (1988).
Here, the governing rules speak directly to the issue of
Rule 23(f)'s fexibility and make clear that its deadline is not
subject to equitable tolling. To begin with, Rule 23(f) itself
conditions the possibility of an appeal on the fling of a petition
“within 14 days” of “an order granting or denying classaction
certifcation.” Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
5(a)(2) likewise says that a petition for permission to appeal
“must be fled within the time specifed.” To be sure, the
simple fact that a deadline is phrased in an unqualifed manner
does not necessarily establish that tolling is unavailable.
See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 2 (allowing suspension of other
Rules for “good cause”); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 26(b) (similar);
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45(b) (similar); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
6(b) (similar). Here, however, the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure single out Civil Rule 23(f) for infexible treatment.
While Appellate Rule 2 authorizes a court of appeals
for good cause to “suspend any provision of these rules in a
particular case,” it does so with a conspicuous caveat: “except
as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).” Appellate Rule
26(b), which generally authorizes extensions of time, in turn
includes this express carveout: A court of appeals “may not
extend the time to fle . . . a petition for permission to appeal.”
Fed. Rule App. Proc. 26(b)(1). In other words, Appellate
Rule 26(b) says that the deadline for the precise type
of fling at issue here may not be extended. The Rules thus
express a clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of
Rule 23(f)'s deadline, even where good cause for equitable
tolling might otherwise exist.
194 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT
Opinion of the Court
Precedent confirms this understanding. Carlisle, 517
U. S. 416, and Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, both centered on Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b), an extension-of-time
provision that parallels Appellate Rule 26(b). Carlisle addressed
Rule 45(b)'s interaction with the time limit in Criminal
Rule 29 for fling a postverdict motion for judgment of
acquittal. See 517 U. S., at 419–423. Rule 45(b), as it was
then written, made clear that “ `the court may not extend
the time for taking any action' ” under Rule 29, “ `except to
the extent and under the conditions' ” stated therein. Id.,
at 421. Because the Court found the text's purpose to foreclose
acceptance of untimely motions “plain and unambiguous,”
the Court held that the District Court lacked that
authority. Ibid. Likewise, in Robinson, the Court held
that an earlier iteration of Rule 45(b) that said “ `the court
may not enlarge . . . the period for taking an appeal' ” prohibited
a court from accepting a notice of appeal that was untimely
fled. 361 U. S., at 224 (quoting Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 45(b)).
Because Rule 23(f) is not amenable to equitable tolling, the
Court of Appeals erred in accepting Lambert's petition on
those grounds.
III
Lambert resists the foregoing conclusion on a variety of
grounds. None withstands scrutiny.
Most pertinently, Lambert argues that the abovementioned
Rules are less emphatic than they frst appear.
Rule 26(b)'s general grant of authority to relax time limits,
he notes, refers both to “extend[ing]” the time to fle a petition
for permission to appeal and “permit[ting]” a petition to
be fled after the deadline. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 26(b)
(“For good cause, the court may extend the time prescribed
by these rules . . . to perform any act, or may permit an
act to be done after that time expires” (emphasis added)).
Rule 26(b)(1) then prohibits courts only from “extend[ing]
the time to fle,” while making no further mention of “perCite
as: 586 U. S. 188 (2019) 195
Opinion of the Court
mit[ting] an act to be done after that time expires.” In
Lambert's view, Rule 26(b)(1)'s prohibition on “extend[ing]
the time to fle” a petition for permission to appeal therefore
should be understood to foreclose only formal extensions
granted ex ante, and to leave courts free to excuse late flings
on equitable grounds after the fact.
Whatever we would make of this contention were we writing
on a blank slate, this Court has already rejected an
indistinguishable argument in Robinson. There, Rule 45(b)
generally authorized both “ `enlarg[ing]' ” a fling period and
“ `permit[ting] the act to be done after [its] expiration,' ” then
specifcally forbade “ `enlarg[ing] . . . the period for taking an
appeal.' ” 361 U. S., at 223. The lower court had accepted
a late fling on the ground that to do so “would not be to
`enlarge' the period for taking an appeal, but rather would
be only to `permit the act to be done' after the expiration of
the specifed period.” Ibid.; see also id., at 230 (Black and
Douglas, JJ., dissenting). This Court reversed, explaining
that acceptance of the late fling did, in fact, “enlarge” the
relevant fling period. Id., at 224. Lambert offers no sound
basis for reading Rule 26(b) differently, and none is apparent.
Cf. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988)
(“Permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over unnamed
parties after the time for fling a notice of appeal has passed
is equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for
fling a notice of appeal”).4
Likewise unavailing is Lambert's reliance on the 1998
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(f), which say that a
petition “may be granted or denied on the basis of any con-
4 Lambert's other textual arguments center on rules addressed to appeals
as of right. See Brief for Respondent 9–12, 17–18, 36–38 (discussing,
e. g., Fed. Rules App. Proc. 3 and 4). As noted above, Rules 5 and 26
specifcally address petitions for permission to appeal from nonfnal orders
such as the one at issue here. Lambert's attempts to reason by implication
from other, inapposite Rules therefore bear little weight. See
Manrique v. United States, 581 U. S. 116, 123–124 (2017).
196 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT
Opinion of the Court
sideration that the court of appeals fnds persuasive.” Advisory
Committee's Notes on 1998 Amendments to Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 815; see also Microsoft Corp.
v. Baker, 582 U. S. 23, 31–33, and n. 6 (2017). That comment,
however, speaks to a court of appeals' discretion to decide
whether a particular certifcation decision warrants review
in an interlocutory posture, not its determination whether
a petition is timely. If anything, the comment serves as a
reminder that interlocutory appeal is an exception to the
general rule that appellate review must await fnal judgment—
which is fully consistent with a conclusion that Rule
23(f)'s time limit is purposefully unforgiving. See Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 107 (2009) (“The
justifcation for immediate appeal must . . . be suffciently
strong to overcome the usual benefts of deferring appeal
until litigation concludes”); cf. Baker, 582 U. S., at 31 (describing
Rule 23(f) as “the product of careful calibration”).5
Finally, Lambert notes that every Court of Appeals to
have considered the question would accept a Rule 23(f) petition
fled within 14 days of the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration that was itself fled within 14 days of the
original order. See 870 F. 3d, at 1177–1178, n. 3 (collecting
cases). Although Lambert's own reconsideration motion
was not fled until after the initial 14 days had run,6 he cites
the lower courts' handling of such cases as evidence that
Rule 23(f) is indeed amenable to tolling. He further sug-
5 Lambert also argues that interpreting Rule 23(f ) fexibly would be consistent
with the Rules' generally equitable approach. Brief for Respondent
21—27. But that simply fails to engage with the dispositive point
here: Any such background preference for fexibility has been overcome
by the clear text of the relevant rules. See, e. g., Young v. United States,
535 U. S. 43, 49 (2002).
6 Lambert argues that his counsel's statements 10 days after the District
Court's decertifcation order constituted an oral motion for reconsideration,
but the transcript belies any such claim. See App. to Pet. for Cert.
71 (requesting only “leave to fle”); id., at 74 (informing the District Court
that Lambert “will want to fle” a reconsideration motion).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 188 (2019) 197
Opinion of the Court
gests that there is no basis for relaxing the 14-day limit in
one situation but not the other.
Lambert's argument relies on a mistaken premise. A
timely motion for reconsideration fled within a window to
appeal does not toll anything; it “renders an otherwise fnal
decision of a district court not fnal” for purposes of appeal.
United States v. Ibarra, 502 U. S. 1, 6 (1991) (per curiam).
In other words, it affects the antecedent issue of when the
14-day limit begins to run, not the availability of tolling.
See id., at 4, n. 2 (noting that this practice is not “a matter
of tolling”).7
IV
Lambert devotes much of his merits brief to arguing the
distinct question whether his Rule 23(f) petition was timely
even without resort to tolling. First, he argues that, even
if his motion for reconsideration was not fled within 14 days
of the decertifcation order, it was fled within the time
allowed (either by the Federal Rules or by the District Court
at the March 2 hearing). The timeliness of that motion,
Lambert contends, “cause[d] the time to appeal to run from
the disposition of the reconsideration motion, not from the
original order.” Brief for Respondent 8; see id., at 9–18.
Alternatively, he argues that the District Court's order denying
reconsideration was itself “ `an order granting or denying
class-action certifcation' ” under Rule 23(f). Id., at 8–9,
7 We therefore have no occasion to address the effect of a motion for
reconsideration fled within the 14-day window. Moreover, because nothing
the District Court did misled Lambert about the appeal fling deadline,
see supra, at 190, we similarly have no occasion to address the question
whether his motion would be timely if that had occurred. See Carlisle v.
United States, 517 U. S. 416, 428 (1996); id., at 435–436 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (discussing Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384, 386–387 (1964)
(per curiam), and Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc.,
371 U. S. 215, 216–217 (1962) (per curiam)). We also have no occasion to
address whether an insurmountable impediment to fling timely might
compel a different result. Cf. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 26(a)(3) (addressing
computation of time when “the clerk's offce is inaccessible”).
198 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT
Opinion of the Court
19–20. The Court of Appeals did not rule on these alternative
grounds, which are beyond the scope of the question
presented. Mindful of our role, we will not offer the frst
word. See United States v. Stitt, 586 U. S. 27, 36 (2018);
Pacifc Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications,
Inc., 555 U. S. 438, 457 (2009). If the Court of Appeals concludes
that these arguments have been preserved, it can address
them in the frst instance on remand.
* * *
The relevant Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure
clearly foreclose the fexible tolling approach on which the
Court of Appeals relied to deem Lambert's petition timely.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 199
Syllabus
JAM et al. v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 17–1011. Argued October 31, 2018—Decided February 27, 2019
In 1945, Congress passed the International Organizations Immunities Act
(IOIA), which, among other things, grants international organizations
the “same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments.”
22 U. S. C. § 288a(b). At that time, foreign governments were
entitled to virtually absolute immunity as a matter of international
grace and comity. In 1952, the State Department adopted a more restrictive
theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which Congress subsequently
codifed in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28
U. S. C. § 1602. The FSIA gives foreign sovereign governments presumptive
immunity from suit, § 1604, subject to several statutory exceptions,
including, as relevant here, an exception for actions based on
commercial activity with a suffcient nexus with the United States,
§ 1605(a)(2).
Respondent International Finance Corporation (IFC), an IOIA international
organization, entered into a loan agreement with Coastal Gujarat
Power Limited, a company based in India, to fnance the construction
of a coal-fred power plant in Gujarat. Petitioners sued the IFC,
claiming that pollution from the plant harmed the surrounding air, land,
and water. The District Court, however, held that the IFC was immune
from suit because it enjoyed the virtually absolute immunity that
foreign governments enjoyed when the IOIA was enacted. The D. C.
Circuit affrmed in light of its decision in Atkinson v. Inter-American
Development Bank, 156 F. 3d 1335.
Held: The IOIA affords international organizations the same immunity
from suit that foreign governments enjoy today under the FSIA.
Pp. 207–215.
(a) The IOIA “same as” formulation is best understood as making
international organization immunity and foreign sovereign immunity
continuously equivalent. The IOIA is thus like other statutes that use
similar or identical language to place two groups on equal footing. See,
e. g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981(a), 1982; Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2674. Whatever the ultimate purpose of international
organization immunity may be, the immediate purpose of
the IOIA immunity provision is expressed in language that Congress
200 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Syllabus
typically uses to make one thing continuously equivalent to another.
Pp. 207–209.
(b) That reading is confrmed by the “reference canon” of statutory
interpretation. When a statute refers to a general subject, the statute
adopts the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question under
the statute arises. In contrast, when a statute refers to another statute
by specifc title, the referenced statute is adopted as it existed when
the referring statute was enacted, without any subsequent amendments.
Federal courts have often relied on the reference canon to harmonize
a statute with an external body of law that the statute refers to generally.
The IOIA's reference to the immunity enjoyed by foreign governments
is to an external body of potentially evolving law, not to a
specifc provision of another statute. Nor is it a specifc reference to a
common law concept with a fxed meaning. The phrase “immunity
enjoyed by foreign governments” is not a term of art with substantive
content but rather a concept that can be given scope and content only
by reference to the rules governing foreign sovereign immunity.
Pp. 209–211.
(c) The D. C. Circuit relied upon Atkinson's conclusion that the reference
canon's probative force was outweighed by an IOIA provision
authorizing the President to alter the immunity of an international organization.
But the fact that the President has power to modify otherwise
applicable immunity rules is perfectly compatible with the notion
that those rules might themselves change over time in light of developments
in the law governing foreign sovereign immunity. The Atkinson
court also did not consider the opinion of the State Department, whose
views in this area ordinarily receive “special attention,” Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 581
U. S. 170, 181, and which took the position that immunity rules of the
IOIA and the FSIA were linked following the FSIA's enactment.
Pp. 211–213.
(d) The IFC contends that interpreting the IOIA immunity provision
to grant only restrictive immunity would defeat the purpose of granting
immunity in the frst place, by subjecting international organizations to
suit under the commercial activity exception of the FSIA for most or
all of their core activities. This would be particularly true with respect
to international development banks, which use the tools of commerce
to achieve their objectives. Those concerns are infated. The IOIA
provides only default rules. An international organization's charter can
always specify a different level of immunity, and many do. Nor is it
clear that the lending activity of all development banks qualifes as commercial
activity within the meaning of the FSIA. But even if it does
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 201
Syllabus
qualify as commercial, that does not mean the organization is automatically
subject to suit, since other FSIA requirements must also be met,
see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§ 1603, 1605(a)(2). Pp. 213–215.
860 F. 3d 703, reversed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas,
Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined.
Breyer, J., fled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 216. Kavanaugh, J., took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Jeffrey L. Fisher argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Pamela S. Karlan, David T. Goldberg,
Richard L. Herz, Marco B. Simons, Michelle C. Harrison,
Anton Metlitsky, Jennifer Sokoler, Samantha Goldstein,
and Jason Zarrow.
Jonathan Y. Ellis argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, Sharon Swingle, Lewis S. Yelin, and Jennifer G.
Newstead.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Ginger D. Anders, Christopher
M. Lynch, Jonathan S. Meltzer, Francis A. Vasquez, Jr.,
Dana Foster, and Maxwell J. Kalmann.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Bipartisan Members
of Congress by Nikesh Jindal, Jeremy M. Bylund, Justin A. Torres,
Anne M. Voigts, and Samuel J. Dubbin; for Center for International Environmental
Law et al. by Henry C. Su; and for Professors of International
Organization and International Law by Patrick W. Pearsall and Lori F.
Damrosch.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the African
Union et al. by Jonathan I. Blackman; for Former Executive Branch Attorneys
by Jonathan S. Franklin and Peter B. Siegal; for Former Secretaries
of State et al. by Stephen M. Nickelsburg; for International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development et al. by Jeffrey T. Green, Frank R.
Volpe, and Jennifer J. Clark; for International Law Experts by Lawrence
H. Martin and Peter R. Shults; and for Member Countries et al. by Paul
D. Clement, Erin E. Murphy, and Ruthanne M. Deutsch.
202 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945
grants international organizations such as the World Bank
and the World Health Organization the “same immunity from
suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments.” 22 U. S. C.
§ 288a(b). At the time the IOIA was enacted, foreign governments
enjoyed virtually absolute immunity from suit.
Today that immunity is more limited. Most signifcantly,
foreign governments are not immune from actions based
upon certain kinds of commercial activity in which they engage.
This case requires us to determine whether the IOIA
grants international organizations the virtually absolute immunity
foreign governments enjoyed when the IOIA was
enacted, or the more limited immunity they enjoy today.
Respondent International Finance Corporation is an international
organization headquartered in the United States.
The IFC fnances private-sector development projects in
poor and developing countries around the world. About 10
years ago, the IFC fnanced the construction of a power plant
in Gujarat, India. Petitioners are local farmers and fshermen
and a small village. They allege that the power plant
has polluted the air, land, and water in the surrounding area.
Petitioners sued the IFC for damages and injunctive relief
in Federal District Court, but the IFC claimed absolute immunity
from suit. Petitioners argued that the IFC was
entitled under the IOIA only to the limited or “restrictive”
immunity that foreign governments currently enjoy. We
agree.
I
A
In the wake of World War II, the United States and many
of its allies joined together to establish a host of new international
organizations. Those organizations, which included
the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and
the World Bank, were designed to allow member countries to
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 203
Opinion of the Court
collectively pursue goals such as stabilizing the international
economy, rebuilding war-torn nations, and maintaining international
peace and security.
Anticipating that those and other international organizations
would locate their headquarters in the United States,
Congress passed the International Organizations Immunities
Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 669. The Act grants international organizations
a set of privileges and immunities, such as immunity
from search and exemption from property taxes. 22
U. S. C. §§ 288a(c), 288c.
The IOIA defnes certain privileges and immunities by reference
to comparable privileges and immunities enjoyed by
foreign governments. For example, with respect to customs
duties and the treatment of offcial communications, the Act
grants international organizations the privileges and immunities
that are “accorded under similar circumstances to foreign
governments.” § 288a(d). The provision at issue in
this case provides that international organizations “shall
enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial
process as is enjoyed by foreign governments.” § 288a(b).
The IOIA authorizes the President to withhold, withdraw,
condition, or limit the privileges and immunities it grants in
light of the functions performed by any given international
organization. § 288. Those privileges and immunities can
also be expanded or restricted by a particular organization's
founding charter.
B
When the IOIA was enacted in 1945, courts looked to the
views of the Department of State in deciding whether a
given foreign government should be granted immunity from
a particular suit. If the Department submitted a recommendation
on immunity, courts deferred to the recommendation.
If the Department did not make a recommendation, courts
decided for themselves whether to grant immunity, although
they did so by reference to State Department policy.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311–312 (2010).
204 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Opinion of the Court
Until 1952, the State Department adhered to the classical
theory of foreign sovereign immunity. According to that
theory, foreign governments are entitled to “virtually absolute”
immunity as a matter of international grace and comity.
At the time the IOIA was enacted, therefore, the Department
ordinarily requested, and courts ordinarily granted,
immunity in suits against foreign governments. Ibid.;
Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480,
486 (1983).1
In 1952, however, the State Department announced that it
would adopt the newer “restrictive” theory of foreign sovereign
immunity. Under that theory, foreign governments are
entitled to immunity only with respect to their sovereign
acts, not with respect to commercial acts. The State Department
explained that it was adopting the restrictive theory
because the “widespread and increasing practice on the
part of governments of engaging in commercial activities”
made it “necessary” to “enable persons doing business with
them to have their rights determined in the courts.” Letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952),
reprinted in 26 Dept. State Bull. 984–985 (1952).
In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act. The FSIA codifed the restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity but transferred “primary responsibility
for immunity determinations from the Executive to the
Judicial Branch.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541
U. S. 677, 691 (2004); see 28 U. S. C. § 1602. Under the
FSIA, foreign governments are presumptively immune from
suit. § 1604. But a foreign government may be subject to
suit under one of several statutory exceptions. Most perti-
1 The immunity was “virtually” absolute because it was subject to occasional
exceptions for specifc situations. In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U. S. 30 (1945), for example, the State Department declined to
recommend, and the Court did not grant, immunity from suit with respect
to a ship that Mexico owned but did not possess.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 205
Opinion of the Court
nent here, a foreign government may be subject to suit in
connection with its commercial activity that has a suffcient
nexus with the United States. § 1605(a)(2).
C
The International Finance Corporation is an international
development bank headquartered in Washington, D. C. The
IFC is designated as an international organization under the
IOIA. Exec. Order No. 10680, 3 CFR 86 (1957); see 22
U. S. C. §§ 282, 288. One hundred eighty-four countries, including
the United States, are members of the IFC.
The IFC is charged with furthering economic development
“by encouraging the growth of productive private enterprise
in member countries, particularly in the less developed
areas, thus supplementing the activities of ” the World Bank.
Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation,
Art. I, Dec. 5, 1955, 7 U. S. T. 2198, T. I. A. S. No. 3620.
Whereas the World Bank primarily provides loans and
grants to developing countries for public-sector projects, the
IFC fnances private-sector development projects that cannot
otherwise attract capital on reasonable terms. See Art.
I(i), ibid. In 2018, the IFC provided some $23 billion in
such fnancing.
The IFC expects its loan recipients to adhere to a set of
performance standards designed to “avoid, mitigate, and
manage risks and impacts” associated with development
projects. IFC Performance Standards on Environmental
and Social Sustainability, Jan. 1, 2012, p. 2, ¶1. Those standards
are usually more stringent than any established by local
law. The IFC includes the standards in its loan agreements
and enforces them through an internal review process.
Brief for Respondent 10.
In 2008, the IFC loaned $450 million to Coastal Gujarat
Power Limited, a company located in India. The loan
helped fnance the construction of a coal-fred power plant in
the state of Gujarat. Under the terms of the loan agree206
JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Opinion of the Court
ment, Coastal Gujarat was required to comply with an environmental
and social action plan designed to protect areas
around the plant from damage. The agreement allowed the
IFC to revoke fnancial support for the project if Coastal
Gujarat failed to abide by the terms of the agreement.
The project did not go smoothly. According to the IFC's
internal audit, Coastal Gujarat did not comply with the environmental
and social action plan in constructing and operating
the plant. The audit report criticized the IFC for inadequately
supervising the project.
In 2015, a group of farmers and fshermen who live near
the plant, as well as a local village, sued the IFC in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
They claimed that pollution from the plant, such as coal dust,
ash, and water from the plant's cooling system, had destroyed
or contaminated much of the surrounding air, land,
and water. Relying on the audit report, they asserted several
causes of action against the IFC, including negligence,
nuisance, trespass, and breach of contract. The IFC maintained
that it was immune from suit under the IOIA and
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The District Court, applying D. C. Circuit precedent, concluded
that the IFC was immune from suit because the IOIA
grants international organizations the virtually absolute immunity
that foreign governments enjoyed when the IOIA
was enacted. 172 F. Supp. 3d 104, 108–109 (DC 2016) (citing
Atkinson v. Inter-American Development Bank, 156 F. 3d
1335 (CADC 1998)). The D. C. Circuit affrmed in light of
its precedent. 860 F. 3d 703 (2017). Judge Pillard wrote
separately to say that she would have decided the question
differently were she writing on a clean slate. Id., at 708
(concurring opinion). Judge Pillard explained that she
thought the D. C. Circuit “took a wrong turn” when it “read
the IOIA to grant international organizations a static, absolute
immunity that is, by now, not at all the same `as is enjoyed
by foreign governments,' but substantially broader.”
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 207
Opinion of the Court
Ibid. Judge Pillard also noted that the Third Circuit had
expressly declined to follow the D. C. Circuit's approach.
See OSS Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F. 3d
756 (CA3 2010).
We granted certiorari. 584 U. S. 992 (2018).
II
The IFC contends that the IOIA grants international organizations
the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments
enjoyed in 1945. Petitioners argue that it instead
grants international organizations the “same immunity” from
suit that foreign governments enjoy today. We think petitioners
have the better reading of the statute.
A
The language of the IOIA more naturally lends itself to
petitioners' reading. In granting international organizations
the “same immunity” from suit “as is enjoyed by foreign
governments,” the Act seems to continuously link the
immunity of international organizations to that of foreign
governments, so as to ensure ongoing parity between the
two. The statute could otherwise have simply stated that
international organizations “shall enjoy absolute immunity
from suit,” or specifed some other fxed level of immunity.
Other provisions of the IOIA, such as the one making the
property and assets of international organizations “immune
from search,” use such noncomparative language to defne
immunities in a static way. 22 U. S. C. § 288a(c). Or the
statute could have specifed that it was incorporating the law
of foreign sovereign immunity as it existed on a particular
date. See, e. g., Energy Policy Act of 1992, 30 U. S. C.
§ 242(c)(1) (certain land patents “shall provide for surface use
to the same extent as is provided under applicable law prior
to October 24, 1992”). Because the IOIA does neither of
those things, we think the “same as” formulation is best un208
JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Opinion of the Court
derstood to make international organization immunity and
foreign sovereign immunity continuously equivalent.
That reading fnds support in other statutes that use similar
or identical language to place two groups on equal footing.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, for instance, Congress established
a rule of equal treatment for newly freed slaves by
giving them the “same right” to make and enforce contracts
and to buy and sell property “as is enjoyed by white citizens.”
42 U. S. C. §§ 1981(a), 1982. That provision is of
course understood to guarantee continuous equality between
white and nonwhite citizens with respect to the rights in
question. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409,
427–430 (1968). Similarly, the Federal Tort Claims Act
states that the “United States shall be liable” in tort “in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. § 2674. That provision
is most naturally understood to make the United States
liable in the same way as a private individual at any given
time. See Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 6–7 (1962).
Such “same as” provisions dot the statute books, and federal
and state courts commonly read them to mandate ongoing
equal treatment of two groups or objects. See, e. g., Adamson
v. Bowen, 855 F. 2d 668, 671–672 (CA10 1988) (statute
making United States liable for fees and expenses “to the
same extent that any other party would be liable under the
common law or under the terms of any statute” interpreted
to continuously tie liability of United States to that of
any other party); Kugler's Appeal, 55 Pa. 123, 124–125
(1867) (statute making the procedure for dividing election
districts “the same as” the procedure for dividing townships
interpreted to continuously tie the former procedure to the
latter).
The IFC objects that the IOIA is different because the
purpose of international organization immunity is entirely
distinct from the purpose of foreign sovereign immunity.
Foreign sovereign immunity, the IFC argues, is grounded
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 209
Opinion of the Court
in the mutual respect of sovereigns and serves the ends of
international comity and reciprocity. The purpose of international
organization immunity, on the other hand, is to allow
such organizations to freely pursue the collective goals of
member countries without undue interference from the
courts of any one member country. The IFC therefore
urges that the IOIA should not be read to tether international
organization immunity to changing foreign sovereign
immunity.
But that gets the inquiry backward. We ordinarily assume,
“absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to
the contrary,” that “the legislative purpose is expressed by
the ordinary meaning of the words used.” American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982) (alterations
omitted). Whatever the ultimate purpose of international
organization immunity may be—the IOIA does not address
that question—the immediate purpose of the immunity provision
is expressed in language that Congress typically uses
to make one thing continuously equivalent to another.
B
The more natural reading of the IOIA is confrmed by a
canon of statutory interpretation that was well established
when the IOIA was drafted. According to the “reference”
canon, when a statute refers to a general subject, the statute
adopts the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question
under the statute arises. 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory
Construction §§ 5207–5208 (3d ed. 1943). For example, a
statute allowing a company to “collect the same tolls and
enjoy the same privileges” as other companies incorporates
the law governing tolls and privileges as it exists at any
given moment. Snell v. Chicago, 133 Ill. 413, 437–439, 24
N. E. 532, 537 (1890). In contrast, a statute that refers to
another statute by specifc title or section number in effect
cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when
the referring statute was enacted, without any subsequent
210 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Opinion of the Court
amendments. See, e. g., Culver v. People ex rel. Kochersperger,
161 Ill. 89, 95–99, 43 N. E. 812, 814–815 (1896) (taxassessment
statute referring to specifc article of another
statute does not adopt subsequent amendments to that
article).
Federal courts have often relied on the reference canon,
explicitly or implicitly, to harmonize a statute with an external
body of law that the statute refers to generally. Thus,
for instance, a statute that exempts from disclosure agency
documents that “would not be available by law to a party
. . . in litigation with the agency” incorporates the general
law governing attorney work-product privilege as it exists
when the statute is applied. FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U. S.
19, 20, 26–27 (1983) (emphasis added); id., at 34, n. 6 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Likewise, a general reference to federal discovery rules incorporates
those rules “as they are found on any given day,
today included,” El Encanto, Inc. v. Hatch Chile Co., 825
F. 3d 1161, 1164 (CA10 2016), and a general reference to “the
crime of piracy as defned by the law of nations” incorporates
a defnition of piracy “that changes with advancements in the
law of nations,” United States v. Dire, 680 F. 3d 446, 451,
467–469 (CA4 2012).
The same logic applies here. The IOIA's reference to the
immunity enjoyed by foreign governments is a general
rather than specifc reference. The reference is to an external
body of potentially evolving law—the law of foreign
sovereign immunity—not to a specifc provision of another
statute. The IOIA should therefore be understood to link
the law of international organization immunity to the law of
foreign sovereign immunity, so that the one develops in tandem
with the other.
The IFC contends that the IOIA's reference to the immunity
enjoyed by foreign governments is not a general reference
to an external body of law, but is instead a specifc
reference to a common law concept that had a fxed meaning
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 211
Opinion of the Court
when the IOIA was enacted in 1945. And because we ordinarily
presume that “Congress intends to incorporate the
well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses,”
Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 23 (1999), the IFC
argues that we should read the IOIA to incorporate what
the IFC maintains was the then-settled meaning of the “immunity
enjoyed by foreign governments”: virtually absolute
immunity.
But in 1945, the “immunity enjoyed by foreign governments”
did not mean “virtually absolute immunity.” The
phrase is not a term of art with substantive content, such as
“fraud” or “forgery.” See id., at 22; Gilbert v. United States,
370 U. S. 650, 655 (1962). It is rather a concept that can
be given scope and content only by reference to the rules
governing foreign sovereign immunity. It is true that under
the rules applicable in 1945, the extent of immunity from suit
was virtually absolute, while under the rules applicable
today, it is more limited. But in 1945, as today, the IOIA's
instruction to grant international organizations the immunity
“enjoyed by foreign governments” is an instruction to
look up the applicable rules of foreign sovereign immunity,
wherever those rules may be found—the common law, the
law of nations, or a statute. In other words, it is a general
reference to an external body of (potentially evolving) law.
C
In ruling for the IFC, the D. C. Circuit relied upon its
prior decision in Atkinson, 156 F. 3d 1335. Atkinson acknowledged
the reference canon, but concluded that the canon's
probative force was “outweighed” by a structural inference
the court derived from the larger context of the IOIA.
Id., at 1341. The Atkinson court focused on the provision of
the IOIA that gives the President the authority to withhold,
withdraw, condition, or limit the otherwise applicable privileges
and immunities of an international organization, “in the
light of the functions performed by any such international
212 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Opinion of the Court
organization.” 22 U. S. C. § 288. The court understood that
provision to “delegate to the President the responsibility for
updating the immunities of international organizations in the
face of changing circumstances.” Atkinson, 156 F. 3d, at
1341. That delegation, the court reasoned, “undermine[d]”
the view that Congress intended the IOIA to in effect update
itself by incorporating changes in the law governing foreign
sovereign immunity. Ibid.
We do not agree. The delegation provision is most naturally
read to allow the President to modify, on a case-by-case
basis, the immunity rules that would otherwise apply to a
particular international organization. The statute authorizes
the President to take action with respect to a single
organization—“any such organization”—in light of the functions
performed by “such organization.” 22 U. S. C. § 288.
The text suggests retail rather than wholesale action, and
that is in fact how authority under § 288 has been exercised
in the past. See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 12425, 3 CFR 193
(1984) (designating INTERPOL as an international organization
under the IOIA but withholding certain privileges and
immunities); Exec. Order No. 11718, 3 CFR 177 (1974) (same
for INTELSAT). In any event, the fact that the President
has power to modify otherwise applicable immunity rules is
perfectly compatible with the notion that those rules might
themselves change over time in light of developments in the
law governing foreign sovereign immunity.
The D. C. Circuit in Atkinson also gave no consideration
to the opinion of the State Department, whose views in this
area ordinarily receive “special attention.” Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co.,
581 U. S. 170, 181 (2017). Shortly after the FSIA was enacted,
the State Department took the position that the immunity
rules of the IOIA and the FSIA were now “link[ed].” Letter
from D. Vagts, Offce of the Legal Adviser, to R. Carswell, Jr.,
Senior Legal Offcer, Organization of American States, p. 2
(Mar. 24, 1977). The Department reaffrmed that view durCite
as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 213
Opinion of the Court
ing subsequent administrations, and it has reaffrmed it
again here.2 That longstanding view further bolsters our
understanding of the IOIA's immunity provision.
D
The IFC argues that interpreting the IOIA's immunity
provision to grant anything less than absolute immunity
would lead to a number of undesirable results.
The IFC frst contends that affording international organizations
only restrictive immunity would defeat the purpose
of granting them immunity in the frst place. Allowing international
organizations to be sued in one member country's
courts would in effect allow that member to second-guess
the collective decisions of the others. It would also expose
international organizations to money damages, which would
in turn make it more diffcult and expensive for them to fulfll
their missions. The IFC argues that this problem is especially
acute for international development banks. Because
those banks use the tools of commerce to achieve their objectives,
they may be subject to suit under the FSIA's commercial
activity exception for most or all of their core activities,
2 See Letter from Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser, to Leroy D. Clark,
Gen. Counsel, EEOC (June 24, 1980), in Nash, Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 917,
918 (1980) (“By virtue of the FSIA, and unless otherwise specifed in their
constitutive agreements, international organizations are now subject to
the jurisdiction of our courts in respect of their commercial activities,
while retaining immunity for their acts of a public character.”); Letter
from Arnold Kanter, Acting Secretary of State, to President George H. W.
Bush (Sept. 12, 1992), in Digest of United States Practice in International
Law 1016–1017 (S. Cummins & D. Stewart eds. 2005) (explaining that the
Headquarters Agreement of the Organization of American States affords
the OAS “full immunity from judicial process, thus going beyond the usual
United States practice of affording restrictive immunity,” in exchange for
assurances that OAS would provide for “appropriate modes of settlement
of those disputes for which jurisdiction would exist against a foreign government
under the” FSIA); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
24–29.
214 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Opinion of the Court
unlike foreign sovereigns. According to the IFC, allowing
such suits would bring a food of foreign-plaintiff litigation
into U. S. courts, raising many of the same foreign-relations
concerns that we identifed when considering similar litigation
under the Alien Tort Statute. See Jesner v. Arab
Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 270–272 (2018); Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 116–117 (2013).
The IFC's concerns are infated. To begin, the privileges
and immunities accorded by the IOIA are only default rules.
If the work of a given international organization would be
impaired by restrictive immunity, the organization's charter
can always specify a different level of immunity. The charters
of many international organizations do just that. See,
e. g., Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, Art. II, § 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U. S. T. 1422, T. I. A.
S. No. 6900 (“The United Nations . . . shall enjoy immunity
from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity”); Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
Art. IX, § 3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1413, T. I. A. S. No. 1501
(IMF enjoys “immunity from every form of judicial process
except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity”).
Notably, the IFC's own charter does not state that the IFC
is absolutely immune from suit.
Nor is there good reason to think that restrictive immunity
would expose international development banks to excessive
liability. As an initial matter, it is not clear that the
lending activity of all development banks qualifes as commercial
activity within the meaning of the FSIA. To be
considered “commercial,” an activity must be “the type” of
activity “by which a private party engages in” trade or commerce.
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U. S.
607, 614 (1992); see 28 U. S. C. § 1603(d). As the Government
suggested at oral argument, the lending activity of at least
some development banks, such as those that make condiCite
as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 215
Opinion of the Court
tional loans to governments, may not qualify as “commercial”
under the FSIA. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27–30.
And even if an international development bank's lending
activity does qualify as commercial, that does not mean the
organization is automatically subject to suit. The FSIA includes
other requirements that must also be met. For one
thing, the commercial activity must have a suffcient nexus to
the United States. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1603, 1605(a)(2). For
another, a lawsuit must be “based upon” either the commercial
activity itself or acts performed in connection with the
commercial activity. See § 1605(a)(2). Thus, if the “gravamen”
of a lawsuit is tortious activity abroad, the suit is not
“based upon” commercial activity within the meaning of the
FSIA's commercial activity exception. See OBB Personenverkehr
AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. 27, 35 (2015); Saudi Arabia
v. Nelson, 507 U. S. 349, 356–359 (1993). At oral argument
in this case, the Government stated that it has “serious
doubts” whether petitioners' suit, which largely concerns allegedly
tortious conduct in India, would satisfy the “based
upon” requirement. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25–26. In short, restrictive
immunity hardly means unlimited exposure to suit
for international organizations.
* * *
The International Organizations Immunities Act grants international
organizations the “same immunity” from suit “as
is enjoyed by foreign governments” at any given time.
Today, that means that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act governs the immunity of international organizations.
The International Finance Corporation is therefore not absolutely
immune from suit.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the D. C. Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
216 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Breyer, J., dissenting
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Justice Breyer, dissenting.
The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945
extends to international organizations “the same immunity
from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by
foreign governments.” 22 U. S. C. § 288a(b). The majority,
resting primarily upon the statute's language and canons of
interpretation, holds that the statute's reference to “immunity”
moves with the times. As a consequence, the statute
no longer allows international organizations immunity from
lawsuits arising from their commercial activities. In my
view, the statute grants international organizations that
immunity—just as foreign governments possessed that immunity
when Congress enacted the statute in 1945. In
reaching this conclusion, I rest more heavily than does the
majority upon the statute's history, its context, its purposes,
and its consequences. And I write in part to show that, in
diffcult cases like this one, purpose-based methods of interpretation
can often shine a useful light upon opaque statutory
language, leading to a result that refects greater legal
coherence and is, as a practical matter, more likely to prove
sound.
I
The general question before us is familiar: Do the words
of a statute refer to their subject matter “statically,” as it
was when the statute was written? Or is their reference to
that subject matter “dynamic,” changing in scope as the subject
matter changes over time? It is hardly surprising,
given the thousands of different statutes containing an untold
number of different words, that there is no single, universally
applicable answer to this question.
Fairly recent cases from this Court make that clear.
Compare New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. 105, 114
(2019) (adopting the interpretation of “ `contracts of employCite
as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 217
Breyer, J., dissenting
ment' ” that prevailed at the time of the statute's adoption in
1925); Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S.
274, 277 (2018) (adopting the meaning of “ `money' ” that prevailed
at the time of the statute's enactment in 1937); Carcieri
v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 388 (2009) (interpreting the
statutory phrase “ `now under Federal jurisdiction' ” to cover
only those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at the
time of the statute's adoption in 1934); and Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U. S. 607, 612–613 (1992)
(adopting the meaning of “ `commercial' ” that was “attached
to that term under the restrictive theory” when the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act was enacted in 1976), with Kimble
v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 461 (2015) (noting
that the words “ `restraint of trade' ” in the Sherman Act
have been interpreted dynamically); West v. Gibson, 527 U. S.
212, 218 (1999) (interpreting the term “ `appropriate' ” in
Title VII's remedies provision dynamically); and Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 275–276 (1995)
(interpreting the term “ `involving commerce' ” in the Federal
Arbitration Act dynamically).
The Court, like petitioners, believes that the language of
the statute itself helps signifcantly to answer the static/
dynamic question. See ante, at 207–209. I doubt that the
language itself helps in this case. Petitioners point to the
words “as is” in the phrase that grants the international organizations
the “same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed
by foreign governments.” Brief for Petitioners 23–24 (emphasis
added). They invoke the Dictionary Act, which
states that “words used in the present tense include the future”
“unless the context indicates otherwise.” 1 U. S. C. § 1.
But that provision creates only a presumption. And it did not
even appear in the statute until 1948, after Congress had passed
the Immunities Act. Compare § 1, 61 Stat. 633, with § 6, 62
Stat. 859.
More fundamentally, the words “as is enjoyed” do not
conclusively tell us when enjoyed. Do they mean “as is en218
JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Breyer, J., dissenting
joyed” at the time of the statute's enactment? Or “as is
enjoyed” at the time a plaintiff brings a lawsuit? If the
former, international organizations enjoy immunity from
lawsuits based upon their commercial activities, for that was
the scope of immunity that foreign governments enjoyed in
1945 when the Immunities Act became law. If the latter,
international organizations do not enjoy that immunity,
for foreign governments can no longer claim immunity from
lawsuits based upon certain commercial activities. See 28
U. S. C. § 1605(a)(2).
Linguistics does not answer the temporal question. Nor
do our cases, which are not perfectly consistent on the matter.
Compare McNeill v. United States, 563 U. S. 816, 821
(2011) (present-tense verb in the Armed Career Criminal
Act requires applying the law at the time of previous conviction,
not the later time when the Act is applied), with Dole
Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 478 (2003) (presenttense
verb requires applying the law “at the time suit is
filed”). The problem is simple: “Without knowing the
point in time at which the law speaks, it is impossible to tell
what is past and what is present or future.” Carr v. United
States, 560 U. S. 438, 463 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). It is
purpose, not linguistics, that can help us here.
The words “same . . . as,” in the phrase “same immunity
. . . as,” provide no greater help. The majority fnds support
for its dynamic interpretation in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which gives all citizens the “same right” to make and enforce
contracts and to buy and sell property “as is enjoyed by
white citizens. ” 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981(a), 1982 (emphasis
added). But it is purpose, not words, that readily resolves
any temporal linguistic ambiguity in that statute. The Act's
objective, like that of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, was
a Nation that treated its citizens equally. Its purpose—
revealed by its title, historical context, and other language
in the statute—was “to guarantee the then newly freed
slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy.”
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 219
Breyer, J., dissenting
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 448 (2008).
Given this purpose, its dynamic nature is obvious.
Similarly, judges interpreting the words “same . . . as”
have long resolved ambiguity not by looking at the words
alone, but by examining the statute's purpose as well. Compare,
e. g., Kugler's Appeal, 55 Pa. 123, 123–125 (1867) (adopting
a dynamic interpretation of “same as” statute in light
of “plain” and “manifest” statutory purpose); and Gaston v.
Lamkin, 115 Mo. 20, 34, 21 S. W. 1100, 1104 (1893) (adopting
a dynamic interpretation of “same as” election statute given
the legislature's intent to achieve “simplicity and uniformity
in the conduct of elections”), with O'Flynn v. East Rochester,
292 N. Y. 156, 162, 54 N. E. 2d 343, 346 (1944) (adopting a
static interpretation of “same as” statute given that the legislature
“did not contemplate” that subsequent changes to a
referenced statute would apply (interpreting N. Y. Gen. Mun.
Law Ann. § 360(5) (West 1934))). There is no hard-and-fast
rule that the statutory words “as is” or the statutory words
“same as” require applying the law as it stands today.
The majority wrongly believes that it can solve the temporal
problem by bringing statutory canons into play. It relies
on what it calls the “reference canon.” That canon, as it
appeared more than 75 years ago in Sutherland's book on
statutory construction, says that “when a statute refers to a
general subject, the statute adopts the law on that subject
as it exists whenever a question under the statute arises.”
Ante, at 209 (citing 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction
§§ 5207–5208 (3d ed. 1943); emphasis added).
But a canon is at most a rule of thumb. Indeed, Sutherland
himself says that “[n]o single canon of interpretation
can purport to give a certain and unerring answer.” 2 id.,
§ 4501, p. 316. And hornbooks, summarizing case law, have
long explained that whether a reference statute adopts the
law as it stands on the date of enactment or includes subsequent
changes in the law to which it refers is “fundamentally
a question of legislative intent and purpose.” Fox, Effect of
220 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Breyer, J., dissenting
Modifcation or Repeal of Constitutional or Statutory Provision
Adopted by Reference in Another Provision, 168
A. L. R. 627, 628 (1947); see also 82 C. J. S., Statutes § 485,
p. 637 (2009) (“The question of whether a statute which has
adopted another statute by reference will be affected by
amendments made to the adopted statute is one of legislative
intent and purpose”); id., at 638 (statute that refers generally
to another body of law will ordinarily include subsequent
changes in the adopted law only “as far as the changes are
consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute”).
Thus, all interpretive roads here lead us to the same place,
namely, to context, to history, to purpose, and to consequences.
Language alone cannot resolve the statute's linguistic
ambiguity.
II
“Statutory interpretation,” however, “is not a game of
blind man's bluff. ” Dole Food Co., 538 U. S., at 484
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We
are “free to consider statutory language in light of a statute's
basic purposes,” ibid., as well as “ `the history of the times
when it was passed,' ” Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440
U. S. 668, 669 (1979) (quoting United States v. Union Pacifc
R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 79 (1875)). In this case, historical context,
purpose, and related consequences tell us a great deal
about the proper interpretation of the Immunities Act.
Congressional reports explain that Congress, acting in the
immediate aftermath of World War II, intended the Immunities
Act to serve two related purposes. First, it would
“enabl[e] this country to fulfll its commitments in connection
with its membership in international organizations.”
S. Rep. No. 861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1945); see also id.,
at 2–3 (explaining that the Immunities Act was “basic legislation”
expected to “satisfy in full the requirements of . . .
international organizations conducting activities in the
United States”); H. R. Rep. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1945) (similar). And second, it would “facilitate fully the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 221
Breyer, J., dissenting
functioning of international organizations in this country.”
S. Rep. No. 861, at 3.
A
I frst examine the international commitments that Congress
sought to fulfll. By 1945, the United States had
entered into agreements creating several important multilateral
organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the
UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). See id., at 2.
The founding agreements for several of these organizations
required member states to grant them broad immunity
from suit. The Bretton Woods Agreements, for example,
provided that the IMF “shall enjoy immunity from every
form of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly
waives its immunity.” Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, Art. IX, § 3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1413, T. I. A. S. No. 1501. UNRRA required members, absent
waiver, to accord the organization “the facilities, privileges,
immunities, and exemptions which they accord to each
other, including . . . [i]mmunity from suit and legal process.”
2 UNRRA, A Compilation of the Resolutions on Policy: First
and Second Sessions of the UNRRA Council, Res. No. 32,
p. 51 (1944). And the UN Charter required member states
to accord the UN “such privileges and immunities as are necessary
for the fulfllment of its purposes.” Charter of the
United Nations, Art. 105, 59 Stat. 1053, June 26, 1945, T. S.
No. 993.
These international organizations expected the United
States to provide them with essentially full immunity. And
at the time the treaties were written, Congress understood
that foreign governments normally enjoyed immunity with
respect to their commercial, as well as their noncommercial,
activities. Thus, by granting international organizations
“the same immunity from suit” that foreign governments enjoyed,
Congress expected that international organizations
222 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Breyer, J., dissenting
would similarly have immunity in both commercial and noncommercial
suits.
More than that, Congress likely recognized that immunity
in the commercial area was even more important for many
international organizations than it was for most foreign governments.
Unlike foreign governments, international organizations
are not sovereign entities engaged in a host of
different activities. See R. Higgins, Problems & Process:
International Law and How We Use It 93 (1994) (organizations
do not act with “ `sovereign authority,' ” and “to assimilate
them to states . . . is not correct”). Rather, many organizations
(including four of the fve I mentioned above) have
specifc missions that often require them to engage in what
U. S. law may well consider to be commercial activities. See
infra, at 226–227.
Nonetheless, under the majority's view, the immunity of
many organizations contracted in scope in 1952, when the
State Department modifed foreign government immunity to
exclude commercial activities. Most organizations could not
rely on the treaty provisions quoted above to supply the necessary
immunity. That is because, unless the treaty provision
granting immunity is “self-executing,” i. e., automatically
applicable, the immunity will not be effective in U. S.
courts until Congress enacts additional legislation to implement
it. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 504–505
(2008); but see id., at 546–547 (Breyer, J., dissenting). And
many treaties are not self-executing. Thus, in the ordinary
case, not even a treaty can guarantee immunity in cases arising
from commercial activities.
The UN provides a good example. As noted, the UN
Charter required the United States to grant the UN all “necessary”
immunities, but it was not self-executing. In 1946,
the UN made clear that it needed absolute immunity from
suit, including in lawsuits based upon its commercial activities.
See Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, Art. II, § 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U. S. T. 1422,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 223
Breyer, J., dissenting
T. I. A. S. No. 6900 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1970); see also
App. to S. Exec. Rep. No. 91–17, p. 14 (1970) (“[T]he U. N.'s
immunity from legal process extends to matters arising out
of its commercial dealings . . . ”). But until Congress ratifed
that comprehensive immunity provision in 1970, no U. S. law
provided that immunity but for the Immunities Act. Id.,
at 1. Both the UN and the United States found this circumstance
satisfactory because they apparently assumed the Immunities
Act extended immunity in cases involving both
commercial and noncommercial activities: When Congress
eventually (in 1970) ratifed the UN's comprehensive immunity
provision, the Senate reported that the long delay in
ratifcation “appears to have been the result of the executive
branch being content to operate under the provisions of the”
Immunities Act. Id., at 2.
In light of this history, how likely is it that Congress, seeking
to “satisfy in full the requirements of . . . international
organizations conducting activities in the United States,” S.
Rep. No. 861, at 3 (emphasis added), would have understood
the statute to take from many international organizations
with one hand the immunity it had given them with the
other? If Congress wished the Act to carry out one
of its core purposes—fulflling the country's international
commitments—Congress would not have wanted the statute
to change over time, taking on a meaning that would fail to
grant not only full, but even partial, immunity to many of
those organizations.
B
Congress also intended to facilitate international organizations'
ability to pursue their missions in the United States.
To illustrate why that purpose is better served by a static
interpretation, consider in greater detail the work of the organizations
to which Congress wished to provide broad immunity.
Put the IMF to the side, for Congress enacted a
separate statute providing it with immunity (absent waiver)
in all cases. See 22 U. S. C. § 286h. But UNRRA, the
224 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Breyer, J., dissenting
World Bank, the FAO, and the UN itself all originally depended
upon the Immunities Act for the immunity they
sought.
Consider, for example, the mission of UNRRA. The
United States and other nations created that organization in
1943, as the end of World War II seemed in sight. Its objective
was, in the words of President Roosevelt, to “ `assure a
fair distribution of available supplies among' ” those liberated
in World War II, and “ `to ward off death by starvation
or exposure among these peoples.' ” 1 G. Woodbridge,
UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration 3 (1950). By the time Congress
passed the Immunities Act in 1945, UNRRA had obtained
and shipped billions of pounds of food, clothing, and other
relief supplies to children freed from Nazi concentration
camps and to others in serious need. 3 id., at 429; see generally
L. Nicholas, Cruel World: The Children of Europe in the
Nazi Web 442–513 (2005).
These activities involved contracts, often made in the
United States, for transportation and for numerous commercial
goods. See B. Shephard, The Long Road Home: The
Aftermath of the Second World War 54, 57–58 (2012). Indeed,
the United States conditioned its participation on
UNRRA's spending what amounted to 67% of its budget on
purchases of goods and services in the United States. Id.,
at 57–58; see also Sawyer, Achievements of UNRRA as an
International Health Organization, 37 Am. J. Pub. Health 41,
57 (1947) (describing UNRRA training programs for foreign
doctors within the United States, which presumably required
entering into contracts); International Refugee Org.
v. Republic S. S. Corp., 189 F. 2d 858, 860 (CA4 1951) (describing
successor organization's transportation of displaced
persons, presumably also under contract). Would Congress,
believing that it had provided the absolute immunity that
UNRRA sought and expected, also have intended that the
statute be interpreted “dynamically,” thereby removing
most of the immunity that it had then provided—not only
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 225
Breyer, J., dissenting
potentially from UNRRA itself but also from other future
international organizations with UNRRA-like objectives
and tasks?
C
This history makes clear that Congress enacted the Immunities
Act as part of an effort to encourage international
organizations to locate their headquarters and carry on their
missions in the United States. It also makes clear that Congress
intended to enact “basic legislation” that would fulfll
its broad immunity-based commitments to the UN, UNRRA,
and other nascent organizations. S. Rep. No. 861, at 2.
And those commitments, of necessity, included immunity
from suit in commercial areas, since organizations were buying
goods and making contracts in the United States.
To achieve these purposes, Congress enacted legislation
that granted necessarily broad immunity. And that fact
strongly suggests that Congress would not have wanted the
statute to reduce signifcantly the scope of immunity that
international organizations enjoyed, particularly organizations
engaged in development fnance, refugee assistance, or
other tasks that U. S. law could well decide were “commercial”
in nature. See infra, at 226–227.
To that extent, an examination of the statute's purpose
supports a static, not a dynamic, interpretation of its crossreference
to the immunity of foreign governments. Unlike
the purpose of the Civil Rights Act, the purpose here was
not to ensure parity of treatment for international organizations
and foreign governments. Instead, as the Court of
Appeals for the D. C. Circuit pointed out years ago, the statute's
reference to the immunities of “foreign governments”
was a “shorthand” for the immunities those foreign governments
enjoyed at the time the Act was passed. Atkinson v.
Inter-American Development Bank, 156 F. 3d 1335, 1340,
1341 (1998).
III
Now consider the consequences that the majority's reading
of the statute will likely produce—consequences that run
226 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Breyer, J., dissenting
counter to the statute's basic purposes. Although the UN
itself is no longer dependent upon the Immunities Act, many
other organizations, such as the FAO and several multilateral
development banks, continue to rely upon that Act to secure
immunity, for the United States has never ratifed treaties
nor enacted statutes that might extend the necessary immunity,
commercial and noncommercial alike.
A
The “commercial activity” exception to the sovereign immunity
of foreign nations is broad. We have said that a foreign
state engages in “commercial activity” when it exercises
“ `powers that can also be exercised by private citizens.' ”
Republic of Argentina, 504 U. S., at 614. Thus, “a contract
to buy army boots or even bullets is a `commercial' activity,”
even if the government enters into the contract to “fulfl[l]
uniquely sovereign objectives.” Ibid.; see also H. R. Rep.
No. 94–1487, p. 16 (1976) (“[A] transaction to obtain goods
or services from private parties would not lose its otherwise
commercial character because it was entered into in
connection with an [Agency for International Development]
program”).
As a result of the majority's interpretation, many of the
international organizations to which the United States belongs
will discover that they are now exposed to civil lawsuits
based on their (U. S.-law-defned) commercial activity.
And because “commercial activity” may well have a broad
defnition, today's holding will at the very least create uncertainty
for organizations involved in fnance, such as the
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. The core functions
of these organizations are at least arguably “commercial”
in nature; the organizations exist to promote international
development by investing in foreign companies and
projects across the world. See Brief for International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development et al. as Amici Curiae
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 227
Breyer, J., dissenting
1–4; Brief for Member Countries and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency as Amici Cur iae 13–15. The
World Bank, for example, encourages development either by
guaranteeing private loans or by providing fnancing from its
own funds if private capital is not available. See Articles of
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Art. I, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T. I. A. S.
No. 1502.
Some of these organizations, including the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), themselves believe they do not
need broad immunity in commercial areas, and they have
waived it. See, e. g., Articles of Agreement of the International
Finance Corporation, Art. 6, § 3, Dec. 5, 1955, 7 U. S. T.
2214, 264 U. N. T. S. 118 (implemented by 22 U. S. C. § 282g);
see also 860 F. 3d 703, 706 (CADC 2017). But today's decision
will affect them nonetheless. That is because courts
have long interpreted their waivers in a manner that protects
their core objectives. See, e. g., Mendaro v. World
Bank, 717 F. 2d 610, 614–615 (CADC 1983). (This very case
provides a good example. The D. C. Circuit held below that
the IFC's waiver provision does not cover petitioners' claims
because they “threaten the [IFC's] policy discretion.” 860
F. 3d, at 708.) But today's decision exposes these organizations
to potential liability in all cases arising from their commercial
activities, without regard to the scope of their
waivers.
Under the majority's interpretation, that broad exposure
to liability is at least a reasonable possibility. And that
being so, the interpretation undercuts Congress' original objectives
and the expectations that it had when it enacted the
Immunities Act in 1945.
B
The majority's opinion will have a further important
consequence—one that more clearly contradicts the statute's
objectives and overall scheme. It concerns the important
goal of weeding out lawsuits that are likely bad or harmful—
228 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Breyer, J., dissenting
those likely to produce rules of law that interfere with an
international organization's public interest tasks.
To understand its importance, consider again that international
organizations, unlike foreign nations, are multilateral,
with members from many different nations. See H. R. Rep.
No. 1203, at 1. That multilateralism is threatened if one nation
alone, through application of its own liability rules (by
nonexpert judges), can shape the policy choices or actions
that an international organization believes it must take or
refrain from taking. Yet that is the effect of the majority's
interpretation. By restricting the immunity that international
organizations enjoy, it “opens the door to divided decisions
of the courts of different member states,” including
U. S. courts, “passing judgment on the rules, regulations,
and decisions of the international bodies.” Broadbent v. Organization
of Am. States, 628 F. 2d 27, 35 (CADC 1980); cf.
Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations:
Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36
Va. J. Int'l L. 53, 63–64 (1995) (recognizing that “[i]t would
be inappropriate for municipal courts to cut deep into the
region of autonomous decision-making authority of institutions
such as the World Bank”).
Many international organizations, fully aware of their
moral (if not legal) obligations to prevent harm to others and
to compensate individuals when they do cause harm, have
sought to fulfll those obligations without compromising their
ability to operate effectively. Some, as I have said, waive
their immunity in U. S. courts at least in part. And the
D. C. Circuit, for nearly 40 years, has interpreted those waivers
in a way that protects the organization against interference
by any single state. See, e. g., Mendaro, 717 F. 2d, at
615. The D. C. Circuit allows a lawsuit to proceed when
“insistence on immunity would actually prevent or hinder
the organization from conducting its activities.” Id., at 617.
Thus, a direct benefciary of a World Bank loan can generally
sue the Bank, because “the commercial reliability of the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 229
Breyer, J., dissenting
Bank's direct loans . . . would be signifcantly vitiated” if
“benefciaries were required to accept the Bank's obligations
without recourse to judicial process.” Id., at 618. Where,
however, allowing a suit would lead to “disruptive interference”
with the organization's functions, the waiver does not
apply. Ibid.
Other organizations have attempted to solve the liability/
immunity problem by turning to multilateral, not singlenation,
solutions. The UN, for instance, has agreed to
“make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of . . .
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private
law character.” Convention on Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations, Art. VIII, § 29, 21 U. S. T. 1438,
T. I. A. S. No. 6900. It generally does so by agreeing to
submit commercial disputes to arbitration. See Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 467, Reporters' Note 7 (1987). Other organizations, including
the IFC, have set up alternative accountability schemes
to resolve disputes that might otherwise end up in court.
See World Bank, Inspection Panel: About Us (describing
World Bank's three-member “independent complaints mechanism”
for those “who believe that they have been . . . adversely
affected by a World Bank-funded project”), https://
inspectionpanel.org/about-us/about-inspection-panel (as last
visited Feb. 25, 2019); Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, How
We Work: CAO Dispute Resolution (describing IFC and Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency dispute-resolution
process, the main objective of which is to help resolve issues
raised about the “social and environmental impacts of IFC/
MIGA projects”), www.cao-ombudsman.org/howwework/
ombudsman.
These alternatives may sometimes prove inadequate.
And, if so, the Immunities Act itself offers a way for America's
Executive Branch to set aside an organization's immunity
and to allow a lawsuit to proceed in U. S. courts. The
Act grants to the President the authority to “withhold,” to
230 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP.
Breyer, J., dissenting
“withdraw,” to “condition,” or to “limit” any of the Act's “immunities”
in “light of the functions performed by any such
international organization.” 22 U. S. C. § 288.
Were we to interpret the statute statically, then, the default
rule would be immunity in suits arising from an organization's
commercial activities. But the Executive Branch
would have the power to withdraw immunity where immunity
is not warranted, as the Act itself provides. And in
making that determination, it could consider whether allowing
the lawsuit would jeopardize the organization's ability to
carry out its public interest tasks. In a word, the Executive
Branch, under a static interpretation, would have the authority
needed to separate lawsuit sheep from lawsuit goats.
Under the majority's interpretation, by contrast, there is
no such fexibility. The Executive does not have the power
to tailor immunity by taking into account the risk of a lawsuit's
unjustifed interference with institutional objectives or
other institutional needs. Rather, the majority's holding
takes away an international organization's immunity (in
cases arising from “commercial” activities) across the board.
And without a new statute, there is no way to restore it, in
whole or in part. Nothing in the present statute gives the
Executive, the courts, or the organization the power to restore
immunity, or to tailor any resulting potential liability,
where a lawsuit threatens seriously to interfere with an organization's
legitimate needs and goals.
Thus, the static interpretation comes equipped with fexibility.
It comes equipped with a means to withdraw immunity
where justifed. But the dynamic interpretation
freezes potential liability into law. It withdraws immunity
automatically and irretrievably, irrespective of institutional
harm. It seems highly unlikely that Congress would have
wanted this result.
* * *
At the end of World War II, many in this Nation saw international
cooperation through international organization as
Cite as: 586 U. S. 199 (2019) 231
Breyer, J., dissenting
one way both to diminish the risk of confict and to promote
economic development and commercial prosperity. Congress
at that time and at the request of many of those organizations
enacted the Immunities Act. Given the differences
between international organizations and nation states, along
with the Act's purposes and the risk of untoward consequences,
I would leave the Immunities Act where we found
it—as providing for immunity in both commercial and noncommercial
suits.
My decision rests primarily not upon linguistic analysis
but upon basic statutory purposes. Linguistic methods
alone, however artfully employed, too often can be used to
justify opposite conclusions. Purposes, derived from context,
informed by history, and tested by recognition of related
consequences, will more often lead us to legally sound,
workable interpretations—as they have consistently done in
the past. These methods of interpretation can help voters
hold offcials accountable for their decisions and permit citizens
of our diverse democracy to live together productively
and in peace—basic objectives in America of the rule of law
itself.
With respect, I dissent.
232 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
GARZA v. IDAHO
certiorari to the supreme court of idaho
No. 17–1026. Argued October 30, 2018—Decided February 27, 2019
Petitioner Gilberto Garza, Jr., signed two plea agreements, each arising
from state criminal charges and each containing a clause stating that
Garza waived his right to appeal. Shortly after sentencing, Garza told
his trial counsel that he wished to appeal. Instead of fling a notice of
appeal, counsel informed Garza that an appeal would be “problematic”
given Garza's appeal waiver. After the time period for Garza to preserve
an appeal lapsed, he sought state postconviction relief, alleging
that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
fle a notice of appeal despite his repeated requests. The Idaho trial
court denied relief, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affrmed. Also affrming,
the Idaho Supreme Court held that Garza could not show the
requisite defcient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. In
doing so, the court concluded that the presumption of prejudice recognized
in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470, when trial counsel fails to
fle an appeal as instructed does not apply when the defendant has
agreed to an appeal waiver.
Held: Flores-Ortega's presumption of prejudice applies regardless of
whether a defendant has signed an appeal waiver. Pp. 237–247.
(a) Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, a defendant who
claims ineffective assistance of counsel must prove (1) “that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” id.,
at 687–688, and (2) that any such defciency was “prejudicial to the defense,”
id., at 692. However, “prejudice is presumed” in “certain Sixth
Amendment contexts,” ibid., such as “when counsel's constitutionally
defcient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise
would have taken,” Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S., at 484. P. 237.
(b) This case hinges on two procedural devices: appeal waivers and
notices of appeal. No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all
appellate claims. Because a plea agreement is essentially a contract, it
does not bar claims outside its scope. And, like any contract, the language
of appeal waivers can vary widely, leaving many types of claims
unwaived. A waived appellate claim may also proceed if the prosecution
forfeits or waives the waiver or if the government breaches the
agreement. Separately, some claims are treated as unwaiveable. Most
fundamentally, courts agree that defendants retain the right to challenge
whether the waiver itself was knowing and voluntary.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 233
Syllabus
The fling of a notice of appeal is “a purely ministerial task that imposes
no great burden on counsel.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S., at 474.
Filing requirements refect that appellate claims are likely to be ill defned
or unknown at the fling stage. And within the division of labor
between defendants and their attorneys, the “ultimate authority” to decide
whether to “take an appeal” belongs to the accused. Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751. Pp. 238–240.
(c) Garza's attorney rendered defcient performance by not fling a
notice of appeal in light of Garza's clear requests. Given the possibility
that a defendant will end up raising claims beyond an appeal waiver's
scope, simply fling a notice of appeal does not necessarily breach a plea
agreement. Thus, counsel's choice to override Garza's instructions was
not a strategic one. In any event, the bare decision whether to appeal
is ultimately the defendant's to make. Pp. 241–242.
(d) Because there is no dispute that Garza wished to appeal, a direct
application of Flores-Ortega's language resolves this case. Flores-
Ortega reasoned that because a presumption of prejudice applies whenever
“ `the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage,' ” it makes
greater sense to presume prejudice when counsel's defciency forfeits an
“appellate proceeding altogether.” 528 U. S., at 483. Because Garza
retained a right to appeal at least some issues despite his waivers, he
had a right to a proceeding and was denied that proceeding altogether
as a result of counsel's defcient performance. That he surrendered
many claims by signing appeal waivers does not change things. First,
the presumption of prejudice does not bend because a particular defendant
seems to have had poor prospects. See, e. g., Jae Lee v. United
States, 582 U. S. 357, 367–368. Second, while the defendant in Flores-
Ortega did not sign an appeal waiver, he did plead guilty, which “reduces
the scope of potentially appealable issues” on its own. 528 U. S., at 480.
Pp. 242–244.
(e) Contrary to the argument by Idaho and the U. S. Government, as
amicus, that Garza never “had a right” to his appeal and thus that any
defcient performance by counsel could not have caused the loss of any
such appeal, Garza did retain a right to his appeal; he simply had fewer
possible claims than some other appellants. The Government also proposes
a rule that would require a defendant to show—on a case-bycase
basis—that he would have presented claims that would have been
considered by the appellate court on the merits. This Court, however,
has already rejected attempts to condition the restoration of a defendant's
appellate rights forfeited by ineffective counsel on proof that the
defendant's appeal had merit. See, e. g., Rodriquez v. United States,
395 U. S. 327, 330. Moreover, it is not the defendant's role to decide
what arguments to press, making it especially improper to impose that
234 GARZA v. IDAHO
Syllabus
role upon the defendant simply because his opportunity to appeal was
relinquished by defcient counsel. And because there is no right to
counsel in postconviction proceedings and, thus, most applicants proceed
pro se, the Government's proposal would be unfair, ill advised, and unworkable.
Pp. 244–247.
162 Idaho 791, 405 P. 3d 576, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, and
in which Alito, J., joined as to Parts I and II, post, p. 248.
Amir H. Ali argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were David M. Shapiro, Catherine E. Stetson,
Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak, Mitchell P. Reich, and Maya
P. Waldron.
Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General of Idaho,
argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief
were Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General of Idaho, and
Paul R. Panther and Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorneys
General.
Allon Kedem argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney General
Benczkowski, Eric J. Feigin, and Sangita K. Rao.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Cato Institute
by Clark M. Neily III and Jay R. Schweikert; for the Ethics Bureau at
Yale by Lawrence J. Fox and Susan D. Reece Martyn; and for the Idaho
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Lauren M. Weinstein,
Robert K. Kry, Jonah Horwitz, Brian McComas, and Craig Durham.
A brief of amici curiae urging affrmance was fled for the State of
Louisiana et al. by Jeff Landry, Attorney General of Louisiana, Elizabeth
B. Murrill, Solicitor General, and Michelle Ghetti, Deputy Solicitor General,
and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as
follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Mark Brnovich of Arizona, Leslie
Rutledge of Arkansas, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana, Derek Schmidt of
Kansas, Doug Peterson of Nebraska, Josh Shapiro of Pennsylvania, Peter
F. Kilmartin of Rhode Island, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Ken Paxton
of Texas, Sean Reyes of Utah, Brad Schimel of Wisconsin, and Peter
K. Michael of Wyoming.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 235
Opinion of the Court
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470 (2000), this Court
held that when an attorney's defcient performance costs a
defendant an appeal that the defendant would have otherwise
pursued, prejudice to the defendant should be presumed
“with no further showing from the defendant of the
merits of his underlying claims.” Id., at 484. This case
asks whether that rule applies even when the defendant has,
in the course of pleading guilty, signed what is often called
an “appeal waiver”—that is, an agreement forgoing certain,
but not all, possible appellate claims. We hold that the presumption
of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega applies
regardless of whether the defendant has signed an appeal
waiver.
I
In early 2015, petitioner Gilberto Garza, Jr., signed two
plea agreements, each arising from criminal charges brought
by the State of Idaho. Each agreement included a clause
stating that Garza “waive[d] his right to appeal.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 44a, 49a. The Idaho trial court accepted the
agreements and sentenced Garza to terms of prison in accordance
with the agreements.
Shortly after sentencing, Garza told his trial counsel that
he wished to appeal.1 In the days that followed, he would
later attest, Garza “continuously reminded” his attorney of
this directive “via phone calls and letters,” Record 210, and
Garza's trial counsel acknowledged in his own affdavit that
Garza had “told me he wanted to appeal the sentence(s) of
1 The record suggests that Garza may have been confused as to whether
he had waived his appellate rights in the frst place. See Record 97 (answering
“No” on a court advisory form asking whether Garza had “waived
[his] right to appeal [his] judgment of conviction and sentence as part of
[his] plea agreement”); see also id., at 118, 121, 132 (showing that Garza's
sentencing judge and judgments of conviction provided, despite the appeal
waiver, generalized notice of a “right to appeal”). Because our ruling
does not turn on these facts, we do not address them further.
236 GARZA v. IDAHO
Opinion of the Court
the court,” id., at 151.2 Garza's trial counsel, however, did
not fle a notice of appeal. Instead, counsel “informed
Mr. Garza that an appeal was problematic because he waived
his right to appeal.” Ibid. The period of time for Garza's
appeal to be preserved came and went with no notice having
been fled on Garza's behalf.
Roughly four months after sentencing, Garza sought postconviction
relief in Idaho state court. As relevant here,
Garza alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to fle notices of appeal despite Garza's
requests. The Idaho trial court denied relief, and both the
Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court affrmed
that decision. See 162 Idaho 791, 793, 405 P. 3d 576,
578 (2017). The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Garza,
given the appeal waivers, needed to show both defcient performance
and resulting prejudice; it concluded that he could
not. See id., at 798, 405 P. 3d, at 583.
In ruling that Garza needed to show prejudice, the Idaho
Supreme Court acknowledged that it was aligning itself
with the minority position among courts. For example,
8 of the 10 Federal Courts of Appeals to have considered
the question have applied Flores-Ortega's presumption of
prejudice even when a defendant has signed an appeal
waiver.3 162 Idaho, at 795, 405 P. 3d, at 580.
2 Garza's affdavit states that he wished to argue, at least in part, that
he “was persuaded to plead guilty by [the] prosecuting attorney and [his]
counsel which was not voluntarily [sic].” Id., at 210.
3 Compare Campbell v. United States, 686 F. 3d 353, 359 (CA6 2012);
Watson v. United States, 493 F. 3d 960, 964 (CA8 2007); United States v.
Poindexter, 492 F. 3d 263, 273 (CA4 2007); United States v. Tapp, 491 F. 3d
263, 266 (CA5 2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F. 3d 770, 775 (CA2
2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F. 3d 788, 791–794 (CA11 2005);
United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F. 3d 1193, 1195–1199 (CA9 2005);
United States v. Garrett, 402 F. 3d 1262, 1266–1267 (CA10 2005), with
Nunez v. United States, 546 F. 3d 450, 455 (CA7 2008); United States v.
Mabry, 536 F. 3d 231, 241 (CA3 2008). At least two state courts have
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 237
Opinion of the Court
We granted certiorari to resolve the split of authority.
585 U. S. 1002 (2018). We now reverse.
II
A
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants
“the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for [their]
defence.” The right to counsel includes “ `the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.' ” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U. S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970)). Under Strickland, a defendant
who claims ineffective assistance of counsel must
prove (1) “that counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,” 466 U. S., at 687–688, and
(2) that any such defciency was “prejudicial to the defense,”
id., at 692.
“In certain Sixth Amendment contexts,” however, “prejudice
is presumed.” Ibid. For example, no showing of prejudice
is necessary “if the accused is denied counsel at a critical
stage of his trial,” United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648,
659 (1984), or left “entirely without the assistance of counsel
on appeal,” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U. S. 75, 88 (1988). Similarly,
prejudice is presumed “if counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing.” Cronic, 466 U. S., at 659. And, most relevant
here, prejudice is presumed “when counsel's constitutionally
defcient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that
he otherwise would have taken.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S.,
at 484. We hold today that this fnal presumption applies
even when the defendant has signed an appeal waiver.
declined to apply Flores-Ortega in the face of appeal waivers. See Buettner
v. State, 382 Mont. 410, 363 P. 3d 1147 (2015) (Table); Stewart v. United
States, 37 A. 3d 870, 877 (D. C. 2012); see also Kargus v. State, 284 Kan.
908, 922, 928, 169 P. 3d 307, 316, 320 (2007).
238 GARZA v. IDAHO
Opinion of the Court
B
It is helpful, in analyzing Garza's case, to frst address two
procedural devices on which the case hinges: appeal waivers
and notices of appeal.
1
We begin with the term “appeal waivers.” While the
term is useful shorthand for clauses like those in Garza's plea
agreements, it can misleadingly suggest a monolithic end to
all appellate rights.4 In fact, however, no appeal waiver
serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims.
As courts widely agree, “[a] valid and enforceable appeal
waiver . . . only precludes challenges that fall within its
scope.” United States v. Hardman, 778 F. 3d 896, 899 (CA11
2014); see also ibid., n. 2 (collecting cases from the 11 other
Federal Courts of Appeals with criminal jurisdiction); State
v. Patton, 287 Kan. 200, 228–229, 195 P. 3d 753, 771 (2008).
That an appeal waiver does not bar claims outside its scope
follows from the fact that, “[a]lthough the analogy may not
hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts.”
Puckett v. United States, 556 U. S. 129, 137 (2009).
As with any type of contract, the language of appeal waivers
can vary widely, with some waiver clauses leaving many
types of claims unwaived.5 Additionally, even a waived appellate
claim can still go forward if the prosecution forfeits
4 While this Court has never recognized a “constitutional right to an
appeal,” it has “held that if an appeal is open to those who can pay for it,
an appeal must be provided for an indigent.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S.
745, 751 (1983); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963); Griffn
v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion). Today, criminal defendants
in nearly all States have a right to appeal either by statute or
by court rule. See generally Robertson, The Right To Appeal, 91 N. C.
L. Rev. 1219, 1222, and n. 8 (2013). Criminal defendants in federal court
have appellate rights under 18 U. S. C. § 3742(a) and 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
5 See generally Brief for Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
et al. as Amici Curiae 6–10 (collecting examples of appeal waivers that
allowed challenges to the defendant's sentence or conviction or allowed
claims based on prosecutorial misconduct or changes in law).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 239
Opinion of the Court
or waives the waiver. E. g., United States v. Story, 439 F. 3d
226, 231 (CA5 2006). Accordingly, a defendant who has
signed an appeal waiver does not, in directing counsel to fle
a notice of appeal, necessarily undertake a quixotic or frivolous
quest.
Separately, all jurisdictions appear to treat at least some
claims as unwaiveable. Most fundamentally, courts agree
that defendants retain the right to challenge whether the
waiver itself is valid and enforceable—for example, on the
grounds that it was unknowing or involuntary.6 Consequently,
while signing an appeal waiver means giving up
some, many, or even most appellate claims, some claims nevertheless
remain.
2
It is also important to consider what it means—and does
not mean—for trial counsel to fle a notice of appeal.
“Filing such a notice is a purely ministerial task that imposes
no great burden on counsel.” Flores-Ortega, 528
U. S., at 474. It typically takes place during a compressed
6 See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 892 F. 3d 385, 394 (CADC 2018)
(“Like all other courts of appeals, our circuit holds that a defendant `may
waive his right to appeal his sentence as long as his decision is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary' ”); Spann v. State, 704 N. W. 2d 486, 491 (Minn.
2005) (“Jurisdictions allowing a defendant to waive his or her right to
appeal a conviction require that the waiver be made `intelligently, voluntarily
and with an understanding of the consequences' ”). Lower courts
have also applied exceptions for other kinds of claims, including “claims
that a sentence is based on race discrimination, exceeds the statutory maximum
authorized, or is the product of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
King & O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55
Duke L. J. 209, 224 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (collecting federal cases); see
also, e. g., United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F. 3d 1278, 1284 (CA11
2015) (“[A]ppellate review is also permitted when a defendant claims that
the government breached the very plea agreement which purports to bar
him from appealing or collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence”);
State v. Dye, 291 Neb. 989, 999, 870 N. W. 2d 628, 634 (2015) (holding that
appeal waivers are subject to a “miscarriage of justice” exception). We
make no statement today on what particular exceptions may be required.
240 GARZA v. IDAHO
Opinion of the Court
window: 42 days in Idaho, for example, and just 14 days in
federal court. See Idaho Rule App. Proc. 14(a) (2017); Fed.
Rule App. Proc. 4(b)(1)(A). By the time this window has
closed, the defendant likely will not yet have important documents
from the trial court, such as transcripts of key proceedings,
see, e. g., Idaho Rules App. Proc. 19 and 25; Fed.
Rule App. Proc. 10(b), and may well be in custody, making
communication with counsel diffcult, see Peguero v. United
States, 526 U. S. 23, 26 (1999). And because some defendants
receive new counsel for their appeals, the lawyer responsible
for deciding which appellate claims to raise may
not yet even be involved in the case.
Filing requirements reflect that claims are, accordingly,
likely to be ill defned or unknown at this stage.
In the federal system, for example, a notice of appeal need
only identify who is appealing; what “judgment, order,
or part thereof” is being appealed; and “the court to
which the appeal is taken.” Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(c)(1).
Generally speaking, state requirements are similarly
nonsubstantive.7
A notice of appeal also fts within a broader division of
labor between defendants and their attorneys. While “the
accused has the ultimate authority” to decide whether to
“take an appeal,” the choice of what specifc arguments to
make within that appeal belongs to appellate counsel. Jones
v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751 (1983); see also McCoy v. Louisiana,
584 U. S. 414, 421–422 (2018). In other words, fling a
notice of appeal is, generally speaking, a simple, nonsubstantive
act that is within the defendant's prerogative.
7 E. g., Miss. Rule Crim. Proc. 29.1(b) (2017); Ohio Rule App. Proc. 3(D)
(Lexis 2017). While Idaho requires a notice of appeal to “contain substantially
. . . [a] preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the
appellant then intends to assert in the appeal,” the Rule in question also
makes clear that “any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent
the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal.” Idaho Rule App.
Proc. 17(f ).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 241
Opinion of the Court
C
With that context in mind, we turn to the precise legal
issues here. As an initial matter, we note that Garza's attorney
rendered defcient performance by not fling the notice
of appeal in light of Garza's clear requests. As this Court
explained in Flores-Ortega:
“We have long held that a lawyer who disregards specifc
instructions from the defendant to fle a notice
of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable.
This is so because a defendant who instructs
counsel to initiate an appeal reasonably relies upon counsel
to fle the necessary notice. Counsel's failure to
do so cannot be considered a strategic decision; fling
a notice of appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the
failure to fle refects inattention to the defendant's
wishes.” 528 U. S., at 477 (citations omitted); see also
id., at 478.
Idaho maintains that the risk of breaching the defendant's
plea agreement renders counsel's choice to override the defendant's
instructions a strategic one. See Strickland, 466
U. S., at 690–691 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options
are virtually unchallengeable . . . ”). That is not so. While
we do not address what constitutes a defendant's breach of
an appeal waiver or any responsibility counsel may have to
discuss the potential consequences of such a breach, it should
be clear from the foregoing that simply fling a notice of appeal
does not necessarily breach a plea agreement, given the
possibility that the defendant will end up raising claims beyond
the waiver's scope. And in any event, the bare decision
whether to appeal is ultimately the defendant's, not counsel's,
to make.8 See McCoy, 584 U. S., at 421–422; Barnes,
8 That does not mean, of course, that appellate counsel must then make
unsupportable arguments. After an appeal has been preserved and counsel
has reviewed the case, counsel may always, in keeping with longstand242
GARZA v. IDAHO
Opinion of the Court
463 U. S., at 751. Where, as here, a defendant has expressly
requested an appeal, counsel performs defciently by disregarding
the defendant's instructions.9
D
We now address the crux of this case: whether Flores-
Ortega's presumption of prejudice applies despite an appeal
waiver. The holding, principles, and facts of Flores-Ortega
show why that presumption applies equally here.
With regard to prejudice, Flores-Ortega held that, to succeed
in an ineffective-assistance claim in this context, a defendant
need make only one showing: “that, but for counsel's
defcient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he
would have timely appealed.” 528 U. S., at 484. So long as
a defendant can show that “counsel's constitutionally defcient
performance deprive[d him] of an appeal that he otherwise
would have taken,” courts are to “presum[e] prejudice
with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of
his underlying claims.” Ibid. Because there is no dispute
here that Garza wished to appeal, see supra, at 235–236, a
direct application of Flores-Ortega's language resolves this
case. See 528 U. S., at 484.
Flores-Ortega's reasoning shows why an appeal waiver
does not complicate this straightforward application. That
case, like this one, involves a lawyer who forfeited an appellate
proceeding by failing to fle a notice of appeal. Id., at
473–475. As the Court explained, given that past preceing
precedent, “advise the court and request permission to withdraw,”
while fling “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal.” Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738, 744 (1967).
The existence of this procedure reinforces that a defendant's appellate
rights should not hinge “on appointed counsel's bare assertion that he or
she is of the opinion that there is no merit to the appeal.” Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U. S. 75, 80 (1988).
9 We leave undisturbed today Flores-Ortega's separate discussion of how
to approach situations in which a defendant's wishes are less clear. See
528 U. S., at 478–481.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 243
Opinion of the Court
dents call for a presumption of prejudice whenever “ `the accused
is denied counsel at a critical stage,' ” it makes even
greater sense to presume prejudice when counsel's defciency
forfeits an “appellate proceeding altogether.” Id., at 483.
After all, there is no disciplined way to “accord any ` “presumption
of reliability” ' . . . to judicial proceedings that
never took place.” Ibid. (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528
U. S. 259, 286 (2000)).
That rationale applies just as well here because, as discussed
supra, at 238–239, and nn. 5, 6, Garza retained a right
to appeal at least some issues despite the waivers he
signed.10 In other words, Garza had a right to a proceeding,
and he was denied that proceeding altogether as a result of
counsel's defcient performance.
That Garza surrendered many claims by signing his appeal
waivers does not change things. First, this Court has made
clear that when defcient counsel causes the loss of an entire
proceeding, it will not bend the presumption-of-prejudice
rule simply because a particular defendant seems to have
had poor prospects. See, e. g., Jae Lee v. United States,
582 U. S. 357, 367–368 (2017). We hew to that principle
again here.
Second, while the defendant in Flores-Ortega did not sign
an appeal waiver, he did plead guilty, and—as the Court
pointed out—“a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially
appealable issues” on its own. See 528 U. S., at 480. In
other words, with regard to the defendant's appellate prospects,
Flores-Ortega presented at most a difference of degree,
not kind, and prescribed a presumption of prejudice
regardless of how many appellate claims were foreclosed.
See id., at 484. We do no different today.
Instead, we reaffrm that, “when counsel's constitutionally
defcient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that
10 Or the State might not have invoked the waiver at all. E. g., United
States v. Archie, 771 F. 3d 217, 223, n. 2 (CA4 2014); State v. Rendon, 2012
WL 9492805, *1, n. 1 (Idaho Ct. App., May 11, 2012).
244 GARZA v. IDAHO
Opinion of the Court
he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out
a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling
him to an appeal,” with no need for a “further showing” of
his claims' merit, ibid., regardless of whether the defendant
has signed an appeal waiver.
III
Flores-Ortega states, in one sentence, that the loss of
the “entire [appellate] proceeding itself, which a defendant
wanted at the time and to which he had a right, . . . demands
a presumption of prejudice.” Id., at 483. Idaho and the
U. S. Government, participating as an amicus on Idaho's behalf,
seize on this language, asserting that Garza never “had
a right” to his appeal and thus that any defcient performance
by counsel could not have caused the loss of any such
appeal. See Brief for Respondent 11, 23–26; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 7, 13, 21–22. These arguments
miss the point. Garza did retain a right to his appeal;
he simply had fewer possible claims than some other
appellants. Especially because so much is unknown at the
notice-of-appeal stage, see supra, at 239–240, it is wholly
speculative to say that counsel's defciency forfeits no proceeding
to which a defendant like Garza has a right.11
The Government also takes its causation argument one
step further. Arguing that, in the appeal-waiver context, “a
generalized request that an attorney fle an appeal . . . is
not enough to show that appellate merits review would have
followed,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22, the
Government proposes a rule that would require a defendant
11 The possibility that an appellate court confronted with a waived claim
(and a motion to enforce the waiver) would technically “dismiss the appeal
without reaching the merits,” see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
17; see also Brief for Respondent 26, does not alter this conclusion.
Whatever the label, the defendant loses the opportunity to raise any appellate
claims at all—including those that would, or at least could, be heard
on the merits.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 245
Opinion of the Court
to show—on a “case-specifc” basis, id., at 23—either (1)
“that he in fact requested, or at least expressed interest in,
an appeal on a non-waived issue,” id., at 21–22, or alternatively
(2) “ `that there were nonfrivolous grounds for appeal'
despite the waiver,” id., at 22 (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528
U. S., at 485). We decline this suggestion, because it cannot
be squared with our precedent and would likely prove both
unfair and ineffcient in practice.
This Court has already rejected attempts to condition the
restoration of a defendant's appellate rights forfeited by ineffective
counsel on proof that the defendant's appeal had
merit. In Flores-Ortega, the Court explained that prejudice
should be presumed “with no further showing from the defendant
of the merits of his underlying claims.” Id., at 484;
see also id., at 486. In Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U. S.
327 (1969), similarly, the Court rejected a rule that required
a defendant whose appeal had been forfeited by counsel “to
specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal
reinstated.” Id., at 330. So too here.
Moreover, while it is the defendant's prerogative whether
to appeal, it is not the defendant's role to decide what arguments
to press. See Barnes, 463 U. S., at 751, 754. That
makes it especially improper to impose that role upon the
defendant simply because his opportunity to appeal was relinquished
by defcient counsel. “Those whose right to appeal
has been frustrated should be treated exactly like any
other appellants; they should not be given an additional hurdle
to clear just because their rights were violated at some
earlier stage in the proceedings.” Rodriquez, 395 U. S., at
330. We accordingly decline to place a pleading barrier between
a defendant and an opportunity to appeal that he
never should have lost.
Meanwhile, the Government's assumption that unwaived
claims can reliably be distinguished from waived claims
through case-by-case postconviction review is dubious.
There is no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings,
246 GARZA v. IDAHO
Opinion of the Court
see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555 (1987), and
most applicants proceed pro se.12 That means that the Government
effectively puts its faith in asking “an indigent, perhaps
pro se, defendant to demonstrate that his hypothetical
appeal might have had merit before any advocate has ever
reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially meritorious
grounds for appeal,” Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S., at 486.
We have already explained why this would be “unfair” and
ill advised. See ibid.; see also Rodriquez, 395 U. S., at 330.
Compounding the trouble, defendants would be asked to
make these showings in the face of the heightened standards
and related hurdles that attend many postconviction proceedings.
See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254, 2255; see also Brief
for Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae 22–25.
The Government's proposal is also unworkable. For one,
it would be diffcult and time consuming for a postconviction
court to determine—perhaps years later—what appellate
claims a defendant was contemplating at the time of
conviction.13 Moreover, because most postconviction petitioners
will be pro se, courts would regularly have to parse
both (1) what claims a pro se defendant seeks to raise
and (2) whether each plausibly invoked claim is subject to
the defendant's appeal waiver (which can be complex, see
supra, at 238–239, and nn. 5, 6), all without the assistance of
counseled briefng. We are not persuaded that this would
be a more effcient or trustworthy process than the one we
reaffrm today.
12 For example, researchers have found that over 90% of noncapital federal
habeas petitioners proceed without counsel. See N. King et al., Final
Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U. S. District Courts 23 (2007).
13 To the extent relief would turn on what precisely a defendant said to
counsel regarding specifc claims, moreover, Garza rightly points out the
serious risk of “causing indigent defendants to forfeit their rights simply
because they did not know what words to use.” Reply Brief 17.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 247
Opinion of the Court
The more administrable and workable rule, rather, is the
one compelled by our precedent: When counsel's defcient
performance forfeits an appeal that a defendant otherwise
would have taken, the defendant gets a new opportunity to
appeal. That is the rule already in use in 8 of the 10 Federal
Circuits to have considered the question, see supra, at 236,
and n. 3, and neither Idaho nor its amici have pointed us to
any evidence that it has proved unmanageable there.14 That
rule does no more than restore the status quo that existed
before counsel's defcient performance forfeited the appeal,
and it allows an appellate court to consider the appeal as
that court otherwise would have done—on direct review, and
assisted by counsel's briefng.
IV
We hold today that the presumption of prejudice recognized
in Flores-Ortega applies regardless of whether a defendant
has signed an appeal waiver. This ruling follows
squarely from Flores-Ortega and from the fact that even the
broadest appeal waiver does not deprive a defendant of all
appellate claims. Accordingly where, as here, an attorney
performed defciently in failing to fle a notice of appeal despite
the defendant's express instructions, prejudice is presumed
“with no further showing from the defendant of the
merits of his underlying claims.” See Flores-Ortega, 528
U. S., at 484.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho is therefore
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
14 It is, of course, inevitable that some defendants under this rule will
seek to raise issues that are within the scope of their appeal waivers. We
are confdent that courts can continue to deal effciently with such cases
via summary dispositions and the procedures outlined in Anders. See 386
U. S., at 744; n. 9, supra.
248 GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, and
with whom Justice Alito joins as to Parts I and II,
dissenting.
Petitioner Gilberto Garza avoided a potential life sentence
by negotiating with the State of Idaho for reduced charges
and a 10-year sentence. In exchange, Garza waived several
constitutional and statutory rights, including “his right to
appeal.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, 49a. Despite this express
waiver, Garza asked his attorney to challenge on appeal
the very sentence for which he had bargained. Garza's
counsel quite reasonably declined to fle an appeal for that
purpose, recognizing that his client had waived this right and
that fling an appeal would potentially jeopardize his plea
bargain. Yet, the majority fnds Garza's counsel constitutionally
ineffective, holding that an attorney's performance is
per se defcient and per se prejudicial any time the attorney
declines a criminal defendant's request to appeal an issue
that the defendant has waived. In effect, this results in
a “defendant-always-wins” rule that has no basis in Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470 (2000), or our other ineffectiveassistance
precedents, and certainly no basis in the original
meaning of the Sixth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.
I
In 2015, in accordance with two plea agreements, Garza
entered an Alford1 plea to aggravated assault and pleaded
guilty to possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine.
Under the terms of the plea agreements, Idaho
agreed not to (1) fle additional burglary and grand theft
charges; (2) refer Garza for federal prosecution on a charge of
unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon, see 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(g)(1); or (3) seek a “Persistent violator” sentencing enhancement
that would expose Garza to a potential life sen-
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (permitting
courts to accept guilty pleas where defendants admit that there is a factual
basis for the plea, but do not admit actual guilt).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 249
Thomas, J., dissenting
tence, see Idaho Code Ann. § 19–2514 (2017). In exchange,
Garza agreed to “ `waiv[e] his right to appeal' ” and his right
to fle a motion for correction or reduction of his sentence.2
Ante, at 235. And both parties agreed to specifc sentences
totaling 10 years of imprisonment, which would be binding
on the District Court if it accepted the plea agreements.
See Idaho Crim. Rules 11(f)(1)(C) and (f)(3) (2017) (allowing
parties to agree to a binding sentence). Thus, the judge
could impose no sentence other than the 10 years for which
Garza had bargained.3
The trial court accepted the plea agreements and, as required,
sentenced Garza to 10 years' imprisonment. However,
the court noted that if the cases had been “considered
individually, ” a “harsher sentence” might have been
warranted due to Garza's “history of violent crime” and
the “gratuitous aggression” displayed by Garza in the
aggravated-assault case. Record 336.
2 The majority questions the validity of Garza's appellate waivers by
suggesting that “Garza may have been confused as to whether he had
waived his appellate rights in the frst place.” Ante, at 235, n. 1. I read
the record differently. It is true that, in the guilty form related to his
possession charge, Garza checked “no” as to whether he was waiving his
appeal rights. But, in the guilty form related to his aggravated-assault
charge, he checked “yes” to waiving his appeal rights. And at the plea
hearing for that offense, he acknowledged under oath that he understood
all the questions, had received enough time with the guilty form, and answered
each question honestly. He also acknowledged at the sentencing
hearing for both offenses that he would be “go[ing] away for ten years,”
as negotiated for in the signed plea agreements that included the appeal
waivers. Record 131. Finally, the trial court in postconviction proceedings
concluded that Garza had never contended “at any stage of these
post-conviction cases” that “he did not appreciate or understand the appeal
waivers when he entered his pleas.” Id., at 185.
3 See id., at 96, 108 (“I understand that my plea agreement is a binding
plea agreement. This means that if the district court does not impose the
specifc sentence as recommended by both parties, I will be allowed to
withdraw my plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 11(d)(4) of the Idaho Criminal
Rules and proceed to a jury trial”); see also id., at 128.
250 GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
Four months later, Garza fled the petitions for postconviction
relief at issue here. Among other things, he claimed
that his pleas were not voluntary and that his counsel had
been constitutionally ineffective for failing to fle an appeal
despite repeated requests that he do so. For relief, Garza
requested that his sentences “run concurrent.” Id., at 207.
The trial court appointed counsel to pursue Garza's collateral
challenges. It subsequently dismissed Garza's claim that his
plea was involuntary for “lack of supporting evidence,” but
it allowed the ineffective-assistance claim to proceed. App.
to Pet for Cert. 29a; 162 Idaho 791, 793–794, 405 P. 3d 576,
578–579 (2017).
In response to Garza's ineffective-assistance claim, Idaho
submitted an affdavit from Garza's trial counsel, which
stated, “Garza indicated to me that he knew he agreed not
to appeal his sentence(s) but he told me he wanted to appeal
the sentence(s)” anyway. Record 151. The trial counsel
explained that he did not honor that request because “Garza
received the sentence(s) he bargained for in his [Idaho Criminal
Rule] 11(f)(1)(c) Agreement,” and he told Garza “that an
appeal was problematic because he waived his right to appeal
in his Rule 11 agreements.” Ibid. Garza, through his
newly appointed collateral counsel, admitted that the appeal
waiver “was by the book,” that he “received exactly what he
bargained for in exchange for his plea,” and that there was
“no ambiguity” as to the appropriate sentence. Id., at 161–
162, 276–277. Garza also conceded that, if forced to identify
an issue he would raise on appeal, “[t]he only issue that could
be identifed is sentencing review.” Id., at 176, 371.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Idaho. It
explained that Garza needed to identify “non-frivolous
grounds for contending on appeal either that (i) the appeal
waiver is invalid or unenforceable, or (ii) the issues he wants
to pursue on appeal are outside the waiver's scope.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 38a. The Idaho Court of Appeals and the
Idaho Supreme Court affrmed. Notably, the Idaho SuCite
as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 251
Thomas, J., dissenting
preme Court declined to presume negligent performance because
state law imposes a duty on counsel not to fle frivolous
litigation and to avoid taking actions that will jeopardize the
beneft his client gained from the plea bargain. The Idaho
Supreme Court also found Flores-Ortega inapplicable, reasoning
that once a defendant waives his appellate rights, he
no longer has a right to an appellate proceeding at all.
II
As with most ineffective-assistance claims, a defendant
seeking to show that counsel was constitutionally ineffective
for failing to fle an appeal must show defcient performance
and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687
(1984). Relying on Flores-Ortega, the majority fnds that
Garza has satisfed both prongs. In so holding, it adopts a
rule whereby a criminal defendant's invocation of the words
“I want to appeal” can undo all sworn attestations to the
contrary and resurrect waived statutory rights.
This rule is neither compelled by precedent nor consistent
with the use of appeal waivers in plea bargaining. In my
view, a defendant who has executed an appeal waiver cannot
show prejudice arising from his counsel's decision not to appeal
unless he (1) identifes claims he would have pursued
that were outside the appeal waiver; (2) shows that the plea
was involuntary or unknowing; or (3) establishes that the
government breached the plea agreement. Garza has not
made any such showing, so he cannot establish prejudice.
Furthermore, because Garza's counsel acted reasonably,
Garza also cannot establish defcient performance. I would
therefore affrm.
A
The majority relies on Flores-Ortega to create its new
rule, but if anything, that decision undermines the majority's
per se approach. In Flores-Ortega, the defendant pleaded
guilty to second-degree murder without waiving any of his
appellate rights. 528 U. S., at 473–474. On federal collat252
GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
eral review, the defendant alleged that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to fle a notice of appeal after she promised
to do so. Id., at 474. The record contained conficting evidence
as to whether the defendant had communicated his
desire to appeal, and the District Court concluded that he
failed to carry his burden. Id., at 475. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that “a habeas petitioner need only show
that his counsel's failure to fle a notice of appeal was without
the petitioner's consent.” Id., at 475–476.
This Court reversed. We frst concluded that the Ninth
Circuit's rule “effectively impose[d] an obligation on counsel
in all cases either (1) to fle a notice of appeal, or (2) to discuss
the possibility of an appeal with the defendant, ascertain his
wishes, and act accordingly.” Id., at 478. We rejected
“this per se rule as inconsistent with Strickland's holding
that `the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance
was reasonable considering all the circumstances.' ”
Ibid. (quoting 466 U. S., at 688). We also faulted the Ninth
Circuit for “fail[ing] to engage in the circumstance-specifc
reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland.” 528 U. S.,
at 478. We concluded that this failure “alone mandates vacatur
and remand.” Ibid.
We further explained that counsel's failure to consult with
the client about an appeal constitutes defcient performance
only when counsel should have consulted. Id., at 479. The
Court was clear: “We cannot say, as a constitutional matter,
that in every case counsel's failure to consult with the defendant
about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable.” Ibid.
In determining whether counsel has a duty to consult, we
stated that “a highly relevant factor in this inquiry will be
whether the conviction follows a trial or guilty plea, both
because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable
issues and because such a plea may indicate that the
defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings.” Id., at 480.
Finally, “[e]ven in cases when the defendant pleads guilty,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 253
Thomas, J., dissenting
the court must consider such factors as whether the defendant
received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea
and whether the plea expressly reserved or waived some
or all appeal rights.” Ibid. We rejected the argument that
choosing not to consult was outside the scope of valid, strategic
decisionmaking, as “we have consistently declined
to impose mechanical rules on counsel.” Id., at 481. In
sum, we “reject[ed] a bright-line rule that counsel must
always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal”
and instructed courts to evaluate whether the decision to
consult was “reasonable” under the circumstances. Id., at
480–481.
We also rejected the Ninth Circuit's “per se prejudice
rule” because it “ignore[d] the critical requirement that
counsel's defcient performance must actually cause the forfeiture
of the defendant's appeal.” Id., at 484. We held
that, “to show prejudice in these circumstances, a defendant
must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's defcient failure to consult with him about
an appeal, he would have timely appealed.” Ibid. After
the defendant makes that showing, we held that he was entitled
to a presumption of prejudice because he was denied
counsel during the entire appellate proceeding, rendering it
presumptively unreliable. Id., at 483–485.
The Court purports to follow Flores-Ortega, but glosses
over the important factual and legal differences between
that case and this one. The most obvious difference is also
the most crucial: There was no appellate waiver in Flores-
Ortega. The proximate cause of the defendant's failure to
appeal in that case was his counsel's failure to fle one. Not
so here. Garza knowingly waived his appeal rights and
never expressed a desire to withdraw his plea. It was thus
Garza's agreement to waive his appeal rights, not his attorney's
actions, that caused the forfeiture of his appeal. Thus,
Flores-Ortega is inapposite.
254 GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
B
Because Flores-Ortega does not control cases involving defendants
who voluntarily waive their appeal rights, this case
should be resolved based on a straightforward application
of Strickland. Under that framework, Garza has failed to
demonstrate either (1) that his counsel was defcient or (2)
that he was prejudiced in any way by that alleged defciency.
1
As to defciency, “[n]o particular set of detailed rules for
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety
of circumstances faced by defense counsel.” Strickland,
466 U. S., at 688–689. Accordingly, “[ j]udicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential” and focus
on “the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the
facts of the particular case.” Id., at 689–690.
Counsel's choice not to appeal Garza's sentence—the only
issue Garza asked his counsel to challenge—was not only not
defcient; it was the only professionally reasonable course of
action for counsel under the circumstances. That is because
fling an appeal would have been worse than pointless even
judging by Garza's own express desires; it would have created
serious risks for Garza while having no chance at all
of achieving Garza's stated goals for an appeal. Garza had
pleaded guilty under Rule 11, expressly waived his right to
appeal his sentence, and stated that his desire in appealing
was to have his consecutive sentences “r[u]n concurrent.”
Record 207. But that kind of appeal challenges the defning
feature of a Rule 11 plea: the agreed-upon sentence from
which the trial court has no discretion to deviate. Here,
that sentence includes the consecutive sentences that Garza
agreed to, then sought to challenge. Had Garza's counsel
refexively fled an appeal and triggered resentencing, Garza
might have faced life in prison, especially in light of the trial
court's concern that the agreed-upon sentence (from which it
could not deviate under Rule 11) might have been too lenient.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 255
Thomas, J., dissenting
And Garza's admissions at the plea hearings and his written
plea form could have been (and thus likely would have been)
used against him if he had proceeded to trial on any additional
charges fled by the State after breaching the plea
agreements. See id., at 104 (“[S]hould the court reinstate a
plea of not guilty on his behalf, the State will use Defendant's
testimony during his entry of plea of guilty and his written
plea form, during the State's case at trial”); id., at 92 (same).
Under these circumstances, it is eminently reasonable for
an attorney to “respec[t] his client's formal waiver of appeal”
and uphold his duty “to avoid taking steps that will cost
the client the beneft of the plea bargain.” Nunez v. United
States, 546 F. 3d 450, 453, 455 (CA7 2008) (Easterbrook, C. J.).
And because fling an appeal places the defendant's plea
agreement in jeopardy, an attorney's decision not to fle in
the face of an appellate waiver does not amount to the failure
to perform “a purely ministerial task” that “cannot be considered
a strategic decision.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S., at
477. Even where state law or a plea agreement preserves
limited appeal rights, an attorney does not fail to “show up
for appeal” by declining to challenge a waived issue. Nunez,
supra, at 454.
The defciency analysis in this case would likely be different
if Garza had informed his counsel that he desired to
breach the plea agreements and fle an appeal—despite the
waiver and in full awareness of the associated risks—for the
sake of an identifed goal that had any hope of being advanced
by the fling of an appeal. But the record shows that
Garza simply sought a more lenient sentence. Since that
goal could not be advanced by an appeal in this case, counsel
had no duty to fle one. The Constitution does not compel
attorneys to take irrational means to their client's stated
ends when doing so only courts disaster.
Garza ultimately faults his plea-stage attorney for failing
to put his plea agreements in jeopardy. But I have no doubt
that if a similarly situated attorney breached a plea agree256
GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
ment by appealing a waived issue and subjected his client to
an increased prison term, that defendant would argue that
his counsel was ineffective for fling the appeal. What
Garza wants—and what the majority gives him—is a per se
defciency rule ensuring that criminal defendants can always
blame their plea-stage counsel on collateral review, even
where they did not ask counsel to appeal nonwaived claims
or breach the plea agreement for the sake of some further
(achievable) goal. Declining to fle an appeal under these
circumstances is reasonable, not defcient.
2
As for prejudice, Garza cannot beneft from a presumedprejudice
fnding since he cannot establish that his counsel
caused the forfeiture of his appeal, as Flores-Ortega requires.
Garza knowingly and voluntarily bargained away
his right to appeal in exchange for a lower sentence. If any
prejudice resulted from that decision, it cannot be attributed
to his counsel.
It does not matter that certain appellate issues—
specifcally, (1) the voluntariness of the plea agreement and
(2) a breach of the agreement by the State—are not waivable.
Garza did not ask his counsel to appeal those issues.
In fact, Garza has not identifed any nonwaived issue that he
would have brought on direct appeal; he simply identifed
“sentencing review” as his primary objective. Moreover,
declining to fle an appeal raising these nonwaivable claims
is unlikely to be prejudicial; this Court has repeatedly stated
that collateral review is a better avenue to address involuntariness
and ineffective-assistance claims, as these claims
often require extra record materials and present conficts
with counsel. See generally Massaro v. United States, 538
U. S. 500 (2003).
The Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U. S. 414
(2018), does not change the analysis. McCoy acknowledges
that some decisions are “reserved for the client,” including
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 257
Thomas, J., dissenting
the decision whether to “forgo an appeal.” Id., at 422. But
Garza exercised his right to decide whether to appeal. He
chose not to when he entered the plea agreements. Like
many constitutional and statutory rights, the right to appeal
can be waived by the defendant, and once that choice is fnally
made, the defendant is bound by the decision and cannot
fault his attorney for the self-inficted prejudicial effects
that he suffers. For instance, a defendant cannot waive his
right against self-incrimination by testifying at his trial, and
then claim that his attorney prejudiced him by not moving
to strike his damaging testimony from the record. Nor can
a defendant waive his right to a jury trial, and then later
claim prejudice when his attorney declines to seek a mistrial
on the ground that the judge found him guilty. In the same
way, Garza was not prejudiced by his attorney's refusal to
fle an appeal challenging his sentence, a right that he had
expressly waived. The lack of prejudice is especially pronounced
in this case, as Garza's instruction to appeal did not
acknowledge that he wanted to challenge or rescind the
plea agreements.
C
There is no persuasive reason to depart from an ordinary
Strickland analysis in cases involving an attorney's decision
to honor his client's agreement to waive his appeal rights.
Garza contends that it is unfair to require pro se defendants
to identify the issues they would have raised on appeal. But
pro se defendants always bear the burden of showing ineffective
assistance of counsel; I see no reason why this kind of
ineffective-assistance claim should be any different. Regardless,
Garza's fairness argument rings hollow because
Garza has been represented by counsel at every stage of this
collateral litigation and has yet to articulate a single nonfrivolous,
nonwaived issue that he would have raised on appeal.
His inability to identify any issues that he preserved simply
underscores the fact that he waived them all.
258 GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
The Court's rule may be easy to “administ[er],” ante, at
247, but it undermines the fnality of criminal judgments—a
primary purpose of plea agreements—and disadvantages the
public by allowing defendants to relitigate issues that they
waived in exchange for substantial benefts. The Court's
rule also burdens the appellate courts that must address the
new, meritless appeals authorized by today's decision. And,
ironically, the Court's rule may prejudice the defendants it
is designed to help, as prosecutors may understandably be
less willing to offer generous plea agreements when courts
refuse to afford the government the beneft of its bargain—
fewer resources spent defending appeals.
Finally, because Garza's requested relief is categorically
barred by the plea agreements, the majority offers Garza an
appeal he is certain to lose. And should Garza accept the
majority's invitation, he could give up much more. If Garza
appeals his sentence and thereby breaches his plea agreements,
Idaho will be free to fle additional charges against
him, argue for a “Persistent violator” sentencing enhancement
that could land him in prison for life, and refer him
for federal prosecution. It simply defes logic to describe
counsel's attempt to avoid those consequences as defcient
or prejudicial.
III
In addition to breaking from this Court's precedent, today's
decision moves the Court another step further from
the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth
Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.” That provision “as originally
understood and ratifed meant only that a defendant had a
right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of
counsel.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356, 389 (2010)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet, the Court has read the Constitution
to require not only a right to counsel at taxpayers'
expense, but a right to effective counsel. The result is that
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 259
Thomas, J., dissenting
convicted criminals can relitigate their trial and appellate
claims through collateral challenges couched as ineffectiveassistance-
of-counsel claims. Because little available evidence
suggests that this reading is correct as an original
matter, the Court should tread carefully before extending
our precedents in this area.
A
The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel
grew out of the Founders' reaction to the English commonlaw
rule that denied counsel for treason and felony offenses
with respect to issues of fact, while allowing counsel for misdemeanors.
See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 349–350 (1769); 1 J. Stephen, A History of
the Criminal Law of England 341 (1883); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U. S. 45, 60 (1932) (“Originally, in England, a person
charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel,
except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself
might suggest”). It was not until 1696 that England
created a narrow exception to this rule for individuals accused
of treason or misprision of treason—by statute, Parliament
provided both that the accused may retain counsel and
that the court must appoint counsel if requested. 7 & 8 Will.
3, ch. 3, § 1. Only in 1836 did England permit all criminally
accused to appear and defend with counsel, and even then it
did not require court-appointed counsel at government expense.
6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 114, § 1. It would be another 67
years—112 years after the ratifcation of the Sixth Amendment,
and 35 years after the ratifcation of the Fourteenth
Amendment—before England provided court-appointed
counsel for all felonies. Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903,
3 Edw. 7, ch. 38, § 1.
The traditional common-law rule that there was no right to
assistance of counsel for felony offenses received widespread
criticism. As Blackstone noted, this rule “seems to be not
at all of a piece with the rest of the humane treatment of
260 GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
prisoners by the English law. ” 4 Commentaries on the
Laws of England, at 349; see ibid. (“[U]pon what face of reason
can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man,
which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty
trespass”). The founding generation apparently shared this
sentiment, as most States adopted some kind of statutory or
constitutional provision providing the accused the right to
retain counsel. W. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American
Courts 14–22 (1955). In fact, at least 12 of the 13 States
at the ratifcation of the Constitution had rejected the English
common-law rule, providing for the right to counsel in
at least some circumstances. See Powell, 287 U. S., at 64–
65; id., at 61–64 (surveying the States' right-to-counsel provisions);
see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 465–467 (1942)
(discussing early state constitutional provisions), overruled
by Gideon v. Wainwr ight, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). Read
against this backdrop, the Sixth Amendment appears to have
been understood at the time of ratifcation as a rejection of
the English common-law rule that prohibited counsel, not as
a guarantee of government-funded counsel.
This understanding—that the Sixth Amendment did not
require appointed counsel for defendants—persisted in the
Court's jurisprudence for nearly 150 years. See United
States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891) (“There is, however,
no general obligation on the part of the government
[to] retain counsel for defendants or prisoners”); Bute v. Illinois,
333 U. S. 640, 661, n. 17 (1948) (“ `It is probably safe to
say that from its adoption in 1791 until 1938, the right conferred
on the accused by the Sixth Amendment . . . was not
regarded as imposing on the trial judge in a Federal court
the duty to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant' ”).
Nor evidently was there any suggestion that defendants
could mount a constitutional attack based on their counsel's
failure to render effective assistance.4
4 A defendant could bring a state-law tort action against his attorney.
As one commentator explained:
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 261
Thomas, J., dissenting
The Court began shifting direction in 1932, when it suggested
that a right to appointed counsel might exist in at
least some capital cases, albeit as a right guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause. Powell, supra, at 71. Soon thereafter,
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment secures a
right to court-appointed counsel in all federal criminal cases.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 462–463 (1938). And in
1963, the Court applied this categorical rule to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, stating “that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” Gideon,
supra, at 344. Neither of these opinions attempted to
square the expansive rights they recognized with the
original meaning of the “right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel.” Amdt. 6.
B
After the Court announced a constitutional right to appointed
counsel rooted in the Sixth Amendment, it went on
to fashion a constitutional new-trial remedy for cases in
which counsel performed poorly. The Courts of Appeals
had initially adopted a “farce and mockery” standard that
they rooted in the Due Process Clause. This standard permitted
a defendant to make out an ineffective-assistance
“An attorney is bound to exercise such skill, care and diligence in any
matter entrusted to him, as members of the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such matters. . . . He will be liable if his client's
interests suffer on account of his failure to understand and apply those
rules and principles of law that are well established and clearly defned in
the elementary books, or which have been declared in adjudged cases that
have been duly reported and published a suffcient length of time to have
become known to those who exercise reasonable diligence in keeping pace
with the literature of the profession.” 2 T. Cooley, Law of Torts 1389–
1390 (3d ed. 1906).
Thus, reasonable choices not clearly foreclosed by law or precedent
would apparently permit an attorney to successfully defend against the
suit.
262 GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
claim only “where the circumstances surrounding the trial
shocked the conscience of the court and made the proceedings
a farce and a mockery of justice.” Diggs v. Welch, 148
F. 2d 667, 670 (CADC 1945); see Bottiglio v. United States,
431 F. 2d 930, 931 (CA1 1970) (per curiam); Williams v. Beto,
354 F. 2d 698, 704 (CA5 1965); Frand v. United States, 301
F. 2d 102, 103 (CA10 1962); O'Malley v. United States, 285
F. 2d 733, 734 (CA6 1961); Snead v. Smyth, 273 F. 2d 838, 842
(CA4 1959); Cofeld v. United States, 263 F. 2d 686, 689 (CA9),
vacated on other grounds, 360 U. S. 472 (1959); Johnston v.
United States, 254 F. 2d 239, 240 (CA8 1958); United States
v. Wight, 176 F. 2d 376, 379 (CA2 1949); United States ex rel.
Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F. 2d 976, 980–981 (CA7 1948).
Beginning in 1970, the Courts of Appeals moved from the
“farce and mockery” standard to a “reasonable competence”
standard. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 149, 151–
152 (CA2 1983) (collecting cases). That same year, this
Court similarly held that defendants are “entitled to the effective
assistance of competent counsel,” defned as receipt
of legal advice that is “within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970).
Then, in Strickland, the Court crafted the current standard
for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Without discussing the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment,
the Court stated that “[t]he Sixth Amendment recognizes
the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions
counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of
the adversarial system to produce just results.” 466 U. S.,
at 685. The Court thus held that, to succeed on an
ineffective-assistance claim, the defendant must show (1)
“that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness” and (2) “that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id., at
Cite as: 586 U. S. 232 (2019) 263
Thomas, J., dissenting
688, 694. The Court applies this standard in most situations,
but, as it does today, it has also created an increasing
number of per se rules in lieu of applying Strickland's factspecifc
inquiry, thereby departing even further from the
original meaning of the Sixth Amendment.
There are a few problems with these precedents that
should cause us to pause before extending them. First, the
ineffective-assistance standard apparently originated not in
the Sixth Amendment, but in our Due Process Clause jurisprudence.
See McMann, supra, at 771, n. 14. Second,
“[t]he Constitution, by its terms, does not mandate any particular
remedy for violations of its own provisions.” United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 157 (2006) (Alito, J.,
dissenting); cf. Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S. 586, 602–606
(2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the exclusionary
rule is not required by the Fourth Amendment).
Strickland does not explain how the Constitution requires a
new trial for violations of any right to counsel.
Third, our precedents seek to use the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to achieve an end it is not designed to guarantee.
The right to counsel is not an assurance of an errorfree
trial or even a reliable result. It ensures fairness in a
single respect: permitting the accused to employ the services
of an attorney. The structural protections provided in the
Sixth Amendment certainly seek to promote reliable criminal
proceedings, but there is no substantive right to a particular
level of reliability. In assuming otherwise, our evergrowing
right-to-counsel precedents directly confict with
the government's legitimate interest in the fnality of criminal
judgments. I would proceed with far more caution than
the Court has traditionally demonstrated in this area.
C
The Court should hesitate before further extending our
precedents and imposing additional costs on the taxpayers
264 GARZA v. IDAHO
Thomas, J., dissenting
and the Judiciary.5 History proves that the States and the
Federal Government are capable of making the policy determinations
necessary to assign public resources for appointed
counsel. The Court has acknowledged as much. Betts, 316
U. S., at 471 (declining to extend the right to counsel to the
States because “the matter has generally been deemed one
of legislative policy”). Before the Court decided Gideon,
the Court noted that “most of the States have by legislation
authorized or even required the courts to assign counsel for
the defense of indigent and unrepresented prisoners. As to
capital cases, all the States so provide. Thirty-four States
so provide for felonies and 28 for misdemeanors.” Bute, 333
U. S., at 663 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is beyond
our constitutionally prescribed role to make these policy
choices ourselves. Even if we adhere to this line of precedents,
our dubious authority in this area should give us
pause before we extend these precedents further.
5 In 2018, the Federal Government's budget for defense counsel had
grown to more than $1 billion. See Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2018, Pub. L. 115–141, Div. E, Tit. III, 132 Stat. 348. And the collateral
challenges produced by the Court's right-to-counsel jurisprudence consume
much of the federal courts' resources. Cf. Statistical Tables for the
Federal Judiciary—June 2018, Table B–7 (for 12-month period ending June
30, 2018, roughly 24% of appeals fled in the courts of appeals—8,914 of
37,487—were categorized as “Habeas Corpus” or “Motions to Vacate
Sentence”), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/statistical-tablesfederal-
judiciary-june-2018 (as last visited Feb. 25, 2019); id., Table C–2
(22,478 of 281,202 cases fled in federal district court, or roughly 8%).
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 265
Syllabus
MADISON v. ALABAMA
certiorari to the circuit court of alabama, mobile
county
No. 17–7505. Argued October 2, 2018—Decided February 27, 2019
In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, this Court held that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments precludes executing
a prisoner who has “lost his sanity” after sentencing. Id., at 406.
And in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930, the Court set out the
appropriate competency standard: A State may not execute a prisoner
whose “mental state is so distorted by a mental illness” that he lacks a
“rational understanding” of “the State's rationale for [his] execution.”
Id., at 958–959.
Petitioner Vernon Madison was found guilty of capital murder and
sentenced to death. While awaiting execution, he suffered a series of
strokes and was diagnosed with vascular dementia. In 2016, Madison
petitioned the state trial court for a stay of execution on the ground
that he was mentally incompetent, stressing that he could not recollect
committing the crime for which he had been sentenced to die. Alabama
responded that Madison had a rational understanding of the reasons for
his execution, even assuming he had no memory of committing his crime.
And more broadly, the State claimed that Madison failed to implicate
Ford and Panetti because both decisions concerned themselves with
gross delusions, which Madison did not have. Following a competency
hearing, the trial court found Madison competent to be executed. On
federal habeas review, this Court summarily reversed the Eleventh Circuit's
grant of relief, holding that, under the “demanding” and “deferential
standard” of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), “[n]either Panetti nor Ford `clearly established' that a
prisoner is incompetent to be executed” because of a simple failure to
remember his crime. Dunn v. Madison, 583 U. S. 10, 13. But the
Court “express[ed] no view” on the question of Madison's competency
outside of the AEDPA context. Id., at 14. When Alabama set a 2018
execution date, Madison returned to state court, arguing once more that
his mental condition precluded the State from going forward. The
state court again found Madison mentally competent.
Held:
1. Under Ford and Panetti, the Eighth Amendment may permit executing
a prisoner even if he cannot remember committing his crime.
Panetti asks only about a person's comprehension of the State's reasons
266 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Syllabus
for resorting to punishment, not his memory of the crime itself. And
the one may exist without the other. Such memory loss, however, still
may factor into the analysis Panetti demands. If that loss combines
and interacts with other mental shortfalls to deprive a person of the
capacity to comprehend why the State is exacting death as a punishment,
then the Panetti standard will be satisfed. Pp. 274–277.
2. Under Ford and Panetti, the Eighth Amendment may prohibit executing
a prisoner even though he suffers from dementia or another disorder
rather than psychotic delusions. The Panetti standard focuses on
whether a mental disorder has had a particular effect; it has no interest
in establishing any precise cause. Panetti's references to “gross delusions,”
551 U. S., at 960, are no more than a predictable byproduct of
that case's facts. Ford and Panetti hinge on the prisoner's “[in]comprehension
of why he has been singled out” to die, 477 U. S., at 409, and
kick in if and when that failure of understanding is present, irrespective
of whether one disease or another is to blame. In evaluating competency,
a judge must therefore look beyond any given diagnosis to a
downstream consequence. Pp. 277–279.
3. Because this Court is uncertain whether the state court's decision
was tainted by legal error, this case is remanded to that court for renewed
consideration of Madison's competency. The state court's brief 2018
ruling—which states only that Madison “did not prove a substantial
threshold showing of insanity[ ]”—does not provide any assurance that
the court knew a person with dementia, and not psychotic delusions, might
receive a stay of execution. Nor does that court's initial 2016 opinion.
The sole question on which Madison's competency depends is whether he
can reach a rational understanding of why the State wants to execute
him. In answering that question—on which this Court again expresses
no view—the state court may not rely on any arguments or evidence
tainted with the legal errors addressed by this Court. Pp. 280–283.
Vacated and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., fled a
dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ., joined, post, p. 283.
Kavanaugh, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Bryan A. Stevenson argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Angela L. Setzer and Randall
S. Susskind.
Thomas R. Govan, Jr., Deputy Attorney General of Alabama,
argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 267
Opinion of the Court
Steve Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, Clay Crenshaw,
Chief Deputy Attorney General, Eric Palmer, Assistant
Solicitor General, and James R. Houts, Deputy Attorney
General.*
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Eighth Amendment, this Court has held, prohibits the
execution of a prisoner whose mental illness prevents him
from “rational[ly] understanding” why the State seeks to impose
that punishment. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S.
930, 959 (2007). In this case, Vernon Madison argued that
his memory loss and dementia entitled him to a stay of execution,
but an Alabama court denied the relief. We now address
two questions relating to the Eighth Amendment's bar,
disputed below but not in this Court. First, does the Eighth
Amendment forbid execution whenever a prisoner shows
that a mental disorder has left him without any memory of
committing his crime? We (and, now, the parties) think not,
because a person lacking such a memory may still be able to
form a rational understanding of the reasons for his death
sentence. Second, does the Eighth Amendment apply similarly
to a prisoner suffering from dementia as to one experiencing
psychotic delusions? We (and, now, the parties)
*David W. Ogden, Daniel S. Volchok, Aaron M. Panner, Nathalie F.
P. Gilfoyle, and Deanne M. Ottaviano fled a brief for the American Psychological
Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Texas et al. by Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Scott A. Keller,
Solicitor General, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant Attorney General, and
Rance Craft, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective States as follows: Mark Brnovich of Arizona, Leslie
Rutledge of Arkansas, Pamela Jo Bondi of Florida, Christopher M. Carr
of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., of Indiana,
Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Jim Hood of Mississippi,
Josh Hawley of Missouri, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson
of South Carolina, and Herbert H. Slatery III of Tennessee; and for the
National Association of Police Organizations by Thomas R. McCarthy, J.
Michael Connolly, and William J. Johnson.
268 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Opinion of the Court
think so, because either condition may—or, then again, may
not—impede the requisite comprehension of his punishment.
The only issue left, on which the parties still disagree, is
what those rulings mean for Madison's own execution. We
direct that issue to the state court for further consideration
in light of this opinion.
I
A
This Court decided in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399
(1986), that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments precludes executing a prisoner who has
“lost his sanity” after sentencing. Id., at 406. While on
death row, Alvin Ford was beset by “pervasive delusion[s]”
associated with “[p]aranoid [s]chizophrenia.” Id., at 402–
403. Surveying both the common law and state statutes,
the Court found a uniform practice against taking the life of
such a prisoner. See id., at 406–409. Among the reasons
for that time-honored bar, the Court explained, was a moral
“intuition” that “killing one who has no capacity” to understand
his crime or punishment “simply offends humanity.”
Id., at 407, 409; see id., at 409 (citing the “natural abhorrence
civilized societies feel” at performing such an act). Another
rationale rested on the lack of “retributive value” in executing
a person who has no comprehension of the meaning of
the community's judgment. Ibid.; see id., at 421 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that
the death penalty's “retributive force[ ] depends on the defendant's
awareness of the penalty's existence and purpose”).
The resulting rule, now stated as a matter of constitutional
law, held “a category of defendants defned by their mental
state” incompetent to be executed. Id., at 419.
The Court clarifed the scope of that category in Panetti
v. Quarterman by focusing on whether a prisoner can “reach
a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.”
551 U. S., at 958. Like Alvin Ford, Scott Panetti suffered
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 269
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from “gross delusions” stemming from “extreme psychosis.”
Id., at 936, 960. In reversing a ruling that he could still be
executed, the Panetti Court set out the appropriate “standard
for competency.” Id., at 957. Ford, the Court now
noted, had not provided “specifc criteria.” 551 U. S., at 957.
But Ford had explored what lay behind the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition, highlighting that the execution of a prisoner
who cannot comprehend the reasons for his punishment
offends moral values and “serves no retributive purpose.”
551 U. S., at 958. Those principles, the Panetti Court explained,
indicate how to identify prisoners whom the State
may not execute. The critical question is whether a “prisoner's
mental state is so distorted by a mental illness” that he
lacks a “rational understanding” of “the State's rationale for
[his] execution.” Id., at 958–959. Or similarly put, the
issue is whether a “prisoner's concept of reality” is “so impair[
ed]” that he cannot grasp the execution's “meaning and
purpose” or the “link between [his] crime and its punishment.”
Id., at 958, 960.
B
Vernon Madison killed a police offcer in 1985 during a
domestic dispute. An Alabama jury found him guilty of
capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death.
He has spent most of the ensuing decades on the State's
death row.
In recent years, Madison's mental condition has sharply
deteriorated. Madison suffered a series of strokes, including
major ones in 2015 and 2016. See Tr. 19, 46–47 (Apr. 14,
2016). He was diagnosed as having vascular dementia, with
attendant disorientation and confusion, cognitive impairment,
and memory loss. See id., at 19–20, 52–54. In particular,
Madison claims that he can no longer recollect committing
the crime for which he has been sentenced to die.
See Tr., Pet. Exh. 2, p. 8.
After his 2016 stroke, Madison petitioned the trial court
for a stay of execution on the ground that he had become
270 MADISON v. ALABAMA
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mentally incompetent. Citing Ford and Panetti, he argued
that “he no longer understands” the “status of his case” or
the “nature of his conviction and sentence.” Pet. for Suspension
in No. CC–85–1385.80 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala.,
Feb. 12, 2016), pp. 11, 14. And in a later fling, Madison emphasized
that he could not “independently recall the facts of
the offense he is convicted of.” Brief Pursuant to Order
(Apr. 21, 2016), p. 8. Alabama countered that Madison had
“a rational understanding of [the reasons for] his impending
execution,” as required by Ford and Panetti, even assuming
he had no memory of committing his crime. Brief on Madison's
Competency (April 21, 2016), pp. 4–5, 8. And more
broadly, the State claimed that Madison could not possibly
qualify as incompetent under those two decisions because
both “concerned themselves with `[g]ross delusions' ”—which
all agree Madison does not have. Id., at 2; see ibid. (Madison
“failed to implicate” Ford and Panetti because he “does
not suffer from psychosis or delusions”).
Expert reports from two psychologists largely aligned
with the parties' contending positions. Dr. John Goff, Madison's
expert, found that although Madison “underst[ood] the
nature of execution” in the abstract, he did not comprehend
the “reasoning behind” Alabama's effort to execute him.
Tr., Pet. Exh. 2 (Apr. 14, 2016), p. 8; see id., at 9. Goff stated
that Madison had “Major Vascular Neurological Disorder”—
also called vascular dementia—which had caused “signifcant
cognitive decline.” Ibid. And Goff underscored that Madison
“demonstrate[d] retrograde amnesia” about his crime,
meaning that he had no “independent recollection[ ]” of the
murder. Id., at 8; see id., at 9. For his part, Dr. Karl Kirkland,
the court-appointed expert, reported that Madison
“was able to discuss his case” accurately and “appear[ed] to
understand his legal situation.” Tr., Ct. Exh. 1, pp. 10–11.
Although Kirkland acknowledged that Madison's strokes had
led to cognitive decline, see id., at 10, the psychologist
made no mention of Madison's diagnosed vascular dementia.
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Rather, Kirkland highlighted that “[t]here was no evidence
of psychosis, paranoia, or delusion.” Id., at 9; see ibid.
(Madison “did not seem delusional at all”).
At a competency hearing, Alabama similarly stressed Madison's
absence of psychotic episodes or delusions. The State
asked both experts to affrm that Madison was “neither delusional
[n]or psychotic.” Tr. 56; see id., at 22. And its closing
argument focused on their agreement that he was not.
As the State summarized: “He's not psychotic. He's not delusional.”
Id., at 81. On the State's view, that fact answered
the competency question because “[t]he Supreme
Court is looking at whether someone's delusions or someone's
paranoia or someone's psychosis is standing in the way of ”
rationally understanding his punishment. Id., at 82. Madison's
counsel disputed that point. “[T]he State would like
to say, well, he's not delusional, he's not psychotic,” the attorney
recapped. Id., at 83. But, she continued, “[t]hat's not
really the criteria” under Panetti. Tr. 83. Rather, the
Court there barred executing a person with any mental illness—“
dementia” and “brain injuries” no less than psychosis
and delusions—that prevents him from comprehending “why
he is being executed.” Ibid.
The trial court found Madison competent to be executed.
Its order frst recounted the evidence given by each expert
witness. The summary of Kirkland's report and testimony
began by stating that the psychologist had “found no evidence
of paranoia[,] delusion [or] psychosis. ” Order
(Apr. 29, 2016), p. 5 (2016 Order). The court then noted Kirkland's
view that Madison could “give details of the history
of his case” and “appear[ed] to understand his legal situation.”
Ibid. Turning to the Goff report, the court noted
the expert's fnding that Madison was “amnesic” and could
not recollect his crime. Id., at 6; see id., at 7. In a single,
fnal paragraph, the court provided both its ruling and its
reasoning. Madison had failed to show, the court wrote, that
he did not “rationally understand the punishment he is about
272 MADISON v. ALABAMA
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to suffer and why he is about to suffer it.” Id., at 10. The
court “accept[ed] the testimony of Dr. Kirkland as to the understanding
Madison has concerning the situation.” Ibid.
“Further,” the court concluded, “the evidence does not support
that Mr. Madison is delusional.” Ibid.
Madison next sought habeas relief in federal court, where
he faced the heavy burden of showing that the state-court
ruling “involved an unreasonable application of[ ] clearly established
federal law” or rested on an “unreasonable determination
of the facts.” Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The
District Court rejected his petition, but the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Madison had demonstrated
both kinds of indisputable error. See Madison v.
Commissioner, 851 F. 3d 1173 (2017). This Court then summarily
reversed the appeals court's decision. See Dunn v.
Madison, 583 U. S. 10 (2017) (per curiam). We explained,
contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's principal holding, that
“[n]either Panetti nor Ford `clearly established' that a prisoner
is incompetent to be executed” because of a simple failure
to remember his crime. Id., at 13. And we found that
the state court did not act unreasonably—otherwise put, did
not err “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”—
when it found that Madison had the necessary understanding
to be executed. Id., at 14 (internal quotation
marks omitted). But we made clear that our decision was
premised on AEDPA's “demanding” and “deferential standard.”
Id., at 12, 14. “We express[ed] no view” on the
question of Madison's competency “outside of the AEDPA
context.” Id., at 14.1
1 Neither did we opine on—or even mention—the subsidiary legal question
whether a mental disorder other than delusions may render a person
incompetent to be executed. Alabama told the Eleventh Circuit that it
could not, thus reprising the claim the State had made in the trial court.
See Madison, 851 F. 3d, at 1188 (describing Alabama's argument that “only
a prisoner suffering from gross delusions can show incompetency under
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 273
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When Alabama set an execution date in 2018, Madison returned
to state court to argue again that his mental condition
precluded the State from going forward. In his petition,
Madison reiterated the facts and arguments he had previously
presented to the state court. But Madison also
claimed that since that court's decision (1) he had suffered
further cognitive decline and (2) a state board had suspended
Kirkland's license to practice psychology, thus discrediting
his prior testimony. See Pet. to Suspend Execution in
No. CC–85–1385.80 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Dec. 18, 2017),
pp. 1–2, 16–19.2 Alabama responded that nothing material
had changed since the court's frst competency hearing. See
Motion to Dismiss (Dec. 20, 2017), p. 9. The State also repeated
its argument that Panetti permits executing Madison,
pointing to the experts' agreement that he is “not delusional
or psychotic” and asserting that neither “memory impairment
[n]or dementia [could] suffce to satisfy the Panetti and
Ford standards” without “an expansion” of those decisions.
Motion to Dismiss 4, 10. A week before the scheduled execution,
the state court again found Madison mentally competent.
Its brief order stated only that Madison “did not
Panetti”); Recording of Oral Arg. in No. 16–12279 (CA11, June 23, 2016),
at 26:36–26:45 (“In this case, what we have is someone who claims to have
a mental illness, dementia,” but does not have “delusions, which is what
Panetti requires”); id., at 26:48–27:21 (When asked if someone with “severe
dementia” but no delusions could be executed, the State responded “I
think so because . . . they don't have delusions”). (Alabama alternatively
argued that the state court's decision was not based on that view, see Brief
for Appellee in No. 16–12279 (CA11), pp. 37–38; the quotations the dissent
picks out, see post, at 292–294, n. 4, come from that additional argument.)
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the State's contention that dementia could
not preclude an execution as “inconsistent with the principles underlying”
Ford and Panetti. 851 F. 3d, at 1188. But we had no reason to address
that holding in light of the errors we saw in other parts of the appeals
court's analysis.
2 As Madison's petition recounted, the license suspension followed the
opening of a criminal investigation into whether Kirkland had committed
narcotics offenses. See Pet. to Suspend Execution 17–19.
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provide a substantial threshold showing of insanity[ ] suffcient
to convince this Court to stay the execution.” App. A
to Pet. for Cert.
Madison then fled in this Court a request to stay his execution
and a petition for certiorari. We ordered the stay on
the scheduled execution date and granted the petition a few
weeks later. See 583 U. S. 1108 and 1155 (2018). Because
the case now comes to us on direct review of the state court's
decision (rather than in a habeas proceeding), AEDPA's deferential
standard no longer governs. (And for that reason—
contrary to the dissent's suggestion, post, at 294—our decision
on Madison's habeas petition cannot help resolve the
questions raised here.)
II
Two issues relating to Panetti's application are before us.
Recall that our decision there held the Eighth Amendment
to forbid executing a prisoner whose mental illness makes
him unable to “reach a rational understanding of the reason
for [his] execution.” 551 U. S., at 958; see supra, at 268.
The frst question presented is whether Panetti prohibits executing
Madison merely because he cannot remember committing
his crime. The second question raised is whether
Panetti permits executing Madison merely because he suffers
from dementia, rather than psychotic delusions.3 In
3 The dissent is in high dudgeon over our taking up the second question,
arguing that it was not presented in Madison's petition for certiorari. See
post, at 283–289. But that is incorrect. The petition presented two questions—
the same two we address here. The frst question asked whether
the Eighth Amendment bars executing Madison because he has no “memory
of his commission of the capital offense.” Pet. for Cert. iii. The second
question asked whether that Amendment bars his execution because
his “vascular dementia” and “severe cognitive dysfunction” prevent him
from either remembering his crime “or understanding the circumstances
of his scheduled execution.” Ibid. So the frst question concerned
whether memory loss alone could form the basis of a Panetti claim and
the second whether the varied consequences of dementia could do so. The
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 275
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prior stages of this case, as we have described, the parties
disagreed about those matters. See supra, at 270–274.
But at this Court, Madison accepted Alabama's position on the
frst issue and Alabama accepted Madison's on the second.
See, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 36. And rightly so. As the parties
now recognize, the standard set out in Panetti supplies the
answers to both questions. First, a person lacking memory
of his crime may yet rationally understand why the State
seeks to execute him; if so, the Eighth Amendment poses no
bar to his execution. Second, a person suffering from dementia
may be unable to rationally understand the reasons for his
sentence; if so, the Eighth Amendment does not allow his
execution. What matters is whether a person has the “rational
understanding” Panetti requires—not whether he has
any particular memory or any particular mental illness.
A
Consider initially a person who cannot remember his crime
because of a mental disorder, but who otherwise has full cognitive
function. The memory loss is genuine: Let us say the
person has some kind of amnesia, which has produced a black
hole where that recollection should be. But the person remains
oriented in time and place; he can make logical connections
and order his thoughts; and he comprehends familiar
concepts of crime and punishment. Can the State execute
body of the petition, to be sure, devoted more space to the frst question.
But it clearly referenced the second. See Pet. for Cert. 18 (“[T]his Court
has never sought to constrain the world of maladies that can give rise to
a fnding that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed”); id., at 25
(“[C]ourts have recognized dementia and attendant cognitive decline and
memory impairment as a basis for a fnding of incompetency to be executed”).
And in any event, the number of words spent on each is not
what matters. Our Rule states that the Court will consider “[o]nly the
questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein.” This Court's
Rule 14.1(a). Here, we consider, in order, the two questions set out in
Madison's petition.
276 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Opinion of the Court
him for a murder? When we considered this case before,
using the deferential standard applicable in habeas, we held
that a state court could allow such an execution without committing
inarguable error. See Madison, 583 U. S., at 13
(stating that no prior decision had “clearly established” the
opposite); supra, at 272. Today, we address the issue
straight-up, sans any deference to a state court. Again, is
the failure to remember committing a crime alone enough to
prevent a State from executing a prisoner?
It is not, under Panetti's own terms. That decision asks
about understanding, not memory—more specifcally, about
a person's understanding of why the State seeks capital punishment
for a crime, not his memory of the crime itself. And
the one may exist without the other. Do you have an independent
recollection of the Civil War? Obviously not. But
you may still be able to reach a rational—indeed, a sophisticated—
understanding of that confict and its consequences.
Do you recall your frst day of school? Probably not. But
if your mother told you years later that you were sent home
for hitting a classmate, you would have no trouble grasping
the story. And similarly, if you somehow blacked out a
crime you committed, but later learned what you had done,
you could well appreciate the State's desire to impose a penalty.
Assuming, that is, no other cognitive impairment, loss
of memory of a crime does not prevent rational understanding
of the State's reasons for resorting to punishment. And
that kind of comprehension is the Panetti standard's singular
focus.
The same answer follows from the core justifcations Panetti
offered for framing its Eighth Amendment test as it
did. Echoing Ford, Panetti reasoned that execution has no
retributive value when a prisoner cannot appreciate the
meaning of a community's judgment. See 551 U. S., at 958–
959 (citing 477 U. S., at 407–408); supra, at 269. But as just
explained, a person who can no longer remember a crime
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 277
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may yet recognize the retributive message society intends to
convey with a death sentence. Similarly, Ford and Panetti
stated that it “offends humanity” to execute a person so
wracked by mental illness that he cannot comprehend the
“meaning and purpose of the punishment.” 477 U. S., at 407;
551 U. S., at 960; see id., at 958. But that offense to morality
must be much less when a person's mental disorder causes
nothing more than an episodic memory loss. Moral values
do not exempt the simply forgetful from punishment, whatever
the neurological reason for their lack of recall.
But such memory loss still may factor into the “rational
understanding” analysis that Panetti demands. If that loss
combines and interacts with other mental shortfalls to deprive
a person of the capacity to comprehend why the State
is exacting death as punishment, then the Panetti standard
will be satisfed. That may be so when a person has diffculty
preserving any memories, so that even newly gained
knowledge (about, say, the crime and punishment) will be
quickly forgotten. Or it may be so when cognitive defcits
prevent the acquisition of such knowledge at all, so that
memory gaps go forever uncompensated. As Panetti indicated,
neurologists, psychologists, and other experts can contribute
to a court's understanding of issues of that kind.
See id., at 962. But the sole inquiry for the court remains
whether the prisoner can rationally understand the reasons
for his death sentence.
B
Next consider a prisoner who suffers from dementia or a
similar disorder, rather than psychotic delusions. The dementia,
as is typical, has compromised this prisoner's cognitive
functions. But it has not resulted in the kind of delusional
beliefs that Alvin Ford and Scott Panetti held. May
the prisoner nonetheless receive a stay of execution under
Ford and Panetti? Or instead, is a delusional disorder a
prerequisite to declaring a mentally ill person incompetent
278 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Opinion of the Court
to be executed? We did not address that issue when we last
considered this case, on habeas review; in that sense, the question
is one of frst impression. See supra, at 272–273, n. 1.
But here too, Panetti has already answered the question.
Its standard focuses on whether a mental disorder has had a
particular effect: an inability to rationally understand why
the State is seeking execution. See supra, at 268–269.
Conversely, that standard has no interest in establishing any
precise cause: Psychosis or dementia, delusions or overall
cognitive decline are all the same under Panetti, so long as
they produce the requisite lack of comprehension. To be
sure, Panetti on occasion spoke of “gross delusions” in explaining
its holding. 551 U. S., at 960. And similarly, Ford
talked about the “insane,” which sometimes refers to persons
holding such irrational beliefs. See, e. g., 477 U. S., at 401,
410.4 But those references are no more than a predictable
byproduct of the two cases' facts. At the same time (and
interchangeably), Panetti used more inclusive terms, such as
“mental illness,” “mental disorder,” and “psychological dysfunction.”
551 U. S., at 936, 959, 960; see Ford, 477 U. S., at
408–409, n. 2 (referring to prisoners with “mental illness”).
And most important, Panetti framed its test, as just described,
in a way utterly indifferent to a prisoner's specifc mental
illness. The Panetti standard concerns, once again, not the
diagnosis of such illness, but a consequence—to wit, the
prisoner's inability to rationally understand his punishment.
And here too, the key justifcations Ford and Panetti offered
for the Eighth Amendment's bar confrm our conclusion
4 Alternatively, however, the term may also be used to encompass persons
with other mental conditions, so long as they are “severe enough [to]
prevent[ ] a person from having legal capacity and excuse[ ] the person
from criminal or civil responsibility.” Black's Law Dictionary 914 (10th
ed. 2014). In that different understanding, “insanity” connotes a general
standard of legal competency rather than a more limited description of
delusional disorders.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 279
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about its reach. As described above, those decisions stated
that an execution lacks retributive purpose when a mentally
ill prisoner cannot understand the societal judgment underlying
his sentence. See Panetti, 551 U. S., at 958–959; Ford,
477 U. S., at 409; supra, at 268–269. And they indicated that
an execution offends morality in the same circumstance.
See 551 U. S., at 958, 960; 477 U. S., at 409; supra, at 268–
269. Both rationales for the constitutional bar thus hinge
( just as the Panetti standard deriving from them does) on
the prisoner's “[in]comprehension of why he has been singled
out” to die. 477 U. S., at 409; see supra, at 268–269. Or
said otherwise, if and when that failure of understanding is
present, the rationales kick in—irrespective of whether one
disease or another (say, psychotic delusions or dementia) is
to blame.
In evaluating competency to be executed, a judge must
therefore look beyond any given diagnosis to a downstream
consequence. As Ford and Panetti recognized, a delusional
disorder can be of such severity—can “so impair the prisoner's
concept of reality”—that someone in its thrall will be
unable “to come to grips with” the punishment's meaning.
Panetti, 551 U. S., at 958; Ford, 477 U. S., at 409. But delusions
come in many shapes and sizes, and not all will interfere
with the understanding that the Eighth Amendment requires.
See Panetti, 551 U. S., at 962 (remanding the case
to consider expert evidence on whether the prisoner's delusions
did so). And much the same is true of dementia.
That mental condition can cause such disorientation and cognitive
decline as to prevent a person from sustaining a rational
understanding of why the State wants to execute him.
See supra, at 277–278. But dementia also has milder forms,
which allow a person to preserve that understanding.
Hence the need—for dementia as for delusions as for any other
mental disorder—to attend to the particular circumstances of
a case and make the precise judgment Panetti requires.
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III
The only question left—and the only one on which the parties
now disagree—is whether Madison's execution may go
forward based on the state court's decision below. Madison's
counsel says it cannot because that ruling was tainted
by legal error—specifcally, the idea that only delusions, and
not dementia, can support a fnding of mental incompetency.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 21, 25, 27. Alabama counters that
the state court did not rely on that (concededly) incorrect
view of the law. See id., at 37–41. But we come away at
the least unsure whether that is so—especially given Alabama's
evidence and arguments in the state court.
As noted earlier, the 2018 ruling we review today contains
only one sentence of explanation. See supra, at 273–274. It
states that Madison “did not provide a substantial threshold
showing of insanity[ ] suffcient to convince this Court to stay
the execution.” App. A to Pet. for Cert. If the state court
used the word “insanity” to refer to a delusional disorder,
then error occurred: The court would have denied a stay on
the ground that Madison did not have that specifc kind of
mental illness. And the likelihood that the court made that
mistake is heightened by the State's emphasis, at that stage
of the proceedings (as at others), that Madison was “not delusional
or psychotic” and that “dementia” could not suffce to
bar his execution absent “an expansion of Ford and Panetti.”
Motion to Dismiss 4, 10; see supra, at 270–274; but see post, at
291–292, and n. 4 (disregarding those arguments).5 Alabama
argues, however, that the court spoke of “insanity” only
because the state statute under which Madison sought relief
uses that term. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37; Ala. Code
§ 15–16–23 (2011) (allowing a stay of execution “on account
5 The State once again repeated that argument in its brief in opposition
to Madison's certiorari petition. See Brief in Opposition 11–12 (“Madison
does not argue that he is insane. Instead, he argues that he suffers
from dementia” and that his execution should be barred “under a yetunannounced
expansion of Ford and Panetti”).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 281
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of the [convict's] insanity”). But even if so, that does not
advance the State's view that the state court properly understood
the Eighth Amendment bar when assessing Madison's
competency. Alabama told this Court in opposing certiorari
that its statute covers only those with delusional disorders,
and not those with dementia. See Brief in Opposition 12
(“[T]he sole question to be answered under the state statute
was whether Madison was insane, not whether he suffered
from dementia”). The state court's (supposed) echoing of
statutory language understood in that way cannot provide
assurance that the court knew a person with dementia might
receive a stay of execution; indeed, it suggests exactly the
opposite. The court's 2018 order thus calls out for a do-over.
Alabama further contends, however, that we should look
past the state court's 2018 decision to the court's initial 2016
determination of competency. (The dissent similarly begins
with the 2016 ruling, see post, at 289, even though that is
not the decision under review here.) According to the State,
nothing material changed in the interim period, see supra,
at 273; thus, we may fnd the meaning of the later ruling in
the earlier one, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37. And, the State
continues, the 2016 opinion gets the law right. Alabama's
proof is that the court, after summarizing the psychologists'
testimony, found that “Madison has a rational[ ] understanding,
as required by Panetti,” concerning the “punishment he
is about to suffer and why he is about to suffer it.” 2016
Order, at 10; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; supra, at 271–272. (The
dissent quotes the same passage. See post, at 289.)
But the state court's initial decision does not aid Alabama's
cause. First, we do not know that the court in 2018 meant
to incorporate everything in its prior opinion. The order
says nothing to that effect; and though it came out the same
way as the earlier decision, it need not have rested on all
the same reasoning. Second, the 2016 opinion itself does not
show that the state court realized that persons suffering
from dementia could satisfy the Panetti standard. True
282 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Opinion of the Court
enough, as Alabama says, that the court accurately stated
that standard in its decision. But as described above, Alabama
had repeatedly argued to the court (over Madison's objection)
that only prisoners suffering from delusional disorders
could qualify as incompetent under Panetti. See, e. g.,
Brief on Madison's Competency 2 (Madison “failed to implicate”
Ford and Panetti because he “does not suffer from psychosis
or delusions”); Tr. 82 (“The Supreme Court [in Panetti]
is looking at whether someone's delusions or someone's
paranoia or someone's psychosis is standing in the way of ”
rationally understanding his punishment); see also supra, at
270–271; but see post, at 291–292, and n. 4 (disregarding
those arguments). And Alabama relied on the expert opinion
of a psychologist who highlighted Madison's lack of “psychosis,
paranoia, or delusion,” while never mentioning his
dementia. Tr., Ct. Exh. 1 (Apr. 14, 2016), p. 9. That toolimited
understanding of Panetti's compass is refected in the
court's 2016 opinion. In its single paragraph of analysis, the
court “accept[ed] the testimony” of the State's preferred psychologist.
6 And the court further found that “the evidence
does not support that Mr. Madison is delusional”—without
ever considering his undisputed dementia. 2016 Order, at 10.
For those reasons, we must return this case to the state
court for renewed consideration of Madison's competency (assuming
Alabama sets a new execution date). See, e. g., Kindred
Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 581 U. S. 246, 256 (2017)
(remanding when “uncertain” whether “an impermissible
taint occurred”); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 751–
752 (1990) (similar). In that proceeding, two matters disputed
below should now be clear. First, under Ford and Pa-
6 The court well understood that expert's exclusive focus on whether
Madison had psychotic delusions. In summarizing his testimony, the
court began as follows: “Dr. Kirkland in his exam found no evidence of
paranoia or delusion at the time of his examin[ation], on March 31, 2016.
He also found that there was no psychosis present.” 2016 Order, at 5; see
supra, at 271.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 283
Alito, J., dissenting
netti, the Eighth Amendment may permit executing Madison
even if he cannot remember committing his crime. Second,
under those same decisions, the Eighth Amendment may
prohibit executing Madison even though he suffers from dementia,
rather than delusions. The sole question on which
Madison's competency depends is whether he can reach a “rational
understanding” of why the State wants to execute
him. Panetti, 551 U. S., at 958. In answering that question—
on which we again express no view, see supra, at 272—
the state court may not rely on any arguments or evidence
tainted with the legal errors we have addressed. And because
that is so, the court should consider whether it needs
to supplement the existing record. Some evidence in that
record, including portions of the experts' reports and testimony,
expressly refects an incorrect view of the relevance
of delusions or memory; still other evidence might have implicitly
rested on those same misjudgments. The state
court, we have little doubt, can evaluate such matters better
than we. It must do so as the frst step in assessing Madison's
competency—and ensuring that if he is to be executed,
he understands why.
We accordingly vacate the judgment of the state court and
remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice
Gorsuch join, dissenting.
What the Court has done in this case makes a mockery of
our Rules.
Petitioner 's counsel convinced the Court to stay his
client's execution and to grant his petition for a writ of certiorari
for the purpose of deciding a clear-cut constitu284
MADISON v. ALABAMA
Alito, J., dissenting
tional question: Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit the
execution of a murderer who cannot recall committing the
murder for which the death sentence was imposed? The
petition strenuously argued that executing such a person is
unconstitutional.
After persuading the Court to grant review of this question,
counsel abruptly changed course. Perhaps because he
concluded (correctly) that petitioner was unlikely to prevail
on the question raised in the petition, he conceded that the
argument advanced in his petition was wrong, and he
switched to an entirely different argument, namely, that the
state court had rejected petitioner's claim that he is incompetent
to be executed because the court erroneously thought
that dementia, as opposed to other mental conditions, cannot
provide a basis for such a claim. See Brief for Petitioner 16.
This was not a question that the Court agreed to hear;
indeed, there is no mention whatsoever of this argument in
the petition—not even a hint. Nor is this question fairly
included within those on which the Court granted review.
On the contrary, it is an entirely discrete and independent
question.
Counsel's tactics fagrantly fouted our Rules. Our Rules
make it clear that we grant certiorari to decide the specifc
question or questions of law set out in a petition for certiorari.
See this Court's Rule 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set
out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered
by the Court”). Our whole certiorari system would be
thrown into turmoil if we allowed counsel to obtain review
of one question and then switch to an entirely different question
after review is granted. In the past when counsel have
done this, we have dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted. See, e. g., Visa, Inc. v. Osborn, 580 U. S. 993 (2016);
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600
(2015). We should do that here.
Instead, the majority rewards counsel's trick. It vacates
the judgment below because it is unsure whether the state
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 285
Alito, J., dissenting
court committed the error claimed in petitioner's merits
brief. But not only was there no trace of this argument in
the petition; there is nothing in the record showing that the
state court ever adopted the erroneous view that petitioner
claims it took.
I
The question on which we granted review was an outgrowth
of our per curiam decision in Dunn v. Madison, 583
U. S. 10 (2017), which concerned an Eleventh Circuit decision
granting petitioner federal habeas relief. Prior to that decision,
this Court had held in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S.
399 (1986), that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution
of a person who is “insane,” and in Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U. S. 930 (2007), the Court elaborated on this rule,
explaining that a person cannot be executed if he lacks a
rational understanding of the reason for the execution. The
Eleventh Circuit interpreted those cases to mean that petitioner
could not be executed because he did not remember
killing his victim, Mobile, Alabama, police offcer Julius
Schulte.
We summarily reversed. Under the relevant provision of
the federal habeas statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), which was
enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), petitioner could not obtain
federal habeas relief unless the state court's rejection of his
memory-loss claim represented an unreasonable application
of federal law as clearly established at the time by decisions
of this Court. We held that neither Ford nor Panetti clearly
established that a person cannot be executed if he does not
remember committing the crime for which the death sentence
was imposed.
Our opinion stated, however, that it “express[ed] no view
on the merits of the underlying question outside of the
AEDPA context.” Dunn, 583 U. S., at 14. And a concurring
opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor teed up this question for
286 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Alito, J., dissenting
review in a later case. Ibid. (“The issue whether a State
may administer the death penalty to a person whose disability
leaves him without memory of his commission of a capital
offense is a substantial question not yet addressed by the
Court. Appropriately presented, the issue would warrant
full airing”).
Taking this cue, petitioner then sought relief in state court
based on his inability to remember his crime, and when that
effort failed, he fled the petition at issue now.
II
The centerpiece of the petition and petitioner's eleventhhour
application for a stay of execution1 was the argument
that he could not constitutionally be executed because he did
not remember killing Offcer Schulte. The petition repeatedly
noted petitioner's inability to remember his crime. See
Pet. for Cert. i, iii, 1, 2, 8, 10, 11, 12, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28.
And the petition was very clear about the question on which
review was sought:
“[T]his case presents this Court with the appropriate
vehicle to consider the substantial question of whether
the execution of a prisoner with no memory of the underlying
offense is consistent with the evolving standards
of decency inherent in this Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.” Id., at 2.
This same point was made time and again:
 “[B]ecause [petitioner's] disability renders him unable
to remember the underlying offense for which he is to
be punished, his execution does not comport with the
1 Petitioner sought and obtained a stay of execution based on this same
argument. See Application for Stay of Execution 2, 6 (moving the Court
to stay petitioner's execution so that it could address the “substantial” and
“critical” question whether executing petitioner, “whose severe cognitive
dysfunction leaves him without memory of his commission of the capital
offense,” would violate the Eighth Amendment).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 287
Alito, J., dissenting
evolving standards of decency required by this Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id., at 18.
 “[I]mposing death on a prisoner, who, like Mr. Madison,
suffers from substantial memory defcits by virtue
of multiple stroke and resulting vascular dementia
serves no retributive or deterrent purpose. ” Id.,
at 22.
 [E]xecuting an individual with no memory of the underlying
offense serves no retributive purpose.” Ibid.
 “[W]here the person being punished has no memory of
the commission of the offense for which he is to be
executed, the `moral quality' of that punishment is lessened
and unable to match outrage over the offense.”
Id., at 22–23.
 “Mr. Madison's severe memory impairments as a result
of vascular dementia render him incompetent to be executed
under the Eight Amendment.” Id., at 25 (quotation
altered).
In sum, the body of the petition makes it clear that review
was sought on the question invited by the Dunn concurrence,
and the thrust of the wording of the two questions
was the same. They read as follows:
“1. Consistent with the Eighth Amendment, and this
Court's decisions in Ford and Panetti, may the State
execute a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him
without memory of his commission of the capital offense?
See Dunn v. Madison, [583 U. S. 10, 14 (2017)
(Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ.,
concurring).]
“2. Do evolving standards of decency and the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
bar the execution of a prisoner whose competency
has been compromised by vascular dementia and multiple
strokes causing severe cognitive dysfunction and a
288 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Alito, J., dissenting
degenerative medical condition which prevents him from
remembering the crime for which he was convicted or
understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution?”
Pet. for Cert. iii.
With the exception of the fnal phrase in question two (“or
understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution”),
both questions solely concern the effect of memory
loss on an Eighth Amendment analysis. The fnal phrase in
question two and certain passages in the petition, if read
with an exceedingly generous eye, might be seen as a basis
for considering whether the evidence in the state-court record
shows that petitioner's dementia rendered him incapable
of having a rational understanding of the reason for his execution.
But that is the sort of factbound question on which
we rarely grant review, see this Court's Rule 10, and it is
questionable whether we did so here.
But whether or not the petition may be fairly read to present
that factbound question, it is a travesty to read it as
challenging the state-court order on the ground that the
state court erroneously believed that dementia cannot provide
a basis for a Ford/Panetti claim. There is no inkling of
that argument in the petition. Although the petition described
the state-court order at numerous places, the petition
never claimed that the order was based on an impermissible
distinction between dementia and other mental conditions.
See, e. g., Pet. for Cert. ii, 2–3, 16. And in fact, there is a
point in the petition where such an interpretation of the
state-court order would surely have been mentioned if the
petition had intended to raise it as a ground for review. The
petition noted that “courts have recognized dementia and attendant
cognitive decline and memory impairment as a basis
for a fnding of incompetency to be executed,” id., at 25, but
the petition did not follow that statement by claiming that
the state court in this case took a contradictory position.
Because the petition did not raise—indeed, did not even
hint at—the argument on which the Court now grants relief,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 289
Alito, J., dissenting
the Court's decision is insupportable.2 It violates our Rule
that “[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly
included therein, will be considered by the Court.” Rule
14.1(a).
III
Even if it were proper for us to consider whether the order
below was based on an erroneous distinction between dementia
and other mental conditions, there is little reason to think
that it was. After a full evidentiary hearing in 2016, the
state court rejected petitioner's Ford/Panetti claim based on
a correct statement of the holding of those decisions. It
found that petitioner “ha[d] not carried his burden [of showing]
by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that he . . .
does not rationally understand the punishment he is about
to suffer and why he is about to suffer it.” Order (Apr. 29,
2016), p. 10. The court's order went on to say that it “specifcally
[found] that Madison has a rationa[l] understanding,
as required by Panetti, that he is going to be executed because
of the murder he committed and a rationa[l] understanding
that the State is seeking retribution and that he
will die when he is executed.” Ibid.
In concluding that the state court might have drawn a distinction
between dementia and other mental conditions, the
majority seizes upon the wording of the order issued after a
subsequent hearing in 2018. Ante, at 280. In that order,
the same judge wrote: “Defendant did not provide a substantial
threshold showing of insanity, a requirement set out by
the United States Supreme Court, suffcient to convince
this Court to stay the execution.” Order (Jan. 16, 2018)
(emphasis added). The majority worries that the statecourt
judge might not have applied the same standard in
2018 as he had two years earlier and might have viewed “in-
2 The Court is unable to cite a single place in the petition that makes
any reference to the argument that the state court failed to understand
that dementia could satisfy the Ford/Panetti test.
290 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Alito, J., dissenting
sanity” as something narrower than the standard mandated
by Ford and Panetti. This concern is unfounded.
Taken out of context, the term “insanity” might not be
read to encompass dementia, but in context, it is apparent
that the state court's use of that term was based on the way
in which it was used in Ford and Panetti. The state court
did not simply refer to “insanity.” It referred to “insanity,
a requirement set out by the United States Supreme Court.”
Thus, it followed the term “insanity” with an appositive,
which is a word or phrase that renames the word or phrase
that precedes it. In other words, what the state court
clearly meant by “insanity” was what this Court termed insanity
in Ford and Panetti. What was that?
In Ford, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of a person who is “insane,” and in the
portion of Justice Marshall's lead opinion that was joined by
a plurality, Justice Marshall equated insanity with a mental
condition that “prevents [a person] from comprehending the
reasons for the penalty or its implications.” 477 U. S., at
417. Justice Powell, who provided the ffth vote for the decision,
took a similar position. See id., at 422–423 (opinion
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In Panetti,
which built on the holding in Ford, the Court used the term
in a similar way. See 551 U. S., at 958–960. Accordingly, a
defendant suffers from “insanity,” as the term is used in Ford
and Panetti, if the prisoner does not understand the reason
for his execution.
Today's decision does not reject this interpretation of the
state-court order; it says only that it is vacating and remanding
because it is “at the least unsure” whether the state court
used the term “ `insanity' ” in this way. Ante, at 280. The
majority cites two reasons for its uncertainty, but both are
weak.
First, the majority attributes to the state court an interpretation
of the term “insanity” that was advanced by the
State in this Court in its brief in opposition to the petition
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 291
Alito, J., dissenting
for certiorari. Ibid. In that submission, the State argued
that certiorari should be denied because petitioner had
sought relief in state court under the wrong provision of
state law, namely, Ala. Code § 15–16–23 (2011), which authorizes
the suspension of the execution of an inmate who is “insane.”
The State argued that petitioner's memory loss did
not render him “insane” within the meaning of this statute
and that if he wished to argue that the Eighth Amendment
bars the execution of an inmate who cannot remember his
crime, he “should have fled a petition for post-conviction relief
” under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4. Brief
in Opposition 11–12.
The majority's argument based on the State's brief in opposition
suffers from multiple defects. For one thing, nothing
suggests that the state court rejected petitioner's application
on the ground that he invoked the wrong provision of
state law; the State's fling in the state court made no mention
of the argument set out in its brief in opposition fled
here. Moreover, if the state court had rejected petitioner's
application on the ground that he moved under the wrong
provision of state law, it is doubtful that we could review
that decision, for then it would appear to rest on an adequate
and independent state-law ground. And to top things off,
the majority's argument distorts what the State's brief in
opposition attempted to say about the term “insane.” The
State did not argue that a defendant who lacks a rational
understanding of the reason for his execution due to dementia
is not “insane” under Ala. Code § 15–16–23. Instead, the
State's point was that a defendant is not “insane” in that
sense merely because he cannot remember committing the
crime for which he was convicted.
The majority's other proffered basis for doubt is that the
State “repeatedly argued to the [state] court (over Madison's
objection) that only prisoners suffering from delusional disorders
could qualify as incompetent under Panetti.” Ante, at
282. The majority, however, cites no place where the State
292 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Alito, J., dissenting
actually made such an argument. To be sure, the State, in
contending that petitioner was not entitled to relief under
Ford and Panetti, argued strenuously that he was not delusional.
(The State made this argument because petitioner's
counsel claimed that petitioner was in fact delusional and fell
within Ford and Panetti for that reason.3) But arguing, as
the State did, that petitioner was not entitled to relief because
the claim that he was delusional was untrue is not the
same as arguing that petitioner could be executed even if his
dementia rendered him incapable of understanding the reason
for his execution. The majority cites no place where the
State made the latter argument in the state court.4 And
3 Petitioner's papers emphasized again and again that he suffers from
delusions. See Pet. for Suspension in No. CC–85–1385.80 (C. C. Mobile
Cty., Ala., Feb. 12, 2016), p. 1 (“Mr. Madison has long suffered from serious
mental illness, marked by paranoid delusions and other disabilities”); id.,
at 5 (“At Mr. Madison's trial, Dr. Barry Amyx established that Mr. Madison
suffers from a delusional disorder that has existed since he was an adolescent”);
ibid. (“This well-documented history of paranoia was one of the
reasons Dr. Amyx concluded that Mr. Madison had a delusional disorder
in a paranoid, really a persecutory type” (internal quotation marks omitted));
ibid. (“Dr. Amyx noted that Mr. Madison exhibited delusional thinking
about . . . medication and believed that he was being used as a guinea
pig in medical experiments”); id., at 6 (emphasizing a “more recent observation”
that “ `Mr. Madison consistently presented with paranoid delusions'
”); id., at 8 (“Mr. Madison exhibited delusional and disoriented behavior
in June 2015”); id., at 14 (“decades of delusional thinking and
psychotropic medications”); see also Pet. for Suspension in No. CC–85–
1385.80 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Dec. 18, 2017), pp. 6–7 (detailing similar
statements).
This line of argument fell apart when petitioner's own expert testifed
that he found no indication that petitioner was “[e]ither delusional or psychotic.”
Tr. 56 (Apr. 14, 2016).
4 Unable to cite any place where the State made this argument to the
state court, the Court claims that the State did so in the Eleventh Circuit.
Ante, at 272–273, n. 1. But even if that were so, it is hard to see what
that would have to do with the question whether the state court thought
that dementia could not satisfy the Ford/Panetti test. And in any event,
the Court does not fairly describe the State's argument in the Eleventh
Circuit. The State's Eleventh Circuit brief argued that merely suffering
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 293
Alito, J., dissenting
even if the State had made such an argument, what matters
is the basis for the state court's decision, not what counsel
for the State wrote or said.
from a mental condition like dementia is not enough to render a prisoner
incompetent to be executed; instead, the prisoner must also establish that
he lacks a rational understanding of the reason for his execution. See
Brief for Appellee in No. 16–12279 (CA11), pp. 37–38 (Brief for Appellee)
(“The fairest reading of the state court's opinion is that it assumed that
dementia and memory loss caused by strokes is a mental illness and went
straight to the rational understanding question. Thus, it is not that the
trial court refused to consider Madison's claims pertaining to dementia—
Madison cannot point to any portion of the state court order that says
this—it is that the trial court correctly noted that Madison failed to prove
that any dementia interfered with Madison's ability to have a rational understanding
of his execution, including the reasons therefor”); id., at 27
(“The Supreme Court has not held that a petitioner can show incompetence
without demonstrating a mental illness or that dementia and memory
loss defnitively preclude rational understanding”); id., at 29 (“To the
extent the state court followed the lead of the Supreme Court, this Court,
and the ABA and required Madison to show that a mental illness prevented
him from having a rational understanding of his punishment, doing
so was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law”).
It is true that the State's brief, in addressing the standard for granting
federal habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), stated that this Court
“ha[d] never held that dementia or memory loss is suffcient to show a lack
of rational understanding,” Brief for Appellee 29, but that was because a
claim under § 2254(d) must be based on a clearly established Supreme
Court holding. See Recording of Oral Arg. in No. 16–12279 (CA11,
June 23, 2016), at 32:37–33:30 (State rejecting a suggestion that Panetti
holds “if you don't remember committing the crime at all, and it is clear
based on the medical testimony that you don't remember committing this
crime, then you don't have a rational understanding of the factual basis
for the imposition of the death penalty”; “First of all, under AEDPA deference,
I think that that is not the holding of Panetti. . . . I think under
AEDPA deference, it's pretty clear that the holding of Panetti is very
narrow. . . . I would say the holding in Panetti is that documented mental
illness that results in a delusion has to be considered when talking about
rational understanding”); id., at 36:00–36:30 (“I think the Supreme Court
has never held that not remembering something is equivalent to not having
a rational understanding. I think that is just undeniably true. And
if AEDPA deference applies, then I don't think the state court could have
294 MADISON v. ALABAMA
Alito, J., dissenting
I add one more comment regarding the majority's uncertainty
about the basis for the state-court decision: Our decision
two years ago in Dunn evinced no similar doubts.
There, we said that the state court “held that, under this
Court's decisions in Ford and Panetti, Madison was entitled
to relief if he could show” that he lacks a rational understanding
of the circumstances of his punishment. 583 U. S.,
at 12 (quotation altered). And we said that the state court
“determined that Madison is competent to be executed because—
notwithstanding his memory loss—he recognizes
that he will be put to death as punishment for the murder
he was found to have committed.” Id., at 13; see also ibid.
(referring to the state court's “fnding that Madison understands
both that he was tried and imprisoned for murder and
that Alabama will put him to death as punishment for that
crime”). Why the majority cannot now see what it understood
without any apparent diffculty two years ago is hard
to grasp.
been unreasonable in rejecting the view that memory is required”). The
State did not argue either that dementia cannot satisfy Ford and Panetti
or that the state court based its decision on that ground. On the contrary,
Alabama wrote that “even if the trial court had determined that dementia
and severe memory loss—or even total amnesia—are insuffcient to meet
the rational understanding test, that fnding would not contradict clearly
established federal law.” Brief for Appellee 29; see also id., at 30 (“Even
assuming the state court held, as a matter of law, that amnesia is not
suffcient to show a lack of rational understanding, that determination was
not unreasonable in light of clearly established federal law”).
The majority acknowledges that the State made this concededly correct
habeas argument, but then oddly writes it off as an “additional” or alternative
argument. Ante, at 272–273, n. 1. Yet, as the State's brief and oral
argument illustrate, the State's core contention was that the state court
did not unreasonably apply clearly established law under Panetti's “very
narrow” holding. (And as we later held in Dunn, the State was correct.)
The majority simply cannot escape the inconvenient fact that the State
never argued, as a non-AEDPA matter, that petitioner could be executed
even if his dementia precluded a rational understanding.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 265 (2019) 295
Alito, J., dissenting
For all these reasons, what the Court has done in this case
cannot be defended, and therefore it is hard to escape thinking
that the real reason for today's decision is doubt on the
part of the majority regarding the correctness of the state
court's factual fnding on the question whether Madison has
a rational understanding of the reason for his execution.
There is no question that petitioner suffers from severe
physical and mental problems, and the question whether he
is capable of understanding the reason for his execution was
vigorously litigated below. But if the Court thinks it is
proper for us to reach that question and to reverse the state
court's fnding based on a cold record, it should own up to
what it is doing.
* * *
Petitioner has abandoned the question on which he succeeded
in persuading the Court to grant review, and it is
highly improper for the Court to grant him relief on a ground
not even hinted at in his petition. The writ should be dismissed
as improvidently granted, and I therefore respectfully
dissent.
296 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORP. v. WALLSTREET.
COM, LLC, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 17–571. Argued January 8, 2019—Decided March 4, 2019
Petitioner Fourth Estate Public Beneft Corporation (Fourth Estate), a
news organization, licensed works to respondent Wall-Street.com, LLC
(Wall-Street), a news website. Fourth Estate sued Wall-Street and its
owner for copyright infringement of news articles that Wall-Street
failed to remove from its website after canceling the parties' license
agreement. Fourth Estate had fled applications to register the articles
with the Copyright Offce, but the Register of Copyrights had not acted
on those applications. Title 17 U. S. C. § 411(a) states that “no civil action
for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall
be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made
in accordance with this title.” The District Court dismissed the complaint,
and the Eleventh Circuit affrmed, holding that “registration . . .
has [not] been made” under § 411(a) until the Copyright Offce registers
a copyright.
Held: Registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an
infringement suit, when the Copyright Offce registers a copyright.
Upon registration of the copyright, however, a copyright owner can recover
for infringement that occurred both before and after registration.
Pp. 300–309.
(a) Under the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, a copyright author
gains “exclusive rights” in her work immediately upon the work's creation.
17 U. S. C. § 106. A copyright owner may institute a civil action
for infringement of those exclusive rights, § 501(b), but generally only
after complying with § 411(a)'s requirement that “registration . . . has
been made.” Registration is thus akin to an administrative exhaustion
requirement that the owner must satisfy before suing to enforce ownership
rights. Pp. 300–302.
(b) In limited circumstances, copyright owners may fle an infringement
suit before undertaking registration. For example, a copyright
owner who is preparing to distribute a work of a type vulnerable to
predistribution infringement—e. g., a movie or musical composition—
may apply to the Copyright Offce for preregistration. § 408(f )(2). A
copyright owner may also sue for infringement of a live broadcast before
“registration . . . has been made.” § 411(c). Outside of statutory exCite
as: 586 U. S. 296 (2019) 297
Syllabus
ceptions not applicable here, however, § 411(a) bars a copyright owner
from suing for infringement until “registration . . . has been made.”
Fourth Estate advances the “application approach” to this provision,
arguing that registration occurs when a copyright owner submits a
proper application for registration. Wall-Street advocates the “registration
approach, ” urging that registration occurs only when the
Copyright Offce grants registration of a copyright. The registration
approach reflects the only satisfactory reading of § 411(a)'s text.
Pp. 302–309.
(1) Read together, § 411(a)'s frst two sentences focus on action by
the Copyright Offce—namely, its registration or refusal to register a
copyright claim. If application alone suffced to “ma[ke]” registration,
§ 411(a)'s second sentence—which permits a copyright claimant to fle
suit when the Register has refused her application—would be superfuous.
Similarly, § 411(a)'s third sentence—which allows the Register to
“become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability
of the copyright claim”—would be negated if an infringement suit could
be fled and resolved before the Register acted on an application. The
registration approach reading of § 411(a) is supported by other provisions
of the Copyright Act. In particular, § 410 confrms that application
is discrete from, and precedes, registration, while § 408(f )'s preregistration
option would have little utility if a completed application
suffced to make registration. Pp. 302–304.
(2) Fourth Estate primarily contends that the Copyright Act uses
the phrases “make registration” and “registration has been made” to
describe submissions by the copyright owner. Fourth Estate therefore
insists that § 411(a)'s requirement that “registration . . . has been made
in accordance with this title” most likely refers to a copyright owner's
compliance with statutory requirements for registration applications.
Fourth Estate points to other Copyright Act provisions that appear to
use the phrase “make registration” or one of its variants to describe
what a copyright claimant does. Fourth Estate acknowledges, however,
that determining how the Copyright Act uses the word “registration”
in a particular provision requires examining the “specifc context”
in which the term is used. The “specifc context” of § 411(a) permits
only one sensible reading: The phrase “registration . . . has been made”
refers to the Copyright Offce's act granting registration, not to the
copyright claimant's request for registration.
Fourth Estate's contrary reading stems in part from its misapprehension
of the signifcance of certain 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act.
But in enacting § 411(a), Congress both reaffrmed the general rule that
registration must precede an infringement suit and added an exception
in that provision's second sentence to cover instances in which registra298
FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
WALL-STREET.COM, LLC
Syllabus
tion is refused. That exception would have no work to do if Congress
intended the 1976 revisions to clarify that a copyright claimant may sue
immediately upon applying for registration. Noteworthy, too, in years
following the 1976 revisions, Congress resisted efforts to eliminate
§ 411(a), which contains the registration requirement.
Fourth Estate also argues that, because “registration is not a condition
of copyright protection,” § 408(a), § 411(a) should not bar a copyright
claimant from enforcing that protection in court once she has applied
for registration. But the Copyright Act safeguards copyright owners
by vesting them with exclusive rights upon creation of their works and
prohibiting infringement from that point forward. To recover for such
infringement, copyright owners must simply apply for registration and
await the Register's decision. Further, Congress has authorized preregistration
infringement suits with respect to works vulnerable to predistribution
infringement, and Fourth Estate's fear that a copyright
owner might lose the ability to enforce her rights entirely is overstated.
True, registration processing times have increased from one to two
weeks in 1956 to many months today. Delays, in large part, are the
result of Copyright Offce staffng and budgetary shortages that Congress
can alleviate, but courts cannot cure. Unfortunate as the current
administrative lag may be, that factor does not allow this Court to revise
§ 411(a)'s congressionally composed text. Pp. 304–309.
856 F. 3d 1338, affrmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Aaron M. Panner argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Gregory G. Rapawy, Joel B. Rothman,
and Jerold I. Schneider.
Peter K. Stris argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Brendan S. Maher, Elizabeth Brannen,
Rachana A. Pathak, Douglas D. Geyser, and Victor
O'Connell.
Jonathan Y. Ellis argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney General
Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Mark R. Freeman,
and Regan A. Smith.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the American
Bar Association by Robert M. Carlson, Dale M. Cendali, and Joshua L.
Simmons; for Authors Guild, Inc., et al. by Eleanor M. Lackman and
Cite as: 586 U. S. 296 (2019) 299
Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Impelling prompt registration of copyright claims, 17
U. S. C. § 411(a) states that “no civil action for infringement
of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted
until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title.” The question this case
presents: Has “registration . . . been made in accordance with
[Title 17]” as soon as the claimant delivers the required application,
copies of the work, and fee to the Copyright Offce;
or has “registration . . . been made” only after the Copyright
Offce reviews and registers the copyright? We hold, in accord
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, that registration occurs, and a copyright claimant
may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright
Offce registers a copyright. Upon registration of the copyright,
however, a copyright owner can recover for infringement
that occurred both before and after registration.
Petitioner Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation
(Fourth Estate) is a news organization producing online journalism.
Fourth Estate licensed journalism works to respondent
Wall-Street.com, LLC (Wall-Street), a news website.
The license agreement required Wall-Street to remove
from its website all content produced by Fourth Estate before
canceling the agreement. Wall-Street canceled, but
continued to display articles produced by Fourth Estate.
Fourth Estate sued Wall-Street and its owner, Jerrold Burden,
for copyright infringement. The complaint alleged that
Cheryl L. Davis; for the Copyright Alliance by J. Matthew Williams and
Eric J. Schwartz; for the International Trademark Association by Lawrence
K. Nodine, Noel M. Cook, and Jason P. Bloom; and for the National
Music Publishers' Association et al. by Beth S. Brinkmann, Kevin F. King,
and Jacqueline C. Charlesworth.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Authors and
Educators by Peter Jaszi and Hillary Brill; for Public Knowledge et al.
by Charles Duan and Harold Feld; and for Washington Legal Foundation
by Cory L. Andrews and Corbin K. Barthold.
300 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
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Opinion of the Court
Fourth Estate had fled “applications to register [the] articles
[licensed to Wall-Street] with the Register of Copyrights.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a.1 Because the Register had not
yet acted on Fourth Estate's applications,2 the District
Court, on Wall-Street and Burden's motion, dismissed the
complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit affrmed. 856 F. 3d
1338 (2017). Thereafter, the Register of Copyrights refused
registration of the articles Wall-Street had allegedly
infringed.3
We granted Fourth Estate's petition for certiorari to resolve
a division among U. S. Courts of Appeals on when registration
occurs in accordance with § 411(a). 585 U. S. 1029
(2018). Compare, e. g., 856 F. 3d, at 1341 (case below) (registration
has been made under § 411(a) when the Register of
Copyrights registers a copyright), with, e. g., Cosmetic Ideas,
Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F. 3d 612, 621 (CA9 2010)
(registration has been made under § 411(a) when the copyright
claimant's “complete application” for registration is received
by the Copyright Offce).
I
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, copyright
protection attaches to “original works of authorship”—
prominent among them, literary, musical, and dramatic
works—“fxed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17
U. S. C. § 102(a). An author gains “exclusive rights” in her
1 The Register of Copyrights is the “director of the Copyright Offce of
the Library of Congress” and is appointed by the Librarian of Congress.
17 U. S. C. § 701(a). The Copyright Act delegates to the Register “[a]ll
administrative functions and duties under [Title 17].” Ibid.
2 Consideration of Fourth Estate's flings was initially delayed because
the check Fourth Estate sent in payment of the fling fee was rejected by
Fourth Estate's bank as uncollectible. App. to Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 1a.
3 The merits of the Copyright Offce's decision refusing registration are
not at issue in this Court.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 296 (2019) 301
Opinion of the Court
work immediately upon the work's creation, including rights
of reproduction, distribution, and display. See § 106; Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186, 195 (2003) (“[F]ederal copyright
protection . . . run[s] from the work's creation.”). The Copyright
Act entitles a copyright owner to institute a civil action
for infringement of those exclusive rights. § 501(b).
Before pursuing an infringement claim in court, however,
a copyright claimant generally must comply with § 411(a)'s
requirement that “registration of the copyright claim has
been made. ” § 411(a). Therefore, although an owner's
rights exist apart from registration, see § 408(a), registration
is akin to an administrative exhaustion requirement that the
owner must satisfy before suing to enforce ownership rights,
see Tr. of Oral Arg. 35.
In limited circumstances, copyright owners may fle an infringement
suit before undertaking registration. If a copyright
owner is preparing to distribute a work of a type vulnerable
to predistribution infringement—notably, a movie or
musical composition—the owner may apply for preregistration.
§ 408(f)(2); 37 CFR § 202.16(b)(1) (2018). The Copyright
Offce will “conduct a limited review” of the application
and notify the claimant “[u]pon completion of the preregistration.”
§ 202.16(c)(7), (c)(10). Once “preregistration . . . has
been made,” the copyright claimant may institute a suit for
infringement. 17 U. S. C. § 411(a). Preregistration, however,
serves only as “a preliminary step prior to a full registration.”
Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright
Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 42286 (2005). An infringement
suit brought in reliance on preregistration risks dismissal unless
the copyright owner applies for registration promptly
after the preregistered work's publication or infringement.
§ 408(f)(3)–(4). A copyright owner may also sue for infringement
of a live broadcast before “registration . . . has been
made,” but faces dismissal of her suit if she fails to “make
registration for the work” within three months of its frst
transmission. § 411(c). Even in these exceptional scenar302
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Opinion of the Court
ios, then, the copyright owner must eventually pursue registration
in order to maintain a suit for infringement.
II
All parties agree that, outside of statutory exceptions not
applicable here, § 411(a) bars a copyright owner from suing
for infringement until “registration . . . has been made.”
Fourth Estate and Wall-Street dispute, however, whether
“registration . . . has been made” under § 411(a) when a copyright
owner submits the application, materials, and fee required
for registration, or only when the Copyright Offce
grants registration. Fourth Estate advances the former
view—the “application approach”—while Wall-Street urges
the latter reading—the “registration approach.” The registration
approach, we conclude, refects the only satisfactory
reading of § 411(a)'s text. We therefore reject Fourth Estate's
application approach.
A
Under § 411(a), “registration . . . has been made,” and a
copyright owner may sue for infringement, when the Copyright
Offce registers a copyright.4 Section 411(a)'s frst sentence
provides that no civil infringement action “shall be instituted
until preregistration or registration of the copyright
claim has been made.” The section's next sentence sets out
an exception to this rule: When the required “deposit, application,
and fee . . . have been delivered to the Copyright
4 Section 411(a) provides, in principal part: “[N]o civil action for infringement
of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until
preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the deposit, application,
and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright
Offce in proper form and registration has been refused, the applicant
is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with
a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights. The
Register may, at his or her option, become a party to the action with
respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim . . . .”
Cite as: 586 U. S. 296 (2019) 303
Opinion of the Court
Offce in proper form and registration has been refused,” the
claimant “[may] institute a civil action, if notice thereof . . . is
served on the Register.” Read together, § 411(a)'s opening
sentences focus not on the claimant's act of applying for registration,
but on action by the Copyright Offce—namely, its
registration or refusal to register a copyright claim.
If application alone suffced to “ma[ke]” registration,
§ 411(a)'s second sentence—allowing suit upon refusal of
registration—would be superfluous. What utility would
that allowance have if a copyright claimant could sue for infringement
immediately after applying for registration without
awaiting the Register's decision on her application?
Proponents of the application approach urge that § 411(a)'s
second sentence serves merely to require a copyright claimant
to serve “notice [of an infringement suit] . . . on the Register.”
See Brief for Petitioner 29–32. This reading, however,
requires the implausible assumption that Congress
gave “registration” different meanings in consecutive, related
sentences within a single statutory provision. In
§ 411(a)'s frst sentence, “registration” would mean the claimant's
act of fling an application, while in the section's second
sentence, “registration” would entail the Register's review
of an application. We resist this improbable construction.
See, e. g., Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 545 U. S. 440, 448 (2005) (declining to read
“the same words” in consecutive sentences as “refer[ring] to
something totally different”).
The third and fnal sentence of § 411(a) further persuades
us that the provision requires action by the Register before a
copyright claimant may sue for infringement. The sentence
allows the Register to “become a party to the action with
respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.”
This allowance would be negated, and the court conducting
an infringement suit would lack the beneft of the Register's
assessment, if an infringement suit could be fled and resolved
before the Register acted on an application.
304 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
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Other provisions of the Copyright Act support our reading
of “registration,” as used in § 411(a), to mean action by the
Register. Section 410 states that, “after examination,” if
the Register determines that “the material deposited constitutes
copyrightable subject matter” and “other legal and formal
requirements . . . [are] met, the Register shall register
the claim and issue to the applicant a certifcate of registration.”
§ 410(a). But if the Register determines that the deposited
material “does not constitute copyrightable subject
matter or that the claim is invalid for any other reason, the
Register shall refuse registration.” § 410(b). Section 410
thus confrms that application is discrete from, and precedes,
registration. Section 410(d), furthermore, provides that if
the Copyright Offce registers a claim, or if a court later determines
that a refused claim was registrable, the “effective
date of [the work's] copyright registration is the day on
which” the copyright owner made a proper submission to the
Copyright Offce. There would be no need thus to specify
the “effective date of a copyright registration” if submission
of the required materials qualifed as “registration.”
Section 408(f)'s preregistration option, too, would have little
utility if a completed application constituted registration.
Preregistration, as noted supra, at 301–302, allows the author
of a work vulnerable to predistribution infringement to
enforce her exclusive rights in court before obtaining registration
or refusal thereof. A copyright owner who fears
prepublication infringement would have no reason to apply
for preregistration, however, if she could instead simply complete
an application for registration and immediately commence
an infringement suit. Cf. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534
U. S. 19, 29 (2001) (rejecting an interpretation that “would
in practical effect render [a provision] superfuous in all but
the most unusual circumstances”).
B
Challenging the Eleventh Circuit's judgment, Fourth Estate
primarily contends that the Copyright Act uses “the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 296 (2019) 305
Opinion of the Court
phrase `make registration' and its passive-voice counterpart
`registration has been made' ” to describe submissions by the
copyright owner, rather than Copyright Offce responses to
those submissions. Brief for Petitioner 21. Section 411(a)'s
requirement that “registration . . . has been made in accordance
with this title,” Fourth Estate insists, most likely refers
to a copyright owner's compliance with the statutory specifcations
for registration applications. In support, Fourth
Estate points to Copyright Act provisions that appear to use
the phrase “make registration” or one of its variants to describe
what a copyright claimant does. See id., at 22–26 (citing
17 U. S. C. §§ 110, 205(c), 408(c)(3), 411(c), 412(2)). Furthermore,
Fourth Estate urges that its reading refects the
reality that, eventually, the vast majority of applications are
granted. See Brief for Petitioner 41.
Fourth Estate acknowledges, however, that the Copyright
Act sometimes uses “registration” to refer to activity by the
Copyright Offce, not activity undertaken by a copyright
claimant. See id., at 27–28 (citing 17 U. S. C. § 708(a)).
Fourth Estate thus agrees that, to determine how the
statute uses the word “registration” in a particular prescription,
one must “look to the specifc context” in which the
term is used. Brief for Petitioner 29. As explained supra,
at 302–304, the “specifc context” of § 411(a) permits only
one sensible reading: The phrase “registration . . . has been
made” refers to the Copyright Offce's act granting registration,
not to the copyright claimant's request for
registration.
Fourth Estate's contrary reading of § 411(a) stems in part
from its misapprehension of the signifcance of certain 1976
revisions to the Copyright Act. Before that year, § 411(a)'s
precursor provided that “[n]o action or proceeding shall be
maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until
the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of copies
and registration of such work shall have been complied
with.” 17 U. S. C. § 13 (1970 ed.). Fourth Estate urges that
this provision posed the very question we resolve today—
306 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
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Opinion of the Court
namely, whether a claimant's application alone effects registration.
The Second Circuit addressed that question,
Fourth Estate observes, in Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F. 2d 637 (1958).
Brief for Petitioner 32–34. In that case, in an opinion by
Judge Learned Hand, the court held that a copyright owner
who completed an application could not sue for infringement
immediately upon the Copyright Offce's refusal to register.
Vacheron, 260 F. 3d, at 640–641. Instead, the owner frst
had to obtain a registration certifcate by bringing a mandamus
action against the Register. The Second Circuit dissenter
would have treated the owner's application as suffcient
to permit commencement of an action for infringement.
Id., at 645.
Fourth Estate sees Congress' 1976 revision of the registration
requirement as an endorsement of the Vacheron dissenter's
position. Brief for Petitioner 34–36. We disagree.
The changes made in 1976 instead indicate Congress' agreement
with Judge Hand that it is the Register's action that
triggers a copyright owner's entitlement to sue. In enacting
17 U. S. C. § 411(a), Congress both reaffrmed the general
rule that registration must precede an infringement suit, and
added an exception in that provision's second sentence to
cover instances in which registration is refused. See H. R.
Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 157 (1976). That exception would have
no work to do if, as Fourth Estate urges, Congress intended
the 1976 revisions to clarify that a copyright claimant may
sue immediately upon applying for registration. A copyright
claimant would need no statutory authorization to sue
after refusal of her application if she could institute suit as
soon as she has fled the application.
Noteworthy, too, in years following the 1976 revisions,
Congress resisted efforts to eliminate § 411(a) and the registration
requirement embedded in it. In 1988, Congress removed
foreign works from § 411(a)'s dominion in order to
comply with the Berne Convention for the Protection of LitCite
as: 586 U. S. 296 (2019) 307
Opinion of the Court
erary and Artistic Works' bar on copyright formalities for
such works. See § 9(b)(1), 102 Stat. 2859. Despite proposals
to repeal § 411(a)'s registration requirement entirely,
however, see S. Rep. No. 100–352, p. 36 (1988), Congress
maintained the requirement for domestic works, see § 411(a).
Subsequently, in 1993, Congress considered, but declined to
adopt, a proposal to allow suit immediately upon submission
of a registration application. See H. R. Rep. No. 103–338,
p. 4 (1993). And in 2005, Congress made a preregistration
option available for works vulnerable to predistribution infringement.
See Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act
of 2005, § 104, 119 Stat. 221. See also supra, at 301–302.
Congress chose that course in face of calls to eliminate registration
in cases of predistribution infringement. 70 Fed.
Reg. 42286. Time and again, then, Congress has maintained
registration as prerequisite to suit, and rejected proposals
that would have eliminated registration or tied it to the copyright
claimant's application instead of the Register's action.5
Fourth Estate additionally argues that, as “registration is
not a condition of copyright protection,” 17 U. S. C. § 408(a),
§ 411(a) should not be read to bar a copyright claimant from
enforcing that protection in court once she has submitted a
proper application for registration. Brief for Petitioner 37.
But as explained supra, at 300–301, the Copyright Act safeguards
copyright owners, irrespective of registration, by vesting
them with exclusive rights upon creation of their works
and prohibiting infringement from that point forward. If infringement
occurs before a copyright owner applies for reg-
5 Fourth Estate asserts that, if a copyright owner encounters a lengthy
delay in the Copyright Offce, she may be forced to fle a mandamus action
to compel the Register to rule on her application, the very problem exposed
in Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 260 F. 2d 637 (CA2 1958), see supra, at 306. But Congress'
answer to Vacheron, codifed in § 411(a)'s second sentence, was to permit
an infringement suit upon refusal of registration, not to eliminate Copyright
Offce action as the trigger for an infringement suit.
308 FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
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Opinion of the Court
istration, that owner may eventually recover damages for
the past infringement, as well as the infringer's profts.
§ 504. She must simply apply for registration and receive
the Copyright Offce's decision on her application before instituting
suit. Once the Register grants or refuses registration,
the copyright owner may also seek an injunction barring
the infringer from continued violation of her exclusive
rights and an order requiring the infringer to destroy infringing
materials. §§ 502, 503(b).
Fourth Estate maintains, however, that if infringement occurs
while the Copyright Offce is reviewing a registration
application, the registration approach will deprive the owner
of her rights during the waiting period. Brief for Petitioner
41. See also 1 P. Goldstein, Copyright § 3.15, p. 3:154.2 (3d
ed. 2018 Supp.) (fnding application approach “the better
rule”); 2 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 7.16[B][3][a],
[b][ii] (2018) (infringement suit is conditioned on application,
while prima facie presumption of validity depends on certifcate
of registration). The Copyright Act's explicit carveouts
from § 411(a)'s general registration rule, however, show that
Congress adverted to this concern. In the preregistration
option, § 408(f), Congress provided that owners of works especially
susceptible to prepublication infringement should be
allowed to institute suit before the Register has granted
or refused registration. See § 411(a). Congress made the
same determination as to live broadcasts. § 411(c); see supra,
at 301–302.6 As to all other works, however, § 411(a)'s gen-
6 Further, in addition to the Act's provisions for preregistration suit, the
Copyright Offce allows copyright claimants to seek expedited processing
of a claim for an additional $800 fee. See U. S. Copyright Offce, Special
Handling: Circular No. 10, pp. 1–2 (2017). The Copyright Offce grants
requests for special handling in situations involving, inter alia, “[p]ending
or prospective litigation,” and “make[s] every attempt to examine the application
. . . within fve working days.” Compendium of U. S. Copyright
Practices § 623.2, 623.4 (3d ed. 2017).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 296 (2019) 309
Opinion of the Court
eral rule requires owners to await action by the Register
before fling suit for infringement.
Fourth Estate raises the specter that a copyright owner
may lose the ability to enforce her rights if the Copyright
Act's three-year statute of limitations runs out before the
Copyright Offce acts on her application for registration.
Brief for Petitioner 41. Fourth Estate's fear is overstated,
as the average processing time for registration applications
is currently seven months, leaving ample time to sue after
the Register's decision, even for infringement that began
before submission of an application. See U. S. Copyright
Offce, Registration Processing Times (Oct. 2, 2018) (Registration
Processing Times), https://www.copyright.gov/
registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf (as last visited
Mar. 1, 2019).
True, the statutory scheme has not worked as Congress
likely envisioned. Registration processing times have increased
from one or two weeks in 1956 to many months
today. See GAO, Improving Productivity in Copyright Registration
3 (GAO–AFMD–83–13, 1982); Registration Processing
Times. Delays in Copyright Offce processing of applications,
it appears, are attributable, in large measure, to
staffng and budgetary shortages that Congress can alleviate,
but courts cannot cure. See 5 W. Patry, Copyright
§ 17:83 (2019). Unfortunate as the current administrative
lag may be, that factor does not allow us to revise § 411(a)'s
congressionally composed text.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we conclude that “registration . . .
has been made” within the meaning of 17 U. S. C. § 411(a) not
when an application for registration is fled, but when the
Register has registered a copyright after examining a properly
fled application. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit is accordingly
Affrmed.
310 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
BNSF RAILWAY CO. v. LOOS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 17–1042. Argued November 6, 2018—Decided March 4, 2019
Respondent Michael Loos sued petitioner BNSF Railway Company under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for injuries he received
while working at BNSF's railyard. A jury awarded him $126,212.78,
ascribing $30,000 of that amount to wages lost during the time Loos
was unable to work. BNSF asserted that the lost wages constituted
“compensation” taxable under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA)
and asked to withhold $3,765 of the $30,000 to cover Loos's share of the
RRTA taxes. The District Court and the Eighth Circuit rejected the
requested offset, holding that an award of damages compensating an
injured railroad worker for lost wages is not taxable under the RRTA.
Held: A railroad's payment to an employee for working time lost due
to an on-the-job injury is taxable “compensation” under the RRTA.
Pp. 313–325.
(a) In 1937, Congress created a self-sustaining retirement benefts
system for railroad workers. The RRTA funds the program by imposing
a payroll tax on both railroads and their employees, referring to
the railroad's contribution as an “excise” tax, 26 U. S. C. § 3221, and the
employee's share as an “income” tax, § 3201. The Railroad Retirement
Act (RRA) entitles railroad workers to various benefts. Taxes under
the RRTA and benefts under the RRA are measured by the employee's
“compensation,” which both statutes defne as “any form of money remuneration
paid to an individual for services rendered as an employee.”
§ 3231(e)(1); 45 U. S. C. § 231(h)(1).
The statutory foundation of the railroad retirement system mirrors
that of the Social Security system. The Federal Insurance Contributions
Act (FICA) taxes employers and employees to fund benefts distributed
pursuant to the Social Security Act (SSA). Tax and beneft
amounts are determined by the worker's “wages,” the Social Security
equivalent to “compensation.” Both the FICA and the SSA defne
“wages” employing language resembling the RRTA and the RRA defnitions
of “compensation.” The term “wages” means “all remuneration”
for “any service, of whatever nature, performed . . . by an employee.”
26 U. S. C. § 3121(a)–(b) (FICA); see 42 U. S. C. §§ 409(a),
410(a) (SSA). Pp. 313–315.
(b) Given the textual similarity between the defnitions of “compensation”
and “wages,” the decisions on the meaning of “wages” in Social
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 311
Syllabus
Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, and United States v. Quality
Stores, Inc., 572 U. S. 141, inform this Court's comprehension of the
RRTA term “compensation.” In Nierotko, the Court held that “wages”
embraced pay for active service as well as pay received for periods of
absence from active service, 327 U. S., at 366, and concluded that backpay
for time lost due to “the employer's wrong” counted as “wages,”
id., at 364. In Quality Stores, the Court held that severance payments
qualifed as “wages” taxable under the FICA. 572 U. S., at 146–147.
In line with these decisions, the Court holds that “compensation” under
the RRTA encompasses not simply pay for active service but also pay
for periods of absence from active service—provided that the remuneration
in question stems from the “employer-employee relationship.”
Nierotko, 327 U. S., at 366.
Damages awarded under the FELA for lost wages ft comfortably
within this defnition. See BNSF R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U. S. 402, 404.
If a railroad negligently fails to maintain a safe railyard and a worker
is injured as a result, the FELA requires the railroad to compensate the
injured worker for working time lost due to the employer's wrongdoing.
FELA damages for lost wages, like backpay, are “compensation” taxable
under the RRTA. Pp. 315–317.
(c) The Eighth Circuit construed “compensation” for RRTA purposes
to mean only pay for active service, but this reading cannot be reconciled
with Nierotko and Quality Stores. In addition, the RRTA's pinpointed
exclusions for certain types of payments for time lost signal that
nonexcluded pay for time lost remains RRTA-taxable “compensation.”
Pp. 317–321.
(d) Loos contends that “compensation” does not include payments
made to compensate for an injury. This reading, however, is at odds
with Nierotko, which held that “wages” included backpay awarded to
redress “the loss of wages” occasioned by “the employer's wrong.” 327
U. S., at 364.
Loos also argues that the exclusion of personal injury damages from
“gross income” for federal income tax purposes, see 26 U. S. C.
§ 104(a)(2), should carry over to the RRTA's tax on the “income” of railroad
workers. The RRTA, however, uses the term “income” merely to
distinguish the “income” tax on an employee from the matching “excise”
tax on a railroad. Further, Congress specifed not “gross income” but
employee “compensation” as the tax base for RRTA taxes. Congress did
not exclude personal injury damages from “compensation.” Pp. 321–324.
865 F. 3d 1106, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, JJ.,
312 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Opinion of the Court
joined. Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J.,
joined, post, p. 325.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for petitioner. With her on
the briefs were Charles G. Cole, Alice E. Loughran, William
Brasher, Elisabeth S. Theodore, and R. Reeves Anderson.
Rachel P. Kovner argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General
Stewart, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Francesca Ugolini, and
Marion E. M. Erickson.
David C. Frederick argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Brendan J. Crimmins, David M.
Burke, Michael A. Wolff, Jerome J. Schlichter, Nelson G.
Wolff, and Michael F. Tello.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Michael Loos was injured while working at
petitioner BNSF Railway Company's railyard. Loos sued
BNSF under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),
35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., and gained a
$126,212.78 jury verdict. Of that amount the jury ascribed
$30,000 to wages lost during the time Loos was unable to
work. BNSF moved for an offset against the judgment.
The lost wages awarded Loos, BNSF asserted, constituted
“compensation” taxable under the Railroad Retirement Tax
Act (RRTA), 26 U. S. C. § 3201 et seq. Therefore, BNSF
urged, the railway was required to withhold a portion of the
$30,000 attributable to lost wages to cover Loos's share of
RRTA taxes, which came to $3,765. The District Court and
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the re-
*Daniel Saphire fled a brief for the Association of American Railroads
as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Association for Justice by Jeffrey R. White and Elise Sanguinetti; and for
SMART et al. by Robert P. Marcus.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 313
Opinion of the Court
quested offset, holding that an award of damages compensating
an injured railroad worker for lost wages is not taxable
under the RRTA.
The question presented: Is a railroad's payment to an
employee for working time lost due to an on-the-job injury
taxable “compensation” under the RRTA, 26 U. S. C.
§ 3231(e)(1)? We granted review to resolve a division of
opinion on the answer to that question. 584 U. S. 976 (2018).
Compare Hance v. Norfolk S. R. Co., 571 F. 3d 511, 523 (CA6
2009) (“compensation” includes pay for time lost); Phillips v.
Chicago Central & Pacifc R. Co., 853 N. W. 2d 636, 650–651
(Iowa 2014) (agency reasonably interpreted “compensation”
as including pay for time lost); Heckman v. Burlington N.
Santa Fe R. Co., 286 Neb. 453, 463, 837 N. W. 2d 532, 540
(2013) (“compensation” includes pay for time lost), with 865
F. 3d 1106, 1117–1118 (CA8 2017) (case below) (“compensation”
does not include pay for time lost); Mickey v. BNSF
R. Co., 437 S. W. 3d 207, 218 (Mo. 2014) (“compensation” does
not include FELA damages for lost wages). We now hold
that an award compensating for lost wages is subject to taxation
under the RRTA.
I
In 1937, Congress created a self-sustaining retirement
benefts system for railroad workers. The system provides
generous pensions as well as benefts “correspon[ding] . . . to
those an employee would expect to receive were he covered
by the Social Security Act.” Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439
U. S. 572, 575 (1979).
Two statutes operate in concert to ensure that retired railroad
workers receive their allotted pensions and benefts.
The frst, the RRTA, funds the program by imposing a payroll
tax on both railroads and their employees. The RRTA
refers to the railroad's contribution as an “excise” tax, 26
U. S. C. § 3221, and describes the employee's share as an “income”
tax, § 3201. Congress assigned to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) responsibility for collecting both taxes.
314 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Opinion of the Court
§§ 3501, 7801.1 The second statute, the Railroad Retirement
Act (RRA), 50 Stat. 307, as restated and amended, 45 U. S. C.
§ 231 et seq., entitles railroad workers to various benefts and
prescribes eligibility requirements. The RRA is administered
by the Railroad Retirement Board. See § 231f(a).
Taxes under the RRTA and benefts under the RRA are
measured by the employee's “compensation.” 26 U. S. C.
§§ 3201, 3221; 45 U. S. C. § 231b. The RRTA and RRA separately
defne “compensation,” but both statutes state that
the term means “any form of money remuneration paid to
an individual for services rendered as an employee.” 26
U. S. C. § 3231(e)(1); 45 U. S. C. § 231(h)(1). This language
has remained basically unchanged since the RRTA's enactment
in 1937. See Carriers Taxing Act of 1937 (1937
RRTA), § 1(e), 50 Stat. 436 (defning “compensation” as “any
form of money remuneration earned by an individual for
services rendered as an employee”). The RRTA excludes
from “compensation” certain types of sick pay and disability
pay. See 26 U. S. C. § 3231(e)(1), (4)(A).
The IRS's reading of the word “compensation” as it appears
in the RRTA has remained constant. One year after
the RRTA's adoption, the IRS stated that “compensation” is
not limited to pay for active service but reaches, as well, pay
for periods of absence. See 26 CFR § 410.5 (1938). This
understanding has governed for more than eight decades.
As restated in the current IRS regulations, “[t]he term compensation
is not confned to amounts paid for active service,
but includes amounts paid for an identifable period during
which the employee is absent from the active service of the
employer.” § 31.3231(e)–1(a)(3) (2017). In 1994, the IRS
added, specifcally, that “compensation” includes “pay for
time lost.” § 31.3231(e)–1(a)(4); see 59 Fed. Reg. 66188 (1994).
1 The railroad remits both taxes to the IRS. As to the income tax, the
railroad deducts the amount owed by the employee from her earnings and
then forwards that amount to the IRS. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22–23. See
also 26 U. S. C. § 3402(a)(1) (employers must “deduct and withhold” income
taxes from earnings).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 315
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Congress created both the railroad retirement system and
the Social Security system during the Great Depression primarily
to ensure the fnancial security of members of the
workforce when they reach old age. See Wisconsin Central
Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. 274, 276 (2018); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 641 (1937). Given the similarities in
timing and purpose of the two programs, it is hardly surprising
that their statutory foundations mirror each other. Regarding
Social Security, the Federal Insurance Contributions
Act (FICA), 26 U. S. C. § 3101 et seq., taxes employers and
employees to fund benefts, which are distributed pursuant
to the Social Security Act (SSA), 49 Stat. 620, as amended,
42 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. Tax and beneft amounts are determined
by the worker's “wages,” the Social Security equivalent
to “compensation.” See Davis, 301 U. S., at 635–636.
Both the FICA and the SSA defne “wages” employing language
resembling the RRTA and the RRA defnitions of
“compensation.” “Wages” under the FICA and the SSA
mean “all remuneration for employment,” and “employment,”
in turn, means “any service, of whatever nature, performed
. . . by an employee.” 26 U. S. C. § 3121(a)–(b)
(FICA); see 42 U. S. C. §§ 409(a), 410(a) (SSA). Reading
these prescriptions together, the term “wages” encompasses
“all remuneration” for “any service, of whatever nature, performed
. . . by an employee.” Ibid.
II
A
To determine whether RRTA-qualifying “compensation”
includes an award of damages for lost wages, we begin with
the statutory text.2 The RRTA defnes “compensation” as
2 Before turning to the language of the RRTA, the dissent endeavors
to unearth the reason why BNSF has pursued this case. The railroad's
“gambit,” the dissent surmises, is to increase pressure on injured workers
to settle their claims. Post, at 327. Contrast with the dissent's conjecture,
BNSF's entirely plausible account of a railroad's stake in this dispute.
Because the RRA credits lost wages toward an employee's benefts,
316 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Opinion of the Court
“remuneration paid to an individual for services rendered as
an employee.” 26 U. S. C. § 3231(e)(1). This defnition, as
just noted, is materially indistinguishable from the FICA's
defnition of “wages” to include “remuneration” for “any
service, of whatever nature, performed . . . by an employee.”
§ 3121.
Given the textual similarity between the defnitions of
“compensation” for railroad retirement purposes and
“wages” for Social Security purposes, our decisions on the
meaning of “wages” in Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327
U. S. 358 (1946), and United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.,
572 U. S. 141 (2014), inform our comprehension of the RRTA
term “compensation.” In Nierotko, the National Labor Relations
Board found that an employee had been “wrongfully
discharged for union activity” and awarded him backpay.
327 U. S., at 359. The Social Security Board refused to
credit the backpay award in calculating the employee's benefts.
Id., at 365–366. In the Board's view, “wages” covered
only pay for active service. Ibid. We disagreed. Emphasizing
that the phrase “any service . . . performed” denotes
“breadth of coverage,” we held that “wages” means remuneration
for “the entire employer-employee relationship”; in
other words, “wages” embraced pay for active service plus
pay received for periods of absence from active service. Id.,
at 366. Backpay, we reasoned, counts as “wages” because it
compensates for “the loss of wages which the employee suffered
from the employer's wrong.” Id., at 364.
In Quality Stores, we again trained on the meaning of
“wages,” reiterating that “Congress chose to defne wages
. . . broadly.” 572 U. S., at 146 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Guided by Nierotko, Quality Stores held that
severance payments qualifed as “wages” taxable under the
FICA. “[C]ommon sense,” we observed, “dictates that emsee
45 U. S. C. § 231(h)(1), BNSF posits that immunizing those payments
from RRTA taxes would expose the system to “a long-term risk of insolvency.”
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4; see Reply Brief for Petitioner 14.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 317
Opinion of the Court
ployees receive th[ose] payments `for employment.' ” 572
U. S., at 146. Severance payments, the Court spelled out,
“are made to employees only,” “are made in consideration for
employment,” and are calculated “according to the function
and seniority of the [terminated] employee.” Id., at 146–147.
In line with Nierotko, Quality Stores, and the IRS's long
held construction, we hold that “compensation” under the
RRTA encompasses not simply pay for active service but, in
addition, pay for periods of absence from active service—
provided that the remuneration in question stems from the
“employer-employee relationship.” Nierotko, 327 U. S.,
at 366.
B
Damages awarded under the FELA for lost wages ft comfortably
within this defnition. The FELA “makes railroads
liable in money damages to their employees for on-the-job
injuries.” BNSF R. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U. S. 402, 404 (2017);
see 45 U. S. C. § 51. If a railroad negligently fails to maintain
a safe railyard and a worker is injured as a result, the
FELA requires the railroad to compensate the injured
worker for, inter alia, working time lost due to the employer's
wrongdoing. FELA damages for lost wages, then, are
functionally equivalent to an award of backpay, which compensates
an employee “for a period of time during which”
the employee is “wrongfully separated from his job. ”
Nierotko, 327 U. S., at 364. Just as Nierotko held that backpay
falls within the defnition of “wages,” ibid., we conclude
that FELA damages for lost wages qualify as “compensation”
and are therefore taxable under the RRTA.
III
A
The Eighth Circuit construed “compensation” for RRTA
purposes to mean only pay for “services that an employee
actually renders,” in other words, pay for active service.
Consequently, the court held that “compensation” within the
318 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Opinion of the Court
RRTA's compass did not reach pay for periods of absence.
865 F. 3d, at 1117. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals attempted
to distinguish Nierotko and Quality Stores. The
Social Security decisions, the court said, were inapposite because
the FICA “taxes payment for `employment,' ” whereas
the RRTA “tax[es] payment for `services.' ” 865 F. 3d, at
1117. As noted, however, supra, at 314–315, the FICA defnes
“employment” in language resembling the RRTA in all
relevant respects. Compare 26 U. S. C. § 3121(b) (FICA)
(“any service, of whatever nature, performed . . . by an employee”)
with § 3231(e)(1) (RRTA) (“services rendered as an
employee”). Construing RRTA “compensation” as less embracive
than “wages” covered by the FICA would introduce
an unwarranted disparity between terms Congress appeared
to regard as equivalents. The reasoning of Nierotko and
Quality Stores, as we see it, resists the Eighth Circuit's
swift writeoff.3
Nierotko and Quality Stores apart, we would in any event
conclude that the RRTA term “compensation” covers pay for
time lost. Restricting “compensation” to pay for active
service, the Court of Appeals relied on statutory history and,
in particular, the eventual deletion of two references to pay
for time lost contained in early renditions of the RRTA. See
also post, at 329–330 (presenting the Eighth Circuit's statutory
history argument). To understand the Eighth Circuit's
position, and why, in our judgment, that position does not
withstand scrutiny, some context is in order.
On enactment of the RRTA in 1937, Congress made “compensation”
taxable at the time it was earned and provided
specifc guidance on when pay for time lost should be
“deemed earned.” Congress instructed: “The term `com-
3 The dissent's reduction of Nierotko's significance fares no better.
Nierotko, the dissent urges, is distinguishable because it involved “a different
factual context.” Post, at 331. But as just explained, supra, at
317 and this page, the facts in Nierotko resemble those here in all material
respects.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 319
Opinion of the Court
pensation' means any form of money remuneration earned
by an individual for services rendered as an employee . . . ,
including remuneration paid for time lost as an employee,
but [such] remuneration . . . shall be deemed earned in
the month in which such time is lost.” 1937 RRTA,
§ 1(e), 50 Stat. 436 (emphasis added). In 1946, Congress
clarifed that the phrase “pa[y] for time lost” meant payment
for “an identifable period of absence from the active
service of the employer, including absence on account of
personal injury.” Act of July 31, 1946 (1946 Act), § 2, 60
Stat. 722.
Thus, originally, the RRTA stated that “compensation” included
pay for time lost, and the language added in 1946 presupposed
the same. In subsequent amendments, however,
Congress removed the references to pay for time lost.
First, in 1975, Congress made “compensation” taxable when
paid rather than when earned. Congress simultaneously removed
the 1937 language that both referred to pay for time
lost and specifed when such pay should be “deemed earned.”
So amended, the defnitional sentence, in its current form,
reads: “The term `compensation' means any form of money
remuneration paid to an individual for services rendered as
an employee . . . .” Act of Aug. 9, 1975 (1975 Act), § 204, 89
Stat. 466 (emphasis added).
Second, in 1983, Congress shifted the wage base for RRTA
taxes from monthly “compensation” to annual “compensation.”
See Railroad Retirement Solvency Act of 1983 (1983
Act), § 225, 97 Stat. 424–425. Because the “monthly wage
bases for railroad retirement taxes [were being] changed to
annual amounts,” the House Report explained, the RRTA
required “[s]everal technical and conforming amendments.”
H. R. Rep. No. 98–30, pt. 2, p. 29 (1983). In a section of the
1983 Act titled “Technical Amendments,” Congress struck
the subsection containing, among other provisions, the 1946
Act's clarifcation of pay for time lost. 1983 Act, § 225, 97
Stat. 424–425. In lieu of the deleted subsection, Congress
320 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Opinion of the Court
inserted detailed instructions concerning the new annual
wage base.
As the Court of Appeals and the dissent see it, the 1975
and 1983 deletions show that “compensation” no longer includes
pay for time lost. 865 F. 3d, at 1119; see post, at 329–
330. We are not so sure. The 1975 Act left unaltered the
language at issue here, “remuneration . . . for services rendered
as an employee.” That Act also left intact the 1946
Act's description of pay for time lost. Continuing after the
1975 Act, then, such pay remained RRTA-taxable “compensation.”
The 1983 Act, as billed by Congress, effected only
“[t]echnical [a]mendments” relating to the change from
monthly to annual computation of “compensation.” Concerning
the 1975 and 1983 alterations, the IRS concluded
that Congress revealed no “inten[tion] to exclude payments
for time lost from compensation.” 59 Fed. Reg. 66188
(1994). We credit the IRS reading. It would be passing
strange for Congress to restrict substantially what counts as
“compensation” in a manner so oblique.
Moreover, the text of the RRTA continues to indicate that
“compensation” encompasses pay for time lost. The RRTA
excludes from “compensation” a limited subset of payments
for time lost, notably certain types of sick pay and disability
pay. See 26 U. S. C. § 3231(e)(1), (4). These enumerated exclusions
would be entirely superfuous if, as the Court of Appeals
held, the RRTA broadly excludes from “compensation”
any and all pay received for time lost.
In justifcation of its confnement of RRTA-taxable receipts
to pay for active service, the Court of Appeals also
referred to the RRA. The RRA, like the RRTA as enacted
in 1937, states that “compensation” “includ[es] remuneration
paid for time lost as an employee” and specifes that such pay
“shall be deemed earned in the month in which such time is
lost.” 45 U. S. C. § 231(h)(1). Pointing to the discrepancy
between the RRA and the amended RRTA, which no longer
contains the above-quoted language, the Court of Appeals
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 321
Opinion of the Court
concluded that Congress intended the RRA, but not the
RRTA, to include pay for time lost. Accord post, at 330.
Although “[w]e usually `presume differences in language . . .
convey differences in meaning,' ” Wisconsin Central, 585
U. S., at 279, Congress' failure to reconcile the RRA and the
amended RRTA is inconsequential. As just explained, the
RRTA's pinpointed exclusions from RRTA taxation signal
that nonexcluded pay for time lost remains RRTA-taxable
“compensation.”
B
Instead of adopting lockstep the Court of Appeals' interpretation,
Loos takes a different approach. In his view,
echoed by the dissent, “remuneration . . . for services rendered”
means the “package of benefts” an employer pays “to
retain the employee.” Brief for Respondent 37; post, at 327–
328. He therefore agrees with BNSF that benefts like sick
pay and vacation pay are taxable “compensation.” He contends,
however, that FELA damages for lost wages are of a
different order. They are not part of an employee's “package
of benefts,” he observes, and therefore should not count
as “compensation.” Such damages, Loos urges, “compensate
for an injury” rather than for services rendered. Brief
for Respondent 20; post, at 327–328. Loos argues in the alternative
that even if voluntary settlements qualify as “compensation,”
“involuntary payment[s]” in the form of damages
do not. Brief for Respondent 33.
Our decision in Nierotko undermines Loos's argument
that, unlike sick pay and vacation pay, payments “compensat-
[ing] for an injury,” Brief for Respondent 20, are not taxable
under the RRTA. We held in Nierotko that an award of
backpay compensating an employee for his wrongful discharge
ranked as “wages” under the SSA. That was so, we
explained, because the backpay there awarded to the employee
redressed “the loss of wages” occasioned by “the
employer's wrong.” 327 U. S., at 364; see supra, at 316.
Applying that reasoning here, there should be no dispositive
322 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Opinion of the Court
difference between a payment voluntarily made and one required
by law.4
Nor does United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co.,
532 U. S. 200 (2001), aid Loos's argument, repeated by the
dissent. See post, at 331. Indeed, Cleveland Indians reasserted
Nierotko's holding that “backpay for a time in which
the employee was not on the job” counts as pay for services,
and therefore ranks as wages. 532 U. S., at 210. Cleveland
Indians then took up a discrete, “secondary issue” Nierotko
presented, one not in contention here, i. e., whether for taxation
purposes backpay is allocable to the tax period when
paid rather than an earlier time-earned period. 532 U. S.,
at 211, 213–214, 219–220. Moreover, Quality Stores, which
postdated Cleveland Indians, lef t no doubt that what
qualifes under Nierotko as “wages” for beneft purposes
also qualifes as such for taxation purposes. 572 U. S., at
146–147.
C
Loos presses a fnal reason why he should not owe RRTA
taxes on his lost wages award. Loos argues, and the District
Court held, that the RRTA's tax on employees does not
apply to personal injury damages. He observes that the
RRTA taxes “the income of each employee.” 26 U. S. C.
§ 3201(a)–(b) (emphasis added). He then cites a provision of
4 The dissent, building on Loos's argument, tenders an inapt analogy
between passengers and employees. If BNSF were ordered to pay damages
for lost wages to an injured passenger, the dissent asserts, one would
not say the passenger had been compensated “for services rendered.”
There is no reason, the dissent concludes, to “reach a different result here
simply because the victim of BNSF's negligence happened to be one of its
own workers.” Post, at 329. Under the RRTA, however, this distinction
is of course critical. The passenger's damages for lost wages are not taxable
under the RRTA, for she has no employment relationship with the
railroad. In contrast, FELA damages for lost wages are taxable because
they are paid only if the injured person previously “rendered [services] as
an employee,” 26 U. S. C. § 3231(e)(1), and, indeed, was working for the
railroad when the injury occurred, see 45 U. S. C. § 51.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 323
Opinion of the Court
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 104(a)(2). This provision
exempts “damages . . . received . . . on account of
personal physical injuries” from federal income taxation by
excluding such damages from “gross income.” Loos urges
that the exclusion of personal injury damages from “gross
income” should carry over to the RRTA's tax on the “income”
of railroad workers, § 3201(a)–(b).
The argument is unconvincing. As the Government
points out, the District Court, echoed by Loos, confated “the
distinct concepts of `gross income,' [a prime component of]
the tax base on which income tax is collected, and `compensation,'
the separately defned category of payments that
are taxable under the RRTA.” Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 15. Blending tax bases that Congress kept
discrete, the District Court and Loos proffer a scheme in
which employees pay no tax on damages compensating for
personal injuries; railroads pay the full excise tax on such
compensation; and employees receive full credit for the
compensation in determining their retirement benefits.
That scheme, however, is not plausibly attributable to
Congress.
For federal income tax purposes, “gross income” means
“all income” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided.” 26 U. S. C.
§ 61; see §§ 1, 63 (imposing a tax on “taxable income,” defned
as “gross income minus . . . deductions”). Congress provided
detailed prescriptions on the scope of “gross income,”
excluding from its reach numerous items, among them, personal
injury damages. See §§ 101–140. Conspicuously absent
from the RRTA, however, is any reference to “gross
income.” As employed in the RRTA, the word “income”
merely distinguishes the tax on the employee, an “income . . .
tax,” § 3201, from the matching tax on the railroad, called an
“excise tax.” §§ 3201, 3221. See also 1937 RRTA, §§ 2–3
(establishing an “income tax on employees” and an “excise
tax on employers”); S. Rep. No. 818, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 5
(1937) (stating that the RRTA imposes an “income tax on
324 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Opinion of the Court
employees” and an “excise tax on employers”); H. R. Rep.
No. 1071, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1937) (same).
Congress, we reiterate, specifed not “gross income” but
employee “compensation” as the tax base for the RRTA's income
and excise taxes. §§ 3201, 3221. Congress then excepted
certain payments from the calculation of “compensation.”
See § 3231(e); supra, at 320. Congress adopted by
cross-reference particular Internal Revenue Code exclusions
from “gross income,” thereby carving out those specifed
items from RRTA coverage. See § 3231(e)(5)–(6), (9)–(11).
Tellingly, Congress did not adopt for RRTA purposes the
exclusion of personal injury damages from federal income
taxation set out in § 104(a)(2). We note, furthermore, that if
RRTA taxes were based on “income” or “gross income”
rather than “compensation,” the RRTA tax base would
sweep in nonrailroad income, including, for example, dividends,
interest accruals, even lottery winnings. Shifting
from “compensation” to “income” as the RRTA tax base
would thus saddle railroad workers with more RRTA taxes.
Given the multiple faws in Loos's last ditch argument, we
conclude that § 104(a)(2) does not exempt FELA damages
from the RRTA's income and excise taxes.
* * *
In harmony with this Court's decisions in Nierotko and
Quality Stores, we hold that “compensation” for RRTA purposes
includes an employer's payments to an employee for
active service and for periods of absence from active service.
It is immaterial whether the employer chooses to make the
payment or is legally required to do so. Either way, the
payment is remitted to the recipient because of his status as
a service-rendering employee. See 26 U. S. C. § 3231(e)(1);
45 U. S. C. § 231(h)(1).
For the reasons stated, FELA damages for lost wages
qualify as RRTA-taxable “compensation.” The judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is accordingly
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 325
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
dissenting.
BNSF Railway's negligence caused one of its employees a
serious injury. After a trial, a court ordered the company
to pay damages. But instead of sending the full amount to
the employee, BNSF asserted that it had to divert a portion
to the Internal Revenue Service. Why? BNSF said the
money represented taxable “compensation” for “services
rendered as an employee.” 26 U. S. C. § 3231(e)(1). Today,
the Court agrees with the company. Respectfully, I do not.
When an employee suffers a physical injury due to his
employer's negligence and has to sue in court to recover
damages, it seems more natural to me to describe the fnal
judgment as compensation for his injury than for services
(never) rendered.
The Court does not lay out the facts of the case, but they
are relevant to my analysis and straightforward enough.
Years ago, Michael Loos was working for BNSF in a train
yard when he fell into a hidden drainage grate and injured
his knee. He missed work for many months, and upon his
return he had a series of absences, many of which he attributed
to knee-injury fareups. When the company moved to
fre him for allegedly violating its attendance policies,
Mr. Loos sued. Among other things, Mr. Loos sought damages
for BNSF's negligence in maintaining the train yard.
He brought his claim under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA), an analogue to traditional state-law tort suits
that makes an interstate railroad “liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed” by the railroad
“for such injury . . . resulting in whole or in part from the
[railroad's] negligence.” 45 U. S. C. § 51. Ultimately, and
again much like in any other tort suit, the jury awarded dam326
BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
ages in three categories: $85,000 in pain and suffering,
$11,212.78 in medical expenses, and $30,000 in lost wages—
the fnal category representing the amount Mr. Loos was unable
to earn because of the injury BNSF's negligence caused.
Then a strange thing happened. BNSF argued that the
lost wages portion of Mr. Loos's judgment represented “compensation”
to him “for services rendered as an employee”
and was thus taxable income under the Railroad Retirement
Tax Act (RRTA). 26 U. S. C. § 3201 et seq. In much the
same way the Social Security Act taxes other citizens' incomes
to fund their retirement benefts, the RRTA taxes
railroad employees' earnings to pay for their public pensions.
And BNSF took the view that, because Mr. Loos owed the
IRS taxes on the lost wages portion of his judgment, it had
to withhold an appropriate sum and redirect it to the government.
The company took this position even though it meant
BNSF would owe corresponding excise taxes. See 26
U. S. C. § 3221. It took this position, too, even though no one
has identifed for us a single case where the IRS has sought
to collect RRTA taxes on a FELA judgment in the 80 years
the two statutes have coexisted. The company even persisted
in its view after, frst, the district court and, then, the
Eighth Circuit ruled that Mr. Loos's award wasn't subject to
RRTA taxes. Even after all that, BNSF went to the trouble
of seeking review in this Court to win the right to pay
the IRS.
What's the reason for BNSF's tireless campaign? Is the
company really moved by a selfess desire to protect a federal
program from “ `a long-term risk of insolvency' ”? Ante,
at 315–316, n. 2. Several amici offer a more prosaic possibility.
Under the rule BNSF seeks and wins today, RRTA
taxes will be due on (but only on) the portion of a FELA
settlement or judgment designated as lost wages. Taxes
will not attach to other amounts attributed to, say, pain and
suffering or medical costs. At trial, of course, a plaintiff's
damages are what they are, and often juries will attribute a
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 327
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
signifcant portion of damages to lost wages. But with the
help of the asymmetric tax treatment they secure today, railroads
like BSNF can now sweeten their settlement offers
while offering less money. Forgo trial and accept a lower
settlement, they will tell injured workers, and in return we
will designate a small fraction (maybe even none) of the payments
as taxable lost wages. In this way, the Court's decision
today may do precisely nothing to increase the government's
tax collections or protect the solvency of any federal
program. Instead, it may only mean that employees will
pay a tax for going to trial—and railroads will succeed in
buying cheaper settlements in the future at the bargain basement
price of a few thousand dollars in excise taxes in one
case today. See Brief for American Association for Justice
as Amicus Curiae 34–36; Brief for SMART et al. as Amici
Curiae 5–7.
Whatever the reason for BNSF's gambit, the problems
with it start for me at the frst step of the statutory interpretation
analysis—with the text of the law itself. The RRTA
taxes an employee's “compensation,” which it defnes as
“money remuneration . . . for services rendered as an employee
to one or more employers.” 26 U. S. C. § 3231(e)(1).
A “service” refers to “duty or labor . . . by one person . . .
bound to submit his will to the direction and control of [another].”
Black's Law Dictionary 1607 (3d ed. 1933). And
“remuneration” means “a quid pro quo,” “recompense” or
“reward” for such services. Id., at 1528. So the words “remuneration
for services rendered” naturally cover things
like an employee's salary or hourly wage. Nor do they stop
there, as the Court correctly notes. Rather, and contrary to
the court of appeals' view, those words also fairly encompass
benefts like sick or disability pay. After all, an employer
offers those benefts to attract and keep employees working
on its behalf. In that way, these benefts form part of the
“quid pro quo” (compensation) the employer pays to secure
the “duty or labor” (services) the employee renders. Cf.
328 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U. S. 141, 146
(2014).
But damages for negligence are different. No one would
describe a dangerous fall or the wrenching of a knee as a
“service rendered” to the party who negligently caused the
accident. BNSF hardly directed Mr. Loos to fall or offered
to pay him for doing so. In fact, BNSF didn't even pay
Mr. Loos voluntarily; he had to wrest a judgment from the
railroad at the end of a legal battle. So Mr. Loos's FELA
judgment seems to me, as it did to every judge in the proceedings
below, unconnected to any service Mr. Loos rendered
to BNSF. Instead of being “compensation” for “services
rendered as an employee,” it seems more natural to say
that the negligence damages BNSF paid are “compensation”
to Mr. Loos for his injury. That's exactly how we usually
understand tort damages—as “compensation” for an “injury”
caused by “the unlawful act or omission or negligence
of another.” Black's Law Dictionary 314 (2d ed. 1910).
And that's exactly how FELA describes the damages it
provides—stating that it renders a railroad “liable” not for
services rendered but for any “injury” caused by the defendant's
“negligence.” 45 U. S. C. § 51; see also New York Central
R. Co. v. Winfeld, 244 U. S. 147, 164 (1917) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (FELA liability is “a penalty for wrong doing,” a
“remedy” that “mak[es] the wrongdoer indemnify him whom
he has wronged”).
Of course, BNSF isn't without a reply. Time and again it
highlights the fact that the district court measured the lost
wages portion of Mr. Loos's award by reference to what he
could have earned but for his injury. But if BNSF's negligence
had injured a passenger on a train instead of an employee
in a train yard, a jury could have measured the passenger's
tort damages in exactly the same way, taking
account of the wages she could have earned from her own
employer but for the railroad's negligence. Vicksburg &
Meridian R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 554 (1886). In
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 329
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
those circumstances, I doubt any of us would say the passenger's
damages award represented compensation for “services
rendered” to her employer rather than compensation for her
injury. And I don't see why we would reach a different result
here simply because the victim of BNSF's negligence
happened to be one of its own workers. Of course, as the
Court points out, ante, at 322, n. 4, FELA suits may be
brought only by railroad employees against their employers.
But in cases like ours a FELA suit simply serves in the interstate
railroad industry as a federalized substitute for a
traditional state negligence tort claim of the sort that could
be brought by anyone the railroad injured, employee or not.
Inescapably, “the basis of liability under [FELA] is and remains
negligence.” Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69
(1949) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Looking beyond the statute's text to its history only compounds
BNSF's problems. To be clear, the statutory history
I have in mind here isn't the sort of unenacted legislative
history that often is neither truly legislative (having failed to
survive bicameralism and presentment) nor truly historical
(consisting of advocacy aimed at winning in future litigation
what couldn't be won in past statutes). Instead, I mean
here the record of enacted changes Congress made to the
relevant statutory text over time, the sort of textual evidence
everyone agrees can sometimes shed light on meaning.
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 653–654
(1898).
The RRTA's statutory history is long and instructive. Beginning
in 1937, the statute defned taxable “compensation”
to include remuneration “for services rendered,” but with
the further instruction that this included compensation “for
time lost.” Carriers Taxing Act of 1937, § 1(e), 50 Stat. 436.
Courts applying the RRTA's sister statute, the Railroad Retirement
Act (RRA), understood this language to capture
settlement payments for personal injury claims that would
not otherwise qualify as “remuneration . . . for services ren330
BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
dered.” See, e. g., Jacques v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 736
F. 2d 34, 39–40 (CA2 1984); Grant v. Railroad Retirement
Bd., 173 F. 2d 385, 386–387 (CA10 1949). Congress itself
seemed to agree, explaining in 1946 that remuneration for
“time lost” includes payments made “with respect to an . . .
absence on account of personal injury.” § 3(f), 60 Stat. 725.
But then Congress reversed feld. In 1975, it removed payments
“for time lost” from the RRTA's defnition of “compensation.”
§ 204, 89 Stat. 466. And in 1983, Congress overwrote
the last remaining reference to payments “for time
lost” in a nearby section. § 225, 97 Stat. 424–426. To my
mind, Congress's decision to remove the only language that
could have fairly captured the damages here cannot be easily
ignored.
Yet BNSF would have us do exactly that. On its account,
the RRTA's discussions about compensation for time lost and
personal injuries only ever served to illustrate what has
qualifed all along as remuneration for “services rendered.”
So, on its view, when Congress frst added and then removed
language about time lost and personal injuries, it quite literally
wasted its time because none of its additions and subtractions
altered the statute's meaning. Put another way,
BNSF asks us to read back into the law words (time lost,
personal injury) that Congress deliberately removed on the
assumption they were never really needed in the frst place.
As I see it, that is less “ `a construction of a statute [than] an
enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted,
[BNSF] presum[es] by inadvertence, may be included within
its scope. To supply omissions [like that] transcends the judicial
function.' ” West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 101 (1991) (quoting Iselin v. United
States, 270 U. S. 245, 251 (1926) (Brandeis, J.)).
Looking beyond the text and history of this statute to
compare it with others confrms the conclusion. Where the
RRTA directs the taxation of railroad employee income to
fund retirement benefts, the RRA controls the calculation of
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 331
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
those benefts. And, unlike the RRTA, that statute continues
to include “pay for time lost” in the defnition of “compensation”
it uses to calculate benefts. 45 U. S. C. § 231(h)(1).
Normally, when Congress chooses to exclude terms in
one statute while introducing or retaining them in another
closely related law, we give effect to rather than pass a
blind eye over the difference. Nor is there any question
that Congress knows exactly how to tax a favorable tort
judgment when it wants. See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 104(a)(2)
(punitive damages are not deductible). Its failure to offer
any comparably clear command here should, once more, tell
us something.
With so much in the statute's text, history, and surroundings
now pointing for Mr. Loos, BNSF is left to lean heavily
on case law. The company says we must rule its way primarily
because of Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U. S.
358 (1946). But I do not see anything in that case dictating
a victory for BNSF. Nierotko concerned a different statute,
a different legal claim, and a different factual context.
There, the plaintiff brought a wrongful termination claim before
the National Labor Relations Board, claiming that his
employer fred him in retaliation for union activity. The
NLRB ordered the employee reinstated to his former job
and paid as if he had never left. Under those circumstances,
this Court held that for purposes of calculating the plaintiff's
Social Security Act benefts, his “wages” should include his
backpay award, allocated to the period when he would have
been working but for the employer's misconduct. Since
then, however, the Court has suggested that at least one of
Nierotko's holdings was likely motivated more by a policy
concern with protecting the employee's full retirement to Social
Security benefts than by a careful reading of the Social
Security Act. See United States v. Cleveland Indians
Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 212–213 (2001); id., at 220–221
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Besides, in this case
we're simply not faced with a wrongful termination claim, an
332 BNSF R. CO. v. LOOS
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
award of backpay, or the interpretation of the Social Security
Act—let alone reason to worry that ruling for Mr. Loos
would inequitably shortchange an employee. So whatever
light Nierotko might continue to shed on the question it
faced, and whatever superfcial similarities one might point
to here, that decision simply doesn't dictate an answer to the
question whether a tort victim's damages for a physical injury
qualify as “compensation for services rendered” under
the RRTA.
By this point BNSF is left with only one argument, which
it treats as no more than a last resort: Chevron deference.
In the past, the briefs and oral argument in this case likely
would have centered on whether we should defer to the
IRS's administrative interpretation of the RRTA. After all,
the IRS (at least today) agrees with BNSF's interpretation
that “compensation . . . for services rendered” includes damages
for personal injuries. And the Chevron doctrine, if
it retains any force, would seem to allow BNSF to parlay
any statutory ambiguity into a colorable argument for judicial
deference to the IRS's view, regardless of the Court's
best independent understanding of the law. See Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837 (1984). Of course, any Chevron analysis here
would be complicated by the government's change of heart.
For if Nierotko is as relevant as BNSF contends, then it
must also be relevant that, back when Nierotko was decided,
the IRS took the view that the term “wages” in the Social
Security Act did not include backpay awards for wrongful
termination. See 327 U. S., at 366–367. And if “wages”
don't include backpay awards for wrongful terminations, it's
hard to see how “compensation . . . for services rendered”
might include damages for an act of negligence. Still, even
with the complications that follow from executive agencies'
penchant for changing their views about the law's meaning
almost as often as they change administrations, a plea for
Cite as: 586 U. S. 310 (2019) 333
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
deference surely would have enjoyed pride of place in
BNSF's submission not long ago.
But nothing like that happened here. BNSF devoted
scarcely any of its briefng to Chevron. At oral argument,
BNSF's lawyer didn't even mention the case until the fnal
seconds—and even then “hate[d] to cite” it. Tr. of Oral Arg.
58. No doubt, BNSF proceeded this way well aware of the
mounting criticism of Chevron deference. See, e. g., Pereira
v. Sessions, 585 U. S. 198, 221 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
And no doubt, too, this is all to the good. Instead of
throwing up our hands and letting an interested party—the
federal government's executive branch, no less—dictate an
inferior interpretation of the law that may be more the product
of politics than a scrupulous reading of the statute, the
Court today buckles down to its job of saying what the law
is in light of its text, its context, and our precedent. Though
I may disagree with the result the Court reaches, my colleagues
rightly afford the parties before us an independent
judicial interpretation of the law. They deserve no less.
334 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
RIMINI STREET, INC., et al. v. ORACLE USA, INC.,
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 17–1625. Argued January 14, 2019—Decided March 4, 2019
A jury awarded Oracle damages after fnding that Rimini Street had infringed
various Oracle copyrights. After judgment, the District Court
also awarded Oracle fees and costs, including $12.8 million for litigation
expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting. In
affrming the $12.8 million award, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
it covered expenses not included within the six categories of costs that
the general federal statute authorizing district courts to award costs, 28
U. S. C. §§ 1821 and 1920, provides may be awarded against a losing
party. The court nonetheless held that the award was appropriate because
the Copyright Act gives federal district courts discretion to award
“full costs” to a party in copyright litigation, 17 U. S. C. § 505.
Held: The term “full costs” in § 505 of the Copyright Act means the costs
specifed in the general costs statute codifed at §§ 1821 and 1920.
Pp. 338–346.
(a) Sections 1821 and 1920 defne what the term “costs” encompasses
in subject-specifc federal statutes such as § 505. Congress may authorize
awards of expenses beyond the six categories specifed in the general
costs statute, but courts may not award litigation expenses that are
not specifed in §§ 1821 and 1920 absent explicit authority. This Court's
precedents have consistently adhered to that approach. See Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437; West Virginia Univ.
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83; Arlington Central School Dist. Bd.
of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291. The Copyright Act does not explicitly
authorize the award of litigation expenses beyond the six categories
specifed in §§ 1821 and 1920, which do not authorize an award for expenses
such as expert witness fees, e-discovery expenses, and jury consultant
fees. Pp. 338–341.
(b) Oracle's counterarguments are not persuasive. First, Oracle argues
that the word “full” authorizes courts to award expenses beyond
the costs specifed in §§ 1821 and 1920. The term “full” is an adjective
that means the complete measure of the noun it modifes. It does not,
therefore, alter the meaning of the word “costs” in § 505. Rather, “full
costs” are all the “costs” otherwise available under the relevant law.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 334 (2019) 335
Syllabus
Second, Oracle maintains that the term “full costs” in the Copyright
Act is a historical term of art that encompasses more than the “costs”
listed in §§ 1821 and 1920. Oracle argues that Congress imported the
meaning of the term “full costs” from the English copyright statutes
into the Copyright Act in 1831. It contends that the 1831 meaning of
“full costs” allows the transfer of all expenses of litigation, beyond those
specifed in any costs schedule, and overrides anything that Congress
enacted in the Fee Act of 1853 or any subsequent costs statute. Courts
need not, however, undertake extensive historical excavation to determine
the meaning of costs statutes. See Crawford Fitting Co., 482
U. S., at 445. In any event, Oracle has not shown that the phrase “full
costs” had an established meaning in English or American law that
covered more than the full amount of the costs listed in the applicable
costs schedule. Case law since 1831 also refutes Oracle's historical
argument.
Third, Oracle advances a variety of surplusage arguments. According
to Oracle, after Congress made the costs award discretionary in
1976, district courts could award any amount of costs up to 100 percent,
and so Rimini's reading of the word “full” now adds nothing to “costs.”
Because Congress would not have intended “full” to be surplusage, Oracle
contends, Congress must have employed the term “full” to mean
expenses beyond the costs specifed in §§ 1821 and 1920. But even if the
term “full” lacked any continuing signifcance after 1976, the meaning
of “costs” did not change. Oracle's interpretation would also create its
own redundancy problem by rendering the second sentence of § 505—
which covers attorney's fees—largely redundant because § 505's frst
sentence presumably would already cover those fees. Finally, Oracle's
argument, even if correct, overstates the signifcance of statutory surplusage
and redundancy. See, e. g., Marx v. General Revenue Corp.,
568 U. S. 371, 385. Pp. 341–346.
879 F. 3d 948, reversed in part and remanded.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Mark A. Perry argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Jeremy M. Christiansen, Blaine H.
Evanson, and Joseph A. Gorman.
Allon Kedem argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Francisco, Assistant Attorney General
336 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Hunt, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Charles W. Scarborough,
Megan Barbero, Casen B. Ross, Regan A. Smith,
and Kevin R. Amer.
Paul D. Clement argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Erin E. Murphy, Matthew D. Rowen,
William A. Isaacson, David B. Salmons, Dale M. Cendali,
and Joshua L. Simmons.*
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Copyright Act gives federal district courts discretion
to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation. 17
U. S. C. § 505. In the general statute governing awards of
costs, Congress has specifed six categories of litigation expenses
that qualify as “costs.” See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1821, 1920.
The question presented in this case is whether the Copyright
Act's reference to “full costs” authorizes a court to award
litigation expenses beyond the six categories of “costs” specifed
by Congress in the general costs statute. The statutory
text and our precedents establish that the answer is no.
The term “full” is a term of quantity or amount; it does not
expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be
awarded as “costs” under the general costs statute. In
copyright cases, § 505's authorization for the award of “full
costs” therefore covers only the six categories specifed in
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Scholars of Corpus
Linguistics by Gene C. Schaerr, Erik S. Jaffe, and Michael T. Worley;
and for Patrick T. Gillen by Joshua C. McDaniel, Barry R. Levy, and Eric
S. Boorstin.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for BSA|The Software
Alliance by Andrew J. Pincus, Paul W. Hughes, and Matthew A.
Waring; for Copyright Alliance by Eleanor M. Lackman; for the National
Music Publishers' Association et al. by Beth S. Brinkmann and Jacqueline
C. Charlesworth; for Scholars of Linguistics by Stephen M. Nickelsburg;
for Steven Baicker-McKee by Robert S. Friedman and Daniel L. Brown;
and for Ralph Oman by Melissa Arbus Sherry and Sarang Vijay Damle.
Stefan Mentzer and Sheldon H. Klein fled a brief for the American
Intellectual Property Law Association as amicus curiae.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 334 (2019) 337
Opinion of the Court
the general costs statute, codifed at §§ 1821 and 1920. We
reverse in relevant part the judgment of the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and we remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Oracle develops and licenses sof tware programs that
manage data and operations for businesses and non-proft
organizations. Oracle also offers its customers software
maintenance services.
Rimini Street sells third-party software maintenance services
to Oracle customers. In doing so, Rimini competes with
Oracle's software maintenance services.
Oracle sued Rimini and its CEO in Federal District Court
in Nevada, asserting claims under the Copyright Act and
various other federal and state laws. Oracle alleged that
Rimini, in the course of providing software support services
to Oracle customers, copied Oracle's software without licensing
it.
A jury found that Rimini had infringed various Oracle
copyrights and that both Rimini and its CEO had violated
California and Nevada computer access statutes. The jury
awarded Oracle $35.6 million in damages for copyright infringement
and $14.4 million in damages for violations of the
state computer access statutes. After judgment, the District
Court ordered the defendants to pay Oracle an additional
$28.5 million in attorney's fees and $4.95 million in
costs; the Court of Appeals reduced the latter award to $3.4
million. The District Court also ordered the defendants to
pay Oracle $12.8 million for litigation expenses such as expert
witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting.
That $12.8 million award is the subject of the dispute in
this case. As relevant here, the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affrmed the District Court's $12.8 million
award. The Court of Appeals recognized that the general
federal statute authorizing district courts to award costs, 28
338 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
U. S. C. §§ 1821 and 1920, lists only six categories of costs
that may be awarded against the losing party. And the
Court of Appeals acknowledged that the $12.8 million award
covered expenses not included within those six categories.
But the Court of Appeals, relying on Circuit precedent, held
that the District Court's $12.8 million award for additional
expenses was still appropriate because § 505 permits the
award of “full costs,” a term that the Ninth Circuit said was
not confned to the six categories identifed in §§ 1821 and
1920. 879 F. 3d 948, 965−966 (2018).
We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement in the
Courts of Appeals over whether the term “full costs” in § 505
authorizes awards of expenses other than those costs identifed
in §§ 1821 and 1920. 585 U. S. 1058 (2018). Compare
879 F. 3d, at 965–966; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Entertainment Distributing, 429 F. 3d 869 (CA9 2005), with
Artisan Contractors Assn. of Am., Inc. v. Frontier Ins. Co.,
275 F. 3d 1038 (CA11 2001); Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F. 3d
292 (CA8 1996).
II
A
Congress has enacted more than 200 subject-specifc federal
statutes that explicitly authorize the award of costs to
prevailing parties in litigation. The Copyright Act is one of
those statutes. That Act provides that a district court in a
copyright case “in its discretion may allow the recovery of
full costs by or against any party other than the United
States or an offcer thereof.” 17 U. S. C. § 505.
In the general “costs” statute, codifed at §§ 1821 and 1920
of Title 28, Congress has specifed six categories of litigation
expenses that a federal court may award as “costs,” 1 and
1 The six categories that a federal court may award as costs are:
“(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
“(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
“(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
Cite as: 586 U. S. 334 (2019) 339
Opinion of the Court
Congress has detailed how to calculate the amount of certain
costs. Sections 1821 and 1920 in essence defne what the
term “costs” encompasses in the subject-specifc federal statutes
that provide for an award of costs.
Sections 1821 and 1920 create a default rule and establish
a clear baseline against which Congress may legislate. Consistent
with that default rule, some federal statutes simply
refer to “costs.” In those cases, federal courts are limited
to awarding the costs specifed in §§ 1821 and 1920. If, for
particular kinds of cases, Congress wants to authorize
awards of expenses beyond the six categories specifed in the
general costs statute, Congress may do so. For example,
some federal statutes go beyond §§ 1821 and 1920 to expressly
provide for the award of expert witness fees or attorney's
fees. See West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 89, n. 4 (1991). Indeed, the Copyright
Act expressly provides for awards of attorney's fees as well
as costs. 17 U. S. C. § 505. And the same Congress that
enacted amendments to the Copyright Act in 1976 enacted
several other statutes that expressly authorized awards of
expert witness fees. See Casey, 499 U. S., at 88. But absent
such express authority, courts may not award litigation
expenses that are not specifed in §§ 1821 and 1920.
Our precedents have consistently adhered to that approach.
Three cases illustrate the point.
In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., the question
was whether courts could award expert witness fees under
Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
“(4) Fees for exemplifcation and the costs of making copies of any materials
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
“(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
“(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters,
and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1828 of this title.” 28 U. S. C. § 1920.
In addition, § 1821 provides particular reimbursement rates for witnesses'
“[p]er diem and mileage” expenses.
340 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
54(d) authorizes an award of “costs” but does not expressly
refer to expert witness fees. 482 U. S. 437, 441 (1987). In
defning what expenses qualify as “costs,” §§ 1821 and 1920
likewise do not include expert witness fees. We therefore
held that the prevailing party could not obtain expert witness
fees: When “a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for
fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is
bound by the limit of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit
statutory authority to the contrary.” Id., at 439.
In Casey, we interpreted 42 U. S. C. § 1988, the federal
statute authorizing an award of “costs” in civil rights litigation.
We described Crawford Fitting as holding that §§ 1821
and 1920 “defne the full extent of a federal court's power to
shift litigation costs absent express statutory authority to go
further.” 499 U. S., at 86. In accord with Crawford Fitting,
we concluded that § 1988 does not authorize awards of
expert witness fees because § 1988 supplies no “ `explicit statutory
authority' ” to award expert witness fees. 499 U. S.,
at 87 (quoting Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at 439).
In Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy,
we considered the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, which authorized an award of costs. The question was
whether that Act's reference to “costs” encompassed expert
witness fees. We again explained that “costs” is “ `a term of
art that generally does not include expert fees.' ” 548 U. S.
291, 297 (2006); see also Taniguchi v. Kan Pacifc Saipan,
Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 573 (2012). We stated: “[N]o statute will
be construed as authorizing the taxation of witness fees as
costs unless the statute `refer[s] explicitly to witness fees.' ”
Murphy, 548 U. S., at 301 (quoting Crawford Fitting, 482
U. S., at 445).
Our cases, in sum, establish a clear rule: A statute awarding
“costs” will not be construed as authorizing an award of
litigation expenses beyond the six categories listed in §§ 1821
and 1920, absent an explicit statutory instruction to that efCite
as: 586 U. S. 334 (2019) 341
Opinion of the Court
fect. See Murphy, 548 U. S., at 301 (requiring “ `explici[t]' ”
authority); Casey, 499 U. S., at 86 (requiring “ `explicit' ” authority);
Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at 439 (requiring “explicit
statutory authority”).
Here, the Copyright Act does not explicitly authorize the
award of litigation expenses beyond the six categories specifed
in §§ 1821 and 1920. And §§ 1821 and 1920 in turn do
not authorize an award for expenses such as expert witness
fees, e-discovery expenses, and jury consultant fees, which
were expenses encompassed by the District Court's $12.8
million award to Oracle here. Rimini argues that the $12.8
million award therefore cannot stand.
B
To sustain its $12.8 million award, Oracle advances three
substantial arguments. But we ultimately do not fnd those
arguments persuasive.
First, although Oracle concedes that it would lose this case
if the Copyright Act referred only to “costs,” Oracle stresses
that the Copyright Act uses the word “full” before “costs.”
Oracle argues that the word “full” authorizes courts to award
expenses beyond the costs specifed in §§ 1821 and 1920. We
disagree. “Full” is a term of quantity or amount. It is an
adjective that means the complete measure of the noun it
modifes. See American Heritage Dictionary 709 (5th ed.
2011); Oxford English Dictionary 247 (2d ed. 1989). As we
said earlier this Term: “Adjectives modify nouns—they pick
out a subset of a category that possesses a certain quality.”
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv.,
586 U. S. 9, 19 (2018).
The adjective “full” in § 505 therefore does not alter the
meaning of the word “costs.” Rather, “full costs” are all
the “costs” otherwise available under law. The word “full”
operates in the phrase “full costs” just as it operates in other
common phrases: A “full moon” means the moon, not Mars.
342 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
A “full breakfast” means breakfast, not lunch. A “full season
ticket plan” means tickets, not hot dogs. So too, the
term “full costs” means costs, not other expenses.
The dispute here, therefore, turns on the meaning of the
word “costs.” And as we have explained, the term “costs”
refers to the costs generally available under the federal costs
statute—§§ 1821 and 1920. “Full costs” are all the costs
generally available under that statute.
Second, Oracle maintains that the term “full costs” in the
Copyright Act is a historical term of art that encompasses
more than the “costs” listed in the relevant costs statute—
here, §§ 1821 and 1920. We again disagree.
Some general background: From 1789 to 1853, federal
courts awarded costs and fees according to the relevant state
law of the forum State. See Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at
439−440; Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U. S. 240, 247−250 (1975). In 1853, Congress departed
from that state-focused approach. That year, Congress
passed and President Fillmore signed a comprehensive federal
statute establishing a federal schedule for the award of
costs in federal court. Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at 440;
10 Stat. 161. Known as the Fee Act of 1853, that 1853 statute
has “carried forward to today” in §§ 1821 and 1920
“ `without any apparent intent to change the controlling
rules.' ” Crawford Fitting, 482 U. S., at 440. As we have
said, §§ 1821 and 1920 provide a comprehensive schedule of
costs for proceedings in federal court.
Now some copyright law background: The term “full
[c]osts” appeared in the frst copyright statute in England,
the Statute of Anne. 8 Anne c.19, § 8 (1710). In the United
States, the Federal Copyright Act of 1831 borrowed the
phrasing of English copyright law and used the same term,
“full costs.” Act of Feb. 3, 1831, § 12, 4 Stat. 438–439. That
term has appeared in subsequent revisions of the Copyright
Act, through the Act's most recent substantive alterations in
1976. See Act of July 8, 1870, § 108, 16 Stat. 215; Copyright
Cite as: 586 U. S. 334 (2019) 343
Opinion of the Court
Act of 1909, § 40, 35 Stat. 1084; Copyright Act of 1976, § 505,
90 Stat. 2586.
Oracle argues that English copyright statutes awarding
“full costs” allowed the transfer of all expenses of litigation,
beyond what was specifed in any costs schedule. According
to Oracle, Congress necessarily imported that meaning of the
term “full costs” into the Copyright Act in 1831. And according
to Oracle, that 1831 meaning overrides anything that
Congress enacted in any costs statute in 1853 or later.
To begin with, our decision in Crawford Fitting explained
that courts should not undertake extensive historical excavation
to determine the meaning of costs statutes. We said
that §§ 1821 and 1920 apply regardless of when individual
subject-specifc costs statutes were enacted. 482 U. S., at
445. The Crawford Fitting principle eliminates the need for
that kind of historical analysis and confrms that the Copyright
Act's reference to “full costs” must be interpreted by
reference to §§ 1821 and 1920.
In any event, Oracle's historical argument fails even on its
own terms. Oracle has not persuasively demonstrated that
as of 1831, the phrase “full costs” had an established meaning
in English or American law that covered more than the full
amount of the costs listed in the applicable costs schedule.
On the contrary, the federal courts as of 1831 awarded costs
in accord with the costs schedule of the relevant state law.
See id., at 439−440; Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U. S., at 250. And
state laws at the time tended to use the term “full costs” to
refer to, among other things, full cost awards as distinguished
from the half, double, or treble cost awards that
were also commonly available under state law at the time.2
That usage accorded with the ordinary meaning of the term.
2 See, e. g., 1 Laws of Pa., ch. DCXLV, pp. 371, 373 (1810) (“full costs”
and “double costs”); 2 Rev. Stat. N. Y., pt. III, ch. X, Tit. 1, §§ 16, 25 (1846)
(“full,” “double,” and “treble” costs); Rev. Stat. Mass., pt. III, Tit. VI, ch.
121, §§ 4, 7, 8, 11, 18 (1836) (“one quarter,” “full,” “double,” and “treble”
costs).
344 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
At the time, the word “full” conveyed the same meaning that
it does today: “Complete; entire; not defective or partial.”
1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language
89 (1828); see also 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language 817 (1773) (“Complete, such as that nothing
further is desired or wanted; Complete without abatement;
at the utmost degree”). Full costs did not encompass
expenses beyond those costs that otherwise could be
awarded under the applicable state law.
The case law since 1831 also refutes Oracle's historical
argument. If Oracle's account of the history were correct,
federal courts starting in 1831 presumably would have interpreted
the term “full costs” in the Copyright Act to allow
awards of litigation expenses that were not ordinarily available
as costs under the applicable costs schedule. But Rimini
points out that none of the more than 800 available copyright
decisions awarding costs from 1831 to 1976—that is,
from the year the term “full costs” frst appeared in the
Copyright Act until the year that the Act was last signifcantly
amended—awarded expenses other than those specifed
by the applicable state or federal law. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 7. Oracle has not refuted Rimini's argument on that
point. Oracle cites no § 505 cases where federal courts
awarded expert witness fees or other litigation expenses of
the kind at issue here until the Ninth Circuit's 2005 decision
adopting the interpretation of § 505 that the Ninth Circuit followed
in this case. See Twentieth Century Fox, 429 F. 3d 869.
In light of the commonly understood meaning of the term
“full costs” as of 1831 and the case law since 1831, Oracle's
historical argument falls short. The best interpretation is
that the term “full costs” meant in 1831 what it means now:
the full amount of the costs specifed by the applicable costs
schedule.
Third, Oracle advances a variety of surplusage arguments.
Oracle contends, for example, that the word “full” would be
unnecessary surplusage if Rimini's argument were correct.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 334 (2019) 345
Opinion of the Court
We disagree. The award of costs in copyright cases was
mandatory from 1831 to 1976. See § 40, 35 Stat. 1084; § 12,
4 Stat. 438–439. During that period, the term “full” fxed
both a foor and a ceiling for the amount of “costs” that could
be awarded. In other words, the term “full costs” required
an award of 100 percent of the costs available under the applicable
costs schedule.
Oracle says that even if that interpretation of “full costs”
made sense before 1976, the meaning of the term “full costs”
changed in 1976. That year, Congress amended the Copyright
Act to make the award of costs discretionary rather
than mandatory. See § 505, 90 Stat. 2586. According to Oracle,
after Congress made the costs award discretionary, district
courts could award any amount of costs up to 100 percent
and so Rimini's reading of the word “full” now adds
nothing to “costs.” If we assume that Congress in 1976 did
not intend “full” to be surplusage, Oracle argues that Congress
must have employed the term “full” to mean expenses
beyond the costs specifed in §§ 1821 and 1920.
For several reasons, that argument does not persuade us.
To begin with, even if the term “full” lacked any continuing
signifcance after 1976, the meaning of “costs” did not
change. The term “costs” still means those costs specifed
in §§ 1821 and 1920. It makes little sense to think that Congress
in 1976, when it made the award of full costs discretionary
rather than mandatory, silently expanded the kinds of
expenses that a court may otherwise award as costs in copyright
suits.3
Moreover, Oracle's interpretation would create its own redundancy
problem by rendering the second sentence of § 505
largely redundant. That second sentence provides: “Except
3 Rimini further suggests that “full” still has meaning after 1976 because
the statute gives the district court discretion to award either full costs or
no costs, unlike statutes that refer only to “costs,” which allow courts to
award any amount of costs up to full costs. In light of our disposition of
the case, we need not and do not consider that argument.
346 RIMINI STREET, INC. v. ORACLE USA, INC.
Opinion of the Court
as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award
a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of
the costs.” 17 U. S. C. § 505. If Oracle were right that “full
costs” covers all of a party's litigation expenditures, then the
frst sentence of § 505 would presumably already cover attorney's
fees and the second sentence would be largely unnecessary.
In order to avoid some redundancy, Oracle's interpretation
would create other redundancy.
Finally, even if Oracle is correct that the term “full” has
become unnecessary or redundant as a result of the 1976
amendment, Oracle overstates the signifcance of statutory
surplusage or redundancy. Redundancy is not a silver bullet.
We have recognized that some “redundancy is `hardly
unusual' in statutes addressing costs.” Marx v. General
Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 385 (2013). If one possible interpretation
of a statute would cause some redundancy and
another interpretation would avoid redundancy, that difference
in the two interpretations can supply a clue as to the
better interpretation of a statute. But only a clue. Sometimes
the better overall reading of the statute contains
some redundancy.
* * *
The Copyright Act authorizes federal district courts to
award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation. That
term means the costs specifed in the general costs statute,
§§ 1821 and 1920. We reverse in relevant part the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, and we remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 347
Syllabus
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING
v. COUGAR DEN, INC.
certiorari to the supreme court of washington
No. 16–1498. Argued October 30, 2018—Decided March 19, 2019
The State of Washington taxes “motor vehicle fuel importer[s]” who bring
large quantities of fuel into the State by “ground transportation.”
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 82.36.010(4), (12), (16). Respondent Cougar Den,
Inc., a wholesale fuel importer owned by a member of the Yakama Nation,
imports fuel from Oregon over Washington's public highways to
the Yakama Reservation to sell to Yakama-owned retail gas stations
located within the reservation. In 2013, the Washington State Department
of Licensing assessed Cougar Den $3.6 million in taxes, penalties,
and licensing fees for importing motor vehicle fuel into the State. Cougar
Den appealed, arguing that the Washington tax, as applied to its
activities, is pre-empted by an 1855 treaty between the United States
and the Yakama Nation that, among other things, reserves the Yakamas'
“right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all
public highways,” 12 Stat. 953. A Washington Superior Court held that
the tax was pre-empted, and the Washington Supreme Court affrmed.
Held: The judgment is affrmed.
188 Wash. 2d 55, 392 P. 3d 1014, affrmed.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice
Kagan, concluded that the 1855 treaty between the United States and
the Yakama Nation pre-empts the State of Washington's fuel tax as
applied to Cougar Den's importation of fuel by public highway.
Pp. 353–367.
(a) The Washington statute at issue here taxes the importation of
fuel by public highway. The Washington Supreme Court construed the
statute that way in the decision below. That court wrote that the statute
“taxes the importation of fuel, which is the transportation of fuel.”
188 Wash. 2d 55, 69, 392 P. 3d 1014, 1020. It added that “travel on
public highways is directly at issue because the tax [is] an importation
tax.” Id., at 67, 392 P. 3d, at 1019. The incidence of a tax is a question
of state law, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S.
450, 461, and this Court is bound by the Washington Supreme Court's
interpretation of Washington law, Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S.
133, 138. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the Washington Supreme
Court meant what it said when it interpreted the statute. In
the statute's own words, Washington “impose[s] upon motor vehicle fuel
348 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
COUGAR DEN, INC.
Syllabus
licensees,” including “licensed importer[s],” a tax for “each gallon of
motor vehicle fuel” that “enters into this state,” but only “if . . . entry
is” by means of “a railcar, trailer, truck, or other equipment suitable for
ground transportation.” Wash. Rev. Code §§ 82.36.010(4), 82.36.020(1),
(2), 82.36.026(3). Thus, Cougar Den owed the tax because Cougar Den
traveled with fuel by public highway. See App. 10a–26a; App. to Pet.
for Cert. 55a. Pp. 353–359.
(b) The State of Washington's application of the tax to Cougar Den's
importation of fuel is pre-empted by the Yakama Nation's reservation
of “the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel
upon all public highways.” This conclusion rests upon three considerations
taken together. First, this Court has considered this treaty four
times previously; each time it has considered language very similar to
the language now before the Court; and each time it has stressed that
the language of the treaty should be understood as bearing the meaning
that the Yakamas understood it to have in 1855. See United States v.
Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 380–381; Seufert Brothers Co. v. United States,
249 U. S. 194, 196–198; Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 681, 683–685;
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Assn., 443 U. S. 658, 677–678. Thus, although the words “in common
with” on their face could be read to permit application to the Yakamas
of general legislation (like the legislation at issue here) that applies to
all citizens, this Court has refused to read “in common with” in this way
because that is not what the Yakamas understood the words to mean in
1855. See Winans, 198 U. S., at 379, 381; Seufert Brothers, 249 U. S.,
at 198–199; Tulee, 315 U. S., at 684; Fishing Vessel, 443 U. S., at 679,
684–685. Second, the historical record adopted by the agency and the
courts below indicates that the treaty negotiations and the United
States' representatives' statements to the Yakamas would have led the
Yakamas to understand that the treaty's protection of the right to travel
on the public highways included the right to travel with goods for purposes
of trade. Third, to impose a tax upon traveling with certain
goods burdens that travel. And the right to travel on the public highways
without such burdens is just what the treaty protects. Therefore,
precedent tells the Court that the tax must be pre-empted. In Tulee,
for example, the fshing right reserved by the Yakamas in the treaty
was held to pre-empt the application to the Yakamas of a state law
requiring fshermen to buy fshing licenses. 315 U. S., at 684. The
Court concluded that “such exaction of fees as a prerequisite to the
enjoyment of ” a right reserved in the treaty “cannot be reconciled with
a fair construction of the treaty.” Id., at 685. If the cost of a fshing
license interferes with the right to fsh, so must a tax imposed on travel
with goods (here fuel) interfere with the right to travel. Pp. 359–367.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 349
Syllabus
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that the
1855 treaty guarantees tribal members the right to move their goods,
including fuel, to and from market freely. When dealing with a tribal
treaty, a court must “give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves
would have understood them.” Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U. S. 172, 196. The Yakamas' understanding of the
terms of the 1855 treaty can be found in a set of unchallenged factual
fndings in Yakama Indian Nation v. Flores, 955 F. Supp. 1229, which
are binding here and suffcient to resolve this case. They provide “no
evidence [suggesting] that the term `in common with' placed Indians in
the same category as non-Indians with respect to any tax or fee the
latter must bear with respect to public roads.” Id., at 1247. Instead,
they suggest that the Yakamas understood the treaty's right-to-travel
provision to provide them “with the right to travel on all public highways
without being subject to any licensing and permitting fees related
to the exercise of that right while engaged in the transportation of tribal
goods.” Id., at 1262. A wealth of historical evidence confrms this understanding.
“Far-reaching travel was an intrinsic ingredient in virtually
every aspect of Yakama culture,” and travel for purposes of trade
was so important to their “way of life that they could not have performed
and functioned as a distinct culture” without it. Id., at 1238.
Everyone then understood that the treaty would protect the Yakamas'
preexisting right to take goods to and from market freely throughout
its traditional trading area. The State reads the treaty only as a promise
to tribal members of the right to venture out of their reservation
and use the public highways like everyone else. But the record shows
that the consideration the Yakamas supplied—millions of acres desperately
wanted by the United States to settle the Washington Territory—
was worth far more than an abject promise they would not be made
prisoners on their reservation. This Court's cases interpreting the
treaty's neighboring and parallel right-to-fsh provision further confrm
this understanding. See, e. g., United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371.
Pp. 367–377.
Breyer, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., fled an
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post,
p. 367. Roberts, C. J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas,
Alito, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined, post, p. 377. Kavanaugh, J., fled a
dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 386.
Noah G. Purcell, Solicitor General of Washington, argued
the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Rob350
WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
COUGAR DEN, INC.
Opinion of Breyer, J.
ert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Washington, Jay D.
Geck and Anne E. Egeler, Deputy Solicitors General, and
Fronda C. Woods, Assistant Attorney General.
Ann O'Connell argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were
Solicitor General Francisco, Acting Assistant Attorney
General Wood, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Elizabeth
Ann Peterson, and Rachel Heron.
Adam G. Unikowsky argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Ian H. Gershengorn, Sam
Hirsch, Mathew L. Harrington, Lance A. Pelletier, and
Brendan V. Monahan.*
Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Kagan join.
The State of Washington imposes a tax upon fuel importers
who travel by public highway. The question before us
is whether an 1855 treaty between the United States and
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Idaho
et al. by Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General of Idaho, and Darrell G.
Early and Steven W. Strack, Deputy Attorneys General, by Zachary W.
Carter, Corporation Counsel of New York City, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Xavier Becerra of California,
Derek Schmidt of Kansas, Jeffrey Martin Landry of Louisiana, Maura
Healey of Massachusetts, Barbara D. Underwood of New York, Peter F.
Kilmartin of Rhode Island, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Herbert H.
Slatery III of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Brad D. Schimel of Wisconsin,
and Peter K. Michael of Wyoming; for Multistate Tax Commission
et al. by Helen Hecht, Sheldon Laskin, Gregory S. Matson, and Gale Garriott;
for Public Health Organizations by Mark Greenwold and Dennis A.
Henigan; and for the Washington Oil Marketers Association et al. by
Philip A. Talmadge.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation by Ethan Jones and Marcus Shirzad;
for the National Congress of American Indians by Virginia A. Seitz
and Kathleen M. Mueller; for the Nez Perce Tribe et al. by David J. Cummings
and John T. Harrison; and for Sacred Ground Legal Services by
Jack Warren Fiander.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 351
Opinion of Breyer, J.
theYakama Nation forbids the State of Washington to impose
that tax upon fuel importers who are members of the Yakama
Nation. We conclude that it does, and we affrm the
Washington Supreme Court's similar decision.
I
A
A Washington statute applies to “motor vehicle fuel importer[
s]” who bring large quantities of fuel into the State
by “ground transportation” such as a “railcar, trailer, [or]
truck.” Wash. Rev. Code §§ 82.36.010(4), (12), (16) (2012).
The statute requires each fuel importer to obtain a license,
and it says that a fuel tax will be “levied and imposed upon
motor vehicle fuel licensees” for “each gallon of motor vehicle
fuel” that the licensee brings into the State. §§ 82.36.020(1),
(2)(c). Licensed fuel importers who import fuel by ground
transportation become liable to pay the tax as of the time
the “fuel enters into this [S]tate.” § 82.36.020(2)(c); see also
§§ 82.38.020(4), (12), (15), (26), 82.38.030(1), (7)(c)(ii) (equivalent
regulation of diesel fuel importers).
But only those licensed fuel importers who import fuel
by ground transportation are liable to pay the tax.
§§ 82.36.026(3), 82.36.020(2)(c). For example, if a licensed
fuel importer brings fuel into the State by pipeline, that
fuel importer need not pay the tax. §§ 82.36.026(3),
82.36.020(2)(c)(ii), 82.36.010(3). Similarly, if a licensed fuel
importer brings fuel into the State by vessel, that fuel
importer need not pay the tax. §§ 82.36.026(3), 82.36.020(2)
(c)(ii), 82.36.010(3). Instead, in each of those instances, the
next purchaser or possessor of the fuel will pay the tax.
§§ 82.36.020(2)(a), (b), (d). The only licensed fuel importers
who must pay this tax are the fuel importers who bring fuel
into the State by means of ground transportation.
B
The relevant treaty provides for the purchase by the
United States of Yakama land. See Treaty Between the
352 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
COUGAR DEN, INC.
Opinion of Breyer, J.
United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, June 9,
1855, 12 Stat. 951. Under the treaty, the Yakamas granted
to the United States approximately 10 million acres of land
in what is now the State of Washington, i. e., about onefourth
of the land that makes up the State today. Art. I,
id., at 951–952; see also Brief for Respondent 4, 9. In return
for this land, the United States paid the Yakamas $200,000,
made improvements to the remaining Yakama land, such as
building a hospital and schools for the Yakamas to use, and
agreed to respect the Yakamas' reservation of certain rights.
Arts. III–V, 12 Stat. 952–953. Those reserved rights include
“the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to
travel upon all public highways,” “the right of taking fsh at
all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of
the Territory,” and other rights, such as the right to hunt, to
gather roots and berries, and to pasture cattle on open and
unclaimed land. Art. III, id., at 953.
C
Cougar Den, Inc., the respondent, is a wholesale fuel importer
owned by a member of the Yakama Nation, incorporated
under Yakama law, and designated by the Yakama Nation
as its agent to obtain fuel for members of the Tribe.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a–64a; App. 99a. Cougar Den buys
fuel in Oregon, trucks the fuel over public highways to the
Yakama Reservation in Washington, and then sells the fuel
to Yakama-owned retail gas stations located within the reservation.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a, 55a. Cougar Den believes
that Washington's fuel import tax, as applied to Cougar
Den's activities, is pre-empted by the treaty. App. 15a.
In particular, Cougar Den believes that requiring it to pay
the tax would infringe the Yakamas' reserved “right, in common
with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all
public highways.” Art. III, 12 Stat. 953.
In December 2013, the Washington State Department of
Licensing (Department), believing that the state tax was not
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Opinion of Breyer, J.
pre-empted by the treaty, assessed Cougar Den $3.6 million
in taxes, penalties, and licensing fees. App. to Pet. for Cert.
65a; App. 10a. Cougar Den appealed the assessment to
higher authorities within the state agency. App. 15a. An
Administrative Law Judge agreed with Cougar Den that the
tax was pre-empted. App. to Brief in Opposition 14a. The
Department's director, however, disagreed and overturned
the ALJ's order. App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a. A Washington
Superior Court in turn disagreed with the director and held
that the tax was pre-empted. Id., at 34a. The director appealed
to the Washington Supreme Court. 188 Wash. 2d 55,
58, 392 P. 3d 1014, 1015 (2017). And that court, agreeing
with Cougar Den, upheld the Superior Court's determination
of pre-emption. Id., at 69, 392 P. 3d, at 1020.
The Department fled a petition for certiorari asking us to
review the State Supreme Court's determination. And we
agreed to do so.
II
A
The Washington statute at issue here taxes the importation
of fuel by public highway. The Washington Supreme
Court construed the statute that way in the decision below.
That court wrote that the statute “taxes the importation of
fuel, which is the transportation of fuel.” Ibid. It added
that “travel on public highways is directly at issue because
the tax [is] an importation tax.” Id., at 67, 392 P. 3d, at 1019.
Nor is there any reason to doubt that the Washington Supreme
Court means what it said when it interpreted the
Washington statute. We read the statute the same way.
In the statute's own words, Washington “impose[s] upon
motor vehicle fuel licensees,” including “licensed importer[
s],” a tax for “each gallon of motor vehicle fuel” that “enters
into this state,” but only “if . . . entry is” by means
of “a railcar, trailer, truck, or other equipment suitable for
ground transportation.” Wash. Rev. Code §§ 82.36.010(4),
354 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
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82.36.020(1), (2), 82.36.026(3). As is true of most tax laws,
the statute is long and complex, and it is easy to stumble
over this technical language. But if you are able to walk
slowly through its provisions, the statute is easily followed.
We need take only fve steps.
We start our journey at the beginning of the statute which
frst declares that “[t]here is hereby levied and imposed upon
motor vehicle fuel licensees, other than motor vehicle fuel
distributors, a tax at the rate . . . provided in [the statute]
on each gallon of motor vehicle fuel.” § 82.36.020(1). That
is simple enough. Washington imposes a tax on a group of
persons called “motor vehicle fuel licensees” for “each gallon
of motor vehicle fuel.”
Who are the “motor vehicle fuel licensees” that Washington
taxes? We take a second step to fnd out. As the defnitions
section of the statute explains, the “motor vehicle
fuel licensees” upon whom the tax is imposed are “person[s]
holding a . . . motor vehicle fuel importer, motor vehicle
fuel exporter, motor vehicle fuel blender, motor vehicle distributor,
or international fuel tax agreement license. ”
§ 82.36.010(12). This, too, is easy to grasp. Not everyone
who possesses motor vehicle fuel owes the tax. Instead,
only motor vehicle fuel importers (and other similar movers
and shakers within the motor vehicle fuel industry) who are
licensed by the State to deal in fuel, must pay the tax.
But must each of these motor vehicle fuel licensees pay
the tax, so that the fuel is taxed as it passes from blender,
to importer, to exporter, and so on? We take a third step,
and learn that the answer is “no.” As the statute explains,
“the tax shall be imposed at the time and place of the frst
taxable event and upon the frst taxable person within this
state.” § 82.36.022. Reading that, we understand that only
the frst licensee who can be taxed, will be taxed.
So, we ask, who is the frst taxable licensee? Who must
actually pay this tax? We take a fourth step to fnd out.
Logic tells us that the frst licensee who can be taxed will
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 355
Opinion of Breyer, J.
likely be the licensee who brings fuel into the State. But
the statute tells us that a “licensed importer” is “liable for
and [must] pay tax to the department” when “[m]otor vehicle
fuel enters into this state if . . . [t]he entry is not by bulk
transfer.” §§ 82.36.020(2)(c), 82.36.026(3) (emphasis added).
That is, a licensed importer can only be the frst taxable licensee
(and therefore the licensee that must pay the tax) if
the importer brings fuel into the State by a method other
than “bulk transfer.”
But what is “bulk transfer”? What does it mean to say
that licensed fuel importers need only pay the tax if they do
not bring in fuel by “bulk transfer”? We take a ffth, and
fnal, step to fnd out. “[B]ulk transfer,” the defnitions
section explains, “means a transfer of motor vehicle fuel
by pipeline or vessel,” as opposed to “railcar, trailer, truck,
or other equipment suitable for ground transportation.”
§§ 82.36.010(3), (4). So, we learn that if the licensed fuel importer
brings fuel into the State by ground transportation,
then the fuel importer owes the tax. But if the licensed fuel
importer brings fuel into the State by pipeline or vessel, then
the importer will not be the frst taxable person to possess
the fuel, and he will not owe the tax.
In sum, Washington taxes travel by ground transportation
with fuel. That feature sets the Washington statute apart
from other statutes with which we are more familiar. It is
not a tax on possession or importation. A statute that taxes
possession would ordinarily require all people who own a
good to pay the tax. A good example of that would be a
State's real estate property tax. That statute would require
all homeowners to pay the tax, every year, regardless of the
specifcs of their situation. And a statute that taxes importation
would ordinarily require all people who bring a good
into the State to pay a tax. A good example of that would
be a federal tax on newly manufactured cars. That statute
would ordinarily require all people who bring a new car into
the country to pay a tax. But Washington's statute is differ356
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Opinion of Breyer, J.
ent because it singles out ground transportation. That is,
Washington does not just tax possession of fuel, or even importation
of fuel, but instead taxes importation by ground
transportation.
The facts of this case provide a good example of the tax in
operation. Each of the assessment orders that the Department
sent to Cougar Den explained that Cougar Den owed
the tax because Cougar Den traveled by highway. See App.
10a–26a; App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a. As the director explained,
Cougar Den owed the tax because Cougar Den had
caused fuel to enter “into this [S]tate at the Washington-
Oregon boundary on the Highway 97 bridge” by means of a
“tank truck” destined for “the Yakama Reservation.” Ibid.
The director offers this explanation in addition to quoting
the quantity of fuel that Cougar Den possessed because the
element of travel by ground transportation is a necessary
prerequisite to the imposition of the tax. Put another way,
the State must prove that Cougar Den traveled by highway
in order to apply its tax.
B
We are not convinced by the arguments raised to the contrary.
The Department claims, and The Chief Justice
agrees, that the state tax has little or nothing to do with the
treaty because it is not a tax on travel with fuel but rather
a tax on the possession of fuel. See Brief for Petitioner 26–
28; post, at 380–381 (dissenting opinion).
We cannot accept that characterization of the tax, however,
for the Washington Supreme Court has authoritatively
held that the statute is a tax on travel. The Washington
Supreme Court held that the Washington law at issue here
“taxes the importation of fuel, which is the transportation of
fuel.” 188 Wash. 2d, at 69, 392 P. 3d, at 1020. It added that
“travel on public highways is directly at issue because the
tax [is] an importation tax.” Id., at 67, 392 P. 3d, at 1019.
In so doing, the State Supreme Court heard, considered, and
rejected the construction of the fuel tax that the Department
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Opinion of Breyer, J.
advances here. See id., at 66–67, 392 P. 3d, at 1019 (“The
Department argues, and the director agreed, that the taxes
are assessed based on incidents of ownership or possession
of fuel, and not incident to use of or travel on the roads or
highways. . . . The Department's argument is unpersuasive.
. . . Here, travel on public highways is directly at issue
because the tax was an importation tax”). The incidence of
a tax is a question of state law, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 461 (1995), and this Court
is bound by the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation
of Washington law, Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133,
138 (2010). We decline the Department's invitation to overstep
the bounds of our authority and construe the tax to mean
what the Washington Supreme Court has said it does not.
Nor would it make sense to construe the tax's incidence
differently. The Washington Supreme Court's conclusion
follows directly from its (and our) interpretation of how the
tax operates. See supra, at 353–356. To be sure, it is generally
true that fuel imported into the State by trucks driving
the public highways can also be described as fuel that
is possessed for the frst time in the State. But to call the
Washington statute a tax on “frst possession” would give
the law an overinclusive label. As explained at length
above, there are several ways in which a company could be
a “frst possessor” of fuel without incurring the tax. See
supra, at 354–355. For example, Cougar Den would not owe
the tax had Cougar Den “frst possessed” fuel by piping fuel
from out of State into a Washington refnery. First possession
is not taxed if the fuel is brought into the State by pipeline
and bound for a refnery. §§ 82.36.026(3), 82.36.020(2)
(c)(ii), 82.36.010(3). Similarly, Cougar Den would not owe the
tax had Cougar Den “frst possessed” fuel by bringing fuel
into Washington through its waterways rather than its highways.
First possession is not taxed if the fuel is brought
into the State by vessel. §§ 82.36.026(3), 82.36.020(2)(c)(ii),
82.36.010(3). Thus, it seems rather clear that the tax cannot
358 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
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Opinion of Breyer, J.
accurately be described as a tax on the frst possession of
fuel.
But even if the contrary were true, the tax would still
have the practical effect of burdening the Yakamas' travel.
Here, the Yakamas' lone off-reservation act within the State
is traveling along a public highway with fuel. The tax thus
operates on the Yakamas exactly like a tax on transportation
would: It falls upon them only because they happened to
transport goods on a highway while en route to their reservation.
And it is the practical effect of the state law that
we have said makes the difference. We held, for instance,
that the fshing rights reserved in the treaty pre-empted the
State's enforcement of a trespass law against Yakama fshermen
crossing private land to access the river. See, e. g.,
United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 381 (1905). That
was so even though the trespass law was not limited to those
who trespass in order to fsh but applied more broadly to any
trespasser. Put another way, it mattered not that the tax
was “on” trespassing rather than fshing because the tax operated
upon the Yakamas when they were exercising their
treaty-protected right. Ibid.; see also Tulee v. Washington,
315 U. S. 681, 685 (1942) (holding that the fshing rights reserved
in the treaty pre-empted the State's application of a
fshing licensing fee to a Yakama fsherman, even though the
fee also applied to types of fshing not practiced by the Yakamas).
And this approach makes sense. When the Yakamas
bargained in the treaty to protect their right to travel, they
could only have cared about preventing the State from burdening
their exercise of that right. To the Yakamas, it is
thus irrelevant whether the State's tax might apply to other
activities beyond transportation. The only relevant question
is whether the tax “act[ed] upon the Indians as a charge
for exercising the very right their ancestors intended to reserve.”
Id., at 685. And the State's tax here acted upon
Cougar Den in exactly that way.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 359
Opinion of Breyer, J.
For the same reason, we are unpersuaded by the Department's
insistence that it adopted this tax after a District
Court, applying this Court's decision in Chickasaw Nation,
barred the State from taxing the sale of fuel products on
tribal land. See Brief for Petitioner 6–7; Squaxin Island
Tribe v. Stephens, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1262 (WD Wash.
2005). Although a State “generally is free to amend its law
to shift the tax's legal incidence,” Chickasaw Nation, 515
U. S., at 460, it may not burden a treaty-protected right in
the process, as the State has done here.
Thus, we must turn to the question whether this fuel tax,
falling as it does upon members of the Tribe who travel on
the public highways, violates the treaty.
III
A
In our view, the State of Washington's application of the
fuel tax to Cougar Den's importation of fuel is pre-empted
by the treaty's reservation to the Yakama Nation of “the
right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel
upon all public highways.” We rest this conclusion upon
three considerations taken together.
First, this Court has considered this treaty four times previously;
each time it has considered language very similar to
the language before us; and each time it has stressed that
the language of the treaty should be understood as bearing
the meaning that the Yakamas understood it to have in
1855. See Winans, 198 U. S., at 380–381; Seufert Brothers
Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 194, 196–198 (1919); Tulee, 315
U. S., at 683–685; Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658, 677–678
(1979).
The treaty language at issue in each of the four cases is
similar, though not identical, to the language before us. The
cases focus upon language that guarantees to the Yakamas
360 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
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“the right of taking fsh at all usual and accustomed places,
in common with citizens of the Territory.” Art. III, para. 2,
12 Stat. 953. Here, the language guarantees to the Yakamas
“the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to
travel upon all public highways.” Art. III, para. 1, ibid.
The words “in common with” on their face could be read to
permit application to the Yakamas of general legislation (like
the legislation before us) that applies to all citizens, Yakama
and non-Yakama alike. But this Court concluded the contrary
because that is not what the Yakamas understood the
words to mean in 1855. See Winans, 198 U. S., at 379, 381;
Seufert Brothers, 249 U. S., at 198–199; Tulee, 315 U. S., at
684; Fishing Vessel, 443 U. S., at 679, 684–685.
The cases base their reasoning in part upon the fact that
the treaty negotiations were conducted in, and the treaty
was written in, languages that put the Yakamas at a signifcant
disadvantage. See, e. g., Winans, 198 U. S., at 380;
Seufert Brothers, 249 U. S., at 198; Fishing Vessel, 443 U. S.,
at 667, n. 10. The parties negotiated the treaty in Chinook
jargon, a trading language of about 300 words that no tribe
used as a primary language. App. 65a; Fishing Vessel, 443
U. S., at 667, n. 10. The parties memorialized the treaty in
English, a language that the Yakamas could neither read nor
write. And many of the representations that the United
States made about the treaty had no adequate translation in
the Yakamas' own language. App. 68a–69a.
Thus, in the year 1905, in Winans, this Court wrote that,
to interpret the treaty, courts must focus upon the historical
context in which it was written and signed. 198 U. S., at
381; see also Tulee, 315 U. S., at 684 (“It is our responsibility
to see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as
possible, in accordance with the meaning they were understood
to have by the tribal representatives at the council”);
cf. Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U. S. 271, 280 (2017)
(noting that, to ascertain the meaning of a treaty, courts
“may look beyond the written words to the history of the
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treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court added, in light of the Yakamas' understanding
in respect to the reservation of fshing rights, the treaty
words “in common with” do not limit the reservation's scope
to a right against discrimination. Winans, 198 U. S., at 380–
381. Instead, as we explained in Tulee, Winans held that
“Article III [of the treaty] conferred upon the Yakimas continuing
rights, beyond those which other citizens may enjoy,
to fsh at their `usual and accustomed places' in the ceded
area.” Tulee, 315 U. S., at 684 (citing Winans, 198 U. S. 371;
emphasis added). Also compare, e. g., Fishing Vessel, 443
U. S., at 677, n. 22 (“Whatever opportunities the treaties assure
Indians with respect to fsh are admittedly not `equal'
to, but are to some extent greater than, those afforded other
citizens” (emphasis added)), with post, at 389 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (citing this same footnote in Fishing Vessel
as support for the argument that the treaty guarantees the
Yakamas only a right against discrimination). Construing
the treaty as giving the Yakamas only antidiscrimination
rights, rights that any inhabitant of the territory would have,
would amount to “an impotent outcome to negotiations and
a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the
word of the Nation for more.” Winans, 198 U. S., at 380.
Second, the historical record adopted by the agency and
the courts below indicates that the right to travel includes a
right to travel with goods for sale or distribution. See App.
to Pet. for Cert. 33a; App. 56a–74a. When the United States
and the Yakamas negotiated the treaty, both sides emphasized
that the Yakamas needed to protect their freedom to
travel so that they could continue to fsh, to hunt, to gather
food, and to trade. App. 65a–66a. The Yakamas maintained
fsheries on the Columbia River, following the salmon
runs as the fsh moved through Yakama territory. Id., at
62a–63a. The Yakamas traveled to the nearby plains region
to hunt buffalo. Id., at 61a. They traveled to the moun362
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tains to gather berries and roots. Ibid. The Yakamas' religion
and culture also depended on certain goods, such as
buffalo byproducts and shellfsh, which they could often obtain
only through trade. Id., at 61a–62a. Indeed, the Yakamas
formed part of a great trading network that stretched
from the Indian tribes on the Northwest coast of North
America to the plains tribes to the east. Ibid.
The United States' representatives at the treaty negotiations
well understood these facts, including the importance
of travel and trade to the Yakamas. Id., at 63a. They repeatedly
assured the Yakamas that under the treaty the Yakamas
would be able to travel outside their reservation on
the roads that the United States built. Id., at 66a–67a; see
also, e. g., id., at 66a (“ `[W]e give you the privilege of traveling
over roads' ”). And the United States repeatedly assured
the Yakamas that they could travel along the roads
for trading purposes. Id., at 65a–67a. Isaac Stevens, the
Governor of the Washington Territory, told the Yakamas, for
example, that, under the terms of the treaty, “You will be
allowed to go on the roads, to take your things to market,
your horses and cattle.” App. to Brief for Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation as Amicus Curiae
68a (record of the treaty proceedings). He added that the
Yakamas “will be allowed to go to the usual fshing places
and fsh in common with the whites, and to get roots and
berries and to kill game on land not occupied by the whites;
all this outside the Reservation.” Ibid. Governor Stevens
further urged the Yakamas to accept the United States' proposals
for reservation boundaries in part because the proposal
put the Yakama Reservation in close proximity to public
highways that would facilitate trade. He said, “ `You will
be near the great road and can take your horses and your
cattle down the river and to the [Puget] Sound to market.' ”
App. 66a. In a word, the treaty negotiations and the United
States' representatives' statements to the Yakamas would
have led the Yakamas to understand that the treaty's protecCite
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tion of the right to travel on the public highways included
the right to travel with goods for purposes of trade. We
consequently so construe the relevant treaty provision.
Third, to impose a tax upon traveling with certain goods
burdens that travel. And the right to travel on the public
highways without such burdens is, as we have said, just what
the treaty protects. Therefore, our precedents tell us that
the tax must be pre-empted. In Tulee, for example, we held
that the fshing right reserved by the Yakamas in the treaty
pre-empted the application to the Yakamas of a state law
requiring fshermen to buy fshing licenses. 315 U. S., at
684. We concluded that “such exaction of fees as a prerequisite
to the enjoyment of ” a right reserved in the treaty “cannot
be reconciled with a fair construction of the treaty.” Id.,
at 685. If the cost of a fshing license interferes with the
right to fsh, so must a tax imposed on travel with goods
(here fuel) interfere with the right to travel.
We consequently conclude that Washington's fuel tax “acts
upon the Indians as a charge for exercising the very right
their ancestors intended to reserve.” Ibid. Washington's
fuel tax cannot lawfully be assessed against Cougar Den on
the facts here. Treaties with federally recognized Indian
tribes—like the treaty at issue here—constitute federal
law that pre-empts conficting state law as applied to offreservation
activity by Indians. Cf. Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148–149 (1973).
B
Again, we are not convinced by the arguments raised to
the contrary. The Chief Justice concedes that “the right
to travel with goods is just an application of the Yakamas'
right to travel.” Post, at 378 (dissenting opinion); see also
ibid. (“It ensures that the Yakamas enjoy the same privileges
when they travel with goods as when they travel without
them”). But he nevertheless insists that, because of the
way in which the Washington statute taxes fuel, the statute
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does not interfere with the right to travel reserved by the
Yakamas in the treaty. Post, at 379–380.
First, The Chief Justice fnds it signifcant that “[t]he
tax is calculated per gallon of fuel; not, like a toll, per vehicle
or distance traveled.” Post, at 379; see also ibid. (“The tax
before us does not resemble a blockade or a toll”). But that
argument fails on its own terms. A toll on highway travel
is no less a toll when the toll varies based on the number of
axles on a vehicle traveling the highway, or on the number
of people traveling in the vehicle. We cannot, therefore, see
why the number of gallons of fuel that the vehicle carries
should make all the difference. Put another way, the fact
that a tax on travel varies based on the features of that
travel does not mean that the tax is not a tax on travel.
Second, The Chief Justice argues that it “makes no
sense,” for example, to hold that “a tax on certain luxury
goods” that is assessed the frst time the goods are possessed
in Washington cannot apply to a Yakama member “who
buys” a mink coat “over the state line in Portland and then
drives back to the reservation,” but the tax can apply to a
Yakama member who “buys a mink coat at an off-reservation
store in Washington.” Post, at 380. The short, conclusive
answer to this argument is that there is a treaty that forbids
taxing Yakama travel on highways with goods (e. g., fuel, or
even furs) for market; and there is no treaty that forbids
taxing Yakama off-reservation purchases of goods. Indeed,
if our precedents supported The Chief Justice's rule, then
our fshing rights cases would have turned on whether Washington
also taxed fsh purchased in the grocery store. Cf.,
e. g., Tulee, 315 U. S., at 682, n. 1 (holding that the fshing
right reserved by the Yakamas in the treaty pre-empted the
application to the Yakamas of a state law which prohibited
“ `catch[ing] . . . fsh for food' ” without having purchased
a license). But in those cases, we did not look to whether
fsh were taxed elsewhere in Washington. That is because
the treaty does not protect the Yakamas from state sales
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taxes imposed on the off-reservation sale of goods. Instead,
the treaty protects the Yakamas' right to travel the public
highways without paying state taxes on that activity, much
like the treaty protects the Yakamas' right to fsh without
paying state taxes on that activity.
Third, The Chief Justice argues that only a law that
“punished or charged the Yakamas” for an “integral feature”
of a treaty right could be pre-empted by the treaty. Post,
at 382. But that is true of the Washington statute at issue
here. The treaty protects the right to travel with goods,
see supra, at 359–363, and the Washington statute taxes
travel with goods, see supra, at 353–356. Therefore, the
statute charges the Yakamas for an “integral feature” of a
treaty right. But even if the statute indirectly burdened a
treaty right, under our precedents, the statute would still
be pre-empted. One of the Washington statutes at issue in
Winans was not a fshing regulation, but instead a trespassing
statute. That trespassing statute indirectly burdened
the right to fsh by preventing the Yakamas from crossing
privately owned land so that the Yakamas could reach their
traditional fshing places and camp on that private property
during the fshing season. See 198 U. S., at 380–381. It
cannot be true that a law prohibiting trespassing imposed a
burden on the right to fsh that is “integral” enough to be
pre-empted by the treaty, while a law taxing goods carried
to the reservation on the public highway imposes a burden
on the right to travel that is too attenuated to be pre-empted
by the treaty.
C
Although we hold that the treaty protects the right to
travel on the public highway with goods, we do not say or
imply that the treaty grants protection to carry any and all
goods. Nor do we hold that the treaty deprives the State
of the power to regulate, say, when necessary for conservation.
To the contrary, we stated in Tulee that, although the
treaty “forecloses the [S]tate from charging the Indians a fee
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of the kind in question here,” the State retained the “power
to impose on Indians, equally with others, such restrictions
of a purely regulatory nature . . . as are necessary for the
conservation of fsh.” 315 U. S., at 684. Indeed, it was crucial
to our decision in Tulee that, although the licensing fees
at issue were “regulatory as well as revenue producing,”
“their regulatory purpose could be accomplished otherwise,”
and “the imposition of license fees [was] not indispensable to
the effectiveness of a state conservation program.” Id., at
685. See also Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of
Wash., 391 U. S. 392, 402, n. 14 (1968) (“As to a `regulation'
concerning the time and manner of fshing outside the reservation
(as opposed to a `tax'), we said that the power of
the State was to be measured by whether it was `necessary
for the conservation of fsh' ” (quoting Tulee, 315 U. S., at
684)).
Nor do we hold that the treaty deprives the State of the
power to regulate to prevent danger to health or safety occasioned
by a tribe member's exercise of treaty rights. The
record of the treaty negotiations may not support the contention
that the Yakamas expected to use the roads entirely
unconstrained by laws related to health or safety. See App.
to Brief for Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama
Nation as Amicus Curiae 20a–21a, 31a–32a. Governor Stevens
explained, at length, the United States' awareness of
crimes committed by United States citizens who settled
amongst the Yakamas, and the United States' intention to
enact laws that would restrain both the United States citizens
and the Yakamas alike for the safety of both groups.
See id., at 31a.
Nor do we here interpret the treaty as barring the State
from collecting revenue through sales or use taxes (applied
outside the reservation). Unlike the tax at issue here,
which applies explicitly to transport by “railcar, trailer,
truck, or other equipment suitable for ground transportation,”
see supra, at 355, a sales or use tax normally applies
irrespective of transport or its means. Here, however, we
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 367
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
deal with a tax applicable simply to importation by ground
transportation. Moreover, it is a tax designed to secure revenue
that, as far as the record shows here, the State might obtain
in other ways.
IV
To summarize, our holding rests upon three propositions:
First, a state law that burdens a treaty-protected right is
pre-empted by the treaty. See supra, at 363–367. Second,
the treaty protects the Yakamas' right to travel on the public
highway with goods for sale. See supra, at 359–363.
Third, the Washington statute at issue here taxes the Yakamas
for traveling with fuel by public highway. See supra,
at 353–359. For these three reasons, Washington's fuel tax
cannot lawfully be assessed against Cougar Den on the facts
here. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Washington is affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring in the judgment.
The Yakamas have lived in the Pacifc Northwest for centuries.
In 1855, the United States sought and won a treaty
in which the Tribe agreed to surrender 10 million acres, land
that today makes up nearly a quarter of the State of Washington.
In return, the Yakamas received a reservation and
various promises, including a guarantee that they would
enjoy “the right, in common with citizens of the United
States, to travel upon all public highways.” Treaty Between
the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians,
Art. III, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 953. Today, the parties offer
dueling interpretations of this language. The State argues
that it merely allows the Yakamas to travel on public highways
like everyone else. And because everyone else importing
gasoline from out of State by highway must pay a
tax on that good, so must tribal members. Meanwhile, the
Tribe submits that the treaty guarantees tribal members the
right to move their goods to and from market freely. So
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that tribal members may bring goods, including gasoline,
from an out-of-state market to sell on the reservation without
incurring taxes along the way.
Our job here is a modest one. We are charged with adopting
the interpretation most consistent with the treaty's original
meaning. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U. S. 530,
534–535 (1991). When we're dealing with a tribal treaty,
too, we must “give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves
would have understood them.” Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U. S. 172, 196 (1999).
After all, the United States drew up this contract, and we
normally construe any ambiguities against the drafter who
enjoys the power of the pen. Nor is there any question that
the government employed that power to its advantage in this
case. During the negotiations “English words were translated
into Chinook jargon . . . although that was not the primary
language” of the Tribe. Yakama Indian Nation v.
Flores, 955 F. Supp. 1229, 1243 (ED Wash. 1997). After the
parties reached agreement, the U. S. negotiators wrote the
treaty in English—a language that the Yakamas couldn't
read or write. And like many such treaties, this one was by
all accounts more nearly imposed on the Tribe than a product
of its free choice.
When it comes to the Yakamas' understanding of the treaty's
terms in 1855, we have the beneft of a set of unchallenged
factual fndings. The fndings come from a separate
case involving the Yakamas' challenge to certain restrictions
on their logging operations. Id., at 1231. The state Superior
Court relied on these factual fndings in this case and
held Washington collaterally estopped from challenging
them. Because the State did not challenge the Superior
Court's estoppel ruling either in the Washington Supreme
Court or here, these fndings are binding on us as well.
They also tell us all we need to know to resolve this case.
To some modern ears, the right to travel in common with
others might seem merely a right to use the roads subject to
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 369
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
the same taxes and regulations as everyone else. Post, at
386–388 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). But that is not how the
Yakamas understood the treaty's terms. To the Yakamas, the
phrase “ `in common with' . . . implie[d] that the Indian and non-
Indian use [would] be joint but [did] not imply that the Indian
use [would] be in any way restricted.” Yakama Indian Nation,
955 F. Supp., at 1265. In fact, “[i]n the Yakama language,
the term `in common with' . . . suggest[ed] public use or general
use without restriction.” Ibid. So “[t]he most the Indians
would have understood . . . of the term[s] `in common with' and
`public' was that they would share the use of the road with
whites.” Ibid. Signifcantly, there is “no evidence [to] sugges[
t] that the term `in common with' placed Indians in the
same category as non-Indians with respect to any tax or fee
the latter must bear with respect to public roads.” Id., at
1247. Instead, the evidence suggests that the Yakamas understood
the right-to-travel provision to provide them “with
the right to travel on all public highways without being subject
to any licensing and permitting fees related to the exercise of
that right while engaged in the transportation of tribal goods.”
Id., at 1262.
Applying these factual fndings to our case requires a ruling
for the Yakamas. As the Washington Supreme Court
recognized, the treaty's terms permit regulations that allow
the Yakamas and non-Indians to share the road in common
and travel along it safely together. But they do not permit
encumbrances on the ability of tribal members to bring their
goods to and from market. And by everyone's admission,
the state tax at issue here isn't about facilitating peaceful
coexistence of tribal members and non-Indians on the public
highways. It is about taxing a good as it passes to and from
market—exactly what the treaty forbids.
A wealth of historical evidence confrms this understanding.
The Yakama Indian Nation decision supplies an admirably
rich account of the history, but it is enough to recount
just some of the most salient details. “Prior to and at the
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time the treaty was negotiated,” the Yakamas “engaged in a
system of trade and exchange with other plateau tribes” and
tribes “of the Northwest coast and plains of Montana and
Wyoming.” Ibid. This system came with no restrictions;
the Yakamas enjoyed “free and open access to trade networks
in order to maintain their system of trade and exchange.”
Id., at 1263. They traveled to Oregon and maybe
even to California to trade “fr trees, lava rocks, horses, and
various species of salmon.” Id., at 1262–1263. This extensive
travel “was necessary to obtain goods that were otherwise
unavailable to [the Yakamas] but important for
sustenance and religious purposes.” Id., at 1262. Indeed,
“far-reaching travel was an intrinsic ingredient in virtually
every aspect of Yakama culture.” Id., at 1238. Travel for
purposes of trade was so important to the “Yakamas' way of
life that they could not have performed and functioned as a
distinct culture . . . without extensive travel.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Everyone understood that the treaty would protect the
Yakamas' preexisting right to take goods to and from market
freely throughout their traditional trading area. “At the
treaty negotiations, a primary concern of the Indians was
that they have freedom to move about to . . . trade.” Id., at
1264. Isaac Stevens, the Governor of the Washington Territory,
specifcally promised the Yakamas that they would “ `be
allowed to go on the roads to take [their] things to market.' ”
Id., at 1244 (emphasis deleted). Governor Stevens called
this the “ `same libert[y]' ” to travel with goods free of restriction
“ `outside the reservation' ” that the Tribe would
enjoy within the new reservation's boundaries. Ibid. Indeed,
the U. S. representatives' “statements regarding the
Yakama's use of the public highways to take their goods to
market clearly and without ambiguity promised the Yakamas
the use of public highways without restriction for future
trading endeavors.” Id., at 1265. Before the treaty, then,
the Yakamas traveled extensively without paying taxes to
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 371
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
bring goods to and from market, and the record suggests
that the Yakamas would have understood the treaty to preserve
that liberty.
None of this can come as much of a surprise. As the State
reads the treaty, it promises tribal members only the right
to venture out of their reservation and use the public highways
like everyone else. But the record shows that the consideration
the Yakamas supplied was worth far more than an
abject promise they would not be made prisoners on their
reservation. In fact, the millions of acres the Tribe ceded
were a prize the United States desperately wanted. U. S.
treaty negotiators were “under tremendous pressure to
quickly negotiate treaties with eastern Washington tribes,
because lands occupied by those tribes were important in
settling the Washington territory.” Id., at 1240. Settlers
were fooding into the Pacifc Northwest and building homesteads
without any assurance of lawful title. The government
needed “to obtain title to Indian lands” to place these
settlements on a more lawful footing. Ibid. The government
itself also wanted to build “wagon and military roads
through Yakama lands to provide access to the settlements
on the west side of the Cascades.” Ibid. So “obtaining Indian
lands east of the Cascades became a central objective”
for the government's own needs. Id., at 1241. The Yakamas
knew all this and could see the writing on the wall: One
way or another, their land would be taken. If they managed
to extract from the negotiations the simple right to take
their goods freely to and from market on the public highways,
it was a price the United States was more than willing
to pay. By any fair measure, it was a bargain-basement
deal.
Our cases interpreting the treaty's neighboring and parallel
right-to-fsh provision further confrm this understanding.
The treaty “secure[s] . . . the right of taking fsh at all
usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of
the Territory.” Art. III, 12 Stat. 953 (emphasis added).
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Initially, some suggested this guaranteed tribal members
only the right to fsh according to the same regulations and
subject to the same fees as non-Indians. But long ago this
Court refused to impose such an “impotent” construction on
the treaty. United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 380
(1905). Instead, the Court held that the treaty language
prohibited state offcials from imposing many nondiscriminatory
fees and regulations on tribal members. While such
laws “may be both convenient and, in [their] general impact,
fair,” this Court observed, they act “upon the Indians as a
charge for exercising the very right their ancestors intended
to reserve.” Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 681, 685 (1942).
Interpreting the same treaty right in Winans, we held that,
despite arguments otherwise, “the phrase `in common with
citizens of the Territory' ” confers “upon the Yak[a]mas continuing
rights, beyond those which other citizens may enjoy,
to fsh at their `usual and accustomed places.' ” Tulee, 315
U. S., at 684 (citing Winans, 198 U. S., at 371; emphasis
added). Today, we simply recognize that the same language
should yield the same result.
With its primary argument now having failed, the State
encourages us to labor through a series of backups. It begins
by pointing out that the treaty speaks of allowing the
Tribe “free access” from local roads to the public highways,
but indicates that tribal members are to use those highways
“in common with” non-Indians. On the State's account,
these different linguistic formulations must be given different
meanings. And the difference the State proposes? No
surprise: It encourages us to read the former language as
allowing goods to be moved tax-free along local roads to the
highways but the latter language as authorizing taxes on the
Yakamas' goods once they arrive there. See also post, at
388 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
The trouble is that nothing in the record supports this interpretation.
Uncontested factual fndings refect the YakaCite
as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 373
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
mas' understanding that the treaty would allow them to use
the highways to bring goods to and from market freely.
These fndings bind us under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
and no one has proposed any lawful basis for ignoring
them. Nor, for that matter, has anyone even tried to offer
a reason why the Tribe might have bargained for the right
to move its goods freely only part of the way to market.
Our job in this case is to interpret the treaty as the Yakamas
originally understood it in 1855—not in light of new lawyerly
glosses conjured up for litigation a continent away and more
than 150 years after the fact.
If that alternative won't work, the State offers another.
It admits that the Yakamas personally may have a right to
travel the highways free of most restrictions on their movement.
See also post, at 379 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (acknowledging
that the treaty prohibits the State from “charg-
[ing] . . . a toll” on Yakamas traveling on the highway). But,
the State continues, the law at issue here doesn't offend that
right. It doesn't, we are told, because the “object” of the
State's tax isn't travel but the possession of fuel; the fact that
the State happens to assess its tax when fuel is possessed on
a public highway rather than someplace else is neither here
nor there. And just look, we are told, at the anomalies that
might arise if we ruled otherwise. A tribal member who
buys a “mink coat” in a Washington store would have to pay
the State's sales tax, but a tribal member who purchases the
same coat at market in Oregon could not be taxed for possessing
it on the highway when reentering Washington.
See post, at 378–383.
This argument suffers from much the same problem as its
predecessors. Now, at least, the State may acknowledge
that the Yakamas personally have a right to travel free of
most restrictions. But the State still fails to give full effect
to the treaty's terms and the Yakamas' original understanding
of them. After all and as we've seen, the treaty doesn't
just guarantee tribal members the right to travel on the
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highways free of most restrictions on their movement; it also
guarantees tribal members the right to move goods freely to
and from market using those highways. And it's impossible
to transport goods without possessing them. So a tax that
falls on the Yakamas' possession of goods as they travel to
and from market on the highway violates the treaty just as
much as a tax on travel alone would.
Consider the alternative. If the State could save the tax
here simply by labeling it a fee on the “possession” of a good,
the State might just as easily revive the fshing license fee
Tulee struck down simply by calling it a fee on the “possession”
of fsh. That, of course, would be ridiculous. The Yakamas'
right to fsh includes the right to possess the fsh they
catch—just like their right to move goods on the highways
embraces the right to possess them there. Nor does the
State's reply solve the problem. It accepts, as it must, that
possessing fsh is “integral” to the right to fsh. Post, at
382–383, n. 2 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). But it stands pat
on its assertion that the treaty protects nothing more than a
personal right to travel, ignoring all of the facts and binding
fndings before us establishing that the treaty also guarantees
a right to move (and so possess) goods freely as they
travel to and from market. Ibid.
What about the supposed “mink coat” anomaly? Under
the terms of the treaty before us, it's true that a Yakama
who buys a mink coat (or perhaps some more likely item) at
an off-reservation store in Washington will have to pay sales
tax because the treaty is silent there. And it is also true
that a Yakama who buys the same coat right over the state
line, pays any taxes due at market there, and then drives
back to the reservation using the public highways is entitled
to move that good tax-free from market back to the reservation.
But that is hardly anomalous—that is the treaty right
the Yakamas reserved. And it's easy to see why. Imagine
the Yakama Reservation reached the Washington/Oregon
state line (as it did before the 1855 Treaty). In that case,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 375
Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment
Washington would have no basis to tax the Yakamas' transportation
of goods from Oregon (whether they might be fuel,
mink coats, or anything else), as all of the Yakamas' conduct
would take place outside of the State or on the reservation.
The only question here is whether the result changes because
the Tribe must now use Washington's highways to
make the trek home. And the answer is no. The Tribe bargained
for a right to travel with goods off reservation just
as it could on reservation and just as it had for centuries. If
the State and federal governments do not like that result,
they are free to bargain for more, but they do not get to
rewrite the existing bargain in this Court.
Alternatively yet, the State warns us about the dire consequences
of a ruling against it. Highway speed limits, reckless
driving laws, and much more, the State tells us, will
be at risk if we rule for the Tribe. See also post, at 383–
386 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). But notice. Once you acknowledge
(as the State and primary dissent just have) that
the Yakamas themselves enjoy a right to travel free of at
least some nondiscriminatory state regulations, this “problem”
inevitably arises. It inevitably arises, too, once you
concede that the Yakamas enjoy a right to travel freely at
least on local roads. See post, at 388 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Whether you read the treaty to afford the Yakamas
the further right to bring goods to and from market is
beside the point.
It turns out, too, that the State's parade of horribles isn't
really all that horrible. While the treaty supplies the Yakamas
with special rights to travel with goods to and from
market, we have seen already that its “in common with” language
also indicates that tribal members knew they would
have to “share the use of the road with whites” and accept
regulations designed to allow the two groups' safe coexistence.
Yakama Indian Nation, 955 F. Supp., at 1265. Indeed,
the Yakamas expected laws designed to “protec[t]”
their ability to travel safely alongside non-Indians on the
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highways. See App. to Brief for Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakama Nation as Amicus Curiae 21a, 31a.
Maybe, too, that expectation goes some way toward explaining
why the State's hypothetical parade of horribles has yet
to take its frst step in the real world. No one before us has
identifed a single challenge to a state highway speed limit,
reckless driving law, or other critical highway safety regulation
in the entire life of the Yakama treaty.
Retreating now, the State suggests that the real problem
isn't so much about the Yakamas themselves traveling freely
as it is with their goods doing so. We are told we should
worry, for example, about limiting Washington's ability to
regulate the transportation of diseased apples from Oregon.
See also post, at 386 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). But if bad
apples prove to be a public menace, Oregon and its localities
may regulate them when they are grown or picked at the
orchard. Oregon, its localities, and maybe even the federal
government may regulate the bad apples when they arrive
at market for sale in Oregon. The Tribe and again, perhaps,
the federal government may regulate the bad apples when
they arrive on the reservation. And if the bad apples somehow
pose a threat to safe travel on the highways, even Washington
may regulate them as they make their way from Oregon
to the reservation—just as the State may require tribal
members to abide nondiscriminatory regulations governing
the safe transportation of fammable cargo as they drive
their gas trucks from Oregon to the reservation along public
highways. The only thing that Washington may not do is
reverse the promise the United States made to the Yakamas
in 1855 by imposing a tax or toll on tribal members or their
goods as they pass to and from market.
Finally, some worry that, if we recognize the potential permissibility
of state highway safety laws, we might wind up
impairing the interests of “tribal members across the country.”
Post, at 385 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). But our decision
today is based on unchallenged factual fndings about
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 377
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
how the Yakamas themselves understood this treaty in light
of the negotiations that produced it. And the Tribe itself
has expressly acknowledged that its treaty, while extending
real and valuable rights to tribal members, does not preclude
laws that merely facilitate the safe use of the roads by Indians
and non-Indians alike. Nor does anything we say here
necessarily apply to other tribes and other treaties; each
must be taken on its own terms. In the end, then, the only
true threat to tribal interests today would come from replacing
the meaningful right the Yakamas thought they had reserved
with the trivial promise the State suggests.
Really, this case just tells an old and familiar story. The
State of Washington includes millions of acres that the Yakamas
ceded to the United States under signifcant pressure.
In return, the government supplied a handful of modest
promises. The State is now dissatisfed with the consequences
of one of those promises. It is a new day, and now
it wants more. But today and to its credit, the Court holds
the parties to the terms of their deal. It is the least we
can do.
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Thomas,
Justice Alito, and Justice Kavanaugh join, dissenting.
In the 1855 treaty in which the Yakamas surrendered most
of their lands to the United States, the Tribe sought to protect
its way of life by reserving, among other rights, “the
right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel
upon all public highways.” Treaty Between the United
States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, Art. III, June 9,
1855, 12 Stat. 953. Cougar Den, a Yakama corporation that
uses public highways to truck gas into Washington, contends
that the treaty exempts it from Washington's fuel tax, which
the State assesses upon the importation of fuel into the
State. The plurality agrees, concluding that Washington
cannot impose the tax on Cougar Den because doing so would
“have the practical effect of burdening” Cougar Den's exer378
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cise of its right to travel on the highways. Ante, at 358.
The concurrence reaches the same result, reasoning that, because
the Yakamas' right to travel includes the right to
travel with goods, the State cannot tax or regulate the Yakamas'
goods on the highways. Ante, at 372–374 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in judgment).
But the mere fact that a state law has an effect on the
Yakamas while they are exercising a treaty right does not
establish that the law impermissibly burdens the right itself.
And the right to travel with goods is just an application of
the Yakamas' right to travel. It ensures that the Yakamas
enjoy the same privileges when they travel with goods as
when they travel without them. It is not an additional right
to possess whatever goods they wish on the highway, immune
from regulation and taxation. Under our precedents,
a state law violates a treaty right only if the law imposes
liability upon the Yakamas “for exercising the very right
their ancestors intended to reserve.” Tulee v. Washington,
315 U. S. 681, 685 (1942). Because Washington is taxing
Cougar Den for possessing fuel, not for traveling on the highways,
the State's method of administering its fuel tax is
consistent with the treaty. I respectfully dissent from the
contrary conclusion of the plurality and concurrence.1
We have held on three prior occasions that a nondiscriminatory
state law violated a right the Yakamas reserved in
the 1855 treaty. All three cases involved the “right of taking
fsh at all usual and accustomed places, in common with
citizens of the Territory.” Art. III, 12 Stat. 953. In United
States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371 (1905), and later again in
1 There is something of an optical illusion in this case that may subtly
distort analysis. It comes from the fact that the tax here happens to be
on motor fuel. There is no claim, however, that the tax inhibits the treaty
right to travel because of the link between motor fuel and highway travel.
The question presented must be analyzed as if the tax were imposed on
goods of any sort.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 379
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
Seufert Brothers Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 194 (1919),
we held that state trespass law could not be used to prevent
tribe members from reaching a historic fshing site. And in
Tulee v. Washington, we held that Washington could not
punish a Yakama member for fshing without a license. We
concluded that the license law was preempted because the
required fee “act[ed] upon the Indians as a charge for exercising
the very right their ancestors intended to reserve”—
the right to fsh. 315 U. S., at 685.
These three cases found a violation of the treaty when the
challenged action—application of trespass law and enforcement
of a license requirement—actually blocked the Yakamas
from fshing at traditional locations. Applying the reasoning
of those decisions to the Yakamas' right to travel, it
follows that a State could not bar Yakama members from
traveling on a public highway, or charge them a toll to do so.
Nothing of the sort is at issue here. The tax before us
does not resemble a blockade or a toll. It is a tax on a product
imported into the State, not a tax on highway travel.
The statute says as much: “There is hereby levied and imposed
. . . a tax . . . on each gallon of motor vehicle fuel.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.36.020(1) (2012) (emphasis added). It
is diffcult to imagine how the legislature could more clearly
identify the object of the tax. The tax is calculated per gallon
of fuel; not, like a toll, per vehicle or distance traveled.
It is imposed on the owner of the fuel, not the driver or
owner of the vehicle—separate entities in this case. And it
is imposed at the same rate on fuel that enters the State by
methods other than a public highway—whether private road,
rail, barge, or pipeline. §§ 82.36.010(4), 020(1), (2). Had
Cougar Den flled up its trucks at a refnery or pipeline terminal
in Washington, rather than trucking fuel in from Oregon,
there would be no dispute that it was subject to the
exact same tax. See §§ 82.36.020(2)(a), (b)(ii). Washington
is taxing the fuel that Cougar Den imports, not Cougar Den's
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travel on the highway; it is not charging the Yakamas “for
exercising the very right their ancestors intended to reserve.”
Tulee, 315 U. S., at 685.
It makes no difference that Washington happens to impose
that charge when Cougar Den's drivers cross into Washington
on a public highway. The time and place of the imposition
of the tax does not change what is taxed, and thus what
activity—possession of goods or travel—is burdened. Say
Washington imposes a tax on certain luxury goods, assessed
upon frst possession of the goods by a retail customer. A
Yakama member who buys a mink coat at an off-reservation
store in Washington will pay the tax. Yet, as the plurality
acknowledges, under its view a tribal member who buys the
same coat right over the state line in Portland and then
drives back to the reservation will owe no tax—all because
of a reserved right to travel on the public highways. Ante,
at 364. That makes no sense. The tax charges individuals
for possessing expensive furs. It in no way burdens highway
travel.
The plurality devotes fve pages to planting trees in hopes
of obscuring the forest: to delving into irrelevancies about
how the tax is assessed or collected, instead of the substance
of what is taxed. However assessed or collected, the tax on
10,000 gallons of fuel is the same whether the tanker carrying
it travels three miles in Washington or three hundred.
The tax varies only with the amount of fuel. Why? Because
the tax is on fuel, not travel. If two tankers travel
200 miles together from the same starting point to the same
destination—one empty, one full of fuel—the full tanker will
pay the fuel tax, the empty tanker will pay nothing. Their
travel has been identical, but only the full one pays tax.
Why? Because the tax is on fuel, not travel. The tax is on
the owner of the fuel, not the owner of the vehicle. Why?
You get the point.
The plurality responds that, even though the tax is calculated
per gallon of fuel, it remains a tax on travel because it
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 381
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
taxes a “feature” of travel. Ante, at 364. It is of course
true that tanker trucks can be seen from time to time on the
highways, but that hardly makes them a regular “feature” of
travel, like the plurality's examples of axles or passengers.
And we know that Washington is not taxing the gas insofar
as it is a feature of Cougar Den's travel, because Washington
imposes the exact same tax on gas that is not in transit on
the highways.
Rather than grappling with the substance of the tax, the
plurality fxates on variations in the time and place of its
assessment. The plurality thinks it signifcant that Washington
does not impose the tax at the moment of entry on
fuel that enters the State by pipeline or by a barge bound
for a refnery, but instead when a tanker truck withdraws
the fuel from the refnery or pipeline terminal. This may
demonstrate that the tax is not on frst possession of fuel
in the State, as the plurality stresses, but it hardly demonstrates
that the tax is not on possession of fuel at all.
Regardless of how fuel enters the State, someone will eventually
pay a per-gallon charge for possessing it. Washington
simply assesses the fuel tax in each case upon the
wholesaler. See 188 Wash. 2d 55, 60, 392 P. 3d 1014, 1016
(2017). This variation does not indicate, as the plurality
suggests, that the fuel tax is somehow targeted at highway
travel.
The plurality also says that it is bound by the Washington
Supreme Court's references to the tax as an “importation
tax” and tax on “the importation of fuel,” ante, at 356 (quoting
188 Wash. 2d, at 67, 69, 392 P. 3d, at 1019, 1020), but these
two references to the point at which the tax is assessed are
not authoritative constructions of the object of the tax. The
state court did not reject Washington's argument that this
is a tax on fuel; instead, like the plurality today, it ignored
that argument and concluded that the tax was invalid simply
because Washington imposed it while Cougar Den was traveling
on the highway. In any event, the state court more
382 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
COUGAR DEN, INC.
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
often referred to the tax as a “tax on fuels” or “fuel tax[ ].”
Id., at 58–61, 392 P. 3d, at 1015–1016.
After the fve pages arguing that a tax expressly labeled
as on “motor vehicle fuel” is actually a tax on something else,
the plurality concludes . . . it doesn't matter. As the plurality
puts it at page nine of its opinion, “even if ” the tax is on
fuel and not travel, it is preempted because it has “the practical
effect of burdening” the Yakamas' right to travel on the
highways. The plurality's rule—that States may not enforce
general legislation that has an effect on the Yakamas
while they are traveling—has no basis in our precedents,
which invalidated laws that punished or charged the Yakamas
simply for exercising their reserved rights. The plurality
is, of course, correct that the trespass law in Winans did
not target fshing, but it effectively made illegal the very act
of fshing at a traditional location. Here, it is the possession
of commercial quantities of fuel that exposes the Yakamas to
liability, not travel itself or any integral feature of travel.
The concurrence reaches the same result as the plurality,
but on different grounds. Rather than holding that the
treaty preempts any law that burdens the Yakamas while
traveling on the highways, the concurrence reasons that the
fuel tax is preempted because it regulates the possession of
goods, and the Yakamas' right to travel includes the right to
travel with goods. Ante, at 373–374. But the right to
travel with goods is just an application of the right to travel.
It means the Yakamas enjoy the same privileges whether
they travel with goods or without. It does not provide the
Yakamas with an additional right to carry any and all goods on
the highways, tax free, in any manner they wish.2 The con-
2 The plurality simply assumes that the right to travel with goods is an
additional, substantive right when it reasons that the fuel tax is preempted
because it taxes an “integral feature” of travel with goods. Ante,
at 365. The concurrence makes the same assumption when it compares
the fuel tax to a tax on “ `possession' of fsh.” Ante, at 374. That tax would
be preempted because “taking possession of fsh” is just another way of
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 383
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
currence purports to fnd this additional right in the record
of the treaty negotiations, but the record shows only that the
Yakamas wanted to ensure they could continue to travel to
the places where they traded. They did not, and did not
intend to, insulate the goods they carried from all regulation
and taxation.
Nothing in the text of the treaty, the historical record, or
our precedents supports the conclusion that the right “to
travel upon all public highways” transforms the Yakamas'
vehicles into mobile reservations, immunizing their contents
from any state interference. Before it reaches the reservation,
the fuel in Cougar Den's tanker trucks is always susceptible
to state regulation—it does not pass in and out of state
authority with every exit off or entry onto the road.
Recognizing the potentially broad sweep of its new rule,
the plurality cautions that it does not intend to deprive the
State of the power to regulate when necessary “to prevent
danger to health or safety occasioned by a tribe member's
exercise of treaty rights.” Ante, at 366. This escape hatch
ensures, the plurality suggests, that the treaty will not preempt
essential regulations that burden highway travel.
Ante, at 359. I am not so confdent.
First, by its own terms, the plurality's health and safety
exception is limited to laws that regulate dangers “occasioned
by” a Yakama's travel. That would seem to allow
speed limits and other rules of the road. But a law against
possession of drugs or illegal frearms—the dangers of which
have nothing to do with travel—does not address a health or
safety risk “occasioned by” highway driving. I do not see
how, under the plurality's rule or the concurrence's, a Washington
police offcer could burden a Yakama's travel by pulling
him over on suspicion of carrying such contraband on
the highway.
describing the act of fshing. But possession of a tanker full of fuel is not
an integral feature of travel, which is the relevant activity protected by
the treaty.
384 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
COUGAR DEN, INC.
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
But the more fundamental problem is that this Court has
never recognized a health and safety exception to reserved
treaty rights, and the plurality today mentions the exception
only in passing. Importantly, our precedents—all of which
concern hunting and fshing rights—acknowledge the authority
of the States to regulate Indians' exercise of their reserved
rights only in the interest of conservation. See
Tulee, 315 U. S., at 684 (“[T]he treaty leaves the state with
power to impose on Indians, equally with others, such restrictions
. . . as are necessary for the conservation of
fsh . . . .”); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U. S. 172, 205 (1999) (“We have repeatedly
reaffrmed state authority to impose reasonable and necessary
nondiscriminatory regulations on Indian hunting, fshing,
and gathering rights in the interest of conservation.”);
Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Anderson,
903 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1197 (ED Wash. 2011) (“Notably absent
from the binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases
dealing with state regulation of `in common' usufructuary
rights is any reference to a state's exercise of its publicsafety
police power.”). Indeed, this Court had previously
assured the Yakamas that “treaty fshermen are immune
from all regulation save that required for conservation.”
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658, 682 (1979) (emphasis
added). Adapted to the travel right, the conservation exception
would presumably protect regulations that preserve
the subject of the Yakamas' right by maintaining safe and
orderly travel on the highways. But many regulations that
burden highway travel (such as emissions standards, noise
restrictions, or the plurality's hypothetical ban on the importation
of plutonium) do not ft that description.
The need for the health and safety exception, of course,
follows from the overly expansive interpretation of the
treaty right adopted by the plurality and concurrence. Today's
decision digs such a deep hole that the future promises
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 385
Roberts, C. J., dissenting
a lot of backing and flling. Perhaps there are good reasons
to revisit our long-held understanding of reserved treaty
rights as the plurality does, and adopt a broad health and
safety exception to deal with the inevitable fallout. Hard to
say, because no party or amicus has addressed the question.
The plurality's response to this important issue is the following,
portentous sentence: “The record of the treaty negotiations
may not support the contention that the Yakamas
expected to use the roads entirely unconstrained by laws related
to health or safety.” Ante, at 366. A lot of weight on
two words, “may not.” The plurality cites assurances from
the territorial Governor of Washington that the United
States would make laws to prevent “bad white men” from
harming the Yakamas, and that the United States expected
the Yakamas to exercise similar restraint in return. App.
to Brief for Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama
Nation as Amicus Curiae 31a; ante, at 366. What this has
to do with health and safety regulations affecting the highways
(or fshing or hunting) is not clear.
In the meantime, do not assume today's decision is good
news for tribal members across the country. Application of
state safety regulations, for example, could prevent Indians
from hunting and fshing in their traditional or preferred
manner, or in particular “usual and accustomed places.” I
fear that, by creating the need for this untested exception,
the unwarranted expansion of the Yakamas' right to travel
may undermine rights that the Yakamas and other tribes
really did reserve.
The concurrence does not mention the plurality's possible
health and safety exception, but observes that the Yakamas
expected to follow laws that “facilitate the safe use of the
roads by Indians and non-Indians alike.” Ante, at 377. The
State is therefore wrong, the concurrence says, to contend
that a decision exempting Cougar Den's fuel from taxation
would call into question speed limits and reckless driving
laws. But that is not the State's principal argument. The
State acknowledges that laws facilitating safe travel on the
386 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
COUGAR DEN, INC.
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
highways would fall within the long-recognized conservation
exception. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12–13. The problem is that
today's ruling for Cougar Den preempts the enforcement of
any regulation of goods on the highway that does not concern
travel safety—such as a prohibition on the possession of potentially
contaminated apples taken from a quarantined area
(a matter of vital concern in Washington). See id., at 13;
Brief for Petitioner 44.
The concurrence says not to worry, the apples could be
regulated and inspected where they are grown, or when they
arrive at a market. Or, if the Yakamas are taking the apples
back to the reservation, perhaps the Federal Government
or the Tribe itself could address the problem there. Ante,
at 376. What the concurrence does not say is that the State
could regulate the contraband apples on the highway. And
there is no reason offered why other contraband should be
treated any differently.
Surely the concurrence does not mean to suggest that the
parties to the 1855 treaty intended to confer on the Tribe
the right to travel with illegal goods, free of any regulation.
But if that is not the logical consequence of the decision
today, the plurality and the concurrence should explain why.
It is the least they should do.
I respectfully dissent.
Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
dissenting.
The text of the 1855 treaty between the United States and
the Yakama Tribe affords the Tribe a “right, in common with
citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways.”
Treaty Between the United States and the Yakama
Nation of Indians, Art. III, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 953. The
treaty's “in common with” language means what it says.
The treaty recognizes tribal members' right to travel on offreservation
public highways on equal terms with other U. S.
citizens. Under the text of the treaty, the tribal members,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 387
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
like other U. S. citizens, therefore still remain subject to nondiscriminatory
state highway regulations—that is, to regulations
that apply equally to tribal members and other U. S.
citizens. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S.
145, 148–149 (1973). That includes, for example, speed limits,
truck restrictions, and reckless driving laws.
The Washington law at issue here imposes a nondiscriminatory
fuel tax. The Chief Justice concludes that the fuel
tax is not a highway regulation and, for that reason, he says
that the fuel tax does not infringe the Tribe's treaty right
to travel on the public highways. I agree with The Chief
Justice and join his dissent.
Even if the fuel tax is a highway regulation, it is a nondiscriminatory
highway regulation. For that reason as well,
the fuel tax does not infringe the Tribe's treaty right to
travel on the public highways on equal terms with other
U. S. citizens.
The plurality, as well as the concurrence in the judgment,
suggests that the treaty, if construed that way, would not
have been important to the Yakamas. For that reason, the
plurality and the concurrence would not adhere to that textual
meaning and would interpret “in common with” other
U. S. citizens to mean, in essence, “exempt from regulations
that apply to” other U. S. citizens.
I respectfully disagree with that analysis. The treaty
right to travel on the public highways “in common with”—
that is, on equal terms with—other U. S. citizens was important
to the Yakama tribal members at the time the treaty
was signed. That is because, as of 1855, States and the Federal
Government sometimes required tribal members to seek
permission before leaving their reservations or even prohibited
tribal members from leaving their reservations altogether.
See, e. g., Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Utah Indians, Art. VII, Dec. 30, 1849, 9
Stat 985; Mo. Rev. Stat., ch. 80, § 10 (1845). The Yakamas
needed to travel to sell their goods and trade for other goods.
388 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
COUGAR DEN, INC.
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
As a result, those kinds of laws would have devastated the
Yakamas' way of life. Importantly, the terms of the 1855
treaty made crystal clear that those kinds of travel restrictions
could not be imposed on the Yakamas.
In particular, the treaty afforded Yakama tribal members
two relevant rights. First was “free access” on roads from
the reservation to “the nearest public highway.” Art. III,
12 Stat. 953. Second was a right to travel “in common with”
other U. S. citizens on “all public highways.” Ibid. The
right to free access from the reservation to public highways,
combined with the right to travel off reservation on public
highways, facilitated the Yakama tribal members' extensive
trading network.
In determining the meaning of the “in common with” language,
we must recognize that the treaty used different
language in defning (1) the right to “free access,” which applies
only on roads connecting the reservation to the offreservation
public highways, and (2) the right to travel “in
common with” other U. S. citizens, which applies on those
off-reservation public highways. The approach of the plurality
and the concurrence would collapse that distinction between
the “free access” and “in common with” language and
thereby depart from the text of the treaty. I would stick
with the text. The treaty's “in common with” language—
both at the time the treaty was signed and now—means what
it says: the right for Yakama tribal members to travel on
public highways on equal terms with other U. S. citizens.
To be sure, the treaty as negotiated and written may not
have turned out to be a particularly good deal for the Yakamas.
As a matter of separation of powers, however, courts
are bound by the text of the treaty. See Oregon Dept. of
Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U. S. 753, 774
(1985). It is for Congress and the President, not the courts,
to update a law and provide additional compensation or benefts
to tribes beyond those provided by an old law. And
since 1855, and especially since 1968, Congress has in fact
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 389
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
taken many steps to assist tribes through a variety of signifcant
legislative measures. In short, lament about the
terms of the treaty negotiated by the Federal Government
and the Tribe in 1855 does not support the Judiciary (as opposed
to Congress and the President) rewriting the law in
2019.
What about precedent? It is true that some of our older
precedents interpreted similar “in common with” treaty language
regarding fshing rights to grant tribal members an
exemption from certain fshing regulations, even when the
fshing regulations were nondiscriminatory. But as we explained
in the most recent of those fshing cases, those nondiscriminatory
fshing regulations had the effect of preventing
the Tribes from catching a fair share of the fsh in the
relevant area. In other words, the fshing regulations at
issue were discriminatory in effect even though nondiscriminatory
on their face. See Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658,
676, n. 22 (1979).
That rationale for departing from the treaty text in the
narrow context of the fshing cases does not apply in the
highway context. Facially nondiscriminatory highway regulations—
such as speed limits, truck restrictions, and reckless
driving laws—are also nondiscriminatory in effect, as
relevant here. They do not deprive tribal members of use
of the public highways or deprive tribal members of a fair
share of the public highways.
Washington's facially nondiscriminatory fuel tax is likewise
nondiscriminatory in effect. The Washington fuel tax
therefore does not violate the key principle articulated in the
fshing cases. I would adhere to the text of the treaty and
hold that the tribal members, like other citizens of the State
of Washington, are subject to the nondiscriminatory fuel tax.
The Court (via the plurality opinion and the concurrence)
disagrees. The Court relies on the fshing cases and fashions
a new right for Yakama tribal members to disregard
390 WASHINGTON STATE DEPT. OF LICENSING v.
COUGAR DEN, INC.
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
even nondiscriminatory highway regulations, such as the
Washington fuel tax and perhaps also Washington's similarly
structured cigarette tax. The Court's newly created right
will allow Yakama businesses not to pay state taxes that
must be paid by other competing businesses, including by
businesses run by members of the many other tribes in the
State of Washington. As a result, the State of Washington
(along with other States) stands to lose millions of dollars
annually in tax revenue, which will necessarily mean fewer
services or increased taxes for other citizens and tribes in
the State.
In addition, the Court's newly created right—if applied
across the board—would seem to afford Yakama tribal members
an exemption from all manner of highway regulations,
ranging from speed limits to truck restrictions to reckless
driving laws. No doubt because of those negative realworld
consequences, the Court simultaneously fashions a
new health and safety exception.* But neither the right nor
the exception comes from the text of the treaty. As The
Chief Justice explains, the Court's “need for the health
and safety exception, of course, follows from the overly expansive
interpretation of the treaty right adopted by the plurality
and concurrence.” Ante, at 384.
I share The Chief Justice's concern that the Court's new
right for tribal members to disregard even nondiscriminatory
highway regulations and the Court's new exception to
that right for health and safety regulations could generate
signifcant uncertainty and unnecessary litigation for States
and tribes. The Chief Justice says it well: The Court
“digs such a deep hole that the future promises a lot of backing
and flling.” Ante, at 384–385.
Instead of judicially creating a new atextual right for
tribal members to disregard nondiscriminatory highway regulations
and then backflling by judicially creating a new
*I understand both the plurality opinion and the concurrence to approve
of a health and safety exception.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 347 (2019) 391
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
atextual exception to that right for health and safety regulations,
I would adhere to the text of the treaty and leave it
to Congress, if it chooses, to provide additional benefts for
the Yakamas. In my respectful view, even when we interpret
any ambiguities in the treaty in favor of the Tribe, the
treaty phrase “in common with” cannot properly be read to
exempt tribal members from nondiscriminatory highway
regulations.
In sum, under the treaty, Washington's nondiscriminatory
fuel tax may be imposed on Yakama tribal members just as
it may be imposed on other citizens and tribes in the State
of Washington. I respectfully dissent.
392 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
NIELSEN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
et al. v. PREAP et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 16–1363. Argued October 10, 2018—Decided March 19, 2019*
Federal immigration law empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security
to arrest and hold a deportable alien pending a removal decision, and
generally gives the Secretary the discretion either to detain the alien
or to release him on bond or parole. 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a). Another provision,
§ 1226(c)—enacted out of “concer[n] that deportable criminal
aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to
appear for their removal hearings,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 513—
sets out four categories of aliens who are inadmissible or deportable for
bearing certain links to terrorism or for committing specifed crimes.
Section 1226(c)(1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such criminal alien
“when the alien is released” from jail, and § 1226(c)(2) forbids the Secretary
to release any “alien described in paragraph (1)” pending a determination
on removal (with one exception not relevant here).
Respondents, two classes of aliens detained under § 1226(c)(2), allege
that because they were not immediately detained by immigration offcials
after their release from criminal custody, they are not aliens “described
in paragraph (1),” even though all of them fall into at least one
of the four categories covered by §§ 1226(c)(1)(A)–(D). Because the
Government must rely on § 1226(a) for their detention, respondents
argue, they are entitled to bond hearings to determine if they should be
released pending a decision on their status. The District Courts ruled
for respondents, and the Ninth Circuit affrmed.
Held: The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded.
831 F. 3d 1193 and 667 Fed. Appx. 966, reversed and remanded.
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, III–A, III–B–1, and IV, concluding that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of § 1226(c) is contrary to the plain text and structure of
the statute. Pp. 404–410, 414–420.
*Together with Wilcox, Acting Field Offce Director, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, et al. v. Khoury et al. (see this Court's Rule 12.4),
also on certiorari to the same court.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 393
Syllabus
(a) The statute's text does not support the argument that because
respondents were not arrested immediately after their release, they are
not “described in” § 1226(c)(1). Since an adverb cannot modify a noun,
§ 1226(c)(1)'s adverbial clause “when . . . released” does not modify the
noun “alien,” which is modifed instead by the adjectival clauses appearing
in subparagraphs (A)–(D). Respondents contend that an adverb can
“describe” a person even though it cannot modify the noun used to denote
that person, but this Court's interpretation is not dependent on a
rule of grammar. The grammar merely complements what is conclusive
here: the meaning of “described” as it appears in § 1226(c)(2)—namely,
“to communicate verbally . . . an account of salient identifying features,”
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 610. That is the relevant
defnition since the indisputable job of the “descri[ption] in paragraph
(1)” is to “identif[y]” for the Secretary which aliens she must
arrest immediately “when [they are] released.” Yet the “when . . . released”
clause could not possibly describe aliens in that sense. If it did,
the directive given to the Secretary in § 1226(c)(1) would be incoherent.
Moreover, Congress's use of the defnite article in “when the alien is
released” indicates that the scope of the word “alien” “has been previously
specifed in context.” Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
1294. For that noun to have been previously specifed, its scope must
have been settled by the time the “when . . . released” clause appears
at the end of paragraph (1). Thus, the class of people to whom “the
alien” refers must be fxed by the predicate offenses identifed in subparagraphs
(A)–(D). Pp. 404–408.
(b) Subsections (a) and (c) do not establish separate sources of arrest
and release authority; subsection (c) is a limit on the authority conferred
by subsection (a). Accordingly, all the relevant detainees will have
been arrested by authority that springs from subsection (a), and that
fact alone will not spare them from subsection (c)(2)'s prohibition on
release. The text of § 1226 itself contemplates that aliens arrested
under subsection (a) may face mandatory detention under subsection (c).
If § 1226(c)'s detention mandate applied only to those arrested pursuant
to subsection (c)(1), there would have been no need for subsection (a)'s
sentence on the release of aliens to include the words “[e]xcept as provided
in subsection (c).” It is also telling that subsection (c)(2) does not
limit mandatory detention to those arrested “pursuant to” subsection
(c)(1) or “under authority created by” subsection (c)(1), but to anyone so
much as “described in” subsection (c)(1). Pp. 408–410.
(c) This reading of § 1226(c) does not fout the interpretative canon
against surplusage. The “when . . . released” clause still functions to
clarify when the duty to arrest is triggered and to exhort the Secretary
394 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Syllabus
to act quickly. Nor does this reading have the incongruous result of
forbidding the release of a set of aliens whom there is no duty to arrest
in the frst place. Finally, the canon of constitutional avoidance does
not apply where there is no ambiguity. See Warger v. Shauers, 574
U. S. 40, 50. Pp. 414–420.
Justice Alito, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Kavanaugh,
concluded in Parts II and III–B–2:
(a) This Court has jurisdiction to hear these cases. The limitation
on review in § 1226(e) applies only to “discretionary” decisions about
the “application” of § 1226 to particular cases. It does not block
lawsuits over “the extent of the Government's detention authority under
the `statutory framework' as a whole. ” Jennings v. Rodr iguez,
583 U. S. 281, 295–296. For reasons stated in Jennings, “§ 1252(b)(9)
does not present a jurisdictional bar.” Id., at 295. Whether the District
Court in the Preap case had jurisdiction under § 1252(f )(1) to grant
injunctive relief is irrelevant because the court had jurisdiction to entertain
the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief. And the fact that by
the time of class certifcation the named plaintiffs had obtained either
cancellation of removal or bond hearings did not make these cases moot.
At least one named plaintiff in both cases could have been returned to
detention and then denied a subsequent bond hearing. Even if that had
not been so, these cases would not be moot because the harms alleged
are transitory enough to elude review. County of Riverside v. Mc-
Laughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 52. Pp. 401–404.
(b) Even assuming that § 1226(c)(1) requires immediate arrest, the result
below would be wrong, because a statutory rule that offcials “ `shall'
act within a specifed time” does not by itself “preclud[e] action later,”
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 158. This principle for
interpreting time limits on statutory mandates was a fxture of the legal
backdrop when Congress enacted § 1226(c). Cf. Woodford v. Garceau,
538 U. S. 202, 209. Pp. 410–414.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concluded that
three statutory provisions—8 U. S. C. §§ 1252(b)(9), 1226(e), and
1252(f)(1)—limit judicial review in these cases and it is unlikely that
the District Courts had Article III jurisdiction to certify the classes.
Pp. 422–427.
Alito, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion
of the Court with respect to Parts I, III–A, III–B–1, and IV, in which
Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined, and
an opinion with respect to Parts II and III–B–2, in which Roberts, C. J.,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 395
Opinion of the Court
and Kavanaugh, J., joined. Kavanaugh, J., fled a concurring opinion,
post, p. 420. Thomas, J., fled an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 422. Breyer,
J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
JJ., joined, post, p. 427.
Zachary D. Tripp argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Solicitor General Francisco, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Readler, Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler, and Troy D. Liggett.
Cecillia Wang argued the cause for respondents. With
her on the brief were Michael K. T. Tan, Judy Rabinovitz,
Omar C. Jadwat, David D. Cole, Lucas Guttentag, Matt
Adams, Robert Pauw, Devin T. Theriot-Orr, Vasudha Talla,
Anoop Prasad, and Jenny Zhao.†
Justice Alito announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I,
III–A, III–B–1, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Parts
II and III–B–2, in which The Chief Justice and Justice
Kavanaugh join.
Aliens who are arrested because they are believed to be
deportable may generally apply for release on bond or parole
while the question of their removal is being decided. These
aliens may secure their release by proving to the satisfaction
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton;
for Immigration Reform Law Institute by Christopher J. Hajec; and
for Rep. Andy Biggs et al. by Richard A. Samp.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Advancement
Project et al. by Alina Das; for Constitutional and Immigration Law Professors
by Mark C. Fleming; for Former INS and DHS General Counsels
by Matthew E. Price; for Members of Congress by Jayashri Srikantiah,
Jennifer L. Stark, and Ward A. Penfold; and for the National Immigrant
Justice Center by Elaine J. Goldenberg and Charles G. Roth.
Anton Metlitsky and Deanna M. Rice fled a brief for Administrative
and Immigration Law Professors as amici curiae.
396 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of the Court
of a Department of Homeland Security offcer or an immigration
judge that they would not endanger others and would
not fee if released from custody.
Congress has decided, however, that this procedure is too
risky in some instances. Congress therefore adopted a special
rule for aliens who have committed certain dangerous
crimes and those who have connections to terrorism. Under
a statutory provision enacted in 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–585, 8
U. S. C. § 1226(c), these aliens must be arrested “when [they
are] released” from custody on criminal charges and (with
one narrow exception not involved in these cases) must be
detained without a bond hearing until the question of their
removal is resolved.
In these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that this mandatory-detention requirement
applies only if a covered alien is arrested by immigration
offcials as soon as he is released from jail. If the alien
evades arrest for some short period of time—according to
respondents, even 24 hours is too long—the mandatorydetention
requirement is inapplicable, and the alien must
have an opportunity to apply for release on bond or parole.
Four other Circuits have rejected this interpretation of the
statute, and we agree that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
is wrong. We therefore reverse the judgments below and
remand for further proceedings.
I
A
Under federal immigration law, aliens present in this country
may be removed if they fall “within one or more . . .
classes of deportable aliens.” 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a). In these
cases, we focus on two provisions governing the arrest, detention,
and release of aliens who are believed to be subject
to removal.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 397
Opinion of the Court
The frst provision, § 1226(a),1 applies to most such aliens,
and it sets out the general rule regarding their arrest and
detention pending a decision on removal. Section 1226(a)
contains two sentences, one dealing with taking an alien into
custody and one dealing with detention. The frst sentence
empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security2 to arrest and
hold an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States.” The second sentence
generally gives the Secretary the discretion either to detain
the alien or to release him on bond or parole. If the alien is
detained, he may seek review of his detention by an offcer
at the Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration
judge (both exercising power delegated by the
Secretary), see 8 CFR §§ 236.1(c)(8) and (d)(1), 1003.19,
1236.1(d)(1) (2018); and the alien may secure his release if he
1 This provision states:
“(a) Arrest, detention, and release
“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending
such decision, the Attorney General—
“(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
“(2) may release the alien on—
“(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
“(B) conditional parole; but
“(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an
`employment authorized' endorsement or other appropriate work permit),
unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise
would (without regard to removal proceedings) be provided such
authorization.”
2 We replace “Attorney General” with “Secretary” because Congress has
empowered the Secretary to enforce the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., though the Attorney General retains the authority
to administer removal proceedings and decide relevant questions of
law. See, e. g., 6 U. S. C. §§ 202(3), 251, 271(b), 542 note, 557; 8 U. S. C.
§§ 1103(a)(1) and (g), 1551 note.
398 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of the Court
can convince the offcer or immigration judge that he poses
no fight risk and no danger to the community. See
§§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d); Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37
(BIA 2006). But while 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a) generally permits
an alien to seek release in this way, that provision's sentence
on release states that all this is subject to an exception that
is set out in § 1226(c).
Section 1226(c) was enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, and
it sprang from a “concer[n] that deportable criminal aliens
who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to
appear for their removal hearings in large numbers.” Demore
v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 513 (2003). To address this problem,
Congress mandated that aliens who were thought to
pose a heightened risk be arrested and detained without a
chance to apply for release on bond or parole.
Section 1226(c) consists of two paragraphs, one on the decision
to take an alien into “[c]ustody” and another on the
alien's subsequent “[r]elease.” 3 The frst paragraph (on custody)
sets out four categories of covered aliens, namely, those
who are inadmissible or deportable on specifed grounds. It
then provides that the Secretary must take any alien falling
into one of these categories “into custody” “when the alien
is released” from criminal custody.
The second paragraph (on release from immigration custody)
states that “an alien described in paragraph (1)” may
be released “only if [the Secretary] decides” that release is
“necessary to provide protection” for witnesses or others cooperating
with a criminal investigation, or their relatives or
associates. That exception is not implicated in the present
cases.
The categories of predicates for mandatory detention identifed
in subparagraphs (A)–(D) generally involve the commission
of crimes. As will become relevant to our anal-
3 The full text of § 1226(c) is set out infra, at 404–405.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 399
Opinion of the Court
ysis, however, some who satisfy subparagraph (D)—e. g.,
close relatives of terrorists and those who are thought likely
to engage in terrorist activity, see 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(3)
(B)(i)(IX)—may never have been charged with any crime
in this country.4 Still, since the vast majority of mandatorydetention
cases do involve convictions, we follow the heading
of subsection (c), as well as our cases and the courts below,
in referring to aliens who satisfy subparagraphs (A)–(D) collectively
as “criminal aliens.”
The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that subsection
(c)(2), which requires the detention of aliens “described
in” subsection (c)(1), applies to all aliens who fall within
subparagraphs (A)–(D), whether or not they were arrested
immediately “when [they were] released” from criminal
custody. Matter of Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117 (2001) (en
banc).
B
Respondents in the two cases before us are aliens who
were detained under § 1226(c)(2)'s mandatory-detention requirement—
and thus denied a bond hearing—pending a decision
on their removal. See Preap v. Johnson, 831 F. 3d 1193
(CA9 2016); Khoury v. Asher, 667 Fed. Appx. 966 (CA9 2016).
Though all respondents had been convicted of criminal offenses
covered in §§ 1226(c)(1)(A)–(D), none were arrested by
immigration offcials immediately after their release from
criminal custody. Indeed, some were not arrested until several
years later.
Respondent Mony Preap, the lead plaintiff in the case that
bears his name, is a lawful permanent resident with two drug
convictions that qualify him for mandatory detention under
4 Nevertheless, such cases appear to be rare. See Straker v. Jones, 986
F. Supp. 2d 345, 357, n. 8 (SDNY 2013) (citing Gomez v. Napolitano, 2012
U. S. App. LEXIS 27076 (CA2, June 5, 2012)). But see Alafyouny v.
Chertoff, 2006 WL 1581959, *3, *24 (ND Tex., May 19, 2006) (an alien was
subject to mandatory detention based on a determination that the alien
had solicited funds for a terrorist group).
400 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of the Court
§ 1226(c). Though he was released from criminal custody in
2006, immigration offcials did not detain him until 2013,
when he was released from jail after an arrest for another
offense. His co-plaintiffs Juan Lozano Magdaleno and Eduardo
Vega Padilla were taken into immigration detention,
respectively, 5 and 11 years after their release from custody
for a § 1226(c) predicate offense. Preap, Magdaleno, and
Padilla fled habeas petitions and a class-action complaint alleging
that because they were not arrested “immediately”
after release from criminal custody, they are exempt from
mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and are entitled to a
bond hearing to determine if they should be released pending
a decision on their status.
Although the named plaintiffs in Preap were not taken
into custody on immigration grounds until years after their
release from criminal custody, the District Court certifed a
broad class comprising all aliens in California “ `who are or
will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U. S. C.
section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken
into custody by the government immediately upon their
release from criminal custody for a [s]ection 1226(c)(1) offense.'
” 831 F. 3d, at 1198 (emphasis added). The District
Court granted a preliminary injunction against the mandatory
detention of the members of this class, holding that
criminal aliens are exempt from mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c) (and are thus entitled to a bond hearing) unless they
are arrested “ `when [they are] released,' and no later.”
Preap v. Johnson, 303 F. R. D. 566, 577 (ND Cal. 2014) (quoting
8 U. S. C. § 1226(c)(1)). The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affrmed.
Khoury, the other case now before us, involves habeas petitions
and a class-action complaint fled in the Western District
of Washington. The District Court certifed a class
comprising all aliens in that district “who were subjected to
mandatory detention under 8 U. S. C. § 1226(c) even though
they were not detained immediately upon their release from
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 401
Opinion of Alito, J.
criminal custody.” 667 Fed. Appx., at 967. The District
Court granted summary judgment for respondents, and the
Ninth Circuit again affrmed, citing its decision on the same
day in Preap.
Because Preap and Khoury created a split with four other
Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari to review the Ninth
Circuit's ruling that criminal aliens who are not arrested immediately
upon release are thereby exempt from mandatory
detention under § 1226(c). 583 U. S. 1179 (2018). We now
reverse.
II
Before addressing the merits of the Court of Appeals' interpretation,
we resolve four questions regarding our jurisdiction
to hear these cases.
The frst potential hurdle concerns § 1226(e), which states:
“The [Secretary's] discretionary judgment regarding
the application of [§ 1226] shall not be subject to review.
No court may set aside any action or decision by the
[Secretary] under this section regarding the detention
or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial
of bond or parole.” (Emphasis added.)
As we have held, this limitation applies only to “discretionary”
decisions about the “application” of § 1226 to particular
cases. It does not block lawsuits over “the extent of the
Government's detention authority under the `statutory
framework' as a whole.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S.
281, 295–296 (2018) (quoting Demore, 538 U. S., at 517). And
the general extent of the Government's authority under
§ 1226(c) is precisely the issue here. Respondents' argument
is not that the Government exercised its statutory authority
in an unreasonable fashion. Instead, they dispute the extent
of the statutory authority that the Government claims.
Because this claim of authority does not constitute a mere
“discretionary” “application” of the relevant statute, our review
is not barred by § 1226(e).
402 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of Alito, J.
Nor are we stripped of jurisdiction by § 1252(b)(9), which
provides:
“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including
interpretation and application of constitutional
and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the
United States under this subchapter [including §§ 1225
and 1226] shall be available only in judicial review of a
fnal order under this section.” (Emphasis added.)
As in Jennings, respondents here “are not asking for review
of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision
to detain them in the frst place or to seek removal [as opposed
to the decision to deny them bond hearings]; and they
are not even challenging any part of the process by which
their removability will be determined. Under these circumstances,”
we held in Jennings, see 583 U. S., at 294–295,
“§ 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.”
The Government raised a third concern before the District
Court in Preap: that under 8 U. S. C. § 1252(f)(1), that court
lacked jurisdiction to enter the requested injunction. As
§ 1252(f)(1) cautions:
“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of
the identity of the party or parties bringing the action,
no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction
or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation
of [§§ 1221–1232] other than with respect to the application
of such provisions to an individual alien against
whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”
Did the Preap court overstep this limit by granting injunctive
relief for a class of aliens that includes some who have
not yet faced—but merely “will face”—mandatory detention?
The District Court said no, but we need not decide.
Whether the Preap court had jurisdiction to enter such an
injunction is irrelevant because the District Court had jurisdiction
to entertain the plaintiffs' request for declaratory reCite
as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 403
Opinion of Alito, J.
lief, and for independent reasons given below, we are ordering
the dissolution of the injunction that the District Court
ordered.
Finally, and again before the Preap District Court, the
Government raised a fourth potential snag: mootness. Class
actions are “[n]ormally . . . moot if no named class representative
with an unexpired claim remain[s] at the time of
class certifcation.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584
U. S. 381, 386 (2018). But that general norm is no hurdle
here.
The suggestion of mootness in these cases was based on
the fact that by the time of class certifcation the named
plaintiffs had obtained either cancellation of removal or bond
hearings. See 831 F. 3d, at 1197–1198; Khoury v. Asher, 3
F. Supp. 3d 877, 879–880 (WD Wash. 2014). But those developments
did not make the cases moot because at least one
named plaintiff in both cases had obtained release on bond,
as opposed to cancellation of removal, and that release had
been granted following a preliminary injunction in a separate
case. Unless that preliminary injunction was made permanent
and was not disturbed on appeal, these individuals faced
the threat of re-arrest and mandatory detention. And indeed,
we later ordered that that injunction be dissolved.
See Jennings, 583 U. S., at 314. Thus, in both cases, there
was at least one named plaintiff with a live claim when the
class was certifed.
Even if that had not been so, these cases would not be
moot because the fact that a class “was not certifed until
after the named plaintiffs' claims had become moot does not
deprive us of jurisdiction” when, as in these cases, the harms
alleged are transitory enough to elude review. County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 52 (1991) (affrming
jurisdiction over a class action challenging a county's failure
to provide “prompt” determinations of probable cause for
those subjected to warrantless arrest and detention). Respondents
claim that they would be harmed by detention
404 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of the Court
without a hearing pending a decision on their removal. Because
this type of injury ends as soon as the decision on
removal is made, it is transitory. So the fact that the named
plaintiffs obtained some relief before class certifcation does
not moot their claims.
III
Having assured ourselves of our jurisdiction, we turn to
the merits. Respondents contend that they are not properly
subject to § 1226(c)'s mandatory-detention scheme, but instead
are entitled to the bond hearings available to those
held under the general arrest and release authority provided
in § 1226(a). Respondents' primary textual argument turns
on the interaction of paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 1226(c). Recall
that those paragraphs govern, respectively, the “[c]ustody”
and “[r]elease” of criminal aliens guilty of a predicate
offense. Paragraph (1) directs the Secretary to arrest any
such alien “when the alien is released,” and paragraph (2)
forbids the Secretary to release any “alien described in paragraph
(1)” pending a determination on removal (with one exception
not relevant here). Because the parties' arguments
about the meaning of § 1226(c) require close attention to the
statute's terms and structure, we reproduce the provision in
full below. But only the portions of the statute that we have
highlighted are directly relevant to respondents' argument.
Section 1226(c) provides:
“(c) Detention of criminal aliens
“(1) Custody
“The [Secretary] shall take into custody any alien
who—
“(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed
any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
“(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any
offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B),
(C), or (D) of this title,
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 405
Opinion of the Court
“(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of
this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien
has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at
least 1 year, or
“(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this
title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
“when the alien is released, without regard to whether
the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or
probation, and without regard to whether the alien may
be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.
“(2) Release
“The [Secretary] may release an alien described in
paragraph (1) only if the [Secretary] decides pursuant
to section 3521 of title 18 that release of the alien from
custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness,
a potential witness, a person cooperating with an investigation
into major criminal activity, or an immediate
family member or close associate of a witness, potential
witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation,
and the alien satisfes the [Secretary] that the alien
will not pose a danger to the safety of other persons or
of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled
proceeding. A decision relating to such release shall
take place in accordance with a procedure that considers
the severity of the offense committed by the alien.”
(Emphasis added.)
Respondents argue that they are not subject to mandatory
detention because they are not “described in” § 1226(c)(1),
even though they (and all the other members of the classes
they represent) fall into at least one of the categories of
aliens covered by subparagraphs (A)–(D) of that provision.
An alien covered by these subparagraphs is not “described
in” § 1226(c)(1), respondents contend, unless the alien was
also arrested “when [he or she was] released” from crimi406
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Opinion of the Court
nal custody. Indeed, respondents insist that the alien must
have been arrested immediately after release. Since they
and the other class members were not arrested immediately,
respondents conclude, they are not “described in”
§ 1226(c)(1). So to detain them, the Government must rely
not on § 1226(c) but on the general provisions of § 1226(a).
And thus, like others detained under § 1226(a), they are
owed bond hearings in which they can earn their release
by proving that they pose no fight risk and no danger to
others—or so they claim. But neither the statute's text nor
its structure supports this argument. In fact, both cut the
other way.
A
First, respondents' position runs aground on the plain text
of § 1226(c). Respondents are right that only an alien “described
in paragraph (1)” faces mandatory detention, but
they are wrong about which aliens are “described in” paragraph
(1).
Paragraph (1) provides that the Secretary “shall take” into
custody any “alien” having certain characteristics and that
the Secretary must do this “when the alien is released” from
criminal custody. The critical parts of the provision consist
of a verb (“shall take”), an adverbial clause (“when . . . released”),
a noun (“alien”), and a series of adjectival clauses
(“who . . . is inadmissible,” “who . . . is deportable,” etc.).
As an initial matter, no one can deny that the adjectival
clauses modify (and in that sense “describ[e]”) the noun
“alien” or that the adverbial clause “when . . . released” modifes
the verb “shall take.” And since an adverb cannot
modify a noun, the “when released” clause cannot modify
“alien. ” Again, what modifies (and in that sense “describe[
s]”) the noun “alien” are the adjectival clauses that
appear in subparagraphs (A)–(D).
Respondents and the dissent contend that this grammatical
point is not the end of the matter—that an adverb can
“describe” a person even though it cannot modify the noun
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 407
Opinion of the Court
used to denote that person. See post, at 431–432 (opinion of
Breyer, J.). But our interpretation is not dependent on a
rule of grammar. The preliminary point about grammar
merely complements what is critical, and indeed conclusive,
in these cases: the particular meaning of the term “described”
as it appears in § 1226(c)(2). As we noted in Luna
Torres v. Lynch, 578 U. S. 452, 459 (2016), the term “ `describe'
takes on different meanings in different contexts.”
A leading defnition of the term is “to communicate verbally
. . . an account of salient identifying features,” Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 610 (1976), and that is
clearly the meaning of the term used in the phrase “an alien
described in paragraph (1).” (Emphasis added.) This is
clear from the fact that the indisputable job of the “descri[ption]
in paragraph (1)” is to “identif[y]” for the Secretary—
to list the “salient . . . features” by which she can pick out—
which aliens she must arrest immediately “when [they are]
released.”
And here is the crucial point: The “when . . . released”
clause could not possibly describe aliens in that sense; it
plays no role in identifying for the Secretary which aliens
she must immediately arrest. If it did, the directive in
§ 1226(c)(1) would be nonsense. It would be ridiculous to
read paragraph (1) as saying: “The Secretary must arrest,
upon their release from jail, a particular subset of criminal
aliens. Which ones? Only those who are arrested upon
their release from jail.” Since it is the Secretary's action
that determines who is arrested upon release, “being arrested
upon release” cannot be one of her criteria in fguring
out whom to arrest. So it cannot “describe”—it cannot
give the Secretary an “identifying featur[e]” of—the relevant
class of aliens. On any other reading of paragraph (1), the
command that paragraph (1) gives the Secretary would be
downright incoherent.
Our reading is confrmed by Congress's use of the defnite
article in “when the alien is released.” Because “[w]ords are
408 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of the Court
to be given the meaning that proper grammar and usage
would assign them,” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 140 (2012), the “rules of
grammar govern” statutory interpretation “unless they contradict
legislative intent or purpose,” ibid. (citing Costello v.
INS, 376 U. S. 120, 122–126 (1964)). Here grammar and
usage establish that “the” is “a function word . . . indicat[ing]
that a following noun or noun equivalent is defnite or has
been previously specifed by context.” Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed. 2005). See also Work
v. United States ex rel. McAlester-Edwards Co., 262 U. S.
200, 208 (1923) (Congress's “use of the defnite article [in a
reference to `the appraisement' means an appraisement
specifcally provided for”). For “the alien”—in the clause
“when the alien is released”—to have been previously specifed,
its scope must have been settled by the time the “when
. . . released” clause appears at the tail end of paragraph (1).
For these reasons, we hold that the scope of “the alien” is
fxed by the predicate offenses identifed in subparagraphs
(A)–(D).5 And since only those subparagraphs settle who is
“described in paragraph (1),” anyone who fts their description
falls under paragraph (2)'s detention mandate—even if
(as with respondents) the Secretary did not arrest them immediately
“when” they were “released.”
B
In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
thought that the very structure of § 1226 favors respondents'
reading. In particular, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, each
subsection's arrest and release provisions must work together.
Thus, aliens must be arrested under the general arrest
authority in subsection (a) in order to get a bond hearing
5 For this reason, it is irrelevant that (as the dissent notes, see post, at
433–434) paragraph (2) applies to aliens described in “paragraph (1)” and not
“subparagraphs (A)–(D).” These two phrases denote the same category,
so nothing can be gleaned from Congress's choice of one over the other.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 409
Opinion of the Court
under subsection (a)'s release provision. And in order to
face mandatory detention under subsection (c), criminal
aliens must have been arrested under subsection (c). But
since subsection (c) authorizes only immediate arrest, the argument
continues, those arrested later fall under subsection
(a), not (c). Accordingly, the court concluded, those arrested
well after release escape subsection (c)'s detention mandate.
See 831 F. 3d, at 1201–1203. But this argument misreads
the structure of § 1226; and in any event, the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion would not follow even if we granted all its premises
about statutory structure.
1
Although the Ninth Circuit viewed subsections (a) and (c)
as establishing separate sources of arrest and release authority,
in fact subsection (c) is simply a limit on the authority
conferred by subsection (a).
Recall that subsection (a) has two sentences that provide
the Secretary with general discretion over the arrest and
release of aliens, respectively. We read each of subsection
(c)'s two provisions—paragraph (1) on arrest and paragraph
(2) on release—as modifying its counterpart sentence in subsection
(a). In particular, subsection (a) creates authority
for anyone's arrest or release under § 1226—and it gives the
Secretary broad discretion as to both actions—while subsection
(c)'s job is to subtract some of that discretion when it
comes to the arrest and release of criminal aliens. Thus,
subsection (c)(1) limits subsection (a)'s frst sentence by curbing
the discretion to arrest: The Secretary must arrest those
aliens guilty of a predicate offense. And subsection (c)(2)
limits subsection (a)'s second sentence by cutting back the
Secretary's discretion over the decision to release: The Secretary
may not release aliens “described in” subsection
(c)(1)—that is, those guilty of a predicate offense. Accordingly,
all the relevant detainees will have been arrested by
authority that springs from subsection (a), and so, contrary
410 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of Alito, J.
to the Court of Appeals' view, that fact alone will not spare
them from subsection (c)(2)'s prohibition on release. This
reading comports with the Government's practice of applying
to the arrests of all criminal aliens certain procedural
requirements, such as the need for a warrant, that appear
only in subsection (a). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 13–14.
The text of § 1226 itself contemplates that aliens arrested
under subsection (a) may face mandatory detention under
subsection (c). The second sentence in subsection (a)—
which generally authorizes the Secretary to release an alien
pending removal proceedings—features an exception “as
provided in subsection (c).” But if the Court of Appeals
were right that subsection (c)(2)'s prohibition on release applies
only to those arrested pursuant to subsection (c)(1),
there would have been no need to specify that such aliens
are exempt from subsection (a)'s release provision. This
shows that it is possible for those arrested under subsection
(a) to face mandatory detention under subsection (c). We
draw a similar inference from the fact that subsection (c)(2),
for its part, does not limit mandatory detention to those arrested
“pursuant to” subsection (c)(1) or “under authority
created by” subsection (c)(1)—but to anyone so much as “described
in” subsection (c)(1). This choice of words marks a
contrast with Congress's reference—in the immediately preceding
subsection—to actions by the Secretary that are “authorized
under” subsection (a). See § 1226(b). Cf. 18 U. S. C.
§ 3262(b) (referring to “a person arrested under subsection (a)”
(emphasis added)). These textual cues indicate that even
if an alien was not arrested under authority bestowed by subsection
(c)(1), he may face mandatory detention under subsection
(c)(2).
2
But even if the Court of Appeals were right to reject this
reading, the result below would be wrong. To see why, assume
with the Court of Appeals that only someone arrested
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 411
Opinion of Alito, J.
under authority created by § 1226(c)(1)—rather than the
more general § 1226(a)—may be detained without a bond
hearing. And assume that subsection (c)(1) requires immediate
arrest. Even then, the Secretary's failure to abide by
this time limit would not cut off her power to arrest under
subsection (c)(1). That is so because, as we have held time
and again, an offcial's crucial duties are better carried out
late than never. See Sylvain v. Attorney Gen. of U. S., 714
F. 3d 150, 158 (CA3 2013) (collecting cases). Or more precisely,
a statutory rule that offcials “ `shall' act within a specifed
time” does not by itself “preclud[e] action later.” Barnhart
v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 158 (2003).
Especially relevant here is our decision in United States v.
Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711 (1990). There we held
that “a provision that a detention hearing ` “shall be held
immediately upon the [detainee's] frst appearance before the
judicial offcer” ' did not bar detention after a tardy hearing.”
Barnhart, 537 U. S., at 159 (quoting Montalvo-Murillo,
495 U. S., at 714). In that case, we refused to “bestow upon
the defendant a windfall” and “visit upon the Government
and the citizens a severe penalty by mandating release of
possibly dangerous defendants every time some deviation
from the [statutory] strictures . . . occur[red].” Id., at 720.
Instead, we gave effect to the principle that “ `if a statute
does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory
timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary
course impose their own coercive sanction.' ” Barnhart,
537 U. S., at 159 (quoting United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 63 (1993)).
This principle for interpreting time limits on statutory
mandates was a fxture of the legal backdrop when Congress
enacted § 1226(c). Cf. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U. S. 202,
209 (2003) (relying on the “legal backdrop” against which
“Congress legislated” to clarify what Congress enacted).
Indeed, we have held of a statute enacted just four years
412 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of Alito, J.
before § 1226(c) that because of our case law at the time—
never since abrogated—Congress was “presumably aware
that we do not readily infer congressional intent to limit an
agency's power to get a mandatory job done merely from a
specifcation to act by a certain time.” Barnhart, 537 U. S.,
at 160 (relying on Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U. S. 253
(1986)). Here this principle entails that even if subsection
(c)(1) were the sole source of authority to arrest aliens without
granting them hearings, that authority would not evaporate
just because offcials had transgressed subsection (c)(1)'s
command to arrest aliens immediately “when . . . released.”
Respondents object that the rule invoked in Montalvo-
Murillo and related cases does not apply here. In those
cases, respondents argue, the governmental authority at
issue would have disappeared entirely if time limits were
enforced—whereas here the Secretary could still arrest
aliens well after their release under the general language
in § 1226(a).
But the whole premise of respondents' argument is that if
the Secretary could no longer act under § 1226(c), she would
lose a specifc power—the power to arrest and detain criminal
aliens without a bond hearing. If that is so, then as in
other cases, accepting respondents' deadline-based argument
would be inconsistent with “the design and function of the
statute.” Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S., at 719. From Congress's
perspective, after all, it is irrelevant that the Secretary
could go on detaining criminal aliens subject to a bond
hearing. Congress enacted mandatory detention precisely
out of concern that such individualized hearings could not be
trusted to reveal which “deportable criminal aliens who are
not detained” might “continue to engage in crime [or] fail to
appear for their removal hearings.” Demore, 538 U. S., at
513. And having thus required the Secretary to impose
mandatory detention without bond hearings immediately,
for safety's sake, Congress could not have meant for judges
to “enforce” this duty in case of delay by—of all things—
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 413
Opinion of Alito, J.
forbidding its execution. Cf. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S.,
at 720 (“The end of exacting compliance with the letter” of
the Bail Reform Act's requirement that a defendant receive
a hearing immediately upon his frst appearance before a judicial
offcer “cannot justify the means of exposing the public
to an increased likelihood of violent crime by persons on bail,
an evil the statute aims to prevent”).
Especially hard to swallow is respondents' insistence that
for an alien to be subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c), the alien must be arrested on the day he walks out
of jail (though respondents allow that it need not be at the
jailhouse door—the “parking lot” or “bus stop” would do).
Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. “Assessing the situation in realistic and
practical terms, it is inevitable that” respondents' unsparing
deadline will often be missed for reasons beyond the Federal
Government's control. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S., at 720.
Cf. Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U. S. 448, 459, n. 3
(1998) (“The Secretary's failure to meet the deadline, a not
uncommon occurrence when heavy loads are thrust on administrators,
does not mean that [she] lacked power to act
beyond it”). To give just one example, state and local offcials
sometimes rebuff the Government's request that they
give notice when a criminal alien will be released. Indeed,
over a span of less than three years (from January 2014 to
September 2016), the Government recorded “a total of 21,205
declined [requests] in 567 counties in 48 states including the
District of Columbia.” ICE, Fiscal Year 2016 ICE Enf. and
Removal Operations Rep. 9. Nor was such local resistance
unheard of when Congress enacted the language of § 1226(c)
in 1996. See S. Rep. No. 104–48, p. 28 (1995). Under these
circumstances, it is hard to believe that Congress made the
Secretary's mandatory-detention authority vanish at the
stroke of midnight after an alien's release.
In short, the import of our case law is clear: Even if subsection
(c) were the only font of authority to detain aliens
without bond hearings, we could not read its “when . . . re414
NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of the Court
leased” clause to defeat offcials' duty to impose such mandatory
detention when it comes to aliens who are arrested well
after their release.
IV
Respondents protest that reading § 1226(c) in the manner
set forth here would render key language superfuous, lead
to anomalies, and violate the canon of constitutional avoidance.
We answer these objections in turn.
A
According to respondents, the Government's reading of
§ 1226(c) fouts the interpretive canon against surplusage—
the idea that “every word and every provision is to be given
effect [and that n]one should needlessly be given an interpretation
that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have
no consequence.” Scalia, Reading Law, at 174. See Kungys
v. United States, 485 U. S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion
of Scalia, J.) (citing the “cardinal rule of statutory interpretation
that no provision should be construed to be
entirely redundant”). Respondents' surplusage argument
has two focal points.
First, respondents claim that if they face mandatory detention
even though they were arrested well after their release,
then “when . . . released” adds nothing to paragraph (1). In
fact, however, it still has work to do. For one thing, it clarifes
when the duty to arrest is triggered: upon release from
criminal custody, not before such release or after the completion
of noncustodial portions of a criminal sentence (such as
a term of “parole, supervised release, or probation,” as the
paragraph goes on to emphasize). Thus, paragraph (1) does
not permit the Secretary to cut short an alien's state prison
sentence in order to usher him more easily right into immigration
detention—much as another provision prevents
offcials from actually removing an alien from the country
“until the alien is released from imprisonment.” 8 U. S. C.
§ 1231(a)(4)(A). And from the other end, as paragraph (1)'s
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 415
Opinion of the Court
language makes clear, the Secretary need not wait for the
sentencing court's supervision over the alien to expire.
The “when . . . released” clause also serves another purpose:
exhorting the Secretary to act quickly. And this point
answers respondents' second surplusage claim: that the
“Transition Period Custody Rules” enacted along with
§ 1226(c) would have been superfuous if § 1226(c) did not call
for immediate arrests, since those rules authorized delays in
§ 1226(c)'s implementation while the Government expanded
its capacities. See Matter of Garvin-Noble, 21 I. & N. Dec.
672, 675 (BIA 1997). This argument again confuses what
the Secretary is obligated to do with the consequences that
follow if the Secretary fails (for whatever reason) to fulfll
that obligation. The transition rules delayed the onset of
the Secretary's obligation to begin making arrests as soon as
covered aliens were released from criminal custody, and in
that sense they were not superfuous.6 This is so even
though, had the transition rules not been adopted, the Secretary's
failure to make an arrest immediately upon a covered
alien's release would not have exempted the alien from mandatory
detention under § 1226(c).
6 The dissent asks why Congress would have felt the need to provide for
a delay if it thought that either way, the Secretary would get to deny a
hearing to aliens arrested well after release. Post, at 436; see also post,
at 439. The answer is that Congress does not draft legislation in the
expectation that the Executive will blow through the deadlines it sets.
That is why Congress specifes any deadlines for executive duties at all;
and here it explains why Congress furthermore provided that the deadline
it set for this particular duty (to arrest criminal aliens upon their release)
would not take effect right away.
In fact, if the dissent's argument from the transition rules were sound—
i. e., if textual evidence that Congress expects the Executive to meet a
deadline (once it offcially takes effect) were proof that Congress wanted
the deadline enforced by courts—then every case involving an express
statutory deadline would be one in which Congress intended for courts to
enforce the deadline. But this would include, by defnition, all of the lossof-
authority cases we discussed above, see Part III–B–2, supra—a long
line of precedent that the dissent does not question.
416 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of the Court
B
The Court of Appeals objected that the Government's
reading of § 1226(c) would have the bizarre result that some
aliens whom the Secretary need not arrest at all must nonetheless
be detained without a hearing if they are arrested.
831 F. 3d, at 1201–1203. This rather complicated argument,
as we understand it, proceeds as follows. Paragraph (2) requires
the detention of aliens “described in paragraph (1).”
While most of the aliens described there have been convicted
of a criminal offense, this need not be true of aliens captured
by subparagraph (D) in particular—which covers, for example,
aliens who are close relatives of terrorists and those who
are believed likely to commit a terrorist act. See § 1182(a)
(3)(B)(i)(IX). But if, as the Government maintains, any
alien who falls under subparagraphs (A)–(D) is thereby ineligible
for release from immigration custody, then the Secretary
would be forbidden to release even these aliens who
were never convicted or perhaps even charged with a crime,
once she arrested them. Yet she would be free not to arrest
them to begin with (or so the Court of Appeals assumed),
since she is obligated to arrest aliens “when . . . released,”
and there was no prior custody for these aliens to be “released”
from. Therefore, the court concluded, the Government's
position has the absurd implication that aliens who
were never charged with a crime need not be arrested pending
a removal determination, but if they are arrested, they
must be detained and cannot be released on bond or parole.
We agree that it would be very strange for Congress to
forbid the release of aliens who need not be arrested in the
frst place, but the fact is that the Government's reading (and
ours) does not have that incongruous result. The real anomalies
here would fow instead from the Court of Appeals'
interpretation.
To begin with the latter point: Under the Court of Appeals'
reading, the mandatory-detention scheme would be
gentler on terrorists than it is on garden-variety offenders.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 417
Opinion of the Court
To see why, recall frst that subparagraphs (A)–(C) cover
aliens who are inadmissible or deportable based on the commission
of certain criminal offenses, and there is no dispute
that the statute authorizes their mandatory detention when
they are released from criminal custody. And the crimes
covered by these subparagraphs include, for example, any
drug offense by an adult punishable by more than one year
of imprisonment, see §§ 1182(a)(2), 1226(c)(1)(A), as well as a
variety of tax offenses, see §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii);
Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U. S. 478 (2012). But notice that
aliens who fall within subparagraph (D), by contrast, may
never have been arrested on criminal charges—which according
to the court below would exempt them from mandatory
detention. Yet this subparagraph covers the very sort
of aliens for which Congress was most likely to have wanted
to require mandatory detention—including those who are
representatives of a terrorist group and those whom the
Government has reasonable grounds to believe are likely to
engage in terrorist activities. See §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(III),
(IV), 1226(c)(1)(D).7 Thus, by the Court of Appeals' logic,
Congress chose to spare terrorist aliens from the rigors of
mandatory detention—a mercy withheld from almost all
drug offenders and tax cheats. See Brief for National Immigrant
Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 7–8. That result
would be incongruous.
Along similar lines, note that one § 1226(c)(1) predicate
reaches aliens who necessarily escape conviction: those “for
whom immunity from criminal jurisdiction was exercised.”
§ 1182(a)(2)(E)(ii). See § 1226(c)(1)(A). And other predicates
sweep in aliens whom there is no reason to expect po-
7 In Alafyouny, 2006 WL 1581959, for example, an alien subject to
mandatory detention had not been charged with any crime. Rather, in a
hearing to consider his application for adjustment of status, an Immigration
Judge found that the alien had engaged in terrorism-related activity
identifed in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc), which qualifed him for mandatory
detention under § 1226(c)(1)(D). Id., at *3, *24.
418 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of the Court
lice (as opposed to immigration offcials) will have reason to
arrest: e. g., the “spouse or child of an alien” who recently
engaged in terrorist activity. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IX); see
§ 1226(c)(1)(D). It would be pointless for Congress to have
covered such aliens in subsections (c)(1)(A)–(D) if subsection
(c)'s mandates applied only to those emerging from jail.
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' interpretation of
the “when released” clause as limiting the class of aliens subject
to mandatory detention, we read subsection (c)(1) to
specify the timing of arrest (“when the alien is released”)
only for the vast majority of cases: those involving criminal
aliens who were once in criminal custody. The paragraph
simply does not speak to the timeline for arresting the few
who had no stint in jail. (And why should it? Presumably
they—unlike those serving time—are to be detained as they
come across the Government's radar and any relevant evidentiary
standards are satisfed.8)
In short, we read the “when released” directive to apply
when there is a release. In other situations, it is simply not
relevant. It follows that both of subsection (c)'s mandates—
for arrest and for release—apply to any alien linked with
a predicate offense identifed in subparagraphs (A)–(D), regardless
of exactly when or even whether the alien was released
from criminal custody.
C
Finally, respondents perch their reading of § 1226(c)—
unsteadily, as it turns out—on the canon of constitutional
avoidance. This canon provides that “[w]hen `a serious
doubt' is raised about the constitutionality of an act of Congress,
` . . . this Court will frst ascertain whether a construction
of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
8 See n. 7, supra. Detainees who deny that they satisfy any § 1226(c)
predicate may challenge their mandatory detention in a Joseph hearing.
See Matter of Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 1999). See also Jennings
v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281, 289, n. 1 (2018).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 419
Opinion of the Court
may be avoided.' ” Jennings, 583 U. S., at 296 (quoting Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932)).
Respondents say we should be uneasy about endorsing any
reading of § 1226(c) that would mandate arrest and detention
years after aliens' release from criminal custody—when
many aliens will have developed strong ties to the country
and a good chance of being allowed to stay if given a hearing.
At that point, respondents argue, mandatory detention may
be insuffciently linked to public benefts like protecting others
against crime and ensuring that aliens will appear at
their removal proceedings. In respondents' view, detention
in that scenario would raise constitutional doubts under
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), which held that detention
violates due process absent “adequate procedural
protections” or “special justifcation[s]” suffcient to outweigh
one's “ `constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint,' ” id., at 690 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U. S. 346, 356 (1997)). Thus, respondents urge, we should
adopt a reading of § 1226(c)—their reading—that avoids this
result.
The trouble with this argument is that constitutional
avoidance “ `comes into play only when, after the application
of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible
of more than one construction.' ” Jennings, 583
U. S., at 296. The canon “has no application” absent “ambiguity.”
Warger v. Shauers, 574 U. S. 40, 50 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Zadvydas, 533 U. S., at
696 (“Despite this constitutional problem, if Congress has
made its intent in the statute clear, we must give effect to
that intent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here the
text of § 1226 cuts clearly against respondents' position, see
Part III, supra, making constitutional avoidance irrelevant.
We emphasize that respondents' arguments here have all
been statutory. Even their constitutional concerns are offered
as just another pillar in an argument for their preferred
reading of the language of § 1226(c)—an idle pillar
420 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
here because the statute is clear. While respondents might
have raised a head-on constitutional challenge to § 1226(c),
they did not. Our decision today on the meaning of
that statutory provision does not foreclose as-applied
challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications
of the statute as we have now read it.
* * *
The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.
I write separately to emphasize the narrowness of the
issue before us and, in particular, to emphasize what this
case is not about.
This case is not about whether a noncitizen may be removed
from the United States on the basis of criminal offenses.
Under longstanding federal statutes, the Executive
Branch may remove noncitizens from the United States
when the noncitizens have been convicted of certain crimes,
even when the crimes were committed many years ago.
This case is also not about whether a noncitizen may be
detained during removal proceedings or before removal.
Congress has expressly authorized the Executive Branch to
detain noncitizens during their removal proceedings and before
removal. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1226(a), (c), and 1231(a).
This case is also not about how long a noncitizen may be
detained during removal proceedings or before removal.
We have addressed that question in cases such as Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678 (2001), Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S.
371 (2005), and Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281 (2018).
This case is also not about whether Congress may mandate
that the Executive Branch detain noncitizens during removal
proceedings or before removal, as opposed to merely
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 421
Kavanaugh, J., concurring
giving the Executive Branch discretion to detain. It is undisputed
that Congress may mandate that the Executive
Branch detain certain noncitizens during removal proceedings
or before removal. Congress has in fact mandated detention
of certain noncitizens who have been in criminal custody
and who, upon their release, would pose a danger to the
community or risk of fight. As relevant here, Congress has
mandated detention “when” such noncitizens are “released”
from criminal custody. 8 U. S. C. § 1226(c)(1).
The sole question before us is narrow: whether, under
§ 1226, the Executive Branch's mandatory duty to detain a
particular noncitizen when the noncitizen is released from
criminal custody remains mandatory if the Executive Branch
fails to immediately detain the noncitizen when the noncitizen
is released from criminal custody—for example, if the
Executive Branch fails to immediately detain the noncitizen
because of resource constraints or because the Executive
Branch cannot immediately locate and apprehend the individual
in question. No constitutional issue is presented.
The issue before us is entirely statutory and requires our
interpretation of the strict 1996 illegal-immigration law
passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton. Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–546.
It would be odd, in my view, if the Act (1) mandated detention
of particular noncitizens because the noncitizens posed
such a serious risk of danger or fight that they must be
detained during their removal proceedings, but (2) nonetheless
allowed the noncitizens to remain free during their removal
proceedings if the Executive Branch failed to immediately
detain them upon their release from criminal custody.
Not surprisingly, the Act does not require such an odd result.
On the contrary, the relevant text of the Act is relatively
straightforward, as the Court explains. Interpreting that
text, the Court correctly holds that the Executive Branch's
detention of the particular noncitizens here remained manda422
NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of Thomas, J.
tory even though the Executive Branch did not immediately
detain them. I agree with the Court's careful statutory
analysis, and I join the Court's opinion in full.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I continue to believe that no court has jurisdiction to decide
questions concerning the detention of aliens before
fnal orders of removal have been entered. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281, 314–323 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment). By my count,
Congress has erected at least three barriers to our review of
the merits, and I also question whether Article III jurisdiction
existed at the time of class certifcation. Nonetheless,
because the Court has held that we have jurisdiction in cases
like these, and because I largely agree with the Court's resolution
of the merits, I join all but Parts II and III–B–2 of
the Court's opinion.
I
Respondents consist of two classes of aliens who committed
criminal offenses that require the Secretary of Homeland
Security to detain them without a bond hearing under
8 U. S. C. § 1226(c), but who were not detained immediately
upon release from criminal custody. Respondents argued
that, by failing to immediately detain them, the Secretary
lost the authority to deny them a bond hearing when they
were rearrested.
The frst class action was brought in the Northern District
of California and has three class representatives. One of
the plaintiffs, Mony Preap, received cancellation of removal
and was not in immigration custody at the time of certifcation.
The other two, Eduardo Vega Padilla and Juan Lozano
Magdaleno, had received bond hearings as required by a
Ninth Circuit decision, Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F. 3d 1127,
1138 (2013); Padilla had been released, while Magdaleno was
denied release. The District Court certifed a class of all
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 423
Opinion of Thomas, J.
aliens in California who are or will be subjected to mandatory
detention under § 1226(c) and who were not or will not
have been taken into custody by the Government immediately
upon their release from criminal custody for a
§ 1226(c)(1) offense. The court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring the Government to provide all class members
with bond hearings under § 1226(a).
The second class action was brought in the Western District
of Washington and also has three class representatives:
Bassam Yusuf Khoury and Alvin Rodriguez Moya, who had
been released on bond before class certifcation after their
Rodriguez hearings, and Pablo Carrera Zavala, who was released
before class certifcation because the Department of
Homeland Security determined that he had not committed a
predicate § 1226(c)(1) offense. The District Court certifed a
class of all aliens in its judicial district who were not detained
immediately upon their release from criminal custody
but were subjected to mandatory detention under § 1226(c).
The court entered a declaratory judgment barring the Government
from subjecting class members to detention under
§ 1226(c) unless it took the alien into custody immediately
upon release.
II
At least three statutory provisions limit judicial review
here, and I am skeptical whether the District Courts had
Article III jurisdiction to certify the classes.
A
First, § 1252(b)(9) bars judicial review of “all questions of
law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional
and statutory provisions, arising from any action
taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the
United States,” except for review of “a fnal order” or other
circumstances not present here. These cases raise questions
of law or fact arising from removal proceedings—“[d]etention
is necessarily a part of [the] deportation procedure”
424 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of Thomas, J.
that culminates in the removal of the alien, Carlson v. Landon,
342 U. S. 524, 538 (1952)—and they do not come to us
on review of fnal orders of removal. Thus, for the reasons
I set forth in Jennings, supra, at 314–323, no court has jurisdiction
over these class actions.
B
Second, § 1226(e) provides that “[n]o court may set aside
any action or decision by the [Secretary] under this section
regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant,
revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” (Emphasis added.)
This provision “unequivocally deprives federal courts of jurisdiction
to set aside `any action or decision' by the [Secretary]”
regarding detention, discretionary or otherwise. Demore
v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 533 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see Jennings,
supra, at 323, n. 6. The plurality once again reads
this language as permitting judicial review for challenges to
the “statutory framework as a whole.” Ante, at 401 (internal
quotation marks omitted). But the text of the statute
contains no such exception. Accordingly, I continue to think
that no court has jurisdiction over these kinds of actions.
C
Third, § 1252(f)(1) deprives district courts of “jurisdiction
or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of [§§ 1221–
1232] other than with respect to the application of such provisions
to an individual alien against whom proceedings
under [§§ 1221–1232] have been initiated.” The text of
§ 1252(f)(1) explicitly prohibits the classwide injunctive relief
ordered by the Northern District of California in this instance,
given that the class includes future, yet-to-be detained
aliens against whom proceedings have not been initiated.
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 481 (1999) (explaining that § 1252(f)(1)
“prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 425
Opinion of Thomas, J.
relief against the operation of §§ 1221–1231”). The District
Court relied on Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F. 3d 1105 (CA9
2010), which held that this provision does not affect authority
to enjoin alleged violations of the specifed statutes because
those claims do not “seek to enjoin the operation of the immigration
detention statutes, but to enjoin conduct . . . not authorized
by the statutes.” Id., at 1120. This reasoning is
circular and unpersuasive. Many claims seeking to enjoin
or restrain the operation of the relevant statutes will allege
that the Executive's action does not comply with the statutory
grant of authority, but the text clearly bars jurisdiction
to enter an injunction “[r]egardless of the nature of the
action or claim.” Although the plurality avoids deciding
whether § 1252(f)(1) prevented the District Court's injunction
here, ante, at 402, I would hold that it did.
D
Finally, I harbor two concerns about whether the class actions
were moot at the time of certifcation. First, as the
plurality recognizes, class actions are ordinarily “moot if no
named class representative with an unexpired claim remain[
s] at the time of class certifcation.” United States v.
Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U. S. 381, 386 (2018); ante, at 403. At
the time of class certifcation, all six of the named plaintiffs
had received bond hearings or cancellation of removal. As
I understand the plaintiffs' arguments, that was the full relief
that they sought: “individualized bond hearings where
they may attempt to prove that their release would not create
a risk of fight or a danger to the public.” Motion for
Class Certifcation in Preap v. Beers, No. 4:13–cv–5754 (ND
Cal.), Doc. 8, p. 8; see Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief in Preap, supra, Doc. 1, p. 3 (seeking “immediate
individualized bond hearings”); First Amended Class Action
Complaint in Khoury v. Asher, No. 2:13–cv–1367 (WD
Wash.), Doc. 19, p. 13 (requesting relief of “individualized
bond hearings to all Plaintiffs”). The plurality concludes that
426 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Opinion of Thomas, J.
some of the named plaintiffs still faced the threat of rearrest
and mandatory detention at the time of class certifcation
because the bond hearings that they received were provided
as part of a preliminary injunction in a separate case that
was later dissolved. But whether the plaintiffs actually
faced that threat has not been addressed by the parties, and
I question whether this future contingency was suffciently
imminent to support Article III jurisdiction.
If the threat of rearrest and mandatory detention was too
speculative to support jurisdiction, I disagree with the plurality
that our jurisdiction would be saved by our precedent on
transitory claims. Ante, at 403–404. We have held that a
court has Article III jurisdiction to certify a class action
when the named plaintiffs' claims have become moot if the
claim is “so inherently transitory that the trial court will not
have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certifcation
before the proposed representative's individual interest
expires.” United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
445 U. S. 388, 399 (1980). The “inherently transitory” exception
is measured from the time that the complaint is fled to
the court's ruling on the motion for class certifcation. See
Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U. S. 66, 75–77
(2013). In other words, the named plaintiff's standing in a
class action need not exist throughout the lifecycle of the
entire lawsuit. Here, Members of the Court have recognized
that aliens are held, on average, for one year, and
sometimes longer. See Jennings, 583 U. S., at 328 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (noting that detention for aliens is “often
lengthy,” sometimes lasting years). I am not persuaded
that the plaintiffs' claims are so “inherently transitory” as to
preclude a ruling on class certifcation, especially since both
District Courts certifed the classes here within a year of the
fling of the complaints. Cf. County of Riverside v. Mc-
Laughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 47, 52 (1991) (fnding jurisdiction over
a class action that challenged a county's failure to provide
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 427
Breyer, J., dissenting
“prompt” probable-cause hearings within the 48-hour window
for arraignments, as required by state law).
* * *
Because three statutes deprive courts of jurisdiction over
respondents' claims, I would have vacated the judgments
below and remanded with instructions to dismiss the cases
for lack of jurisdiction. But because the Court has held otherwise
and I agree with the Court's disposition of the merits,
I concur in all but Parts II and III–B–2 of its opinion.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
A provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U. S. C. § 1226(c), focuses upon potentially deportable noncitizens
who have committed certain offenses or have ties to
terrorism. It requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to take those aliens into custody “when . . . released” from
prison and to hold them without a bail hearing until Government
authorities decide whether to deport them. The question
is whether this provision limits the class of persons in
the “no-bail-hearing” category to only those aliens who were
taken into custody “when . . . released” from prison, or
whether it also places in that “no-bail-hearing” category
those aliens who were taken into custody years or decades
after their release from prison.
The critical statutory language is contained in paragraph
(2) of this provision. That paragraph says (with one exception
not relevant here) that “an alien described in paragraph
(1)” must be held without a bail hearing. Here we must decide
what these words mean. Do the words “an alien described
in paragraph (1)” refer only to those aliens whom
the Secretary, following paragraph (1)'s instructions, has
“take[n] into custody . . . when the alien is released” from,
say, state or federal prison? Or do these words refer in428
NIELSEN v. PREAP
Breyer, J., dissenting
stead to all aliens who have ever committed one of the offenses
listed in paragraph (1), regardless of when these
aliens were “released” from prison?
For present purposes, I accept the Court's holding in Jennings
v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281 (2018), that paragraph (2)
forbids bail hearings for aliens “described in paragraph (1).”
But see id., at 326–327 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (interpreting
paragraph (2) as not forbidding bail hearings, as the Constitution
likely requires them); id., at 312 (majority opinion)
(declining to reach constitutional question). Here, however,
the Court goes much further. The majority concludes that
paragraph (2) forbids bail hearings for aliens regardless
of whether they are taken into custody “when . . . released”
from prison. Under the majority's view, the statute
for bids bail hearings even for aliens whom the Secretary
has detained years or decades after their release from
prison.
The language of the statute will not bear the broad interpretation
the majority now adopts. Rather, the ordinary
meaning of the statute's language, the statute's structure,
and relevant canons of interpretation all argue convincingly
to the contrary. I respectfully dissent.
I
A
The relevant statute, 8 U. S. C. § 1226, is entitled “Apprehension
and detention of aliens.” See Appendix A, infra.
Its frst subsection, subsection (a), is entitled “Arrest, detention,
and release.” Subsection (a) sets forth the background
rule. It gives the Secretary of Homeland Security (formerly
the Attorney General) the authority to “arres[t] and detai[n]”
an “alien . . . pending a decision on whether the alien is to
be removed from the United States.” § 1226(a). See ante,
at 397, n. 2. It adds that the Secretary “may release the
alien” on “bond” or “conditional parole.” § 1226(a)(2). Federal
regulations provide that a person detained under this subCite
as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 429
Breyer, J., dissenting
section must receive a bail hearing. 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1),
1236.1(d)(1) (2018). With respect to release, however, subsection
(a) adds the words “[e]xcept as provided in subsection
(c).” 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a).
The subsection containing the exception to which (a) refers—
namely, subsection (c)—is entitled “Detention of criminal
aliens.” It consists of two paragraphs.
Paragraph (1), entitled “Custody,” says that the Secretary
“shall take into custody any alien who” is “inadmissible” or
“deportable” (by reason of having committed certain offenses
or having ties to terrorism) “when the alien is released,”
presumably from local, state, or federal criminal custody.
§ 1226(c)(1) (emphasis added). Because the relevant
offenses are listed in four subparagraphs headed by the letters
“A,” “B,” “C,” and “D,” I shall refer to the relevant
aliens as “ABCD” aliens. Thus, for present purposes, paragraph
(1) says that the Secretary “shall take into custody
any” ABCD alien “when the alien is released” from criminal
custody.
Paragraph (2), entitled “Release,” says that the Secretary
“may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if ”
the alien falls within a special category—not relevant here—
related to witness protection. § 1226(c)(2) (emphasis added).
We held last Term in Jennings that paragraph (2) forbids a
bail hearing for “an alien described in paragraph (1)” unless
the witness protection exception applies. 583 U. S., at 303–
306 (majority opinion).
Here we focus on the meaning of a key phrase in paragraph
(2): “an alien described in paragraph (1).” This is the
phrase that identifes the aliens to whom paragraph (2) (and
its “no-bail-hearing” requirement) applies. Does paragraph
(1) “describ[e]” all ABCD aliens, even those whom the Secretary
has “take[n] into custody” many years after their release
from prison? Or does it “describ[e]” only those aliens
whom the Secretary has “take[n] into custody . . . when the
alien [was] released” from prison?
430 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Breyer, J., dissenting
B
The issue may sound technical. But it is extremely important.
That is because the Government's reading of the
statute—namely, that paragraph (2) forbids bail hearings for
all ABCD aliens regardless of whether they were detained
“when . . . released” from criminal custody—would signifcantly
expand the Secretary's authority to deny bail hearings.
Under the Government's view, the aliens subject to
detention without a bail hearing may have been released
from criminal custody years earlier, and may have established
families and put down roots in a community. These
aliens may then be detained for months, sometimes years,
without the possibility of release; they may have been convicted
of only minor crimes—for example, minor drug offenses,
or crimes of “moral turpitude” such as illegally downloading
music or possessing stolen bus transfers; and they
sometimes may be innocent spouses or children of a suspect
person. Moreover, for a high percentage of them, it will
turn out after months of custody that they will not be removed
from the country because they are eligible by statute
to receive a form of relief from removal such as cancellation
of removal. These are not mere hypotheticals. See Appendix
B, infra. Thus, in terms of potential consequences and
basic American legal traditions, see infra, at 437–438, the
question before us is not a “narrow” one, ante, at 421 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
Why would Congress have granted the Secretary such
broad authority to deny bail hearings, especially when doing
so would run contrary to basic American and common-law
traditions? See Jennings, supra, at 332–334 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The answer is that Congress did not do so.
Ordinary tools of statutory interpretation demonstrate that
the authority Congress granted to the Secretary is far
more limited.
II
The statute's language, its structure, and relevant canons
of interpretation make clear that the Secretary cannot hold
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 431
Breyer, J., dissenting
an alien without a bail hearing unless the alien is “take[n]
into custody . . . when the alien is released” from criminal
custody. § 1226(c)(1).
A
Consider the statute's language. Paragraph (1) of subsection
(c) provides that the Secretary “shall take into custody”
any ABCD alien—that is, any alien who is “inadmissible” or
“deportable” under the subparagraphs labeled “A,” “B,” “C,”
and “D”—“when the alien is released” from, say, state or
federal prison. Ibid. Paragraph (2), meanwhile, generally
forbids a bail hearing for “an alien described in paragraph
(1).” § 1226(c)(2).
The key phrase in paragraph (2) is “an alien described in
paragraph (1).” As a matter of ordinary meaning and usage,
the words “take into custody . . . when the alien is released”
in paragraph (1) form part of the description of the “alien”:
An “alien described in paragraph (1)” is an ABCD alien
whom the Secretary has “take[n] into custody . . . when the
alien is released” from prison.
The majority emphasizes a grammatical point—namely,
that ordinarily only adjectives or adjectival phrases “modify”
nouns. Ante, at 406. But the statute does not use the word
“modify.” It uses the word “described.” While the word
“describe” will in some contexts refer only to the words that
directly “modify” a noun, normally it has a broader meaning.
Compare American Heritage Dictionary 490 (5th ed. 2011)
(to “describe” is to “convey an idea or impression of ”)
and Webster's Third New International Dictionary 610
(1986) (to “describe” is to “convey an image or notion of ”)
with P. Peters, The Cambridge Guide to English Usage 355
(2004) (defning a “modife[r]” as a word that “qualifes” a
noun).
The common rules of grammar make the broad scope of
the word “described” obvious. They demonstrate that a
noun often is “described” by more than just the adjectives
that modify it. Consider the following sentence: “The wellbehaved
child was taken by a generous couple to see Hamil432
NIELSEN v. PREAP
Breyer, J., dissenting
ton.” That sentence, written in the passive voice, describes
the “child” not only as “well-behaved” but also as someone
“taken by a generous couple to see Hamilton.” The description
of the child would not differ were we to write the
sentence in the active voice: “The generous couple took the
well-behaved child to see Hamilton.” The action taken by
the “generous couple” (“took . . . to see Hamilton”) still
“describes” the “child,” even though these words do not
“modify” the word “child.” That is because a person who
has been subjected to an action can be described by that
action no less than by an adjective. See Peters, supra,
at 386 (describing such a person as someone “affected by
the action”); B. Garner, The Chicago Guide to Grammar,
Usage, and Punctuation 452 (2016) (describing such a person
as someone who “is acted on by or receives the action”);
see also R. Huddleston & G. Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar
of the English Language 1436 (2002) (noting the
“large-scale overlap” between adjectives and certain verb
forms).
An example illustrates how these principles apply to the
statute at issue here. Imagine the following cookbook recipe.
Instruction (1) says: “(1) Remove the Angus steak from
the grill when the steak is cooked to 120 degrees Fahrenheit.”
Instruction (4) says: “(4) Let the steak described in
Instruction (1) rest for ten minutes and then serve it.”
What would we say of a chef who grilled an Angus steak to
185 degrees Fahrenheit, served it, and then appealed to these
instructions—particularly the word “described” in Instruction
(4)—as a justifcation? That he was not a good cook?
That he had an odd sense of humor? Or simply that he did
not understand the instructions? The chef would have no
good textual defense: The steak “described in Instruction
(1)” is not just an “Angus” steak, but an “Angus” steak that
must be “remove[d] . . . when the steak is cooked to 120
degrees Fahrenheit.” By the same logic, the alien in paragraph
(1) is “described” not only by the four clauses—A, B,
C, and D—that directly modify the word “alien,” but also by
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 433
Breyer, J., dissenting
the verb (“shall take”) and that verb's modifer (“when the
alien is released”).
The majority argues that “the crucial point” is that the
phrase “when the alien is released” plays “no role in identifying
for the Secretary which aliens she must immediately arrest.”
Ante, at 407. That may be so. But why is that a
“crucial point” in the majority's favor? After all, in the example
above, the words “[r]emove . . . from the grill when
the steak is cooked to 120 degrees Fahrenheit” do not tell
our chef what kind of steak to cook in the frst place. (The
word “Angus” does that.) Even so, those words still “describe”
the steak that must be served in Instruction (4).
Why? Because by the time our chef gets to Instruction (4),
the recipe contemplates that the action in Instruction (1) has
been completed. At that point, the “steak described in Instruction
(1)” is a steak that has been cooked in the manner
mandated by Instruction (1).
The same is true of the two paragraphs before us. The
key word “described” appears not in paragraph (1), but in
paragraph (2). Paragraph (2) refers back to the entirety of
paragraph (1). And because paragraph (2) is the release
provision, it contemplates that the action mandated by paragraph
(1)—namely, detention—has already occurred. Thus,
the function of the phrase “an alien described in paragraph
(1)” is not to describe who must be detained, but instead to
describe who must be denied bail.
In short, the language demonstrates that an alien is “described
in paragraph (1)”—and therefore subject to paragraph
(2)'s bar on bail hearings—only if the alien is “take[n]
into custody . . . when the alien is released.”
B
The statute's structure and context support this reading
of the phrase “an alien described in paragraph (1).”
First, “Congress often drafts statutes with hierarchical
schemes—section, subsection, paragraph, and on down the
line.” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 300 (2017).
434 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Breyer, J., dissenting
Congress employed that structure “to make precise crossreferences”
throughout the immigration code. Ibid. As
relevant here, in a different detention provision enacted
alongside the provision at issue here, Congress said that the
Government “may release the alien only if the alien is an
alien described in subparagraph (A)(ii) or (A)(iii).” Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), § 303(b)(3)(B), 110 Stat. 3009–587. Yet Congress
did not make such a precise cross-reference in paragraph
(2): It did not refer to “an alien described in subparagraphs
(A)–(D) of paragraph (1),” as it could have—and
would have—done had it intended the majority's narrow interpretation.
Instead, it referred to aliens “described” in
the entirety of paragraph (1).
We usually “presume differences in language like this
convey differences in meaning. ” Henson v. Santander
Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017). The crossreference
to all of paragraph (1) reinforces that “an alien
described in paragraph (1)” is not just an ABCD alien, but
an ABCD alien whom (in the words of paragraph (1)) the
Secretary “take[s] into custody . . . when the alien is released”
from criminal confnement.
Second, consider the structural similarity between subsections
(a) and (c). See Appendix A, infra. The frst sentence
of subsection (a) sets forth a detention rule: An “alien
may be arrested and detained” pending a decision on the
alien's removal. 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a). And the second sentence
sets forth a release rule that allows for release on bond
and parole. Ibid. Subsection (c) has a parallel structure.
The frst sentence (namely, paragraph (1)) says that the Secretary
must “take into custody” a subset of those aliens
“when the alien is released” from criminal custody.
§ 1226(c)(1). And the second sentence (namely, paragraph
(2)) sets forth the rule that “an alien described in paragraph
(1)” generally may not be released. § 1226(c)(2).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 435
Breyer, J., dissenting
It is obvious that the second sentence of (a) applies only
to those aliens who are detained following the rule in (a)'s
frst sentence. Parallel structure suggests that the same is
true in (c): The second sentence of (c) applies only to those
detained following the rule in (c)'s frst sentence. Subsection
(a)'s reference to (c) strengthens this structural
inference: Subsection (a) says that its release rule applies
“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c)”—that is, except
as provided in the whole of subsection (c), not simply paragraph
(2) or the few lines the majority picks from (c)'s
text.
Thus, the release rule in each subsection (the second sentence)
applies only if the Secretary complies with the detention
rule in that subsection (the frst sentence). In light of
“the parallel structures of these provisions,” it would “fou[t]
the text” to fnd that an alien is subject to (c)'s release rule,
which forbids release, without also fnding that the alien was
detained in accordance with (c)'s detention rule, which requires
the alien to be detained “when . . . released.” Chan
v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U. S. 122, 132 (1989).
The majority responds that subsections (a) and (c) do not
“establis[h] separate sources of arrest and release authority,”
and that (c) is merely “a limit” on the authority granted
by (a). Ante, at 409. But even if (c) were treated as a
“limit” on the authority granted by (a), the parallel structure
of the statute would still point to the same conclusion: The
Secretary must comply with the limit on detention in the
frst sentence of (c) in order to invoke the rule on release in
the second sentence of (c).
Third, Congress' enactment of a special “transition” statute
strengthens the point. When Congress enacted subsection
(c), it recognized that there might be “insuffcient detention
space” and “personnel” to carry out subsection (c)'s
requirements. IIRIRA, § 303(b)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–586. It
therefore authorized the Government to delay implementa436
NIELSEN v. PREAP
Breyer, J., dissenting
tion of subsection (c)—initially for one year, then for a second
year. Ibid.
If the majority were correct that the “when . . . released”
provision does not set a time limit on the Secretary's authority
to deny bail hearings, then a special transition statute
delaying implementation for one year would have been unnecessary.
To avoid overcrowding, the Government simply
could have delayed arresting aliens for 1, 2, 5, or 10 years,
as the majority believes it can do, and then deny them bail
hearings. What need for a 1-year transition period? The
majority responds that the transition statute still served a
purpose: to “dela[y] the onset of the Secretary's obligation to
begin making arrests.” Ante, at 415. But that just raises
the question: Why would Congress have needed to “dela[y]
the onset of the Secretary's obligation” if it thought that the
Secretary could detain aliens without a bail hearing after a
year-long delay? The majority offers no good answer. The
transition statute therefore strongly suggests that Congress
viewed the “when . . . released” provision as a constraint on
the Secretary's authority to deny a bail hearing.
The transition statute also supports this conclusion in another
respect: It demonstrates that Congress anticipated
that subsection (c) would apply only to aliens “released” from
state or federal prison. As noted, clauses A, B, C, and D in
paragraph (1) cover some aliens who have never been in criminal
custody. Supra, at 430. Even the majority acknowledges
that it would be bizarre if these aliens could be detained
without a bail hearing. Ante, at 416. The transition
statute confrms as much: It indicates that “the provisions of
[subsection (c)] shall apply to individuals released after” the
transition period concludes. IIRIRA, § 303(b)(2), 110 Stat.
3009–586 (emphasis added). From this it follows that Congress
saw paragraph (2) as forbidding bail hearings only for
aliens who have been “released.” That, however, can be
true only if the “when . . . released” provision limits the class
of aliens subject to paragraph (2)'s “no-bail-hearing” requireCite
as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 437
Breyer, J., dissenting
ment. The majority's contrary reading, under which paragraph
(2) applies “regardless of . . . whether the alien was
released from criminal custody,” ante, at 418, conficts with
how Congress itself described the scope of subsection (c)
when it enacted the statute.
C
Even if statutory text and structure were not enough to
resolve these cases, the Government's reading would fail for
another reason. A well-established canon of statutory interpretation
provides that, “if fairly possible,” a statute must
be construed “so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it
is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.”
United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401 (1916).
See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building
& Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988) (using
word “serious” instead of “grave”). The Government's reading
of the statute, which the majority adopts, construes the
statute in a way that creates serious constitutional problems.
That reading would give the Secretary authority to arrest
and detain aliens years after they have committed a minor
crime and then hold them without a bail hearing for months
or years. This possibility is not simply theoretical. See
Appendix B, infra.
In Jennings, I explained why I believe the practice of indefnite
detention without a bail hearing likely deprives a
“person” of his or her “liberty . . . without due process of
law.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. See 583 U. S., at 330 (dissenting
opinion). This practice runs counter to “those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statute law of England, before the emigration of ” the Founders'
“ancestors.” Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856). It runs counter to
practices well established at the time of the American Revolution.
Jennings, supra, at 333–334. And it runs counter
to common sense: Why would the law grant a bail hearing to
438 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Breyer, J., dissenting
a person accused of murder but deny it to a person who many
years before committed a crime perhaps no greater than possessing
a stolen bus transfer? See Appendix B, infra.
I explained much of the constitutional problem in my dissent
in Jennings. Rather than repeat what I wrote there, I
refer the reader to that opinion. See Jennings, supra, at
326. I add only the obvious point that a bail hearing does
not mean release on bail. It simply permits the person held
to demonstrate that, if released, he will neither run away
nor pose a threat. It is especially anomalous to take this
opportunity away from an alien who committed a crime
many years before and has since reformed, living productively
in a community.
The majority's reading also creates other anomalies. As
I have said, by permitting the Secretary to hold aliens without
a bail hearing even if they were not detained “when . . .
released,” the majority's reading would allow the Secretary
to hold indefnitely without bail those who have never been
to prison and who received only a fne or probation as punishment.
Supra, at 430, 436–437. See, e. g., § 1226(c)(1)(A) (incorporating
§ 1182(a)(2), which covers controlled substance
offenses for which the maximum penalty exceeds one year);
Brief for Advancement Project et al. as Amici Curiae 19, 24,
29 (describing examples). That fact simply aggravates the
constitutional problem.
III
Although the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that
paragraph (2)'s prohibition on release applies only to an alien
whom the Secretary “take[s] into custody . . . when the alien
is released” from criminal custody, it also held that the
phrase “when the alien is released” means that the Secretary
must grant a bail hearing to any alien who is not “ `immediately
detained' when released from criminal custody.”
Preap v. Johnson, 831 F. 3d 1193, 1207 (CA9 2016). I disagree
with the Court of Appeals as to the meaning of the
phrase “when the alien is released.”
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 439
Breyer, J., dissenting
A
As an initial matter, the phrase “when the alien is released”
imposes an enforceable statutory deadline. I cannot
agree with Justice Alito, who writes for a plurality of the
Court on this point, that our cases holding certain statutory
deadlines unenforceable are applicable here. Ante, at 411–
412. See, e. g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149,
152 (2003) (holding that the Government's untimeliness did
not bar it from taking action beyond the statutory deadline);
United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U. S. 711, 713–714
(1990) (holding that a provision requiring a detention hearing
to “ `be held immediately' ” did not bar detention in the event
of a late hearing); Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U. S. 253, 266
(1986) (holding that the Government's failure to observe a
120-day statutory deadline did not deprive it of authority
under the statute).
I disagree with the plurality on this point because our case
law makes clear that a statutory deadline against the Government
must be enforced at least in contexts where “other
part[s]” of the relevant statutes indicate that the time limit
must be enforced, Montalvo-Murillo, supra, at 717; see also
Barnhart, supra, at 161, 163; Dolan v. United States, 560
U. S. 605, 613 (2010); where the statute “ `specif[ies] a consequence
for noncompliance' ” with the time limit, Barnhart,
supra, at 159 (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 63 (1993)); or where the harms
caused by the Government's delay are likely to be serious,
see Dolan, supra, at 615–616; Montalvo-Murillo, supra, at
719–720.
Here, the special transition statute Congress enacted
alongside subsection (c) makes clear that Congress expected
that the mandate that an alien be detained “when . . . released”
would be enforceable. Congress neither wished for
nor expected the Secretary to detain aliens more than a
year after their release from criminal custody. IIRIRA,
§ 303(b)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–586. Why else would Congress
440 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Breyer, J., dissenting
have enacted a statute permitting the Government, due to
“insuffcient detention space and Immigration and Naturalization
Service personnel,” to delay implementation of the
entirety of subsection (c) for one year? Ibid. As I have
said, had Congress read the phrase “when the alien is released”
as the plurality now reads it, the Government could
have delayed implementation for as long as it liked without
the need for any transition statute. Supra, at 435–436.
The transition statute demonstrates that Congress viewed
the phrase “when the alien is released” as imposing a deadline.
Based on the transition statute, the Secretary may not
delay detention under subsection (c) for longer than one year.
Moreover, the statute does “ `specify a consequence' ” for
the Secretary's failure to detain an alien “when the alien is
released.” Barnhart, supra, at 159 (quoting James Daniel
Good, supra, at 63). In that case, subsection (c) will not
apply, and the Secretary must fall back on subsection (a), the
default detention and release provision. Critically, subsection
(a) does not guarantee release. Rather, it leaves much
to the Government's judgment: By regulation, aliens who are
subject to subsection (a)'s default detention and release rules
will simply receive a hearing at which they can attempt to
demonstrate that, if released, they will not pose a risk of
fight or a threat to the community. 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1),
1236.1(d)(1).
Finally, I have already mentioned the many harms that
could befall aliens whom the Secretary does not detain
“when . . . released.” They range from long periods of
detention, to detention years or even decades after the
alien's release from criminal custody, to the risk of splitting
up families that are long established in a community.
Supra, at 430. Thus, unlike some of our prior cases, the
harm from a missed deadline hardly can be described as “insignifcant.”
Montalvo-Murillo, supra, at 719.
The plurality objects that “Congress could not have meant
for judges to `enforce' ” the mandatory detention requireCite
as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 441
Breyer, J., dissenting
ment “in case of delay by—of all things—forbidding its execution.”
Ante, at 412–413. But treating the “when the
alien is released” clause as an enforceable limit does not prohibit
the Secretary from detaining the aliens that subsection
(c) requires her to detain. Rather, the Secretary's failure to
comply with the “when the alien is released” clause carries
only one consequence: The Secretary cannot deny a bail
hearing.
B
So what does the phrase “when the alien is released”
mean? The word “when” can, but does not always, mean
“[a]t the time that,” American Heritage Dictionary, at 1971,
or “just after the moment that,” Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, at 2602. But the word only “[s]ometimes
impl[ies] suddenness.” 20 Oxford English Dictionary
209 (2d ed. 1989). It often admits of at least some temporal
delay. A child who is told to “mow the lawn, please, when
you get home from school” likely does not have to mow the
lawn the second she comes into the house. She can do a few
other things frst.
Mindful of “the greater immigration-related expertise of
the Executive Branch” and “the serious administrative needs
and concerns inherent in the necessarily extensive [Government]
efforts to enforce this complex statute,” I would interpret
the word “when” in the same manner as we interpreted
other parts of this statute in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S.
678, 700 (2001). The words “when the alien is released” require
the Secretary to detain aliens under subsection (c)
within a reasonable time after their release from criminal
custody—presumptively no more than six months. If the
Secretary does not do so, she must grant a bail hearing.
This presumptive 6-month limit is consistent with how long
the Government can detain certain aliens while they are
awaiting removal from the country. Id., at 682, 701 (interpreting
a different provision, § 1231(a)(6)). To insist upon
similar treatment in this context would give the Government
442 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Breyer, J., dissenting
suffcient time to detain aliens following their release from
local, state, or federal criminal custody. It would also ensure
that the Government does not fall outside the 1-year
maximum dictated by the transition statute. See supra, at
435–436, 439–440.
IV
To reiterate: The question before us is not “narrow.”
Ante, at 421 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). See supra, at
430. That is because we cannot interpret the words of this
specifc statute without also considering basic promises that
America's legal system has long made to all persons. In deciphering
the intent of the Congress that wrote this statute,
we must decide—in the face of what is, at worst, linguistic
ambiguity—whether Congress intended that persons who
have long since paid their debt to society would be deprived
of their liberty for months or years without the possibility
of bail. We cannot decide that question without bearing in
mind basic American legal values: the Government's duty not
to deprive any “person” of “liberty” without “due process of
law,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5; the Nation's original commitment
to protect the “unalienable” right to “Liberty,” Declaration
of Independence 92; and, less abstractly and more directly,
the longstanding right of virtually all persons to receive a
bail hearing.
I would have thought that Congress meant to adhere to
these values and did not intend to allow the Government to
apprehend persons years after their release from prison and
hold them indefnitely without a bail hearing. In my view,
the Court should interpret the words of this statute to refect
Congress' likely intent, an intent that is consistent with our
basic values. To speak more technically, I believe that
aliens are subject to paragraph (2)'s bar on release only if
they are detained “when . . . released” from criminal custody.
To speak less technically, I fear that the Court's contrary
interpretation will work serious harm to the principles for
which American law has long stood.
For these reasons, with respect, I dissent.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 443
Appendix A to the opinion of Breyer, J.
APPENDIXES
A
8 U. S. C. § 1226. “Apprehension and detention of aliens
“(a) Arrest, detention, and release
“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien
may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether
the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except
as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the
Attorney General—
“(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
“(2) may release the alien on—
“(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
“(B) conditional parole;
. . . . .
“(c) Detention of criminal aliens
“(1) Custody
“The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien
who—
“(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any
offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,
“(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense
covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or
(D) of this title,
“(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this
title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been
sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or
“(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title
or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,
“when the alien is released, without regard to whether the
alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation,
and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or
imprisoned again for the same offense.
“(2) Release
444 NIELSEN v. PREAP
Appendix B to the opinion of Breyer, J.
“The Attorney General may release an alien described in
paragraph (1) only if the Attorney General decides pursuant
to section 3521 of title 18 that release of the alien from custody
is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential
witness, a person cooperating with an investigation into
major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or
close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating
with such an investigation, and the alien satisfes
the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger
to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to
appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision relating to
such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure
that considers the severity of the offense committed by the
alien.” (Emphasis added.)
B
The following citations support the claims made supra, at
430, regarding the breadth of the Government's reading of the
statute. I do not intend to suggest that these citations provide
a complete description of the many aliens who are detained
without a bail hearing under 8 U. S. C. § 1226(c). See
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 281, 328 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that thousands of aliens are eligible
to be detained under subsection (c), that many are held for
six months or longer, and that “[n]early 40% of those who
have served criminal sentences receive relief from removal”);
Preap v. Johnson, 831 F. 3d 1193, 1197 (CA9 2016) (noting
that one respondent was detained 11 years after his release
from prison); Brief for Advancement Project et al. as Amici
Curiae 12 (presenting data from a recent lawsuit in Massachusetts
indicating that more than one in fve aliens detained
under subsection (c) were taken into custody more than fve
years after their release from prison); § 1226(c)(1)(A) (referencing
§ 1182(a)(2), which includes aliens who have committed
federal or state controlled substance offenses for
which the maximum term of imprisonment exceeds one
year); § 1226(c)(1)(C) (referencing § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which apCite
as: 586 U. S. 392 (2019) 445
Appendix B to the opinion of Breyer, J.
plies to aliens convicted of certain crimes “involving moral
turpitude”); Hashish v. Gonzales, 442 F. 3d 572, 576 (CA7
2006) (illegally downloading music is a crime of “moral turpitude”);
Michel v. INS, 206 F. 3d 253, 261 (CA2 2000) (possessing
stolen bus transfers is a crime of “moral turpitude”);
§ 1226(c)(1)(D) (referencing § 1182(a)(3)(B), which covers the
“spouse or child” of certain aliens engaged in terrorist activity);
§ 1229b (identifying the requirements for obtaining cancellation
of removal).
446 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. et al. v. DEVRIES,
individually and as administratrix of the ESTATE
OF DEVRIES, DECEASED, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 17–1104. Argued October 10, 2018—Decided March 19, 2019
Petitioners produced equipment for three Navy ships. The equipment
required asbestos insulation or asbestos parts to function as intended,
but the manufacturers did not always incorporate the asbestos into their
products. Instead, the manufacturers delivered much of the equipment
to the Navy without asbestos, and the Navy later added the asbestos to
the equipment. Two Navy veterans, Kenneth McAfee and John De-
Vries, were exposed to asbestos on the ships and developed cancer.
They and their wives sued the manufacturers, alleging that the asbestos
exposure caused the cancer and contending that the manufacturers were
negligent in failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos in the integrated
products. Raising the “bare-metal defense,” the manufacturers
argued that they should not be liable for harms caused by later-added
third-party parts. The District Court granted summary judgment to
the manufacturers, but the Third Circuit, adopting a foreseeability approach,
vacated and remanded.
Held: In the maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to
warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is
likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has
no reason to believe that the product's users will realize that danger.
Pp. 451–458.
(a) Tort law imposes a duty to exercise reasonable care on those
whose conduct presents a risk of harm to others. That includes a duty
to warn when the manufacturer “knows or has reason to know” that its
product “is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied”
and “has no reason to believe” that the product's users will realize
that danger. 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388. Three approaches
have emerged on how to apply that “duty to warn” principle
when a manufacturer's product requires later incorporation of a dangerous
part in order for the integrated product to function as intended.
The frst—the foreseeability rule—provides that a manufacturer may
be liable when it was foreseeable that its product would be used with
Cite as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 447
Syllabus
another product or part, even if the manufacturer's product did not require
use or incorporation of that other product or part. The second—
the bare-metal defense—provides that if a manufacturer did not itself
make, sell, or distribute the part or incorporate the part into the product,
the manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by the integrated
product—even if the product required incorporation of the part and the
manufacturer knew that the integrated product was likely to be dangerous
for its intended uses. A third approach, falling between those two,
imposes on the manufacturer a duty to warn when its product requires
incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows or has reason to
know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended
uses.
The third approach is most appropriate for this maritime context.
The foreseeability rule would sweep too broadly, imposing a diffcult
and costly burden on manufacturers, while simultaneously overwarning
users. The bare-metal defense ultimately goes too far in the other direction.
After all, a manufacturer that supplies a product that is dangerous
in and of itself and a manufacturer that supplies a product that
requires incorporation of a part that the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for
its intended uses both “kno[w] or ha[ve] reason to know” that the product
“is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.”
And in the latter case, the product manufacturer will often be in a better
position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the danger, because
the product manufacturer knows the nature of the ultimate integrated
product. Requiring a warning in these circumstances will not impose
a signifcant burden on manufacturers, who already have a duty to warn
of the dangers of their own products. Nor will it result in substantial
uncertainty about when product manufacturers must provide warnings,
because the rule requires a manufacturer to warn only when its product
requires a part in order for the integrated product to function as intended.
And this Court is unaware of any substantial overwarning
problems in those jurisdictions that have adopted the approach taken
here. Requiring the product manufacturer to warn when its product
requires incorporation of a part that makes the integrated product dangerous
for its intended uses is especially appropriate in the context of
maritime law, which has always recognized a “ `special solicitude for the
welfare' ” of sailors. American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U. S.
274, 285. Pp. 451–457.
(b) The maritime tort rule adopted here encompasses all of the following
circumstances, so long as the manufacturer knows or has reason to
know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its in448
AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Syllabus
tended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the
product's users will realize that danger: (i) a manufacturer directs that
the part be incorporated; (ii) a manufacturer itself makes the product
with a part that the manufacturer knows will require replacement with
a similar part; or (iii) a product would be useless without the part.
P. 457.
873 F. 3d 232, affrmed.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined.
Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 458.
Shay Dvoretzky argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Jeffrey R. Johnson, Benjamin M.
Flowers, Christopher G. Conley, Brady L. Green, Christopher
J. Keale, Afgo I. Okpewho-Fadahunsi, and John J.
Hare. Carter G. Phillips, Paul J. Zidlicky, William R.
Levi, Timothy E. Kapshandy, and Tobias S. Loss-Eaton fled
briefs for General Electric as respondent under this Court's
Rule 12.6 in support of petitioners.
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for respondents.
On the brief were Richard P. Myers, Robert E. Paul, Alan
I. Reich, Denyse F. Clancy, Jonathan Ruckdeschel, and William
W. C. Harty.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Jeffrey S. Bucholtz,
Justin A. Torres, and Peter Tolsdorf; for the Coalition for Litigation Justice,
Inc., et al. by Mark A. Behrens, Christopher E. Appel, Karen R.
Harned, and Elizabeth Milito; and for the Product Liability Advisory
Council, Inc., by James M. Beck.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the American
Association for Justice by Jeffrey R. White and Elise Sanguinetti; for
Multiple Veterans Organizations by Christian Hartley; for Port Ministries
International by Michael F. Sturley and Charles S. Siegel; and for Evelyn
Hutchins et al. by Alan Kellman, Lisa Shirley, and Charles W.
Branham III.
Nevin M. Gewertz and Richard A. Epstein, pro se, fled a brief for Richard
A. Epstein et al. as amicus curiae.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 449
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court.
In maritime tort cases, we act as a common-law court, subject
to any controlling statutes enacted by Congress. See
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 507–508 (2008).
This maritime tort case raises a question about the scope
of a manufacturer's duty to warn. The manufacturers here
produced equipment such as pumps, blowers, and turbines
for three Navy ships. The equipment required asbestos insulation
or asbestos parts in order to function as intended.
When used on the ships, the equipment released asbestos
fbers into the air. Two Navy veterans who were exposed to
asbestos on the ships developed cancer and later died. The
veterans' families sued the equipment manufacturers, claiming
that the manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn
of the dangers of asbestos.
The plaintiffs contend that a manufacturer has a duty to
warn when the manufacturer's product requires incorporation
of a part (here, asbestos) that the manufacturer knows
is likely to make the integrated product dangerous for its
intended uses. The manufacturers respond that they had no
duty to warn because they did not themselves incorporate
the asbestos into their equipment; rather, the Navy added
the asbestos to the equipment after the equipment was already
on board the ships.
We agree with the plaintiffs. In the maritime tort context,
a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its
product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know that the integrated product
is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii)
the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product's
users will realize that danger. The District Court did not
apply that test when granting summary judgment to the defendant
manufacturers. Although we do not agree with all
of the reasoning of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, we affrm its judgment requiring the District Court
450 AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Opinion of the Court
to reconsider its prior grants of summary judgment to the
defendant manufacturers.
I
Kenneth McAfee served in the U. S. Navy for more than
20 years. As relevant here, McAfee worked on the U. S. S.
Wanamassa from 1977 to 1980 and then on the U. S. S. Commodore
from 1982 to 1986. John DeVries served in the U. S.
Navy from 1957 to 1960. He worked on the U. S. S. Turner.
Those ships were outftted with equipment such as pumps,
blowers, and turbines. That equipment required asbestos
insulation or asbestos parts in order to function as intended.
When used as intended, that equipment can cause the release
of asbestos fbers into the air. If inhaled or ingested, those
fbers may cause various illnesses.
Five businesses—Air and Liquid Systems, CBS, Foster
Wheeler, Ingersoll Rand, and General Electric—produced
some of the equipment that was used on the ships. Although
the equipment required asbestos insulation or asbestos
parts in order to function as intended, those businesses
did not always incorporate the asbestos into their products.
Instead, the businesses delivered much of the equipment to
the Navy without asbestos. The equipment was delivered
in a condition known as “bare-metal.” In those situations,
the Navy later added the asbestos to the equipment.1
McAfee and DeVries allege that their exposure to the asbestos
caused them to develop cancer. They and their wives
sued the equipment manufacturers in Pennsylvania state
court. (McAfee and DeVries later died during the course of
the ongoing litigation.) The plaintiffs did not sue the Navy
because they apparently believed the Navy was immune.
See Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950). The plaintiffs
also could not recover much from the manufacturers of
1 Sometimes, the equipment manufacturers themselves added the asbestos
to the equipment. Even in those situations, however, the Navy later
replaced the asbestos parts with third-party asbestos parts.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 451
Opinion of the Court
the asbestos insulation and asbestos parts because those
manufacturers had gone bankrupt. As to the manufacturers
of the equipment—such as the pumps, blowers, and turbines—
the plaintiffs claimed that those manufacturers negligently
failed to warn them of the dangers of asbestos in the
integrated products. If the manufacturers had provided
warnings, the workers on the ships presumably could have
worn respiratory masks and thereby avoided the danger.
Invoking federal maritime jurisdiction, the manufacturers
removed the cases to federal court. The manufacturers
then moved for summary judgment on the ground that manufacturers
should not be liable for harms caused by lateradded
third-party parts. That defense is known as the
“bare-metal defense.”
The District Court granted the manufacturers' motions for
summary judgment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit vacated and remanded. In re Asbestos Prods.
Liability Litigation, 873 F. 3d 232, 241 (2017). The Third
Circuit held that “a manufacturer of a bare-metal product
may be held liable for a plaintiff's injuries suffered from
later-added asbestos-containing materials” if the manufacturer
could foresee that the product would be used with the
later-added asbestos-containing materials. Id., at 240.
We granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among
the Courts of Appeals about the validity of the bare-metal
defense under maritime law. 584 U. S. 976 (2018). Compare
873 F. 3d 232 (case below), with Lindstrom v. A-C Prod.
Liability Trust, 424 F. 3d 488 (CA6 2005).
II
Article III of the Constitution grants the federal courts
jurisdiction over maritime cases. Under 28 U. S. C. § 1333,
the federal courts have “original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”
452 AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Opinion of the Court
When a federal court decides a maritime case, it acts as a
federal “common law court,” much as state courts do in state
common-law cases. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U. S., at 507.
Subject to direction from Congress, the federal courts fashion
federal maritime law. See id., at 508, n. 21; Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 27 (1990); United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397, 409 (1975); Detroit
Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U. S. 21, 42–44 (1934).
In formulating federal maritime law, the federal courts may
examine, among other sources, judicial opinions, legislation,
treatises, and scholarly writings. See Exxon Co., U. S. A. v.
Sofec, Inc., 517 U. S. 830, 839 (1996); East River S. S. Corp.
v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 864 (1986).
This is a maritime tort case. The plaintiffs allege that the
defendant equipment manufacturers were negligent in failing
to warn about the dangers of asbestos. “The general
maritime law has recognized the tort of negligence for more
than a century . . . .” Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp. v. Garris, 532 U. S. 811, 820 (2001); see also Kermarec
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 631–
632 (1959). Maritime law has likewise recognized commonlaw
principles of products liability for decades. See East
River S. S. Corp., 476 U. S., at 865.
In this negligence case, we must decide whether a manufacturer
has a duty to warn when the manufacturer's product
requires later incorporation of a dangerous part—here,
asbestos—in order for the integrated product to function as
intended.
We start with basic tort-law principles. Tort law imposes
“a duty to exercise reasonable care” on those whose conduct
presents a risk of harm to others. 1 Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 7, p. 77
(2005). For the manufacturer of a product, the general duty
of care includes a duty to warn when the manufacturer
“knows or has reason to know” that its product “is or is likely
to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied” and the
Cite as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 453
Opinion of the Court
manufacturer “has no reason to believe” that the product's
users will realize that danger. 2 Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 388, p. 301 (1963–1964).
In tort cases, the federal and state courts have not reached
consensus on how to apply that general tort-law “duty to
warn” principle when the manufacturer's product requires
later incorporation of a dangerous part in order for the integrated
product to function as intended. Three approaches
have emerged.
The frst approach is the more plaintiff-friendly foreseeability
rule that the Third Circuit adopted in this case: A
manufacturer may be liable when it was foreseeable that the
manufacturer's product would be used with another product
or part, even if the manufacturer's product did not require
use or incorporation of that other product or part. See, e. g.,
873 F. 3d, at 240; Kochera v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2015 WL
5584749, *4 (SD Ill., Sept. 23, 2015); Chicano v. General Elec.
Co., 2004 WL 2250990, *9 (ED Pa., Oct. 5, 2004); McKenzie
v. A. W. Chesterson Co., 277 Ore. App. 728, 749–750, 373 P. 3d
150, 162 (2016).
The second approach is the more defendant-friendly baremetal
defense that the manufacturers urge here: If a manufacturer
did not itself make, sell, or distribute the part or
incorporate the part into the product, the manufacturer is
not liable for harm caused by the integrated product—even
if the product required incorporation of the part and the
manufacturer knew that the integrated product was likely to
be dangerous for its intended uses. See, e. g., Lindstrom,
424 F. 3d, at 492, 495–497; Evans v. CBS Corp., 230 F. Supp.
3d 397, 403–405 (Del. 2017); Cabasug v. Crane Co., 989 F.
Supp. 2d 1027, 1041 (Haw. 2013).
The third approach falls between those two approaches.
Under the third approach, foreseeability that the product
may be used with another product or part that is likely to
be dangerous is not enough to trigger a duty to warn. But
a manufacturer does have a duty to warn when its product
454 AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Opinion of the Court
requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer knows
or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely
to be dangerous for its intended uses. Under that approach,
the manufacturer may be liable even when the manufacturer
does not itself incorporate the required part into the product.
See, e. g., Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d
760, 769–770 (ND Ill. 2014); In re New York City Asbestos
Litigation, 27 N. Y. 3d 765, 793–794, 59 N. E. 3d 458, 474
(2016); May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 446 Md. 1, 29,
129 A. 3d 984, 1000 (2015).
We conclude that the third approach is the most appropriate
for this maritime tort context.
To begin, we agree with the manufacturers that a rule of
mere foreseeability would sweep too broadly. See generally
1 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm § 7, Comment j, at 82; 2 Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 395, Comment j, at 330. Many products can
foreseeably be used in numerous ways with numerous other
products and parts. Requiring a product manufacturer to
imagine and warn about all of those possible uses—with massive
liability looming for failure to correctly predict how its
product might be used with other products or parts—would
impose a diffcult and costly burden on manufacturers, while
simultaneously overwarning users. In light of that uncertainty
and unfairness, we reject the foreseeability approach
for this maritime context.
That said, we agree with the plaintiffs that the bare-metal
defense ultimately goes too far in the other direction. In
urging the bare-metal defense, the manufacturers contend
that a business generally has “no duty” to “control the conduct
of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical
harm to another.” Id., § 315, at 122. That is true,
but it is also beside the point here. After all, when a manufacturer's
product is dangerous in and of itself, the manufacturer
“knows or has reason to know” that the product “is or
is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.”
Cite as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 455
Opinion of the Court
Id., § 388, at 301. The same holds true, we conclude, when
the manufacturer's product requires incorporation of a part
that the manufacturer knows or has reason to know is likely
to make the integrated product dangerous for its intended
uses. As a matter of maritime tort law, we fnd no persuasive
reason to distinguish those two similar situations for
purposes of a manufacturer's duty to warn. See Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, Comment i,
p. 30 (1997) (“[W]arnings also may be needed to inform users
and consumers of nonobvious and not generally known risks
that unavoidably inhere in using or consuming the product”).
Importantly, the product manufacturer will often be in a
better position than the parts manufacturer to warn of the
danger from the integrated product. See generally G. Calabresi,
The Costs of Accidents 311–318 (1970). The product
manufacturer knows the nature of the ultimate integrated
product and is typically more aware of the risks associated
with that integrated product. By contrast, a parts manufacturer
may be aware only that its part could conceivably be
used in any number of ways in any number of products. A
parts manufacturer may not always be aware that its part
will be used in a way that poses a risk of danger.2
To be sure, as the manufacturers correctly point out, issuing
a warning costs time and money. But the burden usually
is not signifcant. Manufacturers already have a duty
to warn of the dangers of their own products. That duty
typically imposes a light burden on manufacturers. See,
e. g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F. 2d 121, 131 (CA9
1968); Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F. 2d 623, 625–
626 (CA2 1961); Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P. 2d 1076, 1079
(Alaska 1986); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543–544,
332 A. 2d 11, 15 (1975). Requiring a manufacturer to also
warn when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know
that a required later-added part is likely to make the inte-
2 We do not rule out the possibility that, in certain circumstances, the
parts manufacturer may also have a duty to warn.
456 AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Opinion of the Court
grated product dangerous for its intended uses should not
meaningfully add to that burden.
The manufacturers also contend that requiring a warning
even when they have not themselves incorporated the part
into the product will lead to uncertainty about when product
manufacturers must provide warnings. But the manufacturers
have not pointed to any substantial confusion in those
jurisdictions that have adopted this approach. And the rule
that we adopt here is tightly cabined. The rule does not
require that manufacturers warn in cases of mere foreseeability.
The rule requires that manufacturers warn only
when their product requires a part in order for the integrated
product to function as intended.
The manufacturers further assert that requiring a warning
in these circumstances will lead to excessive warning of
consumers. Again, however, we are not aware of substantial
overwarning problems in those jurisdictions that have
adopted this approach. And because the rule we adopt here
applies only in certain narrow circumstances, it will not require
a plethora of new warnings.
Requiring the product manufacturer to warn when its
product requires incorporation of a part that makes the integrated
product dangerous for its intended uses—and not just
when the manufacturer itself incorporates the part into the
product—is especially appropriate in the maritime context.
Maritime law has always recognized a “special solicitude for
the welfare” of those who undertake to “venture upon hazardous
and unpredictable sea voyages.” American Export
Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U. S. 274, 285 (1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The plaintiffs in this case are the families
of veterans who served in the U. S. Navy. Maritime
law's longstanding solicitude for sailors reinforces our decision
to require a warning in these circumstances. See Yamaha
Motor Corp., U. S. A. v. Calhoun, 516 U. S. 199, 213
(1996); Miles, 498 U. S., at 36; Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375, 387 (1970).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 457
Opinion of the Court
For those reasons, we conclude as follows: In the maritime
tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn
when (i) its product requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the integrated
product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses,
and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the
product's users will realize that danger. We do not purport
to defne the proper tort rule outside of the maritime
context.
One fnal point for clarity: Courts have determined that
this rule applies in certain related situations, including when:
(i) a manufacturer directs that the part be incorporated, see,
e. g., Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 2016 WL 5780104,
*6–*7 (ED La., Oct. 4, 2016); (ii) a manufacturer itself makes
the product with a part that the manufacturer knows will
require replacement with a similar part, see, e. g., Chesher v.
3M Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 693, 713–714 (SC 2017); Quirin, 17
F. Supp. 3d, at 769–770; May, 446 Md., at 29, 129 A. 3d, at
1000; or (iii) a product would be useless without the part,
see, e. g., In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 27 N. Y.
3d, at 793–794, 59 N. E. 3d, at 474. In all of those situations,
courts have said that the product in effect requires the part
in order for the integrated product to function as intended.
We agree. The maritime tort rule we adopt today therefore
encompasses those situations, so long as the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is
likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer
has no reason to believe that the product's users will
realize that danger.
* * *
In the maritime tort context, we hold that a product manufacturer
has a duty to warn when (i) its product requires
incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be
dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer
has no reason to believe that the product's users will realize
458 AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
that danger. The District Court should evaluate the evidence
under that rule. Although we do not agree with all
of the reasoning of the Third Circuit, we affrm its judgment
requiring the District Court to reconsider its prior grants of
summary judgment to the defendant manufacturers.
It is so ordered.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice
Alito join, dissenting.
Decades ago, many of the defendants before us sold “bare
metal” products to the Navy. Things like the turbines used
to propel its ships. Did these manufacturers have to warn
users about the dangers of asbestos that someone else later
chose to add to or wrap around their products as insulation?
Start with a couple of things we can all agree on. First,
everyone accepts that, under traditional tort principles, the
manufacturers who actually supplied the later-added asbestos
had to warn about its known dangers. Second, everyone
agrees that the court of appeals erred when it came to analyzing
the duties of the bare metal defendants. The court
of appeals held that the bare metal manufacturers had a duty
to warn because they could have “foreseen” the possibility
that others would later use asbestos in conjunction with their
products. Today, the Court rightly rejects this “foreseeability”
standard, succinctly explaining that “[r]equiring a product
manufacturer to imagine and warn about all of those possible
uses—with massive liability looming for failure to
correctly predict how its product might be used with other
products or parts—would impose a diffcult and costly burden
on manufacturers, while simultaneously overwarning
users.” Ante, at 454.
Our disagreement arises only in what comes next. Immediately
after rejecting the court of appeals' approach, the
Court proceeds to devise its own way of holding the bare
metal manufacturers responsible for later-added asbestos.
In the Court's judgment, the bare metal defendants had a
Cite as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 459
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos introduced by
others so long as they (i) produced a product that “require[d]
incorporation of ” asbestos, (ii) “kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to
know” that the “integrated product” would be dangerous,
and (iii) had “no reason to believe” that users would realize
that danger. Ante, at 457. The Court's new three-part
standard surely represents an improvement over the court
of appeals' unadorned “foreseeability” offering. But, respectfully,
it seems to me to suffer from many of the same
defects the Court itself has identifed.
In the frst place, neither of these standards enjoys meaningful
roots in the common law. The common law has long
taught that a manufacturer has no “duty to warn or instruct
about another manufacturer's products, though those products
might be used in connection with the manufacturer's
own products.” Firestone Steel Prods. Co. v. Barajas, 927
S. W. 2d 608, 616 (Tex. 1996). Instead, “the manufacturer's
duty is restricted to warnings based on the characteristics
of the manufacturer's own product.” Powell v. Standard
Brands Paint Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 357, 364, 212 Cal. Rptr.
395, 398 (1985).1 It doesn't matter, either, whether a manu-
1 See also, e. g., Dreyer v. Exel Industries, S. A., 326 Fed. Appx. 353,
357–358 (CA6 2009); Barnes v. Kerr Corp., 418 F. 3d 583, 590 (CA6 2005);
Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F. 2d 465, 472 (CA11 1993);
Baughman v. General Motors Corp., 780 F. 2d 1131, 1133 (CA4 1986); In re
Deep Vein Thrombosis, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1068 (ND Cal. 2005); Acoba
v. General Tire, Inc., 92 Haw. 1, 18, 986 P. 2d 288, 305 (1999); Brown v.
Drake-Willock Int'l, Ltd., 209 Mich. App. 136, 144–146, 530 N. W. 2d 510,
514–515 (1995); Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N. Y. 2d 289,
297–298, 591 N. E. 2d 222, 225–226 (1992); Walton v. Harnischfeger, 796
S. W. 2d 225, 226 (Tex. App. 1990); Toth v. Economy Forms Corp., 391 Pa.
Super. 383, 388–389, 571 A. 2d 420, 423 (1990); Mitchell v. Sky Climber,
Inc., 396 Mass. 629, 631–632, 487 N. E. 2d 1374, 1376 (1986); Johnson v.
Jones-Blair Paint Co., 607 S. W. 2d 305, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); 63A
Am. Jur. 2d, Products Liability § 1027, p. 247 (2010); Behrens & Horn,
Liability for Asbestos-Containing Connected or Replacement Parts Made
by Third-Parties: Courts Are Properly Rejecting This Form of Guilt by
Association, 37 Am. J. Trial Advocacy 489, 494–497 (2014).
460 AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
facturer's product happens to be (or is designed to be) “integrated”
with another's. Instead, it is black-letter law that
the supplier of a product generally must warn about only
those risks associated with the product itself, not those associated
with the “products and systems into which [it later
may be] integrated.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability § 5, Comment b, p. 132 (1997).2
More than that, the traditional common law rule still
makes the most sense today. The manufacturer of a product
is in the best position to understand and warn users about
its risks; in the language of law and economics, those who
make products are generally the least-cost avoiders of their
risks. By placing the duty to warn on a product's manufacturer,
we force it to internalize the full cost of any injuries
caused by inadequate warnings—and in that way ensure it
is fully incentivized to provide adequate warnings. By contrast,
we dilute the incentive of a manufacturer to warn
about the dangers of its products when we require other people
to share the duty to warn and its corresponding costs.
See S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 17 (1987);
G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 135, and n. 1 (1970);
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring
Co., 376 U. S. 315, 324 (1964).3
2 See, e. g., Cipollone v. Yale Indus. Prods., Inc., 202 F. 3d 376, 379 (CA1
2000); Crossfeld v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F. 3d 701, 703–704 (CA8
1993); Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., 888 F. 2d 45, 48–49 (CA6 1989); Koonce
v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F. 2d 700, 715 (CA5 1986).
3 See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 5, Comment
a, p. 131 (1997) (“If the component is not itself defective, it would be unjust
and ineffcient to impose liability solely on the ground” that others “utiliz[
e] the component in a manner that renders the integrated product defective”);
Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc., 50 F. 3d 484, 490 (CA7 1995) (placing
liability on a defendant who is not “in the best position to prevent a particular
class of accidents” may “dilute the incentives of other potential defendants”
who should be the frst “line of defense”); National Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Riggs Nat. Bank of Washington, D. C., 5 F. 3d
554, 557 (CADC 1993) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“Placing liability with
the least-cost avoider increases the incentive for that party to adopt preCite
as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 461
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
The traditional common law rule better accords, too, with
consumer expectations. A home chef who buys a butcher's
knife may expect to read warnings about the dangers of
knives but not about the dangers of undercooked meat.
Likewise, a purchaser of gasoline may expect to see warnings
at the pump about its fammability but not about the
dangers of recklessly driving a car. As the Court today recognizes,
encouraging manufacturers to offer warnings about
other people's products risks long, duplicative, fne print, and
conficting warnings that will leave consumers less sure
about which to take seriously and more likely to disregard
them all. In the words of the California Supreme Court,
consumer welfare is not well “served by requiring manufacturers
to warn about the dangerous propensities of products
they do not design, make, or sell.” O'Neil v. Crane Co., 53
Cal. 4th 335, 343, 266 P. 3d 987, 991 (2012); see also Cotton v.
Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F. 2d 935, 938 (CADC 1988)
(“The inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every
other item. Given short attention spans, items crowd each
other out; they get lost in fne print”).
The traditional tort rule bears yet another virtue: It is
simple to apply. The traditional rule affords manufacturers
fair notice of their legal duties, lets injured consumers know
whom to sue, and ensures courts will treat like cases alike.
By contrast, when liability depends on the application of
opaque or multifactor standards like the one proposed below
or the one announced today, “equality of treatment” becomes
harder to ensure across cases; “predictability is destroyed”
for innovators, investors, and consumers alike; and “judicial
courage is impaired” as the ability (and temptation) to ft the
law to the case, rather than the case to the law, grows.
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1175, 1182 (1989).
ventive measures” that will “have the greatest marginal effect on preventing
the loss”).
462 AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Just consider some of the uncertainties each part of the
Court's new three-part test is sure to invite:
(i) When does a customer's side-by-side use of two products
qualify as “incorporation” of the products? Does
hanging asbestos on the outside of a boiler count, or
must asbestos be placed inside a product? And when is
incorporation of a dangerous third-party product “required”
as opposed to just optimal or preferred? What
if a potential substitute existed, but it was less effective
or more costly (surely alternatives to asbestos insulation
have existed for a long time)? And what if the thirdparty
product becomes less advantageous over time due
to advancing technology (as asbestos did)? When does
the defendant's duty to warn end?
(ii) What will qualify as an “integrated product”? In
the past, we've suggested that a “product” is whatever
assemblage of parts is “placed in the stream of commerce
by the manufacturer,” and we've stressed the importance
of maintaining the “distinction between the
components added to a product by a manufacturer before
the product's sale . . . and those items added” later
by someone else. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac
& Co., 520 U. S. 875, 883–884 (1997). The Court's
new standard blurs that distinction, but it is unclear how
far it goes. The Court suggests a turbine and separately
installed insulation may now qualify as a single
“integrated product.” But what about other parts connected
to the turbine? Does even the propeller qualify
as part of the fnal “integrated product” too, so that its
manufacturer also bears a duty to warn about the dangers
of asbestos hung around the turbine? For that
matter, why isn't the entire ship an “integrated product,”
with a corresponding duty for all the manufacturers
who contributed parts to warn about the dangers of
all the other parts? And when exactly is a manufacturer
supposed to “know or have reason to know” that
Cite as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 463
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
some supplement to its product has now made a resulting
“integrated product” dangerous? How much cost
and effort must manufacturers expend to discover and
understand the risks associated with third-party products
others may be “incorporating” with their products?
(iii) If a defendant reasonably expects that the manufacturer
of a third-party product will comply with its own
duty to warn, is that suffcient “reason to believe” that
users will “realize” the danger to absolve the defendant
of responsibility? Or does a defendant have to assume
that the third-party manufacturer will behave negligently
in rendering its own warnings? Or that users
won't bother to read the warnings others offer? And
what if the defendants here understood that the Navy
itself would warn sailors about the need for proper handling
of asbestos—did they still have to provide their
own warnings? 4
Headscratchers like these are sure to enrich lawyers and entertain
law students, but they also promise to leave everyone
else wondering about their legal duties, rights, and liabilities.
Nor is this kind of uncertainty costless. Consider what
might follow if the Court's standard were widely adopted in
tort law. Would a company that sells smartphone cases
have to warn about the risk of exposure to cell phone radiation?
Would a car maker have to warn about the risks of
improperly stored antifreeze? Would a manufacturer of
fashlights have to warn about the risks associated with leaking
batteries? Would a seller of hot dog buns have to warn
about the health risks of consuming processed meat? Just
the threat of litigation and liability would force many manufacturers
of safe products to spend time and money educat-
4 See App. 40 (affdavit of retired Rear Admiral Roger B. Horne stating
that “the Navy chose to control and make personnel aware of the hazards
of asbestos exposures through . . . military specifcations and personnel
training”).
464 AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORP. v. DeVRIES
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
ing themselves and writing warnings about the dangers of
other people's more dangerous products. All this would, as
well, threaten to leave consumers worse off. After all, when
we effectively require manufacturers of safe products to subsidize
those who make more dangerous items, we promise to
raise the price and restrict the output of socially productive
products. Tort law is supposed to be about aligning liability
with responsibility, not mandating a social insurance policy
in which everyone must pay for everyone else's mistakes.
Finally and relatedly, the Court's new standard implicates
the same sort of fair notice problem that the court of appeals'
standard did. Decades ago, the bare metal defendants
produced their lawful products and provided all the warnings
the law required. Now, they are at risk of being held responsible
retrospectively for failing to warn about other people's
products. It is a duty they could not have anticipated
then and one they cannot discharge now. They can only pay.
Of course, that may be the point. In deviating from the traditional
common law rule, the Court may be motivated by
the unfortunate facts of this particular case, where the sailors'
widows appear to have a limited prospect of recovery
from the companies that supplied the asbestos (they've gone
bankrupt) and from the Navy that allegedly directed the use
of asbestos (it's likely immune under our precedents). Ante,
at 450–451. The bare metal defendants may be among the
only solvent potential defendants left. But how were they
supposed to anticipate many decades ago the novel duty to
warn placed on them today? People should be able to fnd
the law in the books; they should not fnd the law coming
upon them out of nowhere.
Still, there's a silver lining here. In announcing its new
standard, the Court expressly states that it does “not purport
to defne the proper tort rule outside of the maritime
context.” Ante, at 457. Indeed, the Court acknowledges
that it has created its new standard in part because of the
“solicitude for sailors” that is a unique feature of our mariCite
as: 586 U. S. 446 (2019) 465
Gorsuch, J., dissenting
time jurisdiction. Ante, at 456. All of this means, of
course, that nothing in today's opinion compels courts operating
outside the maritime context to apply the test announced
today. In other tort cases, courts remain free to use the
more sensible and historically proven common law rule.
And given that, “unlike state courts, we have little . . . experience
in the development of new common-law rules of tort,”
Saratoga, 520 U. S., at 886 (Scalia, J., dissenting), that is a
liberty they may be wise to exercise.5
5 As the Court notes, some of the defendants sold the Navy products
that were not “bare metal” but contained asbestos at the time of sale.
Ante, at 450, n. 1. We can all agree that those defendants had a duty to
warn users about the known dangers of asbestos. And there's a colorable
argument that their responsibility didn't end when the Navy, as part of
routine upkeep, swapped out the original asbestos parts for replacements
supplied by others. Under traditional tort principles, the seller of a defective,
“unreasonably dangerous” product may be liable to an injured user
if the product “is expected to and does reach the user . . . without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.” 2 Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A(1)(b), pp. 347–348 (1963–1964). And replacing wornout
parts every now and then with equivalently dangerous third-party parts
may not qualify as a “substantial change” if the replacement part does “no
more than perpetuate” problems latent in the original. Sage v. Fairchild-
Swearingen Corp., 70 N. Y. 2d 579, 584–587, 517 N. E. 2d 1304, 1306–1308
(1987); see, e. g., Whelan v. Armstrong Int'l Inc., 455 N. J. Super. 569, 597–
598, 190 A. 3d 1090, 1106–1107 (App. Div. 2018). Of course, the defendants'
original failure to warn might not be the legal cause of any harm if
the use of the replacement part was unforeseeable, or if an intervening
action severed the connection between the original sale and the injurious
use. For example, if the replacement part itself posed the danger—or if,
by the time the original part wore out, safer alternatives had become
available. The Court's new standard, however, does not address these
defendants separately, but focuses on the bare metal defendants.
466 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 17–1307. Argued January 7, 2019—Decided March 20, 2019
Law frm McCarthy & Holthus LLP was hired to carry out a nonjudicial
foreclosure on a Colorado home owned by petitioner Dennis Obduskey.
McCarthy sent Obduskey correspondence related to the foreclosure.
Obduskey responded with a letter invoking a federal Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA or Act) provision, 15 U. S. C. § 1692g(b),
which provides that if a consumer disputes the amount of a debt, a “debt
collector” must “cease collection” until it “obtains verifcation of the
debt” and mails a copy to the debtor. Instead, McCarthy initiated a
nonjudicial foreclosure action. Obduskey sued, alleging that McCarthy
failed to comply with the FDCPA's verifcation procedure. The District
Court dismissed on the ground that McCarthy was not a “debt collector”
within the meaning of the FDCPA, and the Tenth Circuit affrmed.
Held: A business engaged in no more than nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings
is not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, except for the limited
purpose of § 1692f(6). Pp. 473–481.
(a) The FDCPA regulates “ `debt collector[s].' ” § 1692a(6). Relevant
here, the defnition of debt collector has two parts. The Act frst
sets out the primary defnition of the term “debt collector”: A “ `debt
collector,' ” it says, is “any person . . . in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.” Ibid. The Act
then sets forth the limited-purpose defnition, which states that “[f]or
the purpose of section 1692f(6) . . . [the] term [debt collector] also includes
any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is
the enforcement of security interests.” It is undisputed that McCarthy
is, by virtue of its role enforcing security interests, at least subject to
the specifc prohibitions contained in § 1692f(6). But only if McCarthy
falls within the primary defnition's scope do the Act's other provisions,
including those at issue here, apply. Pp. 473–474.
(b) Three considerations lead to the conclusion that McCarthy is not
subject to the Act's main coverage. First, and most decisive, is the text
of the Act itself. The limited-purpose defnition says that “[f]or the
purpose of section 1692f(6)” a debt collector “also includes” a business,
like McCarthy, “the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of
security interests.” § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). This phrase, particuCite
as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 467
Syllabus
larly the word “also,” strongly suggests that security-interest enforcers
do not fall within the scope of the primary defnition. If they did, the
limited-purpose defnition would be superfuous. By contrast, under a
reading that gives effect to every word of the limited-purpose defnition,
the FDCPA's debt-collector-related prohibitions (with the exception of
§ 1692f(6)) do not apply to those who, like McCarthy, are engaged in no
more than security-interest enforcement. Second, Congress may well
have chosen to treat security-interest enforcement differently from ordinary
debt collection in order to avoid conficts with state nonjudicial
foreclosure schemes. Third, this Court's reading is supported by legislative
history, which suggests that the Act's present language was the
product of a compromise between competing versions of the bill, one
which would have totally excluded security-interest enforcement from
the Act, and another which would have treated it like ordinary debt
collection. Pp. 474–477.
(c) Obduskey's counterarguments are unconvincing. First, he suggests
that the limited-purpose defnition is not superfuous because it
was meant to cover “repo men”—a category of security-interest enforcers
who he says would not otherwise fall within the primary defnition
of “debt collector. ” The limited-purpose definition, however,
speaks broadly of “the enforcement of security interests,” § 1692a(6), not
“the enforcement of security interests in personal property.” Second,
Obduskey claims that the Act's venue provision, § 1692i(a), which covers
legal actions brought by “debt collectors” to enforce interests in real
property, only makes sense if those who enforce security interests in
real property are debt collectors subject to all prohibitions and requirements
that come with that designation. The venue provision, however,
does nothing to alter the defnition of a debt collector. Third, Obduskey
argues that McCarthy engaged in more than security-interest enforcement
by sending notices that any ordinary homeowner would understand
as an attempt to collect a debt. Here, however, the notices sent
by McCarthy were antecedent steps required under state law to enforce
a security interest, and the Act's (partial) exclusion of “the enforcement
of security interests” must also exclude the legal means required to
do so. Finally, Obduskey fears that this Court's decision will permit
creditors and their agents to engage in a host of abusive practices forbidden
by the Act. But the Court must enforce the statute that Congress
enacted, and Congress is free to expand the FDCPA's reach if it wishes.
Pp. 477–481.
879 F. 3d 1216, affrmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor,
J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 481.
468 OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Opinion of the Court
Daniel L. Geyser argued the cause and fled briefs for
petitioner.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Masha G. Hansford, Joel S. Johnson,
Thomas J. Holthus, Matthew E. Podmenik, and Holly
R. Shilliday.
Jonathan C. Bond argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging affrmance. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Francisco, Deputy Solicitor General
Wall, Steven Y. Bressler, and Nandan M. Joshi.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act regulates “ `debt
collector[s].' ” 15 U. S. C. § 1692a(6); see 91 Stat. 874, 15
U. S. C. § 1692 et seq. A “ `debt collector,' ” the Act says, is
“any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts. ”
§ 1692a(6). This defnition, however, goes on to say that
“[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6)” (a separate provision
of the Act), “[the] term [debt collector] also includes any per-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Members of Congress
by Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Ashwin P. Phatak;
for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Sherrilyn A.
Ifll, Janai S. Nelson, and Samuel Spital; and for the National Consumer
Law Center by Stuart Rossman.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Colorado Mortgage
Lenders Association by Deanne R. Stodden and Elizabeth S. Marcus;
for the Commercial Law League of America by Stephen W. Sather; for
Legal League 100 by Michelle G. Gilbert; for the Michigan Creditors Bar
Association by Kathleen H. Klaus and Jesse L. Roth; for Mortgage Bankers
Association et al. by Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, Daniel
E. Jones, Matthew A. Waring, Thomas Pinder, Daryl Joseffer, and
Kevin Carroll; for National Creditors Bar Association by Tomio B. Narita
and Jeffrey A. Topor; for United Trustees Association et al. by Dean T.
Kirby, Jr., Martin T. McGuinn, and Michael R. Pfeifer; and for USFN–
America's Mortgage Banking Attorneys by Richard P. Haber, Christopher
J. Picard, and Robert J. Wichowski.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 469
Opinion of the Court
son . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the
enforcement of security interests.” Ibid.
The question before us concerns this last sentence. Does
it mean that one principally involved in “the enforcement of
security interests” is not a debt collector (except “[f]or the
purpose of section 1692f(6)”)? If so, numerous other provisions
of the Act do not apply. Or does it simply reinforce
the fact that those principally involved in the enforcement of
security interests are subject to § 1692f(6) in addition to the
Act's other provisions?
In our view, the last sentence does (with its § 1692f(6) exception)
place those whose “principal purpose . . . is the enforcement
of security interests” outside the scope of the
primary “debt collector” defnition, § 1692a(6), where the
business is engaged in no more than the kind of securityinterest
enforcement at issue here—nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings.
I
A
When a person buys a home, he or she usually borrows
money from a lending institution, such as a bank. The resulting
debt is backed up by a “mortgage”—a security interest
in the property designed to protect the creditor's investment.
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 1.1
(1996) (Restatement). (In some States, this security interest
is known as a “deed of trust,” though for present purposes
the difference is immaterial. See generally ibid.)
The loan likely requires the homeowner to make monthly
payments. And if the homeowner defaults, the mortgage
entitles the creditor to pursue foreclosure, which is “the
process in which property securing a mortgage is sold to pay
off the loan balance due.” 2 B. Dunaway, Law of Distressed
Real Estate § 15:1 (2018) (Dunaway).
Every State provides some form of judicial foreclosure: a
legal action initiated by a creditor in which a court super470
OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Opinion of the Court
vises sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds.
Id., § 16:1. These procedures offer various protections for
homeowners, such as the right to notice and to protest the
amount a creditor says is owed. Id., §§ 16:17, 16:20; Restatement
§ 8.2. And in the event that the foreclosure sale does not
yield the full amount due, a creditor pursuing a judicial foreclosure
may sometimes obtain a defciency judgment, that is,
a judgment against the homeowner for the unpaid balance of
a debt. J. Rao, T. Twomey, G. Walsh, & O. Williamson, National
Consumer Law Center (NCLC), Foreclosures and
Mortgage Servicing §§ 12.3.1–2 (5th ed. 2014).
About half the States also provide for what is known as
nonjudicial foreclosure, where notice to the parties and sale
of the property occur outside court supervision. 2 Dunaway
§ 17:1. Under Colorado's form of nonjudicial foreclosure, at
issue here, a creditor (or more likely its agent) must frst
mail the homeowner certain preliminary information, including
the telephone number for the Colorado foreclosure hotline.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38–38–102.5(2) (2018). Thirty days
later, the creditor may fle a “notice of election and demand”
with a state offcial called a “public trustee.” § 38–38–101.
The public trustee records this notice and mails a copy,
alongside other materials, to the homeowner. §§ 38–38–102,
38–38–103. These materials give the homeowner information
about the balance of the loan, the homeowner's right to
cure the default, and the time and place of the foreclosure
sale. §§ 38–38–101(4), 38–38–103. Assuming the debtor
does not cure the default or declare bankruptcy, the creditor
may then seek an order from a state court authorizing the
sale. Colo. Rule Civ. Proc. 120 (2018); see Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 38–38–105. (Given this measure of court involvement, Colorado's
“nonjudicial” foreclosure process is something of a
hybrid, though no party claims these features transform Colorado's
nonjudicial scheme into a judicial one.) In court, the
homeowner may contest the creditor's right to sell the property,
and a hearing will be held to determine whether the
sale should go forward. Colo. Rules Civ. Proc. 120(c), (d).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 471
Opinion of the Court
If the court gives its approval, the public trustee may then
sell the property at a public auction, though a homeowner
may avoid a sale altogether by curing the default up until
noon on the day before. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38–38–110, 38–
38–104(VI)(b). If the sale goes forward and the house sells
for more than the amount owed, any profts go frst to lienholders
and then to the homeowner. § 38–38–111. If the
house sells for less than what is owed, the creditor cannot
hold the homeowner liable for the balance due unless it fles
a separate action in court and obtains a defciency judgment.
See § 38–38–106(6); Bank of America v. Kosovich, 878 P. 2d
65, 66 (Colo. App. 1994). Other States likewise prevent
creditors from obtaining defciency judgments in nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings. Restatement § 8.2. And in some
States, pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure bars or curtails a
creditor's ability to obtain a defciency judgment altogether.
Rao, NCLC, Foreclosures and Mortgage Servicing § 12.3.2.
B
In 2007, petitioner Dennis Obduskey bought a home in Colorado
with a $329,940 loan secured by the property. About
two years later, Obduskey defaulted.
In 2014, Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., hired a law frm,
McCarthy & Holthus LLP, the respondent here, to act as
its agent in carrying out a nonjudicial foreclosure. According
to the complaint, McCarthy frst mailed Obduskey a
letter that said it had been “instructed to commence foreclosure”
against the property, disclosed the amount outstanding
on the loan, and identifed the creditor, Wells Fargo.
App. 37–38; see id., at 23. The letter purported to provide
notice “[p]ursuant to, and in compliance with,” both
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or Act)
and Colorado law. Id., at 37. (The parties seem not
to dispute that this and other correspondence from Mc-
Carthy was required under state law. Because that is
a question of Colorado law not briefed by the parties before
us nor passed on by the courts below, we proceed along
472 OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Opinion of the Court
the same assumption.) Obduskey responded with a letter
invoking § 1692g(b) of the FDCPA, which provides that if a
consumer disputes the amount of a debt, a “debt collector”
must “cease collection” until it “obtains verifcation of the
debt” and mails a copy to the debtor.
Yet, Obduskey alleges, McCarthy neither ceased collecting
on the debt nor provided verifcation. App. 22–23. Instead,
the frm initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure action by
fling a notice of election and demand with the county public
trustee. Ibid.; see id., at 39–41. The notice stated the
amount due and advised that the public trustee would “sell
[the] property for the purpose of paying the indebtedness.”
Id., at 40.
Obduskey then fled a lawsuit in federal court alleging that
the frm had violated the FDCPA by, among other things,
failing to comply with the verifcation procedure. Id., at 29.
The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the
law frm was not a “debt collector” within the meaning
of the Act, so the relevant Act requirements did not apply.
Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 2016 WL 4091174, *3 (D Colo.,
July 19, 2016).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affrmed
the dismissal, concluding that the “mere act of enforcing
a security interest through a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding
does not fall under” the Act. Obduskey v. Wells
Fargo, 879 F. 3d 1216, 1223 (2018).
Obduskey then petitioned for certiorari. In light of different
views among the Circuits about application of the
FDCPA to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, we granted
the petition. Compare ibid. and Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v.
ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F. 3d 568, 573 (CA9 2016) (holding
that an entity whose only role is the enforcement of security
interests is not a debt collector under the Act), with Kaymark
v. Bank of America, N. A., 783 F. 3d 168, 179 (CA3
2015) (holding that such an entity is a debt collector for the
purpose of all the Act's requirements), Glazer v. Chase Home
Cite as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 473
Opinion of the Court
Finance LLC, 704 F. 3d 453, 461 (CA6 2013) (same), and Wilson
v. Draper & Goldberg, P. L. L. C., 443 F. 3d 373, 376 (CA4
2006) (same).
II
A
The FDCPA's defnitional section, 15 U. S. C. § 1692a, defnes
a “debt” as
“any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to
pay money arising out of a transaction in which the
money, property, insurance, or services which are the
subject of the transaction are primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.” § 1692a(5) (emphasis
added).
The Act then sets out the defnition of the term “debt collector.”
§ 1692a(6). The frst sentence of the relevant paragraph,
which we shall call the primary defnition, says that
the term “debt collector”
“means any person . . . in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another.” Ibid.
The third sentence, however, provides what we shall call
the limited-purpose defnition:
“For the purpose of section 1692f(6) [the] term [debt collector]
also includes any person . . . in any business the
principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security
interests.” Ibid.
The subsection to which the limited-purpose defnition refers,
§ 1692f(6), prohibits a “debt collector” from
“[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action
to effect dispossession or disablement of property if—
474 OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Opinion of the Court
“(A) there is no present right to possession of the
property . . . ;
“(B) there is no present intention to take possession
of the property; or
“(C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession
or disablement.”
The rest of the Act imposes myriad other requirements on
debt collectors. For example, debt collectors may not use or
threaten violence, or make repetitive annoying phone calls.
§ 1692d. Nor can debt collectors make false, deceptive, or
misleading representations in connection with a debt, like
misstating a debt's “character, amount, or legal status.”
§ 1692e. And, as we have mentioned, if a consumer disputes
the amount of a debt, a debt collector must “cease collection”
until it “obtains verifcation of the debt” and mails a copy to
the debtor. § 1692g(b).
No one here disputes that McCarthy is, by virtue of its role
enforcing security interests, at least subject to the specifc
prohibitions contained in § 1692f(6). The question is
whether other provisions of the Act apply. And they do if,
but only if, McCarthy falls within the scope of the Act's primary
defnition of “debt collector.”
B
Three considerations lead us to conclude that McCarthy is
not subject to the main coverage of the Act.
First, and most decisive, is the text of the Act itself. As
a preliminary matter, we concede that if the FDCPA contained
only the primary defnition, a business engaged in
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings would qualify as a debt
collector for all purposes. We have explained that a home
loan is an obligation to pay money, and the purpose of a mortgage
is to secure that obligation. See supra, at 469. Foreclosure,
in turn, is “the process in which property securing
a mortgage is sold to pay off the loan balance due.” 2 Dunaway
§ 15:1. In other words, foreclosure is a means of collectCite
as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 475
Opinion of the Court
ing a debt. And a business pursuing nonjudicial foreclosures
would, under the capacious language of the Act's
primary defnition, be one that “regularly collects or attempts
to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.” § 1692a(6).
It is true that, as McCarthy points out, nonjudicial foreclosure
does not seek “a payment of money from the debtor”
but rather from sale of the property itself. Brief for Respondent
17 (emphasis added). But nothing in the primary
defnition requires that payment on a debt come “from a
debtor.” The statute speaks simply of the “collection of any
debts . . . owed or due.” § 1692a(6). Moreover, the provision
sweeps in both “direc[t]” and “indirec[t]” debt collection.
Ibid. So, even if nonjudicial foreclosure were not a direct
attempt to collect a debt, because it aims to collect on a consumer's
obligation by way of enforcing a security interest, it
would be an indirect attempt to collect a debt.
The Act does not, however, contain only the primary defnition.
And the limited-purpose defnition poses a serious,
indeed an insurmountable, obstacle to subjecting McCarthy
to the main coverage of the Act. It says that “[f]or the purpose
of section 1692f(6)” a debt collector “also includes” a
business, like McCarthy, “the principal purpose of which is
the enforcement of security interests.” § 1692a(6) (emphasis
added). This phrase, particularly the word “also,” strongly
suggests that one who does no more than enforce security
interests does not fall within the scope of the general defnition.
Otherwise why add this sentence at all?
It is logically, but not practically, possible that Congress
simply wanted to emphasize that the defnition of “debt collector”
includes those engaged in the enforcement of security
interests. But why then would Congress have used the
word “also”? And if security-interest enforcers are covered
by the primary defnition, why would Congress have needed
to say anything special about § 1692f(6)? Af ter all,
§ 1692f(6), just like all the provisions applicable to debt collectors,
would have already applied to those who enforce se476
OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Opinion of the Court
curity interests. The reference to § 1692f(6) would on this
view be superfuous, and we “generally presum[e] that statutes
do not contain surplusage.” Arlington Central School
Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, 299, n. 1 (2006).
By contrast, giving effect to every word of the limitedpurpose
defnition narrows the primary defnition, so that
the debt-collector-related prohibitions of the FDCPA (with
the exception of § 1692f(6)) do not apply to those who, like
McCarthy, are engaged in no more than security-interest
enforcement.
Second, we think Congress may well have chosen to treat
security-interest enforcement differently from ordinary debt
collection in order to avoid conficts with state nonjudicial
foreclosure schemes. As Colorado's law makes clear, supra,
at 470–471, state nonjudicial foreclosure laws provide various
protections designed to prevent sharp collection practices
and to protect homeowners, see 2 Dunaway § 17:1.
And some features of these laws are in tension with aspects
of the Act. For example, the FDCPA broadly limits debt
collectors from communicating with third parties “in connection
with the collection of any debt.” § 1692c(b). If this
rule were applied to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings,
then advertising a foreclosure sale—an essential element of
such schemes—might run afoul of the FDCPA. Given that
a core purpose of publicizing a sale is to attract bidders, ensure
that the sale price is fair, and thereby protect the borrower
from further liability, the result would hardly beneft
debtors. See 2 Dunaway § 17:4. To be sure, it may be possible
to resolve these conficts without great harm to either
the Act or state foreclosure schemes. See Heintz v. Jenkins,
514 U. S. 291, 296–297 (1995) (observing that the
FDCPA's protections may contain certain “implici[t] exception[
s]”). But it is also possible, in light of the language it
employed, that Congress wanted to avoid the risk of such
conflicts altogether.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 477
Opinion of the Court
Third, for those of us who use legislative history to help
interpret statutes, the history of the FDCPA supports our
reading. When drafting the bill, Congress considered a version
that would have subjected security-interest enforcers to
the full coverage of the Act. That version defned a debt
collector as “any person who engages in any business the
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debt or
enforcement of security interests.” S. 918, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 803(f) (1977) (emphasis added). A different version
of the bill, however, would have totally excluded from the
Act's coverage “any person who enforces or attempts to enforce
a security interest in real or personal property.”
S. 1130, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 802(8)(E) (1977). Given
these conficting proposals, the Act's present language has
all the earmarks of a compromise: The prohibitions contained
in § 1692f(6) will cover security-interest enforcers, while the
other “debt collector” provisions of the Act will not.
These considerations convince us that, but for § 1692f(6),
those who engage in only nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings
are not debt collectors within the meaning of the Act.
III
Obduskey makes several arguments to the contrary. But,
on balance, we do not fnd them determinative.
First, Obduskey acknowledges that unless the limitedpurpose
defnition is superfuous, it must make some kind of
security-interest enforcer a “debt collector” who would not
otherwise fall within the primary defnition. Reply Brief
11–13. But, according to Obduskey, “repo men”—those who
seize automobiles and other personal property in response to
nonpayment—ft the bill. See Black's Law Dictionary 1493
(10th ed. 2014) (explaining that “repo” is short for “repossession,”
which means “retaking property; esp., a seller's retaking
of goods sold on credit when the buyer has failed to pay
for them”). This is so, he says, because repossession often
478 OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Opinion of the Court
entails only “limited communication” with the debtor, as
when the repo man sneaks up and “tows a car in the middle
of the night.” Brief for Petitioner 25–26, and n. 13. And
because, according to Obduskey, the language of § 1692f(6),
which forbids “[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial
action to effect dispossession or disablement of property,”
applies more naturally to the seizure of personal property
than to nonjudicial foreclosure. (Emphasis added.)
But we do not see why that is so. The limited-purpose
provision speaks broadly of “the enforcement of security interests,”
§ 1692a(6), not “the enforcement of security interests
in personal property”; if Congress meant to cover only
the repo man, it could have said so. Moreover, Obduskey's
theory fails to save the limited-purpose defnition from superfuity.
As we have just discussed, supra, at 474–475, if
the Act contained only the primary defnition, enforcement
of a security interest would at least be an indirect collection
of a debt. The same may well be true of repo activity, a
form of security-interest enforcement, as the point of repossessing
property that secures a debt is to collect some or
all of the value of the defaulted debt. And while Obduskey
argues that the language of § 1692f(6) fts more comfortably
with repossession of personal property than nonjudicial foreclosure,
we think it at least plausible that “threatening” to
foreclose on a consumer's home without having legal entitlement
to do so is the kind of “nonjudicial action” without
“present right to possession” prohibited by that section.
§ 1692f(6)(A). (We need not, however, here decide precisely
what conduct runs afoul of § 1692f(6).)
We are also unmoved by Obduskey's argument that repossession
would not fall under the primary defnition because
it generally involves only limited communication with the
debtor. For one thing, while some of the FDCPA's substantive
protections apply where there has been a “communicat[
ion]” with a consumer, see, e. g., § 1692c, the primary defnition
of debt collector turns on the “collection of . . . debts,”
Cite as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 479
Opinion of the Court
without express reference to communication, § 1692a(6).
For another, while Obduskey imagines a silent repo man
striking in the dead of night, state law often requires communication
with a debtor during the repossession process,
such as notifying a consumer of a sale. C. Carter, J. Sheldon,
J. Van Alst, T. Twomey, & J. Battle, NCLC, Repossessions
§ 10.4 (9th ed. 2017).
Second, Obduskey points to the Act's venue provision, 15
U. S. C. § 1692i(a), which states that “[a]ny debt collector who
brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall
. . . in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real
property securing the consumer's obligation, bring such action
only in a judicial district” where the “property is located.”
(Emphasis added.) This provision, he says, makes
clear that a person who judicially enforces a real-propertyrelated
security interest is a debt collector; hence, a person
who nonjudicially enforces such an interest must also be a
debt collector. Indeed, he adds, this subsection “only makes
sense” if those who enforce security interests in real property
are debt collectors subject to all prohibitions and requirements
that come with that designation. Brief for Petitioner
21.
This argument, however, makes too much of too little. To
begin with, the venue section has no direct application in
this case, for here we consider nonjudicial foreclosure.
And whether those who judicially enforce mortgages fall
within the scope of the primary defnition is a question we can
leave for another day. See 879 F. 3d, at 1221–1222 (noting that
the availability of a defciency judgment is a potentially relevant
distinction between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures).
More to the point, the venue provision does nothing to
alter the defnition of a debt collector. Rather, it applies
whenever a “debt collector” brings a “legal action . . .
to enforce an interest in real property.” § 1692i(a)(1). In
other words, the provision anticipates that a debt collector
can bring a judicial action respecting real property, but it
480 OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Opinion of the Court
nowhere says that an entity is a debt collector because it
brings such an action. Obduskey suggests that under our
interpretation this provision will capture a null set. We
think not. A business that qualifes as a debt collector
based on other activities (say, because it “regularly collects
or attempts to collect” unsecured credit card debts,
§ 1692a(6)) would have to comply with the venue provision if
it also fled “an action to enforce an interest in real property,”
§ 1692i(a)(1). Here, however, the only basis alleged
for concluding that McCarthy is a debt collector under the
Act is its role in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.
Third, Obduskey argues that even if “simply enforcing a
security interest” falls outside the primary defnition, Mc-
Carthy engaged in more than security-interest enforcement
by sending notices that any ordinary homeowner would understand
as an attempt to collect a debt backed up by the
threat of foreclosure. Brief for Petitioner 15–16; see Reply
Brief 13. We do not doubt the gravity of a letter informing
a homeowner that she may lose her home unless she pays
her outstanding debts. But here we assume that the notices
sent by McCarthy were antecedent steps required under
state law to enforce a security interest. See supra, at 471–
472. Indeed, every nonjudicial foreclosure scheme of which
we are aware involves notices to the homeowner. See 2 Dunaway
§ 17:4 (describing state procedures concerning notice
of sale). And because he who wills the ends must will the
necessary means, we think the Act's (partial) exclusion of
“the enforcement of security interests” must also exclude the
legal means required to do so. This is not to suggest that
pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure is a license to engage in abusive
debt collection practices like repetitive nighttime phone
calls; enforcing a security interest does not grant an actor
blanket immunity from the Act. But given that we here
confront only steps required by state law, we need not
consider what other conduct (related to, but not required
for, enforcement of a security interest) might transform a
Cite as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 481
Sotomayor, J., concurring
security-interest enforcer into a debt collector subject to the
main coverage of the Act.
Finally, Obduskey fears that our decision will open a loophole,
permitting creditors and their agents to engage in a
host of abusive practices forbidden by the Act. States, however,
can and do guard against such practices, for example,
by requiring notices, review by state offcials such as the
public trustee, and limited court supervision. See supra, at
470–471, 476. Congress may think these state protections
adequate, or it may choose to expand the reach of the
FDCPA. Regardless, for the reasons we have given, we believe
that the statute exempts entities engaged in no more
than the “enforcement of security interests” from the lion's
share of its prohibitions. And we must enforce the statute
that Congress enacted.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affrmed.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, which makes a coherent whole
of a thorny section of statutory text. I write separately to
make two observations: First, this is a close case, and today's
opinion does not prevent Congress from clarifying this statute
if we have gotten it wrong. Second, as the Court makes
clear, “enforcing a security interest does not grant an actor
blanket immunity from the” mandates of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U. S. C. § 1692 et seq.
Ante, at 480.
This case turns on two sentences that, put together, read
in relevant part:
“[1] The term `debt collector' means any person . . . in
any business the principal purpose of which is the collection
of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts
to collect, directly or indirectly, debts . . . . [2] For the
purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also
482 OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Sotomayor, J., concurring
includes any person . . . in any business the principal
purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.”
§ 1692a(6).
As the Court recognizes, if the frst sentence were the only
text before us, nonjudicial foreclosure plainly would qualify
as debt collection—after all, foreclosure itself “is a means
of collecting a debt,” ante, at 474–475, whether “directly or
indirectly,” § 1692a(6). That may be because a house can be
sold—thus satisfying the debt with the proceeds—but it may
also be because the initiation of a foreclosure itself sends
a clear message: “[P]ay up or lose your house.” Brief for
Petitioner 17; see Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Ambridge, 372
P. 3d 207, 217–218 (Alaska 2016); Glazer v. Chase Home Finance
LLC, 704 F. 3d 453, 461 (CA6 2013).
The problem for Obduskey's reading, as the Court explains,
is the second sentence, which then becomes superfuous
if all security-interest enforcement is already covered by
sentence one. See ante, at 475–476. To be clear, there is
a reasonable argument that the second sentence covers
security-interest enforcers who are not already covered by
the frst sentence: Under this argument, those additional
security-interest enforcers are “people who engage in the
business of repossessing property, whose business does not
primarily involve communicating with debtors in an effort to
secure payment of debts,” Piper v. Portnoff Law Assoc.,
Ltd., 396 F. 3d 227, 236 (CA3 2005); see also Alaska Trustee,
372 P. 3d, at 219–220; Glazer, 704 F. 3d, at 463–464, such as
“the repo man [who] sneaks up and `tows a car in the middle
of the night,' ” ante, at 478. But, as the Court explains, that
reading does not resolve the surplusage problem, because
even such repossession agencies engage in a means of collecting
debts “indirectly”—which means that they are similarly
situated to entities pursuing nonjudicial foreclosures after
all. See ante, at 477–479.
All the same, this is too close a case for me to feel certain
that Congress recognized that this complex statute would be
Cite as: 586 U. S. 466 (2019) 483
Sotomayor, J., concurring
interpreted the way that the Court does today. While
States do regulate nonjudicial foreclosures, see ante, at 476,
the extent and method of those protections can vary widely,
and the FDCPA was enacted not only “to eliminate abusive
debt collection practices” but also “to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses,” § 1692(e); see also § 1692n (pre-empting
inconsistent state laws while exempting state consumer protections
that are “greater than the protection provided by
[the FDCPA]”). Today's opinion leaves Congress free to
make clear that the FDCPA fully encompasses entities pursuing
nonjudicial foreclosures and regulates securityinterest
enforcers like repossession agencies in only the more
limited way addressed in § 1692f(6). That too would be
consistent with the FDCPA's broad, consumer-protective
purposes. See § 1692(e).
Separately, I note that the Court's opinion recognizes that
the question before us involves “no more than the kind of
security-interest enforcement at issue here,” ante, at 469,
which means an entity that takes “only steps required by
state law,” ante, at 480. The Court rightly notes, therefore,
that nothing in today's opinion is “to suggest that pursuing
nonjudicial foreclosure is a license to engage in abusive debt
collection practices like repetitive nighttime phone calls;
enforcing a security interest does not grant an actor blanket
immunity from the Act.” Ibid. Indeed, in addition to the
unnecessary and abusive practices that the Court notes, I
would see as a different case one in which the defendant
went around frightening homeowners with the threat of foreclosure
without showing any meaningful intention of ever
actually following through. There would be a question, in
such a case, whether such an entity was in fact a “business
the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security
interests,” see § 1692a(6), or whether it was simply using that
label as a stalking horse for something else.
484 OBDUSKEY v. McCARTHY & HOLTHUS LLP
Sotomayor, J., concurring
Because the Court rightly cabins its holding to the kinds
of good-faith actions presented here and because we are
bound to apply Congress' statutes as best we can understand
them, I concur in the Court's opinion.
OCTOBER TERM, 2018 485
Syllabus
FRANK et al. v. GAOS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 17–961. Argued October 31, 2018—Decided March 20, 2019
Three named plaintiffs (including Paloma Gaos) brought class action
claims against Google for alleged violations of the Stored Communications
Act, 18 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. Over the course of litigation below,
Google moved to dismiss for lack of standing three times. As relevant
here, when the District Court held that Gaos had standing to assert an
SCA claim, the District Court rested its conclusion on Edwards v. First
American Corp., 610 F. 3d 514—a Ninth Circuit decision reasoning that
an Article III injury exists whenever a statute gives an individual a
statutory cause of action and the plaintiff claims that the defendant violated
the statute. Gaos v. Google, 2012 WL 1094646, *3. After a second
amended complaint was fled, Google again moved to dismiss, challenging
standing and noting that this Court had agreed to review the
decision in Edwards on which the District Court previously relied.
This Court eventually dismissed Edwards as improvidently granted, 567
U. S. 756 (per curiam), and Google then withdrew its argument that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert SCA claims. On the merits, the
parties ultimately negotiated a settlement agreement that would require
Google to include certain disclosures on some of its webpages and
would distribute more than $5 million to cy pres recipients, more than
$2 million to class counsel, and no money to absent class members. The
District Court granted preliminary certifcation of the class and preliminary
approval of the settlement. Five class members, including petitioners
Theodore Frank and Melissa Holyoak, objected to the settlement
on several grounds. After a hearing, the District Court granted fnal
approval of the settlement, and Frank and Holyoak appealed. While
the appeal was pending in the Ninth Circuit, but prior to decision by
that court, this Court issued Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, in
which the Court held that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury
even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id., at 341. Spokeo
rejected the premise, relied on in Edwards, that “a plaintiff automatically
satisfes the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants
a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue
to vindicate that right.” 578 U. S., at 341. A divided panel of the
Ninth Circuit affrmed the settlement, without addressing Spokeo. In
486 FRANK v. GAOS
Syllabus
re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, 869 F. 3d 737. This
Court granted certiorari to review whether cy pres settlements satisfy
the requirement that class settlements be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e)(2). The Solicitor General fled a
brief as amicus curiae urging the Court to vacate and remand the case
for the lower courts to address whether any named plaintiff in the class
action actually had standing in the District Court. After oral argument,
the Court ordered supplemental briefng on the standing question.
Held: Because there remain substantial questions about whether any of
the named plaintiffs has standing to sue in light of the Court's decision
in Spokeo, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case
remanded. The Court has an obligation to ensure that litigants have
standing under Article III. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U. S. 332, 340. That obligation extends to court approval of proposed
class action settlements. In a class action, the “claims, issues, or defenses
of a certifed class—or a class proposed to be certifed for purposes
of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised
only with the court's approval.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e). A
court is powerless to approve a proposed class settlement if it lacks
jurisdiction over the dispute, and federal courts lack jurisdiction if no
named plaintiff has standing. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 40, n. 20. Here, no court in this case has
analyzed whether any named plaintiff has alleged SCA violations in the
operative complaint that are suffciently concrete and particularized to
support standing. The supplemental briefs fled after oral argument
raise a wide variety of legal and factual issues not addressed in the
merits briefng before the Court or at oral argument. This is “a court
of review, not of frst view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718,
n. 7. Resolution of the standing question should frst take place in the
District Court or the Ninth Circuit.
869 F. 3d 737, vacated and remanded.
Theodore H. Frank, pro se, argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Melissa Holyoak, pro se,
and Anna St. John.
Deputy Solicitor General Wall argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With him
on the brief were Solicitor General Francisco, Acting Assistant
Attorney General Readler, Charles W. Scarborough,
and Katherine Twomey Allen.
Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for respondent Google
LLC. On the brief were Donald M. Falk, Edward D. JohnCite
as: 586 U. S. 485 (2019) 487
Counsel
son, Brian D. Netter, and Daniel E. Jones. Jeffrey A. Lamken
argued the cause for respondent Gaos et al. With him
on the briefs were Michael G. Pattillo, Jr., James A. Barta,
Will iam J. Cooper, Kassra P. Nassir i, and Michael
Aschenbrener.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Arizona
et al. by Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, and Oramel
H. Skinner, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions
as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Jahna Lindemuth of Alaska,
Leslie Rutledge of Arkansas, Cynthia Coffman of Colorado, Christopher
M. Carr of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., of
Indiana, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Bill Schuette of Michigan, Joshua D.
Hawley of Missouri, Adam Paul Laxalt of Nevada, Wayne Stenehjem of
North Dakota, Mike Hunter of Oklahoma, Peter F. Kilmartin of Rhode
Island, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota,
Ken Paxton of Texas, and Peter K. Michael of Wyoming; for the Cato
Institute et al. by Ilya Shapiro and Jeremy L. Kidd; for the Center for
Constitutional Jurisprudence et al. by John C. Eastman and Anthony T.
Caso; for the Center for Individual Rights by Michael E. Rosman; for the
Electronic Privacy Information Center by Marc Rotenberg and Alan Butler;
for Lawyers for Civil Justice by Alex Dahl, Mary Massaron, and
Josephine DeLorenzo; for the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research by
C. Thomas Ludden; and for the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute by
Joseph Edward Feibelman.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of
Oregon et al. by Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General of Oregon, Benjamin
Gutman, Solicitor General, Carson Whitehead, Assistant Attorney
General, and Henry Kantor, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Xavier Becerra of California, George Jepsen of
Connecticut, Russell A. Suzuki of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Brian
E. Frosh of Maryland, Maura Healey of Massachusetts, Lori Swanson of
Minnesota, Barbara D. Underwood of New York, Joshua H. Stein of North
Carolina, Thomas J. Donovan, Jr., of Vermont, and Robert W. Ferguson
of Washington; for the American Association for Justice by Jeffrey R.
White and Elise Sanguinetti; for the Center for Democracy and Technology
et al. by Leslie M. Spencer, Lisa A. Hayes, Sophia Cope, and Sally
Greenberg; for the Center for Workplace Compliance by Rae T. Vann and
John R. Annand; for the Civil Justice Research Initiative by Gerson H.
Smoger, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Anne Bloom; for the Computer & Communications
Industry Association et al. by David H. Kramer and Brian
M. Willen; for the New York Bar Foundation et al. by Christopher M.
Mason, Sarah Erickson André, Daniel Deane, and Seth A. Horvath; for
488 FRANK v. GAOS
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
Three named plaintiffs brought class action claims against
Google for alleged violations of the Stored Communications
Act. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement that
would require Google to include certain disclosures on some
of its webpages and would distribute more than $5 million to
cy pres recipients, more than $2 million to class counsel, and
no money to absent class members. We granted certiorari
to review whether such cy pres settlements satisfy the requirement
that class settlements be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e)(2). Because there remain
substantial questions about whether any of the named
plaintiffs has standing to sue in light of our decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330 (2016), we vacate the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand for further
proceedings.
Google operates an Internet search engine. The search
engine allows users to search for a word or phrase by typing
a query into the Google website. Google returns a list of
webpages that are relevant to the indicated term or phrase.
The complaints alleged that when an Internet user conducted
a Google search and clicked on a hyperlink to open
one of the webpages listed on the search results page, Google
transmitted information including the terms of the search to
the server that hosted the selected webpage. This so-called
referrer header told the server that the user arrived at
Public Citizen, Inc., et al. by Allison M. Zieve, Scott L. Nelson, and Adina
H. Rosenbaum; and for William B. Rubenstein by Mr. Rubenstein, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the American Bar Association by
Hilarie Bass, Rex S. Heinke, and Jessica Weisel; for the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America by Ashley C. Parrish and Justin
A. Torres; for Law Professors by Lori B. Andrews; for Legal Aid Organizations
by Wilber H. Boies and M. Miller Baker; for the National Consumer
Law Center et al. by Stuart Rossman and Michael Landis; for
Spectrum Settlement Recovery, LLC, by Howard L. Yellen, Hugh C. D.
Alexander, Eric L. Lewis, and James P. Davenport; for Roy A. Katriel by
Mr. Katriel, pro se; and for David Lowrey et al. by Antigone G. Peyton.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 485 (2019) 489
Per Curiam
the webpage by searching for particular terms on Google's
website.
Paloma Gaos challenged Google's use of referrer headers.
She fled a complaint in Federal District Court on behalf of
herself and a putative class of people who conducted a Google
search and clicked on any of the resulting links within a certain
time period. Gaos alleged that Google's transmission
of users' search terms in referrer headers violated the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. The SCA
prohibits “a person or entity providing an electronic communication
service to the public” from “knowingly divulg[ing]
to any person or entity the contents of a communication
while in electronic storage by that service.” § 2702(a)(1).
The Act also creates a private right of action that entitles
any “person aggrieved by any violation” to “recover from the
person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged
in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.”
§ 2707(a). Gaos also asserted several state law claims.
Google moved to dismiss for lack of standing three times.
Its frst attempt was successful. The District Court reasoned
that although “a plaintiff may establish standing
through allegations of violation of a statutory right,” Gaos
had “failed to plead facts suffcient to support a claim for
violation of her statutory rights.” Gaos v. Google, Inc., 2011
WL 7295480, *3 (ND Cal., Apr. 7, 2011). In particular, the
court faulted Gaos for failing to plead “that she clicked on a
link from the Google search page.” Ibid.
After Gaos fled an amended complaint, Google again
moved to dismiss. That second attempt was partially successful.
The District Court dismissed Gaos' state law
claims, but denied the motion as to her SCA claims. The
court reasoned that because the SCA created a right to be
free from the unlawful disclosure of certain communications,
and because Gaos alleged a violation of the SCA that was
specifc to her (i. e., based on a search she conducted), Gaos
alleged a concrete and particularized injury. Gaos v. Google
490 FRANK v. GAOS
Per Curiam
Inc., 2012 WL 1094646, *4 (ND Cal., Mar. 29, 2012). The
court rested that conclusion on Edwards v. First American
Corp., 610 F. 3d 514 (2010)—a Ninth Circuit decision reasoning
that an Article III injury exists whenever a statute gives
an individual a statutory cause of action and the plaintiff
claims that the defendant violated the statute. 2012 WL
1094646, *3.
After the District Court ruled on Google's second motion
to dismiss, we granted certiorari in Edwards to address
whether an alleged statutory violation alone can support
standing. First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, 564
U. S. 1018 (2011). In the meantime, Gaos and an additional
named plaintiff fled a second amended complaint against
Google. Google once again moved to dismiss. Google argued
that the named plaintiffs did not have standing to bring
their SCA claims because they had failed to allege facts establishing
a cognizable injury. Google recognized that the
District Court had previously relied on Edwards to fnd
standing based on the alleged violation of a statutory right.
But because this Court had agreed to review Edwards,
Google explained that it would continue to challenge the District
Court's conclusion. We eventually dismissed Edwards
as improvidently granted, 567 U. S. 756 (2012) (per curiam),
and Google then withdrew its argument that Gaos lacked
standing for the SCA claims.
Gaos' putative class action was consolidated with a similar
complaint, and the parties negotiated a classwide settlement.
The terms of their agreement required Google to include
certain disclosures about referrer headers on three of its
webpages. Google could, however, continue its practice of
transmitting users' search terms in referrer headers.
Google also agreed to pay $8.5 million. None of those funds
would be distributed to absent class members. Instead,
most of the money would be distributed to six cy pres recipients.
In the class action context, cy pres refers to the practice
of distributing settlement funds not amenable to individCite
as: 586 U. S. 485 (2019) 491
Per Curiam
ual claims or meaningful pro rata distribution to nonproft
organizations whose work is determined to indirectly beneft
class members. Black's Law Dictionary 470 (10th ed. 2014).
In this case, the cy pres recipients were selected by class
counsel and Google to “promote public awareness and education,
and/or to support research, development, and initiatives,
related to protecting privacy on the Internet.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 84. The rest of the funds would be used for
administrative costs and fees, given to the named plaintiffs
in the form of incentive payments, and awarded to class
counsel as attorney's fees.
The District Court granted preliminary certifcation of the
class and preliminary approval of the settlement. Five class
members, including petitioners Theodore Frank and Melissa
Holyoak, objected to the settlement on several grounds.
They complained that settlements providing only cy pres relief
do not comply with the requirements of Rule 23(e), that
cy pres relief was not justifed in this case, and that conficts
of interest infected the selection of the cy pres recipients.
After a hearing, the District Court granted fnal approval of
the settlement.
Frank and Holyoak appealed. After briefng before the
Ninth Circuit was complete, but prior to decision by that
court, we issued our opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U. S. 330 (2016). In Spokeo, we held that “Article III standing
requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory
violation.” Id., at 341. We rejected the premise, relied
on in the decision then under review and in Edwards,
that “a plaintiff automatically satisfes the injury-in-fact requirement
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory
right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate
that right.” 578 U. S., at 341; see also id., at 336–337.
Google notifed the Ninth Circuit of our opinion.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affrmed, without addressing
Spokeo. In re Google Referrer Header Privacy
Litigation, 869 F. 3d 737 (2017). We granted certiorari, 584
492 FRANK v. GAOS
Per Curiam
U. S. 958 (2018), to decide whether a class action settlement
that provides a cy pres award but no direct relief to class
members satisfes the requirement that a settlement binding
class members be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e)(2).
In briefng on the merits before this Court, the Solicitor
General fled a brief as amicus curiae supporting neither
party. He urged us to vacate and remand the case for
the lower courts to address standing. The Government
argued that there is a substantial open question about
whether any named plaintiff in the class action actually
had standing in the District Court. Because Google withdrew
its standing challenge after we dismissed Edwards
as improvidently granted, neither the District Court nor
the Ninth Circuit ever opined on whether any named
plaintiff sufficiently alleged standing in the operative
complaint.
“We have an obligation to assure ourselves of litigants'
standing under Article III.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 340 (2006) (quoting Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528
U. S. 167, 180 (2000); internal quotation marks omitted).
That obligation extends to court approval of proposed class
action settlements. In ordinary non-class litigation, parties
are free to settle their disputes on their own terms, and
plaintiffs may voluntarily dismiss their claims without a
court order. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 41(a)(1)(A). By contrast,
in a class action, the “claims, issues, or defenses of a certifed
class—or a class proposed to be certifed for purposes of
settlement—may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised
only with the court's approval.” Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 23(e). A court is powerless to approve a proposed
class settlement if it lacks jurisdiction over the dispute, and
federal courts lack jurisdiction if no named plaintiff has
standing. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization,
426 U. S. 26, 40, n. 20 (1976).
Cite as: 586 U. S. 485 (2019) 493
Thomas, J., dissenting
When the District Court ruled on Google's second motion
to dismiss, it relied on Edwards to hold that Gaos had standing
to assert a claim under the SCA. Our decision in Spokeo
abrogated the ruling in Edwards that the violation of a statutory
right automatically satisfes the injury-in-fact requirement
whenever a statute authorizes a person to sue to vindicate
that right. 578 U. S., at 341; see Edwards, 610 F. 3d, at
517–518. Since that time, no court in this case has analyzed
whether any named plaintiff has alleged SCA violations that
are suffciently concrete and particularized to support standing.
After oral argument, we ordered supplemental briefng
from the parties and Solicitor General to address that
question.
After reviewing the supplemental briefs, we conclude that
the case should be remanded for the courts below to address
the plaintiffs' standing in light of Spokeo. The supplemental
briefs fled in response to our order raise a wide variety of
legal and factual issues not addressed in the merits briefng
before us or at oral argument. We “are a court of review,
not of frst view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718,
n. 7 (2005). Resolution of the standing question should take
place in the District Court or the Ninth Circuit in the frst
instance. We therefore vacate and remand for further proceedings.
Nothing in our opinion should be interpreted as
expressing a view on any particular resolution of the standing
question.
* * *
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
Respectfully, I would reach the merits and reverse. As I
have previously explained, a plaintiff seeking to vindicate a
494 FRANK v. GAOS
Thomas, J., dissenting
private right need only allege an invasion of that right to
establish standing. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S.
330, 348 (2016) (concurring opinion). Here, the plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Stored Communications Act, which
creates a private right: It prohibits certain electronic service
providers from “knowingly divulg[ing] . . . the contents of a
communication” sent by a “ `user,' ” “subscriber,” or “customer”
of the service, except as provided in the Act. 18
U. S. C. §§ 2510(13), 2702(a)(1)–(2), (b); see § 2707(a) (providing
a cause of action to persons aggrieved by violations of
the Act). They also asserted violations of private rights
under state law. By alleging the violation of “private dut[
ies] owed personally” to them “ `as individuals,' ” Spokeo,
supra, at 349, 344 (opinion of Thomas, J.), the plaintiffs established
standing. Whether their allegations state a plausible
claim for relief under the Act or state law is a separate
question on which I express no opinion.
As to the class-certifcation and class-settlement orders,
I would reverse. The named plaintiffs here sought to
simultaneously certify and settle a class action under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and (e). Yet
the settlement agreement provided members of the class
no damages and no other form of meaningful relief.*
Most of the settlement fund was devoted to cy pres payments
to nonproft organizations that are not parties to
the litigation; the rest, to plaintiffs' lawyers, administrative
costs, and incentive payments for the named plaintiffs.
Ante, at 490–491. The District Court and the Court
of Appeals approved this arrangement on the view that
the cy pres payments provided an “indirect” benefit
to the class. In re Google Re fer rer Header Pr ivacy
*The settlement required that Google make additional disclosures on its
website for the beneft of “future users.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 50. But
no party argues that these disclosures were valuable enough on their own
to independently support the settlement.
Cite as: 586 U. S. 485 (2019) 495
Thomas, J., dissenting
Litigation, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1128–1129, 1137 (ND Cal.
2015); In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, 869
F. 3d 737, 741 (CA9 2017).
Whatever role cy pres may permissibly play in disposing
of unclaimed or undistributable class funds, see Klier v. Elf
Atochem North Am., Inc., 658 F. 3d 468, 474–476 (CA5 2011);
id., at 480–482 (Jones, C. J., concurring), cy pres payments
are not a form of relief to the absent class members and
should not be treated as such (including when calculating
attorney's fees). And the settlement agreement here provided
no other form of meaningful relief to the class. This
cy pres-only arrangement failed several requirements of
Rule 23. First, the fact that class counsel and the named
plaintiffs were willing to settle the class claims without obtaining
any relief for the class—while securing signifcant
benefts for themselves—strongly suggests that the interests
of the class were not adequately represented. Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc. 23(a)(4), (g)(4); see Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U. S. 591, 619–620 (1997) (settlement terms can
inform adequacy of representation). Second, the lack of any
beneft for the class rendered the settlement unfair and unreasonable
under Rule 23(e)(2). Further, I question
whether a class action is “superior to other available methods
for fairly and effciently adjudicating the controversy”
when it serves only as a vehicle through which to extinguish
the absent class members' claims without providing them
any relief. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3); see Rule 23(b)
(3)(A) (courts must consider “the class members' interests in
individually controlling the prosecution . . . of separate
actions”).
In short, because the class members here received no settlement
fund, no meaningful injunctive relief, and no other
beneft whatsoever in exchange for the settlement of their
claims, I would hold that the class action should not have been
certifed, and the settlement should not have been approved.
Reporter’s Note
The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 495
and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the offcial citations
available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.
ORDERS FOR OCTOBER 1, 2018, THROUGH
MARCH 25, 2019
October 1, 2018
Affrmed for Absence of Quorum
No. 17–8910. Johnson v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Because the Court lacks a quorum, 28 U. S. C. § 1, and since the
only qualifed Justice is of the opinion that the case cannot be
heard and determined at the next Term of the Court, the judgment
is affrmed under 28 U. S. C. § 2109, which provides that
under these circumstances “the court shall enter its order affrming
the judgment of the court from which the case was brought
for review with the same effect as upon affrmance by an equally
divided court.” The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor,
and Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 689.
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 17–8035. Manners v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
No. 17–8244. Richitelli v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.;
No. 17–8349. Parrales-Guzman v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx. 382;
No. 17–8655. Luis Pineda v. Sessions, Attorney General.
C. A. 5th Cir. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 315; and
No. 17–8876. Bannister v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded
for further consideration in light of Sessions v. Dimaya,
584 U. S. 148 (2018).
No. 17–8523. Briley v. United States;
No. 17–8608. Pembrook v. United States; and
No. 17–9235. Calhoun v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Reported below: 876 F. 3d 812. Motions of petitioners for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judg-
801
802 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
ment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in
light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. 148 (2018).
No. 17–8526. Ward v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Class v. United States, 583 U. S. 174
(2018). Reported below: 160 A. 3d 1174.
No. 17–9248. Diez v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U. S. 122 (2018).
Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 898.
No. 18–88. Gramm v. Deere & Co. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U. S. 357
(2018). Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 650.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 17–8926. Harper v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid
and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See
Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1
(1992) (per curiam).
No. 17–8958. Holt v. Baker et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid
and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See
Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1
(1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 422.
No. 17–8991. Burgess v. Elliott et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
ORDERS 803
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 696 Fed. Appx. 125.
No. 17–9005. Shove v. United States District Court for
the Central District of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9041. Ciotta v. Holland, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9107. Grigsby v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 715 Fed. Appx. 868.
No. 17–9110. Graham v. United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9175. Flute v. United States et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 599.
No. 17–9193. Hall v. Chandler, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9239. Bullock v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion
and this petition.
No. 17–9255. Figueroa v. Ramirez, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
804 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 165.
No. 17–9262. Mua et ux. v. California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioners
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9263. Mua et ux. v. Maryland et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx. 309.
No. 17–9264. Mua v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9265. Mua et ux. v. California Casualty Indemnity
Exchange. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioners for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed.
See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9266. Mua v. California Casualty Indemnity Exchange
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9324. McNamara v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 2. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9413. Lei Ke v. Fry et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 174 A. 3d 75.
No. 17–9446. Rogers v. Beasley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
ORDERS 805
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 17–9501. Smith v. Cline, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 17–9530. Flute v. United States et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 604.
No. 17–9538. Harper v. Crow. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid
and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See
Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1
(1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–5002. Gray v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's
Rule 39.8.
No. 18–5017. Selden v. Kovachevich, Judge, United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari before judgment dismissed.
See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeat806
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
edly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to
accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner
unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin
v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)
(per curiam).
No. 18–5030. Williams v. Norman, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–5070. Williams v. Mayberg, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–5101. Reilly v. Davis. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 240 So. 3d 642.
No. 18–5277. Day v. Ofce of the President. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Reported below: 697 Fed. Appx. 17.
No. 18–5323. Caldwell v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–5417. Hardy v. Adams et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–5574. Acker v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matORDERS
807
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
ters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–5631. Jacob v. Frakes, Director, Nebraska Department
of Correctional Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid
and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See
Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1
(1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–5820. Evans v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 184 A. 3d 843.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M1. Father v. Maine Department of Health and
Human Services et al.; and
No. 18M8. Jason K. v. Maine Department of Health and
Human Services et al. Motions for leave to fle petitions for
writs of certiorari under seal granted.
No. 18M2. Atwood v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, et al.;
No. 18M3. Wright v. Thomas Nelson Community College
et al.;
No. 18M4. Wagner et al. v. United States Trustee
et al.;
No. 18M10. Oduok v. Carnes et al.;
No. 18M11. Charles v. McCain, Warden;
No. 18M12. Cynthia R. v. Children’s Aid Society;
No. 18M15. York v. Social Security Administration;
No. 18M18. Black v. Larimer County, Colorado;
No. 18M19. Jones v. Sedita et al.;
No. 18M24. Montoya v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.;
No. 18M26. Spight v. United States;
808 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18M27. Garrett v. Brennan, Postmaster General;
No. 18M28. Best v. Kimble, Warden;
No. 18M30. Phillips v. Phillips;
No. 18M31. Henson v. Griem;
No. 18M32. Fearing v. United States Trustee et al.;
No. 18M33. Chronister v. South Carolina et al.;
No. 18M36. Larson v. Wallace et al.;
No. 18M37. Carlos Ocasio v. Merit Systems Protection
Board; and
No. 18M38. Howard v. United States. Motions to direct
the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M5. Stephens v. Alliant Techsystems Corp.
et al.; and
No. 18M6. Brown v. Wellman et al. Motions to direct the
Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time under
this Court's Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 18M7. Malnes v. City of Flagstaff, Arizona, et al.;
No. 18M13. Henderson v. VIP Taxi LLC et al.;
No. 18M29. Zapata v. PEO et al.; and
No. 18M35. Jossie v. CVS Pharmacy. Motions for leave to
proceed as veterans denied.
No. 18M9. Rodriguez v. United States;
No. 18M16. Thelemaque v. United States;
No. 18M20. Murray v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections;
No. 18M21. Jones v. United States;
No. 18M22. Laschkewitsch v. ReliaStar Life Insurance
Co.;
No. 18M23. M. E. D. v. New Jersey; and
No. 18M34. Medina v. United States. Motions for leave to
fle petitions for writs of certiorari with supplemental appendixes
under seal granted.
No. 18M14. Aquino-Florenciani v. United States; and
No. 18M17. Sealed Appellee v. United States. Motions
for leave to fle petitions for writs of certiorari under seal with
redacted copies for the public record granted.
No. 18M25. Moreno v. United States. Motion to direct the
Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
ORDERS 809
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision
of this motion.
No. 16–1275. Virginia Uranium, Inc., et al. v. Warren
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 584 U. S. 992.] Motion
of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument
as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 17–204. Apple Inc. v. Pepper et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1003.] Motion of the Solicitor General
for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae
and for divided argument granted.
No. 17–773. Culbertson v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 584 U. S. 992.] Motion of the Solicitor General for divided
argument granted.
No. 17–949. Sturgeon v. Frost, Alaska Regional Director
of the National Park Service, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1002.] Motion of petitioner to dispense
with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 17–961. Frank et al. v. Gaos, Individually and on
Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. [Certiorari granted, 584 U. S. 958.] Joint motion of respondents
for divided argument granted. Motion of the Solicitor
General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae
and for divided argument granted. Motion of former Professor
Roy A. Katriel for leave to participate in oral argument as
amicus curiae and for divided argument denied.
No. 17–1011. Jam et al. v. International Finance Corp.
C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 584 U. S. 992.] Motion of
petitioners to dispense with printing joint appendix granted.
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral
argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 17–1042. BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos. C. A. 8th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 584 U. S. 976.] Motion of the Solicitor General
for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae
and for divided argument granted.
No. 17–1175. Poarch Band of Creek Indians et al. v.
Wilkes et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. The Solicitor General is invited to
fle a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.
810 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1184. Biestek v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 585
U. S. 1015.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing joint
appendix granted.
No. 17–1272. Henry Schein, Inc., et al. v. Archer &
White Sales, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 585 U. S.
1015.] Motion of petitioners to fle volume II of the joint appendix
under seal granted.
No. 17–1498. Atlantic Richeld Co. v. Christian et al.
Sup. Ct. Mont.;
No. 17–1678. Hernandez et al. v. Mesa. C. A. 5th Cir.;
No. 17–1686. RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC. C. A. Fed.
Cir.; and
No. 17–1712. Thole et al. v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al. C. A.
8th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to fle briefs in these
cases expressing the views of the United States.
No. 17–1529. Clearstream Banking S. A. v. Peterson
et al.;
No. 17–1530. Banca UBAE, S. p. A. v. Peterson et al.; and
No. 17–1534. Bank Markazi, aka Central Bank of Iran v.
Peterson et al. C. A. 2d Cir. The Solicitor General is invited
to fle a brief in these cases expressing the views of the United
States.
No. 17–8151. Bucklew v. Precythe, Director, Missouri
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 584 U. S. 959.] Motion of petitioner to fle volume
III of the joint appendix under seal with redacted copy of transcript
for public record granted.
No. 17–8555. Anderson v. Venture Express. C. A. 5th
Cir.;
No. 17–8719. De Vera v. United Airlines, Inc. C. A. 9th
Cir.;
No. 17–9105. Debeikes v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., et al.
C. A. 9th Cir.;
No. 17–9226. Green v. Horry County, South Carolina,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir.;
No. 17–9295. Jeanty v. New York City Department of
Finance. C. A. 2d Cir.;
ORDERS 811
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9306. Trinh v. Trinh. Super. Ct. Pa.;
No. 17–9323. In re Michael;
No. 18–5026. Yates v. West Contra Costa Unied School
District. C. A. 9th Cir.;
No. 18–5137. Daniel v. Brooklyn Law School. App. Div.,
Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept.;
No. 18–5537. Opengeym v. Heartland Employment Services,
LLC. C. A. 6th Cir.;
No. 18–5670. Campise v. New York Commissioner of
Labor. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept.;
No. 18–5683. In re Britton-Harr; and
No. 18–5786. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Motions
of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioners are allowed until October 22, 2018, within which to
pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions
in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
No. 17–8689. Gillespie v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions
et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [585 U. S.
1013] denied.
No. 17–8794. In re Spengler. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis
[584 U. S. 1000] denied.
No. 17–1647. In re Henderson et al.;
No. 17–9023. In re Kossie;
No. 17–9366. In re McCrary;
No. 17–9384. In re Jenks;
No. 17–9468. In re Yonamine;
No. 18–5128. In re Fairchild-Littleeld;
No. 18–5176. In re Eugene;
No. 18–5208. In re Bartunek;
No. 18–5472. In re Hedrick;
No. 18–5492. In re Colson;
No. 18–5577. In re Boylen;
No. 18–5580. In re Kye-El;
No. 18–5603. In re Kilmartin;
No. 18–5799. In re Smithback; and
No. 18–5812. In re DeCaro. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
812 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9269. In re Rodgers;
No. 18–5175. In re Brown;
No. 18–5400. In re Pennington-Thurman; and
No. 18–5543. In re Leffebre. Motions of petitioners for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs
of habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–9447. In re Rogers; and
No. 17–9480. In re Woods. Motions of petitioners for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioners
have repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioners unless the docketing fees required by Rule
38(a) are paid and the petitions are submitted in compliance with
Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 17–1570. In re Bieri;
No. 17–1710. In re Gilgenbach et ux.;
No. 17–8710. In re Armstrong;
No. 17–8777. In re Lee;
No. 17–8871. In re Payne;
No. 17–8981. In re Ruiz-Rivera;
No. 17–9073. In re Bey;
No. 17–9290. In re Redden;
No. 17–9355. In re Wardlaw;
No. 17–9465. In re McCree;
No. 18–123. In re Citizens for Fair Representation et al.;
No. 18–140. In re Bundy;
No. 18–5025. In re Wardlaw;
No. 18–5064. In re Stokes;
No. 18–5236. In re Esco;
No. 18–5262. In re McLaughlin;
No. 18–5265. In re Lee;
No. 18–5409. In re Riley;
No. 18–5449. In re Smith; and
No. 18–5579. In re Cole. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
No. 17–9443. In re Rogers. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
ORDERS 813
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid
and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See
Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1
(1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–5671. In re Simpson. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 17–1556. In re McDonald;
No. 17–1561. In re Ellis et al.;
No. 17–1562. In re Stanley;
No. 17–1563. In re Ford;
No. 17–1614. In re Voter Veried, Inc.;
No. 17–1715. In re McNeil et al.;
No. 17–9240. In re Schneider;
No. 18–5740. In re Clark; and
No. 18–5785. In re Winkles. Petitions for writs of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
No. 17–9201. In re Rose. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–5020. In re Brown. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of
this motion and this petition.
No. 17–1581. In re Coulter;
No. 17–8957. In re Gaitor; and
No. 18–5157. In re Luis Arevalo. Petitions for writs of
prohibition denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1140. Stambler v. Mastercard International Inc.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 702 Fed.
Appx. 985.
No. 17–1198. Martins Beach 1, LLC, et al. v. Surfrider
Foundation. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari
814 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
denied. Reported below: 14 Cal. App. 5th 238, 221 Cal. Rptr.
3d 382.
No. 17–1222. Multnomah County, Oregon v. Updike et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 870 F. 3d 939.
No. 17–1252. B/E Aerospace, Inc. v. C&D Zodiac, Inc.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed.
Appx. 687.
No. 17–1283. Atlanta Medical Center, Inc., fka Tenet
Healthsystem GB, Inc., et al. v. Care Improvement Plus
South Central Insurance Co. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 875 F. 3d 584.
No. 17–1286. National Mining Assn. v. Zinke, Secretary
of the Interior, et al.; and
No. 17–1290. American Exploration & Mining Assn. v.
Zinke, Secretary of the Interior, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 845.
No. 17–1316. Sportswear, Inc., dba Prep Sportswear v.
Savannah College of Art & Design, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 F. 3d 1256.
No. 17–1320. Garvin v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 30 N. Y. 3d 174, 88 N. E. 3d 319.
No. 17–1332. Jang v. Boston Scientic Corp. et al. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 F. 3d
1275.
No. 17–1335. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Director, Ofce
of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Department of
Labor, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 719 Fed. Appx. 819.
No. 17–1343. Davis v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1349. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 F. 3d 571.
No. 17–1376. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Parsons.
App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017
IL App (1st) 161384, 88 N. E. 3d 45.
ORDERS 815
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–1383. Empire Distribution Inc. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Television et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 875 F. 3d 1192.
No. 17–1384. Droplets, Inc. v. Iancu, Director, United
States Patent and Trademark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 612.
No. 17–1393. Pavan et al. v. Smith. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1398. SWC, LLC, et al. v. Herr et al. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 865 F. 3d 351.
No. 17–1408. Breckinridge Health, Inc., et al. v. Azar,
Secretary of Health and Human Services. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 869 F. 3d 422.
No. 17–1411. Aker Biomarine Antarctic AS et al. v. Nam
Chuong Huynh et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 199 Wash. App. 1005.
No. 17–1419. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation
et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 870 F. 3d 1313.
No. 17–1432. County of Amador, California v. Department
of the Interior et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 872 F. 3d 1012.
No. 17–1442. Dimond Rigging Co., LLC, dba Absolute Rigging
and Millwrights v. Ordos City Hawtai Autobody Co.,
Ltd., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
695 Fed. Appx. 864.
No. 17–1453. Community Health Systems, Inc., et al. v.
New York City Employees’ Retirement System et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 687.
No. 17–1456. Kennedy v. Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &
Flom LLP et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 706 Fed. Appx. 94.
No. 17–1459. World Programming Ltd. v. SAS Institute,
Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874
F. 3d 370.
816 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1470. Five Star Senior Living Inc., fka Five Star
Quality Care, Inc. v. Lefevre. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 705 Fed. Appx. 622.
No. 17–1472. Indiana v. Bowman et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 81 N. E. 3d 1127.
No. 17–1474. Nassar v. Nassar. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 615.
No. 17–1476. City of Fort Worth, Texas, et al. v. Darden.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880
F. 3d 722.
No. 17–1477. United States ex rel. Chase v. Chapters
Health System, Inc., et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 783.
No. 17–1479. Gentry v. Thompson, Judge, Circuit Court
of Tennessee, Sumner County. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1480. Xiu Jian Sun v. Pollak. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1485. Miranda-Mondragon v. Nautilus Insurance
Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711
Fed. Appx. 214.
No. 17–1486. Pinnavaria v. Trout Valley Assn. et al.
App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1490. Neidermeyer v. Caldwell. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 485.
No. 17–1497. American Technical Ceramics Corp. v. Presidio
Components, Inc.; and
No. 17–1649. Presidio Components, Inc. v. American
Technical Ceramics Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 875 F. 3d 1369.
No. 17–1503. Johnson v. Storix, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 628.
No. 17–1505. Tavares v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car-Company
of Rhode Island. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 817
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–1507. Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United States. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 F. 3d 1086.
No. 17–1508. McCall, as Administrator of the Estate of
McCall v. Morant et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 594.
No. 17–1509. United States ex rel. Barrick v. Parker-
Migliorini International, LLC, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 878 F. 3d 1224.
No. 17–1512. Ziming Shen v. City of New York, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725
Fed. Appx. 7.
No. 17–1513. Keithly, Executrix of the Estate of
Cooper v. Roberts et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1514. Lee v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1515. Taylor v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 303 Ga. 57, 810 S. E. 2d 113.
No. 17–1516. Evans v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 876 F. 3d 375.
No. 17–1517. Olympic Stewardship Foundation et al. v.
State of Washington Environmental and Land Use Hearings
Ofce et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 199 Wash. App. 668, 399 P. 3d 562.
No. 17–1518. Xiu Jian Sun v. Asiello et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1522. Xiu Jian Sun v. Supreme Court of New
York, Queens County. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1528. Ross v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1533. Leed HR, LLC, et al. v. Mitchell. Ct. App.
Ky. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1535. Asrari v. Department of Homeland Security.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710
Fed. Appx. 894.
818 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1536. MMA Consultants 1, Inc. v. Republic of
Peru. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719
Fed. Appx. 47.
No. 17–1537. Morrison v. Quest Diagnostics Inc. et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed.
Appx. 350.
No. 17–1538. Coulter v. Forrest et al. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 175 A. 3d 361.
No. 17–1541. Sobel v. City of Rutland, Vermont. Sup. Ct.
Vt. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1543. Olivar et al. v. Public Service Employee
Credit Union Long Term Disability Plan et al. Sup. Ct.
Colo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 428 P. 3d 208.
No. 17–1546. Stankevich v. Kaplan et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 717.
No. 17–1547. Sauers v. Township of Lower Southampton,
Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 722 Fed. Appx. 255.
No. 17–1548. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance,
dba FedLoan Servicing v. Silver. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 706 Fed. Appx. 369.
No. 17–1549. Morsy E. v. Commissioner, Connecticut
Department of Children and Families. Sup. Ct. Conn.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 327 Conn. 506, 175 A. 3d 21.
No. 17–1550. Failon v. Compass Chemical International,
LLC. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711
Fed. Appx. 141.
No. 17–1551. Stratton v. Virginia, dba Clemens, et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed.
Appx. 302.
No. 17–1552. Bruce v. Potomac Electric Power Co. Ct.
App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 A. 3d 177.
No. 17–1553. De La Cruz v. Kailer et al. Sup. Ct. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 819
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–1554. Bernstein v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 693 Fed.
Appx. 848.
No. 17–1555. Ornstein v. Bank of America, N. A., et al.
Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1557. Tortora v. Alvarez. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1560. Viggers v. Viggers. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1564. Cornelio v. Connecticut et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 41.
No. 17–1565. Geragos & Geragos, APC v. First Solar, Inc.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed.
Appx. 410.
No. 17–1569. Callwood, as Administratrix of the Estate
of Illidge v. Jones et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 552.
No. 17–1571. Marranca v. Loytsker. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1574. Sands v. Menard et al. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 WI 110, 379 Wis. 2d 1, 904
N. W. 2d 789.
No. 17–1576. Viggers v. Pacha et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1578. Bacquie v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 154
App. Div. 3d 648, 62 N. Y. S. 3d 425.
No. 17–1580. Solomon v. Desert Healthcare District
et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1582. Benoit et ux. v. St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc.
Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017–
101 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/8/17), 230 So. 3d 997.
No. 17–1584. Bartelt v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 WI 16, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906
N. W. 2d 684.
820 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1587. Bringman v. Johnson et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1588. Gerrard, as Temporary Administrator of
the Estate of White v. White, as Executor of the Estate
of White. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
342 Ga. App. XXV.
No. 17–1589. Hickerson v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U. S. A.,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882
F. 3d 476.
No. 17–1590. Integrated Technological Systems, Inc. v.
First Internet Bank of Indiana. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 1007.
No. 17–1591. Hoskins v. United States et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 696 Fed. Appx. 242.
No. 17–1595. Glorioso-Brandt v. Azar, Secretary of
Health and Human Services. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 792.
No. 17–1596. Francis et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 403.
No. 17–1598. Peffer et vir v. Stephens. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 256.
No. 17–1599. Ohio ex rel. Walgate et al. v. Kasich, Governor
of Ohio, et al. Ct. App. Ohio, 10th App. Dist., Franklin
County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017-Ohio-5528, 93
N. E. 3d 417.
No. 17–1600. Todd v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1601. Barone v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. Sup. Ct.
Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1603. Kelley v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 280.
No. 17–1605. Kinney v. Clark. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.,
Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1608. Holkesvig v. North Dakota. Sup. Ct. N. D.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 ND 17, 906 N. W. 2d 84.
ORDERS 821
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–1609. Best Auto Repair, Inc., et al. v. Universal
Insurance Group et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 875 F. 3d 733.
No. 17–1612. Hinds v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1613. Wiest v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 485.
No. 17–1615. MacPherson v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
702 Fed. Appx. 621.
No. 17–1617. Ace Partners, LLC, dba TC’s Pawn Co. v.
Town of East Hartford, Connecticut, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 190.
No. 17–1619. Morris v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. Sup.
Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1620. E. B. v. Wicomico County Department of
Social Services et al. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 456 Md. 428, 174 A. 3d 372.
No. 17–1621. Anderson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1622. Dennis v. Sessions, Attorney General.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed.
Appx. 34.
No. 17–1626. Assadian v. Parsi et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1627. Lee, Warden v. Clinard. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 552.
No. 17–1628. Myoungchul Shin et al. v. Uni-Caps, LLC,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699
Fed. Appx. 681.
No. 17–1629. Yan Sui et al. v. Marshack. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 642.
822 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1630. Yan Sui et al. v. Marshack et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1631. T. B. et vir v. P. M. et ux. Sup. Ct. Iowa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 907 N. W. 2d 522.
No. 17–1632. McGuirk v. Swiss Re Financial Services
Corp. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
699 Fed. Appx. 55.
No. 17–1634. Teamah v. Applied Materials, Inc. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 343.
No. 17–1635. Tri-Cities Holdings LLC et al. v. Tennessee
Administrative Procedures Division et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 298.
No. 17–1637. Doe v. Holcomb, Governor of Indiana, et al.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d
971.
No. 17–1639. Streambend Properties II, LLC, et al. v.
Ivy Tower Minneapolis, LLC, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 701 Fed. Appx. 544.
No. 17–1640. Mira v. Kingston et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 28.
No. 17–1642. Heredia v. Walmart Stores Texas, LLC.
Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1643. Nolan v. Department of Energy. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1644. Xiu Jian Sun v. City of New York Human
Resources Administration et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1645. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc.
et al. v. Arctic Cat Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 876 F. 3d 1350.
No. 17–1646. Lyon v. Canadian National Railway Co.
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1648. GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 905.
ORDERS 823
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–1650. Town of Kearny, New Jersey v. New Jersey
Sports and Exposition Authority. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1651. Bates et ux. v. Village of Pentwater, Michigan.
Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1652. Credit One Bank, N. A. v. Anderson. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 382.
No. 17–1653. Town Center Flats, LLC v. ECP Commercial
II LLC. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727
Fed. Appx. 114.
No. 17–1658. Lyles v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 953.
No. 17–1659. Vicks et ux. v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704
Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 17–1661. Harteld et al. v. Eighth Judicial District
for Nevada, Clark County, et al. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 40, 412 P. 3d 23.
No. 17–1662. Aspen Insurance (UK) Ltd. et al. v. Black &
Veatch Corp. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 882 F. 3d 952.
No. 17–1663. Checkseld v. Berg. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 148
App. Div. 3d 1376, 49 N. Y. S. 3d 205.
No. 17–1664. Gregory v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 838.
No. 17–1665. Dixon v. East Coast Music Mall et al. App.
Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 178 Conn. App.
901, 171 A. 3d 1113.
No. 17–1666. Diveglia v. Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing. Commw. Ct.
Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 174 A. 3d 1212.
No. 17–1667. Creative Vision Resources, L. L. C. v. National
Labor Relations Board. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 510.
824 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1668. Nashville Downtown Platinum, LLC v.
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency. Ct. App.
Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1670. Oskoui v. Acosta, Secretary of Labor. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 Fed. Appx. 908.
No. 17–1671. Midamines SPRL Ltd. et al. v. KBC Bank
N. V. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719
Fed. Appx. 41.
No. 17–1674. Yufa v. TSI Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 905.
No. 17–1675. McIntosh v. Estate of Turner, Deceased.
Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1677. Bradley v. West Chester University of the
Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 643.
No. 17–1680. Bustamante v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 703 Fed. Appx. 537.
No. 17–1681. Tanner-Brown et al. v. Zinke, Secretary of
Interior, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 709 Fed. Appx. 17.
No. 17–1682. Branum et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 428.
No. 17–1683. Brooks v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 872 F. 3d 78.
No. 17–1684. France v. Patrick. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1685. Mamakos et al. v. Town of Huntington, New
York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
715 Fed. Appx. 77.
No. 17–1687. Suhl v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 1106.
No. 17–1688. Ozark Materials River Rock, LLC v. Benham.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885
F. 3d 1267.
ORDERS 825
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–1689. Persaud v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 86.
No. 17–1690. Cooney v. Barry School of Law, aka Dwayne
O. Andreas School of Law. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 571.
No. 17–1691. Baylay v. Etihad Airways P. J. S. C. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 1032.
No. 17–1694. Xiu Jian Sun v. Schneiderman, Attorney
General of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1695. California State Teachers’ Retirement
System et al. v. Alvarez et al. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 179 A. 3d 824.
No. 17–1696. Lewis v. Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1697. Marshall v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 706 Fed.
Appx. 620.
No. 17–1706. Puiatti v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 551.
No. 17–1707. Nichia Corp. et al. v. Everlight Electronics
Co., Ltd., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 719 Fed. Appx. 1008.
No. 17–1708. Smith v. Loudoun County Public Schools.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed.
Appx. 194.
No. 17–1709. Kendall v. Olsen et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 970.
No. 17–1711. Hubbard v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan
Inc. et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
692 Fed. Appx. 425.
No. 17–1714. Tavares v. Bridgeloan Investors, Inc. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 241
So. 3d 154.
826 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1716. Henry et al. v. Cash Biz, LP, et al. Sup.
Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 551 S. W. 3d 111.
No. 17–1718. Deutsch v. Phil’s Icehouse, Inc., et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed.
Appx. 361.
No. 17–7297. Gonzalez Garibay v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 176.
No. 17–7335. Young v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 872 F. 3d 742.
No. 17–7476. Jungwirth v. Lee. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 246 So. 3d 104.
No. 17–7613. Harper v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 F. 3d 329.
No. 17–7640. Sams v. Quinn et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–7703. Oldham v. United States;
No. 17–8386. Norwood v. United States; and
No. 17–8393. Walker v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 702 Fed. Appx. 367.
No. 17–7732. Brown v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 477 Mass. 805, 81 N. E. 3d
1173.
No. 17–7801. Bagi v. City of Parma, Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 480.
No. 17–7873. Barinas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 865 F. 3d 99.
No. 17–7930. Boyer v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 863 F. 3d 428.
No. 17–7939. Castillo-Murion, aka Chairez v. United
States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714
Fed. Appx. 343.
No. 17–7970. Robinson v. United States; and
No. 17–7989. Martin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 872 F. 3d 760.
ORDERS 827
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–7988. Mathurin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 868 F. 3d 921.
No. 17–8008. Leon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 948.
No. 17–8041. Monteiro v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 871 F. 3d 99.
No. 17–8059. Beavers, aka Stokes, aka West v. United
States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8073. Cobo-Cobo v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 873 F. 3d 613.
No. 17–8170. Himes v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 690 Fed. Appx. 640.
No. 17–8180. Robertson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
715 Fed. Appx. 387.
No. 17–8198. Jacoby v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 642 Pa. 623, 170 A. 3d 1065.
No. 17–8202. Truelove v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 281.
No. 17–8224. Newmiller v. Raemisch, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 1178.
No. 17–8260. Grifn v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8270. Harris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 878 F. 3d 111.
No. 17–8274. Brandon v. Wilson, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 283.
No. 17–8280. King v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8292. Velasco v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
828 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–8298. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8331. Pabon v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 871 F. 3d 164.
No. 17–8345. Ward v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 165.
No. 17–8352. Martin v. Living Essentials, LLC. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8365. Donat v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8370. Flowers v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 492.
No. 17–8411. Chappell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 492.
No. 17–8413. Verwiebe v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 F. 3d 258.
No. 17–8418. Maxwell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 492.
No. 17–8421. Hutton v. Shoop, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 584.
No. 17–8432. Ali v. Allbaugh, Director, Oklahoma Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 824.
No. 17–8443. Sanchez Molinar v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 1064.
No. 17–8476. Scott v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 42.
No. 17–8485. Pannullo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 683.
No. 17–8524. Anthony v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 280.
No. 17–8527. Vega-Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 822 F. 3d 1031.
ORDERS 829
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–8543. Payne v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8553. Blankenship v. Pastrana, Warden. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8567. Sample v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8576. Johnson v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8587. Arjune v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 30 N. Y. 3d 347, 89 N. E. 3d
1207.
No. 17–8599. Shockley v. Grifth, Warden. Sup. Ct. Mo.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17– 8616. Harnden v. Michigan Department of
Health and Human Services et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8623. Nichol v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8624. Celaya-Cartajena, aka Alberto Rojaz v.
United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 673 Fed. Appx. 431.
No. 17–8629. Henry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 496.
No. 17–8632. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 226.
No. 17–8639. Javier Vergara v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 1309.
No. 17–8645. Prestegui v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8646. Medina v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jersey
State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8664. Padilla v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 817.
830 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–8666. Owens v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017–1258 (La. 11/13/17), 229 So. 3d 457.
No. 17–8668. Rotondo v. Gasparini. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 30 N. Y. 3d 1082, 92 N. E. 3d 1239.
No. 17–8670. Dingler v. Milestone Management et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8680. Williams v. McCain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8681. Walker v. United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8683. Barnett v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8686. Hutton v. Shoop, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8688. Assa’ad-Faltas v. City of Columbia, South
Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
420 S. C. 28, 800 S. E. 2d 782.
No. 17–8690. Bell v. Keeton, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8691. Barnett v. Sullivan, Acting Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8693. Bohannan v. Grifn et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 689 Fed. Appx. 377.
No. 17–8699. Lopez v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 974, 412 P. 3d 14.
No. 17–8703. Solis-Alonzo v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 863.
No. 17–8707. Noziska v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 696 Fed. Appx. 253.
No. 17–8708. Grant-Farley v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 831
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–8712. Alfred v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8716. Barnett v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698
Fed. Appx. 239.
No. 17–8717. Linder v. Haviland, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8718. Bell v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8722. W. P. v. West Virginia. Cir. Ct. Kanawha
County, W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8724. Whiteld v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 297.
No. 17–8725. Valdivia v. Frauenheim, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8730. Price v. Overmyer, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Forest, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8732. Naylor v. Harrell et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 697 Fed. Appx. 416.
No. 17–8733. Carney v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 11th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8737. Markham v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8748. Williams v. Clark et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 555.
No. 17–8750. Mills v. Sessions, Attorney General. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8751. Patterson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
832 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–8753. Klein v. Williams et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 631.
No. 17–8755. Mayes v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8756. Larose v. Missouri. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8761. Bargo v. United States et al. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 17.
No. 17–8764. Gubanic v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8768. Rodriguez v. Ratledge. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 261.
No. 17–8770. Evans v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 F. 3d 210.
No. 17–8773. Daniels v. United States et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8778. Smith v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 WI 2, 379 Wis. 2d 86, 905 N. W.
2d 353.
No. 17–8779. Dawson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8780. Caines v. Gastelo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8781. Taylor v. Jackson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8786. Deveaux v. Caldwell, Warden. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8789. Crowder v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8793. Russell v. Bielefeld et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 833
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–8795. Quiroz v. Moran et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 17–8799. Zeledon v. Hatton, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8808. Kessler v. Overmyer, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Forest. Sup. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8810. Ink, aka Ignacio v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8812. Naseman v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8815. Perez v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 232 So. 3d 527.
No. 17–8816. Ackerman et al. v. Bank of New York Mellon.
Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 149
Ohio St. 3d 1416, 2017-Ohio-4038, 75 N. E. 3d 235.
No. 17–8817. Collins v. Georgia. Super. Ct. Athens-Clarke
County, Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8820. Stone v. Johnson et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 103.
No. 17–8822. DuBois v. MWV Healthcare Assn., Inc.,
et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8824. Conner v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
et al.; and Conner v. United States Postal Service et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8827. Lacey v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 142352–U.
No. 17–8834. Walck v. Corizon Health Care Services
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8839. Thomas v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8841. Mantepan v. Derose et al. Sup. Ct. Fla.
Certiorari denied.
834 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–8842. Jackson v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 301 Ga. 774, 804 S. E. 2d 73.
No. 17–8843. Small v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8845. Eason v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 696 Fed. Appx. 630.
No. 17–8846. Ramey v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 447.
No. 17–8847. Satterwhite v. Frisch’s Restaurant et al.
Ct. App. Ohio, 10th App. Dist., Hamilton County. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8849. Hampton v. Straiger et al. Ct. App. Ariz.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8850. Hutson v. Giurbino, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8851. Young v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 153 App.
Div. 3d 1618, 61 N. Y. S. 3d 752.
No. 17–8856. Shank v. Corizon Health Services et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 Fed.
Appx. 414.
No. 17–8857. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 954.
No. 17–8865. Grazzini-Rucki v. Rucki. Ct. App. Minn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8867. Clopton v. Murphy, Judge, District Court
of Grayson County, Texas. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8869. Jordan v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8870. Kersey v. Prudential Insurance Company
of America. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8881. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 486.
ORDERS 835
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–8883. Swington v. City of Waterloo, Iowa, et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed.
Appx. 861.
No. 17–8887. Fortune v. Herring. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 680 Fed. Appx. 201.
No. 17–8888. Henry v. Caruso et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8892. Morrison v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 204.
No. 17–8894. Warner v. McLaughlin. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8895. Nyabwa v. Corrections Corporation of
America. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
703 Fed. Appx. 357.
No. 17–8896. Leonard v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 245 So. 3d 722.
No. 17–8900. Curry v. Klee, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 271.
No. 17–8901. Grogger v. Genovese, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8902. Ferguson v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8903. Heath v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8905. Israel v. Florida Department of Children
and Families et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8908. Martinez v. Robertson, Acting Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8909. Jaramillo v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 151
App. Div. 3d 1782, 53 N. Y. S. 3d 580.
No. 17–8911. Jones v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied.
836 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–8913. Stokes et al. v. First American Title Company
of Montana, Inc., et al. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 389 Mont. 245, 406 P. 3d 439.
No. 17–8915. Ramirez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 17– 8916. Soniat v. Department of Housing and
Urban Development et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8917. Gilbert v. Daniels et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 789.
No. 17–8918. Franklin v. Valenzuela, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8919. Garcia v. Pickett et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 521.
No. 17–8920. Fuentes v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8922. Duran v. Muse et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 833.
No. 17–8923. Evans v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8924. Murra v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 669.
No. 17–8927. Harris v. Vigil et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8928. Garcia v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8930. Horton v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8931. Howell v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8932. Flores v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 837
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–8935. Campbell v. New York City Transit Authority,
Adjudication Bureau. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8937. Ferguson-Cassidy v. City of Los Angeles,
California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 705 Fed. Appx. 611.
No. 17–8939. Terry v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 232 N. J. 218, 179 A. 3d 378.
No. 17–8947. Peterson v. Burris et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8948. Powell v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8949. Alexander v. Miller, Superintendent,
Great Meadow Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8953. Cruickshank v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 909.
No. 17–8956. Bonner v. Cumberland Regional High
School District. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8961. Harrington v. Winn, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8962. De Min Gu v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8963. Herbert v. CVS Pharmacy et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx. 698.
No. 17–8967. Merrick v. Brnovich, Attorney General of
Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8968. Moore v. Brewer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8970. Blakeney v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 F. 3d 1126.
No. 17–8971. Bartlett v. Pineda, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
838 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–8972. Brown v. California (two judgments). Ct.
App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8973. Jones v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 150821–U.
No. 17–8977. Slater v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717
Fed. Appx. 432.
No. 17–8983. Antonio Aldana v. Santoro, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8989. Brown v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8990. Bostic v. Davis et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8994. Amankrah v. Anglea, Acting Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 688 Fed. Appx. 455.
No. 17–8997. Turrieta v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 F. 3d 1340.
No. 17–8998. Luna-Barragan v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 639.
No. 17–8999. Reed v. Hartford Super 8 et al. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9002. Argon v. California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9004. Sturges v. Curtin, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9007. Bailey v. Gardner et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9010. Wimberly v. United States et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9012. Winston v. Bank of Nova Scotia, dba Scotia
Bank. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722
Fed. Appx. 138.
ORDERS 839
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9014. Oxner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 916.
No. 17–9015. Pittman v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 871 F. 3d 1231.
No. 17–9016. Prince v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2016–260 (La. App. 3 Cir.
2/1/17), 211 So. 3d 481.
No. 17–9018. Littlejohn v. Royal, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 875 F. 3d 548.
No. 17–9019. Johnson v. Mackie, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9022. Abdul-Salaam v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 644 Pa. 149, 174 A. 3d
1049.
No. 17–9024. Jacobs v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9025. Liddell v. New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9027. Lacayo v. Tanner, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9030. Curry v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 222.
No. 17–9031. Martin v. Wendy’s International, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714
Fed. Appx. 590.
No. 17–9032. Maxberry v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 997.
No. 17–9034. Taylor v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9035. Duma v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 159 A. 3d 1220.
840 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9036. Robinson v. Nevada System of Higher Education
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 692 Fed. Appx. 377.
No. 17–9040. Meredith v. O’Rourke, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 709 Fed. Appx. 392.
No. 17–9046. Hammonds v. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama
Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 841.
No. 17–9047. Albert v. State Bar of California. Sup. Ct.
Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9048. Pirela v. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 66.
No. 17–9051. Smith v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 37.
No. 17–9052. White v. Knight, Superintendent, Correctional
Industrial Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 260.
No. 17–9054. Towbridge v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9056. Conrad v. Mays, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9058. Carter v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 711 Fed. Appx. 176.
No. 17–9060. Barnett v. Laurel County, Kentucky, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9062. Bell v. U. S. Bank N. A. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 232 So. 3d 385.
No. 17–9063. Bell v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al. Sup. Ct. Fla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9064. Bell v. PLM L. P. et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 841
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9069. Degrate v. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court
of the United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 721.
No. 17–9071. Bailey v. White, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9072. Quinn v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9074. Chong v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 329.
No. 17–9075. Ramirez v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 303 Ga. 232, 811 S. E. 2d 416.
No. 17–9076. Brown v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 399.
No. 17–9077. Condon v. United States. C. A. Armed
Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 M. J. 244.
No. 17–9078. Arlotta v. Bank of America, N. A., et al.;
and Arlotta v. Diocese of Buffalo et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9079. Ruiz v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 185 A. 3d 718.
No. 17–9080. Reyes-Quintero v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 708.
No. 17–9081. Stinnett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 821.
No. 17–9084. Uptergrove v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 705 Fed. Appx. 620.
No. 17–9085. Westine v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 659.
No. 17–9087. Membreno-Arevalo v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx.
463.
No. 17–9088. Sanchez Rolon v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
842 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9089. Hirsch v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9090. Gagnon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9091. Humphreys v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.
Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 160 A. 3d
266.
No. 17–9092. Helton v. Pash, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9093. Davis v. York County Board of Supervisors
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707
Fed. Appx. 182.
No. 17–9094. Barrios v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 713.
No. 17–9095. Cruz Diaz v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 330.
No. 17–9096. Parum v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 502.
No. 17–9098. Martin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 325.
No. 17–9099. Longoria v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 327.
No. 17–9102. Horton v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9103. Gleason v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9104. Carmenate-Palencia, aka Giulian v. Sessions,
Attorney General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9106. Frazier v. Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9108. Hurd v. Lizarraga, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 843
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9109. Garringer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 894.
No. 17–9111. Girard v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9112. Guerrero v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9113. Hudgins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9114. Hardy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 262.
No. 17–9116. Howard v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9117. Franklin v. Hawley et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 307.
No. 17–9118. Williams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9119. Shue v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 133 Nev. 798, 407 P. 3d 332.
No. 17–9120. Glenewinkel v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9121. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9122. Gerebizza v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 302.
No. 17–9124. Gjuraj v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9125. Lewis v. Nogan, Administrator, East Jersey
State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9126. Arambul-Duran v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 352.
No. 17–9131. Pinet-Fuentes v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 557.
844 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9132. Waldrop v. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 900.
No. 17–9133. Verduzco v. Spearman, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 579.
No. 17–9135. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 994.
No. 17–9136. Terry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 939.
No. 17–9137. Alvarez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 F. 3d 640.
No. 17–9138. Hill v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9139. Yun v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 511.
No. 17–9140. Frie v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 209.
No. 17–9141. Haren v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9142. Hall v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 687 Fed. Appx. 906.
No. 17–9143. Holder v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 586 Fed. Appx. 82.
No. 17–9144. Honish v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9145. Maloy v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9146. Lewis v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9147. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 845
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9148. Frazier v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 249.
No. 17–9149. Green v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9150. Fortson v. Eppinger, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9152. Luma v. Florida Department of Revenue.
Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9153. Jones v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 231 So. 3d 374.
No. 17–9154. Bright v. Bryson, Commissioner, Georgia
Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9156. Turner v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 295 Va. 104, 809 S. E. 2d 679.
No. 17–9157. Harris v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 715.
No. 17–9158. Baskin v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 878 F. 3d 1106.
No. 17–9160. Topilina, aka Pinchuk v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed.
Appx. 689.
No. 17–9161. Bates v. Florida et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 98.
No. 17–9162. Perry v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 539.
No. 17–9163. Lopez-Cotto v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 1.
No. 17–9164. Pemberton v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 221.
No. 17–9165. Witherspoon v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9166. Harris v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 108.
846 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9167. Kryger v. South Dakota. Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 S.D. 13, 907 N. W. 2d 800.
No. 17–9168. Studhorse v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1198.
No. 17–9172. Ryan v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 449.
No. 17–9173. Suggs v. Florida et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 546.
No. 17–9174. Dabney v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 478 Mass. 839, 90
N. E. 3d 750.
No. 17–9176. Higgins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 678 Fed. Appx. 147.
No. 17–9177. Gowadia v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9178. Garcia-Esparza v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 697 Fed. Appx. 426.
No. 17–9179. Abel Grimaldo v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9180. Frederick v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9181. Gentile v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 911.
No. 17–9182. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9183. Hodge v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 254.
No. 17–9184. Garcia v. Burt, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9185. Guadarrama v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9186. Falkenhorst v. Harris County Children’s
Protective Services et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 228.
ORDERS 847
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9187. Murphy v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 689.
No. 17–9188. Mears v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 17–9189. Miltier v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 81.
No. 17–9190. Palmer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 230.
No. 17–9191. Meaux v. Louisiana. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 380.
No. 17–9192. Grose v. Outlaw, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9194. Gardner v. New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9195. Hood v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9196. Kalaba v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 17–9197. Janatsch v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 806.
No. 17–9198. Tafoya, aka Tapioa v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 401.
No. 17–9199. Bustamante v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 965.
No. 17–9200. Dasa v. Cain, Superintendent, Snake River
Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9202. Sorensen v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9203. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 632.
No. 17–9204. Rhodes v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 554.
848 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9205. Rosales-Aguilar v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 818 F. 3d 965.
No. 17–9206. Sweet v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 646.
No. 17–9207. Davis v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 69, 539 S. W. 3d 565.
No. 17–9208. Evans v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1154.
No. 17–9209. Allbrooks v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 256 N. C. App. 505, 808 S. E.
2d 168.
No. 17–9210. Buttercase v. Nebraska. Ct. App. Neb.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 Neb. App. xi.
No. 17–9211. Zaitsev v. Keller. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 200 Wash. App. 1003.
No. 17–9212. Wu v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 824.
No. 17–9213. Williams v. Kent, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9214. Krawczuk v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 873 F. 3d 1273.
No. 17–9215. Mathis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9216. Kennedy v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (4th)
150372–U.
No. 17–9217. Key v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 274.
No. 17–9219. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 492.
No. 17–9220. Heikkila v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 546.
ORDERS 849
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9222. Free v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 200 Wash. App. 1055.
No. 17–9224. Husband v. Ebbert, Warden, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9225. Frank v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 175 A. 3d 394.
No. 17–9227. Geray v. Muniz, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 678 Fed. Appx. 607.
No. 17–9228. Hamilton v. Brannon, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9229. Gladden v. Barber, Warden, et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 Fed. Appx. 128.
No. 17–9230. Farrar v. Peters, Director, Oregon Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 363.
No. 17–9231. Ford v. Doe et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 642.
No. 17–9232. Fawley v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 692 Fed. Appx. 736.
No. 17–9233. Hendrix v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9234. Levine v. State Bar of Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 303 Ga. 284, 811 S. E. 2d 349.
No. 17–9236. Channon v. United States; and
No. 17–9242. Channon v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 806.
No. 17–9237. Rice v. Montgomery, Acting Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 743.
No. 17–9241. Smith v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9243. Stephens v. Florida et al. Sup. Ct. Fla.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 94.
850 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9244. Johnson v. Mitchell, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 303.
No. 17–9245. Camilo Lopez v. Key, Superintendent, Airway
Heights Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9246. Marquardt v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 239 So. 3d 1251.
No. 17–9247. Cassiano v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 314.
No. 17–9249. Ramnaraine v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 749.
No. 17–9250. Flowers v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 820.
No. 17–9251. Karban v. Brnovich, Attorney General of
Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9252. Lucero v. Turco et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9253. Pierre v. Attorney Grievance Committee
for the First Judicial Department. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 31 N. Y. 3d 1043, 100 N. E. 3d 844.
No. 17–9254. Fraticelli v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 170 A. 3d 1246.
No. 17–9256. Grifth v. Blades, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9257. Follansbee v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9258. Garrett v. Paramo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9260. Colebrook v. CIT Bank. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 529.
No. 17–9261. Cromartie v. Alabama State University
et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 851
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9267. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 701.
No. 17–9268. Schneider v. Welker. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 243 So. 3d 374.
No. 17–9270. Steele v. Cheatham, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9271. Frank v. Rackley, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9272. Tippins v. Caruso et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9273. Tippins v. NWI–1, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9274. Anderson v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9275. Arias v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 804.
No. 17–9277. Zapata-Ochoa v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 407.
No. 17–9278. Cortez-Luna v. United States; and
No. 17–9402. Serrato-Navarro v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx.
394.
No. 17–9279. Udoh v. Dooley, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9280. Morton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 419.
No. 17–9281. Gray v. Gilmore, Superintendent, Correctional
Institution at Greene, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9282. Grable v. Turner, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9283. Ioane v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
852 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9285. Harwell v. Schweitzer, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9286. Harden v. Bowersox, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9287. Hollis v. Pster, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9288. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9289. Rodgers v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 268 So. 3d 636.
No. 17–9291. Sullivan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 946.
No. 17–9292. Styles v. Department of Veterans Affairs.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9293. Scott v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9294. Redic v. Rackley, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 695 Fed. Appx. 236.
No. 17–9296. Hastings v. Berghuis, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9297. Hamilton v. Strahota, Warden. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9298. Glover v. Woods, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9299. Galvan v. Stewart, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 705 Fed. Appx. 392.
No. 17–9300. Hawkins v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 208.
No. 17–9301. Fountain v. Rupert, Warden, et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 853
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9302. Howard v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 527 S. W. 3d 348.
No. 17–9303. Geotcha v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9304. Fabricant v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 677 Fed. Appx. 408.
No. 17–9305. Wright v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 Fed. Appx. 873.
No. 17–9307. Kirkpatrick v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 357.
No. 17–9308. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 1007.
No. 17–9309. Maxwell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9311. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 224.
No. 17–9312. Higley v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 715.
No. 17–9313. McMahon v. Neven, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9314. Miller v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 237 So. 3d 921.
No. 17–9315. Aguilar v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 246.
No. 17–9316. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 694 Fed. Appx. 770.
No. 17–9317. Hall v. City of Detroit, Michigan, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9318. Inman v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
854 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9319. Givens v. Allen, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9320. Hyde-el v. Poole. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 203.
No. 17–9321. Guzman v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9322. Haffer v. New Hampshire. Sup. Ct. N. H.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9325. Nelson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9327. Mallory v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed.
Appx. 132.
No. 17–9328. Maldonado-Zelaya v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 424.
No. 17–9329. Jeffries v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 283.
No. 17–9330. Melton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9331. Chasson, aka Alias, aka Hason v. Sessions,
Attorney General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9333. Thyberg v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 847.
No. 17–9334. Smith v. Myrick, Superintendent, Two Rivers
Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9335. Smith v. Cain, Superintendent, Snake River
Correctional Institution, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9336. Shefeld v. Burt, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 438.
No. 17–9337. Susalla v. Harry, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 855
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9338. Schnagl v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 907 N. W. 2d 188.
No. 17–9341. McLamb v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 685.
No. 17–9342. Medina-Avalos v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 434.
No. 17–9343. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 17–9344. England v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 798.
No. 17–9345. Laschkewitsch v. Transamerica Life Insurance
Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
714 Fed. Appx. 275.
No. 17–9346. Woodward v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 54 Kan. App. 2d xxxiii, 398 P. 3d 880.
No. 17–9347. Aldana et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 F. 3d 877.
No. 17–9348. Bowles v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 292.
No. 17–9349. Johnson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9350. Thi Houng Le v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 249.
No. 17–9351. Triplett v. Wyoming. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 WY 148, 406 P. 3d 1257.
No. 17–9352. Viola v. Bennett. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9354. Walker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9356. Walsh v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 288 Ore. App. 278, 406 P. 3d 123.
No. 17–9357. Deason v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
856 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9358. Graves v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 494.
No. 17–9359. Luna Valdez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9360. Booker v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 235 So. 3d 298.
No. 17–9361. Bell v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 235 So. 3d 287.
No. 17–9362. Dockery v. Clark, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Albion, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9363. McFarlin v. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court
of the United States, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 354.
No. 17–9364. Molina v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 181 A. 3d 412.
No. 17–9365. Okoh v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9367. Newberg v. Palmer et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 586.
No. 17–9368. Randle v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9370. Santamaria v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 464.
No. 17–9371. Sims v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9372. Cesar Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 470.
No. 17–9373. Reece v. Basi et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 685.
No. 17–9375. Dillbeck v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 558.
ORDERS 857
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9376. Duran v. Grounds, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 728.
No. 17–9380. Long v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 235 So. 3d 293.
No. 17–9381. Mayo v. Oppman et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9382. Lewis v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9383. Mitchell v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9385. Mayhew v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9386. Bradley v. Jones, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 238 So. 3d 95.
No. 17–9387. Tappen v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 708 Fed. Appx. 630.
No. 17–9388. Towne v. Vermont. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 VT 5, 206 Vt. 615, 182 A. 3d
1149.
No. 17–9389. Foster v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 290.
No. 17–9390. Martinez-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 407.
No. 17–9391. Jiyao Jiang v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 91.
No. 17–9392. Grant v. White et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 703 Fed. Appx. 523.
No. 17–9393. Gaspard et al. v. Drug Enforcement Administration
Task Force et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 382.
858 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9394. Farooq v. Russell, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9395. Hines v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9396. Houk v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 898 N. W. 2d 202.
No. 17–9397. Horsley v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 937.
No. 17–9398. Rock v. Executive Ofce Park of Durham
Assn., Inc. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
370 N. C. 585, 809 S. E. 2d 602.
No. 17–9401. Quince v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 233 So. 3d 1017.
No. 17–9403. Roby v. Demoura, Superintendent, Massachusetts
Correctional Institution at Concord. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9404. Burgett v. Porter et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 271.
No. 17–9405. Ivory v. Hubbard. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9406. Ingram v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9407. Isasi v. Annucci, Acting Commissioner, New
York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9408. Zogradis v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 41.
No. 17–9409. Sutton v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9410. Olivo Ramirez v. Hooks, Secretary, North
Carolina Department of Public Safety. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 179.
ORDERS 859
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9412. Hankishiyev v. ARUP Laboratories et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed.
Appx. 673.
No. 17–9414. Colton v. United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9415. Robinson v. South Carolina Department of
Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 706 Fed. Appx. 809.
No. 17–9416. Kelly v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9417. Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9418. Barton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 595.
No. 17–9419. Paige v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9420. Porter v. Joyner, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 227.
No. 17–9421. Obeginski v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 338 Ga. App. XXVII.
No. 17–9422. Nunn v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9423. Woods v. Arizona. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9424. McBride v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 285.
No. 17–9425. Moore v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 152 Ohio St. 3d 1419, 2018-Ohio-923, 93
N. E. 3d 1001.
No. 17–9426. Miller v. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9427. Carter v. Sherrill et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 111.
860 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9428. Johnson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9429. Manzo-Rios v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 773.
No. 17–9430. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 631.
No. 17–9431. Lawrence v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 240.
No. 17–9432. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9433. Junod v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9434. James v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 196.
No. 17–9435. Davis v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 235 So. 3d 301.
No. 17–9437. Morales-Velez v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9438. West v. Sessions, Attorney General. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9439. Windom v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 556.
No. 17–9440. Lister v. McGinley, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Coal Township, et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9441. Leon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 673.
No. 17–9442. Judy v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9444. Stephens et al. v. City of Englewood, New
Jersey, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 689 Fed. Appx. 710.
ORDERS 861
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9445. Suarez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 653.
No. 17–9448. Johnson v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9449. Cottrell v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 421 S. C. 622, 809 S. E. 2d
423.
No. 17–9450. Patterson v. Asuncion, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 936.
No. 17–9451. Morel et al. v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 17.
No. 17–9452. Myhre v. Seventh-Day Adventist Church
Reform Movement American Union International Missionary
Society et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 719 Fed. Appx. 926.
No. 17–9453. Prillerman v. Huggins et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9454. Halper v. Colorado. Dist. Ct. Colo., Ouray
County. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9455. Bolanos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 822.
No. 17–9456. Carroll v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 659.
No. 17–9457. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 883.
No. 17–9459. Peters v. Satkiewicz et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9460. McKnight v. Bishop, Warden, et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 151.
No. 17–9461. Bulovic v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co.,
LLC, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
698 Fed. Appx. 21.
No. 17–9462. Crawford v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
862 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9463. Rojas v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 240 So. 3d 701.
No. 17–9464. Peterson v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 IL 120331, 106 N. E. 3d 944.
No. 17–9466. Moore v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 150240–U.
No. 17–9470. Ildefonso v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 661.
No. 17–9471. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9472. Franco-De La Cruz v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 469.
No. 17–9473. Antonio Gonzalez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 404.
No. 17–9475. Heath v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 931.
No. 17–9476. Elghannam v. Educational Testing Service.
Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 171 A. 3d
185.
No. 17–9477. Grant v. Alperovich et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 703 Fed. Appx. 556.
No. 17–9478. Fisher v. Missouri. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9479. Wright v. Martin et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9481. Wyatt v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 242 So. 3d 363.
No. 17–9482. Weeks v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9483. Gregory v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 342 Ga. App. 411, 803 S. E. 2d 367.
No. 17–9485. LeBlanc-Simpson v. Maine. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 863
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9486. Kimball v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 716.
No. 17–9487. Rodriguez v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 Mass. App. 1115, 94 N. E.
3d 880.
No. 17–9488. Brown v. Illinois Department of Human
Services. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
717 Fed. Appx. 623.
No. 17–9489. Lebron v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9491. McKissick v. Deal, Governor of Georgia,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9492. Clark v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 99.
No. 17–9493. Damren v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 230.
No. 17–9494. Christian v. United States et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 306.
No. 17–9495. Burks v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 881 F. 3d 663.
No. 17–9496. Peterka v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 903.
No. 17–9497. Occhicone v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 299.
No. 17–9498. Hartley v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 908.
No. 17–9499. Atwater v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 550.
No. 17–9500. Swinton v. Racette, Superintendent, Great
Meadows Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9502. Stevenson v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 235 Md. App. 749.
864 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9503. Rogers v. Liberty Bell Bank. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 147.
No. 17–9504. Ray v. McCollum, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 517.
No. 17–9505. Dotson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9506. Walker v. Howell, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 760.
No. 17–9507. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 492.
No. 17–9508. Dove v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9509. Estremera v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9510. Walls v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 96.
No. 17–9511. Knapp v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9512. Jones v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 21.
No. 17–9513. Lykins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9514. Wagner v. Ford, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9515. Walton v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9516. Taulbee v. Noble, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9517. DeNoma v. Kasich, Governor of Ohio, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9518. Carpenter v. White et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 553.
ORDERS 865
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9519. Hardin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 281.
No. 17–9520. Phillips v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 547.
No. 17–9521. Herrington v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App.
Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9522. Horton v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9523. Brekhus v. City of Bismarck, North Dakota.
Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 ND 84,
908 N. W. 2d 715.
No. 17–9524. Crumble v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 878 Fed. Appx. 656.
No. 17–9525. Wall v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 3 Cal. 5th 1048, 404 P. 3d 1209.
No. 17–9526. Cruz v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 724 Fed. Appx. 875.
No. 17–9527. Javier Jasso v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 729.
No. 17–9528. Lopez-Fuentes v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 341.
No. 17–9529. Edenstrom v. Thurston County, Washington,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
715 Fed. Appx. 752.
No. 17–9531. Hays v. Soto, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9532. Hubbard v. Haviland, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9533. Fox v. Tripp et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 787.
No. 17–9534. Fletcher v. Lengerich, Warden, et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 702 Fed.
Appx. 795.
866 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9536. Kokal v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 907.
No. 17–9537. Marquard v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 560.
No. 17–9539. Hood v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9540. Farmer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 218.
No. 17–9541. Fritz v. Burt, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9542. Grifth v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9543. Solis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 632.
No. 17–9544. Reed v. Ford, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9545. Stein v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 237 So. 3d 919.
No. 17–9546. Raleigh v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 239 So. 3d 1185.
No. 17–9547. Caukin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9548. Willacy v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 100.
No. 17–9550. Torres v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9551. McClure v. Oregon Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 288 Ore. App. 702, 406 P. 3d 241.
No. 17–9552. Morris v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 324.
No. 17–9553. Merriweather v. United States. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 498.
ORDERS 867
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9554. Nelson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 308.
No. 17–9555. Melton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 234.
No. 17–9557. Orozco v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 504.
No. 17–9558. Avalos v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9561. Polk v. Hill, Acting Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx. 688.
No. 17–9562. Taylor v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 342 Ga. App. 814, 805 S. E. 2d 131.
No. 17–9563. Ingram v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9564. Jackson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 905.
No. 17–9565. Chatman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9566. Pinkney v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 876 F. 3d 1290.
No. 17–9567. Brown v. Del Norte County, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9569. Bradeld v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 838.
No. 17–9570. Davis v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 235 So. 3d 295.
No. 17–9571. Cuevas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 436.
No. 17–9573. Hodges v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 241.
No. 17–9574. Flowers v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 907 N. W. 2d 901.
868 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9575. Gonzalez v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 240 So. 3d 629.
No. 17–9576. Pellum v. Fisher et al. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 233 Md. App. 755 and 762.
No. 17–9577. McKinney v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 827.
No. 17–9578. McClinton v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 116, 542 S. W. 3d 859.
No. 17–9579. Russell v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 299 Neb. 483, 908 N. W. 2d 669.
No. 17–9580. Johnson v. Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9581. Velo-Cano v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 352.
No. 17–9582. Corker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9583. Winters v. Cincinnati Insurance Co. Ct.
App. Utah. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9584. Shaman v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9585. Hatcher v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9586. Zenquis v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9587. Gamble v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 288.
No. 17–9588. Finney v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 279.
No. 17–9590. Fox v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9591. Hardy v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 869
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 17–9592. Martinez-Hernandez v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed.
Appx. 358.
No. 17–9593. Knox v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1262.
No. 17–9594. Kraskey v. Groschen. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9595. Sharnese v. Lopez et al. Ct. App. Tex., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–1. C. G. v. Deborah Heart and Lung Center et al.
Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–3. Ohlendorf et al. v. Local 876, United Food &
Commercial Workers International Union. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 636.
No. 18–4. Giancarlo et al. v. UBS Financial Services,
Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
725 Fed. Appx. 278.
No. 18–5. Riley v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 4th App. Dist.,
Washington County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017-
Ohio-5819.
No. 18–6. McNeil v. Marsh et al. Ct. Civ. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–9. Washington v. Azar, Secretary of Health and
Human Services. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 717 Fed. Appx. 279.
No. 18–10. Anderson et ux. v. Rainsdon, Chapter 7
Trustee. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–11. Kan-Di-Ki, LLC, dba Diagnostic Laboratories
v. Sorensen et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 723 Fed. Appx. 432.
No. 18–13. Francisco Maldonado v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex.,
13th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–19. Republic of Korea’s Defense Acquisition
Program Administration et al. v. BAE Systems Solution &
870 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
Services, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 884 F. 3d 463.
No. 18–20. Bangiyev v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 116.
No. 18–21. Allergan Sales, LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed.
Appx. 991.
No. 18–22. Young Sung Lee et al. v. Garvey. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 11.
No. 18–23. Stolz, dba Royce International Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Commission. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 234.
No. 18–24. Hyland v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885
F. 3d 482.
No. 18–25. Mandel v. Thrasher et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 186.
No. 18–26. Schaer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
707 Fed. Appx. 751.
No. 18–27. Estate of Jackson et al. v. Schron. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 873 F. 3d 1325.
No. 18–28. Balding v. Sunbelt Steel Texas, Inc., et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed.
Appx. 742.
No. 18–30. Byrd v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 697 Fed. Appx. 431.
No. 18–31. Beck v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 Fed.
Appx. 691.
No. 18–32. Philadelphia Taxi Assn., Inc., et al. v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 886 F. 3d 332.
No. 18–33. Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc. v. Rahmany
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717
Fed. Appx. 752.
ORDERS 871
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–34. San Martin v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 930.
No. 18–38. Erwin v. Department of the Army. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx.
1019.
No. 18–40. Legacy Community Health Services, Inc. v.
Smith, Executive Commissioner, Texas Health and Human
Services Commission. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 881 F. 3d 358.
No. 18–41. Baptiste v. Gray. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–43. Loor v. Bailey et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 992.
No. 18–44. Kwok et al. v. Mingo Energy, LLC. Ct. Civ.
App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 OK CIV
APP 33, 417 P. 3d 393.
No. 18–45. Whitehead v. Netix et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–46. City of Middletown, Connecticut, et al. v.
McKinney. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
712 Fed. Appx. 97.
No. 18–47. McClary et al. v. Commodores Entertainment
Corp. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 879 F. 3d 1114.
No. 18–49. Plumb et al. v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al. Ct.
App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 1 Wash. App.
2d 1045.
No. 18–51. Francis et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–52. Leitner-Wise v. LWRC International, LLC,
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711
Fed. Appx. 646.
No. 18–53. Dillard v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 758.
872 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–54. Dabbs v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland.
Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 458 Md. 331,
182 A. 3d 798.
No. 18–55. Digital Ally, Inc. v. Taser International, Inc.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed.
Appx. 1023.
No. 18–57. Vallejos v. Lovelace Medical Center et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 696 Fed.
Appx. 923.
No. 18–58. Price v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 18–59. Pineiro Perez et al. v. BP, P. L. C., et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed.
Appx. 360.
No. 18–60. Gunn v. North Dakota. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 ND 95, 909 N. W. 2d 701.
No. 18–62. Colbry et al. v. Von Pier, Director, New Jersey
Division of Child Protection and Permanency, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–63. Briggs v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714
Fed. Appx. 712.
No. 18–65. Aronstein et al. v. Thompson Creek Metals
Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 711 Fed. Appx. 489.
No. 18–66. Ross v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–68. Conforto v. Spencer, Secretary of the Navy,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712
Fed. Appx. 669.
No. 18–69. Yan Ping Xu v. City of New York, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700
Fed. Appx. 62.
No. 18–70. Cosby v. Dickinson. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.,
Div. 8. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 Cal. App. 5th 655,
225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430.
ORDERS 873
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–71. Canete v. Barnabas Health System et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed.
Appx. 168.
No. 18–72. DRK Photo v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 394.
No. 18–74. Zovko et al. v. National Credit Union Administration
Board. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 728 Fed. Appx. 567.
No. 18–75. Jian Long Dong, aka Jian Rong Dong v. Sessions,
Attorney General. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–76. George et al. v. Hargett, Tennessee Secretary
of State, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 879 F. 3d 711.
No. 18–79. Klein et al. v. O’Brien et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 754.
No. 18–80. Melvin v. O’Rourke, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
714 Fed. Appx. 1002.
No. 18–82. Cotman et al. v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 342 Ga. App. 569, 804 S. E. 2d
672.
No. 18–83. Busch et al. v. Nappier et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 571.
No. 18–85. Stuart v. Ryan et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 232 So. 3d 418.
No. 18–87. Samson, Trustee for the Heirs and Next of
Kin of Samson, Deceased v. Gordon et al. Ct. App. Minn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–90. Colonial School District v. Rena C. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 404.
No. 18–91. Pizzino v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., dba Norwegian
Cruise Line. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 709 Fed. Appx. 563.
No. 18–92. Perry v. Kriegman. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 922.
874 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–94. Thomas v. Delmarva Power & Light Co. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 301.
No. 18–95. Wentzell et al. v. BP America, Inc., et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–100. Drane v. Sellers, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–101. Evers v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 322.
No. 18–102. White et al. v. Foster et al. Sup. Ct. N. H.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–103. Van v. Language Line LLC et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 349.
No. 18–104. Tuerk v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–105. Sabeniano v. Citibank, N. A., et al. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–111. Barrett v. Minor. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–117. Grimm v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 458 Md. 602, 183 A. 3d 167.
No. 18–120. Hernandez v. Bailey et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 298.
No. 18–126. Grimstad v. Deschutes County, Oregon,
et al. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–130. Karr v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 96 N. E. 3d 126.
No. 18–131. Lyndon v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714
Fed. Appx. 816.
No. 18–133. Moore v. Bramwell et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–134. Perkins v. US Airways, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 188.
ORDERS 875
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–135. New Products Corp. v. Tibble et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx.
379.
No. 18–137. Hunter v. District of Columbia. Ct. App.
D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 A. 3d 715.
No. 18–139. Freeman v. North Carolina Department of
Health and Human Services. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 370 N. C. 690, 811 S. E. 2d 597.
No. 18–141. Baroni v. CIT Bank N. A., fka OneWest Bank
FSB et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
710 Fed. Appx. 773.
No. 18–143. Bart v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 374.
No. 18–144. Baranski v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 951.
No. 18–145. Alston v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 422 S. C. 270, 811 S. E. 2d
747.
No. 18–146. Marcoski v. Rath. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 910.
No. 18–154. Rooks v. Brewer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–155. Brady v. Associated Press Telecom et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed.
Appx. 62.
No. 18–159. Clack v. United Services Automobile Assn.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed.
Appx. 356.
No. 18–160. Kinney v. United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–163. Teufel v. Northern Trust Co. et al. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 799.
No. 18–174. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance
Co., Inc. v. Citizens of Humanity, LLC, et al. Sup. Ct.
876 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 299 Neb. 545, 909
N. W. 2d 614.
No. 18–175. Applied Underwriters, Inc., et al. v. Citizens
of Humanity, LLC, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.,
Div. 2. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 Cal. App. 5th 806,
226 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1.
No. 18–178. SGK Properties, L. L. C., et al. v. U. S. Bank
N. A. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
881 F. 3d 933.
No. 18–179. Goodman v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 229 So. 3d 366.
No. 18–180. Tirrez v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline
et al. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–186. Silva-Ramirez v. Hospital Espanol Auxilio
Mutuo de Puerto Rico, Inc., et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–189. Smartash LLC v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 718 Fed. Appx. 985.
No. 18–190. Queen’s University at Kingston v. Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 680.
No. 18–191. Cassidy v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 479 Mass. 527, 96 N. E. 3d
691.
No. 18–193. Cannici v. Village of Melrose Park, Illinois,
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885
F. 3d 476.
No. 18–196. Supeno et al. v. Secretary, Vermont Agency
of Natural Resources. Sup. Ct. Vt. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 2018 VT 30, 207 Vt. 108, 185 A. 3d 1264.
No. 18–199. Liang v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 927.
No. 18–202. Haynes Timberland, Inc. v. United States.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 877
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–208. New Products Corp. et al. v. Dickinson
Wright, PLLC, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 890 F. 3d 244.
No. 18–216. Paixao et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 1203.
No. 18–219. Sewell v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed.
Appx. 212.
No. 18–221. Mouton v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 187, 547 S. W. 3d 76.
No. 18–226. Zahnd v. Ofce of Chief Disciplinary Counsel,
Supreme Court of Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–236. Weddle v. Nutzman et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 596.
No. 18–264. New World International, Inc., et al. v.
Ford Global Technologies, LLC, et al. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 1021.
No. 18–5001. Hancock v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5005. Dawkins v. Eckert, Superintendent, Wende
Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5006. Deuman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5007. Tua v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 18 Cal. App.
5th 1136, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143.
No. 18–5009. Drummond v. Sessions, Attorney General.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5010. Chang v. Andrews. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5011. Cardona v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 275.
No. 18–5012. Lightbourne v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 285.
878 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5013. Langley v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 960.
No. 18–5014. Allen v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5015. Aponte v. Tice, Superintendent, State Correctional
Institution at Smitheld, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5016. Brown v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 722.
No. 18–5018. Quince v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 241 So. 3d 58.
No. 18–5019. Seniw v. Connecticut General Assembly
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5021. Brown v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 289.
No. 18–5022. Watson, aka Seui, et al. v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 782.
No. 18–5023. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 166.
No. 18–5024. Dixon v. LeGrand, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 679 Fed. Appx. 571.
No. 18–5027. Wright v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5028. Edlind v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 166.
No. 18–5029. Black v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 4th Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 522 S. W. 3d 2.
No. 18–5031. Wallace v. Kauffman, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5032. Vasquez v. City of Reading, Pennsylvania,
et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 879
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5033. Dawson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 991.
No. 18–5034. Anderson v. North Dakota et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5035. Grazzini-Rucki v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5037. Hamilton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 276.
No. 18–5040. Sireci v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 916.
No. 18–5041. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5042. Sliney v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 310.
No. 18–5043. St. Amour v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 1009.
No. 18–5044. Angulo Riascos v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5045. Brown v. United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 199.
No. 18–5046. Magno Zamora v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5047. Tutt v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 766.
No. 18–5048. Taylor v. Brown, Superintendent, Wabash
Valley Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5049. Wells v. Peters et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5050. Whitney v. Trump, President of the United
States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
880 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5051. Derrick v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 231.
No. 18–5053. Lopez-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 992.
No. 18–5054. Jennings v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 909.
No. 18–5055. Stevens v. Vannoy, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 313.
No. 18–5056. Bouziden v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 653.
No. 18–5057. Bagby v. Hyatte, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5058. Drake v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 780.
No. 18–5059. Bedell v. Jordan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5060. Fotopoulos v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 911.
No. 18–5061. Horne v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5062. Hunter v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5063. Byers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5065. Antonio Rodriguez v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 918.
No. 18–5066. Ray v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5067. Stuhr v. White, Superintendent, Washington
Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5068. Taylor v. Lamanna, Acting Superintendent,
Bedford Hills Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 881
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5069. Uschock v. Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 81.
No. 18–5072. Evans v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 684.
No. 18–5073. Cruz-Colocho v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 381.
No. 18–5074. McLean v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 702 Fed. Appx. 81.
No. 18–5075. Okafor v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 352.
No. 18–5076. Melot v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5077. McCoy v. Maryland Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 286.
No. 18–5078. Pace v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 237 So. 3d 912.
No. 18–5079. Michaud v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 4 Cal. 5th 790, 415 P. 3d 717.
No. 18–5080. Pittman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 197.
No. 18–5081. Morton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 242.
No. 18–5082. Seda v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 719 Fed. Appx. 288.
No. 18–5083. Fulton v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 837 F. 3d 281.
No. 18–5084. Burns v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 234 So. 3d 555.
No. 18–5085. Williams v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 371 N. C. 111, 812 S. E. 2d
852.
882 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5086. Uzzle v. Fleming, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 611.
No. 18–5087. Wilson v. Paramo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5088. Johnson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 232.
No. 18–5089. Beamon v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 221.
No. 18–5091. Foster v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 So. 3d 294.
No. 18–5093. Caterbone v. Trump, President of the
United States, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5094. Sherry v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5095. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 318.
No. 18–5096. Tibbetts v. Kasich, Governor of Ohio, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d
447.
No. 18–5097. Torres v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 379.
No. 18–5098. Williams v. Curtin, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5099. Williams v. Los Angeles County Department
of Public Social Services et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 353.
No. 18–5100. Rahim v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 428.
No. 18–5102. Robinson v. Shaw, Warden, et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5103. Rieber v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 So. 3d 318.
ORDERS 883
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5104. Reed v. Garman, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5106. Stewart v. Holder et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 120.
No. 18–5107. Quinn v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5108. Davila-Reyes v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5109. Rankins v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 162145–U.
No. 18–5110. Spraggins v. Washburn, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5111. Gregory v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5112. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 405.
No. 18–5113. Hester v. Sprayberry. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5114. Faison v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 252.
No. 18–5115. Hayward v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 706 Fed. Appx. 646.
No. 18–5116. Gibbs v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 690 Fed. Appx. 130.
No. 18–5117. Frazier v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 80.
No. 18–5119. King v. King. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5120. Nelson v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5122. Overton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 238.
884 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5123. Parker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 289.
No. 18–5124. Pietri v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 235.
No. 18–5125. Foster v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 220.
No. 18–5126. Hamilton v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5127. Black v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5129. Trejo v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 396.
No. 18–5130. Watford v. Fossum et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 24.
No. 18–5131. Tu My Tong v. New Mexico et al. Ct. App.
N. M. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5133. Hopson v. Stark County, Ohio, et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5134. Fowlkes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5136. Illarramendi v. Securities and Exchange
Commission et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 703 Fed. Appx. 39.
No. 18–5138. Pennington v. Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 714 Fed. Appx. 609.
No. 18–5139. Runnels v. Bordelon, Warden. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 409.
No. 18–5140. M. P. F. v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 268 So. 3d 626.
No. 18–5141. Frederiksen v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 885
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5142. Heximer v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5143. Graham v. Hainsworth, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Somerset, et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5144. Gutierrez-Jaramillo v. Warden, Federal
Correctional Institution, Gilmer. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 311.
No. 18–5145. Bennett v. Wolfe et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 146.
No. 18–5146. Toghill v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 877 F. 3d 547.
No. 18–5148. Blalock v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App. Dist.,
Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017-
Ohio-2658.
No. 18–5149. Cubero v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5150. Correa-Diaz v. Sessions, Attorney General.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 523.
No. 18–5151. Yahnke v. North Dakota. Sup. Ct. N. D.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 ND 66, 908 N. W. 2d
134.
No. 18–5152. Howard v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 181.
No. 18–5153. Knifey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 406.
No. 18–5154. Ray v. Jefferson et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 885.
No. 18–5155. Qazi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5156. Battis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 967.
886 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5158. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5159. Golden v. Caldwell, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5161. Waddleton v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5162. Wells v. Potter, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5163. Thier v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 241 So. 3d 851.
No. 18–5165. Wilson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5166. Taylor v. Clark, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Albion, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5167. Brown v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5169. Davidson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5170. Khan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 236.
No. 18–5171. Lopez-Mendez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 507.
No. 18–5172. Marquez v. Filson, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 924.
No. 18–5173. Medina Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 205.
No. 18–5174. Grifn v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 So. 3d 237.
No. 18–5177. Majors v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 434.
ORDERS 887
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5178. Baltimore v. Buck. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5179. Johnson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 240 So. 3d 630.
No. 18–5180. Wen Liu v. University of Miami School of
Medicine. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
693 Fed. Appx. 793.
No. 18–5183. Holmes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5185. Zivot v. Superior Court of California, Contra
Costa County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., Div.
3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5186. Theresa v. Iancu, Director, United States
Patent and Trademark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 634.
No. 18–5187. Tavares v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5188. Wilks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 300.
No. 18–5189. Green v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 141.
No. 18–5192. McLaughlin v. Ohio Department of Job &
Family Services. Ct. App. Ohio, 10th App. Dist., Franklin
County. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5193. Brown v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5194. Brank v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 527.
No. 18–5195. Alvarez v. Spearman, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5196. Corbin v. Federal Express, dba FedEx.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed.
Appx. 319.
888 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5197. Dixit v. Dixit. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5198. Jones v. Grand Canyon University et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 703 Fed.
Appx. 612.
No. 18–5199. Lewis v. Hadari. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5200. Kruskal v. Meltzer et al. Ct. App. N. M.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5201. Lowe v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5202. Knowles v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5203. Mujahid v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 297.
No. 18–5204. Luis Morales v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 839.
No. 18–5205. Littles v. Roundtree. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5206. Oatman v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5207. Montoya v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5210. Espinoza v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 267.
No. 18–5211. Taylor B. v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5212. Blanc v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 1318.
No. 18–5214. McGinley v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 174 A. 3d 47.
No. 18–5215. Contreras Mejia v. Davis, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 889
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5216. Martin v. McLaughlin, Warden. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5218. Robertson v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2016–1742 (La. 4/6/18), 239
So. 3d 268.
No. 18–5219. Campbell v. Mendez et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 Fed. Appx. 575.
No. 18–5220. Libby v. Baker, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Nev.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 973, 409 P. 3d 889.
No. 18–5221. Guizamano-Cortes v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx.
984.
No. 18–5224. Costelon v. New Mexico. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 696.
No. 18–5225. Savage, aka Kamara v. United States. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 212.
No. 18–5226. Lugo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5227. Harris v. Estes, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5229. Neuman v. Nooth. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 613.
No. 18–5231. Odom v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5233. Alejandro Radillo et al. v. Ndoh, Warden,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708
Fed. Appx. 918.
No. 18–5235. Thomas v. Chandran. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 263.
No. 18–5237. Bland v. Gellman, Brydges & Schroff,
et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 151 App. Div. 3d 1484, 58 N. Y. S. 3d 225.
No. 18–5238. Wright v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 235.
890 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5239. Terrell v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App. Dist.,
Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2016-
Ohio-4563.
No. 18–5240. Ward v. Carter, Commissioner, Indiana Department
of Correction, et al. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 90 N. E. 3d 660.
No. 18–5241. Maturino v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 716.
No. 18–5242. Martin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 353.
No. 18–5243. Jacob v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5244. Jensen v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5245. Rios-Ramos v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5246. Rivers v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5247. McCray v. Burt, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5248. Payne, aka Power v. Publishers Clearing
House, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5249. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 700.
No. 18–5250. Marino v. Department of Justice et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5253. DeCiancio v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 333.
No. 18–5254. Young v. Oregon Department of Corrections
et al. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 288 Ore. App. 853, 406 P. 3d 619.
No. 18–5255. Gibson v. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 126.
ORDERS 891
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5256. Moragne-El v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 179 A. 3d 613.
No. 18–5257. Melvin v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 240 So. 3d 677.
No. 18–5258. Miller v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5259. Nowlin v. Shannon et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5260. McGlocklin v. Blankenship et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5261. Patterson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5264. Jenkins et al. v. WMC Mortgage et al. Ct.
App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 184 A. 3d 851.
No. 18–5266. Ferguson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 745.
No. 18–5267. Waters v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1022.
No. 18–5269. St. Hubert v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1319.
No. 18–5270. Deem v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5272. Ben-Ari v. United States; and Ben-Ari v.
United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5273. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 209.
No. 18–5274. Vega v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 905.
No. 18–5275. Counts v. Wilson, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 779.
892 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5276. Clark v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5278. Collings v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 543 S. W. 3d 1.
No. 18–5279. Hayhoe v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 179.
No. 18–5280. Lanier v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 141.
No. 18–5281. Mosley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 267.
No. 18–5282. Moss v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5283. McGowan v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5284. Small v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5286. Suleitopa v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 233.
No. 18–5287. Salas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5290. Long v. Robinson, Administrator, Northern
State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5291. Ballard v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 757.
No. 18–5292. Angeles v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 624.
No. 18–5293. Autobee v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 701 Fed. Appx. 710.
No. 18–5294. Pridgen v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 171.
No. 18–5295. Pedraza v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 893
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5297. Robinson v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5299. Smith v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 257 N. C. App. 389, 808 S. E.
2d 621.
No. 18–5300. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 227.
No. 18–5301. Clay v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1056.
No. 18–5302. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 334.
No. 18–5304. Sanchez Lopez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 445.
No. 18–5305. Johnson v. Copenhaver, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 756.
No. 18–5307. Hulen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 1015.
No. 18–5308. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 873.
No. 18–5309. McLain v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 171.
No. 18–5310. Rhodes v. Baker, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 947.
No. 18–5311. Reid v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 14.
No. 18–5312. Rowe v. Clark, Superintendent, State Correctional
Institution at Albion, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5315. Chambers v. Green Tree Servicing, L. L. C.,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715
Fed. Appx. 439.
No. 18–5316. Vaughan v. Vaughan et al. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 256 N. C. App. 398, 806 S. E.
2d 80.
894 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5317. Villanueva-Cardenas v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed.
Appx. 205.
No. 18–5318. Terry v. Stonebreaker, Warden. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 236.
No. 18–5319. Tolbert v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 319.
No. 18–5320. MacDonald v. Singer et al. Ct. App. Cal.,
2d App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5324. Laoutaris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 215.
No. 18–5325. Lasher v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5326. Lloyd v. Moats et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 490.
No. 18–5327. Makdessi v. Fields et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 148.
No. 18–5328. Anderson v. Larsen. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 190 Wash. 2d 1013, 415 P. 3d 1189.
No. 18–5329. Lockhart v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 743.
No. 18–5330. Kokal v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5332. Kemp v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 368.
No. 18–5333. Carmell v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
707 Fed. Appx. 295.
No. 18–5334. Crawford v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5335. Min Kwon v. Erie Insurance. Sup. Ct. Va.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 895
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5336. Lott v. Warren, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5337. Johnson v. Johnson, Administrator, New
Jersey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5338. King v. Erdos, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5339. James v. Snyder, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 789.
No. 18–5340. Wilson v. Federal Correctional Institution
at Cumberland et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 199.
No. 18–5341. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5342. Wilson v. Delta Airlines et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 90.
No. 18–5343. Wilson v. McKeesport Police Department
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731
Fed. Appx. 92.
No. 18–5344. Wilson v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 94.
No. 18–5345. Wilson v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 95.
No. 18–5346. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5347. Costic v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (3d) 140218–U.
No. 18–5348. Clack v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5349. Young v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 803.
No. 18–5350. Crider v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5351. Borhan v. Lizarraga, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
896 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5353. Berry v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 127.
No. 18–5354. Barwick v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 927.
No. 18–5355. Sanders v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5356. Ciria v. California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5358. Reynolds v. Stewart, Warden, et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5360. Clinton v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 153 Ohio St. 3d 422, 2017-Ohio-9423,
108 N. E. 3d 1.
No. 18–5361. Sayed v. Trani, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 691.
No. 18–5362. Qazi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 691.
No. 18–5363. Rendon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 712.
No. 18–5364. Austin v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 760.
No. 18–5365. Bruno v. City of Schenectady, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727
Fed. Appx. 717.
No. 18–5366. Martin v. Trierweiler, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 443.
No. 18–5367. Jones v. Schwarzenegger, Former Governor
of California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 523.
No. 18–5368. Werdene v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 204.
No. 18–5369. Taal v. St. Mary’s Bank et al. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 897
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5370. Juresic v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5371. Ellis v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 140613–U.
No. 18–5372. Bagwell v. Southern National Assets,
LLC. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 341
Ga. App. XXIII.
No. 18–5373. Sykes v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 488.
No. 18–5374. Hyman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 496.
No. 18–5375. Henriquez v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 4 Cal. 5th 1, 406 P. 3d 748.
No. 18–5377. Hutchinson v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 243 So. 3d 880.
No. 18–5378. Chavez-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 708.
No. 18–5379. Freeman v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 705
Fed. Appx. 513.
No. 18–5380. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 332.
No. 18–5382. Fiedler v. Brindley et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 396.
No. 18–5383. Shuman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5385. Bell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 217.
No. 18–5386. Alexander, aka Keenan v. New Jersey.
Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 233 N. J. 132,
183 A. 3d 903.
No. 18–5388. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 1049.
898 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5389. Rodgers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 217.
No. 18–5390. Rayyan v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 436.
No. 18–5392. Carter v. Blackmon, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 268.
No. 18–5394. Peebles v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1062.
No. 18–5396. McMillan v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 358 So. 3d 1154.
No. 18–5397. Parra-Ramos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 403.
No. 18–5404. Cooper v. Court of Appeal of California,
First Appellate District, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5405. Pimentel-Soto v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 99.
No. 18–5406. McDaniel v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 176 A. 3d 175.
No. 18–5407. Mitrovic v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 1217.
No. 18–5408. Serna v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5414. Deichert v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5416. Hammond v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App.
Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2017-Ohio-8574, 99 N. E. 3d 1262.
No. 18–5419. Grifn v. DiNapoli. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5421. Gaines v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 717 Fed. Appx. 289.
ORDERS 899
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5423. Seungjin Kim v. United States Customs and
Border Protection. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 729 Fed. Appx. 10.
No. 18–5426. Rivero v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 618.
No. 18–5427. Saint Louis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 145.
No. 18–5430. Bennett et ux. v. United States et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed.
Appx. 577.
No. 18–5431. Morris v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 405.
No. 18–5433. Atkins v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5436. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 740.
No. 18–5438. Tulin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 145.
No. 18–5439. Longoria v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 F. 3d 1278.
No. 18–5444. Buchanan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 717.
No. 18–5445. Pyles v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 1320.
No. 18–5452. Reid v. United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 281.
No. 18–5456. Kachina v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 587.
No. 18–5458. Taylor v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 418.
No. 18–5461. Henderson v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn.
Certiorari denied.
900 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5462. Senior v. Haynes, Superintendent, Stafford
Creek Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 882.
No. 18–5466. Wilson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 2d App. Dist.,
Montgomery County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017-
Ohio-8498.
No. 18–5467. Wyche v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 232 So. 3d 1117.
No. 18–5469. Dorton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5470. Bohlman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 425.
No. 18–5471. Gabriel Contreras v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx. 669.
No. 18–5473. Credico v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 116.
No. 18–5474. Garcia-Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 250.
No. 18–5480. Luster v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5482. Zepeda-Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 803.
No. 18–5483. Vandemerwe v. Langford, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5484. Washington v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5488. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5490. Lowe v. Virginia Department of Corrections.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723
Fed. Appx. 209.
No. 18–5497. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 704.
ORDERS 901
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5500. Reynolds v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5508. Darby v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 304.
No. 18–5510. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5511. Tarvin v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5515. Salemi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5516. Galbreath v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 310.
No. 18–5519. Templeton v. Amsberry, Superintendent,
Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5520. Sellers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 309.
No. 18–5521. Antonio Ramos v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 329.
No. 18–5522. Ray v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5524. Rochelle v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5525. Jouette v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 360.
No. 18–5526. Lough v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 291.
No. 18–5527. Alejandro Chavez v. United States. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 593.
No. 18–5528. Thurman v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 356.
No. 18–5532. Ruiz-Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 202.
902 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5533. Shannon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 356.
No. 18–5535. Schlieve v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 434.
No. 18–5539. Pelto v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5541. Stepp-Zafft v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 327.
No. 18–5542. Mayer v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5547. Estrada-Corrales v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 409.
No. 18–5550. Lopez-Pacheco v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 588.
No. 18–5552. Vega-Jimenez, aka Hernandez v. United
States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5554. Troche-Alvarado v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5555. Womack v. Adams et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5556. Barnes v. Landry, Attorney General of
Louisiana. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5559. Easter v. Amsberry, Superintendent, Eastern
Oregon Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 791.
No. 18–5561. Nieves-Galarza v. United States. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 159.
No. 18–5564. Curry v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 288 Ore. App. 703, 406 P. 3d 242.
No. 18–5565. Edwards v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 175 A. 3d 356.
ORDERS 903
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5576. Asar, aka Gist v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 280.
No. 18–5585. Mackey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 227.
No. 18–5587. Rosa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 403.
No. 18–5588. Sanchez-Jara v. United States. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 418.
No. 18–5593. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 771.
No. 18–5598. Moore v. Stephan, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 300.
No. 18–5599. Chi v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 184.
No. 18–5601. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 377.
No. 18–5604. Fidel Flores v. Montgomery, Acting Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727
Fed. Appx. 273.
No. 18–5605. Beyer v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 878 F. 3d 610.
No. 18–5606. Demirjian v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 888.
No. 18–5607. James v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5613. Sykes v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 150023, 96
N. E. 3d 468.
No. 18–5614. Santiago v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 135.
No. 18–5615. Chavira-Nunez v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 689 Fed. Appx. 896.
904 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5617. Bartunek v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5620. Zuniga v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5622. Walker v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5624. Villa-Sariana, aka Villa v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed.
Appx. 383.
No. 18–5630. Eure v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 238.
No. 18–5636. Searcy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 116.
No. 18–5638. Purnell v. St. Mary’s Hospital et al. Ct.
App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5640. Laux v. Zatecky, Superintendent, Pendleton
Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 890 F. 3d 666.
No. 18–5642. Fejfar v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 621.
No. 18–5646. Martin v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 342 Ga. App. XXVI.
No. 18–5647. Mares v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (2d) 150565, 98
N. E. 3d 554.
No. 18–5651. Swoopes v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 732.
No. 18–5653. Bravebull v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 897.
No. 18–5654. Daniels v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5658. Brown v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 614.
ORDERS 905
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5663. Dale v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 503.
No. 18–5665. Cabrera v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5667. Browne v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 751.
No. 18–5673. Smalls v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 307.
No. 18–5675. Pate v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 228.
No. 18–5678. Paul v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 1099.
No. 18–5679. O’Brien v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 38.
No. 18–5680. McGee v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 346.
No. 18–5682. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 620 Fed. Appx. 365.
No. 18–5684. Verduzco-Rangel v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 918.
No. 18–5685. Patterson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5686. Mundle v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx. 70.
No. 18–5693. Kay v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 750.
No. 18–5696. Croft v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, 100
N. E. 3d 577.
No. 18–5699. Boyd v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 679.
No. 18–5701. Aguiar v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
906 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5706. Islas-Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 511.
No. 18–5708. Arnold v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5709. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5710. Amor v. United States ex rel. Pena et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5715. Sweeney v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 232.
No. 18–5717. Savanh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 931.
No. 18–5721. Levy v. Parris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 960.
No. 18–5725. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 60.
No. 18–5729. Diaz v. Hurwitz, Director, Federal Bureau
of Prisons, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 716 Fed. Appx. 98.
No. 18–5731. Cox v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5732. LaConte v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5736. Moses v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5739. Kinchen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5744. Clark v. Berry, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5745. Molina v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5748. Meeks v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 907
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–5751. Burke v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 302 Ga. 786, 809 S. E. 2d 765.
No. 18–5752. Causey v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5754. Campillo Restrepo v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5756. Blevins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5757. Berry v. Nicholson, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5759. Castellanos v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 359.
No. 18–5766. Jian-yun Dong v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 180.
No. 18–5775. Hogan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 373.
No. 18–5776. Placeres-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 297.
No. 18–5778. DePriest v. Bondi, Attorney General of
Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5780. Capra v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 811.
No. 18–5788. Dutschke v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5789. Thompson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5790. Teaupa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5795. Antonio Ibarra v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 336.
No. 18–5822. Keene v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (5th) 140553–U.
No. 18–5854. Lambright v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 243 Ariz. 244, 404 P. 3d 646.
908 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1353. Fort Peck Housing Authority et al. v. Department
of Housing and Urban Development et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 881 F. 3d 1181.
No. 17–1375. Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural
Labor Relations Board. Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of National
Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center
et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 3 Cal. 5th 1118, 405 P. 3d 1087.
No. 17–1397. Spencer v. Abbott et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 731 Fed.
Appx. 731.
No. 17–1438. Noble Energy, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co.
Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part
in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
532 S. W. 3d 771.
No. 17–1449. Arizona v. Rushing. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motion
of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 243 Ariz. 212, 404 P. 3d 240.
No. 17–1478. Jones v. Life Insurance Company of North
America et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 584.
No. 17–1487. Cook et al. v. Harding et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motions of Concerned United Birthparents, Inc., et al.; American
Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al.; and
10 Feminist Academics and Advocates for leave to fle briefs as
amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879
F. 3d 1035.
No. 17–1592. Makah Indian Tribe v. Quileute Indian
Tribe et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of United Catcher Boats for
leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 873 F. 3d 1157.
No. 17–1602. Pickard v. Department of Justice. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the
ORDERS 909
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 713
Fed. Appx. 609.
No. 17–1616. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Merus
N. V. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of Seven Chicago Patent Lawyers
for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 864 F. 3d 1343.
No. 17–1633. Children’s Hospital Los Angeles et al. v.
N. L., a Minor, By and Through his Guardian ad Litem,
Arce. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of California Hospital Association
et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 433.
No. 17–1638. Sanchez et al. v. Young County, Texas,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of National Alliance on Mental
Illness of Texas et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 866 F. 3d 274.
No. 17–1669. Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp.
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 875 F. 3d 651.
No. 17–1698. Pacetta, LLC, et al. v. Town of Ponce Inlet,
Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Motion of Cato Institute
et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 226 So. 3d 303.
No. 17–6853. Paracha v. Trump, President of the United
States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition. Reported below: 697 Fed. Appx. 703.
No. 17–7974. Williams v. Jarvis, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 17–8457. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 720 Fed.
Appx. 946.
No. 17–8480. Couchman v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consid910
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
eration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 720 Fed.
Appx. 501.
No. 17–8752. Oliver v. Link, Superintendent, State Correctional
Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 17–9086. Wade v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx.
822.
No. 17–9100. Kleinman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of Fully Informed Jury Association for leave to fle brief
as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
880 F. 3d 1020.
No. 17–9101. DeCarlo v. True, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari before judgment denied.
No. 17–9115. Ghailani v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Gorsuch
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 17–9123. Gregory v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 17–9170. Safford v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 707 Fed.
Appx. 571.
No. 17–9369. Stuckey v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 878
F. 3d 62.
No. 17–9374. Carter v. Kane et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 105.
No. 17–9568. Adams v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari before judgment denied.
ORDERS 911
586 U. S. October 1, 2018
No. 18–8. Cohen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 685 Fed. Appx. 609.
No. 18–17. Keister v. Bell et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion
of Alliance Defending Freedom et al. for leave to fle brief as
amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879
F. 3d 1282.
No. 18–97. Liu, Individually and as Successor in Interest
to Liu, Deceased v. Janssen Research & Development,
LLC. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition.
No. 18–170. Gentry v. Tennessee et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Motion of petitioner to expedite consideration of petition for writ
of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5357. Redifer v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 728 Fed.
Appx. 804.
No. 18–5381. Handy v. Johnson & Johnson et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 724
Fed. Appx. 218.
No. 18–5428. Barraquias v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
No. 18–5536. Pacheco v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 884 F. 3d
1031.
No. 18–5538. Gieswein v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan and Justice Gorsuch took
no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 887 F. 3d 1054.
No. 18–5578. Akel v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
912 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 1, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5644. Delva v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 704 Fed.
Appx. 8.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–1532. Kramer v. United States et al., 584 U. S.
1034;
No. 17–6892. Wilford v. United States, 585 U. S. 1033;
No. 17–7141. Young v. Ocasio, Warden, 585 U. S. 1019;
No. 17–7633. Devlin v. Montana, 584 U. S. 907;
No. 17–7830. In re Aldridge et ux., 583 U. S. 1178;
No. 17–7885. Grifn et al. v. Hess Corp., aka Amerada
Petroleum Corp., et al., 584 U. S. 910;
No. 17–8230. West v. Berghuis, Warden, 584 U. S. 1005;
No. 17–8231. Wheeler v. Davis, 584 U. S. 995;
No. 17–8319. Doremus v. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner
for Operations, Social Security Administration,
584 U. S. 1006;
No. 17–8444. Flores Gonzalez v. Florida et al., 584 U. S.
1017;
No. 17–8471. Blair v. Yum! Brands, Inc., et al., 585 U. S.
1006;
No. 17–8534. Starks v. Parball Corp., dba Bally’s Las
Vegas, 584 U. S. 1037;
No. 17–8627. Arlotta v. Cook Moving System, Inc., et al.,
585 U. S. 1026;
No. 17–8653. Mabry v. Virginia, 584 U. S. 1017;
No. 17–8840. Johnston v. United States, 584 U. S. 1039;
and
No. 17–8975. Buxton v. Estock, Acting Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Mercer, et al., 585 U. S.
1023. Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 17–1321. Granton v. Washington State Lottery, 584
U. S. 951;
No. 17–7074. Carter v. Labor Ready Mid-Atlantic, Inc.,
et al., 583 U. S. 1128; and
No. 17–8938. Gills v. United States, 585 U. S. 1009. Motions
for leave to fle petitions for rehearing denied.
ORDERS 913
586 U. S. October 5, 9, 2018
October 5, 2018
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–114. Rollyson v. O’Neal et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below:
729 Fed. Appx. 254.
October 9, 2018*
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 17–1428. Niang et al. v. Tomblinson et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated, and case remanded to
that court with instructions to direct the District Court to dismiss
the case as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340
U. S. 36 (1950). Reported below: 879 F. 3d 870.
No. 17–8381. Frazier v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. 148
(2018). Reported below: 878 F. 3d 508.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18A335. Brakebill et al. v. Jaeger, North Dakota
Secretary of State. Application to vacate the stay entered
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on
September 24, 2018, presented to Justice Gorsuch, and by him
referred to the Court, denied.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Kagan joins,
dissenting.
I would grant the application to vacate the Eighth Circuit's stay
because last-minute “[c]ourt orders affecting elections, especially
conficting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and
consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). The risk of voter
confusion appears severe here because the injunction against requiring
residential-address identifcation was in force during the
*Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the
orders announced on this date.
914 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
primary election and because the Secretary of State's website
announced for months the ID requirements as they existed under
that injunction. Reasonable voters may well assume that the IDs
allowing them to vote in the primary election would remain valid
in the general election. If the Eighth Circuit's stay is not vacated,
the risk of disfranchisement is large. The Eighth Circuit
observed that voters have a month to “adapt” to the new regime.
But that observation overlooks specifc factfndings by the District
Court: (1) 70,000 North Dakota residents—almost 20% of the turnout
in a regular quadrennial election—lack a qualifying ID; and
(2) approximately 18,000 North Dakota residents also lack supplemental
documentation suffcient to permit them to vote without
a qualifying ID. Although the unchallenged portion of the injunction
permitting the use of more informal supplemental documents
somewhat lessens this concern, that relief, by itself,
scarcely cures the problem given the all too real risk of grandscale
voter confusion. True, an order by this Court vacating the
stay would be yet another decision that disrupts the status quo
as the election draws ever closer. But the confusion arising from
vacating the stay would at most lead to voters securing an additional
form of ID. That inconvenience pales in comparison to the
confusion caused by the Eighth Circuit's order, which may lead
to voters fnding out at the polling place that they cannot vote
because their formerly valid ID is now insuffcient.
No. 18M39. Strong v. Burt, Warden;
No. 18M40. Pfeffer v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC,
et al.;
No. 18M41. Williams v. Cox, Judge, Court of Appeal of
Louisiana, Second Circuit, et al.;
No. 18M45. Adams v. United States;
No. 18M46. Moss v. Pollard, Warden;
No. 18M48. Kilpatrick v. Kamkar; and
No. 18M49. Sylince v. Florida. Motions to direct the Clerk
to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M42. Laschkewitsch v. American National Life
Insurance Co.;
No. 18M43. Wairi v. United States; and
No. 18M44. Johnson v. United States. Motions for leave
to fle petitions for writs of certiorari with supplemental appendixes
under seal granted.
ORDERS 915
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18M47. Ruiz v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Motion to
direct the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time
under this Court's Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 16–1094. Republic of Sudan v. Harrison et al. C. A.
2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1015.] Motion of the Solicitor
General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus
curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 16–1498. Washington State Department of Licensing
v. Cougar Den, Inc. Sup. Ct. Wash. [Certiorari granted,
585 U. S. 1015.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted.
No. 17–419. Dawson et ux. v. Steager, West Virginia
State Tax Commissioner. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. [Certiorari
granted, 585 U. S. 1015.] Motion of the Acting Solicitor General
for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and
for divided argument granted.
No. 17–949. Sturgeon v. Frost, Alaska Regional Director
of the National Park Service, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1002.] Motion of Alaska for leave
to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument granted.
No. 17–1026. Garza v. Idaho. Sup. Ct. Idaho. [Certiorari
granted, 585 U. S. 1002.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave
to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument granted.
No. 17–1107. Carpenter, Interim Warden v. Murphy.
C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Royal v. Murphy,
584 U. S. 992.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or
decision of this motion.*
No. 17–1174. Nieves et al. v. Bartlett. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1029.] Motion of respondent to fle
volume II of the joint appendix under seal granted.
*See also note, 586 U. S. 913.
916 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1229. Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 585 U. S. 1015.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave
to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument granted.
No. 18–164. First Solar, Inc., et al. v. Mineworkers’ Pension
Scheme et al. C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General is
invited to fle a brief in this case expressing the views of the
United States.
No. 18–351. City of Pensacola, Florida, et al. v. Kondrat’yev
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioners to expedite
consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied.
No. 18–5401. Poirier v. Massachusetts Department of
Correction. C. A. 1st Cir.;
No. 18–5567. Curry v. City of Manseld, Ohio, et al.
Ct. App. Ohio, 5th App. Dist., Richland County; and
No. 18–5568. Curry v. City of Manseld, Ohio, et al.
Ct. App. Ohio, 5th App. Dist., Richland County. Motions of petitioners
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners
are allowed until October 30, 2018, within which to pay the
docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in
compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
No. 18–5976. In re Amun Re El. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 18–6034. In re Burwell. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.*
No. 18–5952. In re Williams. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–5852. In re Smotherman. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–5454. In re Gouch-Onassis;
No. 18–5455. In re Gouch-Onassis; and
*See also note, 586 U. S. 913.
ORDERS 917
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18–5551. In re Joseph. Motions of petitioners for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs of
mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–5575. In re Allah. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of mandamus
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has
repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not
to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner
unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin
v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)
(per curiam).
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1318. Kindred Nursing Centers L. P., dba Winchester
Centre for Health and Rehabilitation, nka
Fountain Circle Health and Rehabilitation, et al. v. Wellner,
Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Wellner,
Deceased. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 533 S. W. 3d 189.
No. 17–1463. Segovia et al. v. United States et al. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 384.
No. 17–1483. Alexsam, Inc. v. Wildcard Systems, Inc.,
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708
Fed. Appx. 680.
No. 17–1499. RP Healthcare, Inc., et al. v. Ranbaxy
Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 132.
No. 17–1510. Veal v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 303 Ga. 18, 810 S. E. 2d 127.
No. 17–1559. Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, Attorney
General. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
874 F. 3d 871.
No. 17–1566. Lacaze v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2016–0234 (La. 3/13/18), 239 So. 3d 807.
No. 17–1607. Fairley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 198.
918 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–1610. Jones v. Department of Health and Human
Services. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
702 Fed. Appx. 988.
No. 17–1611. Hillsman v. Escoto. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 722.
No. 17–1699. Mr. P. et ux., Individually and as Next
Friends of M. P. v. West Hartford Board of Education.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d
735.
No. 17–1703. Honeywell International Inc. et al. v.
Mexichem Fluor Inc. et al.; and
No. 18–2. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mexichem
Fluor, Inc., et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 866 F. 3d 451.
No. 17–8382. Glover et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 F. 3d 625.
No. 17–8558. Long v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 875 F. 3d 411.
No. 17–8801. Del Monte v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9000. Acosta v. Raemisch, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 918.
No. 17–9130. Potenciano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 620.
No. 17–9159. Ward v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 59, 539 S. W. 3d 546.
No. 17–9549. Zack v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 918.
No. 18–108. Duncan v. GEICO General Insurance Co.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed.
Appx. 900.
No. 18–115. Wynn v. Washington. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 513.
ORDERS 919
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18–116. Reardon v. Zonies et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 129.
No. 18–118. Schwartz et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N. A., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–128. Abouelmagd v. Newell. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–129. W. S. v. S. T. et al. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 20 Cal. App. 5th 132, 228
Cal. Rptr. 3d 756.
No. 18–132. Elmhirst v. McLaren Northern Michigan
Hospital, dba Northern Michigan Emergency Medicine
Center, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 726 Fed. Appx. 439.
No. 18–136. Dreyer v. County Court of Texas, Coleman
County. Ct. App. Tex., 11th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–142. Baroni v. Bank of New York Mellon, fka
Bank of New York. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 710 Fed. Appx. 770.
No. 18–147. Scott v. District Hospital Partners, L. P.,
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
715 Fed. Appx. 6.
No. 18–148. Lothian Cassidy, L. L. C., et al. v. Lothian
Exploration & Development II, L. P. (LEAD II), et al.; and
Shoshana Trust et al. v. Raleigh et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–151. Petit-Clair et al. v. Grewal, Attorney General
of New Jersey, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 120.
No. 18–152. Garmong v. Supreme Court of Nevada et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed.
Appx. 656.
No. 18–156. Brady v. Goldman et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 63.
No. 18–157. Brady v. Underwood, Attorney General of
New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
714 Fed. Appx. 60.
920 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–158. Gebhardt v. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland
Security, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 879 F. 3d 980.
No. 18–166. Probandt et al. v. Walker. Ct. App. Neb.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 Neb. App. 30, 902 N. W.
2d 468.
No. 18–169. Laber v. Milberg LLP et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 413.
No. 18–171. Snyder v. California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 457.
No. 18–172. Andrade Hernandez v. Sessions, Attorney
General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
715 Fed. Appx. 708.
No. 18–173. Xiu Jian Sun v. Zeve. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–183. Advanced Audio Devices, LLC v. HTC Corp.
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721
Fed. Appx. 989.
No. 18–184. Ayanbadejo v. Siegl et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–197. Wade v. Acosta, Secretary of Labor, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed.
Appx. 454.
No. 18–207. Duggan v. Department of Defense. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 842.
No. 18–211. Hurd v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–237. Thomas et al. v. United States; and
No. 18–240. Kirk Tang Yuk v. United States. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 57.
No. 18–249. Connor v. Castro et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 376.
No. 18–250. Tu Ying Chen v. Suffolk County Community
College et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 734 Fed. Appx. 773.
ORDERS 921
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18–253. Felix v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159 App.
Div. 3d 1508, 70 N. Y. S. 3d 104.
No. 18–256. Bartlett et al. v. Honeywell International,
Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
737 Fed. Appx. 543.
No. 18–270. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 399.
No. 18–291. Jaisinghani v. Sharma et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–312. Smith v. Tennessee National Guard. Sup.
Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 551 S. W. 3d 702.
No. 18–5036. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 498.
No. 18–5038. Sweeney v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 529.
No. 18–5039. Rowland v. Chappell, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 876 F. 3d 1174.
No. 18–5164. Brooks v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 671.
No. 18–5217. Perez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 804.
No. 18–5285. Singh v. Sessions, Attorney General. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5352. Brown v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 924.
No. 18–5359. Suggs v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 699.
No. 18–5376. Geralds v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 923.
No. 18–5387. Smith v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 189 Wash. 2d 655, 405 P. 3d 997.
No. 18–5395. Mezzles v. Katavich, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 639.
922 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5402. Pope v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 237 So. 3d 926.
No. 18–5403. Dennis v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5410. Podaras v. City of Menlo Park, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698
Fed. Appx. 348.
No. 18–5411. Mehmeti v. Jofaz Transportation, Inc. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5412. Johnson v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5413. Lewis v. Hedgemon et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5415. Gaskin v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 928.
No. 18–5420. Heagy v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 179 A. 3d 552.
No. 18–5424. Sakuma v. Association of Apartment Owners
of the Tropics of Waikele et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 906.
No. 18–5425. Joaquin Ramirez v. Aponte et al. App. Div.,
Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5429. Garry v. Trane Co. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5432. Sankara v. O’Hara et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5434. Victorino v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 241 So. 3d 48.
No. 18–5437. Whitton v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 724.
No. 18–5440. Lomax v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5441. Byrd v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 922.
ORDERS 923
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18–5442. Wall v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 127.
No. 18–5443. DeGrate v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5446. Story v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5447. Rock v. Bracy, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5448. Stanley v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 720 Fed. Appx. 818.
No. 18–5450. Rivas-Rivera v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct.
Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 161 A. 3d 382.
No. 18–5451. Steele v. Jenkins, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5453. Elliott v. Palmer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5457. Kennedy v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5459. Warnell v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5460. Hill v. Reinke et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 707.
No. 18–5463. Kennedy v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5465. Dreyfuse v. Justice, Governor of West Virginia.
Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5476. Ismaiyl v. Brown et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5477. Ebron v. Brown, Chair, Virginia Parole
Board, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 697 Fed. Appx. 779.
924 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5478. Jennings v. Deutsche Bank National Trust
Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5479. Jackson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5481. Watson v. Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 325.
No. 18–5485. Washington v. Arnold, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5486. Quintana v. Hansen et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 439.
No. 18–5489. Min Ho Kwon v. Hyoun Phil Won et al.
Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5491. Lovin v. Allbaugh, Director, Oklahoma Department
of Corrections. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 698.
No. 18–5493. Gant v. Winn, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5494. Milam v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733
Fed. Appx. 781.
No. 18–5496. Perez v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 4 Cal. 5th 1055, 416 P. 3d 42.
No. 18–5498. Curtis v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 501 Mich. 1037, 909 N. W. 2d
251.
No. 18–5499. Sanchez v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5501. Jones v. Bank of America et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5502. Jacobson v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 244 Ariz. 187, 418 P. 3d 960.
ORDERS 925
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18–5503. Preston v. Great Lakes Specialty Finance,
Inc., dba Axcess Financial. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 453.
No. 18–5506. Sundy v. Friendship Pavilion Acquisition
Co., LLC, et al. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5507. Schwarzman v. Gray, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5512. Wilson v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 WI App 16, 380 Wis. 2d 282,
913 N. W. 2d 233.
No. 18–5513. My Van Tran v. Sheldon, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5514. Wilkins v. Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 310.
No. 18–5523. Sanchez v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5531. Culver v. Zatecky, Superintendent, Pendleton
Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5540. Rush v. Rewerts, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5544. Van Le v. Aldridge, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 763.
No. 18–5545. Lopez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5546. Coble v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed.
Appx. 297.
No. 18–5553. Williams v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5566. Librace v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 709 Fed. Appx. 418.
926 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5573. Williams v. Campbell, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5600. Bonner v. United States et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5609. LaJeunesse v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 913 N. W. 2d 275.
No. 18–5616. Clayborne v. Nebraska. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5623. Williams v. United States et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5633. Kennedy v. Michigan State Treasurer. Ct.
App. Mich. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5639. Castleman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5657. Passmore v. O’Fallon et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 703.
No. 18–5661. Williams v. Samson Resources Corp. et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed.
Appx. 162.
No. 18–5666. Dennison v. Hooks, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5669. Cruz v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5688. Emanuel v. Department of Justice. C. A.
D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5689. Bridgette v. Asuncion, Warden, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5698. Brown v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 6th App. Dist.,
Lucas County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-Ohio-
132.
No. 18–5713. Dunning v. Ware, Director, Court Services
and Offender Supervision Agency. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 927
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18–5743. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5747. Amador-Flores v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 839.
No. 18–5749. Agolli v. District of Columbia et al. Ct.
App. D. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5750. Cuevas v. Kelly, Superintendent, Oregon
State Penitentiary. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5753. Pello v. Zatecky, Superintendent, Pendleton
Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5797. Gutierrez-Torres v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 502.
No. 18–5800. Williams v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 290.
No. 18–5803. Dury v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 123.
No. 18–5804. Diallo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 94.
No. 18–5808. Angel Rondon v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5809. Sharp v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 327.
No. 18–5814. Cruz v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5817. Moorer v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5823. Marshall v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 A. 3d 722.
No. 18–5824. Larive v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5825. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 839.
928 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5826. Carter v. Caldwell, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5828. Lopez-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5831. Curry v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 314.
No. 18–5835. Lizarraga-Leyva v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 258.
No. 18–5839. Rebmann v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5840. Stoney v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5842. Chhea v. DelBalso, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5844. Tinoco v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 581.
No. 18–5845. Pierce v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5846. Wilkins v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 18–5847. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 837.
No. 18–5849. Soza v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5858. Gloor v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 493.
No. 18–5861. Lopez Chavez v. Martinez, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 518.
No. 18–5865. Pennington v. Clark, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Albion, et al. Sup. Ct.
Pa. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 929
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18–5866. Mosley v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5871. Posa v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5872. Medina-Reyes v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 732.
No. 18–5874. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 708.
No. 18–5875. Vivo v. Connecticut. App. Ct. Conn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 179 Conn. App. 906, 176 A. 3d 1261.
No. 18–5879. Eneh v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 367.
No. 18–5882. Vela v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 136.
No. 18–5884. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 616.
No. 18–5885. Shannon v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 243.
No. 18–5890. Whiteld v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5893. Streetman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 594.
No. 18–5894. Shaw v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 1217.
No. 18–5895. Izatt v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 610.
No. 18–5896. Baker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 281.
No. 18–5899. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 28.
No. 18–5900. Martinez-Barrientos v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed.
Appx. 95.
930 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5901. Maxi v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 1318.
No. 18–5904. Cross v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 985.
No. 18–5910. Packard v. Goodrich, Warden, et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx.
711.
No. 18–5912. Kimmell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 586.
No. 18–5913. Escobedo Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 322.
No. 18–5914. Finney v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 342.
No. 18–5915. Hill v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 717.
No. 18–5916. Flores, aka Becerra v. United States.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 359.
No. 18–5917. Doe v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 178.
No. 18–5921. Stevens v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 1249.
No. 18–5928. Limon-Urenda v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5929. Odom v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 254.
No. 18–5933. Wilkerson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 745.
No. 18–5934. Wagner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5935. Cesar Velasquez v. United States (Reported
below: 728 Fed. Appx. 359); and Laguna-Gomez v. United
States (732 Fed. Appx. 340). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 931
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
No. 18–5944. Tanco-Pizarro v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 472.
No. 18–5953. Thorne v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 706 Fed. Appx. 143.
No. 18–5984. Beyah v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1284. Apodaca et al. v. Raemisch et al.; and
No. 17–1289. Lowe v. Raemisch et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: No. 17–1284, 864 F. 3d 1071;
No. 17–1289, 864 F. 3d 1205.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
A punishment need not leave physical scars to be cruel and
unusual. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958). As far
back as 1890, this Court expressed concerns about the mental
anguish caused by solitary confnement.1 These petitions address
one aspect of what a prisoner subjected to solitary confnement
may experience: the denial of even a moment in daylight for
months or years. Although I agree with the Court's decision not
to grant certiorari in these cases because of arguments unmade
and facts underdeveloped below, I write because the issue raises
deeply troubling concern.
I
Petitioners Jonathan Apodaca, Joshua Vigil, and Donnie Lowe
were all previously incarcerated in the Colorado State Penitentiary
(CSP). During that time, they were held in what is often
referred to as “administrative segregation,” but what is also fairly
known by its less euphemistic name: solitary confnement. As
described in a prior case involving the same prison's conditions:
“In administrative segregation at the CSP, each offender is
housed in a single cell approximately 90 square feet in
1 See In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 168 (1890) (“[E]xperience demonstrated
that there were serious objections to it. A considerable number of the prisoners
fell, after even a short confnement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from
which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently
insane; others, still, committed suicide, while those who stood the ordeal
better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover suffcient
mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community”).
932 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Statement of Sotomayor, J. 586 U. S.
size. . . . The cell contains a metal bed, desk, toilet and three
shelves. There is [a] small vertical glass window that admits
light but which, because of its placement in relation to the
bed, desk and shelving, is diffcult to access to look out. A
light in the cell is left on 24 hours a day. The inmates' daily
existence is one of extreme isolation. They remain in their
cells at least 23 hours a day. The cells were designed in a
manner that discourages and largely restricts vocal communication
between cells. [One prisoner could] hear other people
yelling and screaming but not conversations. All meals are
passed through a slot in the cell door to the inmate. The
inmates have little human contact except with prison staff
and limited opportunities for visitors . . . .” Anderson v.
Colorado, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137 (Colo. 2012).
Under then-operative Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) regulations, prisoners like Apodaca, Vigil, and Lowe were
allowed out of their cells fve days per week, for at least “one
hour of recreation in a designated exercise area.” CDOC Reg.
No. 650–03, p. 7 (May 15, 2012). That “designated exercise area”
was also about 90 square feet in size, but “oddly shaped” and
“empty except for a chin-up bar.” Anderson, 887 F. Supp. 2d, at
1137. As the prior District Court described it:
“It has two vertical `windows,' approximately fve feet by six
inches in size, which are not glassed but instead are covered
with metal grates. The grates have holes approximately the
size of a quarter that open to the outside. The inmate can
see through the holes, can sometimes feel a breeze, and can
sometimes feel the warmth of the sun. This is his only exposure
of any kind to fresh air.” Ibid.
During their time at CSP, Apodaca, Vigil, and Lowe were denied
any out-of-cell exercise other than the prescribed hour in
that room for between 11 and 25 months.2 In 2015, Lowe, indi-
2 For Apodaca and Vigil, the deprivation lasted 11 months—from September
2013 to August 2014. Complaint in Apodaca v. Raemisch, No. 15–
cv–845 (D Colo.), Doc. 1, pp. 16–17. For Lowe, it lasted 25 months—from
February 2013 to March 2015. Complaint in Lowe v. Raemisch, No. 15–cv–
1830 (D Colo.), Doc. 1, pp. 20–21 (Complaint). All three were later either
transferred or released from prison. Brief in Opposition 1. Lowe has since
passed away. Reply Brief 2.
ORDERS 933
931 Statement of Sotomayor, J.
vidually, and Apodaca and Vigil, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, fled lawsuits seeking damages under Rev.
Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the District of Colorado, alleging
that this deprivation violated their Eighth Amendment rights to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Respondents, CDOC
Executive Director Rick Raemisch and CSP Warden Travis Trani,
moved to dismiss both cases.3 The District Court denied both
motions to dismiss. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed both denials, concluding that its prior precedents
allowed “reasonable debate on the constitutionality of disallowing
outdoors exercise for two years and one month” in Lowe's case,
864 F. 3d 1205, 1209 (2017), or, moreover, 11 months in Apodaca
and Vigil's case, 864 F. 3d 1071, 1078 (2017).
Apodaca, Vigil, and Lowe petitioned this Court for certiorari,
arguing that the Tenth Circuit had diverged from the common
practice among the Courts of Appeals of allowing a deprivation
of outdoor exercise only when it was supported by a suffcient
security justifcation. See Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–1284, pp. 2–3;
Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–1289, pp. 2–3. Petitioners are correct
that the presence (or absence) of a particularly compelling security
justifcation has, rightly, played an important role in the analysis
of the Courts of Appeals.4 But the litigation before the
lower courts here did not focus on the presence or absence of a
3 With regard to Apodaca and Vigil's 11-month deprivation, respondents
both contested that there was an Eighth Amendment violation and claimed
qualifed immunity. See Motion To Dismiss or Motion for Summary Judgment
in Apodaca, Doc. 18, pp. 6–11. With regard to Lowe's 25-month deprivation,
respondents did not contest that there was an Eighth Amendment
violation but did again claim qualifed immunity. See Motion To Dismiss in
Lowe, Doc. 10, pp. 7–13.
4 See, e. g., Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F. 3d 881, 884–885 (CA7 2001) (reversing
judgment for plaintiff who was denied outdoor exercise for a year after
a series of serious infractions, including beating a guard to the point that he
was hospitalized, setting a fre that prompted an evacuation, and throwing
bodily fuids in a medical technician's face); Bass v. Perrin, 170 F. 3d 1312,
1316–1317 (CA11 1999) (affrming summary judgment for defendants where
plaintiffs had, between them, been convicted of aggravated battery, murder,
and attempted murder since their incarceration and each had attempted to
escape during outdoor recreation); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F. 2d 189, 200
(CA9 1979) (affrming injunctive relief in the absence of “an adequate justifcation”
from the State for not providing outdoor exercise for over four
years).
934 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Statement of Sotomayor, J. 586 U. S.
valid security justifcation, and therefore the factual record before
this Court—as well as the legal analysis provided by the lower
courts—is not well suited to our considering the question now.5
Despite my deep misgivings about the conditions described, I
therefore concur in the Court's denial of certiorari. Cf. Perez v.
Florida, 580 U. S. 1187, 1188 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
II
I write to note, however, that what is clear all the same is that
to deprive a prisoner of any outdoor exercise for an extended
period of time in the absence of an especially strong basis for
doing so is deeply troubling—and has been recognized as such for
many years. Then-Judge Kennedy observed as much in 1979,
ruling that, in the absence of “an adequate justifcation” from the
State, “it was cruel and unusual punishment for a prisoner to be
confned for a period of years without opportunity to go outside
except for occasional court appearances, attorney interviews, and
hospital appointments.” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F. 2d 189, 200
(CA9 1979). And while he acknowledged that various security
concerns—including the safety of staff and other prisoners and
preventing escape—could “justify not permitting plaintiffs to mingle
with the general prison population,” he observed that those
generalized concerns did “not explain why other exercise arrangements
were not made.” Ibid. The same inquiry remains essential
today, given the vitality—recognized by the Tenth Circuit in
other cases6—of the basic human need at issue. It should be
5 For example, the CDOC regulations in effect during the relevant time
period outlined particular conduct that could justify the imposition of solitary
confnement, including, for example, attempting to harm seriously or
kill another person, organizing or inciting a riot, or attempting to escape
from a secure facility. See CDOC Reg. No. 650–03, p. 4 (May 15, 2012).
But those regulations also included provisions that could be questionable in
their application, including a catchall for “[o]ther circumstances.” See ibid.
Here, we have not been presented with facts in the record explaining what
led to this extreme condition of confnement being imposed on Apodaca,
Vigil, or Lowe, or, similarly, whether permitting outdoor exercise would
have meaningfully increased any of the potential risks.
6 See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F. 3d 1252, 1260 (2006) (“[W]e think it is clear
that a factfnder might conclude that the risk of harm from three years of
deprivation of any form of outdoor exercise was obvious”); Perkins v. Kansas
Dept. of Corrections, 165 F. 3d 803, 810 (1999) (“[W]e conclude the district
court here erred when it held that plaintiff 's allegations about the
ORDERS 935
931 Statement of Sotomayor, J.
clear by now that our Constitution does not permit such a total
deprivation in the absence of a particularly compelling interest.
Two Justices of this Court have recently called attention to the
broader Eighth Amendment concerns raised by long-term solitary
confnement. See Ruiz v. Texas, 580 U. S. 1191–1192 (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution); Davis v. Ayala,
576 U. S. 257, 286–290 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Those
writings came in cases involving capital prisoners, but it is important
to remember that the issue sweeps much more broadly:
Whereas fewer than 3,000 prisoners are on death row, a recent
study estimated that 80,000 to 100,000 people were held in
some form of solitary confnement.7 The Eighth Amendment, of
course, protects them all.
Lowe himself, respondents tell us, was convicted of seconddegree
burglary and introduction of contraband—and he evidently
spent 11 years in solitary confnement. See Brief in Opposition
1, n. 1; Complaint, at 5. It is hard to see how those 11 years
could have prepared him for the day in July 2015 when he “was
released from solitary confnement directly to the streets,” though
his Complaint mentions that he had found “wor[k] doing construction
labor and [was] striving to establish a life on the streets.”
Ibid. While we do not know what caused his death in May 2018,
see Reply Brief 2, n. 2, we do know that solitary confnement
imprints on those that it clutches a wide range of psychological
scars.8
extended deprivation of outdoor exercise showed no excessive risk to his
well-being” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); Bailey v.
Shillinger, 828 F. 2d 651, 653 (1987) (“There is substantial agreement among
the cases in this area that some form of regular outdoor exercise is extremely
important to the psychological and physical well being of inmates,
and some courts have held a denial of fresh air and exercise to be cruel and
unusual punishment under certain circumstances”).
7 See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, E. Davis & T. Snell,
Capital Punishment, 2016, p. 2 (Apr. 2018); The Liman Program & Assn. of
State Correctional Adm'rs, Time-In-Cell: The ASCA-Liman 2014 National
Survey of Administrative Segregation in Prison, p. ii (Aug. 2015).
8 See, e. g., Davis v. Ayala, 576 U. S. 257, 289 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(detailing psychological effects and citing story of 16-year-old who was
held in pretrial solitary confnement for three years and committed suicide
two years after his release); Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F. 3d 1162, 1175–1178
(CA10 2018) (Lucero, J., concurring); see also B. Stevenson, Just Mercy 153
(2014) (recounting story of juvenile prisoner whose “mental health unrav936
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Statement of Sotomayor, J. 586 U. S.
Respondent Raemisch, CDOC's executive director, himself has
acknowledged the ills of solitary confnement,9 and I note that
Colorado has in recent years revised its regulations such that it
now allows all inmates “access to outdoor recreation” for at least
one hour, three times per week, subject to “security or safety
considerations.” 10 Those changes cannot undo what petitioners,
and others similarly situated, have experienced, but they are nevertheless
steps toward a more humane system.
More steps may well be needed. Justice Kennedy, in his Ayala
concurrence, 576 U. S., at 287, referenced Charles Dickens' depiction
of the ravages of solitary confnement in A Tale of Two
Cities, but it is worth appreciating that the portrayal referenced
was not merely the result of a skilled novelist's imagination. In
1842, Dickens recounted his real-life visit to Philadelphia's Eastern
State Penitentiary, in which he described the prisoners housed
in solitary confnement there:
“[The prisoner] is led to the cell from which he never again
comes forth, until his whole term of imprisonment has expired.
He never hears of wife and children; home or friends;
the life or death of any single creature. He sees the prisonoffcers,
but with that exception he never looks upon a human
countenance, or hears a human voice. He is a man buried
alive; to be dug out in the slow round of years; and in the
mean time dead to everything but torturing anxieties and
horrible despair.” C. Dickens, American Notes for General
Circulation 148 (J. Whitley & A. Goldman eds. 1972).
eled” in solitary, yielding self-harm and multiple suicide attempts). See generally
Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confnement Is
Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 Ind. L. J. 741, 753–763 (2015);
Betts, Only Once I Thought About Suicide, 125 Yale L. J. Forum 222 (2016);
Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confnement, 22 Wash. U. J. L. &
Pol'y 325 (2006); Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confnement on Prison Inmates:
A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 Crime & Justice
441 (2006); Calambokidis, Note, Beyond Cruel and Unusual: Solitary Confnement
and Dignitary Interests, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 1117, 1150–1155 (2017).
9 See Raemisch, Why We Ended Long-Term Solitary Confnement in Colorado,
N. Y. Times, Oct. 12, 2017, p. A25 (“It is time for this unethical tool to
be removed from the penal toolbox”); Raemisch, My Night in Solitary, N. Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 2014, p. A25 (“I felt as if I'd been there for days. I sat
with my mind. How long would it take before Ad Seg chipped that away?
I don't know, but I'm confdent that it would be a battle I would lose”).
10 CDOC Reg. No. 600–09, p. 7 (Jan. 1, 2018).
ORDERS 937
586 U. S. October 9, 2018
Dickens did not question the penal offcers' motives. He concluded,
rather, that they did “not know what it is that they are
doing” and that “very few” were “capable of estimating the immense
amount of torture and agony which this dreadful punishment,
prolonged for years, inficts upon the sufferers.” Id., at
146. The pain caused was invisible and inaudible, such that
“slumbering humanity” was “not roused up” to put a stop to it.
Id., at 147.
We are no longer so unaware. Courts and corrections offcials
must accordingly remain alert to the clear constitutional problems
raised by keeping prisoners like Apodaca, Vigil, and Lowe in
“near-total isolation” from the living world, Ayala, 576 U. S., at
289 (Kennedy, J., concurring), in what comes perilously close to a
penal tomb.
No. 18–35. Pennsylvania v. Johnson. Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion
of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 644 Pa. 150, 174 A. 3d 1050.
No. 18–112. Day, Judge, Circuit Court of Oregon, Third
Judicial District v. Oregon Commission on Judicial Fitness
and Disability. Sup. Ct. Ore. Motion of Freedom of Conscience
Defense Fund for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 362 Ore. 547, 413
P. 3d 907.
No. 18–210. BATS Global Markets, Inc., et al. v. City of
Providence, Rhode Island, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition.* Reported below: 878 F. 3d 36.
No. 18–231. New West, L. P., et al. v. City of Joliet, Illinois,
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.*
Reported below: 891 F. 3d 271.
No. 18–5560. Beauchamp v. Doglietto et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition.* Reported below: 698
Fed. Appx. 396.
No. 18–5583. Turner v. Smith et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consider-
*See also note, 586 U. S. 913.
938 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 9, 11, 2018 586 U. S.
ation or decision of this petition.* Reported below: 734 Fed.
Appx. 460.
No. 18–5704. Austin v. District Attorney of Philadelphia
County, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision
of this petition.*
No. 18–5810. Chirino Rivera v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.*
No. 18–5811. Escobar De Jesus v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition.*
No. 18–5930. Walker v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.* Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 91.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–8324. Wells v. Harry, Warden, 584 U. S. 1016. Petition
for rehearing denied.
October 11, 2018
Miscellaneous Order
No. 18A385. Mays, Warden, v. Zagorski. Application to vacate
stay of execution of sentence of death, entered by the United
States Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit on October 10, 2018,
presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court,
granted. Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor would deny
the application to vacate the stay.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–6238 (18A376). Zagorski v. Parker, Commissioner,
Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct.
Tenn. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 558 S. W. 3d 606.
*See also note, 586 U. S. 913.
ORDERS 939
586 U. S. Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
dissenting.
Once again, a State hastens to kill a prisoner despite mounting
evidence that the sedative to be used, midazolam, will not prevent
the prisoner from feeling as if he is “drowning, suffocating, and
being burned alive from the inside out” during a process that
could last as long as 18 minutes. Irick v. Tennessee, 585 U. S.
1048, 1048–1049 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
application for stay); see also Arthur v. Dunn, 580 U. S. 1141, 1153–
1154 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
And once again the State claims the right to do so under the
Eighth Amendment not because a court has concluded that these
risks are overblown, but rather because of the “perverse requirement
that inmates offer alternative methods for their own executions.”
McGehee v. Hutchinson, 581 U. S. 933, 935 (2017) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting from denial of application for stay and denial
of certiorari); see also Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863, 878–881
(2015). This requirement was legally and morally wrong when it
was promulgated, and it has been proved even crueler in light of
the obstacles that have prevented capital prisoners from satisfying
this precondition. I would therefore grant a stay of execution
and grant petitioner Edmund Zagorski's petition for certiorari to
consider what suffces for a prisoner to prove “a known and available
alternative method of execution.” Id., at 878.1
For several years, Tennessee has provided for the execution
of capital prisoners via a single drug called pentobarbital. See
Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, No. M2018–01385–SC–RDO–CV (Sup.
Ct. Tenn., Oct. 8, 2018), pp. 3–4. Pentobarbital, a barbiturate,
does not carry the risks described above; unlike midazolam (a
benzodiazepine), pentobarbital is widely conceded to be able to
render a person fully insensate. See, e. g., Glossip, 576 U. S., at
878.
In January 2018, Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC)
adopted an alternative to pentobarbital: Protocol B, a three-drug
1 The State's refusal to allow Zagorski's attorneys to access a telephone
during Zagorski's scheduled execution is also troubling. For reasons expressed
before, I would grant review of this question as well. See Arthur
v. Dunn, 581 U. S. 1002, 1002–1003 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from
denial of application for stay and denial of certiorari).
940 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
sequence beginning with midazolam (the drug whose sedative
properties are dubious), to be followed by vecuronium bromide
(to paralyze the prisoner) and then potassium chloride (to stop
the prisoner's heart).2 No. M2018–01385–SC–RDO–CV, at 4.
The pentobarbital option—Protocol A—remained, meanwhile, in
effect. Ibid. In February 2018, the State set execution dates
for several prisoners, including Zagorski, and Zagorski and others
soon thereafter fled suit challenging Protocol B and pointing to
Protocol A, pentobarbital, as the available, signifcantly less risky
alternative. See id., at 4–5. The State, however, was noncommittal
about pentobarbital's availability. At a pretrial hearing in
April 2018, as Justice Lee explained in dissent below, the trial
court “zeroed in on the problem and repeatedly questioned counsel
about the availability of pentobarbital,” emphasizing that an
answer to this question was “ `essential.' ” Id., at 4. “The
State's response to the trial court's direct question—`will [Protocol
A] be available for the August 9th execution?'—was `I can't
answer that question, Your Honor.' ” Id., at 5.
Then, “[ j]ust a few hours before the parties fled their trial
briefs on July 5, 2018, [TDOC] adopted a revised execution protocol
that abandoned [pentobarbital], leaving only Protocol B”—the
midazolam option. Id., at 4. Trial commenced a few days later.
Working on a highly expedited timeline, the trial court ruled
against the prisoners later that month, concluding that they had
failed to prove the availability of pentobarbital—the very method
that TDOC had retained as Protocol A until just before trial
started.3 See Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, No. 18–183–II(III) (Ch.
2 “The frst drug [midazolam] is critical; without it, the prisoner faces the
unadulterated agony of the second and third drugs.” Arthur v. Dunn, 580
U. S. 1141, 1142 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
This Court in Glossip concluded that a district court did not clearly err in
fnding that midazolam could render a prisoner suffciently insensate to the
excruciating effects of the second and third drugs. See 576 U. S., at 885.
Any confdence in that conclusion has since eroded in the face of growing
contrary medical evidence and worrisome results from executions themselves.
See, e. g., Abdur'Rahman v. Parker, No. 18–183–II(III) (Ch. Ct. Davidson
Cty., Tenn., July 26, 2018), pp. 21–22, 27–28. Because the opinions
below do not defend the use of midazolam on the merits, midazolam's inadequacy
is not the focus here.
3 The trial court also concluded that the prisoners' experts “established
that midazolam does not elicit strong analgesic effects and the inmate being
executed may be able to feel pain from the administration of the second and
ORDERS 941
938 Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Ct. Davidson Cty., Tenn., July 26, 2018), pp. 2, 34. The Tennessee
Supreme Court affrmed on that ground, while declining to “address
the Plaintiffs' claim that the three-drug protocol creates a
demonstrated risk of severe pain.” No. M2018–01385–SC–RDO–
CV, at 22.
The circumstances surrounding Zagorski and his fellow prisoners'
attempts to prove that pentobarbital was “available” demonstrate
how unfairly this already perverse requirement is being
applied. For one, the prisoners' ability to prove the drug's availability
was severely constrained by rules of secrecy surrounding
individuals involved in the execution process. See id., at 3 (Lee,
J., dissenting); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 10–7–504(h) (2018).
The prisoners were unable to depose individuals with direct
knowledge of the State's efforts to obtain pentobarbital. Nor
were the prisoners allowed to learn which potential sellers the
State ostensibly approached to try to obtain pentobarbital. Short
of cold-calling every pharmacy in the country and asking for pentobarbital,
it is anyone's guess how the prisoners were supposed
to challenge meaningfully the State's claim that it could not obtain
the drug. Yet they were faulted below for failing to offer “direct
proof.” No. M2018–01385–SC–RDO–CV, at 21.
Moreover, it is not as if pentobarbital has vanished from the
Earth, for purposes of execution or otherwise. As Justice Lee
noted in dissent, Texas and Georgia have each used it multiple
times in executions this year alone. Id., at 5. Missouri also appears
to be prepared to use it in upcoming executions. See, e. g.,
Brief for Respondent in Bucklew v. Precythe, O. T. 2018, No. 17–
8151, p. 1. Moreover, what discovery the prisoners did obtain
below indicates that roughly 10 of the 100 suppliers that TDOC
reached out to in 2017 did have pentobarbital for sale—just not
the number of doses that the State had requested. No. 18–183–
II(III), at 13. And at least one supplier around this time evidently
quoted a price and discussed a “bulk $ option.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 197a.
The trial court found credible the senior TDOC offcials who
testifed to having delegated a search for pentobarbital to their
third drugs.” Id., at 21. But it nevertheless concluded, without expressing
any countervailing confdence in midazolam's anesthetic properties, that this
Court “would not fnd the facts established in this case to violate the Constitution.”
Id., at 22; see also Irick v. Tennessee, 585 U. S. 1048, 1049–1050
(2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
942 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 11, 12, 2018 586 U. S.
subordinates, see No. 18–183–II(III), at 11–12, and the Tennessee
Supreme Court based its affrmance in signifcant part on these
“credibility determinations,” see No. M2018–01385–SC–RDO–CV,
at 21–22. But these senior offcials were not the individuals who
actually undertook the search for pentobarbital, see id., at 12; the
actual procurers, by contrast, were unavailable to the prisoners
because of the State's secrecy laws. When the prisoners tasked
with asking the State to kill them another way are denied by the
State information crucial to establishing the availability of that
other means of killing, a grotesque requirement has become Kafkaesque
as well.
Such barriers are not the only ways in which prisoners proposing
a more humane means of execution may be thwarted. In
other instances, courts have rejected claims by petitioners proposing
means of execution that are unavailable under state law. See,
e. g., Arthur, 580 U. S., at 1141–1142 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Such rejections are likewise troubling, because
they suggest that “all a State has to do to execute [a person]
through an unconstitutional method is to pass a statute declining
to authorize any alternative method,” id., at 1148, and they likewise
show the need for us to address in more detail what Glossip
actually requires. In any event, the prisoners here sought only
the State's own Protocol A, which the State itself had held out as
a seemingly available method before eliminating it “on the eve of
trial.” No. M2018–01385–SC–RDO–CV, at 5 (Lee, J., dissenting).
That is hardly an extravagant request, particularly when the
State's own evidence discloses that there had been opportunities
to purchase pentobarbital both in smaller quantities and in bulk.
I accordingly would grant Zagorski's request for a stay and
grant certiorari to address what renders a method of execution
“available” under Glossip. Capital prisoners are not entitled to
pleasant deaths under the Eighth Amendment, but they are entitled
to humane deaths. The longer we stand silent amid growing
evidence of inhumanity in execution methods like Tennessee's, the
longer we extend our own complicity in state-sponsored brutality.
I dissent.
October 12, 2018
Certiorari Granted
No. 17–1702. Manhattan Community Access Corp. et al.
v. Halleck et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of Chicago Access
ORDERS 943
586 U. S. October 12, 15, 2018
Corporation for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 300.
October 15, 2018
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–161. Detroit International Bridge Co., Inc.,
et al. v. Department of State et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below:
883 F. 3d 895.
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 18–5184. Hashimi v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded
for further consideration in light of McCoy v. Louisiana,
584 U. S. 414 (2018). Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 178.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M50. Lyon v. Canadian National Railway Company
et al.;
No. 18M51. Zaremba Family Farms, Inc., et al. v. Encana
Oil & Gas (USA) Inc.;
No. 18M52. Reid v. United States; and
No. 18M54. McGhee v. Davis, Warden. Motions for leave
to fle petitions for writs of certiorari with supplemental appendixes
under seal granted.
No. 18M53. Smith v. Food Bank of Eastern Michigan; and
No. 18M55. Rafi v. Brigham and Women’s Hospital et al.
Motions to direct the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari
out of time denied.
No. 18–5621. Torkornoo v. Helwig et al. C. A. 4th Cir.;
and
No. 18–5982. Britton-Harr v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied. Petitioners are allowed until November 5, 2018,
within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a)
and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules
of this Court.
No. 18–6048. In re Spottsville; and
944 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 15, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6065. In re Richardson. Motions of petitioners for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs
of habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6054. In re Boone. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of habeas
corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice Kagan
took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and
this petition.
No. 18–5968. In re Gracia-Cantu. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–6018. In re Terry. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of mandamus
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice Kagan
took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and
this petition.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1575. Yong v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 644 Pa. 613, 177 A. 3d 876.
No. 17–1624. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d
1226.
No. 17–1713. Emerson Electric Co. et al. v. Superior
Court of California, Orange County, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 4 Cal. 5th 316, 410 P. 3d 32.
No. 17–7929. Brown v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8462. Petras et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 155.
No. 17–8495. Velez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–8853. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 924.
No. 17–9326. Kornse v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 135.
ORDERS 945
586 U. S. October 15, 2018
No. 17–9436. Francisco Vega v. Germaine. Dist. Ct. App.
Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 247 So. 3d
471.
No. 17–9458. Porter v. Rhode Island. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 179 A. 3d 1218.
No. 18–84. ConAgra Grocery Products Co. et al. v. California;
and
No. 18–86. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. California. Ct. App.
Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 Cal.
App. 5th 51, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499.
No. 18–124. Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications,
LLC, et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 874 F. 3d 1329.
No. 18–167. MCC (Xiangtan) Heavy Industrial Equipment
Co., Ltd. v. Liebherr Mining & Construction Equipment,
Inc., dba Liebherr Mining Equipment Newport News
Co. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–176. Conestoga Trust Services, LLC, as Trustee
of the Conestoga Settlement Trust, dated May 1, 2010 v.
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 600.
No. 18–181. Klayman v. Luck. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App. Dist.,
Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017-
Ohio-8231.
No. 18–198. Celli v. New York City Department of Education
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 699 Fed. Appx. 88.
No. 18–200. Michigan v. Jones. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–201. Montazer v. Montazer. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–205. Northern California Water Assn. et al. v.
California State Water Resources Control Board et al.
Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
20 Cal. App. 5th 1204, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142.
946 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 15, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–224. Pickens v. Brevard Police Testing and Selection
Center. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 245 So. 3d 745.
No. 18–258. El-Khalidi v. Arabian American Development
Co. Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–293. Farkas v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L. L. C.,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725
Fed. Appx. 273.
No. 18–303. Oleksy v. General Electric Co. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 981.
No. 18–342. City of Maplewood, Missouri v. Webb et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 483.
No. 18–368. Thomas v. Cozzi. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 892 F. 3d 1288.
No. 18–5168. Palacios v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 405.
No. 18–5191. Paniagua-Paniagua v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 700.
No. 18–5222. Cooper v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 259.
No. 18–5529. Terry v. Earley et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 684.
No. 18–5530. Kaldawi v. State of Kuwait et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 452.
No. 18–5557. Bussing v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5558. Atwell v. Ferguson, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5562. Pierre v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 224.
No. 18–5563. Bruton v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 947
586 U. S. October 15, 2018
No. 18–5569. Weisner v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5570. Vargas v. Superior Court of California,
San Bernardino County. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., Div. 2.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5571. Wilkins, aka Brown v. Contra Costa
County, California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5572. Wells v. Gray, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5581. Jenewicz v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J.,
App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5582. Kissner v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5584. Thompson v. Copeland et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 582 and 714 Fed.
Appx. 805.
No. 18–5586. Knight v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 247 So. 3d 481.
No. 18–5589. Dema v. Allegiant Air LLC. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5590. Johnson v. Virginia et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 308.
No. 18–5591. Mason v. Polster, Judge, United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5592. Madrid v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5595. Williams v. Sood et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5596. Wallace v. Barnes, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5602. Leonard v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
948 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 15, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5608. Mata v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5610. Saxena v. Abud. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 677 Fed. Appx. 436.
No. 18–5611. Stewart v. Stukey. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5619. Contreras v. Anglea, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5625. Crew v. Montgomery, Acting Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5627. Webb v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5628. Tacquard v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5629. Chaney v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5632. Leonor v. Frakes, Director, Nebraska
Department of Correctional Services. Ct. App. Neb.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 25 Neb. App. xvi.
No. 18–5635. Jackson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5637. Desir v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 239 So. 3d 678.
No. 18–5643. Craft v. Bonds, Administrator, South
Woods State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5668. Blackledge v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 247.
No. 18–5677. Loughner v. Clarke, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 949
586 U. S. October 15, 2018
No. 18–5728. Earnest v. Davis, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct.
Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5769. Smith v. Eppinger, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5794. Davis v. Maddie. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 702 Fed. Appx. 230.
No. 18–5857. Latimore v. Jones, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5859. Martinez Perez v. Sessions, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724
Fed. Appx. 605.
No. 18–5868. Cannon v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5889. Welch v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5902. Allen v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 273.
No. 18–5905. Moore v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 150208–U.
No. 18–5922. Sarhan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed.
Appx. 871.
No. 18–5937. Burton v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 273 So. 3d 867.
No. 18–5941. Tippens v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5949. Morris v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5950. Miller v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 431.
950 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 15, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5956. Whitney v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 138.
No. 18–5957. Arcila v. United States; and
No. 18–6016. Sandoval-Ramos v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 279.
No. 18–5964. Hacheney v. Obenland, Superintendent,
Monroe Correctional Complex. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 541.
No. 18–5966. Faulkner v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 488.
No. 18–5967. Howard v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 720.
No. 18–5970. Gorion v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 528.
No. 18–5971. Fortin v. Cain, Superintendent, Snake
River Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 762.
No. 18–5972. Faye v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 120.
No. 18–5973. Ramirez-De Jesus v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 558.
No. 18–5978. Register v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 670.
No. 18–5979. Derry v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 107.
No. 18–5983. Charlton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 257.
No. 18–5987. Hammond v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 901.
No. 18–5992. Butler v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5994. White v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 81, 540 S. W. 3d 291.
ORDERS 951
586 U. S. October 15, 2018
No. 18–5996. Barris v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 583.
No. 18–5997. Burciaga v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 811.
No. 18–6006. Gonzalez Tovar v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 89.
No. 18–6007. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 771.
No. 18–6008. Pagan-Romero v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 441.
No. 18–6010. Patel v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6012. Wilson v. Soto, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6014. Vega-Orozco v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 233.
No. 18–6020. Rodgers v. Miller, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 294.
No. 18–6023. Blackwell v. Hansen, Warden, et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx.
826.
No. 18–6024. Brown v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6028. Baum v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 167.
No. 18–6030. Smith v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 647.
No. 18–6031. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6033. Myers v. Osborne, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6036. Harden v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 434.
952 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 15, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6041. Burse v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 83.
No. 18–6042. Ary v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 787.
No. 18–6046. Skillern v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 1103.
No. 18–6049. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 726.
No. 18–6060. Chavez v. LeGrand, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 388.
No. 18–6063. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 423.
No. 17–508. Livnat, Individually and as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Livnat, et al. v. Palestinian
Authority, aka Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 851 F. 3d 45.
No. 17–1656. Violet Dock Port, Inc., LLC v. St. Bernard
Port, Harbor & Terminal District. Sup. Ct. La. Motion of
National Federation of Independent Business Small Business
Legal Center et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017–0434 (La. 1/30/18), 239
So. 3d 243.
No. 17–8368. Molette v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.;
No. 17–8637. Gipson v. United States (Reported below: 710
Fed. Appx. 697); and Walker v. United States (710 Fed. Appx.
696). C. A. 6th Cir.;
No. 17–8746. Wilson v. United States. Reported below:
710 Fed. Appx. 435. C. A. 11th Cir.;
No. 17–9045. Homrich v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.;
No. 17–9379. Chubb v. United States. Reported below: 707
Fed. Appx. 388. C. A. 6th Cir.;
No. 17–9400. Smith v. United States. Reported below: 714
Fed. Appx. 310. C. A. 4th Cir.;
No. 17–9411. Buckner v. United States. Reported below:
714 Fed. Appx. 273. C. A. 4th Cir.; and
ORDERS 953
586 U. S. October 15, 2018
No. 17–9490. Lewis v. United States. Reported below: 733
Fed. Appx. 501. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
I dissent from the denial of certiorari for the reasons set out
in Brown v. United States, 586 U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
No. 17–8775. Greer v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 1241.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
I dissent from the denial of certiorari for the reasons set out
in Brown v. United States, 586 U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
No. 17–9276. Brown v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 868 F. 3d 297.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
Today this Court denies petitioners, and perhaps more than
1,000 like them, a chance to challenge the constitutionality of
their sentences.1 They were sentenced under a then-mandatory
provision of the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines, the exact language
of which we have recently identifed as unconstitutionally vague
in another legally binding provision. These petitioners argue
that their sentences, too, are unconstitutional. This important
question, which has generated divergence among the lower courts,
calls out for an answer. Because this Court's decision to deny
certiorari precludes petitioners from obtaining such an answer, I
respectfully dissent.
Petitioner Thilo Brown, like others whose petitions the Court
denies today, was sentenced as a “career offender” under the U. S.
Sentencing Guidelines. United States Sentencing Commission,
1 In addition to Thilo Brown's petition, this Court denies the petitions of
Gregory Molette, No. 17–8368; Bobby Jo Gipson and Keith Walker, No. 17–
8637; Carlos Wilson, No. 17–8746; Jason Greer, No. 17–8775; Robert Homrich,
No. 17–9045; Charles Chubb, No. 17–9379; Terrance Smith, No. 17–9400; John
Elwood Buckner, No. 17–9411; and Paul Lewis, No. 17–9490. For the reasons
expressed herein, I respectfully dissent from denial of certiorari in
their cases as well.
954 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (Nov. 2004) (USSG). At the time,
those Guidelines were mandatory. They were “binding on
judges” and carried “the force and effect of laws.”2 United
States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 234 (2005).3 The Guidelines directed
enhanced punishment for “career offender[s].” USSG
§ 4B1.1(a). Defendants qualifed as “career offender[s]” if they
had “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense.” Ibid. There were
different ways that a past conviction could count as “a crime of
violence,” but only one is at issue here: A conviction counted as
“a crime of violence” if it “involve[d] conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 4B1.2(a)(2)
(Nov. 2002). Because it supplied an amorphous catchall at the
end of a more defnite list, that phrase has been known as the
“residual clause.” If the phrase sounds familiar, it may be because
in Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015), this Court
considered the exact same language in another provision where
it was binding on judges and had the force and effect of law: a
statute called the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(e). Like the Guidelines, the ACCA also required enhanced
punishments for career offenders. And, like the Guidelines, the
ACCA included its own residual clause. In fact, the ACCA's residual
clause was identical to the Guidelines' residual clause. See
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“ . . . involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another”).
2 This Court accordingly ruled that the mandatory Guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 226–227
(2005). The Court then rendered the Guidelines advisory by striking down
the provisions that had made them mandatory. See id., at 245.
3 Indeed, before Booker, this Court consistently held that the Sentencing
Guidelines “b[ound] judges and courts in their uncontested responsibility to
pass sentence in criminal cases.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361,
391 (1989); see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 42 (1993) (“The
principle that the Guidelines Manual is binding on federal courts applies as
well to policy statements”). The lower courts heeded that instruction. See
United States v. Hendricks, 171 F. 3d 1184, 1186 (CA8 1999) (“The sentencing
guidelines are, of course, binding on federal district courts”); accord,
United States v. Lafayette, 337 F. 3d 1043, 1051–1052 (CADC 2003); United
States v. Stephens, 347 F. 3d 427, 430 (CA2 2003); United States v. Barbosa,
271 F. 3d 438, 465 (CA3 2001); United States v. Bahe, 201 F. 3d 1124, 1129,
n. 5 (CA9 2000); United States v. Harriott, 976 F. 2d 198, 202–203 (CA4
1992); United States v. Lee, 957 F. 2d 770, 772 (CA10 1992).
ORDERS 955
953 Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Johnson struck down the ACCA's residual clause as unconstitutionally
vague. 576 U. S., at 597. You might think that if a sequence
of words that increases a person's time in prison is unconstitutionally
vague in one legally binding provision, that same
sequence is unconstitutionally vague if it serves the same purpose
in another legally binding provision. Indeed, after Johnson, the
Sentencing Commission deleted the residual clause from the
Guidelines. See USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2016). But for petitioners
like Brown, who were sentenced long before Johnson, this
Court has thus far left the validity of their sentences an open
question. See Beckles v. United States, 580 U. S. 256, 266–267
(2017); id., at 281, n. 4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The Court's decision
today all but ensures that the question will never be answered.
In these petitions, that question largely overlaps with a related,
timeliness question: whether Brown and his fellow petitioners
may rely on the right announced in Johnson, in the ACCA context,
to attack collaterally their mandatory-Guidelines sentences.
Federal law imposes on prisoners seeking to mount collateral attacks
on fnal sentences “[a] 1-year period of limitation . . . from
the latest of ” several events. See 28 U. S. C. § 2255(f ). One
event that can reopen this window is this Court “newly recogniz-
[ing]” a right and making that right “retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.” § 2255(f )(3). The right recognized in
the ACCA context in Johnson, we have held, is retroactive on
collateral review. Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120, 130 (2016).
The question for a petitioner like Brown, then, is whether he
may rely on the right recognized in Johnson to challenge identical
language in the mandatory Guidelines. Three Courts of Appeals
have said no. See 868 F. 3d 297 (CA4 2017) (case below); Raybon
v. United States, 867 F. 3d 625 (CA6 2017); United States v. Greer,
881 F. 3d 1241 (CA10 2018). One Court of Appeals has said yes.
See Cross v. United States, 892 F. 3d 288 (CA7 2018). Another
has strongly hinted yes in a different posture, after which point
the Government dismissed at least one appeal that would have
allowed the court to answer the question directly. See Moore v.
United States, 871 F. 3d 72, 80–84 (CA1 2017); see also United
States v. Roy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 421 (Mass. 2017); United States v.
Roy, Withdrawal of Appeal in No. 17–2169 (CA1). One other
court has concluded that the mandatory Guidelines themselves
cannot be challenged for vagueness. See In re Griffn, 823 F. 3d
1350, 1354 (CA11 2016).
956 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 15, 19, 22, 2018 586 U. S.
Regardless of where one stands on the merits of how far Johnson
extends, this case presents an important question of federal
law that has divided the courts of appeals and in theory could
determine the liberty of over 1,000 people.4 That sounds like the
kind of case we ought to hear. See this Court's Rules 10(a), (c).5
Because the Court nevertheless declines to do so, I respectfully
dissent.
No. 18–5998. Biggins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–7972. Barnes v. Texas, 584 U. S. 940. Petition for
rehearing denied.
No. 17–6147. Sappington v. Oldham, Sheriff, Shelby
County, Tennessee, 583 U. S. 1017. Motion for leave to fle
petition for rehearing denied.
October 19, 2018
Miscellaneous Order. (For Court's order making allotment of
Justices, see 586 U. S. iv.)
October 22, 2018
Miscellaneous Order
No. 18A375. In re Department of Commerce et al. Application
for stay, presented to justice Ginsburg, and by her
referred to the Court, granted in part and denied in part. The
application is granted as to the order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York dated September
21, 2018, which is stayed through October 29, 2018, at 4 p.m. The
4 See Brief for Eight Federal Public Defender Offces as Amici Curiae in
No. 16–7056 (CA4), pp. 1a–5a (estimating 1,187 cases pending nationwide).
5 Rule 10 sets forth situations that can weigh in favor of certiorari, although
they are “neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion.”
Rule 10(a) points to a situation in which “a United States court of
appeals has entered a decision in confict with the decision of another United
States court of appeals on the same important matter.” Rule 10(c) points
to a situation in which “a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court.”
ORDERS 957
586 U. S. October 22, 2018
application is denied as to the orders of the District Court dated
July 3, 2018, and August 17, 2018.
If applicants fle a petition for writ of certiorari or a petition
for writ of mandamus with respect to the stayed order by or
before October 29, 2018, at 4 p.m., the stay will remain in effect
until disposition of such petition by this Court. Should the petition
be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the
event the petition is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the
sending down of the judgment of this Court. Denial of the stay
with respect to the remaining orders does not preclude applicants
from making arguments with respect to those orders.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
To implement the constitutional requirement for an “actual
Enumeration” of the people every 10 years, Art. I, § 2, cl. 3,
Congress has instructed the Secretary of Commerce to “take a
decennial census . . . in such form and content as he may determine.”
13 U. S. C. § 141(a). Most censuses in our history have
asked about citizenship, and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross
recently decided to reinstate a citizenship question in the 2020
census, citing a statement from the Department of Justice indicating
that citizenship data would help it enforce the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. Normally, judicial review of an agency action like
this is limited to the record the agency has compiled to support
its decision. But in the case before us the district court held that
the plaintiffs—assorted States and interest groups—had made a
“strong showing” that Secretary Ross acted in “bad faith” and
were thus entitled to explore his subjective motivations through
“extra-record discovery,” including depositions of the Secretary,
an Acting Assistant Attorney General, and other senior offcials.
New York v. Department of Commerce, 333 F. Supp. 3d 282, 285,
289 (SDNY 2018). In two weeks, the district court plans to hold
a trial to probe the Secretary's mental processes.
This is all highly unusual, to say the least. Leveling an extraordinary
claim of bad faith against a coordinate branch of government
requires an extraordinary justifcation. As evidence of
bad faith here, the district court cited evidence that Secretary
Ross was predisposed to reinstate the citizenship question when
he took offce; that the Justice Department hadn't expressed a
desire for more detailed citizenship data until the Secretary solic958
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Opinion of Gorsuch, J. 586 U. S.
ited its views; that he overruled the objections of his agency's
career staff; and that he declined to order more testing of the
question given its long history. But there's nothing unusual
about a new cabinet secretary coming to offce inclined to favor
a different policy direction, soliciting support from other agencies
to bolster his views, disagreeing with staff, or cutting through
red tape. Of course, some people may disagree with the policy
and process. But until now, at least, this much has never been
thought enough to justify a claim of bad faith and launch an
inquisition into a cabinet secretary's motives.
Unsurprisingly, the government tells us that it intends to fle a
petition seeking review of the district court's bad faith determination
and its orders allowing extra-record discovery. Toward that
end, it has asked us to stay temporarily all extra-record discovery
until we may consider its petition for review.
Today, the Court signals that it is likely to grant the government's
petition. It stays Secretary Ross's deposition after weighing,
among other things, the likelihood of review and the injury
that could occur without a stay. And it expressly invites the
government to seek review of all of the district court's orders
allowing extra-record discovery, including those authorizing the
depositions of other senior offcials.
Respectfully, I would take the next logical step and simply stay
all extra-record discovery pending our review. When it comes to
the likelihood of success, there's no reason to distinguish between
Secretary Ross's deposition and those of other senior executive
offcials: each stems from the same doubtful bad faith ruling, and
each seeks to explore his motives. As to the hardships, the Court
apparently thinks the deposition of a cabinet secretary especially
burdensome. But the other extra-record discovery also burdens
a coordinate branch in most unusual ways. Meanwhile and by
comparison, the plaintiffs would suffer no hardship from being
temporarily denied that which they very likely have no right to
at all.
There is another factor here, too, weighing in favor of a more
complete stay: the need to protect the very review we invite.
One would expect that the Court's order today would prompt the
district court to postpone the scheduled trial and await further
guidance. After all, that is what normally happens when we
grant certiorari or indicate that we are likely to do so in a case
where trial is imminent. But because today's order technically
ORDERS 959
586 U. S. October 22, 26, 2018
leaves the plaintiffs able to pursue much of the extra-record discovery
they seek, it's conceivable they might withdraw their request
to depose Secretary Ross, try to persuade the trial court
to proceed quickly to trial on the basis of the remaining extrarecord
evidence they can assemble, and then oppose certiorari on
the ground that their discovery dispute has become “moot.” To
ensure that the Court's offer of prompt review is not made meaningless
by such maneuvers, I would have thought it simplest to
grant the requested extra-record discovery stay in full. Of
course, other, if more involved, means exist to ensure that this
Court's review of the district court's bad faith fnding is not frustrated.
I only hope they are not required.
October 26, 2018
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 17–571. Fourth Estate Public Benet Corp. v. Wall-
Street.com, LLC, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted,
585 U. S. 1029.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted.
No. 17–1077. Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission.
C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1002.]
Motion of the Solicitor General to argue pro hac vice granted.
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision
of this motion.
No. 17–1107. Carpenter, Interim Warden v. Murphy.
C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Royal v. Murphy,
584 U. S. 992.] Joint motion of respondent and Muscogee (Creek)
Nation for leave for Muscogee (Creek) Nation to participate in
oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or
decision of this motion.
No. 17–1174. Nieves et al. v. Bartlett. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1029.] Motion of the Solicitor General
for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae
and for divided argument granted.
Certiorari Granted
No. 17–1594. Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal
Service et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted limited to
960 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 26, 29, 2018 586 U. S.
Question 1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 868 F. 3d
1350.
No. 17–1657. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology,
LLC, nka Old Cold LLC. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. Reported
below: 879 F. 3d 389.
No. 17–1672. United States v. Haymond. C. A. 10th Cir.
Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 869 F. 3d 1153.
October 29, 2018
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–5645. Johnson v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A.
9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8.
No. 18–5774. Driessen v. Royal Bank of Scotland. C. A.
2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8. Reported below: 691 Fed. Appx. 21.
No. 18–5801. Larson v. Moore et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–5836. Shekhem El-Bey v. United States et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this
Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further
petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing
fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted
in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of CoORDERS
961
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
lumbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision
of this motion and this petition.
No. 18–5856. Jeep v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed
not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from
petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid
and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See
Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1
(1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–5974. Spaulding v. United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6118. Jonassen v. Shartle, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Miscellaneous Orders
No. D–3029. In re Discipline of Speights. Nathaniel H.
Speights, of Washington, D. C., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3030. In re Discipline of Reiner. Martin Barnett
Reiner, of Beverly Hills, Cal., is suspended from the practice of
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3031. In re Discipline of Roberts. Richard Allen
Roberts, of White Plains, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of
962 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3032. In re Discipline of Powell. Roger N. Powell,
of Reisterstown, Md., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring
him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3033. In re Discipline of Casale. Michael J. Casale,
Jr., of Montoursville, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3034. In re Discipline of Jonas. W. James Jonas,
of San Antonio, Tex., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring
him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3035. In re Discipline of Blythe. Angela M.
Blythe, of Oakland, Md., is suspended from the practice of law in
this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring
her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3036. In re Discipline of Kwasnik. Michael William
Kwasnik, of Hollywood, Fla., is suspended from the practice
of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40
days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred
from the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3037. In re Discipline of Cooper. John Edwin
Cooper, of Erie, Pa., is suspended from the practice of law in this
Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring
him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the
practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3038. In re Discipline of Hicks. Thomas Stephen
Hicks, of Snow Hill, N. C., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
ORDERS 963
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
No. D–3039. In re Discipline of Marcin. John Bernard
Marcin, of Las Vegas, Nev., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3040. In re Discipline of Mandelbaum. David Ben
Mandelbaum, of Overland Park, Kan., is suspended from the practice
of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within
40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred
from the practice of law in this Court.
No. D–3041. In re Discipline of Durban. Frampton Durban,
Jr., of Newberry, S. C., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.
No. 18M56. Cotner v. United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. Motion for leave to proceed as a veteran
denied.
No. 18M57. In re Sealed Petitioner. Motion for leave to
fle petition for writ of mandamus under seal with redacted copies
for the public record denied.
No. 18M58. Craft v. National Labor Relations Board;
and
No. 18M59. Thompson v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust
Co. et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to fle petitions for writs
of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M60. Bullock v. District of Columbia et al. Motion
to direct the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out
of time under this Court's Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 17–9484. Jason K. v. Maine Department of Health
and Human Services et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner
is allowed until November 19, 2018, within which to pay the docketing
fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance
with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
No. 18–109. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Illumina, Inc.
C. A. Fed. Cir.; and
964 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–309. Swartz v. Rodriguez, Individually and as
Surviving Mother and Personal Representative of J. A.
C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to fle briefs in
these cases expressing the views of the United States.
No. 18–5843. Chanthunya v. Maryland attorney Grievance
Commission. Ct. App. Md.; and
No. 18–6128. Diamond v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until November
19, 2018, within which to pay the docketing fees required by
Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1
of the Rules of this Court.
No. 18–6099. In re Margheim. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–5850. In re Schneider. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1544. Father v. Maine Department of Health and
Human Services et al. Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 2017 ME 214, 173 A. 3d 142.
No. 17–1568. Padilla-Ramirez v. Culley et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 826.
No. 17–1572. Peterson et al. v. Franklin, Trustee for
the Estate of Franklin. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 878 F. 3d 631.
No. 17–1604. Brown v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 103.
No. 17–1636. California Sea Urchin Commission et al. v.
Combs, Acting Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife,
and Parks, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 883 F. 3d 1173.
No. 17–1654. Wise et al. v. Hurt et al.; and
No. 17–1655. Vantlin et al. v. Hurt et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 831.
No. 17–1673. Aviation & General Insurance Co., Ltd.,
et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 882 F. 3d 1088.
ORDERS 965
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
No. 17–1700. Turzai, Speaker of the Pennsylvania House
of Representatives, et al. v. Brandt et al. Sup. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 644 Pa. 287, 175 A. 3d 282.
No. 17–1701. Wei Sun v. Sessions, Attorney General.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 23.
No. 17–8844. Cooper v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8960. Haskin v. US Airways et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 689 Fed. Appx. 515.
No. 17–9171. Sandoval v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 705 Fed. Appx. 773.
No. 17–9310. Lopez Lara v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 432.
No. 17–9377. Desilien v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9474. Greenway v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., Pima
County. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9535. King v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 577.
No. 18–67. Hurst v. Caldwell et al. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–77. Advanced Video Technologies LLC v. HTC
Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 879 F. 3d 1314.
No. 18–182. AIDS Healthcare Foundation, Inc. v. Gilead
Sciences, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 890 F. 3d 986.
No. 18–187. Simpson v. Bank of New York Mellon. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 227
So. 3d 669.
No. 18–194. Nunn v. Tennessee Department of Correction
et al. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 547 S. W. 3d 163.
966 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–206. Cunningham v. General Dynamics Information
Technology, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 888 F. 3d 640.
No. 18–209. Mehta v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–213. Austin v. Hanover Insurance Co., aka Massachusetts
Bay Insurance Co. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 319.
No. 18–214. Bazargani v. Latch’s Lane Owners Assn.
et al. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–215. Aubuchon et al. v. Maricopa County, Arizona,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 708 Fed. Appx. 436.
No. 18–218. Beam v. Abercrombie. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 918.
No. 18–220. Carrillo et al. v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al.
Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
241 So. 3d 143.
No. 18–222. EMED Technologies Corp. v. Repro-Med Systems,
Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
725 Fed. Appx. 1005.
No. 18–228. Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Allen
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716
Fed. Appx. 660.
No. 18–230. Richards v. County of Los Angeles, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
723 Fed. Appx. 556.
No. 18–233. Indiezone, Inc., et al. v. Rooke et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 333.
No. 18–235. Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885
F. 3d 597.
No. 18–239. Rinaldo v. Mahan et al. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 967
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
No. 18–241. Parmar, Individually and as Executor of
the Estate of Parmar, et al. v. Madigan, Attorney General
of Illinois, et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 2018 IL 122265, 106 N. E. 3d 1004.
No. 18–242. Gicharu et al. v. Sessions, Attorney General.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–243. Fox v. Powell et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 865.
No. 18–245. Penn v. New York Methodist Hospital et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 416.
No. 18–248. Ahmed v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 863.
No. 18–251. Schwartz v. HRI Hospital, Inc., et al. App.
Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 Mass. App.
1120, 95 N. E. 3d 302.
No. 18–255. Briscoe v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 542 S. W. 3d 109.
No. 18–263. Faust v. Illinois Workers Compensation
Commission et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–284. Gessler v. Smith et al. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 419 P. 3d 964.
No. 18–297. White et al. v. Underwood, Attorney General
of New York, et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 31 N. Y. 3d 543, 106 N. E. 3d 709.
No. 18–298. Beaty v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 423 S. C. 26, 813 S. E. 2d 502.
No. 18–313. Diamond v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 250 So. 3d 1.
No. 18–332. Singson v. Reyes, Attorney General of
Utah. Ct. App. Utah. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–335. Teamer v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 286.
No. 18–341. Keyes et al. v. Gunn et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 232.
968 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–343. Andrews v. United States. C. A. Armed
Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 M. J. 393.
No. 18–356. Orth v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed.
Appx. 223.
No. 18–357. Taskov v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–360. Bergrin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 416.
No. 18–381. Marro v. New York State Teachers’ Retirement
System. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–387. Triestman v. Underwood, Attorney General
of New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 715 Fed. Appx. 97.
No. 18–396. Holland et al. v. Rosen et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 272.
No. 18–397. Clowdis v. Virginia Board of Medicine. Sup.
Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–407. Stickle v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5004. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 146.
No. 18–5230. Murphy v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 1064.
No. 18–5263. McGee v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5268. Sailor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5271. Murray v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 882 F. 3d 778.
No. 18–5298. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 810.
ORDERS 969
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
No. 18–5331. Jeremias v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 46, 412 P. 3d 43.
No. 18–5391. Sexton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 787.
No. 18–5399. Perez v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 4 Cal. 5th 421, 411 P. 3d 490.
No. 18–5618. Chon v. Obama, Former President of the
United States, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 718 Fed. Appx. 653.
No. 18–5641. Alston v. Florida et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 243 So. 3d 885.
No. 18–5648. Lamarca v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 914.
No. 18–5649. Richardson v. Kent, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5650. Ross v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 235 Md. App. 747.
No. 18–5652. Springer v. Caple et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 650.
No. 18–5656. Metayer v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 241 So. 3d 836.
No. 18–5659. Cavalieri v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5660. Garton v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 4 Cal. 5th 485, 412 P. 3d 315.
No. 18–5662. Diaz v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5672. Renchenski v. McGinley, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5676. Morris v. Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5681. Johnson v. Oklahoma. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari
denied.
970 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5687. O’Keefe v. Baker, Warden, et al. Ct. App.
Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 990.
No. 18–5690. Taylor v. Schweitzer, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5695. Annabel v. Michigan Department of Corrections
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5697. Reece v. Whitley et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5700. Docaj v. Johnson, Administrator, New
Jersey State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5703. Blair v. Virginia Department of Corrections.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699
Fed. Appx. 182.
No. 18–5705. Easterly v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 So. 3d 844.
No. 18–5711. Coleman v. Ward. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 279.
No. 18–5712. Christmon v. B&B Airparts, Inc. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 510.
No. 18–5714. Rivera-Quinones v. Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5716. Ray v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5718. Campbell v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 294 Va. 486, 807 S. E. 2d 735.
No. 18–5719. Bartlett v. Pineda, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5720. Bartlett v. Pineda, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5722. Lugo v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 971
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
No. 18–5723. Kushner v. Grewal, Attorney General of
New Jersey, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 734 Fed. Appx. 95.
No. 18–5724. Concepcion v. McGinley, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5726. Cazares v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5727. Clarke v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5733. Pinder v. McDowell et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 612.
No. 18–5734. Martin v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5735. Ervin v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5737. Kyles v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed.
Appx. 912.
No. 18–5738. Marquardt v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 550.
No. 18–5741. Riley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed.
Appx. 413.
No. 18–5742. Roberts v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 253 So. 3d 1111.
No. 18–5746. Nix v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 242 So. 3d 1118.
No. 18–5755. Allen v. Superior Court of Georgia, Camden
County. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5758. Annamalai v. Sivanadiyan. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 409.
972 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5761. Herman v. Young et al. App. Ct. Ill., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (4th)
170001, 92 N. E. 3d 1070.
No. 18–5764. Crane v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5767. Salerno v. Gentry, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5768. Rayford v. Leibach, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5772. Saldivar v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 416.
No. 18–5777. Pederson v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.
Sup. Ct. Alaska. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 421 P. 3d
58.
No. 18–5779. Cobia v. Ohio et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5782. Cook v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5783. Cotton v. County of San Bernardino, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 700 Fed. Appx. 776.
No. 18–5784. Wabuyabo v. Correct Care Solutions. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx.
642.
No. 18–5787. Tubbs v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5792. Watford v. LaFond et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 412.
No. 18–5798. C. B. v. Fischgrund. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 243 So. 3d 365.
No. 18–5802. Doe v. Kaweah Delta Hospital et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 457.
ORDERS 973
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
No. 18–5805. Cobb v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5806. Corbett v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5807. Rubens v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5815. Francisco Puentes v. Ryan, Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5829. Matelyan v. Atlantic Records et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5830. A. L. v. Florida Department of Children
and Families. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 240 So. 3d 708.
No. 18–5832. Dixon v. Lee, Superintendent, Eastern
New York Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5837. Roberts v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 268 So. 3d 605.
No. 18–5848. Darby v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5851. Salinas v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5855. Knight v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5860. Amin v. Sessions, Attorney General. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 206.
No. 18–5867. Preston v. Smith, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5869. Montgomery v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx. 278.
No. 18–5870. Prow v. Roy et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 649.
974 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5883. Lowe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 724.
No. 18–5887. Morton v. Haynes, Superintendent, Stafford
Creek Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5911. Lampon-Paz v. Department of Justice et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5918. Guerrero Lozano v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App.
Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 243 So. 3d
352.
No. 18–5942. Byler v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 409.
No. 18–5943. Linh Thi Minh Tran v. Pham et al. Ct. App.
Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 288 Ore. App. 384, 414
P. 3d 486.
No. 18–5946. Parrish v. Wainwright, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5951. Cassady v. Hall. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 1150.
No. 18–5959. Ingebretsen v. Palmer, Warden, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5975. Singh v. Sessions, Attorney General. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6000. Barreiro v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6001. Carman v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 304 Ga. 21, 815 S. E. 2d 860.
No. 18–6015. Torres-Medel v. Lashbrook, Warden. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6017. Robey v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6035. Chambers v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 975
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
No. 18–6057. Sosa-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 1.
No. 18–6066. Vasquez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 323.
No. 18–6067. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 827.
No. 18–6068. Jones v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6069. Cadena v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 381.
No. 18–6072. Gamez Mendez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 358.
No. 18–6073. Price v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 369.
No. 18–6076. Sandifer v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6078. Springer v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App.
Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2017-Ohio-8861.
No. 18–6079. Brooks v. Frauenheim, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6080. Bonowitz et al. v. United States. Ct. App.
D. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6083. Laureano-Perez v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 50.
No. 18–6084. Lee v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 243 So. 3d 337.
No. 18–6087. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6090. Williams v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 A. 3d 1253.
No. 18–6095. Luis Buenrostro v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 1160.
976 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6100. Pliego-Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 790.
No. 18–6102. Mayes v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6103. Valdez-Cejas v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 408.
No. 18–6104. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 689.
No. 18–6107. Stone v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6108. Smotherman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6109. Singh v. United States Postal Service.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed.
Appx. 661.
No. 18–6111. Mandrell v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 554.
No. 18–6112. Jones v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6113. Ballesteros v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 801.
No. 18–6116. Jean v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 712.
No. 18–6117. Buendia v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 907 F. 3d 399.
No. 18–6119. Long v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6120. Pulido-Nolazco v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 859.
No. 18–6121. Vega-Garcia, aka Moreno Molina v. United
States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893
F. 3d 326.
No. 18–6122. Kapahu v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 600.
ORDERS 977
586 U. S. October 29, 2018
No. 18–6123. Green v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6127. Vallier v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 786.
No. 18–6132. Oliver v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6133. Olivares-Cepeda v. United States. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6143. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6145. Nichols v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6146. Neuman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6148. Nanda v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 401.
No. 18–6150. Aquino-Florenciani v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 4.
No. 18–6151. Thelemaque v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 696 Fed. Appx. 966.
No. 18–6171. Taylor v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 405.
No. 18–6173. Tiznado-Valenzuela v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 F. 3d 627.
No. 17–7894. Townes v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 253 So. 3d 447.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Today the Court denies review of Tawuan Townes' capital murder
conviction, the constitutionality of which hinges on whether
the trial court instructed jurors that they “may” infer his intent
to kill a victim or that they “must” do so. The former instruction
is constitutional; the latter is not. There is no way to know for
sure which instruction the trial court gave. Two court reporters
978 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Statement of Sotomayor, J. 586 U. S.
certifed two conficting transcripts, and the trial court no longer
has the original recording. Because Townes has not shown that
the procedures below amount to constitutional error, I must vote
to deny his petition for certiorari. I write separately because
the trial court's failure to preserve the original recording gives
cause for deep concern.
Petitioner Tawuan Townes was convicted of capital murder
committed in the course of a burglary and sentenced to death.
At trial, the crucial question for the jury was whether Townes
possessed the requisite intent for a capital murder conviction.
According to the trial transcript prepared and certifed by the
court reporter after trial, the trial court instructed the jury on
how to make that decision as follows:
“ `A specifc intent to kill is an essential ingredient of capital
murder as charged in this indictment, and may be inferred
from the character of an assault, the use of a deadly weapon,
or other attendant circumstances. Such intent must be inferred
if the act was done deliberately and death was reasonably
to be apprehended or expected as a natural and probable
consequence of the act.' ” No. CR–10–1892 (Ala. Crim. App.,
June 13, 2014), App. to Pet. for Cert. A–5 (emphasis added),
withdrawn and substituted, 253 So. 3d 447 (Ala. Crim. App.
2015).
Townes appealed, arguing that the trial court's jury instructions
violated his constitutional right to due process. The Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the jury instruction, as
reproduced above, plainly violated his due process rights. Instructing
the jury that it “must” infer Townes' specifc intent
removed the issue of intent from the jury's consideration and
relieved the State of its burden to prove each element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom v. Montana,
442 U. S. 510, 523 (1979). Such presumptions, this Court has held,
violate the Due Process Clause. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S.
307, 325 (1985).
Indeed, Townes' intent was the only issue for the jury to resolve
at trial. He was charged with shooting and killing Christopher
Woods during a burglary. Townes admitted that he and an acquaintance
had planned to rob Woods. But Townes adamantly
disclaimed any intent to kill Woods, insisting that he shot at
ORDERS 979
977 Statement of Sotomayor, J.
Woods only to scare him. At trial, Townes' counsel focused the
defense on this distinction. Under state law, if the jury found
that Townes lacked specifc intent to kill Woods, it could fnd
Townes guilty of only felony murder. But if the jury found that
Townes intended to kill Woods, it could convict Townes of capital
murder, making him eligible to receive a death sentence. Because
the trial court's instructions took that pivotal question away
from the jury, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Townes'
conviction.
After the reversal, however, the trial court judge fled a “supplemental
record” with the appellate court asserting that the certifed
trial transcript—or rather, a single word of that transcript—
had been mistranscribed. The trial court judge insisted
that he had properly instructed the jury that it “may,” rather
than “must,” infer specifc intent and that the audio recording of
Townes' trial confrmed as much. (The government, notably, had
not contested the accuracy of the transcript.)
Upon receiving the trial court's sua sponte fling, the Court of
Criminal Appeals, citing Alabama law, remanded the case and
directed the trial court to appoint a new court reporter to listen
to the audio recording and retranscribe the trial court proceedings.
1 The second court reporter submitted a new 56-page transcript.
It differed from the original transcript by exactly one
word: The new transcript said “may” where the original had
said “must.” 2
1 Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(g) (1991) provides: “The appellate
court may, on motion of a party or on its own initiative, order that a
supplemental or corrected record be certifed and transmitted to the appellate
court if necessary to correct an omission or misstatement.”
2 This was not the frst time that the same trial court judge sought to
correct a transcript while a case was pending review. In Hammonds v.
Commissioner, Ala. Dept. of Corrections, 712 Fed. Appx. 841, 847–848
(2017), the Eleventh Circuit rejected the State's attempt to amend the habeas
record with a corrected transcript fled by a court reporter at the
request of the same trial judge who presided over Townes' trial. The court
reporter—the same one who prepared the second transcript in Townes'
case—stated that she had reviewed her notes and the recording of the defendant's
trial and concluded that the judge had said “inference” instead of
“innocence,” curing an allegedly erroneous instruction that the defendant
challenged on collateral review. Ibid.
980 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
October 29, 2018 586 U. S.
On the basis of the new transcript, the Court of Criminal Appeals
withdrew its reversal and affrmed Townes' conviction and
death sentence. The court explained that, according to the new
transcript—which was now the offcial record—the trial judge
properly instructed the jury. There is no indication that the
Court of Criminal Appeals itself reviewed the audio recording of
the instructions.
Townes fled a petition for writ of certiorari. This Court called
for the record and specifcally requested that the trial court provide
a copy of the audio recording. The trial court informed this
Court's Clerk's Offce that the recording no longer exists.
Without the recording, we cannot know what the judge actually
said at trial. The second transcript is now the offcial record of
the trial court proceedings, on which this Court must rely in
evaluating Townes' challenge to his conviction. On that record, I
am unable to conclude that Townes' conviction is unconstitutional.
But the absence of demonstrable constitutional error makes the
doubts raised by the trial court's unusual handling of this matter
no less troubling. In a matter of life and death, hinging on a
single disputed word, all should take great care to protect the
reviewing courts' opportunity to learn what was said to the jury
before Townes was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death. Yet the trial court, after its unilateral intervention in
Townes' appeal resulted in dueling transcripts, failed to preserve
the recording at issue—despite the fact that Townes' case was
still pending direct review, and, consequently, his conviction was
not yet fnal. As a result, the potential for this Court's full review
of Townes' conviction has been frustrated.
The Constitution guarantees certain procedural protections
when the government seeks to prove that a person should pay
irreparably for a crime. A reliable, credible record is essential
to ensure that a reviewing court—not to mention the defendant
and the public at large—can say with confdence whether those
fundamental rights have been respected. Parker v. Dugger, 498
U. S. 308, 321 (1991) (“It cannot be gainsaid that meaningful appellate
review requires that the appellate court consider the defendant's
actual record”). By fostering uncertainty about the result
here, the trial court's actions in this case erode that confdence.
That gives me—and should give us all—great pause.
No. 17–9340. Metcalf v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Motion of Gail Heriot et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae
granted. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 641.
ORDERS 981
586 U. S. October 29, November 1, 2018
No. 18–48. Minnesota v. Chute. Sup. Ct. Minn. Motion of
respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 908 N. W. 2d 578.
No. 18–232. Grifn v. Teamcare et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari before judgment denied.
No. 18–254. Xiu Jian Sun v. Trump, President of the
United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
No. 18–277. Bhagat v. Iancu, Director, United States
Patent and Trademark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motion of
Independent Inventors et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae
out of time denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed.
Appx. 772.
No. 18–553 (18A449). Yackel v. South Dakota et al. Sup.
Ct. S. D. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Gorsuch, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–8407. Mincey v. Davis, Warden, 584 U. S. 996. Petition
for rehearing denied.
November 1, 2018
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–6525 (18A465). Zagorski v. Mays, Warden. C. A.
6th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 907 F. 3d 901.
No. 18–6530 (18A470). Zagorski v. Haslam, Governor of
Tennessee, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Application for stay of execution
of sentence of death, presented to Justice Kagan, and by
her referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 741 Fed. Appx. 320.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
Three weeks ago, I expressed my concerns with the Tennessee
Supreme Court's rejection of petitioner Edmund Zagorski's challenge
to the lethal-injection protocol that the State previously
982 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
planned to use to execute him. Zagorski v. Parker, 586 U. S. 938,
939 (2018) (opinion dissenting from denial of application for stay
and denial of certiorari). In the wake of that ruling, Zagorski
sought instead to be executed by the electric chair. He did so
not because he thought that it was a humane way to die, but
because he thought that the three-drug cocktail that Tennessee
had planned to use was even worse. Given what most people
think of the electric chair, it is hard to imagine a more striking
testament—from a person with more at stake—to the legitimate
fears raised by the lethal-injection drugs that Tennessee uses.
See ibid. (noting “mounting evidence that the sedative to be used,
midazolam, will not prevent the prisoner from feeling as if he is
`drowning, suffocating, and being burned alive from the inside out'
during a process that could last as long as 18 minutes”).
The present challenge does not concern lethal injection. That
said, it might never have arisen if Zagorski had been able to
prevail simply by showing that Tennessee's lethal-injection protocol
“creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain.” Abdur'Rahman
v. Parker, 558 S. W. 3d 606, 625 (Tenn., 2018). Instead, under
this Court's decision in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863 (2015),
Zagorski's prior challenge failed only because the Tennessee Supreme
Court ruled that he had not proved the “availability of ”
a safer lethal-injection drug (pentobarbital) that was Zagorski's
“proposed alternative method of execution.” Abdur'Rahman,
558 S. W. 3d, at 625. His eleventh-hour decision to accept the
electric chair as a marginally less excruciating alternative does
not undermine, as a matter of logic, his contention that both
Tennessee's lethal-injection protocol and the electric chair are
cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Given this petition's unique posture, I note that this Court's
denial of Zagorski's challenge says nothing about the constitutional
tolerability of the electric chair, which has raised concern
in other forums. See, e. g., State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 67, 745
N. W. 2d 229, 278 (2008) (“Electrocution's proven history of burning
and charring bodies is inconsistent with both the concepts of
evolving standards of decency and the dignity of man”). It says
a great deal, however, about how this Court's decision in Glossip
continues to “immunize . . . methods of execution—no matter how
cruel or how unusual—from judicial review.” Arthur v. Dunn,
580 U. S. 1141, 1142 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial
ORDERS 983
586 U. S. November 1, 2, 2018
of certiorari). Because I continue to believe that we should rethink
this troubling doctrinal shift and reaffrm that “[t]he Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition of inherently
barbaric punishments under all circumstances,” Graham
v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, 59 (2010), I dissent.
November 2, 2018
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18A410. In re United States et al. The Government
seeks a stay of proceedings in the District Court pending disposition
of a petition for a writ of mandamus, No. 18–505, ordering
dismissal of the suit. In such circumstances, a stay is warranted
if there is (1) “a fair prospect that a majority of the Court will
vote to grant mandamus,” and (2) “a likelihood that irreparable
harm will result from the denial of a stay.” Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). Mandamus may
issue when “(1) `no other adequate means [exist] to attain the
relief [the party] desires,' (2) the party's `right to issuance of the
writ is clear and indisputable,' and (3) `the writ is appropriate
under the circumstances.' ” Ibid. (quoting Cheney v. United
States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 380–381 (2004)). “ `The
traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction . . . has
been to confne [the court against which mandamus is sought] to
a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction.' ” Id., at 380
(quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21, 26 (1943)).
The Government contends that these standards are satisfed
here because the litigation is beyond the limits of Article III.
The Government notes that the suit is based on an assortment of
unprecedented legal theories, such as a substantive due process
right to certain climate conditions, and an equal protection right
to live in the same climate as enjoyed by prior generations. The
Government further points out that plaintiffs ask the District
Court to create a “national remedial plan” to stabilize the climate
and “restore [the] Earth's energy balance.”
The District Court denied the Government's dispositive motions,
stating that “[t]his action is of a different order than the
typical environmental case. It alleges that defendants' actions
and inactions—whether or not they violate any specifc statutory
duty—have so profoundly damaged our home planet that they
threaten plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional rights to life and
984 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 2, 2018 586 U. S.
liberty.” Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1261
(Ore. 2016). The District Court declined to certify its orders for
interlocutory review under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) (permitting such
review when the district court certifes that its order “involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal . . . may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”).
See this Court's order of July 30, 2018, No. 18A65 [585 U. S.
1045] (noting that the “striking” breadth of plaintiffs' below claims
“presents substantial grounds for difference of opinion”).
At this time, however, the Government's petition for a writ of
mandamus does not have a “fair prospect” of success in this Court
because adequate relief may be available in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. When mandamus relief
is available in the court of appeals, pursuit of that option is ordinarily
required. See this Court's Rule 20.1 (petitioners seeking
extraordinary writ must show “that adequate relief cannot be
obtained in any other form or from any other court” (emphasis
added)); Rule 20.3 (mandamus petition must “set out with particularity
why the relief sought is not available in any other court”);
see also Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 585 (1943) (mandamus
petition “ordinarily must be made to the intermediate appellate
court”).
Although the Ninth Circuit has twice denied the Government's
request for mandamus relief, it did so without prejudice. And
the court's basis for denying relief rested, in large part, on the
early stage of the litigation, the likelihood that plaintiffs' claims
would narrow as the case progressed, and the possibility of attaining
relief through ordinary dispositive motions. Those reasons
are, to a large extent, no longer pertinent. The 50-day trial was
scheduled to begin on October 29, 2018, and being held in abeyance
only because of the current administrative stay.
In light of the foregoing, the application for stay, presented to
The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, is denied
without prejudice. The order heretofore entered by The Chief
Justice is vacated. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch
would grant the application.
No. 18A455. In re Department of Commerce et al. D. C.
S. D. N. Y. Application for stay, presented to Justice Ginsburg,
and by her referred to the Court, denied. Justice Thomas,
ORDERS 985
586 U. S. November 2, 2018
Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch would grant the
application.
No. 17–647. Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 583 U. S. 1166.] Case
restored to the calendar for reargument. The parties and the
Solicitor General are directed to fle letter briefs, not to exceed 10
pages, addressing petitioner's alternative argument for vacatur,
discussed at pages 12–15 and 40–42 of the transcript of oral argument
and in footnote 14 of petitioner's brief on the merits. Briefs
are to be fled simultaneously with the Clerk and served upon
opposing counsel on or before 2 p.m., Friday, November 30, 2018.
Reply briefs, not to exceed four pages, are to be fled simultaneously
with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or
before 2 p.m., Friday, December 21, 2018.
Certiorari Granted
No. 17–1606. Smith v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported
below: 880 F. 3d 813.
No. 17–1679. Gray v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below:
875 F. 3d 1102.
No. 17–1717. American Legion et al. v. American Humanist
Assn. et al.; and
No. 18–18. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
Commission v. American Humanist Assn. et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of
one hour is allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 874
F. 3d 195.
No. 17–8995. Mont v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 325.
No. 17–9572. Flowers v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted limited to the following question: “Whether
the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), in this case.” Reported below: 240
So. 3d 1082.
986 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
586 U. S.
November 5, 2018
Appeal Dismissed
No. 18–290. LaVergne et al. v. United States House of
Representatives et al. Appeal from D. C. D. C. dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–5863. Johnson v. Butler Law Firm. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 345.
No. 18–5873. Olic v. Spearman, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–5881. Vurimindi v. Hoopskirt Lofts Condominium
Assn. Commw. Ct. Pa. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18A365. Keyes v. Banks. Cir. Ct. Letcher County, Ky.
Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and referred
to the Court, denied.
No. 65, Orig. Texas v. New Mexico. Motion of the River
Master for fees and expenses granted, and the River Master is
awarded a total of $14,242.82 for the period July 1, 2017, through
June 30, 2018, to be paid equally by the parties. [For earlier
order herein, see, e. g., 583 U. S. 810.]
No. 17–1606. Smith v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 586 U. S.
985.] Deepak Gupta, Esq., of Washington, D. C., is invited to
brief and argue this case as amicus curiae in support of judgment
below.
ORDERS 987
586 U. S. November 5, 2018
No. 18–5820. Evans v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Motion of
petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 807] denied.
No. 18–6160. Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is
allowed until November 26, 2018, within which to pay the docketing
fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance
with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–9218. Cain v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 870 F. 3d 1003.
No. 18–121. Rothery et al. v. Blanas et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx.
782.
No. 18–125. Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School,
Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882
F. 3d 655.
No. 18–252. Real Estate Alliance Ltd. v. Move, Inc.,
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721
Fed. Appx. 950.
No. 18–259. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, et al. v.
Wheatt et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 741 Fed. Appx. 302.
No. 18–262. Xiu Jian Sun v. Mullkoff. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–271. Trost et ux. v. Trost. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 875.
No. 18–276. Baker v. Microsoft Corp. et al. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 800.
No. 18–278. Koziol, Individually, as Natural Parent of
Child A et al., and on Behalf of Parents Similarly Situated
v. DiFiore, Chief Judge, New York State Unied
Court System, et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept.
Certiorari denied.
988 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 5, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–282. Tucker v. Atwater et al. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 343 Ga. App. 301, 807 S. E. 2d 56.
No. 18–286. Prasad v. Lightbourne et al. Ct. App. Cal.,
6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–289. DeGennaro v. American Bankers Insurance
Company of Florida et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 631.
No. 18–296. Diaz v. Sessions, Attorney General. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 240.
No. 18–299. Briggs v. Rendlen, Judge, United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 930.
No. 18–314. Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Cisco Systems,
Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 711 Fed. Appx. 642.
No. 18–346. Estate of Smallwood v. United States.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed.
Appx. 1007.
No. 18–371. Wang v. Iancu, Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 534.
No. 18–388. Parker et al. v. Iancu, Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent
and Trademark Ofce (two judgments). C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 979 (second
judgment) and 980 (frst judgment).
No. 18–411. Omidi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 808.
No. 18–417. Harkonen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 705 Fed. Appx. 606.
No. 18–421. Cepeda-Cortes v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 686.
No. 18–427. Bamdad v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 989
586 U. S. November 5, 2018
No. 18–430. Jones v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 66.
No. 18–5003. Mulet v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 697.
No. 18–5105. Makonnen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 905.
No. 18–5132. Bryant v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 238 So. 3d 751.
No. 18–5182. Butler v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 732.
No. 18–5303. Mason v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 153 Ohio St. 3d 476, 2018-Ohio-1462, 108
N. E. 3d 56.
No. 18–5393. McMahan v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 665.
No. 18–5435. Ybarra v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 660.
No. 18–5765. Russell v. Redstone Federal Credit Union
et al. (Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 830); and Russell v.
Ingegneri et al. (713 Fed. Appx. 991). C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5816. Nash v. Bishop et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 332.
No. 18–5818. Kilpatrick v. Kondaveeti. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5819. Kilpatrick v. Fields. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5827. King v. Neall, Secretary, Maryland Department
of Health, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 221.
No. 18–5833. Kilpatrick v. Volterra. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5834. Kilpatrick v. Robinson. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
990 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 5, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5841. Rodriguez v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5862. Ross v. Clerk of Courts of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 864.
No. 18–5864. Lee v. Peery, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5877. Stoltzfoos v. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 34.
No. 18–5878. Jamerson v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 581.
No. 18–5886. Mitchell v. Taylor et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5897. Braddy v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 246 So. 3d 281.
No. 18–5903. Jones v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5961. Marino v. Rickard, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 794.
No. 18–5962. Mattis v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 244 So. 3d 1076.
No. 18–5977. Rafi v. Yale University School of Medicine
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5981. Pastor v. Partnership for Children ’s
Rights. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 159 App. Div. 3d 910, 70 N. Y. S. 3d 65.
No. 18–5986. Caldwell v. Payne, Superintendent, Eastern
Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center.
Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6037. Zavala v. Rios et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 720.
ORDERS 991
586 U. S. November 5, 2018
No. 18–6040. Thornberry v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6051. Bender v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6074. Kuri v. Kansas Department of Labor,
Employment Security Board of Review. Ct. App. Kan.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 Kan. App. 2d xiii, 405
P. 3d 1247.
No. 18–6081. Camacho v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 888 Fed. Appx. 389.
No. 18–6088. Burris v. Ramey, Superintendent, Jefferson
City Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6093. Tate v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 459 Md. 587, 187 A. 3d 660.
No. 18–6138. Fox v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6139. Frias v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 1268.
No. 18–6141. Towne v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6149. Polk v. Lewis, Superintendent, Southeast
Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6155. Lemus Cerna, aka Lemus Alfaro v. United
States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894
F. 3d 593.
No. 18–6156. Medina v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 777.
No. 18–6159. Williams v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 242.
992 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 5, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6161. Lombard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6163. Jones v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6165. Rinehart v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 4th App.
Dist., Ross County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-1261.
No. 18–6169. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6178. Clark v. Ramey, Superintendent, Jefferson
City Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6180. Deronceler v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 683.
No. 18–6184. Barnes v. Masters, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 93.
No. 18–6186. Gaitan Benitez v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 593.
No. 18–6188. Lucero v. Colorado Department of Corrections.
Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6190. Swenson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 677.
No. 18–6193. White v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6197. Medina Ortiz v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6198. Acosta-Joaquin v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 60.
No. 18–6201. DeAngelis v. Plumley, Warden. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 290.
No. 18–6204. Franklin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6205. Guevara-Guevara v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 348.
ORDERS 993
586 U. S. November 5, 2018
No. 18–6206. Howard v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 526.
No. 18–6208. Hemsher v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 525.
No. 18–6209. Werbach v. University of Arkansas et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed.
Appx. 801.
No. 18–6215. Peragine v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 498.
No. 18–6216. Mulenga v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 A. 3d 720.
No. 18–6222. Bacon v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 605.
No. 18–6225. Bummer v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 721.
No. 18–6226. Forest v. Lewis, Superintendent, Southeast
Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6229. Wairi v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6232. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 153.
No. 18–6240. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6241. Jewell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6242. Locke v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6251. Pebley v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6266. Rivera-Solis v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 207.
No. 18–6267. Robertson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 1206.
994 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 5, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6268. King v. Kilpatrick, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6271. Scott v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 244.
No. 18–6277. Yawn v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 881.
No. 18–6279. Kwushue v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 693.
No. 18–6280. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 254.
No. 18–6282. Dixon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 627.
No. 17–498. Berninger v. Federal Communications Commission
et al.;
No. 17–499. AT&T Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
et al.;
No. 17–500. American Cable Assn. v. Federal Communications
Commission et al.;
No. 17–501. CTIA–The Wireless Assn. et al. v. Federal
Communications Commission et al.;
No. 17–502. NCTA–The Internet and Television Assn. v.
Federal Communications Commission et al.;
No. 17–503. TechFreedom et al. v. Federal Communications
Commission et al.; and
No. 17–504. United States Telecom Assn. et al. v. Federal
Communications Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice
Gorsuch would grant the petitions, vacate the judgment,
and remand with instructions to dismiss the cases as moot. See
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). The
Chief Justice and Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the
consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 825
F. 3d 674.
No. 18–275. Smith et al. v. Clinton et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 886
F. 3d 122.
ORDERS 995
586 U. S. November 5, 6, 2018
No. 18–325. Gehrmann et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 731
Fed. Appx. 792.
No. 18–334. Medina Del Rosario et al. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N. A., as Trustee, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision
of this petition. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 722.
No. 18–5932. Jones v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jersey
State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition.
No. 18–6094. Garcia-Martinez v. United States. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
730 Fed. Appx. 665.
No. 18–6213. Baxter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
November 6, 2018
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 17–961. Frank et al. v. Gaos, Individually and on
Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. [Certiorari granted, 584 U. S. 958.] The parties and the
Solicitor General are directed to fle supplemental briefs addressing
whether any named plaintiff has standing such that the federal
courts have Article III jurisdiction over this dispute. Briefs,
not to exceed 6,000 words, are to be fled simultaneously with the
Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 2 p.m., Friday,
November 30, 2018. Reply briefs, not to exceed 3,000 words,
are to be fled simultaneously with the Clerk and served upon
opposing counsel on or before 2 p.m., Friday, December 21,
2018.
No. 18–557. In re Department of Commerce et al. Respondents
are directed to fle a response to the petition on or
before 5 p.m., Tuesday, November 13, 2018. Petitioners may fle
a reply brief on or before 2 p.m., Thursday, November 15, 2018.
996 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 6, 13, 2018 586 U. S.
Amicus curiae briefs may be fled on or before 5 p.m., Tuesday,
November 13, 2018.
November 13, 2018
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M61. Hendricks v. Bingham et al. Motion to direct
the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M62. Rodwell v. Massachusetts. Motion for leave
to fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted.
No. 18–5955. In re Turner. Petition for writ of prohibition
denied.
Probable Jurisdiction Postponed
No. 18–281. Virginia House of Delegates et al. v.
Bethune-Hill et al. Appeal from D. C. E. D. Va. Further
consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of
case on the merits. In addition to the questions presented by
the jurisdictional statement, the parties are directed to fully brief
the following question: “Whether appellants have standing to
bring this appeal.” Reported below: 326 F. Supp. 3d 128.
Certiorari Granted
No. 17–1705. PDR Network, LLC, et al. v. Carlton &
Harris Chiropractic, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted
limited to the following question: “Whether the Hobbs Act required
the District Court in this case to accept the FCC's legal
interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.” Reported
below: 883 F. 3d 459.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–8719. De Vera v. United Airlines, Inc. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 689 Fed. Appx. 575.
No. 17–9105. Debeikes v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed.
Appx. 499.
No. 17–9295. Jeanty v. New York City Department of
Finance. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
709 Fed. Appx. 89.
ORDERS 997
586 U. S. November 13, 2018
No. 17–9306. Trinh v. Trinh. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9339. Silva Medina v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–29. Bhawnani et al. v. United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York et al. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–37. Securiforce International America, LLC v.
United States. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 879 F. 3d 1354.
No. 18–50. Carty v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 543 S. W. 3d 149.
No. 18–73. Carpenter v. Jordan. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 413.
No. 18–119. Gotech International Technology Ltd.
et al. v. Nagravision SA. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 882 F. 3d 494.
No. 18–244. Woide et al. v. Federal National Mortgage
Association. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 730 Fed. Appx. 731.
No. 18–269. Mapuatuli et al. v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 714 Fed. Appx. 730.
No. 18–279. Konarski, dba FGPJ Apartments and Development,
et al. v. City of Tucson, Arizona, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 609.
No. 18–305. Kirby v. Ofce of the Attorney General of
North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 727 Fed. Appx. 48.
No. 18–310. Tucker v. LCP-Maui, LLC. Int. Ct. App. Haw.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 142 Haw. 149, 414 P. 3d 201.
No. 18–316. Weese v. Maryland. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 271.
No. 18–318. Koutentis v. New York City Police Department,
Licensing Division. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud.
998 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 13, 2018 586 U. S.
Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158 App. Div. 3d 542,
68 N. Y. S. 3d 722.
No. 18–320. CEH Energy, LLC, et al. v. Kean Miller,
LLP, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–322. Miner v. Illinois Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–345. Xiu Jian Sun v. Newman et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–347. West Congress Street Partners, LLC v. Rivertown
Development, LLC, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 778.
No. 18–350. Brown v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 S. C. 519, 815 S. E. 2d
761.
No. 18–352. South Carolina v. Young. Ct. App. S. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–353. Clark v. Southwest Airlines Co. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 442.
No. 18–372. Coddington v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 925, 415 P. 3d 12.
No. 18–400. Hoskins v. Fuchs. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 517 S. W. 3d 834.
No. 18–402. Pezhman v. Chanel et al. Ct. App. N. Y.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 32 N. Y. 3d 1018, 111 N. E.
3d 320.
No. 18–403. Shear v. MAZ Partners, LP, Individually
and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 419.
No. 18–429. Germinaro et al. v. Fidelity National Title
Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 737 Fed. Appx. 96.
No. 18–435. LabMD, Inc. v. Tiversa, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 878.
ORDERS 999
586 U. S. November 13, 2018
No. 18–439. Janangelo v. Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 660.
No. 18–440. Nero et al. v. Mosby. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 106.
No. 18–449. Pharmavite LLC v. Bradach. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 251.
No. 18–454. Dinger v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 M. J. 447.
No. 18–455. Emineth v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 290 Ore. App. 720, 414 P. 3d 498.
No. 18–456. Persico v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 44.
No. 18–467. Fletcher et al. v. Honeywell International,
Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 892 F. 3d 217.
No. 18–509. Kinney v. State Bar of California et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed.
Appx. 409.
No. 18–5137. Daniel v. Brooklyn Law School. App. Div.,
Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 153 App. Div. 3d 708, 60 N. Y. S. 3d 308.
No. 18–5223. Ratcliff v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 894.
No. 18–5487. Soto v. Sweetman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 865.
No. 18–5517. Gallardo v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., County
of Maricopa. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5534. Carrasquilla-Lombada et al. v. United
States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
685 Fed. Appx. 761.
No. 18–5537. Opengeym v. Heartland Employment Services,
LLC. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
1000 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 13, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5548. Tuttle v. Allied Nevada Gold Corp. et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed.
Appx. 144.
No. 18–5888. Morrison v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5891. Whitney v. Guterres, Secretary General
of the United Nations, et al. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 2018 Ark. 133.
No. 18–5892. Jackson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App. Dist.,
Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-276, 105 N. E. 3d 472.
No. 18–5906. Kilpatrick v. Weiss. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5907. Kilpatrick v. Elia, Commissioner, New York
State Department of Education. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5908. Kilpatrick v. Zucker, Commissioner, New
York State Department of Health, Ofce of Professional
Medical Conduct; and Kilpatrick v. Dreslin, Executive
Deputy Commissioner, New York State Department
of Health, Ofce of Professional Medical Conduct.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5909. Soldridge v. Mahally, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5919. Martin v. Brown et al.; and Martin v. California.
Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5920. Rolland v. Carnation Building Services,
Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739
Fed. Appx. 920.
No. 18–5926. Wilkins v. Lane, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Fayette, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5927. J. A. v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 233 N. J. 432, 186 A. 3d 266.
ORDERS 1001
586 U. S. November 13, 2018
No. 18–5931. Laschkewitsch v. Legal & General
America, Inc., dba Banner Life Insurance Co. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 252.
No. 18–5936. Johnson v. Williams, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 238.
No. 18–5938. Bailey v. Nagy, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 425.
No. 18–5947. Roberson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5958. Wilmot v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5963. Kassab v. Skinner et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 877.
No. 18–5989. Bilbo v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5990. Brockman v. Balcarcel, Acting Warden.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5991. Bennett v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5993. Burns v. Horton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5995. Webb v. Harrison, Sheriff, Wake County,
North Carolina, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 225.
No. 18–5999. Bailey v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51,627 (La. App. 2 Cir.
9/27/17), 245 So. 3d 145.
No. 18–6039. Taylor v. Minnesota. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6050. Rodriguez v. Burton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
1002 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 13, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6056. Blevins v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 244 So. 3d 1084.
No. 18–6058. Reeves v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6126. Villaverde v. Smith, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6181. Patino v. Rhode Island. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 188 A. 3d 646.
No. 18–6183. Lynch v. Hall, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6196. Tunstall v. Wolfe, Warden, et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 251.
No. 18–6235. Lane v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6246. Parnell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 745.
No. 18–6248. Mercedes-Rijo v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6255. Oden v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6256. Mock v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 545.
No. 18–6260. Traverso v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 237 Md. App. 760.
No. 18–6270. Lynch v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App. Dist.,
Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-1078, 109 N. E. 3d 628.
No. 18–6283. Cole v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 749.
No. 18–6284. Churchwell v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6285. Chan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 728.
ORDERS 1003
586 U. S. November 13, 2018
No. 18–6293. Martinez-Rey v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 266.
No. 18–6297. Robles-Avalos v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 405.
No. 18–6299. Dunning v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 261.
No. 18–6300. Singleton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 947.
No. 18–6301. Dancy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6302. Melgar-Cabrera v. United States. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 1053.
No. 18–6303. Pendleton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 978.
No. 18–6304. McCoy v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 358.
No. 18–6308. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 496.
No. 18–6313. Washington v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 410.
No. 18–6314. Khouanmany v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 514.
No. 18–6317. Turner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 687.
No. 18–6322. Medina Osorio v. United States (Reported
below: 734 Fed. Appx. 922); Velasquez-Rios v. United States
(731 Fed. Appx. 358); and Vega-Zapata v. United States (735
Fed. Appx. 135). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6324. Coleman v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6328. Hunter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6348. Pence v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (2d) 151102, 100
N. E. 3d 218.
1004 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 13, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6362. Lett v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9284. Guardado v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Reported
below: 238 So. 3d 162;
No. 17–9556. Philmore v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Reported
below: 234 So. 3d 567;
No. 18–5160. Tanzi v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Reported
below: 251 So. 3d 805;
No. 18–5228. Franklin v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Reported
below: 236 So. 3d 989;
No. 18–5518. Grim v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Reported
below: 244 So. 3d 147; and
No. 18–5793. Johnston v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Reported
below: 246 So. 3d 266. Certiorari denied.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
I concur for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586 U. S.
1004, 1008 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586
U. S. 1004, 1011 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
No. 18–153. Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 883
F. 3d 929.
No. 18–283. Coleman et al. v. Campbell County Library
Board of Trustees. Ct. App. Ky. Motion of the New England
Legal Foundation for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 547 S. W. 3d 526.
No. 18–301. Chieftain Royalty Co. v. Nutley et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 888 F. 3d 455.
No. 18–5181. Reynolds v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 251 So. 3d 811.
ORDERS 1005
586 U. S. Statement of Breyer, J.
Statement of Justice Breyer respecting the denial of
certiorari.
This case, along with 83 others in which the Court has denied
certiorari in recent weeks, asks us to decide whether the Florida
Supreme Court erred in its application of this Court's decision in
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. 92 (2016). In Hurst, this Court concluded
that Florida's death penalty scheme violated the Constitution
because it required a judge rather than a jury to fnd the
aggravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence.
The Florida Supreme Court now applies Hurst retroactively to
capital defendants whose sentences became fnal after this Court's
earlier decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), which
similarly held that the death penalty scheme of a different State,
Arizona, violated the Constitution because it required a judge
rather than a jury to fnd the aggravating circumstances necessary
to impose a death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court
has declined, however, to apply Hurst retroactively to capital defendants
whose sentences became fnal before Ring. Hitchcock
v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (2017). As a result, capital defendants
whose sentences became fnal before 2002 cannot prevail on
a “Hurst-is-retroactive” claim.
Many of the Florida death penalty cases in which we have
denied certiorari in recent weeks involve—directly or indirectly—
three important issues regarding the death penalty as it is currently
administered. First, these cases highlight what I have
previously described as a serious faw in the death penalty system:
the unconscionably long delays that capital defendants must
endure as they await execution. Henry Sireci, the petitioner in
one case we recently denied, was frst sentenced to death in 1976.
He has lived in prison under threat of execution for nearly 42
years. Unfortunately, Sireci is far from alone in having endured
lengthy delays. The Court has recently denied petitions from at
least 10 other capital defendants in Florida who have lived under
a death sentence for more than 30 years, and from at least 50
other capital defendants who have lived under a death sentence
for more than 20 years. I have previously written that lengthy
delays—made inevitable by the Constitution's procedural protections
for defendants facing execution—deepen the cruelty of the
death penalty and undermine its penological rationale. Glossip
v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863, 925 (2015) (dissenting opinion); see Dunn
1006 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Statement of Breyer, J. 586 U. S.
v. Madison, 583 U. S. 10, 15 (2017) (concurring opinion); Smith v.
Ryan, 581 U. S. 954, 955 (2017) (statement respecting denial of
certiorari); Sireci v. Florida, 580 U. S. 1036, 1037 (2016) (opinion
dissenting from denial of certiorari). I remain of that view.
However, because the petitioners in these cases did not squarely
raise the delay issue, I do not vote to grant certiorari on that
basis here.
Second, many of these cases raise the question whether the
Constitution demands that Hurst be made retroactive to all cases
on collateral review, not just to cases involving death sentences
that became fnal after Ring. I believe the retroactivity analysis
here is not signifcantly different from our analysis in Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348 (2004), where we held that Ring does
not apply retroactively. Although I dissented in Schriro, I am
bound by the majority's holding in that case. I therefore do not
dissent on that ground here.
Third, several of the cases in which we deny certiorari today,
including this one, indirectly raise the question whether the
Eighth Amendment requires a jury rather than a judge to make
the ultimate decision to sentence a defendant to death. See
Guardado v. Florida, No. 17–9284; Philmore v. Florida, No. 17–
9556; Tanzi v. Florida, No. 18–5160; Franklin v. Florida, No. 18–
5228; Grim v. Florida, No. 18–5518; Johnston v. Florida, No. 18–
5793. In these cases, the Florida Supreme Court treated Hurst
errors as harmless in signifcant part because the jury in each
case unanimously recommended that the defendant be sentenced
to death. The problem, however, is that the defendants in these
cases were sentenced to death under a scheme that required the
judge to make the ultimate decision to impose the death penalty,
and in which the jury was repeatedly instructed that its recommended
verdict would be advisory. As I have previously written,
I believe that this scheme violates the Eighth Amendment. See
Middleton v. Florida, 583 U. S. 1162 (2018) (opinion dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Hurst, supra, at 103 (opinion concurring
in judgment); Ring, supra, at 619 (same). Because juries are
better suited than judges to “express the conscience of the community
on the ultimate question of life or death,” the Constitution
demands that jurors make, and take responsibility for, the ultimate
decision to impose a death sentence. Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U. S. 510, 519 (1968).
ORDERS 1007
1004 Statement of Breyer, J.
Although these cases do not squarely present the general question
whether the Eighth Amendment requires jury sentencing,
they do present a closely related question: whether the Florida
Supreme Court's harmless-error analysis violates the Eighth
Amendment because it “rest[s] a death sentence on a determination
made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's
death rests elsewhere.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S.
320, 328–329 (1985). For the reasons set out in Justice Sotomayor's
dissent, post, at 1011–1016, I believe the Court should
grant certiorari on that question in an appropriate case. That
said, I would not grant certiorari on that question here. In many
of these cases, the Florida Supreme Court did not fully consider
that question, or the defendants may not have properly raised it.
That may ultimately impede, or at least complicate, our review.
Nonetheless, the three issues raised by these cases draw into
focus a more basic point I made in Schriro: A death sentence
should refect a jury's “community-based judgment that the sentence
constitutes proper retribution.” 542 U. S., at 360 (dissenting
opinion). It seems to me that the jurors in at least some of
these cases might not have made a “community-based judgment”
that a death sentence was “proper retribution” had they known
at the time of sentencing (1) that the death penalty might not be
administered for another 40 years or more; (2) that other defendants
who were sentenced years later would be entitled to resentencing
based on a later-discovered error, but that the defendants
in question would not be entitled to the same remedy for roughly
the same error; or (3) that the jury's death recommendation would
be treated as if it were decisive, despite the judge's instruction
that the jury's recommendation was merely advisory. Had jurors
known about these issues at the time of sentencing, some might
have hesitated before recommending a death sentence. At least
a few might have recommended a life sentence instead. The result
is that some defendants who have lived under threat of execution
for decades might never have been sentenced to death in the
frst place.
The faws in the current practice of capital punishment could
often cast serious doubt on the death sentences imposed in these
and other capital cases. Rather than attempting to address the
faws in piecemeal fashion, however, I remain of the view that “it
1008 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Thomas, J., concurring 586 U. S.
would be wiser to reconsider the root cause of the problem—the
constitutionality of the death penalty itself.” Madison, supra, at
16 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas, concurring.
On the night of July 21, 1998, petitioner Michael Gordon Reynolds
murdered nearly an entire family. While the father, Danny
Ray Privett, relieved himself outside the family's camping trailer,
petitioner snuck up behind him and “viciously and deliberately
battered [his] skull with a piece of concrete.” Reynolds v. State,
934 So. 2d 1128, 1157 (Fla. 2006) (Reynolds I). Petitioner would
later explain: “ `[W]ith my record' ”—which included aggravated
robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery—“ `I couldn't
afford to leave any witnesses.' ” Id., at 1149, 1157. So petitioner
entered the trailer, where he brutally beat, stabbed, and murdered
Privett's girlfriend, Robin Razor, and their 11-year-old
daughter, Christina Razor. Robin “suffered multiple stab wounds
along with multiple blows to the side of her face and a broken
neck resulting in injuries to her spinal cord.” Id., at 1136. She
desperately fought back, suffering “signifcant defensive wounds”
and “torment wounds”—shallow slashes that occur when “the perpetrator
tak[es] a depraved, measured approach to the infiction
of the injury and tak[es] pleasure in his cruel activity.” Id., at
1136, 1153. Eleven-year-old Christina also resisted, suffering
“blunt force trauma to her head, a stab wound to the base of her
neck that pierced her heart, and another stab wound to her right
shoulder that pierced her lung and lacerated her pulmonary artery.”
Id., at 1136. Only petitioner knows whether Robin had
to watch her daughter die, or whether Christina had to watch her
mother die. “Regardless, in the close confnes of that cramped
camping trailer, Christina Razor, in great pain and fear, was
forced to fght a losing battle for her life knowing that either her
mother had already been killed and she was next or that after
Reynolds killed her, he was sure to end her mother's life.” Id.,
at 1154. “For a child to experience the fear, terror and emotional
strain that accompanied Christina Razor as she fought for her
life, knowing full well that she was fghting a losing battle, is
unimaginable, heinous, atrocious and cruel.” Ibid. “Christina
was found not wearing any underwear,” and petitioner's DNA
was matched to both a pubic hair and Christina's underwear, both
found near her body. Reynolds v. State, 99 So. 3d 459, 487–488,
ORDERS 1009
1004 Thomas, J., concurring
501 (Fla. 2012). The sole surviving family member, Danielle,
“was spared only because she was spending the night with a
friend.” Stutzman, Judge Gives Killer Death Sentence, Orlando
Sentinel, Sept. 20, 2003, p. B7, col. 1. Danielle was devastated;
“she wished she'd been home that night” to “f[ight] the attacker
and tr[y] to save her sister and parents” or “di[e] alongside
them.” Ibid.
Justice Breyer worries that the jurors here “might not have
made a `community-based judgment' that a death sentence was
`proper retribution' had they known” of his concerns with the
death penalty. Ante, at 1007 (statement respecting denial of certiorari).
In light of petitioner's actions, I have no such worry,
and I write separately to alleviate Justice Breyer's concerns.*
*Justice Breyer cites several other cases in which we have denied certiorari
today. Ante, at 1006. He need not worry about the jury's decisions
in those cases either. In Guardado v. Florida, No. 17–9284, petitioner, in
need of money to “continue his recent crack cocaine binge,” went to the
home of a 75-year-old woman who had given him repeated assistance, struck
her over and over with a “ `breaker bar,' ” and when “ `she would not die,' ”
“pulled [a] kitchen knife and stabbed her several times, then slashed her
throat.” Guardado v. State, 965 So. 2d 108, 110–111 (Fla. 2007). In Philmore
v. Florida, No. 17–9556, petitioner, in need of a getaway car for a
planned bank robbery, asked the victim if he could use her phone, then
pushed himself into her car, drove her to “an isolated area,” “ordered her to
walk towards high vegetation,” and “shot her once in the head.” Philmore
v. State, 820 So. 2d 919, 923–924 (Fla. 2002). In Tanzi v. Florida, No. 18–
5160, petitioner carjacked his victim by “punch[ing] her in the face until he
gained entry,” “forced [her] to perform oral sex,” then “told [her] that he
was going to kill her,” put “duct tape over her mouth, nose, and eyes,” and
“strangle[d her] until she died.” Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 110–111
(Fla. 2007). In Franklin v. Florida, No. 18–5228, petitioner stole a woman's
car after invading her home and bashing her on the head with a hammer
(leaving her “unable to live on her own”), asked a security guard at a local
store for driving directions, bragged that he was going to come back and
“ `get' ” the guard, and did just that, shooting the guard once in the back.
Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 84 (Fla. 2007). In Grim v. Florida, No.
18–5518, petitioner invited his neighbor over for coffee and then “repeatedly
attacked [her] with a hammer, stabbed [her] multiple times,” “forcefully inserted
[an object] into her vagina,” and dumped her body in Pensacola Bay.
Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 89–90, 93 (Fla. 2007). Finally, in Johnston v.
Florida, No. 18–5793, petitioner kidnaped his victim, “bea[t], raped, and
manually strangled [her], then dragged her to a pond and left her nude,
foating face down.” Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 735 (Fla. 2011).
1010 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Thomas, J., concurring 586 U. S.
Justice Breyer's frst concern is “that the death penalty
might not be administered for another 40 years or more” after
the jury's verdict. Ante, at 1007. That is a reason to carry out
the death penalty sooner, not to decline to impose it. In any
event, petitioner evidently is not bothered by delay. Petitioner
has litigated all the way through the state courts and petitioned
this Court for review three separate times. He can avoid “endur-
[ing]” an “unconscionably long dela[y],” ante, at 1005, “by submitting
to what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve:
execution,” Foster v. Florida, 537 U. S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas,
J., concurring in denial of certiorari). “It makes `a mockery of
our system of justice for a convicted murderer, who, through
his own interminable efforts of delay has secured the almostindefnite
postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the
almost-indefnite postponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.'
” Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U. S. 1114, 1117 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting Turner v.
Jabe, 58 F. 3d 924, 933 (CA4 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring in judgment);
alterations omitted).
It is no mystery why it often takes decades to execute a convicted
murderer. The “labyrinthine restrictions on capital punishmen[
t] promulgated by this Court” have caused the delays that
Justice Breyer now bemoans. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S.
863, 898 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Knight v. Florida,
528 U. S. 990, 991 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari). As “the Drum Major in this parade” of new precedents,
Justice Breyer is not well positioned to complain about
their inevitable consequences. Glossip, supra, at 898 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
Justice Breyer's second concern is that petitioner's jury
might have declined to impose the death penalty if it had known
that other capital defendants “would be entitled to resentencing,”
while petitioner himself would not be resentenced. Ante, at 1007.
What this has to do with the original jury's judgment as to
“ `proper retribution,' ” ibid., is beyond me. Petitioner murdered
Danielle Privett's entire family. Whether he deserves to be sentenced
to death has nothing to do with whether a different person
who engaged in different conduct might be entitled to be resentenced
on procedural grounds. Moreover, if petitioner had been
resentenced, and was again sentenced to death, I have little doubt
ORDERS 1011
1004 Sotomayor, J., dissenting
that Justice Breyer would instead be fretting that the original
jury failed to consider his belief that resentencing “sharpen[s]”
“[d]eath row's inevitable anxieties and uncertainties.” Foster,
supra, at 993 (opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Justice Breyer's third concern is that petitioner was “sentenced
to death under a scheme that required the judge to make
the ultimate decision to impose the death penalty, and in which
the jury was repeatedly instructed that its recommended verdict
would be advisory.” Ante, at 1006. Once again, petitioner did
not share Justice Breyer's concern. “After thorough consultation
with his attorneys and the trial court,” petitioner waived
“his right to a jury's penalty recommendation as to the appropriate
sentence” and “waived the presentation of mitigating evidence
before the penalty phase jury.” Reynolds I, 934 So. 2d, at
1138, 1148. When the trial court did not allow petitioner to
waive the jury's involvement, petitioner appealed, arguing that
“the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible
error when it refused to honor” his waiver. Id., at 1147–1148.
Contrary to Justice Breyer's suggestion that the jury did not
feel an adequate sense of “responsibility” for its recommendation,
ante, at 1006, the jury was instructed that a “ `human life is at
stake' ” and that the trial court could reject the jury's recommendation
“ `only if the facts [are] so clear and convincing that virtually
no reasonable person could differ.' ” 251 So. 3d 811, 813, 828
(Fla. 2018) (per curiam). The jury was further instructed that
its recommendation did not need to be unanimous. Id., at 815.
Nonetheless, the jury returned not one but two unanimous death
recommendations. Ibid.
Justice Breyer's fnal (and actual) concern is with the “ `death
penalty itself.' ” Ante, at 1008. As I have elsewhere explained,
“it is clear that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the
death penalty.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S. 35, 94 (2008) (opinion
concurring in judgment); see Glossip, supra, at 899–901, and n. 1
(Thomas, J., concurring). The only thing “cruel and unusual” in
this case was petitioner's brutal murder of three innocent victims.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
Today, this Court denies the petitions of seven capital defendants,
each of whom was sentenced to death under a capital sentencing
scheme that this Court has since declared unconstitu1012
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
tional.1 The Florida Supreme Court has left petitioners' death
sentences undisturbed, reasoning that any sentencing error in
their cases was harmless. Petitioners challenge the Florida Supreme
Court's analysis because it treats the fact of unanimous
jury recommendations in their cases as highly signifcant, or legally
dispositive, even though those juries were told repeatedly
that their verdicts were merely advisory. I have dissented before
from this Court's failure to intervene on this issue.2 Petitioners'
constitutional claim is substantial and affects numerous capital
defendants. The consequence of error in these cases is too severe
to leave petitioners' challenges unanswered, and I therefore would
grant the petitions.
I
I begin by acknowledging that petitioners have been convicted
of gruesome crimes. Their victims, and the families and communities
of those victims, have suffered. I am cognizant of their
suffering. I am also mindful that it is this Court's duty to ensure
that all defendants, even those who have committed the most
heinous crimes, receive a sentence that is the result of a fair
process. It is with that responsibility in mind that I analyze
petitioners' challenges.
II
Like the petitioners described in my prior dissents, each petitioner
here was sentenced pursuant to Florida's former sentencing
scheme. That regime involved an evidentiary hearing before a
jury, after which the jury would issue an advisory sentence for
life or death. See Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. 92, 95–96 (2016).
1 In addition to Reynolds' petition, this Court denies the petitions of Jesse
Guardado, No. 17–9284; Lenard James Philmore, No. 17–9556; Michael Anthony
Tanzi, No. 18–5160; Quawn M. Franklin, No. 18–5228; Norman Mearle
Grim, No. 18–5518; and Ray Lamar Johnston, No. 18–5793. For the reasons
expressed herein, I respectfully dissent from denial of certiorari in their
cases as well.
2 I thrice dissented because the Florida Supreme Court had failed even to
address the significant constitutional question petitioners raised. See
Guardado v. Jones, 584 U. S. 922 (2018) (opinion dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Middleton v. Florida, 583 U. S. 1162 (2018) (same); Truehill v.
Florida, 583 U. S. 938, 939 (2017) (same). I dissented again after the Florida
Supreme Court ultimately did take up the question, and I noted the
need for a defnitive resolution of the issue. Kaczmar v. Florida, 585 U. S.
1011 (2018) (same).
ORDERS 1013
1004 Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Next, the judge independently decided whether aggravating and
mitigating factors existed, weighed those factors, and entered a
sentence of life or death. Id., at 96. In Hurst, this Court held
that Florida's scheme violated the Sixth Amendment because it
impermissibly allowed a judge to increase the punishment authorized
for a defendant “based on her own factfnding.” Id., at 99.
Petitioners sought relief from the Florida courts after Hurst
was decided. Although the Florida Supreme Court assumed that
Hurst errors had occurred in petitioners' cases, it concluded that
any such errors were harmless—in other words, there was “no
reasonable possibility” that the errors affected petitioners' sentences.
251 So. 3d 811, 815 (2018) (per curiam) (case below).
In theory, the Florida Supreme Court's harmless-error analysis
turns on an individualized review of each case. See id., at 816.
And, indeed, in some cases the Florida Supreme Court has considered
several factors in its harmless-error analysis. See Davis v.
State, 207 So. 3d 142, 174–175 (2016) (referring to the unanimity
of the jury recommendations of death as well as the “egregious
facts” of the case). In practice, however, the Florida Supreme
Court's harmless-error approach appears to refect a myopic focus
on one factor: whether the advisory jury's recommendation for
death was unanimous. Because the jurors in pre-Hurst cases
were informed that they should recommend death only if they
determined that suffcient aggravating factors existed and outweighed
the mitigating factors, the Florida Supreme Court has
reasoned that a jury that unanimously recommended death necessarily
made the fndings that Hurst said are constitutionally required.
See Davis, 207 So. 3d, at 174–175. By concluding that
Hurst violations are harmless because jury recommendations
were unanimous, the Florida Supreme Court “transforms those
advisory jury recommendations into binding fndings of fact.”
Guardado v. Jones, 584 U. S. 922, 925 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
III
A
Because the Florida Supreme Court's harmless-error analysis
relies heavily on the fact that a purely advisory jury rendered
a unanimous decision, it raises serious questions under this
Court's precedents.
1014 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985), this Court said
it is “constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a
determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant's death rests elsewhere.” Id., at 328–329. Caldwell
involved misleading comments by a prosecutor who emphasized
that the jury's verdict would be subject to appellate review. See
id., at 336. This Court concluded that the resulting sentence did
not satisfy the minimum standard of reliability required by the
Eighth Amendment because the prosecutor's suggestions created
“an intolerable danger” that the jury would “minimize the importance
of its role.” Id., at 333. Caldwell explained that this
Court has “always premised its capital punishment decisions on
the assumption that a capital sentencing jury recognizes the gravity
of its task and proceeds with the appropriate awareness of its
`truly awesome responsibility.' ” Id., at 341. Where a sentencing
jury is encouraged to proceed without that awareness, Caldwell
suggests that “there are specifc reasons to fear substantial
unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences.” Id.,
at 330.
As noted above, the sentencing scheme in place in Florida when
petitioners were sentenced placed the fnal responsibility with the
trial judge. Juries were instructed accordingly. Thus although
the jury in this case was instructed that the court would reject
a recommendation “only if the facts [we]re so clear and convincing
that virtually no reasonable person could differ” and that a
“human life [wa]s at stake,” the jury also was told that its duty
was to “advise the court” and that “the fnal decision as to what
punishment shall be imposed [wa]s the responsibility of the
judge.” App. D to Pet. for Cert. The jury also heard, repeatedly,
that it was to “recommend” an “advisory sentence.” Ibid.
Jury instructions varied across cases. For example, the jurors in
petitioner Jesse Guardado's case heard that “human life [wa]s at
stake,” but not that the court would reject the jury's recommendation
only in limited circumstances. App. to Pet. for Cert. in
Guardado v. Florida, O. T. 2018, No. 17–9284, pp. 92a–105a. Like
the jurors in this case, the jurors in Guardado's case were instructed
that it was their responsibility to “advise the Court” as
to the appropriate punishment. Id., at 92a. The court further
instructed jurors that the “[f]inal decision as to what punishment
shall be imposed rest[ed] solely with the judge of th[e] court.”
ORDERS 1015
1004 Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Ibid. These jurors knew that the fnal decision as to whether
Guardado would live or die did not rest with them. The Court's
reasoning in Caldwell informs how much weight, if any, to give
such a purely advisory recommendation for death.
B
In the case below, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the
Caldwell issue at length. See 251 So. 3d, at 814–828.3 Two aspects
of the plurality's analysis show the need for further engagement
with this issue.
First, the Florida Supreme Court said that its application of
the harmless-error rule does not entirely turn on jury unanimity.
See id., at 816 (“a unanimous recommendation is not suffcient
alone” to fnd harmlessness). To be sure, in some cases the Florida
Supreme Court has mentioned factors other than unanimity
to support a fnding of harmlessness. See, e. g., Philmore v.
State, 234 So. 3d 567, 568 (2018) (noting that the defendant's confession
and the aggravation in the case, as well as the jury's
unanimous recommendation, supported a fnding of harmlessness),
cert. denied, 586 U. S. 1004 (2018). But in many other cases, the
court's analysis started and ended with the unanimity of the jury's
recommendation. Indeed, on the very day that the Florida Supreme
Court decided this case, it treated jury unanimity as dispositive
in four other capital cases. 4 In a recent opinion, the
Florida Supreme Court again stated that it “has consistently . . .
den[ied] Hurst relief to defendants who have received a unani-
3 Of the seven justices of the Florida Supreme Court, only two justices
concurred in the court's per curiam opinion and one justice concurred specially
with an opinion. Of the remaining four justices, two dissented and
two concurred only in the result.
4 See Tanzi v. State, 251 So. 3d 805, 806 (2018) (citing Davis v. State, 207
So. 3d 142, 175 (2016), for the proposition that the unanimity of a jury's
recommendation for death ensures that jurors have made the necessary
fndings of fact), cert. denied, 586 U. S. 1004 (2018); Johnston v. State, 246
So. 3d 266 (“Johnston received a unanimous jury recommendation of death
and, therefore, the Hurst error in this case is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt”), cert. denied, 586 U. S. 1004 (2018); Crain v. State, 246 So. 3d 206,
210 (2018) (“[T]his Court can rely on the jury's unanimous recommendation
for death to conclude that the Hurst error in Crain's case was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt”); Taylor v. State, 246 So. 3d 204, 206 (2018)
(“[T]his Court has consistently relied on Davis to deny Hurst relief to defendants
who have received unanimous jury recommendations of death”).
1016 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
mous jury recommendation of death.” Anderson v. State, 257 So.
3d 355, 356 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the
extent the Florida Supreme Court gives dispositive weight to the
fact that an advisory jury offered a unanimous recommendation,
that action implicates the Eighth Amendment concerns that Caldwell
addressed.
Second, the state court dismissed Caldwell as inapplicable to
cases like petitioners' because the pre-Hurst jury instructions accurately
described the advisory role assigned to the jury by state
law at that time. 251 So. 3d, at 824–825. It is true that Caldwell's
holding invalidates only those sentences imposed following
comments that “mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing
process.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1, 9 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). But whether or not
Caldwell itself makes petitioners' sentences unconstitutional, the
reasoning in Caldwell surely informs the related question whether
a purely advisory jury recommendation is suffciently reliable for
a court to treat it as legally dispositive for purposes of harmlesserror
review. Caldwell provides strong reasons to doubt that a
jury would have reached the same decision had it been instructed
that its role was not advisory. See 251 So. 3d, at 832 (Pariente,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he jury [in Reynolds' case] was repeatedly told
that its sentencing recommendation between life and death was
merely `advisory.' . . . I would conclude that Caldwell further
supports the conclusion that the Hurst error in Reynolds' case is
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).
IV
“[T]his Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has taken as
a given that capital sentencers would view their task as the serious
one of determining whether a specifc human being should die
at the hands of the State.” Caldwell, 472 U. S., at 329. The
jurors in petitioners' cases were repeatedly instructed that their
role was merely advisory, yet the Florida Supreme Court has
treated their recommendations as legally binding by way of its
harmless-error analysis. This approach raises substantial Eighth
Amendment concerns. As I continue to believe that “the stakes
in capital cases are too high to ignore such constitutional challenges,”
Truehill v. Florida, 583 U. S. 938, 940 (2017) (opinion
dissenting from denial of certiorari), I would grant review to
decide whether the Florida Supreme Court's harmless-error apORDERS
1017
586 U. S. November 13, 2018
proach is valid in light of Caldwell. This Court's refusal to address
petitioners' challenges signals that it is unwilling to decide
this issue. I respectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari,
and I will continue to note my dissent in future cases raising the
Caldwell question.
No. 18–5190. Garcia-Echaverria v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 717
Fed. Appx. 505.
No. 18–6003. Kavandi v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., et al.
Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. The Chief
Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
No. 18–6281. Callins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States, 586
U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
No. 18–6333. Staples v. Maye, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 711 Fed.
Appx. 866.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–1479. Gentry v. Thompson, Judge, Circuit Court
of Tennessee, Sumner County, 586 U. S. 816;
No. 17–1684. France v. Patrick, 586 U. S. 824;
No. 17–9333. Thyberg v. United States, 586 U. S. 854;
No. 17–9398. Rock v. Executive Ofce Park of Durham
Assn., Inc., 586 U. S. 858;
No. 17–9478. Fisher v. Missouri, 586 U. S. 862;
No. 17–9517. DeNoma v. Kasich, Governor of Ohio, et al.,
586 U. S. 864;
No. 18–105. Sabeniano v. Citibank, N. A., et al., 586 U. S.
874;
No. 18–170. Gentry v. Tennessee et al., 586 U. S. 911;
and
1018 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 13, 14, 16, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5812. In re DeCaro, 586 U. S. 811. Petitions for rehearing
denied.
No. 17–9069. Degrate v. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court
of the United States, 586 U. S. 841. Petition for rehearing
denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
November 14, 2018
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–162. Ball et al. v. LeBlanc, Secretary, Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1.
Reported below: 881 F. 3d 346.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–6680 (18A510). Moreno Ramos v. Davis, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution
of sentence of death, presented to Justice Alito, and by
him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6682 (18A512). Moreno Ramos v. Texas. Ct. Crim.
App. Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied.
November 16, 2018
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–315. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., et al. v. United
States ex rel. Hunt. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari granted.
Reported below: 887 F. 3d 1081.
No. 18–557. In re Department of Commerce et al. Petition
for writ of mandamus is treated as a petition for writ of
certiorari, and certiorari is granted. Petitioners' brief on the
merits is to be fled on or before Monday, December 17, 2018.
Respondents' brief on the merits is to be fled on or before Thursday,
January 17, 2019. Reply brief is to be fled on or before
Monday, February 4, 2019. Case is set for oral argument on
Tuesday, February 19, 2019.
ORDERS 1019
586 U. S.
November 19, 2018
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M63. Lofton v. SP Plus Corp., fka Standard Parking
Corp. et al.; and
No. 18M65. Carter v. United States. Motions to direct the
Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M64. Zukerman v. United States. Motion for leave
to fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted.
No. 18M66. Tyson v. Texas (two cases). Motion for leave to
proceed as a veteran denied.
No. 17–646. Gamble v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1029.] Motion of Texas et al. for
leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae and for
enlargement of time for oral argument granted, and the time
is allotted as follows: 40 minutes for petitioner, 30 minutes for
respondent, and 10 minutes for Texas et al.
No. 17–8151. Bucklew v. Precythe, Director, Missouri
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 584 U. S. 959.] Motion of petitioner for appointment
of counsel granted, and Cheryl A. Pilate, Esq., of Kansas
City, Mo., is appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this
case.
No. 17–9041. Ciotta v. Holland, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 803] denied.
No. 18–5002. Gray v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 805]
denied.
No. 18–5017. Selden v. Kovachevich, Judge, United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [586 U. S.
805] denied.
1020 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 19, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5631. Jacob v. Frakes, Director, Nebraska Department
of Correctional Services. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 807] denied.
No. 18–6071. Nayshtut v. Comercializadora Travel Advisory,
S. A. de C. V., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., Div. 1.;
and
No. 18–6384. Lanteri v. Connecticut. C. A. 2d Cir. Motions
of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioners are allowed until December 10, 2018, within which to
pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions
in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
No. 18–6448. In re Quattrocchi;
No. 18–6470. In re Malone;
No. 18–6486. In re Hernandez; and
No. 18–6514. In re Bell. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus
denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–8988. Book v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 696 Fed. Appx. 231.
No. 17–9223. Hinton v. Walker et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 691 Fed. Appx. 733.
No. 18–78. Ramirez-Barajas v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General (Reported below: 877 F. 3d 808); and Onduso v.
Whitaker, Acting Attorney General (877 F. 3d 1073). C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–150. Plummer et al. v. Hopper, Special Administrator
of the Estate of Richardson. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 744.
No. 18–204. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v.
Pounds et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–212. Bank of America, N. A. v. Lusnak. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1185.
No. 18–300. Delano Farms Co. et al. v. California Table
Grape Commission. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 4 Cal. 5th 1204, 417 P. 3d 699.
ORDERS 1021
586 U. S. November 19, 2018
No. 18–326. Estate of Goldberg by Executor Goldberg
v. Nimoityn et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 734 Fed. Appx. 141.
No. 18–330. Greene v. Frost Brown Todd, LLC, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–336. Jones et al. v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892
F. 3d 935.
No. 18–338. Soccolich et ux. v. Wilmington Savings Fund
Society, FSB, as Trustee. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 241 So. 3d 119.
No. 18–344. Shao v. McManis Faulkner, LLP. Ct. App.
Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–354. Weiss v. New Jersey. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–358. Roe v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–361. Alleyne v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 A. 3d 1272.
No. 18–362. Brown v. Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 344.
No. 18–363. Uribe-Sanchez v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 728 Fed. Appx. 363.
No. 18–367. Jacobi v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal
et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 156 App. Div. 3d 1154, 68 N. Y. S. 3d 184.
No. 18–382. Rab v. Superior Court of California, Sacramento
County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–401. Hobson v. Mattis, Secretary of Defense.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–405. Dastmalchian v. Department of Justice
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713
Fed. Appx. 603.
1022 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 19, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–413. Bosch v. Arizona Department of Revenue.
Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–441. Accord Healthcare, Inc., et al. v. UCB, Inc.,
et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890
F. 3d 1313.
No. 18–463. Morello v. Texas. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 547 S. W. 3d 881.
No. 18–468. SSL Services, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed.
Appx. 987.
No. 18–492. Souza v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 5th App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–522. Ishee v. Mississippi. Ct. App. Miss. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 248 So. 3d 841.
No. 18–524. Gathings v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–532. Sixty-01 Association of Apartment Owners
v. Goudelock. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 895 F. 3d 633.
No. 18–5252. Earp v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 1135.
No. 18–5289. Barbee v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728
Fed. Appx. 259.
No. 18–5321. Ortiz-Uresti v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 145.
No. 18–5401. Poirier v. Massachusetts Department of
Correction. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5597. Miller v. Mays, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 691.
No. 18–5948. Murphy v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737
Fed. Appx. 693.
ORDERS 1023
586 U. S. November 19, 2018
No. 18–5985. Sparks v. Premo, Superintendent, Oregon
State Penitentiary. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 289 Ore. App. 159, 408 P. 3d 276.
No. 18–5988. Allah v. Wilson et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6002. Librace v. Wright et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6004. Jones v. Superior Court of Connecticut
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722
Fed. Appx. 109.
No. 18–6019. Quintero v. Nevada. Ct. App. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 998.
No. 18–6021. Burney v. Aldridge, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 856.
No. 18–6022. Udeigwe v. Texas Tech University et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed.
Appx. 788.
No. 18–6026. Booth v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 861.
No. 18–6027. Beaulieu v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6029. Aquilina v. Davis, Administrator, Edna
Mahan Correctional Facility, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6032. D. L. v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6038. Villavicencio v. Jones, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6043. Manning v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6045. Beckham v. Miller, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 169.
1024 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 19, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6047. Seed v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6052. Khoshmood v. Catholic Charity et al. C. A.
D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6053. Kissner v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6055. Triplett v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 396.
No. 18–6059. Carter v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 1st App. Dist.,
Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-645, 95 N. E. 3d 443.
No. 18–6082. Lee v. Cheatham, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 984.
No. 18–6154. Easley v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 290 Ore. App. 506, 415 P. 3d 1099.
No. 18–6200. Uzoechi v. Wilson et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 65.
No. 18–6253. Wesling v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 169 A. 3d 1219.
No. 18–6254. Tyler v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed.
Appx. 221.
No. 18–6259. Tyler v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699 Fed.
Appx. 424.
No. 18–6275. Lupian-Barajas v. Jones, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6291. Cook v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6327. Humphrey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 265.
No. 18–6335. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 730.
ORDERS 1025
586 U. S. November 19, 2018
No. 18–6339. Willan v. Petitioner. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 WI App 21, 380 Wis. 2d 510,
913 N. W. 2d 515.
No. 18–6341. Lieba v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 480.
No. 18–6342. Lopez-Vaal v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 193.
No. 18–6343. Llerenas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 86.
No. 18–6346. Dubarry v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 568.
No. 18–6347. Brake v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 97.
No. 18–6349. Palomino v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 485.
No. 18–6350. Brand v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6351. Baker v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 123.
No. 18–6352. Aberant v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 905.
No. 18–6355. Scott v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 348.
No. 18–6358. Hilton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 948.
No. 18–6359. Gomez-Saavedra v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 483.
No. 18–6360. Faurisma v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 932.
No. 18–6361. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 710.
No. 18–6363. Bernhardt v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 903 F. 3d 818.
1026 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 19, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6366. Barbosa v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 60.
No. 18–6370. Harper v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 445.
No. 18–6371. Henderson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 565.
No. 18–6372. Small v. Lindamood, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6373. Semien v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 303.
No. 18–6379. Nakhleh v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 838.
No. 18–6389. Lomax v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 678.
No. 18–6391. Hawks v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 868.
No. 18–6436. Cintron v. Ferguson, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Phoenix, et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6444. Whitney v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–1676. Stuart v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 268 So. 3d 607.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins,
dissenting.
More and more, forensic evidence plays a decisive role in criminal
trials today. But it is hardly “immune from the risk of
manipulation.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. 305,
318 (2009). A forensic analyst “may feel pressure—or have an
incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the
prosecution.” Ibid. Even the most well-meaning analyst may
lack essential training, contaminate a sample, or err during the
testing process. See ibid.; see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
564 U. S. 647, 654, n. 1 (2011) (documenting laboratory probORDERS
1027
1026 Gorsuch, J., dissenting
lems). To guard against such mischief and mistake and the risk
of false convictions they invite, our criminal justice system depends
on adversarial testing and cross-examination. Because
cross-examination may be “the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth,” California v. Green, 399 U. S.
149, 158 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Constitution
promises every person accused of a crime the right to confront
his accusers. Amdt. 6.
That promise was broken here. To prove Vanessa Stuart was
driving under the infuence, the State of Alabama introduced in
evidence the results of a blood-alcohol test conducted hours after
her arrest. But the State refused to bring to the stand the analyst
who performed the test. Instead, the State called a different
analyst. Using the results of the test after her arrest and the
rate at which alcohol is metabolized, this analyst sought to estimate
for the jury Ms. Stuart's blood-alcohol level hours earlier
when she was driving. Through these steps, the State effectively
denied Ms. Stuart the chance to confront the witness who supplied
a foundational piece of evidence in her conviction. The engine of
cross-examination was left unengaged, and the Sixth Amendment
was violated.
To be fair, the problem appears to be largely of our creation.
This Court's most recent foray in this feld, Williams v. Illinois,
567 U. S. 50 (2012), yielded no majority and its various opinions
have sown confusion in courts across the country. See, e. g., State
v. Dotson, 450 S. W. 3d 1, 68 (Tenn. 2014) (“The Supreme Court's
fractured decision in Williams provides little guidance and is of
uncertain precedential value”); State v. Michaels, 219 N. J. 1, 31,
95 A. 3d 648, 666 (2014) (“We fnd Williams's force, as precedent,
at best unclear”); United States v. Turner, 709 F. 3d 1187, 1189
(CA7 2013); United States v. James, 712 F. 3d 79, 95 (CA2 2013).
This case supplies another example of that confusion. Though
the opinion of the Alabama court is terse, the State defends it by
arguing that, “[u]nder the rule of the Williams plurality,” the
prosecution was free to introduce the forensic report in this case
without calling the analyst who prepared it. Brief in Opposition
6. This is so, the State says, because it didn't offer the
report for the truth of what it said about Ms. Stuart's bloodalcohol
level at the time of the test, only to provide the State's
testifying expert a basis for estimating Ms. Stuart's blood-alcohol
level when she was driving.
1028 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Gorsuch, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
But while Williams yielded no majority opinion, at least fve
Justices rejected this logic—and for good reason. After all, why
would any prosecutor bother to offer in evidence the nontestifying
analyst's report in this case except to prove the truth of its assertions
about the level of alcohol in Ms. Stuart's blood at the time
of the test? The whole point of the exercise was to establish—
because of the report's truth—a basis for the jury to credit the
testifying expert's estimation of Ms. Stuart's blood-alcohol level
hours earlier. As the four dissenting Justices in Williams explained,
“when a witness . . . repeats an out-of-court statement
as the basis for a conclusion, . . . the statement's utility is then
dependent on its truth.” 567 U. S., at 126 (opinion of Kagan, J.).
With this Justice Thomas fully agreed, observing that “[t]here
is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court
statement so that the factfnder may evaluate the [testifying] expert's
opinion and disclosing that statement for its truth.” Id.,
at 106 (opinion concurring in judgment).
Faced with this diffculty, the State offers an alternative defense
of its judgment in this case. Even if it did offer the forensic
report for the truth of its assertion about Ms. Stuart's bloodalcohol
level at the time of her arrest, the State contends that
the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation failed to attach because
the report wasn't “ `testimonial.' ” Brief in Opposition 9.
But piecing together the fractured decision in Williams reveals
this argument to be mistaken too—and this time in the view of
eight Justices. The four-Justice Williams plurality took the view
that a forensic report qualifes as testimonial only when it is
“prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual”
who is “in custody [or] under suspicion.” 567 U. S., at 84.
Meanwhile, four dissenting Justices took the broader view that
even a report devised purely for investigatory purposes without
a target in mind can qualify as testimonial when it is “made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that [it] would be available for use at a later trial.”
Id., at 121 (opinion of Kagan, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But however you slice it, a routine postarrest forensic report
like the one here must qualify as testimonial. For even
under the plurality's more demanding test, there's no question
that Ms. Stuart was in custody when the government conducted
its forensic test or that the report was prepared for the primary
purpose of securing her conviction.
ORDERS 1029
586 U. S. November 19, 2018
Respectfully, I believe we owe lower courts struggling to abide
our holdings more clarity than we have afforded them in this
area. Williams imposes on courts with crowded dockets the job
of trying to distill holdings on two separate and important issues
from four competing opinions. The errors here may be manifest,
but they are understandable and they affect courts across the
country in cases that regularly recur. I would grant review.
No. 18–380. Vannoy, Warden v. Floyd. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion
of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 143.
No. 18–5925. Loren v. City of New York, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–6387. Bowens v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 322.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States, 586
U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–1537. Morrison v. Quest Diagnostics Inc. et al.,
586 U. S. 818;
No. 17–1571. Marranca v. Loytsker, 586 U. S. 819;
No. 17–1601. Barone v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., 586
U. S. 820;
No. 17–1608. Holkesvig v. North Dakota, 586 U. S. 820;
No. 17–1612. Hinds v. United States, 586 U. S. 821;
No. 17–1621. Anderson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 821;
No. 17–1626. Assadian v. Parsi et al., 586 U. S. 821;
No. 17–1647. In re Henderson et al., 586 U. S. 811;
No. 17–1651. Bates et ux. v. Village of Pentwater, Michigan,
586 U. S. 823;
No. 17–1690. Cooney v. Barry School of Law, aka Dwayne
O. Andreas School of Law, 586 U. S. 825;
No. 17–7988. Mathurin v. United States, 586 U. S. 827;
1030 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
November 19, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–8846. Ramey v. United States, 586 U. S. 834;
No. 17–8937. Ferguson-Cassidy v. City of Los Angeles,
California, et al., 586 U. S. 837;
No. 17–9078. Arlotta v. Bank of America, N. A., et al.;
and Arlotta v. Diocese of Buffalo et al., 586 U. S. 841;
No. 17–9210. Buttercase v. Nebraska, 586 U. S. 848;
No. 17–9311. Johnson v. United States, 586 U. S. 853;
No. 17–9331. Chasson, aka Alias, aka Hason v. Sessions,
Attorney General, 586 U. S. 854;
No. 17–9352. Viola v. Bennett, 586 U. S. 855;
No. 17–9423. Woods v. Arizona, 586 U. S. 859;
No. 17–9428. Johnson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 860;
No. 17–9444. Stephens et al. v. City of Englewood, New
Jersey, et al., 586 U. S. 860;
No. 17–9476. Elghannam v. Educational Testing Service,
586 U. S. 862;
No. 17–9504. Ray v. McCollum, Warden, 586 U. S. 864;
No. 17–9567. Brown v. Del Norte County, California,
et al., 586 U. S. 867;
No. 18–9. Washington v. Azar, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 586 U. S. 869;
No. 18–49. Plumb et al. v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al., 586
U. S. 871;
No. 18–92. Perry v. Kriegman, 586 U. S. 873;
No. 18–95. Wentzell et al. v. BP America, Inc., et al.,
586 U. S. 874;
No. 18–104. Tuerk v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, 586 U. S. 874;
No. 18–139. Freeman v. North Carolina Department of
Health and Human Services, 586 U. S. 875;
No. 18–143. Bart v. United States, 586 U. S. 875;
No. 18–186. Silva-Ramirez v. Hospital Espanol Auxilio
Mutuo de Puerto Rico, Inc., et al., 586 U. S. 876;
No. 18–5009. Drummond v. Sessions, Attorney General,
586 U. S. 877;
No. 18–5094. Sherry v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 882;
ORDERS 1031
586 U. S. November 19, 27, December 3, 2018
No. 18–5099. Williams v. Los Angeles County Department
of Public Social Services et al., 586 U. S. 882;
No. 18–5178. Baltimore v. Buck, 586 U. S. 887;
No. 18–5197. Dixit v. Dixit, 586 U. S. 888;
No. 18–5235. Thomas v. Chandran, 586 U. S. 889;
No. 18–5309. McLain v. United States, 586 U. S. 893;
No. 18–5316. Vaughan v. Vaughan et al., 586 U. S. 893;
No. 18–5327. Makdessi v. Fields et al., 586 U. S. 894;
No. 18–5665. Cabrera v. United States, 586 U. S. 905; and
No. 18–5799. In re Smithback, 586 U. S. 811. Petitions for
rehearing denied.
November 27, 2018
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 17–1056. Quality Systems, Inc., et al. v. City of Miami
Fire Fighters’ and Police Ofcers’ Retirement Trust
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's
Rule 46.1. Reported below: 865 F. 3d 1130.
December 3, 2018
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 17–74. Markle Interests, L. L. C., et al. v. United
States Fish and Wildlife Service et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States
Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. 9 (2018). Reported below: 827
F. 3d 452.
No. 17–886. Fleck v. Wetch et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motions
of Pacifc Legal Foundation and Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi et al.
for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration
in light of Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees,
585 U. S. 878 (2018). Reported below: 868 F. 3d 652.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–5813. Kilpatrick v. Henkin. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6129. Matelyan v. CD Baby Distribution Co.
C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
1032 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 3, 2018 586 U. S.
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's
Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6130. Kilpatrick v. Cuomo, Governor of New
York. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6131. Kilpatrick v. Arp; and Kilpatrick v. Scott.
C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's
Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6191. Sanders v. Esqueda, Dane County Clerk of
Court. Ct. App. Wis. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6195. Watford v. Doe et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6223. Jonassen v. United States et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As
petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk
is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M67. Deng v. United States;
No. 18M68. McGuirk v. Airbnb, Inc., et al.; and
No. 18M69. Trease v. Florida. Motions to direct the Clerk
to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 17–290. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1029.] Motion
of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral
argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 17–532. Herrera v. Wyoming. Dist. Ct. Wyo., Sheridan
County. [Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1029.] Motion of the SoORDERS
1033
586 U. S. December 3, 2018
licitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus
curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 17–1307. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP.
C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1029.] Motion of
the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as
amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 17–1335. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Director, Ofce
of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Department of
Labor, et al., 586 U. S. 814. Motion of respondent Robert
Thompson for attorney's fees and expenses granted. The Court
approves the parties' agreed upon attorney's fees of $14,732.50,
and expenses of $1,152.63, to be paid by Consolidation Coal Co.
No. 17–9480. In re Woods. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [586
U. S. 812] denied.
No. 18–260. County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife
Fund et al. C. A. 9th Cir.; and
No. 18–268. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L. P.,
et al. v. Upstate Forever et al. C. A. 4th Cir. The Solicitor
General is invited to fle briefs in these cases expressing the views
of the United States on or before 4 p.m., Friday, January 4,
2019.
No. 18–5020. In re Brown. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis
[586 U. S. 813] denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this motion.
No. 18–5400. In re Pennington-Thurman. Motion of petitioner
for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 812] denied.
No. 18–5567. Curry v. City of Manseld, Ohio, et al.
Ct. App. Ohio, 5th App. Dist., Richland County. Motion of petitioner
for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 916] denied.
No. 18–5568. Curry v. City of Manseld, Ohio, et al. Ct.
App. Ohio, 5th App. Dist., Richland County. Motion of petitioner
for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [586 U. S. 916] denied.
1034 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 3, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5786. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 811] denied.
No. 18–6321. Nguyen v. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland
Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until December
26, 2018, within which to pay the docketing fee required
by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule
33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
No. 18–614. In re Houston;
No. 18–5683. In re Britton-Harr;
No. 18–6654. In re Debolt; and
No. 18–6675. In re Zater. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus
denied.
No. 18–6632. In re Howell. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6091. In re Walcott. Petition for writ of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–223. In re Dawson. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–9134. Young, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Green, Deceased v. City of Tampa, Florida,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713
Fed. Appx. 986.
No. 17–9332. Vinson v. Jackson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 329.
No. 18–81. Taylor v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 86 N. E. 3d 157.
No. 18–89. AmeriCulture, Inc., et al. v. Los Lobos Renewable
Power, LLC, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 885 F. 3d 659.
No. 18–113. Rodgers v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 242 So. 3d 276.
ORDERS 1035
586 U. S. December 3, 2018
No. 18–165. DHL Supply Chain v. DEX Systems, Inc.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed.
Appx. 276.
No. 18–188. Tucker v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 881.
No. 18–246. Doherty et al. v. Allstate Indemnity Co.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 F. 3d 817.
No. 18–247. Animal Legal Defense Fund et al. v. Department
of Homeland Security et al. D. C. S. D. Cal.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 284 F. Supp. 3d 1092.
No. 18–257. Bauch, Individually and as Father and
Next Friend of O. B., a Minor, et al. v. Richland County
Children Services et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 292.
No. 18–321. TVEyes, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 169.
No. 18–329. Rountree v. Dyson et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 681.
No. 18–366. Golden et vir v. Peterson. App. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 92 Mass. App. 1131, 103 N. E.
3d 766.
No. 18–369. Valdez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–376. Partin et vir v. Michigan Children’s Institute.
Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501
Mich. 865, 901 N. W. 2d 382.
No. 18–379. Keyes v. Banks. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–383. Davis et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N. A.
Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 328 Conn.
921, 180 A. 3d 963.
No. 18–390. Pletos et al. v. Makower Abatte Guerra
Wegner Vollmer, PLLC, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 431.
1036 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 3, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–393. Moody v. National Football League. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 65.
No. 18–399. Fink v. Kirchner et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 157.
No. 18–409. Liu v. Ryan et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 92.
No. 18–414. Burnett v. Panasonic Corp. et al. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 777.
No. 18–416. Hatch v. Brennan, Postmaster General,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720
Fed. Appx. 868.
No. 18–419. Boogaard et al., as Personal Representatives
of the Estate of Boogaard, Deceased v. National
Hockey League et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 891 F. 3d 289.
No. 18–424. Brown-Williams et al. v. Superior Court of
California, Los Angeles County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 8. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–425. Williams et al. v. Superior Court of California,
Los Angeles County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 8. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–434. Mosby v. Parilla. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 30 N. Y. 3d 1083, 92 N. E. 3d 1240.
No. 18–452. Wesley v. Town Square Media West Central
Radio Broadcasting et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 595.
No. 18–464. Hateld Enterprizes, Inc., et al. v. Washington
State Employment Security Department. Ct.
App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 1 Wash. App.
2d 174, 404 P. 3d 517.
No. 18–465. Garnett v. Remedi Seniorcare of Virginia,
LLC. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892
F. 3d 140.
No. 18–466. Gulick Trucking, Inc. v. Washington State
Employment Security Department. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2 Wash. App. 2d 1016.
ORDERS 1037
586 U. S. December 3, 2018
No. 18–469. MacMillan-Piper, Inc. v. Washington State
Employment Security Department. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 1 Wash. App. 2d 1055.
No. 18–484. Pettigrew v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–494. Ross v. Apple Inc. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 733.
No. 18–497. Coulter v. Bissoon, Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
731 Fed. Appx. 83.
No. 18–501. Adburahman et al. v. Hyundai Motor
America, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 896 F. 3d 278.
No. 18–531. Coffman v. Iowa. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 914 N. W. 2d 240.
No. 18–535. Residents Against Flooding et al. v. Reinvestment
Zone Number Seventeen, City of Houston,
Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 734 Fed. Appx. 916.
No. 18–538. Nora v. Wisconsin Ofce of Lawyer Regulation.
Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018
WI 23, 380 Wis. 2d 311, 909 N. W. 2d 155.
No. 18–541. Deol v. Depreta et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 232.
No. 18–542. Hamilton v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 217.
No. 18–563. Commander v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 824.
No. 18–568. Rippl v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5052. Cureton v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 318.
1038 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 3, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5071. Carlos Vazquez v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct.
S. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5121. Musgrove v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 155.
No. 18–5296. Rasberry v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 241.
No. 18–5322. Rodriguez-Aparicio v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 189.
No. 18–5468. Villarreal et al. v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 515.
No. 18–5475. George v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5621. Torkornoo v. Helwig et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 198.
No. 18–5674. Swain v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5692. Jordan v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5702. Angel Mejia v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 731.
No. 18–5791. Wharton v. Vaughn. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 268.
No. 18–5796. Cromartie v. Sellers, Warden. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5982. Britton-Harr v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6064. Rose v. Kirkegard, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 406.
No. 18–6077. Qazi v. Nevada et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6085. Daniels v. Dowling, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 756.
ORDERS 1039
586 U. S. December 3, 2018
No. 18–6089. Assa’ad-Faltas v. City of Columbia, South
Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6101. Pierre v. FJC Security Services, Inc. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 70.
No. 18–6105. Wallace v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6106. Miller v. Kashani et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6110. Mahdi v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6114. Linh Thi Minh Tran v. Pham. Ct. App. Ore.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 288 Ore. App. 385, 406
P. 3d 247.
No. 18–6115. Antonio Jimenez v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 247 So. 3d 395.
No. 18–6124. Washington v. Palmer, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6125. Wright v. Carter et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 80.
No. 18–6134. Peters v. Baldwin et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6136. Lara-Aguilar v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 889 F. 3d 134.
No. 18–6140. Hardaway v. Cross State Moving et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed.
Appx. 8.
No. 18–6142. Dingler v. Georgia et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 923.
No. 18–6144. Padilla v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
1040 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 3, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6152. M. E. D. v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6153. Raisbeck v. Stewart, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6158. Terry v. Abraham, Chief, Dillon County
Detention Center. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 728 Fed. Appx. 242.
No. 18–6164. Laschkewitsch v. ReliaStar Life Insurance
Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
720 Fed. Appx. 155.
No. 18–6166. Rafi v. Brigham and Women ’s Hospital
et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6167. Clark v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6168. Soon Young Kim v. California. Ct. App. Cal.,
4th App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6170. Henderson v. VIP Taxi LLC et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6176. Lucero v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6179. Emanuel v. Territory of the Virgin Islands.
Sup. Ct. V. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 68
V. I. 666.
No. 18–6182. Moore v. Nevada et al. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 262, 417 P. 3d 356.
No. 18–6189. Salgado v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6194. Vandivere v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 265.
No. 18–6199. Torres v. Perrone, Judge, Judicial Circuit
Court of Florida, Hillsborough County. Sup. Ct. Fla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6202. Dinsio v. Appellate Division, Supreme
Court of New York, Third Judicial Department. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1041
586 U. S. December 3, 2018
No. 18–6203. Hayes v. Plumley, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 772.
No. 18–6217. Marquis v. Deutsche Bank National Trust
Co. et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
710 Fed. Appx. 437.
No. 18–6219. May v. Continental Towers Condominiums
Assn. et al. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6228. Laschkewitsch v. American National Life
Insurance Co. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 724 Fed. Appx. 283.
No. 18–6305. Polshyn v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 411.
No. 18–6329. Sandoval Dominguez v. Spearman, Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6337. Williams v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 548 S. W. 3d 275.
No. 18–6338. Williams v. Superior Court of California,
Los Angeles County, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div.
1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6364. Buth v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 480 Mass. 113, 101 N. E. 3d
925.
No. 18–6393. Qazi v. Killian, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6395. Ramos v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6396. Solorio v. Muniz, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 914.
No. 18–6397. Rosario v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6398. Pittman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 551.
No. 18–6399. Perez-Trevino v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 359.
1042 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 3, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6401. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 606.
No. 18–6404. Ramirez-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 345.
No. 18–6405. Thieszen v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 300 Neb. 112, 912 N. W. 2d 696.
No. 18–6408. Prince v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx. 396.
No. 18–6415. Cherniavsky, aka Yegiyan v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed.
Appx. 601.
No. 18–6417. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 577.
No. 18–6421. Negron-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6422. Norton v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 464.
No. 18–6425. Beattie v. Romero et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 385.
No. 18–6429. White v. Ector County Appraisal District.
Ct. App. Tex., 11th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6430. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6431. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 636.
No. 18–6432. Killen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 703.
No. 18–6434. Shults v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 421.
No. 18–6445. Vick v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6447. Goodwin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1043
586 U. S. December 3, 2018
No. 18–6451. Spain v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 180.
No. 18–6456. O’Brien v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 38.
No. 18–6457. Puente v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6459. Balmes-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 515.
No. 18–6461. Love v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 194.
No. 18–6462. Carlos Mendez v. California. Ct. App. Cal.,
6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6463. Portillo v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 A. 3d 722.
No. 18–6468. Lugo-Santiago v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6472. Gibson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6473. Harrison v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 383.
No. 18–6474. Hart v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 919.
No. 18–6475. Wright v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 181 A. 3d 1236.
No. 18–6483. Chavez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 195.
No. 18–6484. Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 714.
No. 18–6494. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6495. Trent v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 985.
1044 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 3, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6496. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 807.
No. 18–6497. Watson v. Byrd, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6504. Russian v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 360.
No. 18–6505. Powell v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 925 F. 3d 1.
No. 18–6512. Jones v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6515. Vanover et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 162.
No. 18–6518. Crum v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 261.
No. 18–6519. Alvarez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6524. Thomas, aka O’Brian v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed.
Appx. 262.
No. 18–6531. Eppes v. United States. C. A. Armed Forces.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 77 M. J. 339.
No. 18–6534. Tyler v. Wilson, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 119.
No. 18–6546. Castellano-Benitez v. United States. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 715.
No. 18–6548. Leone v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6549. Branch v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 254.
No. 18–14. Donjuan v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 720 Fed.
Appx. 486.
ORDERS 1045
586 U. S. December 3, 2018
No. 18–287. Neal, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
v. Baer. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 879 F. 3d 769.
No. 18–385. Jakks Pacic, Inc. v. Accasvek LLC. C. A.
D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part
in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
727 Fed. Appx. 704.
No. 18–426. Ashbourne v. Hansberry et al. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
703 Fed. Appx. 3.
No. 18–554. Weiss v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took
no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–562. Coomes v. Maryland Insurance Administration.
Ct. App. Md. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration
of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 457 Md. 659, 181 A. 3d 204.
No. 18–5422. Garrett v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States, 586
U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
No. 18–6394. Steele v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–6498. Majalca-Aguilar v. United States. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–1591. Hoskins v. United States et al., 586 U. S. 820;
No. 17–8008. Leon v. United States, 586 U. S. 827;
No. 17–8043. Morgan v. Kansas et al., 584 U. S. 953;
1046 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 3, 4, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–8352. Martin v. Living Essentials, LLC, 586 U. S.
828;
No. 17–8516. O’Neal v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections, 585 U. S. 1007;
No. 17–8710. In re Armstrong, 586 U. S. 812;
No. 17–8824. Conner v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
et al.; and Conner v. United States Postal Service et al.,
586 U. S. 833;
No. 17–8867. Clopton v. Murphy, Judge, District Court
of Grayson County, Texas, 586 U. S. 834;
No. 17–8935. Campbell v. New York City Transit Authority,
Adjudication Bureau, 586 U. S. 837;
No. 17–9031. Martin v. Wendy’s International, Inc.,
et al., 586 U. S. 839;
No. 17–9071. Bailey v. White, Warden, 586 U. S. 841;
No. 17–9145. Maloy v. New York, 586 U. S. 844;
No. 17–9345. Laschkewitsch v. Transamerica Life Insurance
Co., 586 U. S. 855;
No. 17–9346. Woodward v. Kansas, 586 U. S. 855;
No. 17–9569. Bradeld v. United States, 586 U. S. 867;
No. 18–5011. Cardona v. United States, 586 U. S. 877;
No. 18–5058. Drake v. United States, 586 U. S. 880;
No. 18–5067. Stuhr v. White, Superintendent, Washington
Corrections Center, 586 U. S. 880;
No. 18–5119. King v. King, 586 U. S. 883;
No. 18–5158. Brown v. United States, 586 U. S. 886;
No. 18–5163. Thier v. Florida, 586 U. S. 886;
No. 18–5224. Costelon v. New Mexico, 586 U. S. 889;
No. 18–5280. Lanier v. United States, 586 U. S. 892;
No. 18–5424. Sakuma v. Association of Apartment Owners
of the Tropics of Waikele et al., 586 U. S. 922;
No. 18–5442. Wall v. Florida, 586 U. S. 923;
No. 18–5450. Rivas-Rivera v. Pennsylvania, 586 U. S. 923;
No. 18–5666. Dennison v. Hooks, Warden, 586 U. S. 926; and
No. 18–5788. Dutschke v. United States, 586 U. S. 907.
Petitions for rehearing denied.
December 4, 2018
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 17–1107. Carpenter, Interim Warden v. Murphy.
C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted sub nom. Royal v. Murphy,
ORDERS 1047
586 U. S. December 4, 2018
584 U. S. 992.] The parties, the Solicitor General, and the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation are directed to fle supplemental briefs addressing
the following two questions: “(1) Whether any statute
grants the State of Oklahoma jurisdiction over the prosecution of
crimes committed by Indians in the area within the 1866 territorial
boundaries of the Creek Nation, irrespective of the area's
reservation status. (2) Whether there are circumstances in which
land qualifes as an Indian reservation but nonetheless does not
meet the defnition of Indian country as set forth in 18 U. S. C.
§ 1151(a).” Briefs, not to exceed 6,000 words, are to be fled simultaneously
with the Clerk and served upon opposing counsel
on or before 2 p.m., Friday, December 28, 2018. Reply briefs, not
to exceed 3,000 words, are to be fled simultaneously with the
Clerk and served upon opposing counsel on or before 2 p.m., Friday,
January 11, 2019. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the
consideration or decision of this order.
No. 18–6890 (18A570). In re Garcia. Application for stay of
execution of sentence of death, presented to Justice Alito, and
by him referred to the Court, denied. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–6891 (18A571). Garcia v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6892 (18A572). Garcia v. Collier, Executive Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 231.
No. 18–6893 (18A573). Garcia v. Jones et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 910 F. 3d 188.
No. 18–6898 (18A579). Garcia v. Davis, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution
of sentence of death, presented to Justice Alito, and by him
1048 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 4, 6, 2018 586 U. S.
referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 756 Fed. Appx. 391.
December 6, 2018
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–6739 (18A528). Miller et al. v. Parker, Commissioner,
Tennessee Department of Correction, et al. Sup.
Ct. Tenn. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Sotomayor, and by her referred to the
Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 558 S. W.
3d 606.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting from denial of application for
stay and denial of certiorari.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Miller v. Parker, 586 U. S.
1048 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application
for stay and denial of certiorari).
No. 18–6906 (18A578). Miller v. Parker, Commissioner,
Tennessee Department of Correction, et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to Justice Sotomayor, and by her referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 910 F. 3d 259.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
Tennessee is scheduled to electrocute David Miller tonight.
Miller is the second inmate in just over a month who has chosen
to die by the electric chair in order to avoid the State's current
lethal injection protocol. See Zagorski v. Haslam, 586 U. S. 981
(2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application for
stay and denial of certiorari). Both so chose even though electrocution
can be a dreadful way to die.* They did so against the
backdrop of credible scientifc evidence that lethal injection as
currently practiced in Tennessee may well be even worse. See
Zagorski, 586 U. S., at 981–982; Irick v. Tennessee, 585 U. S.
1048, 1048–1049 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
application for stay).
The decision that the Court leaves undisturbed in this case
rests in part on the fction that Miller's choice was voluntary, and
*See State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 66, 745 N. W. 2d 229, 278 (2008) (concluding
that “electrocution will unquestionably infict intolerable pain unnecessary
to cause death in enough executions so as to present a substantial risk
that any prisoner will suffer unnecessary and wanton pain”).
ORDERS 1049
586 U. S. December 6, 7, 10, 2018
in part on predictions about the effcacy of electric chairs made
over a century ago. 910 F. 3d 259, 262 (CA6 2018); see In re
Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 443–444 (1890). Another decision that
the Court today declines to review faulted Miller for not proving
an available alternative means of his own execution. See No. 18–
6739, Miller v. Parker, 586 U. S. 1048. It did so while effectively
permitting the State to turn that “perverse requirement” into a
moving target. McGehee v. Hutchinson, 581 U. S. 933, 935 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay and
denial of certiorari). These cases are the unfortunate byproducts
of this Court's decision in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. 863 (2015).
Such madness should not continue. Respectfully, I dissent.
December 7, 2018
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–266. Dutra Group v. Batterton. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 880 F. 3d 1089.
December 10, 2018
Appeal Dismissed
No. 18–433. Larry v. Arkansas et al. Appeal from D. C.
E. D. Ark. dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–6221. Vinnie v. Henry et al. App. Ct. Mass. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 92 Mass. App. 1128, 102 N. E. 3d 1032.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M70. Perez Soto v. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico;
No. 18M72. Woods v. Warden, Federal Detention Center
Philadelphia;
No. 18M73. Rose v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division;
No. 18M74. Vilutis v. NRG Solar Alpine LLC; and
No. 18M75. James v. Eldorado Casino Shreveport Joint
Venture et al. Motions to direct the Clerk to fle petitions for
writs of certiorari out of time denied.
1050 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 10, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18M71. In re Chafe. Motion for leave to proceed as a
veteran denied.
No. 17–1594. Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal
Service et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 586 U. S.
959.] Motion of petitioner to dispense with printing joint appendix
granted.
No. 18–5856. Jeep v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 961] denied.
No. 18–6731. In re Sudberry. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 18–6537. In re Wooten; and
No. 18–6630. In re Gullett. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–6551. In re Hoskins et al. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
No. 18–6511. In re Ezeah; and
No. 18–6561. In re Lopez. Petitions for writs of prohibition
denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–15. Kisor v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question
1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 869 F. 3d 1360.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1641. Thomas et vir v. Williams. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 346.
No. 17–9169. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 408.
No. 17–9238. Streeter v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 140900–U.
No. 18–7. Choctaw County, Mississippi, et al. v. Jauch.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 F. 3d 425.
No. 18–39. Boyd v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 1 Wash. App. 2d 501, 408 P. 3d 362.
ORDERS 1051
586 U. S. December 10, 2018
No. 18–93. Zimmerman v. City of Austin, Texas. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 378.
No. 18–304. Kimberly-Clark Corp. et al. v. Davidson.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 956.
No. 18–395. Corning Optical Communications RF LLC v.
PPC Broadband, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 714 Fed. Appx. 1022.
No. 18–412. Watts v. Allen et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–432. Pineda, aka Pineda Alarcon v. Nielson,
Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 348.
No. 18–437. Medvedev v. Henrico County. Sup. Ct. Va.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–438. Placide v. Supreme Court of Washington
et al. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 190
Wash. 2d 402, 414 P. 3d 1124.
No. 18–448. Estate of West, Deceased v. Department of
Veterans Affairs. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 895 F. 3d 432.
No. 18–471. Cooper v. Bank of New York Mellon,
Trustee, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 713 Fed. Appx. 368.
No. 18–574. Rachal v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–585. Franceschi v. Yee et al. (Reported below: 887
F. 3d 927); and DeOrio v. Yee et al. (718 Fed. Appx. 548).
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5313. Steele v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 47.
No. 18–5509. Makell v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 307.
No. 18–5670. Campise v. New York Commissioner of
Labor. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 150 App. Div. 3d 1523, 54 N. Y. S. 3d 761.
1052 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 10, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–5843. Chanthunya v. Maryland Attorney Grievance
Commission. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5876. Sanford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6128. Diamond v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6175. Jones v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 241 So. 3d 65.
No. 18–6192. Rodriguez v. Gore, Sheriff, San Diego
County, California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6211. Rodriguez v. San Diego County, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6218. Linden v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6220. Kelly v. Bishop, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 153.
No. 18–6224. Latney v. Parker. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 202.
No. 18–6227. Wester v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (2d) 150768–U.
No. 18–6230. Shoate v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6231. Rahim v. South Carolina Department of
Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 136.
No. 18–6234. Barrett v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6250. Nairn v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6252. Wesson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 9th App. Dist.,
Summit County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-834.
ORDERS 1053
586 U. S. December 10, 2018
No. 18–6262. Penunuri v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 126, 418 P. 3d 263.
No. 18–6288. Cooley v. Director, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, Department of Labor, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed.
Appx. 248.
No. 18–6295. Walcott v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6312. Mason v. Lindsey, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6316. Wilks v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 154 Ohio St. 3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114
N. E. 3d 1092.
No. 18–6320. McGhee v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6325. Contreras-Rebollar v. Obenland, Superintendent,
Monroe Correctional Complex. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6326. Coxe v. White, Superintendent, Washington
State Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6331. Robinson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 250 So. 3d 5.
No. 18–6345. Bruette v. Zinke, Secretary of the Interior.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727
Fed. Appx. 878.
No. 18–6353. Bien v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 550 S. W. 3d 180.
No. 18–6381. Crockett v. Brown, Superintendent, Wabash
Valley Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6386. Adkins v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed.
Appx. 238.
1054 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 10, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6400. Watson v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6406. Tappen v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 248 So. 3d 70.
No. 18–6414. Locke v. Paramo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6416. Williams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6453. Thompson v. Nielson, Secretary of Homeland
Security. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 710 Fed. Appx. 430.
No. 18–6464. LaPena v. Grigas et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 651.
No. 18–6480. Hill v. Gammon, Superintendent, Moberly
Correctional Center. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6499. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 191.
No. 18–6536. Waters v. Lockett, Warden. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 559.
No. 18–6542. Licea v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 713.
No. 18–6552. Woods v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 480 Mass. 231, 102 N. E. 3d
961.
No. 18–6553. Dixon v. Texas (four judgments). Ct. Crim.
App. Tex. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6554. Collins v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6557. O’Dell v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6560. Weaver v. Nicholson, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 878.
ORDERS 1055
586 U. S. December 10, 2018
No. 18–6564. Hollis v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 183 A. 3d 737.
No. 18–6565. Gore v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (3d) 150627, 110
N. E. 3d 231.
No. 18–6566. Flowers v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 352.
No. 18–6567. Delprado v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 800.
No. 18–6570. Kaprelian v. Tegels, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6573. Farrad v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 859.
No. 18–6574. Hall v. United States; Hill v. United
States; Jackson v. United States; Proctor v. United States;
and Angel Rosario v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6576. Kevra-Shiner v. United States. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 130.
No. 18–6581. Hailey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 280.
No. 18–6582. Glass v. Hainsworth, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Somerset. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6583. Fiumano v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 45.
No. 18–6584. Flenoid v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6585. Gagnon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6586. Wood v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 187 A. 3d 1248.
No. 18–6587. Matthew v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 688.
1056 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 10, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 18–6589. Young v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 94.
No. 18–6591. Chin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 785.
No. 18–6596. Dury v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 231.
No. 18–6597. Joseph v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 258.
No. 18–6600. Labrador v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 270.
No. 18–6601. Palomo v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6602. Nolley v. McLaughlin, Warden, et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6604. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 732.
No. 18–6605. Perrone v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 898.
No. 18–6606. Merrick v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 702.
No. 18–6616. Sanutti-Spencer v. Pennsylvania. Super.
Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 183 A. 3d 1049.
No. 18–6618. Marquez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 F. 3d 1036.
No. 18–6622. Williams v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 660.
No. 18–6625. Blagmon v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6638. Isbell v. Merlak, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6698. Aluiso v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 84.
ORDERS 1057
586 U. S. December 10, 2018
No. 17–1340. Andersen, Secretary, Kansas Department
of Health and Environment v. Planned Parenthood of
Kansas and Mid-Missouri et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 1205.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch
join, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Gee v. Planned Parenthood
of Gulf Coast, Inc., 586 U. S. 1057 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
No. 17–1492. Gee, Secretary, Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf
Coast, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 862 F. 3d 445.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch
join, dissenting.
One of this Court's primary functions is to resolve “important
matter[s]” on which the courts of appeals are “in confict.” This
Court's Rule 10(a); e. g., Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U. S. 99, 106
(1995). This case and Andersen v. Planned Parenthood of Kan.
and Mid-Missouri, 586 U. S. 1057 (2018), present a confict on a
federal question with signifcant implications: whether Medicaid
recipients have a private right of action to challenge a State's
determination of “qualifed” Medicaid providers under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1396a(a)(23) and Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Five Circuits
have held that Medicaid recipients have such a right, and
one Circuit has held that they do not.* The last three Circuits
to consider the question have themselves been divided.
This question is important and recurring. Around 70 million
Americans are on Medicaid, and the question presented directly
affects their rights. If the majority of the courts of appeals
are correct, then Medicaid patients could sue when, for example,
a State removes their doctor as a Medicaid provider or inadequately
reimburses their provider. E. g., Bader v. Wernert, 178
*Compare Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F. 3d 1205, 1225–
1229 (CA10 2018); 862 F. 3d 445, 457–462 (CA5 2017) (case below); Planned
Parenthood of Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F. 3d 960, 966–968 (CA9 2013);
Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Commissioner of Ind. State Dept. of
Health, 699 F. 3d 962, 974–977 (CA7 2012); Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F. 3d
456, 461–465 (CA6 2006), with Does v. Gillespie, 867 F. 3d 1034, 1041–1046
(CA8 2017).
1058 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Thomas, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
F. Supp. 3d 703 (ND Ind. 2016); Women's Hospital Foundation v.
Townsend, 2008 WL 2743284 (MD La., July 10, 2008). Because
of this Court's inaction, patients in different States—even patients
with the same providers—have different rights to challenge their
State's provider decisions.
The question presented also affects the rights of the States,
many of which are amici requesting our guidance. Under the
current majority rule, a State faces the threat of a federal lawsuit—
and its attendant costs and fees—whenever it changes providers
of medical products or services for its Medicaid recipients.
E. g., Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F. 3d 456 (CA6 2006). Not only
are the lawsuits themselves a fnancial burden on the States, but
the looming potential for complex litigation inevitably will dissuade
state offcials from making decisions that they believe to
be in the public interest. State offcials are not even safe doing
nothing, as the cause of action recognized by the majority rule
may enable Medicaid recipients to challenge the failure to list
particular providers, not just the removal of former providers.
E. g., Kapable Kids Learning Center, Inc. v. Arkansas Dept. of
Human Servs., 420 F. Supp. 2d 956 (ED Ark. 2005); Martin v.
Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940 (SD Ohio 2002). Moreover, allowing
patients to bring these claims directly in federal court reduces
the ability of States to manage Medicaid, as the suits give Medicaid
providers “an end run around the administrative exhaustion
requirements in [the] state's statutory scheme.” 876 F. 3d 699,
702 (CA5 2017) (Elrod, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
Finally, the disagreement over § 1396a(a)(23) implicates fundamental
questions about the appropriate framework for determining
when a cause of action is available under § 1983—an important
legal issue independently worthy of this Court's attention. The
division in the lower courts stems, at least in part, from this
Court's own lack of clarity on the issue. As one court observed,
the disagreement “can be explained in part by an evolution in the
law,” Does v. Gillespie, 867 F. 3d 1034, 1043 (CA8 2017)—a tactful
way of saying that this Court made a mess of the issue. We
have acknowledged as much, explaining that language in our early
opinions could be “read to suggest that something less than an
unambiguously conferred right” can give rise to a cause of action
under § 1983, and that “[t]his confusion has led some courts”
astray. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 282–283 (2002). We
ORDERS 1059
1057 Thomas, J., dissenting
have “[f]uel[ed] this uncertainty” by equivocating on whether the
standards for implying private rights of action have any “bearing
on the standards for discerning whether a statute creates rights
enforceable by § 1983.” Id., at 283. Courts are not even able to
identify which of our decisions are “binding”; in Planned Parenthood
of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F. 3d 1205 (CA10 2018), the Court
of Appeals applied a decision that this Court recently said had
been “ `plainly repudiate[d].' ” Id., at 1229, and n. 16 (quoting
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U. S. 320, 330,
n. (2015), in turn citing Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496
U. S. 498 (1990)). One can hardly blame the Tenth Circuit for misunderstanding.
We created this confusion. We should clear it up.
So what explains the Court's refusal to do its job here? I
suspect it has something to do with the fact that some respondents
in these cases are named “Planned Parenthood.” That
makes the Court's decision particularly troubling, as the question
presented has nothing to do with abortion. It is true that these
particular cases arose after several States alleged that Planned
Parenthood affliates had, among other things, engaged in “the
illegal sale of fetal organs” and “fraudulent billing practices,” and
thus removed Planned Parenthood as a state Medicaid provider.
Andersen, 882 F. 3d, at 1239, n. 2 (Bacharach, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). But these cases are not about abortion
rights. They are about private rights of action under the
Medicaid Act. Resolving the question presented here would not
even affect Planned Parenthood's ability to challenge the States'
decisions; it concerns only the rights of individual Medicaid patients
to bring their own suits.
Some tenuous connection to a politically fraught issue does not
justify abdicating our judicial duty. If anything, neutrally applying
the law is all the more important when political issues are in
the background. The Framers gave us lifetime tenure to promote
“that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential
to the faithful performance” of the courts' role as “bulwarks of
a limited Constitution,” unaffected by feeting “mischiefs.” The
Federalist No. 78, pp. 469–470 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
We are not “to consult popularity,” but instead to rely on
“nothing . . . but the Constitution and the laws.” Id., at 471.
We are responsible for the confusion among the lower courts,
and it is our job to fx it. I respectfully dissent from the Court's
decision to deny certiorari.
1060 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 10, 2018 586 U. S.
No. 17–9038. Banks v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 998.
No. 18–138. Huffman v. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland
Security. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 18–408. Kohn Law Group, Inc. v. Auto Parts Manufacturing
Mississippi, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Federal
Bar Association Southern District of New York Chapter, Network
of Bar Leaders, et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx.
305.
No. 18–436. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., dba Liberty
International Underwriters, et al. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas,
Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of American Institute of Marine
Underwriters for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 350.
No. 18–6424. Deiter v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 890 F. 3d
1203.
No. 18–6559. Alexander v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 726 Fed.
Appx. 262.
No. 18–6593. Molina-Varela v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 726
Fed. Appx. 722.
No. 18–6599. Jordan v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States, 586
U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
ORDERS 1061
586 U. S. December 10, 13, 2018
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–8780. Caines v. Gastelo, Warden, 586 U. S. 832;
No. 17–8847. Satterwhite v. Frisch’s Restaurant et al.,
586 U. S. 834;
No. 17–8956. Bonner v. Cumberland Regional High
School District, 586 U. S. 837;
No. 17–8970. Blakeney v. United States, 586 U. S. 837;
No. 17–8971. Bartlett v. Pineda, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al., 586 U. S. 837;
No. 17–9351. Triplett v. Wyoming, 586 U. S. 855;
No. 17–9488. Brown v. Illinois Department of Human
Services, 586 U. S. 863;
No. 17–9526. Cruz v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security, 586 U. S. 865;
No. 18–38. Erwin v. Department of the Army, 586 U. S.
871;
No. 18–5145. Bennett v. Wolfe et al., 586 U. S. 885;
No. 18–5157. In re Luis Arevalo, 586 U. S. 813;
No. 18–5382. Fiedler v. Brindley et al., 586 U. S. 897;
No. 18–5622. Walker v. United States, 586 U. S. 904;
No. 18–5808. Angel Rondon v. United States, 586 U. S. 927;
and
No. 18–5933. Wilkerson v. United States, 586 U. S. 930.
Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 17–9374. Carter v. Kane et al., 586 U. S. 910. Petition
for rehearing denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
December 13, 2018
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–6970 (18A606). Antonio Jimenez v. Florida. Sup.
Ct. Fla. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 265 So. 3d 462.
No. 18–7020 (18A628). Antonio Jimenez v. Jones, Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections, et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death,
presented to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 758 Fed. Appx. 682.
1062 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
December 18, 19, 21, 2018, January 4, 2019 586 U. S.
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–42.
December 18, 2018
GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Louisiana. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported
below: 879 F. 3d 61.
December 19, 2018
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–572. McCall v. Aptim Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 888
F. 3d 129.
December 21, 2018
Miscellaneous Order
No. 18A615. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant et al. D. C. N. D.
Cal. Application for stay, presented to Justice Kagan, and by
her referred to the Court, denied. Justice Thomas, Justice
Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh would grant
the application for stay.
January 4, 2019
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 17–1625. Rimini Street, Inc., et al. v. Oracle USA,
Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 585 U. S. 1058.]
Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral
argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument granted.
No. 18–96. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn.
v. Blair, Interim Director of the Tennessee Alcoholic
Beverage Commission, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted
sub nom. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v. Byrd,
585 U. S. 1058.] Motion of Illinois et al. for leave to participate in
oral argument as amici curiae and for divided argument granted.
Joint motion of respondents for divided argument denied.
Probable Jurisdiction Postponed
No. 18–422. Rucho et al. v. Common Cause et al. Appeal
from D. C. M. D. N. C. Further consideration of question of
ORDERS 1063
586 U. S. January 4, 7, 2019
jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits. Case
will be set for argument in the March argument session. Reported
below: 318 F. Supp. 3d 777.
No. 18–726. Lamone et al. v. Benisek et al. Appeal from
D. C. Md. Motion of David Trone for leave to fle brief as amicus
curiae granted. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction
postponed to hearing of case on the merits. Case will be set for
argument in the March argument session. Reported below: 348
F. Supp. 3d 493.
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–302. Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark
Ofce v. Brunetti. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari granted.
Reported below: 877 F. 3d 1330.
No. 18–459. Emulex Corp. et al. v. Varjabedian et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 888 F. 3d
399.
No. 18–489. Taggart v. Lorenzen, Executor of the Estate
of Brown, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported
below: 888 F. 3d 438.
No. 18–431. United States v. Davis et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Motions of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 903 F. 3d 483.
January 7, 2019
Certiorari Granted—Reversed in part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded.
(See Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U. S. 38 (2019)
(per curiam).)
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded. (See also Shoop v.
Hill, 586 U. S. 45 (2019) (per curiam).)
No. 18–195. Poff v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Lagos v. United States, 584 U. S. 577
(2018). Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 249.
No. 18–227. Wolfe v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration
in light of Class v. United States, 583 U. S. 174 (2018).
1064 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–6289. Small v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 253 So. 3d 1111.
No. 18–6380. Bartlett v. Pineda, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6460. Bynum v. DeKalb County Sanitation. C. A.
11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's
Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6491. Reeves v. Lashbrook, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ill.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6503. Richard v. District Attorney of Westmoreland
County, Pennsylvania, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6523. Bell v. Orlando Health, Inc., dba Winnie
Palmer Hospital. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6922. Singh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. C. A. 9th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18A511. Zodhiates v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Application for stay, addressed to Justice Gorsuch and referred
to the Court, denied.
No. 18M76. Furminger v. United States. Motion to direct
the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of
this motion.
ORDERS 1065
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18M77. Hiramanek v. Clark et al.;
No. 18M78. Barber v. Sherman, Warden;
No. 18M79. Webb-El v. Kane et al.;
No. 18M80. Drivas v. United States;
No. 18M81. Dougherty v. Gilmore, Warden;
No. 18M84. Wilson v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections;
No. 18M85. Marshall v. Ash et al.; and
No. 18M87. Abdur-Rahiim v. United States. Motions to direct
the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time
denied.
No. 18M82. Bush v. Arizona. Motion for leave to fle petition
for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix under
seal granted.
No. 18M83. Doe v. United States; and
No. 18M86. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.
Motions for leave to fle petitions for writs of certiorari under
seal with redacted copies for the public record granted.
No. 148, Orig. Missouri et al. v. California. Motion for
leave to fle bill of complaint denied. Justice Thomas would
grant the motion. [For earlier order herein, see 584 U. S. 929.]
No. 149, Orig. Indiana et al. v. Massachusetts. Motion
for leave to fle bill of complaint denied. Justice Thomas would
grant the motion. [For earlier order herein, see 584 U. S. 929.]
No. 17–1672. United States v. Haymond. C. A. 10th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 586 U. S. 960.] Motion of petitioner to dispense
with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 17–8926. Harper v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 802] denied.
No. 17–9269. In re Rodgers. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis
[586 U. S. 812] denied.
No. 17–9538. Harper v. Crow. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 805] denied.
1066 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–252. Real Estate Alliance Ltd. v. Move, Inc.,
et al., 586 U. S. 987. Motion of Mark Tornetta for leave to
intervene to fle a petition for rehearing denied.
No. 18–415. HP Inc., fka Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berkheimer.
C. A. Fed. Cir.;
No. 18–575. YPF S. A. v. Petersen Energia Inversora
S. A. U. et al. C. A. 2d Cir.;
No. 18–581. Argentine Republic v. Petersen Energia Inversora
S. A. U. et al. C. A. 2d Cir.; and
No. 18–600. Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions,
Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America, Inc., fka Intersil
Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to
fle briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United
States.
No. 18–5863. Johnson v. Butler Law Firm. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 986] denied.
No. 18–6410. McKinzy v. Gaston (McKinzy). Ct. App. Mo.,
Western Dist.;
No. 18–6781. Farr v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. 10th Cir.;
No. 18–6792. Fillmore v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co.,
Inc. C. A. 7th Cir.;
No. 18–6813. Ghosh v. City of Berkeley, California. Ct.
App. Cal., 1st App. Dist.; and
No. 18–7063. In re Dread. Motions of petitioners for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed
until January 28, 2019, within which to pay the docketing fees
required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with
Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
No. 18–6949. Klein v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioner is allowed until January 28, 2019, within which to pay
the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition
in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this motion.
No. 18–6579. In re McQuarry;
ORDERS 1067
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6784. In re Rivera;
No. 18–6787. In re Bailey; and
No. 18–6961. In re Johnson. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
No. 18–488. In re Idlett;
No. 18–6357. In re Senthilnathan;
No. 18–6479. In re Galvan; and
No. 18–6526. In re Yonamine. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–6449. In re Sultaana; and
No. 18–6500. In re Rumanek. Petitions for writs of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
No. 18–6478. In re Gaitor. Petition for writ of prohibition
denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–936. Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. United States ex
rel. Campie et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 862 F. 3d 890.
No. 17–1149. United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity
Industries, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 872 F. 3d 645.
No. 17–1285. Association des Eleveurs de Canards et
d’Oies du Quebec et al. v. Becerra, Attorney General
of California. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 870 F. 3d 1140.
No. 17–1301. Harvey et al. v. UTE Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation et al. Sup. Ct. Utah. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 UT 75, 416 P. 3d 401.
No. 17–1404. Gordon v. Laer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 654.
No. 17–1704. Kerr, for Kerr, Deceased v. Berryhill,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 874 F. 3d 926.
No. 17–7517. Smith v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 720.
1068 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 17–8160. Khoury v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 720.
No. 17–8282. Nebinger v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–9259. Collins v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 7. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–16. Elijah v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 191.
No. 18–36. Brice v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 179 A. 3d 870.
No. 18–98. Cook v. Mississippi. Ct. App. Miss. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 242 So. 3d 865.
No. 18–110. Burningham et al. v. Raines, Guardian of
the Estate of Raines. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 883 F. 3d 1071.
No. 18–122. Sinegal v. Polk. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 457.
No. 18–127. Amgen Inc. et al. v. Sano et al. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 872 F. 3d 1367.
No. 18–168. Nichols, Individually and on Behalf of All
Others Similarly Situated v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC,
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718
Fed. Appx. 736.
No. 18–177. Dawson v. Board of County Commissioners
of Jefferson County, Colorado, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 624.
No. 18–185. Connecticut v. Skakel. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 329 Conn. 1, 188 A. 3d 1.
No. 18–203. Chandler v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 242 So. 3d 65.
No. 18–229. Curry v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 968.
No. 18–238. South Carolina v. Samuel. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 422 S. C. 596, 813 S. E. 2d
487.
ORDERS 1069
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–261. Cebreros v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–273. Williams, aka Williamson v. Whitaker, Acting
Attorney General. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 880 F. 3d 100.
No. 18–274. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 651.
No. 18–288. Mearing v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–308. Bethea v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 255 N. C. App. 749, 806 S. E.
2d 677.
No. 18–311. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, Attorney General
of Massachussetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 479 Mass. 312, 94 N. E. 3d 786.
No. 18–331. Pabon Ortega v. Llompart Zeno et al. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–333. Old Dominion Electric Cooperative v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 1223.
No. 18–337. County of Orange, California, et al. v. Gordon,
Individually and as Successor in Interest to Gordon,
Deceased. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
888 F. 3d 1118.
No. 18–339. Harper v. Leahy et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 716.
No. 18–348. Weisler v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Ofce
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736
Fed. Appx. 468.
No. 18–355. Prison Legal News v. Jones, Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 954.
No. 18–359. St. Bernard Parish et al. v. United States.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d
1354.
1070 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–373. Rose v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 82.
No. 18–374. Lemus Castillo v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 1208.
No. 18–375. Alexander v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC.
Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–378. Merck & Co., Inc., et al. v. Gilead Sciences,
Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888
F. 3d 1231.
No. 18–386. Vasquez et al. v. Foxx, State’s Attorney of
Cook County, Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 895 F. 3d 515.
No. 18–418. United States ex rel. Harper et al. v.
Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 330.
No. 18–445. Ramirez v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 557 S. W. 3d 717.
No. 18–453. de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, et al.
Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 21 Cal. App. 5th 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625.
No. 18–458. Pellegrini v. Fresno County, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742
Fed. Appx. 209.
No. 18–470. Stokes v. Corsbie et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 263.
No. 18–473. Davis v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737
Fed. Appx. 379.
No. 18–474. Lyon v. Canadian National Railway Company
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–476. Cowlitz County, Washington, et al. v. Crowell
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 726 Fed. Appx. 593.
No. 18–477. Martin et al. v. United States. C. A. Fed.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 1356.
ORDERS 1071
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–478. Malnes v. City of Flagstaff, Arizona, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 710 Fed.
Appx. 764.
No. 18–479. Schenkel v. Xyngular Corp. et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 868.
No. 18–482. Hill v. Accounts Receivable Services, LLC.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 343.
No. 18–487. D. A. v. D. P. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 96 N. E. 3d 663.
No. 18–490. Watts v. Allen. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–491. Ray v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–493. Spano v. Florida Bar. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–495. Morris & Associates, Inc. v. John Bean Technologies
Corp. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 887 F. 3d 1322.
No. 18–502. Kinney et al. v. Anderson Lumber Co., Inc.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–504. Kinney v. Boren et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 410.
No. 18–507. McDonald v. United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–508. Kinney v. Takeuchi et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 414.
No. 18–510. Kinney v. Clark et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 411.
No. 18–511. Gates v. Khokhar et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 1290.
No. 18–512. Simmons v. Smith, Acting Director of the
National Park Service, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 888 F. 3d 994.
1072 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–514. Drake et al. v. Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
54 Kan. App. 2d x, 404 P. 3d 372.
No. 18–515. Kinney v. Clark et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 413.
No. 18–516. Kinney v. Gutierrez et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 453.
No. 18–517. Kinney v. Gutierrez. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 415.
No. 18–518. Kinney v. Clerk, Court of Appeal of California,
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed.
Appx. 420.
No. 18–519. Jennings v. Jennings. Ct. App. Ohio, 10th App.
Dist., Franklin County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2017-Ohio-8974.
No. 18–520. WeConnect, Inc. v. Goplin. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 488.
No. 18–521. Juan v. Jneso District Council 1 et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–523. Griffin v. Verizon Communications Inc.
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 746
Fed. Appx. 873.
No. 18–526. Choizilme v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
886 F. 3d 1016.
No. 18–527. Straub v. City of Spokane, Washington,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738
Fed. Appx. 392.
No. 18–528. Kie et al. v. Ahmed. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 934.
No. 18–529. Jenn-Ching Luo v. Owen J. Roberts School
District et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 737 Fed. Appx. 111.
ORDERS 1073
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–536. Taylor v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–537. James v. Montgomery Regional Airport Authority
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 730 Fed. Appx. 772.
No. 18–549. Voter Veried, Inc. v. Election Systems &
Software LLC. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 887 F. 3d 1376.
No. 18–550. Stokes v. Corsbie et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 319.
No. 18–558. Gutierrez v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
887 F. 3d 770.
No. 18–559. Negatu v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. Ct. App.
D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189 A. 3d 715.
No. 18–564. Decosimo v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 555 S. W. 3d 494.
No. 18–567. Snapp v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Railway Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 889 F. 3d 1088.
No. 18–569. Shao v. Tsan-Kuen Wang. Ct. App. Cal., 6th
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–570. Tunac, Individually and as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Tunac, Deceased v. United
States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897
F. 3d 1197.
No. 18–571. Williams v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 930.
No. 18–577. Netzer v. Shell Oil Co. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–582. Yagman v. Colello. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 463.
No. 18–583. Mayle v. United States et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 680.
1074 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–584. Horne v. WTVR, LLC, dba CBS6. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 201.
No. 18–586. Koch v. Estrella et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–590. Cave Consulting Group, LLC v. Optum-
Insight, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 725 Fed. Appx. 988.
No. 18–591. Dressler v. Rice et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 814.
No. 18–592. Ferguson Florissant School District v. Missouri
State Conference of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 924.
No. 18–594. Snyder v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–595. Tatten v. City and County of Denver, Colorado,
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 730 Fed. Appx. 620.
No. 18–598. Chien v. Clark et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–599. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp. et al.
(three judgments). C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 887 F. 3d 1329 (frst judgment); 719 Fed. Appx.
1018 (second and third judgments).
No. 18–602. Smith v. Lakewood Ranch Gymnastics LLC
et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 254 So. 3d 339.
No. 18–603. Siegel et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed.
Appx. 986.
No. 18–605. Stein v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–611. Tatar v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1075
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–613. Grifn v. Aetna Health Inc. et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx.
169.
No. 18–616. Nepal v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 204.
No. 18–619. Hussein v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney General,
et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 715 Fed. Appx. 585.
No. 18–623. Walker v. Weatherspoon et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 354.
No. 18–624. Rasko v. New York City Administration for
Children’s Services. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 734 Fed. Appx. 52.
No. 18–627. Starrett v. Lockheed Martin Corp. et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed.
Appx. 169.
No. 18–629. Cody v. California Air Resources Board
et al.; and
No. 18–666. Alliance for California Business v. California
Air Resources Board. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 23 Cal. App. 5th 1050, 234
Cal. Rptr. 3d 22.
No. 18–632. LeRoux v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 407.
No. 18–633. Byrd v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–637. Marro v. Caesar’s Entertainment Operating
Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–639. Biszczanik v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC,
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–667. Williams v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–675. West v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Eastern Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 551 S. W. 3d 506.
1076 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–683. Stark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 767.
No. 18–685. Robinson et al. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743
Fed. Appx. 233.
No. 18–688. Mann v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 790.
No. 18–698. Reynolds v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 461 Md. 159, 192 A. 3d 617.
No. 18–702. Yadav et ux. v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection. Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–706. Kiobel, By and Through Her Attorney-
In-Fact, Samkalden v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 238.
No. 18–708. Bertram et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 743.
No. 18–714. Chhay Lim v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 673.
No. 18–737. Aime et al. v. JTH Tax, Inc., dba Liberty Tax
Service, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 744 Fed. Appx. 787.
No. 18–5008. Canadate v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5090. Mason v. Burton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 241.
No. 18–5118. Floyd v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 872 F. 3d 760.
No. 18–5147. Wing v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 592.
No. 18–5209. Barrett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 288.
No. 18–5251. Dambelly v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 87.
ORDERS 1077
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–5314. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 878 F. 3d 498.
No. 18–5398. Prutting v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 886.
No. 18–5418. Green v. Colorado. Sup. Ct. Colo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5464. Benitez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 783.
No. 18–5504. Posey v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5505. Morris v. Mays, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5549. Kenner v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5594. Washington v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 891.
No. 18–5626. Wishnefsky v. Salameh et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5634. Kinkel v. Laney, Superintendent, Oregon
State Correctional Institution. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 363 Ore. 1, 417 P. 3d 401.
No. 18–5655. Foster v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 129.
No. 18–5664. Cheeseboro v. Little Richie Bus Service,
Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722
Fed. Appx. 107.
No. 18–5691. Baker v. Cheatham, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5730. Denmark v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5762. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 621.
No. 18–5770. Rouse v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 853.
1078 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–5771. Qualls v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 592.
No. 18–5821. Farmer v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5853. Binns v. City of Marietta, Georgia. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx.
797.
No. 18–5880. Caudill v. Conover, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 881 F. 3d 454.
No. 18–5898. Castillo Valerio v. United States. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 551.
No. 18–5923. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 938.
No. 18–5939. Allen v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 313.
No. 18–5945. Chiddo v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 917.
No. 18–5960. Gharib v. Casey (three judgments). C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 Fed. Appx. 950
(frst judgment); 727 Fed. Appx. 455 (third judgment) and 456
(second judgment).
No. 18–5980. Jones v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 559.
No. 18–6005. Williams v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 696.
No. 18–6013. Wyatt v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6044. Beasley v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 153 Ohio St. 3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493, 108
N. E. 3d 1028.
No. 18–6070. Cornwell v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App.
Tenn. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1079
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6071. Nayshtut v. Comercializadora Travel Advisory,
S. A. de C. V., et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist.,
Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6137. Burton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 677.
No. 18–6160. Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 893 F. 3d 397.
No. 18–6174. Lang v. Bobby, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 803.
No. 18–6214. Sanders v. Davis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 873 F. 3d 778.
No. 18–6233. Schuermann v. Anqui. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6236. Swan v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6239. Reilly v. Herrera et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 760.
No. 18–6243. Jackson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 241 So. 3d 914.
No. 18–6244. Martin v. Oklahoma et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 612.
No. 18–6245. Kirkland v. Progressive Insurance Co.
et al. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
278 So. 3d 483.
No. 18–6247. Parker v. Cain, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6261. Vargas, aka Vargas Romero v. McMahon.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6263. Vargas, aka Vargas Romero v. McMahon
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714
Fed. Appx. 813.
1080 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6264. Requena v. Roberts et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 1195.
No. 18–6272. Steshenko v. McKay et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 298.
No. 18–6274. Klein v. Centennial Ranch and Aspen
Mountain Ranch Assn. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6276. Terrell v. Berry, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6278. Martin v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6287. Crutsinger v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
898 F. 3d 584.
No. 18–6290. Solgado v. Braun, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6294. Walcott v. Terrebonne Parish Jail Medical
Department et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 728 Fed. Appx. 361.
No. 18–6296. Jacome v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6298. Fratta v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889
F. 3d 225.
No. 18–6307. Latimer v. Macomber, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6311. Walters v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6315. Ivy v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6318. Ware v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1081
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6323. Hunter v. North Dakota. Sup. Ct. N. D.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 ND 173, 914 N. W. 2d
527.
No. 18–6332. Stroble v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726
Fed. Appx. 254.
No. 18–6334. Wiggins v. Tanner, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6340. Williams v. Sare et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6344. Lacy v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 174, 545 S. W. 3d 746.
No. 18–6354. Jossie v. CVS Pharmacy. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 912.
No. 18–6356. Reyes v. Artus. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6365. Bartlett v. Michigan et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6367. Carter v. Ayala et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6368. Calhoun v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6382. Chavez v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 895 F. 3d 962.
No. 18–6383. Kulick v. Rein. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6384. Lanteri v. Connecticut. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 80.
No. 18–6388. Blackmon v. Eaton Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6390. White v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
1082 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6392. Khoshmood v. Eastern Market Management
(two judgments). C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 728 Fed. Appx. 1 (both judgments).
No. 18–6402. Robinson v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6403. Starnes v. Jackson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6407. Vue v. Henke et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 780.
No. 18–6412. Bey v. Elmwood Place Police Department
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6418. Wilson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 251 So. 3d 904.
No. 18–6419. Whipple v. Florida Department of Corrections.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6420. Nesselrode v. DeVos, Secretary of Education.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6426. Brunson v. North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 203.
No. 18–6427. Valle v. Rogers et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 309.
No. 18–6428. Gonzalez Delacruz v. Davis, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6433. Smithback v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6435. Rogers v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6437. Holder v. Sepanek, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 216.
No. 18–6438. Moreno v. Butler. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6439. Ortega Lara v. Madden, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1083
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6440. Meeks v. Tennessee Department of Correction
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6441. McKissick v. Deal, Governor of Georgia,
et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6442. Merritt v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (2d) 150219, 83
N. E. 3d 1125.
No. 18–6443. Adams v. Netix, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 76.
No. 18–6446. Fairley v. PM Management-San Antonio
AL, L. L. C., dba Lakeside Assisted Living by Trisun Healthcare.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724
Fed. Appx. 343.
No. 18–6452. Bartlett v. State Bar of California et al.
Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6454. Nash v. Phillips, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6455. McGee v. Bondi, Attorney General of Florida.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704
Fed. Appx. 920.
No. 18–6458. Williams v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6465. Yanez v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6466. Ortega v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 617.
No. 18–6467. Pulley v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6469. Morant v. Lewis, Superintendent, Southeast
Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6476. White v. Detroit East Community Mental
Health et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied.
1084 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6477. Ackels v. Olsen et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 665.
No. 18–6485. Cain v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2 Wash. App. 2d 1054.
No. 18–6487. Howell v. NuCar Connection, Inc., et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed.
Appx. 416.
No. 18–6488. Coleman v. Hakala et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 608.
No. 18–6489. Fikrou v. Montgomery County Ofce of
Child Support Enforcement Division et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 695 Fed. Appx. 299.
No. 18–6490. Hopkins v. Language Testing International
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6492. Rentas v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6493. Burke v. Turner, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6501. Robertson v. Interactive College of Technology
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 743 Fed. Appx. 269.
No. 18–6506. Boudreaux v. Hooper, Warden. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6507. Brown v. Del Norte County, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6508. Williams v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6509. Tedesco v. Monroe County, Pennsylvania,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723
Fed. Appx. 125.
No. 18–6510. Pruitt v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 32 N. Y. 3d 1007, 111 N. E. 3d 1121.
No. 18–6513. Chinchilla v. Lewis, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 443.
ORDERS 1085
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6516. Linh Thi Minh Tran v. Happy Valley Municipal
Court, Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 289 Ore. App. 377, 412 P. 3d 1210.
No. 18–6517. Brown v. Elite Modeling Agency. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6520. Arnett v. Covello, Acting Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6521. Porto v. City of Laguna Beach, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720
Fed. Appx. 853.
No. 18–6522. Prunty v. DeSoto County School Board
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738
Fed. Appx. 648.
No. 18–6527. Jedediah C. v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 240 W. Va. 534, 814
S. E. 2d 197.
No. 18–6528. Cabbagestalk v. Sterling et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6529. Kozich v. Deibert et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 644.
No. 18–6532. Myers v. Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 154 Ohio St. 3d 405, 2018-Ohio-1903, 114
N. E. 3d 1138.
No. 18–6535. Williams v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6538. Sydnor v. Hampton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6539. Rencountre v. Braun, Warden. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6540. Rayan v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6541. Stoller v. Wilmington Trust. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6543. Koresko v. Acosta, Secretary of Labor.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed.
Appx. 127.
1086 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6544. McNemar v. Terry, Acting Warden. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 207.
No. 18–6545. Lopez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6555. Barnett v. City of Gastonia, North Carolina.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733
Fed. Appx. 111.
No. 18–6556. McAlister v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 WI 34, 380 Wis. 2d 684, 911
N. W. 2d 77.
No. 18–6558. Merrick v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6562. Pierce v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6568. Pompee v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 819.
No. 18–6571. Jervis v. Brown, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6572. Thompson v. Missouri Board of Probation
and Parole. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6575. Stokes v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6577. Solano Godoy v. Clarke, Director, Virginia
Department of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 689 Fed. Appx. 164.
No. 18–6578. Fox v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6580. Fitts v. Goodrich, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct.
Ga. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6590. Mohamed v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 221.
ORDERS 1087
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6592. Pavon v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 719 Fed. Appx. 978.
No. 18–6594. Safford v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 So. 3d 163.
No. 18–6595. Smith v. Florida Department of Corrections.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6603. Johnson v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 102 N. E. 3d 355.
No. 18–6607. Peters v. Baldwin. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6609. Lampon-Paz v. Ofce of Personnel Management.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732
Fed. Appx. 158.
No. 18–6610. Johnson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6613. DeJesus v. Godinez et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 766.
No. 18–6614. Rose v. Horton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6619. Robinson v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 247 So. 3d 1212.
No. 18–6620. Armenta v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed.
Appx. 255.
No. 18–6623. Cosme v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6627. Curry v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6628. Clemons v. Kasich, Governor of Ohio. Sup.
Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 153 Ohio St. 3d
1449, 2018-Ohio-3025, 103 N. E. 3d 828.
1088 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6629. Harloff v. Koenig, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 170.
No. 18–6637. Grist v. Carlin, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6639. Dizak v. Smith, Superintendent, Mid-State
Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6642. Ibeabuchi v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6647. Sharma v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6652. Lowe v. Roy, Commissioner, Minnesota Department
of Corrections. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6653. Calderin v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 150730–U.
No. 18–6659. Rodwell v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct.
Mass. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6660. Arif v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 1.
No. 18–6661. Samuel v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 117.
No. 18–6664. Garza v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 258.
No. 18–6665. Smith v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6666. Sosa v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 615.
No. 18–6673. Vick v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6676. Wilmore v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6677. Marshall v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1089
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6678. White v. Bracy, Warden, et al. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6681. Rios et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 854.
No. 18–6683. Sakoman v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6687. Kennedy v. Pollock. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 233 N. J. 604, 187 A. 3d 844.
No. 18–6689. Sanchez v. Pfeiffer, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 745 Fed. Appx. 703.
No. 18–6691. McCurtis v. Burke, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6692. Waterson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx. 823.
No. 18–6693. Mangual-Rosado v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 907 F. 3d 107.
No. 18–6694. Weakley v. Eagle Logistics et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 1244.
No. 18–6695. Mehmood v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 928.
No. 18–6697. Bellinger v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 731.
No. 18–6700. DePietro v. Allstate Insurance Co. et al.
Super. Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6703. Trimble v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 482.
No. 18–6705. Jiles v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 1005.
No. 18–6707. Proa-Dominguez v. United States (Reported
below: 739 Fed. Appx. 309); Lopez v. United States (740 Fed.
Appx. 422); and Cazares v. United States (740 Fed. Appx. 456).
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
1090 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6711. Deleon Colon v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 1236.
No. 18–6712. Gilstrap v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 312.
No. 18–6714. Suarez Plasencia v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 1336.
No. 18–6718. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6719. Williamson v. Luther, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Smitheld, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6720. Witchard v. Antonelli, Warden. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 54.
No. 18–6721. Cullens v. Curtin, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6723. Noel v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6725. Bussell v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6726. Brantley v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 91 N. E. 3d 566.
No. 18–6729. Santiago v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 693.
No. 18–6732. Stevens v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 943.
No. 18–6733. Shauger v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6737. Lopez-Castillo v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 363.
No. 18–6738. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6742. Mathis v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 258 N. C. App. 651, 813 S. E.
2d 861.
ORDERS 1091
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6746. Haymore et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 421.
No. 18–6748. Glass v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 319.
No. 18–6753. Mendez v. Swarthout, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx.
421.
No. 18–6757. Norman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 208.
No. 18–6759. Brown v. Hatton, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 661.
No. 18–6760. Upshaw v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 538.
No. 18–6761. Williams v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6763. Antonio Bonilla v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6764. Borders v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6765. Bagdis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6767. Galbreath v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 348.
No. 18–6768. Perez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6770. Nino-Flores v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 152.
No. 18–6775. Kehoe v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 232.
No. 18–6778. Horn v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6791. Bland v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 194.
1092 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6793. Booth v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 882 F. 3d 759.
No. 18–6795. Brown v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6797. Greene v. South Carolina. Sup. Ct. S. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 423 S. C. 263, 814 S. E. 2d
496.
No. 18–6798. Hill v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 51.
No. 18–6800. Powell v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 311.
No. 18–6801. McDuffy v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 796.
No. 18–6804. Roach v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 1185.
No. 18–6806. Sarmiento v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 704.
No. 18–6808. Suarez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 1330.
No. 18–6809. Camp v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 903 F. 3d 594.
No. 18–6810. Hickman-Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6811. Rivera Fonseca v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx.
985.
No. 18–6812. Ferranti v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6814. Gerald et al. v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 295 Va. 469, 813 S. E. 2d 722.
No. 18–6816. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1093
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6817. Focia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 869 F. 3d 1269.
No. 18–6820. Langley v. Premo, Superintendent, Oregon
State Penitentiary. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 288 Ore. App. 168, 403 P. 3d 832.
No. 18–6821. Kelley v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 279 So. 3d 14.
No. 18–6824. Keys v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 198.
No. 18–6827. Williams v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162
App. Div. 3d 694, 78 N. Y. S. 3d 386.
No. 18–6828. Thomas v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 Md. App. 760.
No. 18–6829. Fuentes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 161.
No. 18–6830. Heredia-Silva v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 344.
No. 18–6833. Ramon Zuniga, aka Zuniga-Zaragoza, aka
Zuniga-Garcia v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 147.
No. 18–6838. Roundtree v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6839. Robin v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 179 A. 3d 867.
No. 18–6841. Stewart v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6842. Davis, aka Sealed Defendant v. United
States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715
Fed. Appx. 107.
No. 18–6844. Kerr v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 WI 87, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 N. W.
2d 787.
No. 18–6846. Pena v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 236 Md. App. 740.
1094 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6847. Antonio Haro v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 727.
No. 18–6851. Gomez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6853. Garcia-Lima v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 374.
No. 18–6855. Perez-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 468.
No. 18–6856. Mills v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6858. Pritchett v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 128.
No. 18–6861. Wilborn v. Ryan, Warden. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6862. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 807.
No. 18–6863. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 1004.
No. 18–6864. Whitlow v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6865. Nina v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 27.
No. 18–6867. Silva-Ibarra v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 858.
No. 18–6871. Cabello v. United States District Court for
the District of Oregon. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6873. Armenta v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1005.
No. 18–6875. Thrift v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 607.
No. 18–6879. Hogue v. Cain, Superintendent, Snake
River Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 426.
No. 18–6894. Crosby v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 752.
ORDERS 1095
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6895. Clark v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 667.
No. 18–6896. Wingate v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6897. Tavia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 697.
No. 18–6900. Watters v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 324.
No. 18–6910. Musa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 265.
No. 18–6911. Pineda-Orozco v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 311.
No. 18–6912. Monie v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6917. Portela v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 1322.
No. 18–6918. Velazquez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 462.
No. 18–6920. Retiz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 500.
No. 18–6923. Sarras v. Unknown Party. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6924. Walden v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas
Department of Correction. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6926. Valentine v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6934. Evans v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 64.
No. 18–6935. Ewing v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx. 317.
No. 18–6937. Morrill v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 884.
1096 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6948. Gavidia v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 908 F. 3d 920.
No. 18–6951. Cooper v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 840.
No. 18–6952. Garcia Licon v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6963. Camran v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 263.
No. 18–6964. Wallace v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6967. Danilovich, aka Sealed Defendant, aka
Daniels v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 45.
No. 18–6969. Bivins v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 765.
No. 18–6974. McIntosh v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6981. Surratt v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 259 N. C. App. 940, 814 S. E.
2d 626.
No. 18–7028. Simpson v. Erkerd et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–938. City of Cibolo, Texas v. Green Valley Special
Utility District. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Guadalupe
Valley Development Corporation et al. for leave to fle brief as
amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 866
F. 3d 339.
No. 17–1165. de Csepel et al. v. Republic of Hungary
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motions of Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat
and AJC et al. for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration
or decision of these motions and this petition. Reported
below: 859 F. 3d 1094.
No. 17–1237. Osage Wind, LLC, et al. v. Osage Minerals
Council. C. A. 10th Cir. Motions of American Wind Energy
Association and Osage County Farm Bureau, Inc., et al. for leave
to fle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 871 F. 3d 1078.
ORDERS 1097
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 17–1382. Lance v. Sellers, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 706 Fed. Appx. 565.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
Before deciding that petitioner Donnie Cleveland Lance should
die as punishment for two murders he committed, a jury heard
no evidence whatsoever to counterbalance the State's case for the
death penalty. Lance's counsel bore responsibility for the onesidedness
of the sentencing proceedings; he inexcusably failed
even to look into, much less to put on, a case for sparing Lance's
life. And we have since learned that Lance suffers from signifcant
cognitive impairments that the jury could have weighed in
assessing his moral culpability. In other words, there is a meaningful
case to be made for sparing Lance's life, but—because he
lacked access to constitutionally adequate counsel—he has never
had a chance to present it.
The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that this state of affairs
was constitutionally tolerable because, in its view, Lance's untold
story stood no chance of persuading even a single juror to favor
life without parole over a death sentence. The U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that its conclusion was not
unreasonable. I cannot agree. Our precedents clearly establish
that Lance was prejudiced by his inability to inform the jury
about his impairments. I therefore would grant Lance's petition
for review and summarily reverse.
I
A
The facts of Lance's crimes—murdering his ex-wife, Sabrina
“Joy” Lance, and her boyfriend, Dwight “Butch” Wood, Jr., in
1997—admittedly inspire little sympathy. Lance went to Butch's
home, kicked in the front door, shot Butch with a shotgun, then
bludgeoned Joy to death with the gun. According to a fellow
inmate, he later bragged about the killings. Lance also had an
extensive prior history of domestic violence against Joy.1
1 Lance previously had kidnapped Joy, electrocuted her, beaten her, strangled
her, and threatened her with various other harms. He also repeatedly
had threatened to kill her if she left him or became involved with Butch.
Four years earlier, Lance and a friend took a shotgun to Butch's home and
kicked in the door, but fed when a child inside spoke to them.
1098 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
Due to his counsel's ineffectiveness, however, those facts were
all the jurors ever learned about Lance; they heard no evidence
why his life was worth sparing. Lance was represented during
both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial by a solo practitioner
who became convinced of Lance's innocence—and his own ability
to prove it—early in the representation. He thus prepared exclusively
for the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial. Counsel did
not even broach the subject of possible penalty-phase evidence
with Lance or his family, because he did not want them “thinking
that [he] might be thinking in terms of losing the case.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 232. So when the jury found Lance guilty and the
question became whether Lance should be put to death,2 Lance's
counsel had no evidence whatsoever to present.
The State did. It called six witnesses, including the victims'
relatives, to explain why Lance deserved to die. The State's closing
argument emphasized Lance's history of violence against Joy,
the brutality of her killing, and Lance's apparent lack of remorse.
The State urged the jury to perceive Lance as “ `cold and calculating'
” and repeatedly asked “ `what kind of person' ” would do
these things. 1 App. in No. 16–15008 (CA11), pt. 1, pp. 68, 75,
77. Lance's counsel, by contrast, made no opening statement and
presented no mitigating evidence. By his own admission, he “had
nothing to put on.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 273. His closing argument
merely urged the jury to consider Lance's family and to
resist the temptation to exact vengeance. About Lance, counsel
said only that he was “ `kind of a quiet person and a country boy' ”
who “ `doesn't talk a lot.' ” 1 App. in No. 16–15008, pt. 1, at 85.
The jury sentenced Lance to death.
B
In 2003, Lance fled a petition for postconviction relief in state
court, asserting that his trial counsel's failure to investigate or
present any mitigating evidence was ineffective assistance of
counsel. Essentially, he argued that there was a meaningful case
to be made for sparing his life, and that his counsel had forfeited
his chance to do so through inattention.
2 The jury found that two aggravating circumstances supported Lance's
eligibility for the death penalty: that he committed a double murder and
that Joy's killing was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 74; Lance v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 23, 560 S. E. 2d 663,
677 (2002); see also Ga. Code Ann. §§ 17–10–30(b)(2), (b)(7) (Supp. 2018).
ORDERS 1099
1097 Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The evidence showed that counsel could have found possible
cognitive problems had he looked into Lance's personal history.
That history included repeated serious head traumas caused by
multiple car crashes, alcoholism, and—most seriously—Lance's
once being shot in the head by unknown assailants while lying on
his couch.3 In the aftermath of the shooting, Lance had “terrible
headaches,” “dizziness,” “diffculty working,” and “became even
more quiet than he had before.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 171–172.
The court found that any reasonable defense attorney would have
had Lance's mental health evaluated and, in so doing, uncovered
“signifcant mitigating evidence for the jury to consider.” Id.,
at 174.
Four mental health professionals testifed at an evidentiary
hearing.4 They agreed on many points. First, Lance had permanent
damage to his brain's frontal lobe. Second, his IQ placed
him in the borderline range for intellectual disability. Third, his
symptoms warranted a diagnosis of clinical dementia. The experts
differed somewhat, however, over the extent and practical
consequences of Lance's brain damage. Primarily, the experts
seemed to disagree about the extent to which Lance's brain damage
affected his impulse control.5
The Superior Court granted Lance's habeas petition and vacated
his death sentence, holding that trial counsel's failure to
3 In addition to the history discussed by the court, Lance also ingested
gasoline as a small child, was trampled by a horse as a teenager, and once
was overcome by fumes while working to clean the interior of an oil tanker
truck. 1 App. in No. 16–15008, pt. 2, pp. 202–203.
4 Lance put on Thomas Hyde, an expert in behavioral neurology; Ricardo
Weinstein, an expert in neuropsychology; and David Pickar, an expert in
psychiatry and clinical neuroscience. The State called Daniel Martell, an
expert in neuropsychology. (A ffth expert's unsworn report was ruled inadmissible
by the Georgia Supreme Court. See Hall v. Lance, 286 Ga. 365,
371, n. 1, 687 S. E. 2d 809, 815, n. 1 (2010).)
5 Hyde, Weinstein, and Pickar opined that the type and extent of damage
refected in Lance's test results would adversely affect his ability to suppress
impulsive behavior. Weinstein and Hyde added that the damage
could impair Lance's ability to conform his conduct to the law, and Hyde
noted that the effects of Lance's impairments would be most acute in moments
of emotional stress. Martell, in contrast, saw no direct evidence of
impulse-control diffculties and opined that Lance's brain damage would not
“ `prevent him' ” from conforming his conduct to the law. 1 App. in No. 16–
15008, pt. 3, at 170.
1100 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
investigate and present evidence of Lance's mental condition was
defcient performance, and that his failure prejudiced Lance. The
missing evidence could have prompted a different sentence, the
court explained, because it went directly to the key issue before
the jury: the assessment of Lance's character, culpability, and
worth.
The Georgia Supreme Court, however, reversed and reinstated
Lance's death sentence. Hall v. Lance, 286 Ga. 365, 687 S. E. 2d
809 (2010). It agreed that counsel's performance was defcient
but held that Lance suffered no prejudice. As relevant here, it
held that even if the jury had considered at trial all the neuropsychological
evidence adduced at the postconviction hearing, there
was no reasonable probability that Lance's sentence would have
changed.6 In the Georgia Supreme Court's view, the new evidence
was only “somewhat mitigating” because it showed only
“subtle neurological impairments,” which would necessarily have
been outweighed by Lance's prior threats and violence toward
the victims, the nature of the crime, and Lance's statements and
demeanor in its aftermath. Id., at 373, 687 S. E. 2d, at 815–816.
C
Lance sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The U. S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the petition
but granted a certifcate of appealability. Under the deferential
review provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affrmed, holding that the Georgia
Supreme Court's conclusion that the absence of the postconviction
mental health evidence caused Lance no prejudice “was not unreasonable.”
Lance v. Warden, 706 Fed. Appx. 565, 573 (2017).
II
To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel
claim, a defendant must show both that his counsel's performance
was defcient and that his counsel's errors caused him
6 As an alternative ground for fnding no prejudice, the Georgia Supreme
Court also hypothesized that even an adequate investigation would not have
uncovered the evidence that Lance presented at the postconviction hearing.
That conclusion is not implicated by Lance's petition because the Court of
Appeals did not address it.
ORDERS 1101
1097 Sotomayor, J., dissenting
prejudice. In assessing defciency, a court asks whether defense
“counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668,
688 (1984). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show
“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Id., at 694. When, as here, a petitioner seeks
federal habeas review of a state court's rejection of his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, he can prevail only if the
decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of,” Strickland and its progeny, or rested “on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).
Because the Supreme Court of Georgia mischaracterized or
omitted key facts and improperly weighed the evidence, I agree
with Lance that its decision was an objectively “unreasonable
application of ” our precedents. § 2254(d)(1); see Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 528 (2003). I would therefore grant the
petition and summarily reverse.
A
With regard to Strickland's performance prong, the Georgia
Supreme Court determined that trial counsel's failure to investigate
possible mitigation was defcient. See Lance, 286 Ga., at
368, 687 S. E. 2d, at 812–813. That is plainly correct. Counsel
in a death penalty case has an obligation at the very least to
consider possible penalty-phase defenses. See Wiggins, 539 U. S.,
at 521–522. By his own admission, counsel here did not. Without
any inquiry into what penalty-phase evidence he might be
forgoing, he succumbed to tunnel vision—and as a consequence
left Lance defenseless. Because nothing here “obviate[d] the
need for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation,”
Lance has satisfed Strickland's defcient-performance
requirement. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U. S. 30, 40 (2009) (per
curiam); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U. S. 374, 381 (2005);
Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 534.
B
Turning to the prejudice prong, the Court of Appeals was
wrong to conclude that Lance suffered no clearly established prejudice
from his inability to make his case. Georgia law permits a
death sentence only upon a unanimous jury recommendation, so
1102 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Sotomayor, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
Lance needed only to show “a reasonable probability that at least
one juror would have struck a different balance” between the
aggravating and the mitigating factors had he or she considered
the missing evidence. Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 537; see Ga. Code
Ann. §§ 17–10–31(a), (c).7 The trial court, upon hearing Lance's
proffered mitigation evidence, concluded that it was “extremely
important for the jury to consider” and thus that its absence was
prejudicial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 174. Under any reasonable
application of Strickland and its progeny, that conclusion was
correct. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d); Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 528.
To determine whether a defendant reasonably might have been
spared a death sentence but for his counsel's defciency, courts
take into account “ the totality of the available mitigation
evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced
in the habeas proceeding,” then “reweig[h] it against the evidence
in aggravation.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 397–398
(2000). “We do not require a defendant to show that counsel's
defcient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of
his penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish a probability
suffcient to undermine confdence in that outcome.” Porter, 558
U. S., at 44 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
The jurors who sentenced Lance determined whether he would
live or die “knowing hardly anything about him other than the
facts of his crimes.” Id., at 33. They heard nothing “that would
humanize [Lance] or allow them to accurately gauge his moral
culpability.” Id., at 41. Yet if counsel had performed his duties,
the jurors would have heard that Lance's brain endured physical
trauma throughout his life, resulting in frontal lobe damage and
dementia. The jury further would have heard that Lance's IQ
placed him within the borderline range for intellectual disability.
The jury also would have heard that Lance's cognitive defcits
could affect his impulse control and capacity to conform his behavior
to the law, especially at moments of emotional distress.
Taken together, those facts—with their accompanying explanatory
potential to humanize Lance, or at least to render less incompre-
7 In Georgia, “a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury
verdict includes a fnding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance
and a recommendation that such sentence be imposed.” Ga. Code Ann. § 17–
10–31(a). “If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to sentence,
the judge shall dismiss the jury and shall impose a sentence of either life
imprisonment or imprisonment for life without parole.” § 17–10–31(c).
ORDERS 1103
1097 Sotomayor, J., dissenting
hensible his conduct—were signifcant mitigating evidence. See
id., at 36, 42–43 (noting the potentially mitigating effect of evidence
that the defendant “suffered from brain damage that could
manifest in impulsive, violent behavior” and was “substantially
impaired in his ability to conform his conduct to the law”).
To be sure, the evidence before the jury—the brutality of Joy's
death, Lance's past violence toward her, and Lance's conduct
thereafter—could have supported a death sentence. See Ga.
Code Ann. §§ 17–10–30(b), 17–10–31(a). But there is a stark contrast
between no mitigation evidence whatsoever and the signifcant
neuropsychological evidence that adequate counsel could
have introduced as a potential counterweight. Lance's unintroduced
case for leniency, even if not airtight, “adds up to a mitigation
case that bears no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy
actually put before the jury.” Rompilla, 545 U. S., at 393; see
also Williams, 529 U. S., at 398. Our precedents thus clearly
establish Lance's right to a new sentencing at which a jury can,
for the frst time, weigh the evidence both for and against death.
The Georgia Supreme Court reached its contrary conclusion
only by unreasonably disregarding or minimizing Lance's evidence.
The state court acknowledged that experts would testify
that “ `signifcant damage' ” to Lance's frontal lobe compromised
his ability “ `to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.' ” Lance, 286 Ga., at 370–371, 687 S. E. 2d, at 814. It failed,
however, to allow for the possibility that the jury might credit
that evidence. This Court previously has cautioned against prematurely
resolving disputes or unreasonably discounting mitigating
evidence in this context. See Porter, 558 U. S., at 43 (“While
the State's experts identifed perceived problems with the tests
[showing brain damage and cognitive defects] and the conclusions
[the defense expert] drew from them, it was not reasonable to
discount entirely the effect that [the defense expert's] testimony
might have had on the jury”). We should do so again here.
Further, the Georgia Supreme Court relied on characterizations
of Lance's evidence that cannot be squared with the record, which
“further highlights the unreasonableness of ” the Georgia Supreme
Court's decision. Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 528; see 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(2). With regard to Lance's frontal lobe damage, the
Georgia Supreme Court appears to have credited the testimony
of the State's expert over Lance's experts' testimony, treating as
defnitive Martell's assertion that “Lance's symptoms were so sub1104
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
tle that a typical court-ordered evaluation might not have given
any indication of problems.” Lance, 286 Ga., at 372, 687 S. E. 2d,
at 815; see also id., at 373, 687 S. E. 2d, at 816. Yet the other
experts concluded that Lance's impairments and resulting behavioral
distortions were “serious” and “signifcant.” 8 E. g., 1 App.
in No. 16–15008, pt. 3, at 92; 2 id., at 10. The Georgia Supreme
Court also unreasonably dismissed the experts' consensus that
Lance was in the borderline range for intellectual disability,9 and
never mentioned—much less discussed the significance of—
Lance's dementia diagnosis.
These errors, taken together, make clear that the Georgia Supreme
Court applied our Strickland precedents in an objectively
unreasonable manner. The mental impairment evidence reasonably
could have affected at least one juror's assessment of
whether Lance deserved to die for his crimes, and Lance should
have been given a chance to make the case for his life. The
Georgia Supreme Court's conclusion that it would be futile to
allow him to do so was unreasonable.
III
Absent this Court's intervention, Lance may well be executed
without any adequately informed jury having decided his fate.
Because the Court's refusal to intervene permits an egregious
breakdown of basic procedural safeguards to go unremedied, I
respectfully dissent.
No. 17–9082. Hester et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 441.
8 Moreover, it is unclear even that Martell's milder characterizations genuinely
contradicted the other experts' testimony. Unlike the other experts,
Martell seems at least sometimes to have been characterizing Lance's impairments
“relative to his overall borderline [intellectually disabled] baseline,”
1 App. in No. 16–15008, pt. 3, at 151, not relative to the average
person or to the level at which Lance might have functioned absent his head
traumas. Compare 2 id., at 34 (Weinstein: specifc test results “vastly excee[
d] the threshold for impairment” and “indicate signifcant organic impairment
of the frontal lobe”), with 2 id., at 152 (Martell: results on the
same test were “at a level expected for [Lance's] IQ” or “showed mild
impairment”).
9 See Lance, 286 Ga., at 372, 687 S. E. 2d, at 815 (describing Lance as
merely “in the lower range of normal intelligence”). But see, e. g., 1 App.
in No. 16–15008, pt. 3, at 135 (Martell, describing Lance's intellectual functioning
as “in the borderline range,” which is “lower than low average”).
ORDERS 1105
586 U. S. Gorsuch, J., dissenting
Justice Alito, concurring.
The argument that the Sixth Amendment, as originally understood,
requires a jury to fnd the facts supporting an order of
restitution depends upon the proposition that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to fnd the facts on which a sentence of
imprisonment is based. That latter proposition is supported by
decisions of this Court, see United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220,
230–232 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 478 (2000),
but it represents a questionable interpretation of the original
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, Gall v. United States, 552 U. S.
38, 64–66 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting). Unless the Court is willing
to reconsider that interpretation, fdelity to original meaning
counsels against further extension of these suspect precedents.
Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins,
dissenting.
If you're charged with a crime, the Sixth Amendment guarantees
you the right to a jury trial. From this, it follows that the
prosecutor must prove to a jury all of the facts legally necessary
to support your term of incarceration. Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U. S. 466 (2000). Neither is this rule limited to prison time.
If a court orders you to pay a fne to the government, a jury
must also fnd all the facts necessary to justify that punishment
too. Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U. S. 343 (2012).
But what if instead the court orders you to pay restitution to
victims? Must a jury fnd all the facts needed to justify a restitution
order as well? That's the question presented in this case.
After the defendants pleaded guilty to certain fnancial crimes,
the district court held a hearing to determine their victims' losses.
In the end and based on its own factual fndings, the court ordered
the defendants to pay $329,767 in restitution. The Ninth Circuit
affrmed, agreeing with the government that the facts supporting
a restitution order can be found by a judge rather than a jury.
Respectfully, I believe this case is worthy of our review. Restitution
plays an increasing role in federal criminal sentencing
today. Before the passage of the Victim and Witness Protection
Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1248, and the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1227, restitution orders were comparatively
rare. But from 2014 to 2016 alone, federal courts sentenced
33,158 defendants to pay $33.9 billion in restitution. GAO, G.
Goodwin, Federal Criminal Restitution 16 (GAO–18–203, 2018).
1106 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Gorsuch, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
And between 1996 and 2016, the amount of unpaid federal criminal
restitution rose from less than $6 billion to more than $110 billion.
GAO, G. Goodwin, Federal Criminal Restitution 14 (GAO–18–115,
2017); Dept. of Justice, C. DiBattiste, U. S. Attorneys Annual
Statistical Report 79–80 (1996) (Tables 12A and 12B). The effects
of restitution orders, too, can be profound. Failure or inability
to pay restitution can result in suspension of the right to vote,
continued court supervision, or even reincarceration. Lollar,
What Is Criminal Restitution? 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 123–129
(2014).
The ruling before us is not only important, it seems doubtful.
The Ninth Circuit itself has conceded that allowing judges, rather
than juries, to decide the facts necessary to support restitution
orders isn't “well-harmonized” with this Court's Sixth Amendment
decisions. United States v. Green, 722 F. 3d 1146, 1151
(2013). Judges in other circuits have made the same point in
similar cases. See United States v. Leahy, 438 F. 3d 328, 343–
344 (CA3 2006) (en banc) (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); United States v. Carruth, 418 F. 3d 900, 905–906
(CA8 2005) (Bye, J., dissenting).
Nor does the government's defense of the judgment below dispel
these concerns. This Court has held that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to fnd any fact that triggers an increase in
a defendant's “statutory maximum” sentence. Apprendi, 530
U. S., at 490. Seizing on this language, the government argues
that the Sixth Amendment doesn't apply to restitution orders
because the amount of restitution is dictated only by the extent
of the victim's loss and thus has no “statutory maximum.” But
the government's argument misunderstands the teaching of our
cases. We've used the term “statutory maximum” to refer to the
harshest sentence the law allows a court to impose based on
facts a jury has found or the defendant has admitted. Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U. S. 296, 303 (2004). In that sense, the statutory
maximum for restitution is usually zero, because a court can't
award any restitution without fnding additional facts about the
victim's loss. And just as a jury must fnd any facts necessary
to authorize a steeper prison sentence or fne, it would seem to
follow that a jury must fnd any facts necessary to support a
(nonzero) restitution order.
The government is not without a backup argument, but it appears
to bear problems of its own. The government suggests
ORDERS 1107
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
that the Sixth Amendment doesn't apply to restitution orders
because restitution isn't a criminal penalty, only a civil remedy
that “compensates victims for [their] economic losses.” Brief in
Opposition 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial right expressly applies “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions,” and the government concedes that “restitution is
imposed as part of a defendant's criminal conviction.” Brief in
Opposition 8. Federal statutes, too, describe restitution as a
“penalty” imposed on the defendant as part of his criminal sentence,
as do our cases. 18 U. S. C. §§ 3663(a)(1)(A), 3663A(a)(1),
3572(d)(1); see Paroline v. United States, 572 U. S. 434, 456 (2014);
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U. S. 349, 365 (2005). Besides,
if restitution really fell beyond the reach of the Sixth Amendment's
protections in criminal prosecutions, we would then have
to consider the Seventh Amendment and its independent protection
of the right to a jury trial in civil cases.
If the government's arguments appear less than convincing,
maybe it's because they're diffcult to reconcile with the Constitution's
original meaning. The Sixth Amendment was understood
as preserving the “ `historical role of the jury at common law.' ”
Southern Union, 567 U. S., at 353. And as long ago as the time
of Henry VIII, an English statute entitling victims to the restitution
of stolen goods allowed courts to order the return only of
those goods mentioned in the indictment and found stolen by a
jury. 1 J. Chitty, Criminal Law 817–820 (2d ed. 1816); 1 M. Hale,
Pleas of the Crown 545 (1736). In America, too, courts held that
in prosecutions for larceny, the jury usually had to fnd the value
of the stolen property before restitution to the victim could be
ordered. See, e. g., Schoonover v. State, 17 Ohio St. 294 (1867);
Jones v. State, 13 Ala. 153 (1848); State v. Somerville, 21 Me. 20
(1842); Commonwealth v. Smith, 1 Mass. 245 (1804). See also
Barta, Guarding the Rights of the Accused and Accuser: The
Jury's Role in Awarding Criminal Restitution Under the Sixth
Amendment, 51 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 463, 472–476 (2014). And it's
hard to see why the right to a jury trial should mean less to the
people today than it did to those at the time of the Sixth and
Seventh Amendments' adoption.
Respectfully, I would grant the petition for review.
No. 18–61. Stand Up for California! et al. v. Department
of the Interior et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari de1108
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
nied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or
decision of this petition. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 1177.
No. 18–64. Lucio-Rayos v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 875 F. 3d 573.
No. 18–267. Electronic Privacy Information Center v.
Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity
et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 878 F. 3d 371.
No. 18–327. N. K., an Infant, by His Mother and Natural
Guardian, Bruestle-Kumra v. Abbott Laboratories. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 731
Fed. Appx. 24.
No. 18–370. Haight v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 892 F. 3d
1271.
No. 18–398. FCA US LLC et al. v. Flynn et al. (two judgments).
C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of CTIA–The Wireless Association
et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted. Motion
of respondents for leave to fle brief in opposition under seal with
redacted copies for the public record granted. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–480. Raghavendra v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the
consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–513. Mulcahy v. Aspen Pitkin County Housing
Authority. Ct. App. Colo. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration
of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–544. Canuto v. Department of Defense et al.
C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took
no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 723 Fed. Appx. 6.
ORDERS 1109
586 U. S. January 7, 2019
No. 18–6376. Albra v. Board of Trustees of Miami Dade
College et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
No. 18–6502. Epperson v. United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari before judgment denied.
No. 18–6717. Lei Yin v. Thermo Fisher Scientic. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–6783. Scott v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 1239.
No. 18–6854. Durham v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 902 F. 3d
1180.
No. 18–6872. Abdul-Salaam v. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 254.
No. 18–6915. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 599.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States, 586
U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–8502. Ambrose v. Trierweiler, Warden, 584 U. S.
1037;
No. 17–8558. Long v. United States, 586 U. S. 918;
No. 17–8688. Assa’ad-Faltas v. City of Columbia, South
Carolina, 586 U. S. 830;
No. 17–8842. Jackson v. Georgia, 586 U. S. 834;
No. 17–8909. Jaramillo v. New York, 586 U. S. 835;
No. 17–9004. Sturges v. Curtin, Warden, 586 U. S. 838;
1110 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 7, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 17–9034. Taylor v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, 586 U. S. 839;
No. 17–9292. Styles v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
586 U. S. 852;
No. 17–9306. Trinh v. Trinh, 586 U. S. 997;
No. 17–9363. McFarlin v. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court
of the United States, et al., 586 U. S. 856;
No. 17–9433. Junod v. United States, 586 U. S. 860;
No. 17–9461. Bulovic v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co.,
LLC, et al., 586 U. S. 861;
No. 18–79.
873;
No. 18–209.
No. 18–220.
U. S. 966;
No. 18–233.
U. S. 966;
No. 18–239.
No. 18–271.
No. 18–330.
586 U. S. 1021;
No. 18–382.
Klein et al. v. O’Brien et al., 586 U. S.
Mehta v. California, 586 U. S. 966;
Carrillo et al. v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al., 586
Indiezone, Inc., et al. v. Rooke et al., 586
Rinaldo v. Mahan et al., 586 U. S. 966;
Trost et ux. v. Trost, 586 U. S. 987;
Greene v. Frost Brown Todd, LLC, et al.,
Rab v. Superior Court of California, Sacramento
County, et al., 586 U. S. 1021;
No. 18–401.
U. S. 1021;
No. 18–427.
No. 18–5075.
No. 18–5106.
No. 18–5139.
Hobson v. Mattis, Secretary of Defense, 586
Bamdad v. United States, 586 U. S. 988;
Okafor v. United States, 586 U. S. 881;
Stewart v. Holder et al., 586 U. S. 883;
Runnels v. Bordelon, Warden, 586 U. S. 884;
No. 18–5161. Waddleton v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 586 U. S. 886;
No. 18–5325.
No. 18–5366.
896;
No. 18–5388.
No. 18–5403.
No. 18–5413.
No. 18–5452.
Lasher v. United States, 586 U. S. 894;
Martin v. Trierweiler, Warden, 586 U. S.
Roberts v. United States, 586 U. S. 897;
Dennis v. Oklahoma, 586 U. S. 922;
Lewis v. Hedgemon et al., 586 U. S. 922;
Reid v. United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina, 586 U. S. 899;
ORDERS 1111
586 U. S. January 7, 8, 2019
No. 18–5519. Templeton v. Amsberry, Superintendent,
Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution, et al., 586
U. S. 901;
No. 18–5530. Kaldawi v. State of Kuwait et al., 586
U. S. 946;
No. 18–5599. Chi v. United States, 586 U. S. 903;
No. 18–5602. Leonard v. Florida, 586 U. S. 947;
No. 18–5659. Cavalieri v. Virginia, 586 U. S. 969;
No. 18–5689. Bridgette v. Asuncion, Warden, et al., 586
U. S. 926;
No. 18–5719. Bartlett v. Pineda, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al., 586 U. S. 970;
No. 18–5720. Bartlett v. Pineda, Judge, Superior Court
of Arizona, Maricopa County, et al., 586 U. S. 970;
No. 18–5732. LaConte v. United States, 586 U. S. 906;
No. 18–5782. Cook v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, et al., 586 U. S. 972;
No. 18–5793. Johnston v. Florida, 586 U. S. 1004;
No. 18–5802. Doe v. Kaweah Delta Hospital et al., 586
U. S. 972;
No. 18–5829. Matelyan v. Atlantic Records et al., 586
U. S. 973;
No. 18–5885. Shannon v. United States, 586 U. S. 929;
No. 18–5887. Morton v. Haynes, Superintendent, Stafford
Creek Corrections Center, 586 U. S. 974;
No. 18–5903. Jones v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security, et al., 586 U. S. 990;
No. 18–5977. Rafi v. Yale University School of Medicine
et al., 586 U. S. 990;
No. 18–6017. Robey v. Washington, 586 U. S. 974;
No. 18–6074. Kuri v. Kansas Department of Labor, Employment
Security Board of Review, 586 U. S. 991; and
No. 18–6166. Rafi v. Brigham and Women ’s Hospital
et al., 586 U. S. 1040. Petitions for rehearing denied.
January 8, 2019
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–5707. Flowers v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1.
1112 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 8, 11, 2019 586 U. S.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18A629 (18–281). Virginia House of Delegates et al.
v. Bethune-Hill et al. D. C. E. D. Va. Application for stay,
presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the
Court, denied.
No. 18A669. In re Grand Jury Subpoena. Application for
stay, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to
the Court, denied. The administrative stay previously entered
by The Chief Justice is vacated.
No. 18–422. Rucho et al. v. Common Cause et al. D. C.
M. D. N. C. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 586 U. S. 1062]; and
No. 18–726. Lamone et al. v. Benisek et al. D. C. Md.
[Probable jurisdiction postponed, 586 U. S. 1063.] Appellants'
briefs on the merits are to be fled on or before Friday, February
8, 2019. Appellees' briefs on the merits are to be fled on or
before Monday, March 4, 2019. Reply briefs on the merits are to
be fled in accordance with Rule 25.3 of the Rules of this Court.
Amicus curiae briefs in support of appellants or in support of
neither party are to be fled on or before Tuesday, February 12,
2019. Amicus curiae briefs in support of appellees are to be
fled on or before Friday, March 8, 2019.
January 11, 2019
Certiorari Granted
No. 17–778. Quarles v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
granted. Reported below: 850 F. 3d 836.
No. 18–389. Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd.
v. Newton. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported
below: 881 F. 3d 1078 and 888 F. 3d 1085.
No. 18–457. North Carolina Department of Revenue v.
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 371 N. C. 133, 814 S. E.
2d 43.
No. 18–481. Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader
Media, dba Argus Leader. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted.
Reported below: 889 F. 3d 914.
No. 18–485. McDonough v. Smith, Individually and as
Special District Attorney for the County of Rensselaer,
ORDERS 1113
586 U. S. January 11, 14, 2019
New York. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below:
898 F. 3d 259.
No. 18–525. Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 300.
No. 17–9560. Rehaif v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 888 F. 3d
1138.
No. 18–6210. Mitchell v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 2018 WI 84, 383 Wis. 2d
192, 914 N. W. 2d 151.
January 14, 2019
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 17–9467. White v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1 (2017).
Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice
Gorsuch join, dissenting.
The Court grants, vacates, and remands this case in light of
Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1 (2017). But Moore was handed down
on March 28, 2017—almost fve months before the Supreme Court
of Kentucky reached a decision in this case. I would accordingly
deny the petition for the reasons previously stated in my dissent
in Kaushal v. Indiana, 585 U. S. 1028 (2018), and in Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in Webster v. Cooper, 558 U. S. 1039,
1040 (2009).
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M88. Deuschel v. USC Faculty Dental Practice
et al. Motion for leave to fle petition for writ of certiorari with
supplemental appendix under seal granted.
No. 18–266. Dutra Group v. Batterton. C. A. 9th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 586 U. S. 1049.] Motion of petitioner to dispense
with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 18–447. Alabama Department of Revenue et al. v.
CSX Transportation, Inc.; and
1114 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 14, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–612. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department
of Revenue et al. C. A. 11th Cir. The Solicitor
General is invited to fle a brief in these cases expressing the
views of the United States.
No. 18–486. Toshiba Corp. v. Automotive Industries Pension
Trust Fund et al. C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General
is invited to fle a brief in this case expressing the views of the
United States.
No. 18–6611. Philips v. North Carolina et al. C. A. 4th
Cir.;
No. 18–6780. Farr v. Davis et al. C. A. 10th Cir.; and
No. 18–7026. Coats v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Motions
of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioners are allowed until February 4, 2019, within which
to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit
petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this
Court.
No. 18–7097. In re Quinto; and
No. 18–7135. In re Harrington. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1423. Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc.,
fka T-Mobile USA, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 522.
No. 17–1692. Ahsan v. Staples the Ofce Superstore
East, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
710 Fed. Appx. 31.
No. 18–149. Lair et al. v. Mangan, Commissioner of Political
Practices, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 873 F. 3d 1170.
No. 18–317. Metzgar et al. v. KBR, Inc., et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 241.
No. 18–324. Leone et ux., as Trustees Under That Certain
Unrecorded Leone-Perkins Family Trust Dated August
26, 1999, as Amended v. Maui County, Hawaii, et al.
Sup. Ct. Haw. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1115
586 U. S. January 14, 2019
No. 18–394. Kelleher et ux. v. New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 159
App. Div. 3d 822, 69 N. Y. S. 3d 832.
No. 18–573. Colony Cove Properties, LLC v. City of Carson,
California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 888 F. 3d 445.
No. 18–604. Delerro v. Pensco Trust Co., fbo Hermann.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed.
Appx. 720.
No. 18–607. Vazeen, aka Vazin v. Vazin. Ct. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–610. TiEnergy, LLC v. Wisconsin Central Ltd.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d
851.
No. 18–620. Simmons v. Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 160.
No. 18–631. McCabe v. Aranda et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 792.
No. 18–635. Burmaster v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 699.
No. 18–638. Anderson v. Herbert et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 745 Fed. Appx. 63.
No. 18–641. J. M., By and Through His Mother, Mandeville
v. Matayoshi, Superintendent, Hawaii Public
Schools, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 729 Fed. Appx. 585.
No. 18–643. Dunkle v. Dale et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 616.
No. 18–644. Cottingham v. Washington State Bar Assn.
et al. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191
Wash. 2d 450, 423 P. 3d 818.
No. 18–668. Berg v. Social Security Administration.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d
864.
1116 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 14, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–671. Smith v. Valentine, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 178.
No. 18–690. Rosetto et al. v. Murphy et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 517.
No. 18–693. Crain v. Nevada et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 591.
No. 18–711. Marin et al. v. Bank of New York. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 257
So. 3d 128.
No. 18–715. Carpenter-Barker v. Ohio Department of
Medicaid et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 752 Fed. Appx. 215.
No. 18–730. McCormick et al. v. Browne et al. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–738. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 327.
No. 18–739. Wallace v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–745. Overton v. Tennessee Department of
Children’s Services. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5135. Honish v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5763. Wooten v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 Ark. 198, 547 S. W. 3d 683.
No. 18–6162. Lemeunier-Fitzgerald v. Maine. Sup. Jud.
Ct. Me. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 ME 85, 188
A. 3d 183.
No. 18–6309. Hardy v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 56, 418 P. 3d 309.
No. 18–6471. Haynes v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733
Fed. Appx. 766.
ORDERS 1117
586 U. S. January 14, 2019
No. 18–6598. Robinson v. Baynes. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6615. Riley v. Dorethy, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 838.
No. 18–6621. Vang v. Roy, Commissioner, Minnesota Department
of Corrections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6624. Morris v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6626. Miller v. Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6631. Hollenback v. Clark, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Albion, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6633. Fremin v. Tanner, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6634. Leonel Gonzalez v. Armenta et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6635. Hampton v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6636. Grifn v. Arnold, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6640. Hundley v. Baker, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6641. Fahie v. McDowell, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6643. Iskander v. United States District Court
for the Central District of California et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6644. Jingyuan Feng v. Komenda et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 699 Fed. Appx. 580.
No. 18–6645. Hopson v. Stark County, Ohio, et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6646. Davis v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 245 So. 3d 745.
1118 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 14, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6648. Escobedo v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718
Fed. Appx. 297.
No. 18–6649. Davis v. Brown & Dortch LLC et al. Ct.
Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6651. Cobb v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 246 So. 3d 1244.
No. 18–6655. Miller v. MacLaren, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 269.
No. 18–6656. Prince v. Jackson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6657. Khoshmood v. District of Columbia Housing
Authority Headquarters. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 703.
No. 18–6658. Veteto v. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department
of Corrections, et al. Ct. Civ. App. Ala. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 268 So. 3d 49.
No. 18–6663. Escobar v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 151963–U.
No. 18–6668. Tory v. Whited et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6669. Chestnut v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6670. Barker v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6674. Rhymes v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 536 S. W. 3d 85.
No. 18–6685. Merryman v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6686. Pederson v. Minnesota et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6688. Leonard v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1119
586 U. S. January 14, 2019
No. 18–6690. Lawson v. Speight et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6696. Torres Ortega v. Bondi, Attorney General
of Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6699. Drane v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6701. Epperson v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6704. Zemke v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6709. Landrum v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 4th App.
Dist., Ross County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-1280.
No. 18–6710. Tyler v. Main Industries, Inc., et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 275.
No. 18–6724. Ozier v. Harry, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6730. Ramirez et al. v. Superior Court of California,
El Dorado County, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6751. McIntosh v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 1301.
No. 18–6754. McCarns v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 1141.
No. 18–6756. Koresko v. Acosta, Secretary of Labor.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 726 Fed.
Appx. 127.
No. 18–6831. Willock v. Sperfslage, Warden. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6860. McCloud v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6874. Cornelius v. Town of Atkinson, New Hampshire.
Sup. Ct. N. H. Certiorari denied.
1120 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 14, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6939. Nelson v. Norwood, Secretary, Kansas Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 935.
No. 18–6941. Chapman v. Lampert, Director, Wyoming
Department of Corrections, et al. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6955. Harrison v. Fulton County, Georgia. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx.
579.
No. 18–6971. Cooley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 957.
No. 18–6980. Martin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 501.
No. 18–6983. Weiss v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6984. Tillman v. Barnhart, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 361.
No. 18–6986. Cloud v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 727.
No. 18–6994. Meador v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 488.
No. 18–6995. Owens v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 299.
No. 18–6996. Curshen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7004. Rodriguez-Garcia v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx.
597.
No. 18–7005. Aviles Salguero v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 109.
No. 18–7007. Spoor v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 141.
No. 18–7009. Davis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 449.
ORDERS 1121
586 U. S. January 14, 2019
No. 18–7010. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 25.
No. 18–7012. Addison v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7021. Thomas v. Johnson, Administrator, New Jersey
State Prison, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7023. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 253.
No. 18–7029. Ruelas-Martinez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 228.
No. 18–7032. Lomax v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 754.
No. 18–7035. Reodica v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 535.
No. 18–7037. Smith v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7039. Ndaula v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7044. Yellowbear v. Lampert, Director, Wyoming
Department of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7050. Portillo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 478.
No. 18–7060. Schumaker v. Joyner, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 181.
No. 18–7061. Reza v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 253.
No. 18–7065. Lobo v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx. 31.
No. 18–7066. Jones v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7067. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 221.
1122 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 14, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7074. Mattiaccio v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 266.
No. 18–7076. Person v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 745 Fed. Appx. 380.
No. 18–7110. Flinn v. Parris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–307. State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v.
Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–391. Arizona v. Goodman. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Motions
of Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Inc., et al. and Michael C.
Dorf et al. for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 244 Ariz. 22, 417 P. 3d 787.
No. 18–496. Michaels v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner to substitute
denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx.
757.
No. 18–650. Cabrera-Rangel v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Motion of Cato Institute for leave to fle brief as amicus
curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed.
Appx. 227.
No. 18–6617. Rudzavice v. Harmon, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 734 Fed.
Appx. 317.
No. 18–6713. Grant v. Carpenter, Interim Warden. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
886 F. 3d 874.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–7364. Goraya v. Florida, 583 U. S. 1171;
No. 17–8816. Ackerman et al. v. Bank of New York Mellon,
586 U. S. 833;
No. 17–9500. Swinton v. Racette, Superintendent, Great
Meadows Correctional Facility, 586 U. S. 863;
ORDERS 1123
586 U. S. January 14, 22, 2019
No. 17–9540. Farmer v. United States, 586 U. S. 866;
No. 18–5131. Tu My Tong v. New Mexico et al., 586 U. S.
884;
No. 18–5180. Wen Liu v. University of Miami School of
Medicine, 586 U. S. 887;
No. 18–5429. Garry v. Trane Co., 586 U. S. 922;
No. 18–5499. Sanchez v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 586 U. S. 924;
No. 18–5523. Sanchez v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 586 U. S. 925;
No. 18–5920. Rolland v. Carnation Building Services,
Inc., 586 U. S. 1000;
No. 18–5981. Pastor v. Partnership for Children ’s
Rights, 586 U. S. 990;
No. 18–6046. Skillern v. United States, 586 U. S. 952; and
No. 18–6050. Rodriguez v. Burton, Warden, 586 U. S. 1001.
Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 18–5810. Chirino Rivera v. United States, 586 U. S.
938. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice Kagan took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–5925. Loren v. City of New York, New York,
et al., 586 U. S. 1029. Petition for rehearing denied. The
Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
January 22, 2019
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–636. Pure Presbyterian Church of Washington
et al. v. Grace of God Presbyterian Church. Sup. Ct. Va.
Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported
below: 296 Va. 42, 817 S. E. 2d 547.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–6684. Matelyan v. Fox 11. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–6736. Whitney v. Glover, Clerk, Circuit Court
of Lincoln County, Arkansas, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion
1124 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 22, 2019 586 U. S.
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–7048. Nance v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx.
246.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18A625. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Karnoski et al. D. C. W. D. Wash. Application for
stay, presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the
Court, granted, and the District Court's December 11, 2017, order
granting preliminary injunction is stayed pending disposition of
the Government's appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government's petition
for writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought. If a writ of certiorari
is sought and the Court denies the petition, this order shall
terminate automatically. If the Court grants the petition for writ
of certiorari, this order shall terminate when the Court enters its
judgment. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor,
and Justice Kagan would deny the application.
No. 18A627. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Stockman et al. D. C. C. D. Cal. Application for
stay presented to Justice Kagan, and by her referred to the
Court, granted, and the District Court's December 22, 2017, order
granting preliminary injunction is stayed pending disposition of
the Government's appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government's petition
for writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought. If a writ of certiorari
is sought and the Court denies the petition, this order shall
terminate automatically. If the Court grants the petition for writ
of certiorari, this order shall terminate when the Court enters its
judgment. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor,
and Justice Kagan would deny the application.
ORDERS 1125
586 U. S. January 22, 2019
No. 18A669. In re Grand Jury Subpoena. Applications for
leave to fle the application for stay, the response, and the reply
under seal presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred
to the Court, granted.
No. 18M89. Baltazar Garcia v. United States. Motion for
leave to fle petition for writ of certiorari with supplemental appendix
under seal granted.
No. 18M90. Harris v. fuller. Motion to direct the Clerk to
fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M93. In re Grand Jury Subpoena. Motion for leave
to fle petition for writ of certiorari under seal with redacted
copies for the public record granted.
No. 17–1657. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology,
LLC, nka Old Cold LLC. C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari
granted, 586 U. S. 960.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave
to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument granted.
No. 17–1705. PDR Network, LLC, et al. v. Carlton &
Harris Chiropractic, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted,
586 U. S. 996.] Motion of petitioners to dispense with printing
joint appendix granted.
No. 17–1717. American Legion et al. v. American Humanist
Assn. et al.; and
No. 18–18. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
Commission v. American Humanist Assn. et al. C. A.
4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 586 U. S. 985.] Motion of the Acting
Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as
amicus curiae and for divided argument granted. Joint motion
of petitioners for enlargement of time for oral argument and for
divided argument granted, and the time is divided as follows: 15
minutes for petitioner in No. 18–18, 10 minutes for petitioners in
No. 17–1717, 10 minutes for the Acting Solicitor General as amicus
curiae, and 35 minutes for respondents.
No. 18–6048. In re Spottsville. Motion of petitioner for
reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis
[586 U. S. 943] denied.
No. 18–6745. In re Spencer; and
1126 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 22, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6868. In re Roukis. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–6825. In re Shephard. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied. The Chief Justice and Justice
Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–280. New York State Rie & Pistol Assn., Inc.,
et al. v. City of New York, New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 45.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–6891. Wood v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–6943. Jones v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–475. Zaremba Family Farms, Inc., et al. v. Encana
Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 736 Fed. Appx. 557.
No. 18–500. First Presbyterian Church U. S. A. of
Tulsa, Oklahoma, et al. v. Doe. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017 OK 106, 421 P. 3d 284.
No. 18–506. Hassell et al. v. Yelp, Inc. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 522, 420 P. 3d 776.
No. 18–561. Berkley et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 896 F. 3d 624.
No. 18–615. Munro et al. v. Lucy Activewear Inc. et al.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 585.
No. 18–618. Gutierrez et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A.,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889
F. 3d 1230.
No. 18–628. Cooper, as Administrator of the Estate of
Cooper, Deceased v. Haq et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1127
586 U. S. January 22, 2019
No. 18–630. Richards v. City of Des Moines Police Department
et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 720 Fed. Appx. 821.
No. 18–634. El-Saba v. University of South Alabama.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed.
Appx. 640.
No. 18–646. Marquette Transportation Co., L. L. C.,
et al. v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 800.
No. 18–647. Pulte Homes of New York LLC v. Town of
Carmel, New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 291.
No. 18–655. Spitzer v. Aljoe et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 457.
No. 18–659. Masomi v. Madadi. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–660. Taggart v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A., et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed.
Appx. 127.
No. 18–662. McDonald v. City of Wichita, Kansas. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx.
529.
No. 18–665. Alvis v. Schilling. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 453.
No. 18–764. Steinmetz v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 595.
No. 18–793. Brewster v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 197.
No. 18–5694. James v. Asuncion, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 451.
No. 18–5760. Brown v. Mansukhani, Warden. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 320.
No. 18–5965. Harmon v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 879.
1128 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 22, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6062. Rubi Ibarra v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
738 Fed. Appx. 814.
No. 18–6097. Marquez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 884.
No. 18–6330. Arnaldo Rodrigues v. Davis, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 918.
No. 18–6375. Whisby v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6378. Peede v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 249 So. 3d 1181.
No. 18–6650. Duplessis-Jean, aka Duplessis, aka Jean v.
Whitaker, Acting Attorney General. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6708. Williams v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 12th App.
Dist., Butler County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-1358.
No. 18–6722. Porter v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 540 S. W. 3d 178.
No. 18–6735. Taylor v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 246 So. 3d 231.
No. 18–6740. Lasher v. Bureau of Professional and Occupational
Affairs, Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy.
Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6743. Kulick v. Leisure Village Assn., Inc. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx.
439.
No. 18–6744. Schaefer v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Criminal Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6749. Barnes v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 1148.
ORDERS 1129
586 U. S. January 22, 2019
No. 18–6762. Thomas v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6769. Middleton v. Pash, Superintendent, Crossroads
Correctional Center. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6785. Scott v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6786. Hill v. Lizarraga, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 686.
No. 18–6788. Bean v. Hamilton, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 324.
No. 18–6790. Otworth v. Trump, President of the United
States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
728 Fed. Appx. 6.
No. 18–6832. West v. Georgia. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 344 Ga. App. 274, 808 S. E. 2d 914.
No. 18–6843. Dailey v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 247 So. 3d 390.
No. 18–6880. Lenz v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6889. Booker v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 252 So. 3d 723.
No. 18–6945. Washington v. Frauenheim, Warden. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6973. Minor v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7072. Harper v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 17.
No. 18–7077. Pulham v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 937.
No. 18–7078. O’Shaughnessy v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
1130 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 22, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7079. Morillo v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 910 F. 3d 1.
No. 18–7108. Pryer v. Gardner. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 247 So. 3d 1245.
No. 18–7138. Alvarez-Moreno v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 465.
No. 18–7144. Russell v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 111.
No. 18–7156. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 752 Fed. Appx. 771.
No. 18–12. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 869 F. 3d 813.
Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas,
Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh join, respecting the
denial of certiorari.
I concur in the denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari
because denial of certiorari does not signify that the Court necessarily
agrees with the decision (much less the opinion) below. In
this case, important unresolved factual questions would make it
very diffcult if not impossible at this stage to decide the free
speech question that the petition asks us to review.
I
Petitioner Joseph Kennedy claims that he lost his job as football
coach at a public high school because he engaged in conduct that
was protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
He sought a preliminary injunction awarding two forms
of relief: (1) restoration to his job and (2) an order requiring the
school to allow him to pray silently on the 50-yard line after
each football game. The latter request appears to depend on
petitioner's entitlement to the frst—to renewed employment—
since it seems that the school would not permit members of the
general public to access the 50-yard line at the relevant time.
The key question, therefore, is whether petitioner showed that
he was likely to prevail on his claim that the termination of his
employment violated his free speech rights, and in order to answer
that question it is necessary to ascertain what he was likely
to be able to prove regarding the basis for the school's action.
ORDERS 1131
586 U. S. Statement of Alito, J.
Unfortunately, the answer to this second question is far from
clear.
On October 23, 2015, the superintendent wrote to petitioner to
explain why the district found petitioner's conduct at the thenmost
recent football game to be unacceptable. And in that letter,
the superintendent gave two quite different reasons: frst, that
petitioner, in praying on the feld after the game, neglected his
responsibility to supervise what his players were doing at that
time and, second, that petitioner's conduct would lead a reasonable
observer to think that the district was endorsing religion
because he had prayed while “on the feld, under the game lights,
in BHS-logoed attire, in front of an audience of event attendees.”
869 F. 3d 813, 819 (CA9 2017). After two subsequent games,
petitioner again kneeled on the feld and prayed, and the superintendent
then wrote to petitioner, informing him that he was being
placed on leave and was forbidden to participate in any capacity
in the school football program. The superintendent's letter reiterated
the two reasons given in his letter of October 23. And the
district elaborated on both reasons in an offcial public statement
explaining the reasons for its actions.
When the case was before the District Court, the court should
have made a specifc fnding as to what petitioner was likely to
be able to show regarding the reason or reasons for his loss of
employment. If the likely reason was simply petitioner's neglect
of his duties—if, for example, he was supposed to have been actively
supervising the players after they had left the feld but
instead left them unsupervised while he prayed on his own—his
free speech claim would likely fail. Under those circumstances,
it would not make any difference that he was praying as opposed
to engaging in some other private activity at that time. On the
other hand, his free speech claim would have far greater weight
if petitioner was likely to be able to establish either that he was
not really on duty at the time in question or that he was on duty
only in the sense that his workday had not ended and that his
prayer took place at a time when it would have been permissible
for him to engage briefy in other private conduct, say, calling
home or making a reservation for dinner at a local restaurant.
Unfortunately, the District Court's brief, informal oral decision
did not make any clear fnding about what petitioner was likely
to be able to prove. Instead, the judge's comments melded the
two distinct justifcations:
1132 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Statement of Alito, J. 586 U. S.
“He was still in charge. He was still on the job. He was
still responsible for the conduct of his students, his team. . . .
And a reasonable observer, in my judgment, would have seen
him as a coach, participating, in fact leading an orchestrated
session of faith . . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. 89.
The decision of the Ninth Circuit was even more imprecise on
this critical point. Instead of attempting to pinpoint what petitioner
was likely to be able to prove regarding the reason or
reasons for his loss of employment, the Ninth Circuit recounted
all of petitioner's prayer-related activities over the course of several
years, including conduct in which he engaged as a private
citizen, such as praying in the stands as a fan after he was suspended
from his duties.
If this case were before us as an appeal within our mandatory
jurisdiction, our clear obligation would be to vacate the decision
below with instructions that the case be remanded to the District
Court for proper application of the test for a preliminary injunction,
including a fnding on the question of the reason or reasons
for petitioner's loss of employment. But the question before us
is different. It is whether we should grant discretionary review,
and we generally do not grant such review to decide highly factspecifc
questions. Here, although petitioner's free speech claim
may ultimately implicate important constitutional issues, we cannot
reach those issues until the factual question of the likely
reason for the school district's conduct is resolved. For that reason,
review of petitioner's free speech claim is not warranted at
this time.
II
While I thus concur in the denial of the present petition, the
Ninth Circuit's understanding of the free speech rights of public
school teachers is troubling and may justify review in the future.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion applies our decision in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410 (2006), to public school teachers and
coaches in a highly tendentious way. According to the Ninth
Circuit, public school teachers and coaches may be fred if they
engage in any expression that the school does not like while they
are on duty, and the Ninth Circuit appears to regard teachers and
coaches as being on duty at all times from the moment they
report for work to the moment they depart, provided that they
are within the eyesight of students. Under this interpretation
of Garcetti, if teachers are visible to a student while eating lunch,
they can be ordered not to engage in any “demonstrative” conduct
ORDERS 1133
1130 Statement of Alito, J.
of a religious nature, such as folding their hands or bowing their
heads in prayer. And a school could also regulate what teachers
do during a period when they are not teaching by preventing
them from reading things that might be spotted by students or
saying things that might be overheard.
This Court certainly has never read Garcetti to go that far.
While Garcetti permits a public employer to regulate employee
speech that is part of the employee's job duties, we warned that
a public employer cannot convert private speech into public
speech “by creating excessively broad job descriptions.” Id., at
424. If the Ninth Circuit continues to apply its interpretation of
Garcetti in future cases involving public school teachers or
coaches, review by this Court may be appropriate.
What is perhaps most troubling about the Ninth Circuit's opinion
is language that can be understood to mean that a coach's
duty to serve as a good role model requires the coach to refrain
from any manifestation of religious faith—even when the coach is
plainly not on duty. I hope that this is not the message that the
Ninth Circuit meant to convey, but its opinion can certainly be
read that way. After emphasizing that petitioner was hired to
“communicate a positive message through the example set by his
own conduct,” the court criticized him for “his media appearances
and prayer in the BHS bleachers (while wearing BHS apparel
and surrounded by others).” 869 F. 3d, at 826. This conduct, in
the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, “signal[ed] his intent to send a
message to students and parents about appropriate behavior and
what he values as a coach.” Ibid. But when petitioner prayed
in the bleachers, he had been suspended. He was attending a
game like any other fan. The suggestion that even while off duty,
a teacher or coach cannot engage in any outward manifestation
of religious faith is remarkable.
III
While the petition now before us is based solely on the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, petitioner still has live
claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Brief in Opposition
11, n. 1. Petitioner's decision to rely primarily on his free
speech claims as opposed to these alternative claims may be due
to certain decisions of this Court.
In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v.
Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), the Court drastically cut back on the
1134 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
January 22, 30, 2019 586 U. S.
protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause, and in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977), the Court
opined that Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of religion does not require an employer to make any accommodation
that imposes more than a de minimis burden. In this case,
however, we have not been asked to revisit those decisions.
No. 18–676. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Karnoski et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Foundation
for Moral Law for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted.
Certiorari before judgment denied.
No. 18–677. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Doe et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari before judgment
denied.
No. 18–678. Trump, President of the United States,
et al. v. Stockman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari before
judgment denied.
No. 18–6882. Crain v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 246 So. 3d 206.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586
U. S. 1004, 1011 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–9054. Towbridge v. Florida, 586 U. S. 840;
No. 17–9213. Williams v. Kent, Warden, 586 U. S. 848;
No. 18–344. Shao v. McManis Faulkner, LLP, 586 U. S.
1021;
No. 18–5420. Heagy v. Pennsylvania, 586 U. S. 922;
No. 18–5548. Tuttle v. Allied Nevada Gold Corp. et al.,
586 U. S. 1000; and
No. 18–5569. Weisner v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 947. Petitions for rehearing denied.
January 30, 2019
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–6848 (18A540). Jennings v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App.
Tex. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, preORDERS
1135
586 U. S. January 30, February 1, 7, 2019
sented to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 662 S. W. 3d 379.
No. 18–7650 (18A775). Jennings v. Davis, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for stay of execution
of sentence of death, presented to Justice Alito, and by him
referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 760 Fed. Appx. 319.
February 1, 2019
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–625. City of Miami, Florida v. Smart. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1 Reported
below: 740 Fed. Appx. 952.
February 7, 2019
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18A774. June Medical Services, L. L. C., et al. v.
Gee, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals. Application for stay, presented to Justice Alito,
and by him referred to the Court, granted, and the mandate of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in case
No. 17–30397 is stayed pending the timely fling and disposition
of a petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ
of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically.
In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the stay
shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this
Court. Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch,
and Justice Kavanaugh would deny the application.
Justice Kavanaugh, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court's stay order. In this case,
the plaintiffs raised a pre-enforcement facial challenge to Louisiana's
new admitting-privileges requirement for doctors who perform
abortions. The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' facial
challenge based on that court's factual prediction that the new
law would not affect the availability of abortions from, as relevant
here, the four doctors who currently perform abortions at Louisiana's
three abortion clinics. In particular, the Fifth Circuit determined
that the four doctors likely could obtain admitting privi1136
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Kavanaugh, J., dissenting 586 U. S.
leges. The plaintiffs seek a stay of the Fifth Circuit's mandate.
They argue that the Fifth Circuit's factual prediction is inaccurate
because, according to the plaintiffs, three of those four doctors
will not be able to obtain admitting privileges. As I explain
below, even without a stay, the status quo will be effectively
preserved for all parties during the State's 45-day regulatory
transition period. I would deny the stay without prejudice to
the plaintiffs' ability to bring a later as-applied complaint and
motion for preliminary injunction at the conclusion of the 45-day
regulatory transition period if the Fifth Circuit's factual prediction
about the doctors' ability to obtain admitting privileges
proves to be inaccurate.
Louisiana's new law requires doctors who perform abortions
to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital. The question
presented to us at this time is whether the law imposes an undue
burden under our decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt,
579 U. S. 582 (2016). All parties, including the State of
Louisiana, agree that Whole Woman's Health is the governing
precedent for purposes of this stay application. I therefore will
analyze the stay application under that precedent.
Louisiana has three clinics that currently provide abortions.
As relevant here, four doctors perform abortions at those three
clinics. One of those four doctors has admitting privileges at a
nearby hospital, as required by the new law. The question is
whether the other three doctors—Doe 2, Doe 5, and Doe 6—can
obtain the necessary admitting privileges. If they can, then the
three clinics could continue providing abortions. And if so, then
the new law would not impose an undue burden for purposes of
Whole Woman's Health. By contrast, if the three doctors cannot
obtain admitting privileges, then one or two of the three clinics
would not be able to continue providing abortions. If so, then
even the State acknowledges that the new law might be deemed
to impose an undue burden for purposes of Whole Woman's
Health.
The law has not yet taken effect, so the case comes to us in
the context of a pre-enforcement facial challenge. That means
that the parties have offered, in essence, competing predictions
about whether those three doctors can obtain admitting privileges.
The District Court concluded that the three doctors likely
could not obtain admitting privileges. The District Court therefore
enjoined the law. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ORDERS 1137
1135 Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
concluded that the three doctors likely could obtain admitting
privileges. The Fifth Circuit therefore lifted the injunction.
Before us, the case largely turns on the intensely factual question
whether the three doctors—Doe 2, Doe 5, and Doe 6—can
obtain admitting privileges. If we denied the stay, that question
could be readily and quickly answered without disturbing the
status quo or causing harm to the parties or the affected women,
and without this Court's further involvement at this time. That
is because the State's regulation provides that there will be a 45-
day regulatory transition period before the new law is applied.
The State represents, moreover, that Louisiana will not “move
aggressively to enforce the challenged law” during the transition
period, Objection to Emergency Application for Stay 2, and further
represents that abortion providers will not “immediately be
forced to cease operations,” id., at 25. Louisiana's regulation together
with its express representations to this Court establish
that even without admitting privileges, these three doctors (Doe
2, Doe 5, and Doe 6) could lawfully continue to perform abortions
at the clinics during the 45-day transition period. Furthermore,
during the 45-day transition period, both the doctors and the
relevant hospitals could act expeditiously and in good faith to
reach a defnitive conclusion about whether those three doctors
can obtain admitting privileges.
If the doctors, after good-faith efforts during the 45-day period,
cannot obtain admitting privileges, then the Fifth Circuit's factual
predictions, which were made in the context of a pre-enforcement
facial challenge, could turn out to be inaccurate as applied. And
if that turns out to be the case, then even the State acknowledges
that the law as applied might be deemed to impose an undue
burden for purposes of Whole Woman's Health. In that circumstance,
the plaintiffs could fle an as-applied complaint or motion
for preliminary injunction in the District Court, and the District
Court could consider under Whole Woman's Health whether to
enter a preliminary or permanent injunction.
On the other hand, if the doctors can obtain necessary admitting
privileges during the 45-day transition period, then the doctors
could continue performing abortions at the three clinics both during
and after the 45-day transition period, as envisioned and predicted
by the Fifth Circuit. And in that circumstance, the Louisiana
law as applied would not impose an undue burden under
Whole Woman's Health.
1138 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 7, 2019 586 U. S.
In order to resolve the factual uncertainties presented in the
stay application about the three doctors' ability to obtain admitting
privileges, I would deny the stay without prejudice to the
plaintiffs' ability to bring a later as-applied complaint and motion
for preliminary injunction at the conclusion of the 45-day regulatory
transition period. The Court adopts an approach—granting
the stay and presumably then granting certiorari for plenary
review next Term of the plaintiffs' pre-enforcement facial
challenge—that will take far longer and be no more benefcial
than the approach suggested here. I respectfully dissent from
the Court's stay order.
No. 18A815. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department
of Corrections v. Ray. Application to vacate stay of execution
of sentence of death, entered by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit on February 6, 2019, presented to
Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, granted.
On November 6, 2018, the State scheduled Domineque Ray's
execution date for February 7, 2019. Because Ray waited until
January 28, 2019, to seek relief, we grant the State's application
to vacate the stay entered by the Court of Appeals. See Gomez
v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S.
653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (“A court may consider the lastminute
nature of an application to stay execution in deciding
whether to grant equitable relief ”).
Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.
Holman Correctional Facility, the Alabama prison where Domineque
Ray will be executed tonight, regularly allows a Christian
chaplain to be present in the execution chamber. But Ray is
Muslim. And the prison refused his request to have an imam
attend him in the last moments of his life. Yesterday, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that
the prison's policy violates the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause, and stayed Ray's execution so it could consider his claim
on its merits. Today, this Court reverses that decision as an
abuse of discretion and permits Mr. Ray's execution to go forward.
Given the gravity of the issue presented here, I think that decision
profoundly wrong.
“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause,” this
Court has held, “is that one religious denomination cannot be
ORDERS 1139
1138 Kagan, J., dissenting
offcially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S.
228, 244 (1982). But the State's policy does just that. Under
that policy, a Christian prisoner may have a minister of his own
faith accompany him into the execution chamber to say his last
rites. But if an inmate practices a different religion—whether
Islam, Judaism, or any other—he may not die with a minister
of his own faith by his side. That treatment goes against the
Establishment Clause's core principle of denominational neutrality.
See, e. g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968)
(“[Government] may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S.
306, 314 (1952) (“The government must be neutral when it comes
to competition between sects”).
To justify such religious discrimination, the State must show
that its policy is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. I
have no doubt that prison security is an interest of that kind.
But the State has offered no evidence to show that its wholesale
prohibition on outside spiritual advisers is necessary to achieve
that goal. Why couldn't Ray's imam receive whatever training
in execution protocol the Christian chaplain received? The State
has no answer. Why wouldn't it be suffcient for the imam to
pledge, under penalty of contempt, that he will not interfere with
the State's ability to perform the execution? The State doesn't
say. The only evidence the State has offered is a conclusory
affdavit stating that its policy “is the least restrictive means of
furthering” its interest in safety and security. Brief for Applicant,
Exh. A, p. 2. That is not enough to support a denominational
preference.
I also see no reason to reject the Eleventh Circuit's fnding
that Ray brought his claim in a timely manner. The warden
denied Ray's request to have his imam by his side on January 23,
2019. And Ray fled his complaint fve days later, on January 28.
The State contends that Ray should have known to bring his
claim earlier, when his execution date was set on November 6.
But the relevant statute would not have placed Ray on notice
that the prison would deny his request. To the contrary, that
statute provides that both the chaplain of the prison and the
inmate's spiritual adviser of choice “may be present at an execution.”
Ala. Code § 15–18–83(a) (2018). It makes no distinction
between persons who may be present within the execution chamber
and those who may enter only the viewing room. And the
1140 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 7, 15, 19, 2019 586 U. S.
prison refused to give Ray a copy of its own practices and procedures
(which would have made that distinction clear). So there
is no reason Ray should have known, prior to January 23, that
his imam would be granted less access than the Christian chaplain
to the execution chamber.
This Court is ordinarily reluctant to interfere with the substantial
discretion Courts of Appeals have to issue stays when needed.
See, e. g., Dugger v. Johnson, 485 U. S. 945, 947 (1988) (O'Connor,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). Here, Ray has put
forward a powerful claim that his religious rights will be violated
at the moment the State puts him to death. The Eleventh Circuit
wanted to hear that claim in full. Instead, this Court shortcircuits
that ordinary process—and itself rejects the claim with
little briefng and no argument—just so the State can meet its
preferred execution date. I respectfully dissent.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–7796 (18A813). Ray v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Application
for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to Justice Thomas, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied.
February 15, 2019
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–966. Department of Commerce et al. v. New York
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari before judgment granted. Case
will be set for argument in the second week of the April argument
session.
February 19, 2019
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–626. Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC,
et al. v. Wetzel. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under
this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 856.
Certiorari Granted—Reversed and Remanded. (See Moore v.
Texas, 586 U. S. 133 (2019) (per curiam).)
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–7073. Luh v. Fulton State Hospital et al. C. A.
8th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauORDERS
1141
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
peris denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process,
the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal
matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required
by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance
with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–7090. Morales v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Justice
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion
and this petition.
No. 18–7501. GwanJun Kim v. Grand Valley State University
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See
this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this
Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further
petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing
fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted
in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 17A612. Schneider v. Bank of America, N. A., et al.
Application for injunctive relief, addressed to Justice Ginsburg
and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 18A554. Harihar v. U. S. Bank N. A. et al. C. A. 1st
Cir. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief Justice and
referred to the Court, denied.
No. 18A692. Golz v. Carson, Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development. D. C. Colo. Application for stay, addressed
to The Chief Justice and referred to the Court, denied.
No. D–3014. In re Disbarment of Wertkin. Disbarment
entered. [For earlier order herein, see 584 U. S. 912.]
No. D–3028. In re Disbarment of Sacks. Disbarment entered.
[For earlier order herein, see 584 U. S. 929.]
No. D–3029. In re Disbarment of Speights. Disbarment
entered. [For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 961.]
1142 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. D–3031. In re disbarment of Roberts. Disbarment
entered. [For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 961.]
No. D–3032. In re Disbarment of Powell. Disbarment
entered. [For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 962.]
No. D–3033. In re Disbarment of Casale. Disbarment
entered. [For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 962.]
No. D–3034. In re Disbarment of Jonas. Disbarment entered.
[For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 962.]
No. D–3037. In re Disbarment of Cooper. Disbarment
entered. [For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 962.]
No. D–3038. In re Disbarment of Hicks. Disbarment entered.
[For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 962.]
No. D–3039. In re Disbarment of Marcin. Disbarment
entered. [For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 963.]
No. D–3040. In re Disbarment of Mandelbaum. Disbarment
entered. [For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 963.]
No. 18M91. Romain v. O’Connor et al. Motion to direct the
Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this
Court's Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 18M92. Smith v. United States;
No. 18M95. Morales v. United States;
No. 18M96. Golden v. Pster, Warden;
No. 18M97. Matthews v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections;
No. 18M99. Wong v. Lubetkin, Chapter 7 Trustee,
et al.; and
No. 18M102. Thompson v. Uehara. Motions to direct the
Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M94. In re Hudnall. Motion for leave to proceed as
a veteran granted.
No. 18M98. A. R. v. Florida Department of Children and
Families et al. Motion for leave to fle petition for writ of
certiorari under seal granted.
No. 18M100. RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time,
LLC; and
ORDERS 1143
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18M101. Rodriguez v. New Jersey. Motions for leave
to fle petitions for writs of certiorari with supplemental appendixes
under seal granted.
No. 17–1594. Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal
Service et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 586 U. S.
959.] Motion of Electronic Frontier Foundation for leave to fle
brief as amicus curiae granted.
No. 17–9107. Grigsby v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 803] denied.
No. 18–281. Virginia House of Delegates et al. v.
Bethune-Hill et al. D. C. E. D. Va. [Probable jurisdiction
postponed, 586 U. S. 996.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave
to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument granted in part, and the time is divided as follows: 25 minutes
for appellants, 10 minutes for the Solicitor General as amicus
curiae, 10 minutes for appellee Virginia State Board of Elections
et al., and 15 minutes for appellee Golden Bethune-Hill et al.
No. 18–431. United States v. Davis et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
[Certiorari granted, 586 U. S. 1063.] Motion of petitioner to dispense
with printing joint appendix granted.
No. 18–948. In re Grand Jury Subpoena. Motion of Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press to intervene denied.
Motion of respondent for leave to fle redacted copies of the application
for stay, response, and reply granted.
No. 18–6823. Williams v. County of Los Angeles, California,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir.;
No. 18–6857. Munt v. Schnell, Commissioner, Minnesota
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 8th Cir.;
No. 18–6907. Kulick v. Leisure Village Assn., Inc. C. A.
9th Cir.;
No. 18–7013. In re Zimmermann; and
No. 18–7241. Kerrigan v. QBE Insurance Corp. C. A. 9th
Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 12, 2019,
within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a)
and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules
of this Court.
1144 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7247. In re Bolze;
No. 18–7392. In re Rudnick;
No. 18–7461. In re Lee;
No. 18–7507. In re Carter; and
No. 18–7528. In re Doyle. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus
denied.
No. 18–7260. In re Daniels. Petition for writ of habeas corpus
denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–7526. In re Heffernan. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ
of habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–768. In re Kellogg et al.; and
No. 18–6962. In re Kostich. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–7001. In re Kennedy; and
No. 18–7205. In re Armstrong. Motions of petitioners for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petitions for writs
of mandamus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–7255. In re Barnes. Petition for writ of mandamus
and/or prohibition denied.
No. 18–7207. In re Johnston. Petition for writ of prohibition
denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–260. County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife
Fund et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question
1 presented by the petition. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 737.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1386. Wilson v. Bridges, Individually and as the
Surviving Spouse of Bridges, Deceased, et al. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed. Appx. 636.
No. 18–99. Barnes v. Gerhart et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 316.
No. 18–265. Patterson v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1145
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–295. Alimanestianu et al. v. United States. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 1374.
No. 18–306. Larrabee v. United States. C. A. Armed
Forces. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 78 M. J. 107.
No. 18–377. Montanans for Community Development v.
Mangan et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 735 Fed. Appx. 280.
No. 18–392. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 822.
No. 18–410. Yates v. United States; and
No. 18–6336. Walker v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 167 A. 3d 1191.
No. 18–423. Barrella v. Village of Freeport, New York,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714
Fed. Appx. 78.
No. 18–444. Montana v. Tipton. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 392 Mont. 59, 421 P. 3d 780.
No. 18–546. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland,
et al. v. Association for Accessible Medicines. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 664.
No. 18–560. Peaje Investments LLC v. Financial Oversight
and Management Board for Puerto Rico et al.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 1.
No. 18–580. Nu Image, Inc. v. International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 636.
No. 18–597. Lee v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 589.
No. 18–622. Whole Woman’s Health et al. v. Texas Catholic
Conference of Bishops et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 362.
No. 18–652. El Omari v. Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade
Zone Authority et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 735 Fed. Appx. 30.
1146 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–669. Gates v. Reed et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 874.
No. 18–681. Nwoke v. Consulate of Nigeria. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 478.
No. 18–686. King et al. v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed.
Appx. 47.
No. 18–687. Frett v. Territory of the Virgin Islands.
Sup. Ct. V. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 66 V. I. 399.
No. 18–691. Snelling v. Segbers et al. Ct. App. Mo.,
Eastern Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 548 S. W.
3d 372.
No. 18–692. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. et al. v. UCB,
Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 890 F. 3d 1313.
No. 18–695. Chung et al. v. Silva, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Haleck, et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 883.
No. 18–697. Carruthers v. Mays, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 273.
No. 18–700. Saunders-Gomez v. Rutledge Maintenance
Corp. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 189
A. 3d 1288.
No. 18–701. Tanksley v. Daniels et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 902 F. 3d 165.
No. 18–703. University of Southern California et al. v.
Munro et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 896 F. 3d 1088.
No. 18–705. Griffen, Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Pulaski
County, Arkansas v. Kemp, Chief Justice, Arkansas
Supreme Court, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 894 F. 3d 900.
No. 18–707. Becton v. Social Security Administration
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738
Fed. Appx. 180.
ORDERS 1147
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–712. Artrip v. Ball Corp. et al. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 708.
No. 18–713. Wright v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 963.
No. 18–718. Young v. Overly et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–720. Duhe et al. v. City of Little Rock, Arkansas,
et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
902 F. 3d 858.
No. 18–721. Bloom v. Aftermath Public Adjusters, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 902
F. 3d 516.
No. 18–723. Rodriguez v. Bank of America, N. A. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 246
So. 3d 541.
No. 18–724. City of Sandpoint, Idaho, et al. v. Maddox,
on Behalf of Minor Children D. M. et al., et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 609.
No. 18–727. Manley v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–731. Vega Duron, a Minor, et al. v. Johnson et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 F. 3d 644.
No. 18–732. Coulter v. Tatananni et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 613.
No. 18–734. Szmania v. E-Loan, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 647.
No. 18–736. Lawson et ux. v. Bell Sports USA. Super.
Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–741. Odermatt v. Way et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 694 Fed. Appx. 842.
No. 18–743. White Oak Realty, LLC, et al. v. Army Corps
of Engineers et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 746 Fed. Appx. 294.
No. 18–744. Unger v. Bergh, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 55.
1148 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–748. Wilson v. Ofce of the Commissioner of the
Revenue of Stafford County et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–749. Crossett v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–751. Metropolitan Interpreters & Translators
Inc. v. Bates et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 742 Fed. Appx. 268.
No. 18–752. Taupier v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 330 Conn. 149, 193 A. 3d 1.
No. 18–753. Couturier v. Presiding Judge, Superior
Court of California, Los Angeles County, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–754. Ramirez v. Walmart. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 ND 179, 915 N. W. 2d 674.
No. 18–757. Chuang v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App.
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–758. Ivy et al. v. Moran. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 820.
No. 18–765. Brady v. New York et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 158
App. Div. 3d 457, 67 N. Y. S. 3d 837.
No. 18–767. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. United
States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899
F. 3d 295.
No. 18–769. Minnesota Living Assistance, Inc., dba Baywood
Home Care v. Peterson et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 548.
No. 18–770. Webtrends, Inc. v. Iancu, Director, Patent
and Trademark Ofce. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 1010.
No. 18–771. Vaigasi v. Solow Management Corp. et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 750 Fed.
Appx. 37.
ORDERS 1149
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–775. Chien v. LeClairRyan et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 63.
No. 18–777. Bueno-Muela v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney
General (Reported below: 893 F. 3d 1073); and Lemus Martinez
v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney General (893 F. 3d 1067).
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–778. St. Louis Heart Center, Inc. v. Nomax, Inc.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 500.
No. 18–780. Kerr v. Marshall University Board of Governors
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 735 Fed. Appx. 827.
No. 18–787. Rhoe v. Montgomery County Ofce of Child
Support Enforcement. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 237 Md. App. 756 and 758.
No. 18–789. Hylton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721
Fed. Appx. 300.
No. 18–791. Moesch v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–794. Shea v. Winnebago County Sheriff’s Ofce
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 746
Fed. Appx. 541.
No. 18–795. Bush v. Department of Agriculture, Risk
Management Agency, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 607.
No. 18–796. Alexander v. Trump, President of the
United States, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 753 Fed. Appx. 201.
No. 18–797. Burmaster v. Herman et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 790.
No. 18–799. Davis v. Bhatt. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–804. Dry, as Administrator ad Litem for the Estate
of Dry v. Steele et al. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari
denied.
1150 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–806. Hohman et al. v. United States et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 776.
No. 18–808. Webster v. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of
Defense. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
731 Fed. Appx. 214.
No. 18–818. Thompson v. Rovella, Chief of Police, City
of Hartford, Connecticut, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 787.
No. 18–820. Weinacker v. National Loan Acquisitions Co.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed.
Appx. 390.
No. 18–823. ZUP, LLC v. Nash Manufacturing, Inc. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 1365.
No. 18–825. Shumpert, Individually and as Administrator
of the Estate of Shumpert, et al. v. City of Tupelo,
Mississippi, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 905 F. 3d 310.
No. 18–826. Shelton v. Patterson. Commw. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 175 A. 3d 442.
No. 18–828. Ghiringhelli et al. v. Assurance Group, Inc.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed.
Appx. 970.
No. 18–833. Stokes v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–839. Colon v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, 117
N. E. 3d 278.
No. 18–841. Hoffman v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 248 So. 3d 1107.
No. 18–846. Anderton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 278.
No. 18–850. Altstatt v. Fruendt, Executive Director,
Oklahoma Department of Rehabilitation Services, et al.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d
1167.
ORDERS 1151
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–851. Marshall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 139.
No. 18–856. Antonin v. Baltimore Police Department.
Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 237 Md.
App. 348, 185 A. 3d 811.
No. 18–857. Boyd v. Mississippi Department of Public
Safety et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 751 Fed. Appx. 444.
No. 18–858. McCullars v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 255.
No. 18–860. Parrish v. Board of Professional Responsibility.
Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 556
S. W. 3d 153.
No. 18–861. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d
1308.
No. 18–863. Edmond v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 446.
No. 18–864. Tatum et ux. v. Dallas Morning News, Inc.,
et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 554
S. W. 3d 614.
No. 18–872. Dolacinski et al. v. Bank of America. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252
So. 3d 1188.
No. 18–874. Houston Auto M. Imports Greenway, Ltd.,
dba Mercedes-Benz of Houston Greenway v. Zastrow
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736
Fed. Appx. 496.
No. 18–878. Stevens et al. v. CoreLogic, Inc. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 666.
No. 18–884. Jeffrey v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–888. Bent v. Strange et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 357.
1152 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–902. Poupart v. Hooper, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 53.
No. 18–903. Perry et al. v. Coles County, Illinois. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 583.
No. 18–931. Hesse v. Howell. Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6009. Myrthil v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 480.
No. 18–6011. Hamidullin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 62.
No. 18–6061. Ortiz-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6096. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6147. Nettles v. Horton, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6157. Sealed Appellee v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 707.
No. 18–6185. Beckman v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 230 So. 3d 77.
No. 18–6187. Martinez-Lopez v. United States. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 326.
No. 18–6212. Burgess v. English, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6258. Lazar v. Capozza, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Fayette, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 119.
No. 18–6269. Lloyd v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 570.
No. 18–6273. Davis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 165.
No. 18–6292. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1153
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–6374. Welsh v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 879 F. 3d 530.
No. 18–6385. Beeman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 871 F. 3d 1215.
No. 18–6409. Morrow v. Ford, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 1138.
No. 18–6563. Gonzalez-Negron v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 485.
No. 18–6588. Warren v. Thomas, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 609.
No. 18–6608. O’Neil v. Warden, Federal Correctional
Complex Coleman. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6679. Graham v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 152413,
109 N. E. 3d 281.
No. 18–6716. Walker, aka Richmond v. United States.
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6741. Mamou v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742
Fed. Appx. 820.
No. 18–6766. Gulbrandson v. Ryan, Director, Arizona
Department of Corrections. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6773. Knox v. Plowden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 263.
No. 18–6776. Owen v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 247 So. 3d 394.
No. 18–6779. Hefngton v. Puleo et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 753 Fed. Appx. 572.
No. 18–6794. Bradshaw v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736
Fed. Appx. 457.
1154 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6796. Muckle v. Wells Fargo Bank et al. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6799. Nash v. Wachovia Bank et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6802. Kitlas v. Haws, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 158.
No. 18–6803. McNeil v. Grim et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 33.
No. 18–6805. Rodriguez v. Paramo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6815. Ibenyenwa v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6835. Sanchez v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
735 Fed. Appx. 172.
No. 18–6836. Rivas v. Spearman, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 163.
No. 18–6837. Swinton v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6840. Rosky v. Baker, Warden, et al. Ct. App.
Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 1004.
No. 18–6849. James v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6850. Esparza v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6866. Sperber v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 177 A. 3d 212.
No. 18–6876. Joshlin v. Neven, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 477.
No. 18–6877. Shere v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1155
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–6878. Daley v. Maryland et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 172.
No. 18–6881. Alston v. Mississippi Department of Employment
Security. Ct. App. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 247 So. 3d 303.
No. 18–6883. Caterbone v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6884. Tryon v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 OK CR 20, 423 P. 3d
617.
No. 18–6885. Marquez v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6886. Johnson v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 733 Fed. Appx. 107.
No. 18–6887. Wilson v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 737 Fed. Appx. 286.
No. 18–6888. Clay v. Papik. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 709.
No. 18–6899. Uranga v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
893 F. 3d 282.
No. 18–6902. Manseld v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 248 So. 3d 59.
No. 18–6903. McLaurin v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 160
App. Div. 3d 1438, 76 N. Y. S. 3d 691.
No. 18–6909. Lucero v. Holland, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 902 F. 3d 979.
No. 18–6921. Stevenson v. Richman, Judge, Superior
Court of California, Los Angeles County, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
1156 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6925. Tarver v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 249 So. 3d 641.
No. 18–6928. Johnson v. Wylie et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 31.
No. 18–6929. Johnson v. Queen Elizabeth. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 28.
No. 18–6930. Johnson v. Rothschild. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 87.
No. 18–6931. Johnson v. Rothschild. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 52.
No. 18–6932. Johnson v. German Aerospace Center.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed.
Appx. 182.
No. 18–6933. Johnson v. Ofce of Children, Youth and
Families. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
740 Fed. Appx. 17.
No. 18–6938. Phillips v. Washburn, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6940. Andrews v. Montgomery, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 697.
No. 18–6942. Zapata v. PECO Energy Co. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 216.
No. 18–6944. Vizcaino-Ramos v. Lindamood, Warden.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6946. Trevino v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6947. Gillard v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 171121–U.
No. 18–6950. McBride v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6953. Jaime Jimenez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1157
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–6954. Wells v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6956. Walton v. Florida et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 246 So. 3d 246.
No. 18–6957. Sultaana v. Harris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6958. Velayo v. Talamayan et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 614.
No. 18–6959. Kingham v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6960. Mack v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6965. Lei Yin v. Biogen, Inc., fka Biogen-IDEC.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6966. Wagoner v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6968. Quinones Leyva v. United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 139.
No. 18–6975. Van Nortrick v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 51,604 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1/10/18), 244 So. 3d 810.
No. 18–6976. Ewalan v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 3 Wash. App. 2d 1041.
No. 18–6977. Mitchell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6978. Mascarena v. Montana. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 392 Mont. 553, 416 P. 3d 180.
No. 18–6987. Sanders v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
1158 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6988. Sanders v. Uribe, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 527.
No. 18–6991. Rambo v. Kansas. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 246.
No. 18–6997. T. H. -H. v. Allegheny County Ofce of
Children, Youth and Families, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 648 Pa. 236, 192 A. 3d 1080.
No. 18–6998. Cleveland v. South Carolina. Ct. App. S. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6999. McQueen v. Fisher. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7003. Ramirez v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7006. Reid v. Warden et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7008. White v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7011. Myzer v. Bush et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 644.
No. 18–7014. Collins v. Epstein et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 145.
No. 18–7015. West v. Spencer, Secretary of the Navy.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7016. Washington v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7017. Black v. Lindsay. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 189 A. 3d 712.
No. 18–7018. Santos LaGaite v. Foley et al. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7019. Jones v. Byrne, Warden. Ct. App. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 965.
ORDERS 1159
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–7024. Villafana v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7025. Burt v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7027. Kuri v. Addictive Behavioral Change
Health Group et al. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 55 Kan. App. 2d xiii, 408 P. 3d 1003.
No. 18–7030. S. R. v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Resources et al. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7031. Lewis v. Quiros et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7034. Sadik v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 181 A. 3d 1255.
No. 18–7040. Perry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 337.
No. 18–7041. Donaldson v. Michigan Department of
Health and Human Services et al. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7042. Wartereld v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7043. Tuton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 562.
No. 18–7045. Gilkers v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 336.
No. 18–7046. Castillo v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 610.
No. 18–7047. Casanova v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7049. Munt v. Larson et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 108.
No. 18–7051. Taylor v. CVS Caremark Corp. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 704.
1160 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7052. Wilkerson v. Woods. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7053. Varner v. Christiansen, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7054. White v. Matthews et al. Sup. Ct. Mich.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 Mich. 863, 917 N. W.
2d 59.
No. 18–7055. White v. Southeast Michigan Surgical Hospital
et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 503 Mich. 862, 917 N. W. 2d 67.
No. 18–7056. Johnson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7057. Royston v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7058. Joaquin Ramirez v. City of New York, New
York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7059. Rosky v. Byrne, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7062. Clements v. Florida Department of Corrections
et al. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 255 So. 3d 818.
No. 18–7064. Mackenzie v. Jones, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7068. Figueroa v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7069. Ludovici v. Marsh, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Benner Township, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7070. Jackson v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7071. Brewer v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 509.
No. 18–7075. Martinez v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1161
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–7080. Danmola v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 514.
No. 18–7081. Williams v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7082. Rosas Cuellar v. United States (Reported
below: 738 Fed. Appx. 320); and Larios-Villatoro v. United
States (741 Fed. Appx. 269). C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7083. Walter-Eze, aka Okam v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 869 F. 3d 891.
No. 18–7084. Young v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 754 Fed. Appx. 331.
No. 18–7085. McGhee v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7087. Lopez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 752 Fed. Appx. 614.
No. 18–7088. Mora v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 271.
No. 18–7089. Milliner v. Litteral, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7092. Cain v. Atelier Esthetique Institute of
Esthetics, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 733 Fed. Appx. 8.
No. 18–7093. Clark v. Allen & Overy, LLP. App. Div.,
Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 159 App. Div. 3d 478, 73 N. Y. S. 3d 144.
No. 18–7095. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 277.
No. 18–7100. Simmons v. Capra, Superintendent, Sing
Sing Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7101. Ghobrial v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 250, 420 P. 3d 179.
No. 18–7102. Huling v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 702.
1162 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7103. Garcia-Montejo v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 94.
No. 18–7104. Irizarry-Rosario v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 903 F. 3d 151.
No. 18–7106. Plascencia-Orozco v. United States. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7107. Odums v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 175.
No. 18–7109. Miller v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 7th App. Dist.,
Mahoning County. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018-
Ohio-3430, 118 N. E. 3d 1094.
No. 18–7111. Guerra v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7114. Williams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7116. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 1325.
No. 18–7117. Mayberry v. Dittman, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 525.
No. 18–7119. Grigsby v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7120. Zuniga Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7121. Higgs, aka Beachum v. New Jersey. Super.
Ct. N. J., App. Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7122. Gola v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 602.
No. 18–7124. Hernandez v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 6th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7125. Abul Hosn v. Department of State et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7126. Abdullah v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 905 F. 3d 739.
ORDERS 1163
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–7127. French v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 836.
No. 18–7128. Bebo v. Medeiros, Superintendent, Massachusetts
Correctional Institution at Norfolk. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 129.
No. 18–7129. Christian v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 165.
No. 18–7131. Lott v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7133. Burks v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 191.
No. 18–7134. Lowe v. Tennessee. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 552 S. W. 3d 842.
No. 18–7141. Rey Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 224.
No. 18–7142. Talley v. Pride Mobility Products Corp.
et al. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 259
N. C. App. 734, 816 S. E. 2d 533.
No. 18–7143. Eidson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 453.
No. 18–7145. Sadowski v. Grounds, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 311.
No. 18–7147. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 943.
No. 18–7150. Hostetler v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7153. J. E., aka J. E. C. v. Oregon Department of
Human Services. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 285 Ore. App. 652, 402 P. 3d 783.
No. 18–7154. Visconti v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 543.
No. 18–7158. Knox v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
1164 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7161. Martin v. Whitaker, Acting Attorney General.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729
Fed. Appx. 210.
No. 18–7162. Jama v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 295.
No. 18–7163. Mayeld et al. v. Harvey County Sheriff’s
Department et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 732 Fed. Appx. 685.
No. 18–7167. Kirsh v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017–0231 (La. App. 1 Cir.
11/1/17), 234 So. 3d 941.
No. 18–7169. Wright v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 902 F. 3d 868.
No. 18–7176. Garcia-Ortiz v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 102.
No. 18–7177. Gonzales v. Santoro, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 468.
No. 18–7178. Tran v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7180. Urquia-Melendez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 280.
No. 18–7181. White v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 255.
No. 18–7183. Martin v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 446.
No. 18–7184. Chambers, aka Sealed Defendant v. United
States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 751
Fed. Appx. 44.
No. 18–7185. Diaz-Martinez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 830.
No. 18–7186. Weidner v. Taylor, Superintendent, Eastern
Oregon Correctional Institution. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 782.
No. 18–7189. Manlove v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 755 Fed. Appx. 630.
ORDERS 1165
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–7191. Pendergraft et al. v. Network of Neighbors,
Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
745 Fed. Appx. 517.
No. 18–7192. Phillips v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 754 Fed. Appx. 891.
No. 18–7193. Collins v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 743 Fed. Appx. 21.
No. 18–7194. Colbert v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7195. Gomez v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 150605, 105
N. E. 3d 901.
No. 18–7196. McElroy v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 612.
No. 18–7197. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 247.
No. 18–7198. Cruz v. Hallenbeck, Superintendent, Hale
Creek Correctional Facility. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7199. Fauntleroy v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7200. Riley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 175.
No. 18–7206. Kegler v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 572.
No. 18–7209. Oberacker v. Noble, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7210. Prailow v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 237 Md. App. 757.
No. 18–7212. Dailey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7214. McLaughlin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 270.
1166 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7215. Uces v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 745 Fed. Appx. 115.
No. 18–7216. Duhamel v. Miller, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7222. Jiau v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7227. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 771.
No. 18–7228. Brown v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 959.
No. 18–7229. Blackman v. Davis, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 909 F. 3d 772.
No. 18–7230. Ashley v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7231. Avery v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 482.
No. 18–7236. Stoutamire v. La Rose, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7238. Edwards v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 526.
No. 18–7239. Cannon v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7240. King v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 323.
No. 18–7243. Rojas-Cisneros v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7245. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 638.
No. 18–7249. Doe v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 987 F. 3d 1216.
ORDERS 1167
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–7251. Jordan v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 742 Fed. Appx. 514.
No. 18–7253. Forte v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 207.
No. 18–7254. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 120.
No. 18–7256. De Castro v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 905 F. 3d 676.
No. 18–7263. Patmon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 902.
No. 18–7267. Greene v. Semple, Commissioner, Connecticut
Department of Correction. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 330 Conn. 1, 190 A. 3d 851.
No. 18–7268. Berry v. McGinley, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Coal Township, et al. C. A.
3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7269. Allison v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7270. Bryant v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 143578–U.
No. 18–7272. Pablo Arreola v. United States. C. A. 2d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 48.
No. 18–7274. Spears, aka Aziz v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7275. Powers v. Block et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 480.
No. 18–7278. Williams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 6. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7282. Bradley v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 779.
No. 18–7284. Barlow v. Garman, Superintendent, State
Correctional Institution at Rockview, et al. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
1168 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7287. LaPrade v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 592.
No. 18–7289. Bommerito v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7292. Whitley v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7293. Walker v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 286 So. 3d 18.
No. 18–7294. Antonio Zambrano v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 752 Fed. Appx.
775.
No. 18–7296. Cisneros v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 555.
No. 18–7297. Howard v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7300. Millis v. Kallis, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7303. Rivera v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 896.
No. 18–7304. Rodriguez-Mantos v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 591.
No. 18–7305. Hilts v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 757 Fed. Appx. 56.
No. 18–7306. Steele v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7307. Rayo-Espinoza v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 295.
No. 18–7308. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 638.
No. 18–7309. Balfour v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7310. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1169
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–7313. Templeton v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 685.
No. 18–7317. Davis v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 125.
No. 18–7320. Ford v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 785.
No. 18–7323. Willis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7325. Zinkand v. Hernandez, Superintendent,
Avery-Mitchell Correctional Institution, et al. C. A.
4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 128.
No. 18–7327. Johnson v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7329. Selfa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 856.
No. 18–7330. Garrett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 F. 3d 811.
No. 18–7333. Moffett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7340. Dillon v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 310.
No. 18–7341. Burton v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 361.
No. 18–7344. Dickinson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7345. Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7348. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 868.
No. 18–7350. Flores-Botello v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 674 Fed. Appx. 409.
No. 18–7351. Geddes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
1170 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7352. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 598.
No. 18–7355. Haynes v. Oregon Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7356. Gossett v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 705 Fed. Appx. 337.
No. 18–7357. Ford v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7360. Mathis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7361. Gibbons v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7365. DeVore v. Kelly, Superintendent, Oregon
State Penitentiary. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7367. Huggans v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7371. Johnson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7372. Cuevas v. Kelly, Superintendent, Oregon
State Prison. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7374. Mejia v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 307.
No. 18–7375. Nicolaison v. County of Hennepin, Minnesota.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7377. Harris v. Easterling, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7387. Lenihan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7388. Romo v. Ormond, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7390. Stancik v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1171
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–7391. Romero v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 196.
No. 18–7393. Roman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 304.
No. 18–7400. Sleugh v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 1007.
No. 18–7417. Robinson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 152703–U.
No. 18–7418. Seals v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 231.
No. 18–7419. Becerra v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 213.
No. 18–7420. Alires v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 510.
No. 18–7424. Vail v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2017–354 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/28/
17), 236 So. 3d 644.
No. 18–7434. Graham v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7463. Koyle v. Sand Canyon Corp. et al. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx.
549.
No. 18–7466. Bennett v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7467. LaPointe v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, 127
N. E. 3d 131.
No. 18–7469. Valenzuela Arzate v. Robertson, Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7484. Naphaeng v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 173.
No. 18–7496. Allan v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 329 Conn. 815, 190 A. 3d 874.
1172 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7506. Turner v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 1084.
No. 18–7512. Jackson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 150487,
105 N. E. 3d 996.
No. 18–7515. Newton v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL 122958, 120 N. E. 3d 948.
No. 18–7518. Holt v. Terris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7555. Gray v. Dorethy, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–1542. McKee v. Cosby. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 874 F. 3d 54.
Justice Thomas, concurring.
In December 2014, petitioner Kathrine McKee publicly accused
actor and comedian Bill Cosby of forcibly raping her some 40
years earlier. McKee contends that Cosby's attorney responded
on his behalf by writing and leaking a defamatory letter. According
to McKee, the letter deliberately distorts her personal background
to “damage her reputation for truthfulness and honesty,
and further to embarrass, harass, humiliate, intimidate, and
shame” her. App. to Pet. for Cert. 93a. She alleges that excerpts
of the letter were disseminated via the Internet and published
by news outlets around the world.
McKee fled suit in federal court for defamation under state
law, but her case was dismissed. Applying New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), and its progeny, the Court of
Appeals concluded that, by disclosing her accusation to a reporter,
McKee had “ `thrust' herself to the `forefront' ” of the public controversy
over “sexual assault allegations implicating Cosby” and
was therefore a “limited purpose public fgure.” 874 F. 3d 54,
61–62 (CA1 2017) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323,
345 (1974)). Under this Court's First Amendment precedents,
public fgures are barred from recovering damages for defamation
unless they can show that the statement at issue was made with
“ `actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York
Times, supra, at 280. Like many plaintiffs subject to this “alORDERS
1173
1172 Thomas, J., concurring
most impossible” standard, McKee was unable to make that showing.
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U. S. 749, 771 (1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment).
McKee asks us to review her classifcation as a limited-purpose
public fgure. I agree with the Court's decision not to take up
that factbound question. I write to explain why, in an appropriate
case, we should reconsider the precedents that require
courts to ask it in the frst place.
New York Times and the Court's decisions extending it were
policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law. Instead
of simply applying the First Amendment as it was understood
by the people who ratifed it, the Court fashioned its own
“ `federal rule[s]' ” by balancing the “competing values at stake in
defamation suits.” Gertz, supra, at 334, 348 (quoting New York
Times, supra, at 279).
We should not continue to refexively apply this policy-driven
approach to the Constitution. Instead, we should carefully examine
the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
If the Constitution does not require public fgures to satisfy
an actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits, then
neither should we.
I
From the founding of the Nation until 1964, the law of defamation
was “almost exclusively the business of state courts and
legislatures.” Gertz, supra, at 369–370 (White, J., dissenting).
But beginning with New York Times, the Court “federalized
major aspects of libel law by declaring unconstitutional in important
respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the
50 States.” Gertz, supra, at 370. These decisions made little
effort to ground their holdings in the original meaning of the
Constitution.
A
New York Times involved a full-page advertisement soliciting
support for the civil-rights movement and the legal defense of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. 376 U. S., at 256–257. The advertisement
asserted that the movement was facing an “ `unprecedented
wave of terror by those who would deny and negate' ” the protections
of the Constitution. Id., at 256. As an example, the advertisement
claimed that “ `truckloads of police' ” in Montgomery,
Alabama, “ `armed with shotguns and tear-gas,' ” had surrounded
1174 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Thomas, J., concurring 586 U. S.
a college campus following a student demonstration. Id., at 257.
It further claimed that “ `[w]hen the entire student body protested
to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall
was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.' ”
Ibid. The advertisement also stated that “ `the Southern violators'
” had “ `answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation
and violence,' ” “ `bombed his home almost killing his wife
and child, ' ” “ `assaulted his person, ' ” “ `arrested him seven
times,' ” and “ `charged him with “perjury.” ' ” Id., at 257–258.
The Times made no independent effort to confrm the truth of
these claims, and they contained numerous inaccuracies. Id., at
261.1 The Times eventually retracted the advertisement. Ibid.
L. B. Sullivan served as Montgomery's commissioner of public
affairs when the advertisement was published. Id., at 256. Although
none of the “Southern violators” was identifed in the
advertisement, Sullivan fled a libel suit alleging that the statements
implicating Montgomery police offcers were made “ `of
and concerning' ” him because his responsibilities included supervising
the police department. Id., at 256, 262. A jury awarded
Sullivan $500,000, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affrmed.
Id., at 256.
This Court reversed. Id., at 264. It held that the evidence in
the record was “incapable of supporting the jury's fnding” that
the false statements were made about Sullivan, who was not mentioned
“by name or offcial position” in the advertisement. Id.,
at 288. The advertisement was an “impersonal attack on governmental
operations” and could not by “legal alchemy” be transformed
into “a libel of an offcial responsible for those operations.”
Id., at 292. This holding was suffcient to resolve the case.
But the Court also addressed “the extent to which the constitutional
protections for speech and press limit a State's power to
award damages in a libel action brought by a public offcial against
critics of his offcial conduct.” Id., at 256. The Court took it
upon itself “to defne the proper accommodation between” two
1 For example, the police did not “at any time” surround the campus when
deployed near it; the dining hall “was not padlocked on any occasion”; the
student protesters had not “refus[ed] to register” but rather “boycott[ed]
classes on a single day”; “Dr. King had not been arrested seven times, but
only four”; and the police “were not only not implicated in the bombings,
but had made every effort to apprehend those who were. ” New York
Times, 376 U. S., at 259.
ORDERS 1175
1172 Thomas, J., concurring
competing interests—“the law of defamation and the freedoms of
speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” Gertz,
supra, at 325 (majority opinion). It consulted a variety of materials
to assist it in its analysis: “general proposition[s]” about the
value of free speech and the inevitability of false statements, New
York Times, 376 U. S., at 269–272, and n. 13; judicial decisions
involving criminal contempt and offcial immunity, id., at 272–273,
282–283; public responses to the Sedition Act of 1798, id., at 273–
277; comparisons of civil libel damages to criminal fnes, id., at
277–278; policy arguments against “self-censorship,” id., at 278–
279; the “consensus of scholarly opinion,” id., at 280, n. 20; and
state defamation laws, id., at 280–282. These materials led the
Court to promulgate a “federal rule” that “prohibits a public offcial
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his offcial conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with `actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”
Id., at 279–280. Although the Court held that its newly minted
actual-malice rule was “required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments,” id., at 283, it made no attempt to base that rule
on the original understanding of those provisions.
B
New York Times was “the frst major step in what proved to
be a seemingly irreversible process of constitutionalizing the entire
law of libel and slander.” Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U. S., at
766 (White, J., concurring in judgment). The Court promptly
expanded the actual-malice rule to all defamed “ `public fgures,' ”
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 134 (1967), which it
defned to include private persons who “thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to infuence
the resolution of the issues involved,” Gertz, 418 U. S., at 345.
The Court also extended the actual-malice rule to criminal libel
prosecutions, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964), and even
restricted the situations in which private fgures could recover
for defamation against media defendants, Gertz, supra, at 347,
349; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U. S. 767 (1986).
None of these decisions made a sustained effort to ground their
holdings in the Constitution's original meaning. As the Court
itself acknowledged, “the rule enunciated in the New York Times
case” is “largely a judge-made rule of law,” the “content” of which
1176 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Thomas, J., concurring 586 U. S.
is “given meaning through the evolutionary process of commonlaw
adjudication.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 501–502 (1984). Only Justice White
grappled with the historical record, and he concluded that “there
are wholly insuffcient grounds for scuttling the libel laws of the
States in such wholesale fashion, to say nothing of deprecating
the reputation interest of ordinary citizens and rendering them
powerless to protect themselves.” Gertz, supra, at 370 (dissenting
opinion).
II
The constitutional libel rules adopted by this Court in New
York Times and its progeny broke sharply from the common law
of libel, and there are sound reasons to question whether the First
and Fourteenth Amendments displaced this body of common law.
A
The common law of libel at the time the First and Fourteenth
Amendments were ratifed did not require public fgures to satisfy
any kind of heightened liability standard as a condition of recovering
damages. Typically, a defamed individual needed only to
prove “a false written publication that subjected him to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule.” Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 765 (White,
J., concurring in judgment); see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
*150 (Blackstone); H. Folkard, Starkie on Slander and Libel *156
(4th Eng. ed., H. Wood ed. 1877) (Starkie). Malice was presumed
in the absence of an applicable privilege, right, or duty. Id., at
*293–*294. General injury to reputation was also presumed, special
damages could be recovered, and punitive damages were
available if actual malice was established. Dun & Bradstreet,
supra, at 765 (White, J., concurring in judgment); see Starkie
*151, *322–*323; M. Newell, Defamation, Libel and Slander 842–
843 (1890) (Newell). Truth was a defense to a civil libel claim.
See Starkie *170, *528–*530; 4 Blackstone *150–*151. But where
the publication was false, even if the defendant could show that
no reputational injury occurred, the prevailing rule was that at
least nominal damages were to be awarded. Dun & Bradstreet,
supra, at 765 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Restatement
of Torts § 569, Comment b, p. 166 (1938)); see Starkie *492;
Newell 839.
Libel was also a “common-law crime, and thus criminal in the
colonies.” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 254 (1952);
ORDERS 1177
1172 Thomas, J., concurring
see 4 Blackstone *150–*153. The same principles generally
applied, except that truth traditionally was not a defense to libel
prosecutions—the crime was intended to punish provocations to
a breach of the peace, not the falsity of the statement. See id.,
at *150–*151; Starkie *712–*713. Laws authorizing the criminal
prosecution of libel were both widespread and well established at
the time of the founding. See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S.
476, 482, and n. 11 (1957); Newell 28–29 (describing colonial statutes
dating back to 1645 and 1701). And they remained so when
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, although many States
by then allowed truth or good motives to serve as a defense to a
libel prosecution. Beauharnais, supra, at 254–255, and n. 4.
Far from increasing a public fgure's burden in a defamation
action, the common law deemed libels against public fgures to
be, if anything, more serious and injurious than ordinary libels.
See 3 Blackstone *124 (“Words also tending to scandalize a magistrate,
or person in a public trust, are reputed more highly injurious
than when spoken of a private man”); 4 id., at *150 (defning
libels as “malicious defamations of any person, and especially a
magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures,
in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public
hatred, contempt, and ridicule” (emphasis added)). Libel of a
public offcial was deemed an offense “ `most dangerous to the
people, and deserv[ing of] punishment, because the people may
be deceived and reject the best citizens to their great injury, and
it may be to the loss of their liberties.' ” Newell 533 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 169–170 (1808)); accord,
White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266, 290 (1845).2
2 In England, “[w]ords spoken in derogation of a peer, a judge, or other
great offcer of the realm” were called scandalum magnatum and were
“held to be still more heinous”; such words could support a claim that
“would not be actionable in the case of a common person.” 3 Blackstone
*123 (emphasis added); Starkie *142–*143. This action, recognized by English
statutes dating back to 1275, had fallen into disuse by the 19th century
and was not employed in the United States. See id., at *142, n. 1 (“In this
country, no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice, a person
holding a high offce is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fy
his poisonous words”). Nevertheless, the action of scandalum magnatum
confrms that the law of defamation historically did not impose a heightened
burden on public fgures as plaintiffs.
1178 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Thomas, J., concurring 586 U. S.
The common law did afford defendants a privilege to comment
on public questions and matters of public interest. Starkie *237–
*238. This privilege extended to the “public conduct of a public
man,” which was a “matter of public interest” that could “be
discussed with the fullest freedom” and “made the subject of
hostile criticism.” Id., at *242. Under this privilege, “criticism
may reasonably be applied to a public man in a public capacity
which might not be applied to a private individual.” Ibid. And
the privilege extended to the man's character “ `so far as it may
respect his ftness and qualifcations for the offce,' ” which was
in the interest of the people to know. White, supra, at 290 (quoting
Clap, supra, at 169).
But the purposes underlying this privilege also defned its limits.
Thus, the privilege applied only when the facts stated were
true. Starkie *238, n. 4; White, supra, at 290. And the privilege
did not afford the publisher an opportunity to defame the offcer's
private character. Starkie *238; see id., at *242 (“The question
for the jury is, whether the writer has transgressed the bounds
within which comments upon the character of a public man ought
to be confned . . . ”); ibid. (distinguishing between criticism of
public conduct and the “imputation of motives by which that conduct
may be supposed to be actuated”). “One may in good faith
publish the truth concerning a public offcer, but if he states that
which is false and aspersive, he is liable therefor however good
his motives may be; and the same is true whether the party
defamed be an offcer or a candidate for an offce, elective or
appointive.” Newell 533 (footnote omitted).
B
These common-law protections for the “core private righ[t]” of
a person's “ `uninterrupted enjoyment of . . . his reputation' ”
formed the backdrop against which the First and Fourteenth
Amendments were ratifed. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political
Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 567 (2007) (quoting 1 Blackstone
*129). Before our decision in New York Times, we consistently
recognized that the First Amendment did not displace the common
law of libel. As Justice Story explained:
“The liberty of speech, or of the press, has nothing to do with
this subject. They are not endangered by the punishment of
libellous publications. The liberty of speech and the liberty
of the press do not authorize malicious and injurious defamaORDERS
1179
1172 Thomas, J., concurring
tion.” Dexter v. Spear, 7 F. Cas. 624 (No. 3,867) (CC RI
1825).
The Court consistently listed libel among the “well-defned and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571–572
(1942); see, e. g., Beauharnais, supra, at 254–256, and nn. 4–5, 266
(libelous utterances are “not . . . within the area of constitutionally
protected speech”); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S.
697, 715 (1931) (“[T]he common law rules that subject the libeler
to responsibility for the public offense, as well as for the private
injury, are not abolished by the protection extended in our
constitutions”).
New York Times marked a fundamental change in the relationship
between the First Amendment and state libel law. Although
the Court did not repudiate its earlier statements that libel is
constitutionally unprotected, it nevertheless was unable to “accept
the generality of this historic view.” Gertz, 418 U. S., at 386
(White, J., dissenting). The Court instead observed that it had
never upheld the use of libel law “to impose sanctions upon expression
critical of the offcial conduct of public offcials.” New
York Times, 376 U. S., at 268. In the Court's view, it was “writing
upon a clean slate,” id., at 299 (Goldberg, J., concurring in
result), and thus free to work a “substantial abridgement” of the
common law of libel based on its balancing of competing interests,
Gertz, supra, at 343 (majority opinion).
C
There are sound reasons to question whether either the First
or Fourteenth Amendment, as originally understood, encompasses
an actual-malice standard for public fgures or otherwise displaces
vast swaths of state defamation law.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” See
Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939)
(applying these protections against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment).3 Justice White's dissenting opinion in Gertz
3 By its terms, the First Amendment addresses only “law[s]” “ma[d]e” by
“Congress.” For present purposes, I set aside the question whether the
speech and press rights incorporated against the States restrict common-law
rights of action that are not codifed by state legislatures.
1180 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Thomas, J., concurring 586 U. S.
provides a helpful starting point in interpreting these terms.
Justice White had joined the majority opinion in New York Times.
But after canvassing historical practice under similar state constitutions,
treatises, scholarly commentary, the ratifcation debates,
and our precedent, he concluded that “[s]cant, if any, evidence
exists that the First Amendment was intended to abolish the
common law of libel, at least to the extent of depriving ordinary
citizens of meaningful redress against their defamers.” Gertz,
418 U. S., at 381; see id., at 380–388. Justice White later expressed
“doubts about the soundness of the Court's approach” in New
York Times “and about some of the assumptions underlying it.”
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U. S., at 767 (concluding that the Court
“struck an improvident balance in the New York Times case”).
Historical practice further suggests that protections for free
speech and a free press—whether embodied in state constitutions,
the First Amendment, or the Fourteenth Amendment—did not
abrogate the common law of libel. See generally Chase, Criticism
of Public Offcers and Candidates for Offce, 23 Am. L. Rev. 346
(1889) (surveying American defamation decisions). Public offcers
and public fgures continued to be able to bring civil libel suits for
unprivileged statements without showing proof of actual malice
as a condition for liability. See, e. g., Root v. King, 7 Cow. 613, 628
(N. Y. 1827) (lieutenant governor); White, 3 How., at 291 (customs
collector); Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116, 126 (1880) (assistant
health inspector) (citing Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1 (N. Y. 1809)
(Governor)); Royce v. Maloney, 58 Vt. 437, 447–448, 5 A. 395, 400
(1886) (chief judge and chancellor); Wheaton v. Beecher, 66 Mich.
307, 309–310, 33 N. W. 503, 505–506 (1887) (candidate for city
comptroller); Prosser v. Callis, 117 Ind. 105, 108–109, 19 N. E.
735, 737 (1889) (county auditor). The States continued to criminalize
libel, including of public fgures. E. g., People v. Croswell,
3 Johns. Cas. 337, 377–378, 393–394 (N. Y. 1804) (opinion of Kent,
J.), and id., at 403–404, 410 (opinion of Lewis, J.) (President Jefferson);
Clap, 4 Mass., at 169–170 (auctioneer); see also Commonwealth
v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 311–314 (1825) (elaborating on
legal standard); Beauharnais, 343 U. S., at 254–255 (noting that
many States in the frst decades after the founding began to allow
truth or good motives to serve as a defense, but “nowhere was
there any suggestion that the crime of libel be abolished”). As
of 1952, “every American jurisdiction . . . punish[ed] libels directed
ORDERS 1181
1172 Thomas, J., concurring
at individuals.” Id., at 255, and n. 5. And “Congresses, during
the period while [the Fourteenth] Amendment was being considered
or was but freshly adopted, approved Constitutions of `Reconstructed'
States that expressly mentioned state libel laws, and
also approved similar Constitutions for States erected out of the
federal domain.” Id., at 293–294, and nn. 7–8 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Criticism of the public actions of public fgures remained
privileged, allowing latitude for public discourse and disagreement
on matters of public concern.
As against this body of historical evidence, New York Times
pointed only to opposition surrounding the Sedition Act of 1798,
which prohibited “any false, scandalous and malicious writing”
against “the government of the United States, or either house of
the Congress . . . , or the President.” § 2, 1 Stat. 596; see New
York Times, 376 U. S., at 273–277. Most prominently, the opinion
discusses a report written by James Madison in support of the
Virginia Resolutions of 1798, which protested the Act. Id., at
274–275. The opinion highlights Madison's view that the press
in every State had “ `exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits
and measures of public men, of every description, which has
not been confned to the strict limits of the common law.' ” Id.,
at 275 (quoting 4 Debates on the Constitution 570 (J. Elliot ed.
1876) (Elliot's Debates)). It also emphasizes Madison's point that
“ `[s]ome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of
the press.' ” 376 U. S., at 271 (quoting 4 Elliot's Debates 571).
After discussing other opposition to the Act, the Court concluded
that “the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court
of history.” 376 U. S., at 276; see id., at 273–277.
The Court gleaned from this evidence a “broad consensus” that
the First Amendment protects “criticism of government and public
offcials.” Id., at 276. And the Court further inferred that
because the Act allowed truth to be offered as a defense and
applied to defamatory statements, a libel law prohibiting only
false defamation could still fail First Amendment scrutiny. Id.,
at 273–274. But constitutional opposition to the Sedition Act—
a federal law directly criminalizing criticism of the Government—
does not necessarily support a constitutional actual-malice rule in
all civil libel actions brought by public fgures. Madison did not
contend that the Constitution abrogated the common law applica1182
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
ble to these private actions. Instead, he seemed to contemplate
that “those who administer [the Federal Government]” retain “a
remedy, for their injured reputations, under the same laws, and
in the same tribunals, which protect their lives, their liberties,
and their properties.” 4 Elliot's Debates 573. Moreover, a central
assumption of Madison's view was the historical absence of a
national common law “pervading and operating through” each Colony
“as one society.” Id., at 561. Yet the Court elevated just
such a rule to constitutional status in New York Times.
It is certainly true that defamation law did not remain static
after the founding. For example, many States acted “by judicial
decision, statute or constitution” during the early 19th century to
allow truth or good motives to serve as a defense to a libel prosecution.
Beauharnais, supra, at 254–255, and n. 4. Eventually,
changing views led to the “virtual disappearance” of criminal libel
prosecutions involving individuals. Garrison, 379 U. S., at 69.
But these changes appear to have refected changing policy judgments,
not a sense that existing law violated the original meaning
of the First or Fourteenth Amendment.
In short, there appears to be little historical evidence suggesting
that the New York Times actual-malice rule fows from the
original understanding of the First or Fourteenth Amendment.
III
Like Justice White, I assume that New York Times and our
other constitutional decisions displacing state defamation law have
been popular in some circles, “but this is not the road to salvation
for a court of law.” Gertz, 418 U. S., at 370 (dissenting opinion).
We did not begin meddling in this area until 1964, nearly 175
years after the First Amendment was ratifed. The States are
perfectly capable of striking an acceptable balance between encouraging
robust public discourse and providing a meaningful
remedy for reputational harm. We should reconsider our jurisprudence
in this area.
No. 18–404. Colorado Independent v. District Court for
the 18th Judicial District of Colorado et al. Sup. Ct.
Colo. Motion of respondent Sir Mario Owens for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis granted. Motion of respondent District Court
of Colorado for leave to fle supplemental appendix under seal
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 420 P. 3d 257.
ORDERS 1183
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–406. Schock v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 334.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Petitioner Aaron Schock, a former Congressman from Illinois,
asks us to decide whether he may immediately appeal, as a collateral
order, the denial of his motion to dismiss part of a criminal
indictment against him for running afoul of the Constitution's
Rulemaking Clause. See Art. I, § 5. He argues that certain
charges against him would require the District Court for the
Central District of Illinois to interpret internal rules adopted by
the House of Representatives to govern its own Members, and
thus would violate separation-of-powers doctrine. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that denials of such Rulemaking
Clause challenges are not collateral orders subject to immediate
appeal, 891 F. 3d 334 (2018), in disagreement with at least
one other Court of Appeals, see United States v. Rostenkowski,
59 F. 3d 1291, 1297 (CADC 1995). Although this question does
not arise frequently—presumably because criminal charges
against Members of Congress are rare—the sensitive separationof-
powers questions that such prosecutions raise ought to be handled
uniformly.
It is not clear, however, that this case cleanly presents the
question whether such orders are, as a general matter, immediately
appealable. The District Court here denied the motion to
dismiss on Rulemaking Clause grounds only provisionally, stating
that it would revisit the matter “if at any time it becomes apparent
that the prosecution will rely upon evidence that requires the
interpretation of House Rules.” 2017 WL 4780614, *7, and n. 6
(CD Ill., Oct. 23, 2017). Indeed, the District Court dismissed the
only count of the indictment that did, in its view, necessarily turn
on an interpretation of the House Rules. Id., at *8–*11. As a
result, the District Court's order may have been insuffciently
“conclusive” to support collateral-order appellate jurisdiction,
whether or not such jurisdiction would otherwise have been proper.
See Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U. S. 35, 42 (1995).
The Court of Appeals did not address that alternative ground for affrmance,
the presence of which might complicate our review.
I therefore concur in the Court's decision to deny certiorari. I
do so on the understanding, however, that Schock remains free to
1184 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
reassert his Rulemaking Clause challenge in the District Court
should subsequent developments warrant.*
No. 18–446. City of Taunton, Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of City of
Dover, New Hampshire, for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae
out of time denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895
F. 3d 120.
No. 18–462. Gunderson et vir v. Indiana et al. Sup. Ct.
Ind. Motions of Minnesota Association of Realtors and Cato Institute
et al. for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 90 N. E. 3d 1171.
No. 18–548. Adorers of the Blood of Christ, United
States Province, et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of The Rutherford
Institute for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 187.
No. 18–717. PMCM TV, LLC v. Federal Communications
Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner to
defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari
denied. The Chief Justice and Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and
this petition. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 18–747. Ritter v. Brady, Chapter 7 Trustee. C. A.
9th Cir. Motions of the Honorable Eugene Wedoff et al. and
Professor Margaret Howard for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx.
529.
No. 18–6901. Hall v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 246 So. 3d 210.
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Reynolds v. Florida, 586
U. S. 1004, 1011 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
*In its briefng to the Court of Appeals, the Government argued that the
House regulations were, in fact, “ `necessary' ” and “important” to prove
other charges still pending. Brief for Appellee in No. 17–3277 (CA7),
p. 55. Those representations may be pertinent to the District Court's further
consideration of Schock's arguments.
ORDERS 1185
586 U. S. February 19, 2019
No. 18–6982. Walden v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–6990. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates. C. A.
D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part
in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–7002. Diaz v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 18–7086. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 743 Fed.
Appx. 156.
No. 18–7112. Hill v. Associates for Renewal in Education,
Inc. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 232.
No. 18–7132. Bright v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States,
586 U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
No. 18–7148. Ray v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 852.
No. 18–7264. Miller v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 891 F. 3d
1220.
No. 18–7266. Brown v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 731 Fed.
Appx. 827.
1186 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7286. Masters v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Motion
of Student Press Law Center et al. for leave to fle brief as amici
curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 551 S. W.
3d 458.
No. 18–7346. Ford, aka Green, aka Wray v. United
States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–7421. Allen v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States,
586 U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
No. 18–7432. Barber v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 731 Fed.
Appx. 5.
Rehearing Denied
No. 16–8635. Dean v. United States, 581 U. S. 983;
No. 17–1641. Thomas et vir v. Williams, 586 U. S. 1050;
No. 17–7345. Green v. McGill-Johnston et al., 583 U. S.
1185;
No. 17–8355. Ismay v. United States, 584 U. S. 985;
No. 17–8719. De Vera v. United Airlines, Inc., 586 U. S.
996;
No. 17–8845. Eason v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections, 586 U. S. 834;
No. 17–8959. Gibson v. United States, 585 U. S. 1009;
No. 17–9085. Westine v. United States, 586 U. S. 841;
No. 17–9118. Williams v. California, 586 U. S. 843;
No. 17–9138. Hill v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 844;
No. 17–9319. Givens v. Allen, Warden, 586 U. S. 854;
No. 17–9383. Mitchell v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 857;
586 U. S.
No. 18–331.
U. S. 1069;
No. 18–393.
U. S. 1036;
No. 18–399.
No. 18–413.
586 U. S. 1022;
No. 18–538.
ORDERS 1187
February 19, 2019
Pabon Ortega v. Llompart Zeno et al., 586
Moody v. National Football League, 586
Fink v. Kirchner et al., 586 U. S. 1036;
Bosch v. Arizona Department of Revenue,
Nora v. Wisconsin Ofce of Lawyer Regulation,
586 U. S. 1037;
No. 18–541. Deol v. Depreta et al., 586 U. S. 1037;
No. 18–569. Shao v. Tsan-Kuen Wang, 586 U. S. 1073;
No. 18–577. Netzer v. Shell Oil Co. et al., 586 U. S. 1073;
No. 18–5200. Kruskal v. Meltzer et al., 586 U. S. 888;
No. 18–5425. Joaquin Ramirez v. Aponte et al., 586 U. S.
922;
No. 18–5537. Opengeym v. Heartland Employment Services,
LLC, 586 U. S. 999;
No. 18–5584. Thompson v. Copeland et al., 586 U. S. 947;
No. 18–5591. Mason v. Polster, Judge, United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, et al., 586
U. S. 947;
No. 18–5621.
No. 18–5628.
No. 18–5718.
No. 18–5722.
No. 18–5742.
No. 18–5765.
Torkornoo v. Helwig et al., 586 U. S. 1038;
Tacquard v. Arizona, 586 U. S. 948;
Campbell v. Virginia, 586 U. S. 970;
Lugo v. California, 586 U. S. 970;
Roberts v. Florida, 586 U. S. 971;
Russell v. Redstone Federal Credit Union
et al.; and Russell v. Ingegneri et al., 586 U. S. 989.
No. 18–5888. Morrison v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 1000;
No. 18–5931. Laschkewitsch v. Legal & General
America, Inc., dba Banner Life Insurance Co., 586 U. S.
1001;
No. 18–6020. Rodgers v. Miller, Warden, 586 U. S. 951;
No. 18–6055. Triplett v. Vannoy, Warden, 586 U. S. 1024;
No. 18–6093. Tate v. Maryland, 586 U. S. 991;
No. 18–6106. Miller v. Kashani et al., 586 U. S. 1039;
No. 18–6134. Peters v. Baldwin et al., 586 U. S. 1039;
No. 18–6164. Laschkewitsch v. ReliaStar Life Insurance
Co., 586 U. S. 1040;
1188 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 19, 21, 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6168. Soon Young Kim v. California, 586 U. S. 1040;
No. 18–6228. Laschkewitsch v. American National Life
Insurance Co., 586 U. S. 1041;
No. 18–6288. Cooley v. Director, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs, Department of Labor, et al., 586
U. S. 1053;
No. 18–6386. Adkins v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.,
586 U. S. 1053;
No. 18–6486. In re Hernandez, 586 U. S. 1020;
No. 18–6526. In re Yonamine, 586 U. S. 1067;
No. 18–6630. In re Gullett, 586 U. S. 1050;
No. 18–6652. Lowe v. Roy, Commissioner, Minnesota Department
of Corrections, 586 U. S. 1088; and
No. 18–6743. Kulick v. Leisure Village Assn., Inc., 586
U. S. 1128. Petitions for rehearing denied.
No. 18–5538. Gieswein v. United States, 586 U. S. 911. Petition
for rehearing denied. Justice Kagan and Justice Gorsuch
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–6003. Kavandi v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., et al.,
586 U. S. 1017. Petition for rehearing denied. The Chief Justice
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
February 21, 2019
Miscellaneous Order
No. 18–966. Department of Commerce et al. v. New York
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 586 U. S. 1140.] Petitioners'
brief on the merits, and any amicus curiae briefs in
support of petitioners or in support of neither party, are to be
fled on or before Wednesday, March 6, 2019. Respondents' briefs
on the merits, and any amicus curiae briefs in support of respondents,
are to be fled on or before Monday, April 1, 2019.
Reply brief on the merits is to be fled in accordance with this
Court's Rule 25.3.
February 25, 2019
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded. (See also Yovino
v. Rizo, 586 U. S. 181 (2019) (per curiam).)
No. 17–5018. Klikno v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.;
No. 17–8740. Van Sach v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.;
ORDERS 1189
586 U. S. February 25, 2019
No. 17–9399. Shields v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Reported
below: 885 F. 3d 1020;
No. 18–6177. Lipscomb v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 518; and
No. 18–6369. Browning v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 343. Motions of petitioners for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted,
judgments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration
in light of Stokeling v. United States, 586 U. S. 73 (2019).
No. 17–8401. Franklin v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded
for further consideration in light of the position asserted
by the Solicitor General in his brief for the United States fled
on July 6, 2018.
No. 18–5213. Baker v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of petitioner for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted,
judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration
in light of Washington v. Commissioner of Social Security, 906
F. 3d 1353 (CA11 2018). Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 870.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–7608. Whitney v. Chancellor. Sup. Ct. Ark. Motion
of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied,
and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported
below: 2018 Ark. 259.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M103. Hom v. United States. Motion to direct the
Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this
Court's Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 18M104. Grigsby v. Baltazar, Warden. Motion for
leave to proceed as a veteran denied. Justice Gorsuch took no
part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
No. 17–1606. Smith v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 586 U. S.
985.] Motion for divided argument fled by the Solicitor General
granted, and the time is divided as follows: 15 minutes for peti1190
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 25, 2019 586 U. S.
tioner, 15 minutes for the Solicitor General, and 30 minutes for
Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below.
No. 18–315. Cochise Consultancy, Inc., et al. v. United
States ex rel. Hunt. C. A. 11th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 586
U. S. 1018.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted.
No. 18–7681. In re Aguinaga. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–328. Rotkiske v. Klemm et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
granted. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 422.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–5239. Razz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 679 Fed. Appx. 950.
No. 17–5543. Davis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–5745. Phelps v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–5772. Conde v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 686 Fed. Appx. 755.
No. 17–6026. Williams v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 700 Fed. Appx. 895.
No. 17–6054. Everette v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 694 Fed. Appx. 760.
No. 17–6140. Jones v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–6276. Middleton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–6357. Reeves v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–6374. Rivera v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1191
586 U. S. February 25, 2019
No. 17–6540. Shotwell v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 989.
No. 17–6664. Mays v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–6829. Hardy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–6887. Wright v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 868.
No. 17–6991. Baxter v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed. Appx. 572.
No. 17–7140. Pace v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 577.
No. 17–7391. Repress v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 713 Fed. Appx. 826.
No. 17–7563. Cottman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–7716. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–7747. Beverly v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–7762. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 911.
No. 17–7952. Wright v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8272. Bannister v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8289. Wright v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 17–8431. Casamayor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 890.
No. 17–8544. Robinett v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 689.
No. 17–8663. Hall v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 877 F. 3d 800.
1192 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 17–8676. King v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 913.
No. 17–8678. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 954.
No. 17–8745. Williams v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 50.
No. 17–8766. DeShazior v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 1352.
No. 17–8860. Davis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 948.
No. 17–8951. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 619.
No. 17–9097. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 17–9128. Joyner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 882 F. 3d 1369.
No. 17–9151. Godbee v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed. Appx. 588.
No. 17–9353. Walker v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 968.
No. 17–9378. Diemer v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 654.
No. 17–9589. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 919.
No. 18–192. J. B. R. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–323. Evans, Individually and as Wife and Next
of Kin of Evans, Deceased v. United States et al. C. A.
6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 554.
No. 18–340. In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 894 F. 3d 707.
No. 18–566. Menendez v. Garber. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 839.
ORDERS 1193
586 U. S. February 25, 2019
No. 18–578. Pender et al. v. Bank of America Corp.
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736
Fed. Appx. 359.
No. 18–642. Zukerman v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 423.
No. 18–651. Montgomery v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 381.
No. 18–674. Murphy v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901
F. 3d 578.
No. 18–680. Huss, Warden v. Robinson. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 710.
No. 18–742. Washington v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–773. Sullivan v. City of Frederick, Maryland,
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738
Fed. Appx. 198.
No. 18–779. Power Integrations Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor
International, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 965.
No. 18–783. Barone v. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 244
So. 3d 277.
No. 18–784. Bugg v. Honey et al. Ct. App. Mo., Western
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 542 S. W. 3d 367.
No. 18–785. Alston v. Administrative Office of the
Courts, Delaware Judiciary, et al. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 181 A. 3d 614.
No. 18–786. Blair v. McClinton et al. Ct. App. Tex., 1st
Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–792. Satterlee v. Miller-Degase, Assessor of
Douglas County, Missouri, et al. Ct. App. Mo., Southern
Dist. Certiorari denied.
1194 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–800. Shao v. McManis Faulkner, LLP. Ct. App.
Cal., 6th App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–802. DeHoog et al. v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/
NV et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
899 F. 3d 758.
No. 18–812. Teamsters Local 210 Afliated Health and
Insurance Fund v. Silverman, as Trustee of the Union
Mutual Medical Fund, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 725 Fed. Appx. 79.
No. 18–816. Davis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–822. Cohen v. Grievance Administrator, Attorney
Grievance Commission of Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 Mich. 875, 917 N. W.
2d 666.
No. 18–829. Davis v. Anderson, Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, et al. C. A.
7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–836. Miranda Luna v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 So. 3d 1196.
No. 18–844. Chavez-Juarez v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed.
Appx. 509.
No. 18–849. HTC Corp. v. 3G Licensing, S. A., et al. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 1349.
No. 18–871. Jarmuth v. International Club Homeowners
Assn., Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
738 Fed. Appx. 155.
No. 18–875. Hill et al. v. PBL Multi-Strategy Fund,
L. P. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 744
Fed. Appx. 192.
No. 18–892. Kirsch v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 903 F. 3d 213.
No. 18–904. King Law Group, PLLC, et al. v. M2 Technology,
Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
748 Fed. Appx. 588.
ORDERS 1195
586 U. S. February 25, 2019
No. 18–914. Bove v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 606.
No. 18–919. Davies v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 86.
No. 18–924. Bullock v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 258 N. C. App. 72, 811 S. E.
2d 713.
No. 18–945. TLSL, Inc. v. Snead, as Administrator ad
Litem of the Estate of Estrada, et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 288 So. 3d 418.
No. 18–960. Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v.
BMO Harris Bank, N. A. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 564.
No. 18–961. Swartz v. United States Patent and Trademark
Ofce et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 743 Fed. Appx. 426.
No. 18–991. Huebner v. Midland Credit Management
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897
F. 3d 42.
No. 18–993. Young Adult Institute, Inc., dba YAI National
Institute for People with Disabilities, et al. v.
Levy et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
744 Fed. Appx. 12.
No. 18–1002. Davis et al. v. Valsamis, Inc. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 752 Fed. Appx. 688.
No. 18–5092. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 833.
No. 18–5232. Pettis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 962.
No. 18–5288. Serrano v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 659.
No. 18–5384. Rivera-Ruperto v. United States. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 846 F. 3d 417 and 852
F. 3d 1.
1196 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–5612. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–5838. Swopes v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 668.
No. 18–5940. Perez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 885 F. 3d 984.
No. 18–6025. Borrero v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 719 Fed. Appx. 990.
No. 18–6092. Ables v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 394.
No. 18–6257. McCranie v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 677.
No. 18–6410. McKinzy v. Gaston (McKinzy). Ct. App. Mo.,
Western Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 555 S. W.
3d 479.
No. 18–6411. Reed v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 4 Cal. 5th 989, 416 P. 3d 68.
No. 18–6715. Edstrom v. Minnesota. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 916 N. W. 2d 512.
No. 18–6727. Stojetz v. Shoop, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 175.
No. 18–6752. McGuire v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 8th App.
Dist., Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2018-Ohio-1390.
No. 18–6772. Grant v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6781. Farr v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed.
Appx. 969.
No. 18–6813. Ghosh v. City of Berkeley, California. Ct.
App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6818. Rangel v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 442, 420 P. 3d 902.
ORDERS 1197
586 U. S. February 25, 2019
No. 18–7026. Coats v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 257.
No. 18–7099. Ratushny v. Kauffman, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739 Fed.
Appx. 104.
No. 18–7118. Lynch v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 254 So. 3d 312.
No. 18–7136. Hanna v. LeBlanc, Secretary, Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 716 Fed.
Appx. 265.
No. 18–7137. Madrigal v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 6th App.
Dist., Lucas County. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7146. Sage v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 1 Wash. App. 2d 685, 407 P. 3d 359.
No. 18–7149. Danielak v. Brewer, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 339.
No. 18–7151. Mulhern v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 179 A. 3d 576.
No. 18–7155. Provencio v. Lizarraga, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7157. Mayeld v. Martin, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 722.
No. 18–7159. Lamar v. O’Dell, Colorado Parole Board
Member. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
750 Fed. Appx. 714.
No. 18–7160. Aranoff v. Aranoff. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 32 N. Y. 3d 1052, 113 N. E. 3d 463.
No. 18–7164. Knuth v. Arp, Judge, District Court for
the First Judicial District of Colorado, et al. Ct. App.
Colo. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7165. Jones v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
1198 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7168. Williams v. Soto, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7170. Yancey v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 286 So. 3d 34.
No. 18–7171. Young v. Voong et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 509.
No. 18–7172. Keen v. Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7173. Lofgren v. Hardin. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 3 Wash. App. 2d 1024.
No. 18–7174. Everson v. New York (two judgments). App.
Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 158 App. Div. 3d 1119, 70 N. Y. S. 3d 301 (frst judgment);
158 App. Div. 3d 1123, 67 N. Y. S. 3d 877 (second judgment).
No. 18–7175. Lipsey v. Court of Appeal of California,
Second Appellate District. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7179. Taylor v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 300 Neb. 629, 915 N. W. 2d 568.
No. 18–7182. Gates v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7202. Rios Soto v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 6th
App. Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7234. Edwards et al. v. Gene Salter Properties
et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739
Fed. Appx. 357.
No. 18–7237. Saunders v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 733.
No. 18–7244. Licea Morales v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 713.
No. 18–7250. Jones v. Samson Resources Corp. et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed.
Appx. 177.
ORDERS 1199
586 U. S. February 25, 2019
No. 18–7276. Francisco Vega et al. v. Kapusta, Interim
Secretary, Florida Department of Children and Families.
Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 253 So. 3d 1072.
No. 18–7298. Moore v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7311. Wilkins, aka Brown v. Gonzalez et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7337. Martin v. Terry, Acting Warden. Sup. Ct.
App. W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7354. Johnson v. Bradley, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7368. Howard v. McCready et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 219.
No. 18–7385. Cheng Le v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 902 F. 3d 104.
No. 18–7394. Brown v. Tanner, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7395. Wilfred H. v. West Virginia. Sup. Ct. App.
W. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7397. Breeden v. Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 2018 Ark. 299, 557 S. W. 3d 264.
No. 18–7404. Laake v. Turning Stone Resort Casino.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed.
Appx. 744.
No. 18–7410. Kott v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7412. Kennedy v. Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 2018–1489 (La. 12/17/18), 258 So. 3d 596.
No. 18–7427. Daud v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 608.
1200 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7430. Farah v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 608.
No. 18–7436. Aase v. Schnell, Commissioner, Minnesota
Department of Corrections. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7440. Whitman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 1240.
No. 18–7443. Thornton v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 991.
No. 18–7445. George v. Kent, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7447. Lemon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 444.
No. 18–7452. Garcia-Carillo v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 767.
No. 18–7454. St. Vallier v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 135.
No. 18–7456. Sebert v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 639.
No. 18–7462. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7468. Jones v. Palmer, Warden, et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 127.
No. 18–7473. Albright v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7498. Hall v. Terris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7522. Kennedy v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 649.
No. 18–7523. James v. Krueger, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7537. Saldierna v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 371 N. C. 407, 817 S. E. 2d
174.
ORDERS 1201
586 U. S. February 25, 2019
No. 18–7550. Reyes-Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 496.
No. 18–7556. Horton v. Ducart, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7562. Isaiah v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7565. Fuller v. Eppinger, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ohio.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 153 Ohio St. 3d 269, 2018-
Ohio-2629, 104 N. E. 3d 762.
No. 18–7578. Howard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7579. Price v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 685.
No. 18–7585. Gay v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 886.
No. 18–7587. Hudson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7588. Odom v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 317.
No. 18–7593. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7598. Morris v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 221.
No. 18–7600. Holt v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 751 Fed. Appx. 820.
No. 18–7602. Demerson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 228.
No. 18–7605. Diaz v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7607. White v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7609. Alston v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 135.
1202 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7615. Bacon v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 1234.
No. 18–7619. Morris v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 753 Fed. Appx. 607.
No. 18–7623. Goolsby v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7638. Williams v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 267.
No. 18–7644. Benitez v. Key, Superintendent, Airway
Heights Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7654. Fausnaught v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7662. Lewis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 296.
No. 18–7664. Greer v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7666. De Jesus Vasquez v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 753 Fed. Appx. 800.
No. 18–7667. Taylor v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7713. Grimsley v. McGinley, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Coal Township, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 17–6271. James v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 17–6577. Orr v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 685 Fed. Appx. 263.
No. 17–8739. Dorvilus v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 17–9469. Angel Garcia v. United States. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the conORDERS
1203
586 U. S. February 25, 2019
sideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 877
F. 3d 944.
No. 18–551. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jordan. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 243 So. 3d 929.
No. 18–552. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Brown, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Brown. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 243 So. 3d 521.
No. 18–621. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al. v. Pardue,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Faricy.
Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 247 So. 3d 415.
No. 18–649. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al. v. Searcy,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of LaSard.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no
part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 902 F. 3d 1342.
No. 18–653. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. McKeever, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of McKeever. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 207 So. 3d 907.
No. 18–654. Philip Morris USA Inc. et al. v. Boatright
et ux. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice
Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of
this petition. Reported below: 217 So. 3d 166.
No. 18–798. Blauch v. Colorado. Dist. Ct. Colo., Adams
County. Motion of petitioner to defer consideration of petition
for writ of certiorari denied. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–897. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Nally, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Nally, Deceased.
Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Reported below: 253 So. 3d 576.
1204 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–898. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Johnston, Personal
Representative of Johnston. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below:
253 So. 3d 576.
No. 18–900. Zodhiates v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Motion of Foundation for Moral Law for leave to fle brief as
amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901
F. 3d 137.
No. 18–7448. Foxx v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 253.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States,
586 U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
No. 18–7453. Sterling v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 752 Fed. Appx. 848.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States,
586 U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
No. 18–7495. Boyd v. Quintana, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–7614. Jacoby v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 750 Fed.
Appx. 689.
No. 18–7656. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–8786. Deveaux v. Caldwell, Warden, 586 U. S. 832;
No. 17–8963. Herbert v. CVS Pharmacy et al., 586 U. S. 837;
ORDERS 1205
586 U. S. February 25, 26, 2019
No. 17–9058. Carter v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security, 586 U. S. 840;
No. 17–9108. Hurd v. Lizarraga, Warden, 586 U. S. 842;
No. 17–9144. Honish v. United States, 586 U. S. 844;
No. 17–9322. Haffer v. New Hampshire, 586 U. S. 854;
No. 17–9563. Ingram v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 586
U. S. 867;
No. 18–223. In re Dawson, 586 U. S. 1034;
No. 18–375. Alexander v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC,
586 U. S. 1070;
No. 18–458. Pellegrini v. Fresno County, California,
et al., 586 U. S. 1070;
No. 18–598. Chien v. Clark et al., 586 U. S. 1074;
No. 18–683. Stark v. United States, 586 U. S. 1076;
No. 18–5128. In re Fairchild-Littleeld, 586 U. S. 811;
No. 18–5886. Mitchell v. Taylor et al., 586 U. S. 990;
No. 18–6160. Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois et al., 586 U. S. 1079;
No. 18–6230. Shoate v. Lewis, Warden, 586 U. S. 1052;
No. 18–6294. Walcott v. Terrebonne Parish Jail Medical
Department et al., 586 U. S. 1080;
No. 18–6298. Fratta v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 1080;
No. 18–6326. Coxe v. White, Superintendent, Washington
State Corrections Center, 586 U. S. 1053;
No. 18–6354. Jossie v. CVS Pharmacy, 586 U. S. 1081;
No. 18–6383. Kulick v. Rein, 586 U. S. 1081;
No. 18–6507. Brown v. Del Norte County, California,
et al., 586 U. S. 1084;
No. 18–6647. Sharma v. United States, 586 U. S. 1088; and
No. 18–6654. In re Debolt, 586 U. S. 1034. Petitions for rehearing
denied.
February 26, 2019
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–995. Crunch San Diego, LLC v. Marks. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported
below: 904 F. 3d 1041.
1206 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
February 28, March 4, 2019 586 U. S.
February 28, 2019
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–8070 (18A845). Coble v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented
to Justice Alito, and by him referred to the Court, denied.
Certiorari denied.
March 4, 2019
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 17–9044. Fabian-Baltazar v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded
for further consideration in light of Garza v. Idaho, 586
U. S. 232 (2019). Reported below: 707 Fed. Appx. 477.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–7225. Gillespie v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions,
Inc. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has repeatedly abused this
Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further
petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing
fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted
in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–7544. Williams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 6. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–7545. Williams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d
App. Dist., Div. 6. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this
Court's Rule 39.8.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. D–3030. In re Disbarment of Reiner. Disbarment entered.
[For earlier order herein, see 586 U. S. 961.]
No. 18M105. Caldwell v. Roberts, Warden;
ORDERS 1207
586 U. S. March 4, 2019
No. 18M107. Cox et al. v. United States et al.;
No. 18M108. Dyson v. Brennan, Postmaster General;
No. 18M109. Katz v. National Board of Medical Examiners
et al.;
No. 18M110. Jennifer A. v. Gregory M. et al.; and
No. 18M111. Lebron v. United States. Motions to direct
the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M106. Shampine v. Lee et al. Motion to direct the
Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this
Court's Rule 14.5 denied.
No. 17–1705. PDR Network, LLC, et al. v. Carlton &
Harris Chiropractic, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted,
586 U. S. 996.] Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate
in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted.
No. 18–7856. In re Alexander; and
No. 18–7890. In re Joaquin Ramirez. Petitions for writs of
habeas corpus denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–801. Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for
Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark
Ofce v. NantKwest, Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
granted. Reported below: 898 F. 3d 1177.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–384. Papierfabrik August Koehler SE v. United
States et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 710 Fed. Appx. 889.
No. 18–450. Utah Republican Party v. Cox, Lieutenant
Governor of Utah, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 892 F. 3d 1066.
No. 18–534. Well Luck Co., Inc. v. United States. C. A.
Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 887 F. 3d 1106.
No. 18–555. Marquette County Road Commission v. Environmental
Protection Agency et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 726 Fed. Appx. 461.
1208 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 4, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–648. Searcey et al. v. Dean et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 504.
No. 18–746. County of Los Angeles, California, et al. v.
Mendez et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 897 F. 3d 1067.
No. 18–815. T. B., By and Through His Parents, T. B.
et ux. v. Prince George’s County Board of Education
et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897
F. 3d 566.
No. 18–819. Vasconcellos v. Hamlin. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (2d) 160715–U.
No. 18–840. Banks v. Gore et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 766.
No. 18–862. Daugherty et al. v. Sheer et al. C. A. D. C.
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 386.
No. 18–883. Ledesma-Conchas v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722
Fed. Appx. 744.
No. 18–885. Kennedy et al. v. Schneider Electric, fka
Square D Co. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 893 F. 3d 414.
No. 18–920. Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 171.
No. 18–927. Mekowulu v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–967. Micheo-Acevedo v. Stericycle of Puerto
Rico, Inc. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
897 F. 3d 360.
No. 18–977. Anderson v. Walrath, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 294.
No. 18–1005. Zell v. Klingelhafer et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 751 Fed. Appx. 641.
No. 18–1009. United States ex rel. Cody v. ManTech International
Corp. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 746 Fed. Appx. 166.
ORDERS 1209
586 U. S. March 4, 2019
No. 18–1011. Rodriguez Lopez v. ReadyOne Industries,
Inc. Ct. App. Tex., 8th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 551 S. W. 3d 305.
No. 18–1018. Bennett et al. v. Jefferson County, Alabama.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899
F. 3d 1240.
No. 18–1021. Hawkins v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6207. Paiz Guevara v. United States. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 593.
No. 18–6306. Hebert v. Rogers, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 213.
No. 18–6482. Anchundia-Espinoza v. United States.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897 F. 3d 629.
No. 18–6569. Murray v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–6780. Farr v. Davis et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 961.
No. 18–6807. Slusser v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 437.
No. 18–6845. Mitchell v. Mahally, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Dallas, et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 902 F. 3d 156.
No. 18–6869. McNeill v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 371 N. C. 198, 813 S. E. 2d
797.
No. 18–6916. Powell v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 921, 422 P. 3d 973.
No. 18–7190. Wicks v. Radnothy et al. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7211. Monte v. Kessling et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 745 Fed. Appx. 471.
No. 18–7213. Dixit v. Brasher, Judge, Superior Court of
Georgia, Atlanta Judicial Circuit. Ct. App. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
1210 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 4, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7218. Berhe v. Oleseha. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7220. Farooqi v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App.
Dist., Div. 3. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7221. Gilbert v. Washington Department of Corrections
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 731 Fed. Appx. 673.
No. 18–7223. Hall v. Paramo, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 519.
No. 18–7295. Barnes v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 254 So. 3d 397.
No. 18–7316. Howell v. NuCar Connection, Inc., et al.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed.
Appx. 784.
No. 18–7319. Greene v. Alabama Department of Revenue
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 746 Fed. Appx. 929.
No. 18–7339. Reyes v. Duggan et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 3.
No. 18–7347. Freer v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 41.
No. 18–7362. Daniels v. Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7402. Shapiro v. United States. C. A. Fed. Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7405. Beason v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 102 N. E. 3d 346.
No. 18–7415. Scott v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 8. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7479. Haycraft v. Indiana. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7505. Pina v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 413.
ORDERS 1211
586 U. S. March 4, 2019
No. 18–7511. Ortiz-Fagot v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7541. Rangel v. Tippecanoe County, Indiana,
et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7557. Hyppolite v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 329.
No. 18–7560. Freeman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 333.
No. 18–7561. Guzman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 240.
No. 18–7563. Foster v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7566. Goris, aka Goriz, aka Abreu v. United
States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709
Fed. Appx. 107.
No. 18–7567. Collins v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7611. Everett v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 186 A. 3d 1224.
No. 18–7612. Bowens v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 907 F. 3d 347.
No. 18–7621. Burns v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 243.
No. 18–7627. Houpe v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 704 Fed. Appx. 276.
No. 18–7632. Grant v. Kelly, Director, Arkansas Department
of Correction. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 2018 Ark. 204, 548 S. W. 3d 814.
No. 18–7642. Lassend v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 F. 3d 115.
No. 18–7645. Sanchez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 440.
No. 18–7646. Sawyer v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 907 F. 3d 121.
1212 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 4, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7649. Bazar v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 747 Fed. Appx. 454.
No. 18–7660. Harris v. Deal, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7663. Ford v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 922.
No. 18–7668. Paladin v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7669. Moreno-Alvarez v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 255.
No. 18–7675. Hayes v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7678. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 124.
No. 18–7679. Curry v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 784.
No. 18–7682. Demers v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 750.
No. 18–7692. Horn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 262.
No. 18–7699. Ruiz-Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 253.
No. 18–7700. Ray v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 452.
No. 18–7707. Anguiano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 699.
No. 18–7711. Fitzgerald v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 754 Fed. Appx. 351.
No. 18–7712. Mims v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7715. Flores v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 505.
ORDERS 1213
586 U. S. March 4, 2019
No. 18–7716. Ingram v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 714 Fed. Appx. 982.
No. 18–7717. Ferguson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 314.
No. 18–7737. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7740. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7742. Serna v. County of Hennepin, Minnesota.
C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7745. Evans v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 329 Conn. 770, 189 A. 3d 1184.
No. 18–7750. Morrobel v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 754 Fed. Appx. 867.
No. 18–7759. Buckner v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 905.
No. 18–7766. Reeder v. Reynolds, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 81.
No. 18–7773. Espinoza-Mendoza v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 263.
No. 18–7794. Krott v. May, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 649.
No. 18–364. Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders
et al. v. Freedom From Religion Foundation et al.; and
No. 18–365. Presbyterian Church in Morristown et al.
v. Freedom From Religion Foundation et al. Sup. Ct. N. J.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 232 N. J. 543, 181 A. 3d 992.
Statement of Justice Kavanaugh, with whom Justice Alito
and Justice Gorsuch join, respecting the denial of certiorari.
Morris County, New Jersey, distributes historic preservation
funds to help preserve local buildings such as libraries, schoolhouses,
performing arts centers, and museums. As part of that
program, Morris County also distributes funds to help preserve
1214 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Statement of Kavanaugh, J. 586 U. S.
religious buildings such as synagogues, temples, churches, and
mosques. But it turns out that New Jersey law, as recently interpreted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, prohibits Morris
County from awarding grants to preserve religious buildings.
The petitioners here argue that the State's exclusion of religious
buildings—because they are religious—from Morris County's
historic preservation program constitutes unconstitutional
discrimination against religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The New
Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the State's discrimination
did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In my view, the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court is
in serious tension with this Court's religious equality precedents.
As this Court has repeatedly held, governmental discrimination
against religion—in particular, discrimination against religious
persons, religious organizations, and religious speech—violates
the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. In
the words of Justice Brennan, the “government may not use religion
as a basis of classifcation for the imposition of duties, penalties,
privileges or benefts.” McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 639
(1978) (opinion concurring in judgment). Under the Constitution,
the government may not discriminate against religion generally
or against particular religious denominations. See Larson v. Valente,
456 U. S. 228, 244 (1982).
The principle of religious equality eloquently articulated by Justice
Brennan in McDaniel is now frmly rooted in this Court's
jurisprudence. As Justice Kennedy later wrote for the Court, a
law may not discriminate against “some or all religious beliefs,”
and “a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.”
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S.
520, 532, 533 (1993). Put another way, the government may not
“impose special disabilities on the basis of . . . religious status.”
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,
494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990).
We have applied that bedrock principle of religious equality in
numerous cases. See, e. g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449 (2017); Good News Club v. Milford
Central School, 533 U. S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993);
McDaniel, 435 U. S. 618.
ORDERS 1215
1213 Statement of Kavanaugh, J.
For example, in McDaniel, a Tennessee statute disqualifed
ministers from serving as delegates to Tennessee's constitutional
convention. The Court ruled the statute unconstitutional, explaining
that the Constitution does not allow the government to
discriminate against religious persons by prohibiting their service
in a public offce. See id., at 629.
In Good News, a school district in New York allowed residents
to use the local public high school for social, civic, and recreational
events. But the school district prohibited a religious organization
from using the school, simply because the organization was religious.
This Court held that the school district's exclusion of the
religious organization was unconstitutional discrimination against
religion. See 533 U. S., at 109.
That same principle of religious equality applies to governmental
benefts or grants programs in which religious organizations
or people seek benefts or grants on the same terms as secular
organizations or people—at least, our precedents say, so long as
the government does not fund the training of clergy, for example.
See Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at 464–465; Locke v. Davey, 540
U. S. 712, 721, 725 (2004).
In Trinity Lutheran, Missouri barred a religious school from
obtaining a state funding grant for the school's playground. By
contrast, Missouri allowed secular private schools to obtain state
funding grants for their schools' playgrounds. This Court held
that Missouri's law was unconstitutional. The Court stated that
the Constitution “protects religious observers against unequal
treatment.” 582 U. S., at 458 (alterations omitted). In the
Court's description, Missouri's law refected an unconstitutional
policy of “No churches need apply.” Id., at 465. The Court
minced no words: Discriminating against religious schools because
the schools are religious “is odious to our Constitution.” Id.,
at 467.
In this case, New Jersey's “No religious organizations need
apply” for historic preservation grants appears similar to, for example,
Missouri's “No religious schools need apply” for school
playground grants and New York's “No religious clubs need
apply” for use of school facilities and Tennessee's “No ministers
need apply” for state offce.
To be clear, this is not a case like Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S.
577 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983); or County
of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pitts1216
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 4, 2019 586 U. S.
burgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573 (1989), where the government itself
is engaging in religious speech, such as a government-sponsored
prayer or a government-sponsored religious display. Nor is this
a case like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U. S. 682
(2014), or Smith, 494 U. S. 872, where a religious group or person
is asking for an accommodation or exemption from a generally
applicable law. Under the Court's precedents, both of those categories
of cases can pose diffcult questions. This kind of case, by
contrast, should not be as diffcult: Barring religious organizations
because they are religious from a general historic preservation
grants program is pure discrimination against religion.
* * *
At some point, this Court will need to decide whether governments
that distribute historic preservation funds may deny funds
to religious organizations simply because the organizations are
religious. But at this point and in this case, it is appropriate to
deny certiorari, for two main reasons. First, the factual details
of the Morris County program are not entirely clear. In particular,
it is not evident precisely what kinds of buildings can be
funded under the Morris County program. That factual uncertainty
about the scope of the program could hamper our analysis
of petitioners' religious discrimination claim. Second, this Court
decided Trinity Lutheran only recently, and there is not yet a
robust post-Trinity Lutheran body of case law in the lower courts
on the question whether governments may exclude religious organizations
from general historic preservation grants programs.
For those reasons, denial of certiorari is appropriate. As always,
a denial of certiorari does not imply agreement or disagreement
with the decision of the relevant federal court of appeals or
state supreme court. In my view, prohibiting historic preservation
grants to religious organizations simply because the organizations
are religious would raise serious questions under this
Court's precedents and the Constitution's fundamental guarantee
of equality.
No. 18–684. Stevens-Rucker, Administrator of the Estate
of White, Deceased v. Frenz et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Motion of The Rutherford Institute for leave to fle brief as amicus
curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 739
Fed. Appx. 834.
ORDERS 1217
586 U. S. March 4, 2019
No. 18–704. Abbott et al. v. Pastides et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Motions of First Amendment Clinics at Duke Law et al.
and American Civil Liberties Union of South Carolina et al. for
leave to fle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 900 F. 3d 160.
No. 18–7538. Russo v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 902 F. 3d 880.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set out in Brown v. United States,
586 U. S. 953 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
No. 18–7616. Tovar Pupo v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition. Reported below: 715 Fed.
Appx. 11.
No. 18–7674. Gorbey v. McCall, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice and Justice Kagan took
no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported
below: 722 Fed. Appx. 327.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–8059. Beavers, aka Stokes, aka West v. United
States, 586 U. S. 827;
No. 17–8685. Bell v. Inova Health Care, dba Inova Fairfax
Hospital (two judgments), 585 U. S. 1022;
No. 18–5057. Bagby v. Hyatte, Warden, 586 U. S. 880;
No. 18–5120. Nelson v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security, 586 U. S. 883;
No. 18–5355. Sanders v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 896;
No. 18–5896. Baker v. United States, 586 U. S. 929;
No. 18–5989. Bilbo v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 1001;
No. 18–6038. Villavicencio v. Jones, Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, 586 U. S. 1023;
1218 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 4, 5, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–6239. Reilly v. Herrera et al., 586 U. S. 1079;
No. 18–6365. Bartlett v. Michigan et al., 586 U. S. 1081;
No. 18–6509. Tedesco v. Monroe County, Pennsylvania,
et al., 586 U. S. 1084;
No. 18–6517. Brown v. Elite Modeling Agency, 586 U. S.
1085;
No. 18–6575. Stokes v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 1086;
No. 18–6661. Samuel v. United States, 586 U. S. 1088;
No. 18–6676. Wilmore v. United States, 586 U. S. 1088;
No. 18–6841. Stewart v. North Carolina, 586 U. S. 1093;
and
No. 18–6941. Chapman v. Lampert, Director, Wyoming
Department of Corrections, et al., 586 U. S. 1120. Petitions
for rehearing denied.
No. 18–5578. Akel v. United States, 586 U. S. 911. Petition
for rehearing denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–5704. Austin v. District Attorney of Philadelphia
County, Pennsylvania, et al., 586 U. S. 938. Petition for
rehearing denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–6291. Cook v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al., 586 U. S. 1024. Motion for leave
to fle petition for rehearing denied.
No. 18–6376. Albra v. Board of Trustees of Miami Dade
College et al., 586 U. S. 1109. Petition for rehearing denied.
Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision
of this petition.
March 5, 2019
Dismissal Under Rule 46
No. 18–788. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Odom, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Thurston. Sup.
Ct. Fla. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 46.1. Reported
below: 254 So. 3d 268.
ORDERS 1219
586 U. S. March 15, 18, 2019
March 15, 2019
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18–422. Rucho et al. v. Common Cause et al. D. C.
M. D. N. C. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 586 U. S. 1062.]
Joint motion of appellees for enlargement of time for oral argument
and for divided argument granted in part, and the time is
divided as follows: 35 minutes for appellants, 20 minutes for appellee
Common Cause et al., and 15 minutes for appellee League of
Women Voters of North Carolina et al.
No. 18–966. Department of Commerce et al. v. New York
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 586 U. S. 1140.] The
parties are directed to brief and argue the following additional
question: “Whether the Secretary of Commerce's decision to add
a citizenship question to the Decennial Census violated the Enumeration
Clause of the U. S. Constitution, Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.” Respondents
are allowed an additional 2,000 words in aggregate to
address this question in their briefs on the merits. Petitioners
are allowed an additional 1,000 words to address this question in
their reply brief on the merits.
March 18, 2019
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
No. 18–6612. Pinkney v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded
for further consideration in light of Stokeling v. United
States, 586 U. S. 73 (2019). Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 986.
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–7697. Yates v. Iowa. Dist. Ct. North Lee County,
Iowa. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule
39.8.
No. 18–7705. Yates v. Iowa. Ct. App. Iowa. Motion of petitioner
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certiorari
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. Reported below: 924
N. W. 2d 532.
1220 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18M112. Alfetlawi v. Klee, Warden;
No. 18M115. Webb-El v. Hurwitz, Director, Federal Bureau
of Prisons, et al.; and
No. 18M116. Price v. Vannoy, Warden. Motions to direct
the Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M113. In re Twelve Grand Jury Subpoenas; and
No. 18M114. Runnels v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
Motions for leave to fle petitions for writs of certiorari
under seal with redacted copies for the public record granted.
No. 18–349. Patterson v. Walgreen Co. C. A. 11th Cir.;
and
No. 18–817. Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. et al. v.
Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. C. A. Fed. Cir. The Solicitor
General is invited to fle briefs in these cases expressing the views
of the United States.
No. 18–6321. Nguyen v. Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland
Security. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration
of order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis [586
U. S. 1034] denied.
No. 18–6907. Kulick v. Leisure Village Assn., Inc. C. A.
9th Cir. Motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying
leave to proceed in forma pauperis [586 U. S. 1143] denied.
No. 18–7369. Ghosh v. City of Berkeley, California,
et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist.; and
No. 18–7695. Williams v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Motions of petitioners for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until
April 8, 2019, within which to pay the docketing fees required by
Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1
of the Rules of this Court.
No. 18–1064. In re Williams;
No. 18–7063. In re Dread;
No. 18–8080. In re Johnson;
No. 18–8098. In re Hanson; and
No. 18–8110. In re Anderson. Petitions for writs of habeas
corpus denied.
ORDERS 1221
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–8006. In re Evans. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of habeas
corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
No. 18–7754. In re Cabello; and
No. 18–7949. In re Watson. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
No. 18–7777. In re Brice. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of mandamus
dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner has
repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not
to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner
unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and
the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin
v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992)
(per curiam).
No. 18–6927. In re Urbina. Petition for writ of prohibition
denied.
Certiorari Granted
No. 18–217. Mathena, Warden v. Malvo. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari granted. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 265.
No. 17–834. Kansas v. Garcia (Reported below: 306 Kan.
1113, 401 P. 3d 588); Kansas v. Morales (306 Kan. 1100, 401
P. 3d 155); and Kansas v. Ochoa-Lara (306 Kan. 1107, 401 P. 3d
159). Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1
presented by the petition and the following question: “Whether
the Immigration Reform and Control Act impliedly pre-empts
Kansas' prosecution of respondents.”
No. 18–5924. Ramos v. Louisiana. Ct. App. La., 4th Cir.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 2016–1199 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 11/2/17), 231 So. 3d 44.
No. 18–6135. Kahler v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari
granted. Reported below: 307 Kan. 374, 410 P. 3d 105.
Certiorari Denied
No. 18–234. Chaidez Campos v. United States. C. A. 5th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 724.
1222 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–292. Lewis v. English, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 749.
No. 18–442. Benton v. United States;
No. 18–601. Tate v. United States; and
No. 18–606. Kesari v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 890 F. 3d 697.
No. 18–461. Hinojosa et al. v. Horn et al. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 305.
No. 18–472. Behr Dayton Thermal Products LLC et al.
v. Martin et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 896 F. 3d 405.
No. 18–499. Grifoen et al. v. Cedar Rapids and Iowa
City Railways Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 914 N. W. 2d 273.
No. 18–503. N. E. L. et al. v. Douglas County, Colorado,
et al. (Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 920), certiorari denied;
and N. E. L. et al. v. Gildner et al., certiorari before judgment
denied. C. A. 10th Cir.
No. 18–530. Congregation Jeshuat Israel v. Congregation
Shearith Israel. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 866 F. 3d 53.
No. 18–539. Hawes v. Reilly. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 184 A. 3d 661.
No. 18–576. Wright v. Watson et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 739 Fed. Appx. 981.
No. 18–596. Neba v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 260.
No. 18–617. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 1230.
No. 18–656. Hall, Director, Kentucky Department of
Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole v. Ayers.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 829.
No. 18–689. Moya et al. v. Garcia, Sheriff, Santa Fe
County, New Mexico, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 895 F. 3d 1229.
ORDERS 1223
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–699. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc.,
et al. v. United States ex rel. Prather. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 892 F. 3d 822.
No. 18–716. Petroleo Brasileiro S. A. v. EIG Energy
Fund XIV, L. P., et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 894 F. 3d 339.
No. 18–760. Saunders v. Ivey, Sheriff, Brevard County,
Florida, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 735 Fed. Appx. 559.
No. 18–763. Fattah v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 914 F. 3d 112.
No. 18–805. Strohmeyer v. Surface Transportation
Board et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–834. Sheikh et al. v. San Joaquin General Hospital.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–835. Lozano v. Superior Court of Massachusetts,
Suffolk County, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–845. Seidel v. Century Surety Co. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 328.
No. 18–848. Bisbee v. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–859. Peel v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co. Ct. App. Tex.,
14th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–865. Vella v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 623.
No. 18–867. Jackson et al. v. Jackson. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 905.
No. 18–869. Lecuona v. Lecuona. Ct. App. Tex., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–870. Ibragimov v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–876. Almond et al. v. Singing River Health System
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
742 Fed. Appx. 846.
1224 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–880. SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf International,
Inc. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 754 Fed. Appx. 235.
No. 18–886. Jones v. Hawaii Residency Programs, Inc.,
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727
Fed. Appx. 423.
No. 18–887. California Trucking Assn. v. Su. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 903 F. 3d 953.
No. 18–889. Smith et al. v. Weber. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–890. D’Addario et al. v. D’Addario. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 80.
No. 18–901. Simmons v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–905. Mastrogiovanni Schorsch & Mersky, P. C.,
et al. v. Mandel. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 747 Fed. Appx. 955.
No. 18–906. Kinney v. Cantil-Sakauye et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 562.
No. 18–907. Kinney v. Three Arch Bay Community Services
District et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 723 Fed. Appx. 553.
No. 18–908. Kinney v. Rothschild et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 555.
No. 18–909. Davis v. Fiat Chrysler Automobiles U. S.,
LLC. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747
Fed. Appx. 309.
No. 18–912. AmeriCare MedServices, Inc. v. City of Anaheim,
California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 473.
No. 18–915. Christian v. Payne et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 504.
No. 18–917. Bent v. Talkin, Marshal, Supreme Court of
the United States, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1225
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–922. Fisch v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 537 S. W. 3d 207.
No. 18–925. A–1 Premium Acceptance, Inc. v. Hunter.
Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 557 S. W. 3d
923.
No. 18–934. Prosterman et al. v. American Airlines Inc.
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 747
Fed. Appx. 458.
No. 18–939. Ortega-Morales v. Barr, Attorney General.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 752 Fed.
Appx. 839.
No. 18–947. Barth v. Township of Bernards, New Jersey,
et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–950. Freeman v. American K–9 Detection Services,
LLC, et al. Sup. Ct. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 556 S. W. 3d 246.
No. 18–951. T&T Rock Distribution, LLC v. Velasco. Ct.
App. Tex., 10th Dist. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–955. Fernandez v. School Board of Miami-Dade
County, Florida. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 898 F. 3d 1324.
No. 18–985. BMP Family L. P. et al. v. United States.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed.
Appx. 764.
No. 18–986. Huckaby et al. v. Halley, as Next Friend
of J. H., a Minor Child. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 902 F. 3d 1136.
No. 18–988. RPD Holdings, L. L. C. v. Tech Pharmacy
Services, dba Advanced Pharmacy Services. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 907 F. 3d 845.
No. 18–994. Williams v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–997. Williams et al. v. National Gallery, London,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 749
Fed. Appx. 13.
1226 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–1001. Sibley v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–1003. Slone et al. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
896 F. 3d 1083.
No. 18–1016. Beam v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–1029. Ghosh v. Dish Network L. L. C. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 752 Fed. Appx. 589.
No. 18–1075. RPX Corp. v. Applications in Internet Time,
LLC. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 897
F. 3d 1336.
No. 18–5773. Delancy v. Pastrana, Warden. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–5781. Dusenbery v. Holt, Warden. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 102.
No. 18–5969. Fuentes-Canales v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 902 F. 3d 468.
No. 18–6237. Smith v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 710.
No. 18–6265. Silva v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 704.
No. 18–6310. Lawson v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 663.
No. 18–6319. Reid v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 256.
No. 18–6377. Woodside v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 894.
No. 18–6481. Fontanez v. Coakley, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 698 Fed. Appx. 150.
No. 18–6533. Lewallyn v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 471.
ORDERS 1227
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–6550. Thomas v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 F. 3d 561.
No. 18–6667. Elbeblawy v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 899 F. 3d 925.
No. 18–6671. Malone v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 310.
No. 18–6771. Gardner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 734 Fed. Appx. 311.
No. 18–6904. Roberson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 87.
No. 18–6913. Sowell v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6914. Rojas v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 748 Fed. Appx. 777.
No. 18–6979. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 152.
No. 18–6989. Smith v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx. 827.
No. 18–7000. Bueno Jimenez v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 756 Fed. Appx. 933.
No. 18–7022. Zater v. Atkinson, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 178.
No. 18–7224. Acuna Valenzuela v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 245 Ariz. 197, 426 P. 3d 1176.
No. 18–7242. Sanders v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 245 Ariz. 113, 425 P. 3d 1056.
No. 18–7246. Sims v. King et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7248. Anthony v. Boyd, Warden, et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 903.
No. 18–7252. Wiese v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 720.
1228 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7257. Diakite v. Asuncion, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7258. Thomason v. Jackson et al. Sup. Ct. Ala.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7259. Allen v. Smith, Superintendent, State Correctional
Institution at Houtzdale. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7261. Cumbee v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
726 Fed. Appx. 238.
No. 18–7265. Armstrong v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7271. Johnson v. McDowell, Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 588.
No. 18–7273. Blake v. Fish et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 206.
No. 18–7279. Thomas v. District Attorney of Lancaster
County, Pennsylvania. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7280. Wappler v. Ivey et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7281. Workman v. Vandermosten et al. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 379.
No. 18–7283. Bartlett v. Kalamazoo County Community
Mental Health Board et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7285. Burch v. Atlanta City Court et al. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx.
914.
No. 18–7288. Harrison v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th
App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7290. Ajvazi v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1229
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–7291. Thompson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7299. Parker v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7301. J. C. v. Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services. Ct. App. Tex., 14th Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7302. Bartlett v. Gorsalitz et al. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7312. Tran v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 54 Kan. App. 2d xxx, 399 P. 3d 290.
No. 18–7314. Thomas v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 252 So. 3d 164.
No. 18–7315. Armistead v. Bowen et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 69.
No. 18–7318. Gomez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 4. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7321. Young v. Chapdelaine, Warden; Young v.
Chapdelaine, Warden; and Young v. Chapdelaine, Warden,
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7322. Yerton v. Bryant, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 902.
No. 18–7324. Gil v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 239 So. 3d 69.
No. 18–7328. Sheely et ux. v. Bank of America, N. A.,
et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738
Fed. Appx. 603.
No. 18–7332. Dellinger v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App.
Tenn. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7334. Perez v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (3d) 160114–U.
No. 18–7335. McKay v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 127.
1230 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7336. Hill v. Michigan. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7338. Jones v. Ofce of Administrative Hearings
et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 757
Fed. Appx. 692.
No. 18–7342. Gross v. Dannatt. Ct. App. Tex., 13th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7343. Israel, on Behalf of Minor Children A. I.
et al. v. City of North Miami, Florida, et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7349. Hicks v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7353. Jackson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, 11th App.
Dist., Trumbull County. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
2018-Ohio-2146.
No. 18–7357. Frazier v. Crump et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7359. Greenwood v. Tennessee Board of Parole.
Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 547 S. W.
3d 207.
No. 18–7363. Krohe v. Steinhardt. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 452.
No. 18–7364. Chambers v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7366. Gray v. Sorrels et al. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 563.
No. 18–7370. Gipson v. Tampkins, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7373. Patton v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7380. Glover v. Wisconsin. Ct. App. Wis. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7381. Hernandez v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal.
Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1231
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–7382. Herbin v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7383. Feldman v. Adoption Star Agency et al.
C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 724 Fed.
Appx. 915.
No. 18–7384. Deuschel v. USC Faculty Dental Practice
et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7386. Armando, aka Sarres Mendoza v. Whiteld
et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7389. Smith v. Jackson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7396. Fishback v. Parris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7398. Kruskal v. Sprunt. Ct. App. N. M. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7399. Carter v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 185 A. 3d 1129.
No. 18–7401. Shapiro v. United States (two judgments).
C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7403. Blackwell v. Dooley et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 424.
No. 18–7406. Boatman v. Diaz, Acting Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7407. Blankumsee v. Circuit Court of Maryland,
Washington County, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 844.
No. 18–7409. Leonard v. Florida et al. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7411. Jacob v. Cotton, Chairperson, Nebraska
Board of Parole, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 509.
No. 18–7413. Smith v. Corcoran et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 656.
1232 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7416. Solis v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 724 Fed. Appx. 886.
No. 18–7422. Williams v. Vannoy, Warden. Sup. Ct. La.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018–1540 (La. 10/15/18), 253
So. 3d 1295.
No. 18–7423. Washington v. Boughton, Warden. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 884 F. 3d 692.
No. 18–7425. Cooper v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2015 IL App (1st) 130884–U.
No. 18–7428. Jones v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 256 So. 3d 801.
No. 18–7429. Lopez v. Montgomery, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 211.
No. 18–7433. Ardaneh v. Massachusetts et al. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7435. Biggins v. Danberg et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7437. Animashaun v. Schmidt et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7438. Villa v. Kowalski. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7442. Underwood v. Carpenter, Warden. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 894 F. 3d 1154.
No. 18–7446. Hopkins v. Warden, Ventress Correctional
Facility. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7450. Miller v. Texas et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7457. Case v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 1, 418 P. 3d 360.
No. 18–7458. Taylor v. Miller et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 730 Fed. Appx. 392.
No. 18–7459. Greene v. Huffman et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 119.
ORDERS 1233
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–7460. Horvatt v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7464. Gary v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 241 So. 3d 100.
No. 18–7465. Boykin v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (1st) 151347–U.
No. 18–7480. Wiley v. Cartledge, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 319.
No. 18–7483. Frank v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 237 So. 3d 985.
No. 18–7492. Ferebee v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7508. Brooks v. Pinnacle Financial Corp. et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7517. Johnson v. McDermott, Warden. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7519. Duncan v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 33.
No. 18–7521. King v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7525. Harris v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 1120.
No. 18–7535. Chalfant v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 625.
No. 18–7558. Hawkins v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 246 So. 3d 354.
No. 18–7559. Daley v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 741 Fed. Appx. 963.
No. 18–7570. Hardeman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
1234 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7577. Castro v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 755 Fed. Appx. 371.
No. 18–7586. Frey v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 752 Fed. Appx. 878.
No. 18–7592. Hubbard v. Brown et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7601. Chhim v. Golden Nuggett Lake Charles,
L. L. C. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 730
Fed. Appx. 255.
No. 18–7606. Davis v. Florence et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7617. Hinton v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7626. Haynes v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 150590–U.
No. 18–7628. Bevan v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7634. Fox v. Turner, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7635. Hall v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 266 So. 3d 759.
No. 18–7672. Moody v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 238 Md. App. 733.
No. 18–7684. Brown v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7689. James v. Kapusta, Interim Secretary, Florida
Department of Children and Families. Dist. Ct. App.
Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 260 So. 3d
241.
No. 18–7698. Ingram v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 798.
No. 18–7702. Reese v. Zatecky, Superintendent, Pendleton
Correctional Facility. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
ORDERS 1235
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–7706. Ali v. Interactive Brokers LLC. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 450.
No. 18–7714. Grandison v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 234 Md. App. 564, 174 A. 3d
388.
No. 18–7720. Webber v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 511.
No. 18–7722. Escobedo-Coronado v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 36.
No. 18–7723. Dempsey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7726. Williams v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 898 F. 3d 323.
No. 18–7727. Hatt v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 710 Fed. Appx. 585.
No. 18–7734. Cannon v. Iowa District Court, Des Moines
County. Sup. Ct. Iowa. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7735. Davis v. Andrews, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 782.
No. 18–7736. Davis v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y.,
4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 153 App.
Div. 3d 1673, 60 N. Y. S. 3d 907.
No. 18–7738. Farrish v. Navy Federal Credit Union.
C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 711 Fed.
Appx. 189.
No. 18–7741. Sills v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7746. Davis v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 909 F. 3d 9.
No. 18–7748. Freeman v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7751. Bolton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
1236 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7755. Garcia v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
908 F. 3d 728.
No. 18–7758. Cummins v. Lollar. Ct. App. Tex., 7th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7760. Gish v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7762. Fauconier v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 174.
No. 18–7763. Adams v. Department of Defense. C. A. 4th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 200.
No. 18–7764. French v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 141815, 72
N. E. 3d 1214.
No. 18–7765. Massey v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 248.
No. 18–7768. Strauss v. Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure.
Sup. Ct. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
558 S. W. 3d 443.
No. 18–7776. Olvera-Cruz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 16.
No. 18–7778. Zemlyansky v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 908 F. 3d 1.
No. 18–7779. Kirkland v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 909 F. 3d 1049.
No. 18–7781. Lopez v. Noble, Warden. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 154 Ohio St. 3d 192, 2018-Ohio-
4061, 112 N. E. 3d 905.
No. 18–7783. Cannady v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7784. David v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7788. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 861.
ORDERS 1237
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–7790. Simpson v. Cooper, Judge, Court of Common
Pleas, Hamilton County, Ohio. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 154 Ohio St. 3d 320, 2018-Ohio-4068, 114
N. E. 3d 172.
No. 18–7792. Donato v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7795. Lanieux v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018–1410 (La. 11/5/18), 255
So. 3d 1038.
No. 18–7799. Cutulle v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7800. Antonio Aguilar v. United States. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 522.
No. 18–7801. Tannehill v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7802. Hopson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 754 Fed. Appx. 153.
No. 18–7804. Watson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7812. Wilcox v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J., App.
Div. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7814. Brown v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7817. Ceballos v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App. Dist., Div. 2. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7818. Castaneda v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 691.
No. 18–7821. Mixon v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7823. Norwood v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 387.
No. 18–7824. Killingbeck v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied.
1238 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7830. Johnson v. Kansas. Ct. App. Kan. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 54 Kan. App. 2d xxiii, 404 P. 3d 362.
No. 18–7836. Moore v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7838. Moore v. United States (two judgments).
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7839. Byers v. White, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 254.
No. 18–7841. Adetiloye v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7842. Burton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7843. Gibson v. Boe, Superintendent, Clallam
Bay Corrections Center. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7844. Hartley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 112.
No. 18–7846. Hough v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7848. Fisher v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 690 Fed. Appx. 108.
No. 18–7849. Pacheco Estudillo v. United States. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7858. Majid v. Noble, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 751 Fed. Appx. 735.
No. 18–7859. Monsegue v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7861.
tiorari denied.
No. 18–7862.
tiorari denied.
No. 18–7863.
tiorari denied.
Graves v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Reported below: 908 F. 3d 137.
Cer-
Beatty v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Reported below: 754 Fed. Appx. 166.
Cer-
Burris v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 183.
CerORDERS
1239
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–7871. Vennings v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 419.
No. 18–7874. Booze v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7878. Cannon v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 785.
No. 18–7880. Clarke v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 972.
No. 18–7882. Gates v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 755 Fed. Appx. 649.
No. 18–7883. Carter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7884. Villalva-Patricio v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 289.
No. 18–7886. Ocean v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 25.
No. 18–7898. Reid El Bey v. North Carolina et al. Gen.
Ct. Justice, Super. Ct. Div., Wilson County, N. C. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7900. Blanco-Rodriguez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 755 Fed. Appx. 339.
No. 18–7903. Arrington v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7905. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 731 Fed. Appx. 218.
No. 18–7910. Fuentes v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 906 F. 3d 322.
No. 18–7911. Kun v. State Bar of California. Sup. Ct.
Cal. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7913. Thomas v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 129.
1240 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7914. Tharps v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 141.
No. 18–7915. Warner v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 701 Fed. Appx. 288.
No. 18–7916. Wren v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7918. Hernandez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 715 Fed. Appx. 433.
No. 18–7920. Habeck v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 953.
No. 18–7921. Looman v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7922. LaFleur v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 983.
No. 18–7927. Anderson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 507.
No. 18–7930. Button v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 702 Fed. Appx. 936.
No. 18–7947. Garden v. Massachusetts. App. Ct. Mass.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 93 Mass App. 1108, 103 N. E.
3d 1237.
No. 18–7954. Blanton v. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department
of Corrections. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 328.
No. 18–7960. Marshall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 754 Fed. Appx. 157.
No. 18–7968. Ragland v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 371 N. C. 572, 818 S. E. 2d
638.
No. 18–7969. Smith v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7983. Laurson v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1241
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
No. 18–7993. Bedford v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 914 F. 3d 422.
No. 18–8033. Montalvo Borgos v. Medeiros, Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8100. Franklin v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–285. Missouri v. Douglass et al. Sup. Ct. Mo.
Motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 544 S. W. 3d 182.
No. 18–420. United States v. Wheeler. C. A. 4th Cir.
Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 886 F. 3d 415.
No. 18–451. Aloha Bed & Breakfast v. Cervelli et al.
Int. Ct. App. Haw. Motions of Foundation for Moral Law and
Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist
Convention for leave to fle briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 142 Haw. 177, 415 P. 3d 919.
No. 18–545. First Advantage Background Services Corp.
v. Superior Court of California, San Mateo County, et al.
Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist., Div. 4. Motion of Washington Legal
Foundation et al. for leave to fle brief as amici curiae granted.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–661. Zank v. Lopez Moreno. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion
of Reunite International Child Abduction Centre for leave to fle
brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 895 F. 3d 917.
No. 18–910. City of San Diego, California v. Public Employment
Relations Board. Sup. Ct. Cal. Motion of Pacifc
Legal Foundation for leave to fle brief as amicus curiae granted.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 898, 422 P. 3d 552.
No. 18–6819. Tharpe v. Ford, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
Statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting the denial of
certiorari.
Petitioner Keith Tharpe is a Georgia inmate on death row. For
years, Tharpe, who is black, has asked state and federal courts
1242 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Statement of Sotomayor, J. 586 U. S.
to consider his claim that a white member of the jury that sentenced
him to death was biased against him because of his race.
Tharpe has presented a signed affdavit from the juror in question,
who stated, among other things, that “ `there are two types
of black people: 1. Black folks and 2. Niggers,' ” and that Tharpe,
“ `who wasn't in the “good” black folks category in [his] book,
should get the electric chair for what he did.' ” Tharpe v. Sellers,
583 U. S. 33, 34 (2018) (per curiam). Nevertheless, Tharpe has
never received a hearing on the merits of his racial-bias claim.
The petition that the Court denies today does not turn on the
merits of that claim, and I concur in the denial of Tharpe's petition.
I write because I am profoundly troubled by the underlying
facts of this case.
I
More than seven years af ter he was sentenced to death,
Tharpe's attorneys uncovered evidence that a white member of
his jury, Barney Gattie, harbored racist views at the time of the
trial. In a sworn statement, Gattie made “repugnant comments
. . . rife with racial slurs . . . and even an explicit statement that
[his] decision to sentence Tharpe to death was[,] at leas[t] in part,
based on race.” Tharpe v. Warden, 898 F. 3d 1342, 1348 (CA11
2018) (Wilson, J., concurring). Tharpe sought postconviction relief
in state court, arguing that racial bias tainted the jury's deliberations
in his case.
To this day, Tharpe's racial-bias claim has never been adjudicated
on its merits. The Georgia state court and the Federal
District Court denied Tharpe's requests for postconviction relief
on procedural grounds. Tharpe moved to reopen the federal proceedings
in light of “ `extraordinary circumstances,' ” Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 536 (2005), but the District Court denied
that motion. Tharpe requested a certifcate of appealability
(COA) from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, but the court denied his request after concluding that he
had not made an adequate showing that Gattie's racial bias affected
the jury's verdict. Tharpe, 583 U. S., at 34. This Court
disagreed, explaining that Tharpe had “present[ed] a strong factual
basis for the argument that Tharpe's race affected Gattie's
vote for a death verdict.” Id., at 34–35. We remanded for further
consideration.
On remand, the Court of Appeals again denied Tharpe's request
for a COA. It held that the District Court did not arguably
ORDERS 1243
1241 Statement of Sotomayor, J.
abuse its discretion in denying Tharpe's motion to reopen because
two different threshold obstacles barred Tharpe's claim. First,
the court held that Tharpe's juror-bias claim could not go forward
because the claim relied on a later decided case, Pena-Rodriguez
v. Colorado, 580 U. S. 206 (2017), which the court concluded does
not apply retroactively. 898 F. 3d, at 1345–1346. Second, the
court decided that Tharpe had not established cause for his procedural
default in state court—i. e., he had not given a suffcient
justifcation for failing to raise the juror-bias claim in a motion
for a new trial or in his direct appeal. Specifcally, the court
rejected as unsubstantiated Tharpe's allegation that counsel's ineffectiveness
was to blame for his not having raised the racial-bias
claim sooner. Id., at 1347. Tharpe seeks this Court's review.
II
Tharpe's petition for a writ of certiorari asks us to decide only
whether the Court of Appeals' procedural rulings were correct,
not whether his juror-bias claim has merit. Tharpe “faces a high
bar in showing that jurists of reason could disagree whether the
District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion”
to reopen. Tharpe, 583 U. S., at 35. And for Tharpe's claim to
proceed, he must overcome both of the Court of Appeals' independent
reasons for denying him a COA. In other words, even
setting aside whether Pena-Rodriguez is retroactive, he would
have to establish that he arguably showed suffcient cause to excuse
his procedural default.
I see little likelihood that we would reverse the Court of Appeals'
factbound conclusion that Tharpe did not make that showing.
Before this Court, Tharpe argues that he could not have
raised his racial-bias claim in a motion for new trial or on direct
appeal because he did not know—indeed, could not have known—
of the predicate facts of the claim at that time. Pet. for Cert.
35. If preserved, that argument would have force. But Tharpe
did not make this argument before the District Court until a
footnote in his reply brief in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(6) proceedings, see Reply to Brief in Opposition 12–13 (listing
the reply brief as the earliest point at which this argument
was made), and the District Court did not address it, see App. D
to Pet. for Cert. Given this preservation issue and the deference
due to the District Court, the Court of Appeals reasonably focused
on the ineffective-assistance argument that Tharpe did pre1244
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 2019 586 U. S.
viously present to the District Court in deciding that Tharpe had
not made the requisite showing of cause. See 898 F. 3d, at 1347.
I therefore concur in the Court's decision to deny Tharpe's
petition for certiorari. As this may be the end of the road for
Tharpe's juror-bias claim, however, we should not look away from
the magnitude of the potential injustice that procedural barriers
are shielding from judicial review.
Tharpe has uncovered truly striking evidence of juror bias.
Gattie, the juror at issue, signed an affdavit refecting his “view
that `there are two types of black people: 1. Black folks and 2.
Niggers'; that Tharpe, `who wasn't in the “good” black folks category
in [his] book, should get the electric chair for what he did';
that `[s]ome of the jurors voted for death because they felt that
Tharpe should be an example to other blacks who kill blacks, but
that wasn't [his] reason'; and that, `[a]fter studying the Bible, [he]
ha[d] wondered if black people even have souls.' ” Tharpe, 583
U. S., at 34 (quoting App. B to Pet. for Cert. 15–16).
These racist sentiments, expressed by a juror entrusted with a
vote over Tharpe's fate, suggest an appalling risk that racial bias
swayed Tharpe's sentencing. The danger of race determining any
criminal punishment is intolerable and endangers public confdence
in the law. See Buck v. Davis, 580 U. S. 100, 124 (2017).
That risk is especially grave here, where it may have yielded a
punishment that is unique in its “complete fnality.” Turner v.
Murray, 476 U. S. 28, 35 (1986). When Tharpe went on trial
for his crimes, the Constitution promised him the “fundamental
`protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.' ”
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 310 (1987) (quoting Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 309 (1880)). There is strong evidence
that this promise went unfulflled.
It may be tempting to dismiss Tharpe's case as an outlier, but
racial bias is “a familiar and recurring evil.” Pena-Rodriguez,
580 U. S., at 224. That evil often presents itself far more subtly
than it has here. Yet Gattie's sentiments—and the fact that they
went unexposed for so long, evading review on the merits—
amount to an arresting demonstration that racism can and does
seep into the jury system. The work of “purg[ing] racial prejudice
from the administration of justice,” id., at 221, is far from
done.
No. 18–7408. Leonard v. George Washington University
Hospital et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice
ORDERS 1245
586 U. S. March 18, 2019
Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
No. 18–7441. Wheeler v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–7687. Lee v. Muniz, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–7769. Hill v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
No. 18–7840. Telfair v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–5617. Moreland v. Lynchburg Department of Social
Services, 583 U. S. 935;
No. 17–8213. Brewer v. United States, 584 U. S. 955;
No. 17–8593. Brooks v. Raemisch, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Corrections, et al., 585 U. S.
1021;
No. 17–8818. Baker v. United States, 584 U. S. 1019;
No. 17–8962. De Min Gu v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
et al., 586 U. S. 837;
No. 17–9392. Grant v. White et al., 586 U. S. 857;
No. 17–9477. Grant v. Alperovich et al., 586 U. S. 862;
No. 18–497. Coulter v. Bissoon, Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania,
et al., 586 U. S. 1037;
No. 18–586. Koch v. Estrella et al., 586 U. S. 1074;
No. 18–611. Tatar v. United States, 586 U. S. 1074;
No. 18–659. Masomi v. Madadi, 586 U. S. 1127;
No. 18–702. Yadav et ux. v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, 586 U. S. 1076;
No. 18–6245. Kirkland v. Progressive Insurance Co.
et al., 586 U. S. 1079;
No. 18–6272. Steshenko v. McKay et al., 586 U. S. 1080;
No. 18–6388. Blackmon v. Eaton Corp., 586 U. S. 1081;
No. 18–6688. Leonard v. Florida, 586 U. S. 1118; and
1246 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 18, 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7065. Lobo v. United States, 586 U. S. 1121. Petitions
for rehearing denied.
No. 17–8011. Blount v. United States, 584 U. S. 941. Petition
for rehearing denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in
the consideration or decision of this petition.
No. 18–5428. Barraquias v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, 586 U. S. 911. Petition for rehearing denied. Justice
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this
petition.
March 25, 2019
Certiorari Dismissed
No. 18–7709. Laschkewitsch, as Administrator for the
Estate of Laschkewitsch v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Distributors,
Inc., dba Lincoln Financial Group. C. A. 4th
Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
denied, and certiorari dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8.
Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 261.
Miscellaneous Orders
No. 18A738. Dressler v. Circuit Court of Wisconsin, Racine
County. Application for stay, addressed to The Chief
Justice and referred to the Court, denied.
No. 18M117. Reed v. Florissant County, Missouri, et al.;
No. 18M118. Lockhart v. Georgia; and
No. 18M119. Wang v. California. Motions to direct the
Clerk to fle petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
No. 18M120. Bueno-Sierra v. United States. Motion to
direct the Clerk to fle petition for writ of certiorari out of time
denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or
decision of this motion.
No. 18–7499. Bida v. Johnson. C. A. 3d Cir.;
No. 18–7542. Harnden v. St. Clair County, Michigan,
et al. C. A. 6th Cir.; and
No. 18–7584. Marberry v. State Bar of California. Sup.
Ct. Cal. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until April 15, 2019,
within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a)
ORDERS 1247
586 U. S. March 25, 2019
and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules
of this Court.
No. 18–8246. In re Jackson. Petition for writ of habeas corpus
denied.
No. 18–8243. In re Leffebre. Motion of petitioner for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of
habeas corpus dismissed. See this Court's Rule 39.8. As petitioner
has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is
directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters
from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule
38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule
33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506
U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
No. 18–973. In re Chateld et al.;
No. 18–8015. In re Agbonifo; and
No. 18–8099. In re Bryant. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
Certiorari Denied
No. 17–1351. Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC et al.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 708 Fed.
Appx. 371.
No. 18–225. Zappos.com, Inc. v. Stevens et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 888 F. 3d 1020.
No. 18–498. Maricopa County, Arizona v. United States.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 889 F. 3d 648.
No. 18–533. Travis v. Exel, Inc., dba DHL Supply Chain
(USA), et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 884 F. 3d 1326.
No. 18–640. Acklin v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 266 So. 3d 89.
No. 18–657. Grimsrud v. Department of Transportation.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 718 Fed.
Appx. 987.
No. 18–728. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 883 F. 3d 1111.
1248 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–729. Maxwell & Morgan, P. C., et al. v. McNair.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 893 F. 3d 680.
No. 18–774. Anderson News, L. L. C., et al. v. American
Media, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 899 F. 3d 87.
No. 18–831. Presley et al. v. United States. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 895 F. 3d 1284.
No. 18–930. Brandon v. Brandon. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App.
Dist., Div. 5. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–933. Patel v. Patel et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 727 Fed. Appx. 52.
No. 18–943. Faireld County, Ohio, et al. v. Morgan
et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 903
F. 3d 553.
No. 18–946. Arroyo v. Torres-Sanchez et al. C. A. 1st
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–958. Mitrano v. United States et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 723 Fed. Appx. 518.
No. 18–971. Hobson v. Mattis, Former Secretary of Defense.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–980. Torkornoo v. Maryland et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 123.
No. 18–998. Waite, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Waite v. Union Carbide Corp. et al. C. A. 11th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 1307.
No. 18–1006. Adams v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 5th Dist. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–1007. Abulkhair v. Google LLC et al. C. A. 3d
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 754.
No. 18–1025. Leon v. New York City Department of Education
et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 740 Fed. Appx. 759.
No. 18–1047. Wade v. Florida Department of Juvenile
Justice. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
745 Fed. Appx. 894.
ORDERS 1249
586 U. S. March 25, 2019
No. 18–1082. Guzall v. City of Romulus, Michigan, et al.
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed.
Appx. 574.
No. 18–1090. Beckman v. Match.com, LLC. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 142.
No. 18–1119. Richman Group of Florida, Inc. v. Pinellas
County, Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 253 So. 3d 662.
No. 18–6413. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 975.
No. 18–6706. Davis v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 900 F. 3d 733.
No. 18–6728. Quintana v. Colorado. Ct. App. Colo. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–6789. McLean v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 891 F. 3d 1308.
No. 18–6822. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 741.
No. 18–6834. Johnson v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 746
Fed. Appx. 375.
No. 18–7098. Scott v. Tellez, Acting Warden. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7113. Hylor v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 896 F. 3d 1219.
No. 18–7140. Hull v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 313.
No. 18–7152. Bonet v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 737 Fed. Appx. 988.
No. 18–7376. Peters v. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7455. Israel Sanchez v. California. Ct. App. Cal.,
4th App. Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
1250 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7472. Yoder v. Good Will Steam Fire Engine Company
No. 1 et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 740 Fed. Appx. 27.
No. 18–7474. Gonzalez v. Ferguson, Superintendent,
State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 655 Fed.
Appx. 96.
No. 18–7475. Aldona B. v. Nicholas S. Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7476. Zirus v. Keller et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 44.
No. 18–7477. Williams v. Minor, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7478. Blair v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7481. Workman v. Perry et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 365.
No. 18–7487. Hokenstrom v. New Hampshire Department
of Corrections et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7491. Crow v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7493. Jackson v. Equifax Workforce Solutions,
dba Labor Ready Southwest, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 116.
No. 18–7494. Bozell v. Skipper, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7497. Wellborn v. Jackson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7502. Payne v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 3d Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 2018 IL App (3d) 160105, 116
N. E. 3d 965.
No. 18–7503. Ambrose v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 254 So. 3d 77.
ORDERS 1251
586 U. S. March 25, 2019
No. 18–7504. Hamilton v. Allbaugh, Director, Oklahoma
Department of Corrections. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 525.
No. 18–7509. Mixon v. Nevada et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7510. Perez v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7513. Cobas v. Lindsey, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7514. Palmer v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
Technology Risk Ofce. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 753 Fed. Appx. 590.
No. 18–7516. Mora v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 5 Cal. 5th 442, 420 P. 3d 902.
No. 18–7520. Lee v. Pirko et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7524. Harrison et al. v. Huggins et al. Sup. Ct.
Ill. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7529. Dennison v. Arizona. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7531. Galbraith v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 722
Fed. Appx. 391.
No. 18–7532. Green v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 5th
Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 256 So. 3d 872.
No. 18–7533. Canada v. Miles, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7534. Hudson v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 2017 IL App (1st) 143125–U.
No. 18–7539. Rossi v. The Crown. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7547. Mulder v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 134 Nev. 986, 422 P. 3d 1231.
1252 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7551. Gomez v. Berghuis, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7552. Hayes v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7553. Hopkins v. Dooley, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7554. Ferm v. Ofce of the Attorney General
of Nevada. Ct. App. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 134 Nev. 936.
No. 18–7564. Howard v. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 250 So. 3d 618.
No. 18–7571. Cervantes Valencia v. Davey, Warden.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7574. Haines-Marchel v. Washington State Liquor
and Cannabis Board. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied.
Reported below: 1 Wash. App. 2d 712, 406 P. 3d 1199.
No. 18–7580. Neal v. Wayne County Treasurer. Ct. App.
Mich. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7582. Canete v. Keeton, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7589. Judy v. Williams et al. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 357.
No. 18–7661. Jones v. Inch, Secretary, Florida Department
of Corrections. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 906 F. 3d 1339.
No. 18–7728. Haynesworth v. South Carolina Department
of Mental Health et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 733 Fed. Appx. 122.
No. 18–7732. Curry v. Supreme Court of the United
States et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 707 Fed. Appx. 210.
No. 18–7756. Chambers v. Sarcone. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
ORDERS 1253
586 U. S. March 25, 2019
No. 18–7770. Bradley v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7780. Lemoine v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7787. Golder v. Chapdelaine, Warden, et al.
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7805. Bohannan v. Grifn. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 709 Fed. Appx. 283.
No. 18–7808. Wilson v. LeGrand, Warden, et al. C. A.
9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 566.
No. 18–7829. Mark v. Rabeau. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7847. Howlett v. Richardson, Warden. C. A. 7th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 461.
No. 18–7869. Deorio v. Flournoy, Warden. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7875. Cannon v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 721 Fed. Appx. 227.
No. 18–7876. Callahan v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7877. Decker v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7881. Ellison v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 732 Fed. Appx. 207.
No. 18–7887. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 429.
No. 18–7895. Anderson v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7896. Montanez-Quinones v. United States. C. A.
1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 911 F. 3d 59.
No. 18–7904. Alcequiecz v. Ryan, Warden. C. A. 1st Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7923. Jones v. LeBlanc, Secretary, Louisiana Department
of Public Safety and Corrections, et al. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
1254 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–7928. Carrasco v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7931. Henley v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7938. Quintana-Torres v. United States. C. A.
10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx.
734.
No. 18–7941. Little v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 735 Fed. Appx. 87.
No. 18–7943. Watson v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7946. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7948. Carapia Hernandez v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 28.
No. 18–7950. Walker v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7951. McClure v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 741 Fed. Appx. 155.
No. 18–7952. Partman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 738 Fed. Appx. 197.
No. 18–7958. Lohmeier v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7964. Santos v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7965. Stewart v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 902 F. 3d 664.
No. 18–7966. Smith v. Terris, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7971. Chivoski v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 299.
No. 18–7973. Villa v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 740 Fed. Appx. 586.
ORDERS 1255
586 U. S. March 25, 2019
No. 18–7974. Cruz-Rivera, aka Llorens v. United States.
C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 904 F. 3d 63.
No. 18–7975. Wolf v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–7977. Mowery v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 863.
No. 18–7978. Amerson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7979. Watkins v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–7981. Murillo, aka Santos Murillo v. United
States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 744
Fed. Appx. 378.
No. 18–7984. Ervin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 729 Fed. Appx. 268.
No. 18–7986. Chacon v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 901 F. 3d 1322.
No. 18–7989. Guerrero v. English, Warden. C. A. 10th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 207.
No. 18–7994. King v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 736 Fed. Appx. 56.
No. 18–7995. Martin v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 751 Fed. Appx. 873.
No. 18–7997. Allen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 859.
No. 18–8010. Barrie v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 720 Fed. Appx. 158.
No. 18–8011. Kerr v. Barr, Attorney General. C. A. 8th
Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8012. Blackburn v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8019. Austin v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
1256 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–8025. St. Hubert v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 909 F. 3d 335.
No. 18–8026. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8028. Reel v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–8031. Bolden v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 168 A. 3d 294.
No. 18–8034. Brewer v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–8036. Boyle v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–8038. Burke v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 712 Fed. Appx. 441.
No. 18–8040. Bannister v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8041. Johnson v. United States. Ct. App. D. C.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8042. Blaylock v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8043.
tiorari denied.
No. 18–8044.
tiorari denied.
No. 18–8047.
denied.
No. 18–8048.
tiorari denied.
No. 18–8049.
Alanis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Cer-
Brooks v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Cer-
Reported below: 756 Fed. Appx. 52.
Pope v. Franke. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
Owens v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Cer-
Reported below: 750 Fed. Appx. 415.
Montero v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 892.
No. 18–8051. Valencia Torres v. United States. C. A.
11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx.
493.
ORDERS 1257
586 U. S. March 25, 2019
No. 18–8053. Allen v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 717 Fed. Appx. 340.
No. 18–8054. Young v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 751 Fed. Appx. 381.
No. 18–8056. Glick v. Premo, Superintendent, Oregon
State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8058. Elias Sanchez v. Beard, Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed.
Appx. 334.
No. 18–8059. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 742 Fed. Appx. 879.
No. 18–8065. Maxwell v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743 Fed. Appx. 255.
No. 18–8066. Magana v. Credio et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 744 Fed. Appx. 390.
No. 18–8067. Lew v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App.
Dist., Div. 1. Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8068. Hill v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–8075. Oriakhi v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 728 Fed. Appx. 386.
No. 18–8079. Bentley v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 756 Fed. Appx. 957.
No. 18–8083. Magnificent-El, aka Phillips v. United
States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 743
Fed. Appx. 726.
No. 18–8091. Williams v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 753 Fed. Appx. 167.
No. 18–8094. Gros v. Kent, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–8096. Hall v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 716 Fed. Appx. 223.
1258 OCTOBER TERM, 2018
March 25, 2019 586 U. S.
No. 18–8101. Foltz v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 724 Fed. Appx. 237.
No. 18–8104. Frazier v. United States. C. A. 11th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8106. Crump v. Delaware. Sup. Ct. Del. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 194 A. 3d 16.
No. 18–8111. Black v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–8112. Brown v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–8113. Arnaud v. Vannoy, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8114. Boyd v. Driver et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 722 Fed. Appx. 367.
No. 18–8115. Barrios v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
No. 18–8116. Michel v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 257 So. 3d 3.
No. 18–8130. Segoviano-Briseno v. United States. C. A.
5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 746 Fed. Appx. 399.
No. 18–8254. Phillips v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari
denied.
No. 18–948. In re Grand Jury Subpoena. C. A. D. C. Cir.
Motion of respondent for leave to fle a supplemental brief under
seal granted. Motion of petitioner for leave to fle a supplemental
reply brief under seal with redacted copies for the public record
granted in part; the supplemental reply brief will be fled under
seal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 749 Fed. Appx. 1.
No. 18–990. Raghavendra v. Booth et al. C. A. 2d Cir.
Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.
Rehearing Denied
No. 17–7818. In re West, 583 U. S. 1178;
No. 17–9227. Geray v. Muniz, Warden, 586 U. S. 849;
ORDERS 1259
586 U. S. March 25, 2019
No. 18–6051. Bender v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division, 586 U. S. 991;
No. 18–6218. Linden v. Davis, Director, Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
586 U. S. 1052;
No. 18–6478. In re Gaitor, 586 U. S. 1067;
No. 18–6540. Rayan v. Georgia, 586 U. S. 1085;
No. 18–6607. Peters v. Baldwin, 586 U. S. 1087;
No. 18–6710. Tyler v. Main Industries, Inc., et al., 586
U. S. 1119;
No. 18–6740. Lasher v. Bureau of Professional and Occupational
Affairs, Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy,
586 U. S. 1128;
No. 18–6945. Washington v. Frauenheim, Warden, 586
U. S. 1129;
No. 18–6996. Curshen v. United States, 586 U. S. 1120;
No. 18–7027. Kuri v. Addictive Behavioral Change
Health Group et al., 586 U. S. 1159; and
No. 18–7066. Jones v. United States, 586 U. S. 1121. Petitions
for rehearing denied.
No. 91–8199. Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129. Motion
for leave to fle petition for rehearing denied. The Chief Justice
took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
No. 18–6717. Lei Yin v. Thermo Fisher Scientic, 586
U. S. 1109. Petition for rehearing denied. The Chief Justice
took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
I N D E X
(Vol. 586 U. S.)
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967.
Numerosity limitation—Inapplicability to government employers.—
State and local governments are covered employers under Act regardless
of number of employees they have. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido,
p. 1.
ANTIDISCRIMINATION. See Taxes.
ANTITRUST LAW. See Federal Arbitration Act.
ARBITRATION. See Federal Arbitration Act.
ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT.
1. Elements of crime of burglary.—Act's term “burglary” includes burglary
of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily
used for overnight accommodation. United States v. Stitt, p. 27.
2. Elements of Florida's state-law robbery crime—Evaluation under
ACCA.—Act's elements clause encompasses a robbery offense that, like
Florida's law, requires criminal to overcome victim's resistance. Stokeling
v. United States, p. 73.
ATTORNEY'S FEES. See Social Security Act.
AWARD OF COSTS. See Copyright Law.
BENEFIT PLANS AND PAYMENTS. See Social Security Act.
BURGLARY. See Armed Career Criminal Act.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871. See Qualifed Immunity from Suit.
CLASS ACTIONS. See Standing.
CLASS CERTIFICATION. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
COLLECTION OF DEBTS. See Debt Collection.
COMPENSATION. See Taxes.
CONFIDENTIALITY. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
1261
1262 INDEX
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Qualifed Immunity from Suit.
I. Cruel and unusual punishment
1. Death penalty—Inmate suffering from dementia.—Eighth Amendment
may permit executing a prisoner even if he cannot remember committing
his crime but it may prohibit executing a prisoner who suffers
from dementia or another disorder rather than psychotic delusions. Madison
v. Alabama, p. 265.
2. Death penalty—Intellectual disability.—Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals' redetermination that Moore does not have an intellectual disability
and is thus eligible for death penalty is inconsistent with Moore v.
Texas, 581 U. S. 1. Moore v. Texas, p. 133.
II. Excessive fnes
Constitutional protection incorporated to the States—Due process.—
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection
applicable to States under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Timbs v. Indiana, p. 146.
III. Right to counsel
Application of presumption of prejudice.—Presumption of prejudice
for Sixth Amendment purposes recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U. S. 470, applies regardless of whether a defendant has signed an appeal
waiver. Garza v. Idaho, p. 232.
CONTRACT LAW. See Federal Arbitration Act.
COPYRIGHT LAW.
1. Award of costs in copyright litigation—Limitation on discretion by
court to award “full costs.”—A federal district court's discretion to award
“full costs” to a party in copyright litigation pursuant to 17 U. S. C. § 505
is limited to six categories specifed in general costs statute codifed at 28
U. S. C. §§ 1821 and 1920. Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., p. 334.
2. Point at which registration occurs—Effect on commencement of infringement
suit.—Registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence
an infringement suit, when Copyright Offce registers a copyright.
Fourth Estate Pub. Beneft Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, p. 296.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Armed Career Criminal Act; Immigration
Law.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. See Constitutional Law.
DEATH IN OFFICE. See Judges.
DEATH PENALTY. See Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus.
INDEX 1263
DEBT COLLECTION.
Defnition of “debt collector”—Nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.—
A business engaged in no more than nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings
is not a “debt collector” under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, except
for limited purpose of enforcing security interests under 15 U. S. C.
§ 1692f(6). Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, p. 466.
DEMENTIA. See Constitutional Law.
DEPORTATION. See Immigration Law.
DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law.
ELEMENTS OF A CRIME. See Armed Career Criminal Act.
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS. See Federal Arbitration Act.
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973.
Designation of critical habitat for listed species—Judicial review of
Interior Secretary's decision.—An area is eligible for designation as “critical
habitat” under Act only if it is habitat for listed species; and Secretary's
decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat under 16 U. S. C.
§ 1533(b)(2) is subject to judicial review. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United
States Fish and Wildlife Serv., p. 9.
ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS. See Federal Arbitration Act.
EQUITABLE TOLLING. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law.
EXECUTION OF THE INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED. See Constitutional
Law.
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.
1. Contracts of employment for transportation-worker class—Triggering
of § 1's exception to general rule.—A court should determine whether
Act's § 1 exclusion for disputes involving “contracts of employment” of certain
transportation workers applies before ordering arbitration; here,
truck driver Oliveira's independent contractor operating agreement with
New Prime falls within that exception. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira,
p. 105.
2. Threshold arbitrability questions—Groundless exception to arbitrability.—“
Wholly groundless” exception to general rule that courts must
enforce contracts that delegate threshold arbitrability questions to an arbitrator,
not a court, is inconsistent with Act and this Court's precedent.
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., p. 63.
1264 INDEX
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES. See Taxes.
FEDERAL PENSION BENEFITS. See Taxes.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Filing deadlines—Equitable tolling—Class certification.—Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f ), which establishes a 14-day deadline to seek
permission to appeal an order granting or denying class certifcation, is
not subject to equitable tolling. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, p. 188.
FILING DEADLINES. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FLORIDA. See Armed Career Criminal Act.
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS. See Debt Collection.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976. See International
Organizations Immunities Act of 1945.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law; Qualifed
Immunity from Suit.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE. See Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act.
GENERAL COSTS STATUTE. See Copyright Law.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS. See Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.
HABEAS CORPUS.
Evaluation of intellectual disability—Improper reliance on Court
precedent.—Because Hill's intellectual disability claim must be evaluated
based solely on holdings of this Court that were clearly established when
state-court decisions were rendered, see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1), Sixth Circuit's
reliance on Moore v. Texas, 581 U. S. 1—which was handed down
much later—was plainly improper. Shoop v. Hill, p. 45.
IMMIGRATION LAW.
Mandatory detention of deportable aliens—Immediate arrest upon release
from jail.—Ninth Circuit's judgments—that respondents, who are
deportable for certain specifed crimes, are not subject to 8 U. S. C.
§ 1226(c)(2)'s mandatory-detention requirement because they were not arrested
by immigration offcials as soon as they were released from jail—
are reversed, and cases are remanded. Nielsen v. Preap, p. 392.
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. See International Organizations Immunities
Act of 1945.
INCORPORATION. See Constitutional Law.
INDEX 1265
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. See Federal Arbitration Act.
INDIAN LAW. See Taxes.
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY. See Constitutional Law.
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED CRIMINALS. See Habeas Corpus.
INTERIOR SECRETARY. See Endangered Species Act of 1973.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1945.
Immunity from foreign suits—Similarity to Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.—Act affords international organizations same immunity
from suit that foreign governments enjoy today under Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976. Jam v. International Finance Corp., p. 199.
JUDGES.
Death of sitting judge—Effect on vote in case.—Ninth Circuit erred
when it counted as a member of majority a judge who died before court's
opinion in this case was fled. Yovino v. Rizo, p. 181.
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE. See Judges.
JUDICIAL REMAND. See Standing.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS. See Endangered
Species Act of 1973.
LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT.
Commercial sale of invention to third-party—Invention “on sale” before
patent application effective fling date.—Sale of an invention to a
third party who is obligated to keep invention confdential may place invention
“on sale” for purposes of Act, which bars a person from receiving
a patent on an invention that was “in public use, on sale, or otherwise
available to the public before the effective fling date of the claimed invention,”
35 U. S. C. § 102(a)(1). Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc., p. 123.
LEGAL FEES AND COSTS. See Copyright Law.
LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS. See Constitutional Law.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. See Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.
MARITIME LAW.
Integration of part into fnal product—Product dangerousness—Duty
to warn.—In maritime tort context, a product manufacturer has a duty to
warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, manufacturer
knows or has reason to know that integrated product is likely to be dan1266
INDEX
MARITIME LAW—Continued.
gerous for its intended uses, and manufacturer has no reason to believe
that product's users will realize that danger. Air & Liquid Systems Corp.
v. DeVries, p. 446.
NOTICE OF APPEAL. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
ON-THE-JOB INJURIES. See Taxes.
PATENT LAW. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY. See Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act.
PREJUDICE. See Constitutional Law.
PRISONERS RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law.
PRODUCT LIABILITY. See Maritime Law.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
Response to domestic violence incident—Question of violation of
clearly established law.—Ninth Circuit failed to conduct analysis required
by this Court's precedents in determining whether two Escondido police
offcers were entitled to qualifed immunity. Escondido v. Emmons, p. 38.
REGISTRATION OF COPYRIGHTS. See Copyright Law.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law.
ROBBERY. See Armed Career Criminal Act.
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. See Endangered Species Act
of 1973.
SECTION 1983. See Qualifed Immunity from Suit.
SIXTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law.
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT.
Regulation of attorney's fees—Question of reasonableness.—Act's fee
cap of 25% of past-due benefts imposed on attorneys who successfully
represent Title II beneft claimants in court proceedings applies only to
fees for court representation and not to aggregate fees for both court and
agency representation. Culbertson v. Berryhill, p. 53.
STANDING.
Question of standing—Class action settlement.—This class action settlement
case is remanded for courts below to address plaintiffs' standing
in light of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330. Frank v. Gaos, p. 485.
STATE DISCRIMINATION. See Taxes.
INDEX 1267
STATE GOVERNMENTS. See Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.
STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. See Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION. See Federal Rules of Civi l
Procedure.
SUPREME COURT.
1. Retirement of Justice Kennedy, p. xi.
2. Appointment of Justice Kavanaugh, p. vii.
TAXES.
1. Preemption of fuel tax by treaty provision—Right to travel.—Supreme
Court of Washington's judgment—that “right to travel” provision
of 1855 Treaty Between United States and Yakama Nation of Indians preempts
State's fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den's importation of fuel by
public highway for sale within reservation—is affrmed. Washington
State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., p. 347.
2. State taxation of federal pension benefts—Antidiscrimination statute.—
By taxing federal pension benefts of U. S. Marshals Service retiree
Dawson, while exempting from taxation pension benefts of certain state
and local law enforcement offcers, West Virginia unlawfully discriminates
against Mr. Dawson as 4 U. S. C. § 111 forbids. Dawson v. Steager, p. 171.
3. Taxable compensation—Payment for lost time due to injury.—A
railroad's payment to an employee for working time lost due to an on-thejob
injury is taxable “compensation” under Railroad Retirement Tax Act.
BNSF R. Co. v. Loos, p. 310.
TEXAS. See Constitutional Law.
TITLE II BENEFITS. See Social Security Act.
TRANSPORTATION WORKERS. See Federal Arbitration Act.
TREATIES. See Taxes.
VIOLENT FELONIES. See Armed Career Criminal Act.
WORDS AND PHRASES.
1. “[B]urglary.” Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
United States v. Stitt, p. 27.
2. “[C]ontracts of employment.” Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1.
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, p. 105.
3. “[C]ritical habitat.” Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U. S. C.
§ 1533(a)(3)(A)(i). Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife
Serv., p. 9.
1268 INDEX
WORDS AND PHRASES—Continued.
4. “[O]n sale.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U. S. C. § 102(a)(1).
Helsinn Healthcare S. A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., p. 123.
5. “[C]ompensation.” Railroad Retirement Tax Act. BNSF R. Co. v.
Loos, p. 310.
6. “[D]ebt collector.” Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1692f(6). Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, p. 466
7. “[F]ull costs.” Copyright Act, 17 U. S. C. § 505. Rimini Street, Inc.
v. Oracle USA, Inc., p. 334.