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4. “Violent felony”; “[a] crime [that] involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. §§ 924(e)(1), (e)(2)(b)(ii). *Chambers v. United States*, p. 122.