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2. *Guantanamo Bay detainees—Change in facts underlying petition.*—This habeas case is remanded for a determination, in first instance, of what further proceedings in Court of Appeals or in District Court are necessary and appropriate for full and prompt disposition in light of change in underlying facts, namely that most of Guantanamo Bay detainees at issue have accepted resettlement offers in other countries, while a few have rejected such offers. *Kiyemba v. Obama*, p. 131.

3. *Jury selection—Peremptory challenge—Clearly established federal rule.*—No decision of this Court clearly establishes a categorical rule that a judge, in ruling on objection to a peremptory challenge under *Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U. S. 79, must reject a demeanor-based explanation for challenge unless judge personally observed and recalls aspect of prospective juror’s demeanor on which explanation is based; and by apparently concluding that either *Batson* itself or *Snyder v. Louisiana*, 552 U. S. 472, clearly established such a rule, Fifth Circuit read far too much into those decisions. *Thaler v. Haynes*, p. 43.

4. *Unreasonable application of federal law—Declaration of mistrial.*—Because Michigan Supreme Court’s decision that judge in respondent’s trial had not abused her discretion in declaring a mistrial because of a deadlocked jury was not “an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law” under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1), Sixth Circuit erred in granting Lett habeas relief. *Renico v. Lett*, p. 766.

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INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940.

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2. *Diversity jurisdiction—Corporate domicile.*—Phrase “principal place of business” in 28 U. S. C. § 1332(c)(1) refers to place where a corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate corporation’s activi-

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ties, *i. e.*, its “nerve center,” which will typically be found at a corporation’s headquarters. *Hertz Corp. v. Friend*, p. 77.

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