

## INDEX

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**ABATEMENT OF INTEREST.** See **Jurisdiction**, 2.

**ABORTION RIGHTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III.

**AID TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS.** See **Impact Aid Act**.

**ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996.** See **Supreme Court**, 6.

**ANTITRUST LAW.**

*Sherman Act—Stating a conspiracy claim.*—Stating a claim under § 1 of Act requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made; an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice; under this standard, respondents' claim of conspiracy in restraint of trade by petitioner telecommunications firms comes up short. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, p. 544.

**APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES.**  
See **Individuals with Disabilities Education Act**.

**ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT.** See **Criminal Law**.

**ATTEMPTED BURGLARY.** See **Criminal Law**.

**AUTOMOBILE CHASES.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 1.

**BANKS.** See **National Bank Act**.

**BAN ON PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III.

**BURGLARY.** See **Criminal Law**.

**CAPITAL MURDER.** See **Constitutional Law**, II; **Habeas Corpus**, 1, 2.

**CAR CHASES.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 1.

**CERTIORARI.** See **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Supreme Court**, 5, 6.

**CHARGING PERIOD FOR TITLE VII CLAIMS.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964**.

**CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES.** See **Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.**

**CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 1.

**CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.**

*Title VII—Sex discrimination—Pay discrimination claim—180-day charging period.*—Because later effects of past discrimination do not restart clock for filing a Title VII charge with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Ledbetter's claim was untimely when filed more than 180 days after alleged discriminatory pay decisions, even though her subsequent pay continued to be affected by those decisions. *Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.*, p. 618.

**COMMERCE CLAUSE.** See **Constitutional Law**, I.

**COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934.**

*Telephone communications regulation—Payphone operator's compensation.*—Federal Communications Commission's conclusion—that a long-distance communications carrier's refusal to compensate a payphone operator when a caller uses that operator's payphone to obtain free access to carrier is a "practice . . . that is unjust or unreasonable" under § 201(b) of Act—is lawful; § 207, which authorizes any person "damaged" by a § 201(b) violation to bring a federal-court damages suit, authorizes suit in this case. *Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.*, p. 45.

**COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY.** See **National Bank Act.**

**CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995.** See **Jurisdiction**, 1.

**CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.** See **Antitrust Law.**

**CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.**

**I. Commerce Clause.**

*Discrimination against interstate commerce—Solid waste disposal.*—Respondent counties' flow control ordinances requiring trash haulers to deliver solid waste to respondent authority's processing facilities treat in-state and out-of-state private business interests same way and do not discriminate against interstate commerce. *United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority*, p. 330.

**II. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.**

*Texas capital sentencing scheme—Special issues.*—Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made errors of federal law in analyzing Smith's challenge to special issues used at his capital sentencing hearing, and those

**CONSTITUTIONAL LAW**—Continued.

errors cannot be predicate for requiring Smith to show egregious harm to obtain relief. *Smith v. Texas*, p. 297.

**III. Right to Abortion.**

*Partial-birth abortion ban.*—Respondent abortion doctors and advocacy groups have not demonstrated that federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, as a facial matter, is void for vagueness, or that it imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to abortion based on its overbreadth or lack of a health exception. *Gonzales v. Carhart*, p. 124.

**IV. Searches and Seizures.**

1. *High-speed motor chase—Motorist forced off road.*—Because video shows that car chase respondent motorist initiated posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others, deputy's attempt to terminate chase by forcing respondent off road was reasonable, and he is thus entitled to summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. §1983 suit. *Scott v. Harris*, p. 372.

2. *Valid warrant—Suspects and respondents of different races.*—Fourth Amendment was not violated where respondents' house was searched by deputies executing a valid warrant for possibly armed suspects of a race different from respondents' and where officers ordered sleeping respondents out of bed and required them to stand unclothed for a few minutes while securing premises. *Los Angeles County v. Rettele*, p. 609.

**CRIMINAL LAW.**

*Armed Career Criminal Act—Mandatory minimum prison term—"Violent felony"—Attempted burglary.*—Attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is a "violent felony" for purposes of Armed Career Criminal Act, which provides a 15-year mandatory minimum prison term for a defendant, convicted of possessing a firearm, who has three prior "violent felony" convictions, 18 U.S.C. §924(e). *James v. United States*, p. 192.

**CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.** See **Constitutional Law, II.**

**DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE.** See **Constitutional Law, I.**

**DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964.**

**DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964.**

**DISCRIMINATION IN PAY.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964.**

**DISPOSAL OF SOLID WASTE.** See **Constitutional Law, I.**

**EIGHTH AMENDMENT.** See **Constitutional Law**, II.

**EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964**.

**FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.**

Amendment to Rules, p. 983.

**FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE.**

Amendments to Rules, p. 989.

**FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.**

Amendments to Rules, p. 1003.

**FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.**

Amendments to Rules, p. 1165.

**FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS.** See **National Bank Act**.

**FLORIDA.** See **Criminal Law**.

**FOURTH AMENDMENT.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV.

**FREE EDUCATION.** See **Individuals with Disabilities Education Act**.

**GAS PEDALS.** See **Patents**, 1.

**HABEAS CORPUS.** See also **Supreme Court**, 6.

1. *Capital murder—Jury instructions—Consideration of mitigating evidence.*—Because there is a reasonable likelihood that Texas trial court's instructions prevented jurors from giving meaningful consideration to constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' merits adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). *Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman*, p. 233.

2. *Capital murder—State capital sentencing scheme—Consideration of mitigating evidence.*—Because Texas capital sentencing statute, as interpreted by State's Court of Criminal Appeals, impermissibly prevented Brewer's jury from giving meaningful consideration and effect to constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, appeals court's decision denying Brewer relief under *Penry v. Lynaugh*, 492 U. S. 302, was both "contrary to" and "involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law," 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). *Brewer v. Quarterman*, p. 286.

3. *Evidentiary hearing—Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.*—District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing to respondent federal habeas applicant on ground that he could not make out a colorable ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. *Schriro v. Landrigan*, p. 465.

**HIGH-SPEED MOTOR CHASES.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV, 1.

**IMPACT AID ACT.**

*Public school funding—Calculation method.*—In determining whether a State's public school funding program "equalizes expenditures" for purposes of Federal Impact Aid Program, Secretary of Education is permitted to identify school districts that should be "disregard[ed]" from calculation by looking to number of district's pupils as well as to size of district's expenditures per pupil. *Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Education*, p. 81.

**INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT.**

*Parents' rights—Dismissal for lack of counsel.*—Act grants parents independent, enforceable rights, which encompass entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their child; because parents enjoying such rights are entitled to prosecute claims on their own behalf, Sixth Circuit erred in dismissing petitioner parents' appeal for lack of counsel. *Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist.*, p. 516.

**INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.** See **Habeas Corpus**, 3.

**INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS.** See **Patents**.

**INTEREST ABATEMENT.** See **Jurisdiction**, 2.

**INTERSTATE COMMERCE.** See **Constitutional Law**, I.

**JURISDICTION.**

1. *Supreme Court—Congressional Accountability Act of 1995.*—Appeal is dismissed because, absent a constitutional holding below, this Court lacks jurisdiction under 2 U. S. C. § 1412's authorization of direct review of "any . . . judgment . . . upon the constitutionality of any provision" of Act; treating jurisdictional statement as a certiorari petition, petition is denied. *Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson*, p. 511.

2. *Tax Court—Interest abatement.*—Tax Court provides exclusive forum for judicial review of a failure to abate, under 26 U. S. C. § 6404(e)(1), interest accrued on unpaid income taxes. *Hinck v. United States*, p. 501.

**JURY INSTRUCTIONS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II; **Habeas Corpus**, 1, 2.

**LONG-DISTANCE COMMUNICATIONS.** See **Communications Act of 1934**.

**MINIMUM PRISON TERM.** See **Criminal Law**.

**MITIGATING EVIDENCE.** See **Habeas Corpus**, 1, 2.

**MURDER.** See **Constitutional Law**, II; **Habeas Corpus**, 1, 2.

**NATIONAL BANK ACT.**

*Mortgage lending business—Supervisory authority.*—Wachovia's mortgage lending business, whether conducted by bank itself or through bank's operating subsidiary, is subject to superintendence by Comptroller of Currency's office, and not to licensing, reporting, and visitorial regimes of States in which subsidiary operates. *Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A.*, p. 1.

**NINTH AMENDMENT.** See **Constitutional Law, III.**

**PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT OF 2003.** See **Constitutional Law, III.**

**PATENTS.**

1. *Gas pedal design—Infringement.*—In holding that a claimed gas pedal invention could be held “obvious,” and thus unpatentable under 35 U. S. C. § 103(a), absent some proven “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” that would have led a person of ordinary skill in that art to combine relevant prior art teachings in manner claimed, Federal Circuit addressed obviousness question in a narrow, rigid manner that is inconsistent with § 103 and this Court's precedents. *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, p. 398.

2. *Windows operating system installed on foreign-made computers—Infringement.*—Because Microsoft does not export from United States copies of its Windows operating system that are installed on foreign-made computers at issue, Microsoft does not “suppl[y] . . . from the United States” “components” of those computers, and therefore is not liable to AT&T for patent infringement under 35 U. S. C. § 271(f) as currently written. *Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.*, p. 437.

**PAY DISCRIMINATION.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964.**

**PAYPHONE OPERATOR COMPENSATION.** See **Communications Act of 1934.**

**PRISON TERM.** See **Criminal Law.**

**PRIVACY RIGHTS.** See **Constitutional Law, III.**

**PUBLIC EDUCATION.** See **Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; Impact Aid Act.**

**PUBLIC SCHOOL FUNDING.** See **Impact Aid Act.**

**RESTRAINT OF TRADE.** See **Antitrust Law.**

**SCHOOL FUNDING.** See **Impact Aid Act.**

**SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.** See **Constitutional Law, IV.**

**SEX DISCRIMINATION.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964.**

**SHERMAN ACT.** See **Antitrust Law.**

**SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL.** See **Constitutional Law, I.**

**SPECIAL-ISSUE JURY INSTRUCTIONS.** See **Constitutional Law, II.**

**STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.** See **Taxes.**

**SUPREME COURT.** See also **Jurisdiction, 1.**

1. Amendment to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, p. 983.

2. Amendments to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, p. 989.

3. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 1003.

4. Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, p. 1165.

5. *Certiorari*.—Both applicants' request for an extension of time in which to file a petition for rehearing of this Court's order denying certiorari and their request for suspension of order denying certiorari are denied. *Boumediene v. Bush* (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers), p. 1301.

6. *Certiorari—Habeas corpus review*.—Certiorari to test whether Eighth Circuit's application of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's stringent review standard was consistent with this Court's interpretation of that statute is dismissed as improvidently granted because District Court erroneously dismissed respondent's pre-AEDPA petition. *Roper v. Weaver*, p. 598.

**TAX COURT.** See **Jurisdiction, 2.**

**TAXES.** See also **Jurisdiction, 2.**

*Levy on third party's property—Taxes owed by another*.—In challenging Internal Revenue Service's levy upon petitioner trust's funds to collect taxes owed by another, trust may not bring a tax refund action under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1), which has a 2-year limitations period, when it had an opportunity to utilize 26 U. S. C. § 7426(a)(1)'s wrongful levy procedure, but missed that statute's 9-month deadline. *EC Term of Years Trust v. United States*, p. 429.

**TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS.** See **Communications Act of 1934.**

**TEXAS.** See **Constitutional Law, II; Habeas Corpus, 1, 2.**

**TITLE VII.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964.**

**TRADE RESTRAINTS.** See **Antitrust Law.**

**TRASH DISPOSAL.** See **Constitutional Law, I.**

**VIDEO OF CAR CHASE.** See **Constitutional Law, IV, 1.**

**VIOLENT FELONY.** See **Criminal Law.**

**WASTE DISPOSAL.** See **Constitutional Law, I.**

**WINDOWS OPERATING SYSTEM.** See **Patents, 2.**

**WOMAN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE ABORTION.** See **Constitutional Law, III.**

**WORDS AND PHRASES.**

1. “*Any . . . judgment . . . upon the constitutionality of any provision.*” §412, Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U. S. C. § 1412. Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, p. 511.

2. “*Disregard.*” Impact Aid Act, 20 U. S. C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i). Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Education, p. 81.

3. “*Obvious.*” 35 U. S. C. § 103(a). KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., p. 398.

4. “*Practice . . . that is unjust or unreasonable.*” § 201(b), Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. § 201(b). Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., p. 45.

5. “*Suppl[y] . . . from the United States*” “*components.*” Patent Act, 35 U. S. C. § 271(f). Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., p. 437.

6. “*Violent felony.*” Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e). James v. United States, p. 192.

**WRONGFUL LEVY.** See **Taxes.**