

INDEX

- ABORTIONS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IX; **Stays**, 1.
- ACTUAL INNOCENCE.** See **Habeas Corpus**, 1.
- ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.** See **Federal Rules of Evidence**.
- AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.** See **Constitutional Law**, II.
- AIRPORT TERMINALS.** See **Constitutional Law**, VIII, 1, 2.
- ALLOCATION OF POWERS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, XI.
- AMATEUR ATHLETICS.** See **Stays**, 2.
- APPORTIONMENT.** See **Constitutional Law**, I.
- ASSEMBLY AND PARADE ORDINANCES.** See **Constitutional Law**, VIII, 3.
- ATTORNEY'S FEES.**
Enhancement of award under Solid Waste Disposal Act and Clean Water Act.—A court may not enhance fees awarded under Acts above “lodestar” amount to reflect fact that a party’s attorneys were retained on a contingent-fee basis. *Burlington v. Dague*, p. 557.
- BAN ON LITERATURE DISTRIBUTION.** See **Constitutional Law**, VIII, 1.
- BAN ON SOLICITATION.** See **Constitutional Law**, VIII, 2.
- BEACHFRONT PROPERTY MANAGEMENT.** See **Constitutional Law**, V.
- BIAS-MOTIVATED CRIME STATUTES.** See **Constitutional Law**, VIII, 4.
- BUSINESS TAXES.** See **Constitutional Law**, III; **Taxes**.
- CALIFORNIA.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV; VI, 1.
- CAPITAL MURDER.** See **Constitutional Law**, II; **Habeas Corpus**, 1.
- CIGARETTES.** See **Constitutional Law**, XII.

CLEAN WATER ACT. See **Attorney's Fees.**

CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE STANDARD. See **Habeas Corpus**, 1.

CLERGY-LED PRAYERS. See **Constitutional Law**, VII.

COMMERCE CLAUSE. See **Constitutional Law**, III.

COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL. See **Constitutional Law**, IV.

CONDEMNATION. See **Constitutional Law**, V.

CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT. See **Constitutional Law**, I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

I. Apportionment.

Allocation of overseas federal employees—Equal representation.—Allocating overseas federal employees to their home States when apportioning congressional representatives among States is consistent with constitutional language and goal of equal representation. *Franklin v. Massachusetts*, p. 788.

II. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

Death penalty—Weighing State—Consideration of invalid aggravating factor.—If a weighing State requires a trial court to pay deference to a jury's sentencing recommendation in determining appropriate sentence, jury's consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance unconstitutionally infects court's sentencing determination. *Espinosa v. Florida*, p. 1079.

III. Discrimination Against Foreign Commerce.

Iowa business tax—Dividends from foreign subsidiaries.—Iowa's business tax on corporations—which allows a deduction for dividends received from domestic, but not foreign, subsidiaries—facially discriminates against foreign commerce in violation of Foreign Commerce Clause. *Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue and Finance*, p. 71.

IV. Due Process.

Competence to stand trial—Burden of proof.—Due Process Clause permits a State to require that a defendant claiming incompetence to stand trial—here, for first-degree murder—bear burden of proving such incompetence by a preponderance of evidence; a presumption of competence also does not violate Clause. *Medina v. California*, p. 437.

V. Eminent Domain.

Loss of economic value—Beachfront property.—Where South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act in effect barred petitioner from erecting permanent structures on two residential lots, State Supreme Court erred

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.

in applying “harmful or noxious uses” principle to determine whether Act’s dramatic effect on property’s economic value accomplished a taking of private property under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. *Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council*, p. 1003.

VI. Equal Protection of the Laws.

1. *California property tax assessment*.—Acquisition-value assessment scheme used to value real property under Article XIII A of California Constitution, which was added by Proposition 13, does not violate Equal Protection Clause. *Nordlinger v. Hahn*, p. 1.

2. *Jury selection—Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by criminal defendant*.—Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on racial grounds in exercising peremptory challenges. *Georgia v. McCollum*, p. 42.

3. *Segregation in public higher education—Standard to determine compliance—Justification for policies*.—In determining whether Mississippi has brought itself into compliance with Equal Protection Clause in desegregating its higher education system, correct legal standard is whether State has perpetuated policies and practices traceable to its prior *de jure* dual system that continue to have segregative effects and whether such policies are without sound educational justification and can be practicably eliminated; using that standard, Mississippi must justify several policies that may be race neutral on their face but substantially restrict a person’s choice of which institution to enter and contribute to racial identifiability of eight public universities. *United States v. Fordice*, p. 717.

VII. Establishment of Religion.

Establishment of religion—Public school prayer—Graduation ceremonies.—Inclusion of clergy to offer prayers as part of an official public school graduation ceremony is forbidden by Establishment Clause. *Lee v. Weisman*, p. 577.

VIII. Freedom of Speech.

1. *Airport terminal—Ban on literature distribution*.—Court of Appeals’ decision that a ban on distribution of literature in respondent Port Authority’s airport terminals is invalid under First Amendment is affirmed. *Lee v. International Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc.*, p. 830.

2. *Airport terminal—Ban on solicitation*.—Since an airport terminal operated by a public authority is a nonpublic forum, a ban on solicitation need only satisfy a reasonableness standard; such a ban imposed by respondent Port Authority was reasonable, and thus its application to peti-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.

tioner religious corporation did not deprive petitioner's members of their First Amendment rights. *International Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee*, p. 672.

3. *Assembly and parade ordinance—Government official's discretion.*—County's assembly and parade ordinance—which permits a government administrator to vary fee for assembling or parading to reflect estimated cost of maintaining public order—is invalid because it unconstitutionally ties fee amount to speech's content and lacks adequate procedural safeguards. *Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement*, p. 123.

4. *Cross burning—Prosecution under city's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.*—City ordinance—which prohibits display of a symbol that one knows or has reason to know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others" on basis of, *inter alia*, race and under which petitioner was charged for allegedly burning a cross on a black family's lawn—is facially invalid under First Amendment. *R. A. V. v. St. Paul*, p. 377.

IX. Right to Abortion.

Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.—Court of Appeals' decision striking down Act's husband notification provision but otherwise upholding Act is affirmed in part and reversed in part. *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey*, p. 833.

X. Right to Speedy Trial.

Federal drug charges—Lag between indictment and arrest.—A delay of 8½ years between petitioner's indictment and arrest on federal drug charges violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. *Doggett v. United States*, p. 647.

XI. States' Powers.

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985—Incentives to States.—While Congress has substantial power to encourage States to provide for radioactive waste disposal, Constitution does not give Congress ability to compel States to do so; thus, Act's monetary incentives and access incentives provisions are consistent with Constitution's allocation of power between Federal and State Governments, but take-title provision is not. *New York v. United States*, p. 144.

XII. Supremacy Clause.

Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965—Pre-emption of state common-law claims.—Act did not pre-empt state-law damages action against cigarette manufacturer for death of petitioner's mother, but superseded only positive enactments by state and federal rulemaking bodies mandating particular warnings on cigarette labels or in cigarette advertisements. *Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.*, p. 504.

- CONTINGENT-FEE AGREEMENTS.** See **Attorney's Fees.**
- CORPORATE TAXES.** See **Constitutional Law, III; Taxes.**
- CRIMINAL LAW.** See **Constitutional Law, II; IV; VI, 2; VIII, 4; X; Federal Rules of Evidence; Habeas Corpus.**
- CROSS BURNING.** See **Constitutional Law, VIII, 4.**
- CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.** See **Constitutional Law, II.**
- DEATH PENALTY.** See **Constitutional Law, II; Habeas Corpus, 1.**
- DE JURE SEGREGATION.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 3.**
- DELAY IN TRIAL.** See **Constitutional Law, X.**
- DESEGREGATION.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 3.**
- DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FOREIGN COMMERCE.** See **Constitutional Law, III.**
- DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 2.**
- DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 3.**
- DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF RACE.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 2, 3.**
- DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE.** See **Constitutional Law, XI.**
- DRUGS.** See **Constitutional Law, X.**
- DUE PROCESS.** See **Constitutional Law, IV; Habeas Corpus, 2.**
- ECONOMIC VALUE OF LAND.** See **Constitutional Law, V.**
- EDUCATION.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 3.**
- EIGHTH AMENDMENT.** See **Constitutional Law, II.**
- EMINENT DOMAIN.** See **Constitutional Law, V.**
- EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES.** See **Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.**
- ENHANCEMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.** See **Attorney's Fees.**
- EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.** See **Constitutional Law, VI.**
- EQUAL REPRESENTATION.** See **Constitutional Law, I.**
- ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE.** See **Constitutional Law, VII.**

EVIDENCE. See **Federal Rules of Evidence.**

FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT OF 1965. See **Constitutional Law, XII.**

FEDERAL COURTS. See **Jurisdiction.**

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES. See **Constitutional Law, I.**

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.

Exception to hearsay rule—Admission of grand jury testimony.—Rule 804(b)(1)'s requirement that an unavailable witness' testimony from a prior hearing may not be introduced without a showing that party against whom it is now offered had a "similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination" does not evaporate when Government obtains immunized testimony in a grand jury proceeding from a witness who refuses to testify at trial. *United States v. Salerno*, p. 317.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See **Constitutional Law, XI; XII; Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970; Taxes.**

FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES. See **Attorney's Fees.**

FIFTH AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law, V.**

FIRST AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law, VII; VIII.**

FIRST-DEGREE MURDER. See **Constitutional Law, IV.**

FLORIDA. See **Constitutional Law, II.**

FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE. See **Constitutional Law, III.**

FORFEITURE. See **Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.**

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law, IV–VI.**

FRANCHISE TAXES. See **Taxes.**

FREEDOM OF SPEECH. See **Constitutional Law, VIII.**

GEORGIA. See **Constitutional Law, VI, 2.**

GRADUATION CEREMONIES. See **Constitutional Law, VII.**

GRAND JURY TESTIMONY. See **Federal Rules of Evidence.**

HABEAS CORPUS.

1. *Successive, abusive, or defaulted claim—Actual innocence—Clear and convincing evidence.*—A petitioner bringing a successive, abusive, or defaulted federal habeas claim can show that he is "actually innocent" of

HABEAS CORPUS—Continued.

death penalty so that a court may reach his claim's merits only if he shows by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for death penalty under applicable state law; here, petitioner failed to show actual innocence. *Sawyer v. Whitley*, p. 333.

2. *Sufficiency of evidence to support conviction*.—Court of Appeals' decision, on federal habeas, that evidence against respondent was insufficient, as a matter of due process, to support his state-court conviction for grand larceny, is reversed. *Wright v. West*, p. 277.

"HARMFUL OR NOXIOUS USES" PRINCIPLE. See **Constitutional Law**, V.

HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL. See **Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970**.

HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS. See **Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970**.

HEARSAY. See **Federal Rules of Evidence**.

HIGHER EDUCATION SEGREGATION. See **Constitutional Law**, VI, 3.

ILLINOIS. See **Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970**.

INCOME TAXES. See **Taxes**.

INCOMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL. See **Constitutional Law**, IV.

INFRINGEMENT ON TRADE DRESS. See **Trademark Act of 1946**.

INJUNCTIONS. See **Stays**, 2.

INTEGRATION. See **Constitutional Law**, VI, 3.

IOWA. See **Constitutional Law**, III.

JURISDICTION.

Federal courts—Removal from state court—"Sue or be sued" clause.—Because "sue or be sued" clause in Red Cross' federal charter confers original federal jurisdiction over all cases to which Red Cross is a party, it was authorized to remove from state to federal court a tort action it was defending. *American Nat. Red Cross v. S. G.*, p. 247.

JURY SELECTION. See **Constitutional Law**, VI, 2.

JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE. See **Constitutional Law**, V.

LAND VALUE. See **Constitutional Law**, V.

LANHAM ACT. See **Trademark Act of 1946.**

LARCENY. See **Habeas Corpus**, 2.

LITERATURE DISTRIBUTION. See **Constitutional Law**, VIII, 1.

LODESTAR. See **Attorney's Fees.**

LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT.

Forfeiture provision—Application when employer not currently subject to payments under Act.—Act's forfeiture provision—which provides that if workers settle third-party claims for injuries without their employer's written approval, all future benefits are forfeited—applies to a worker whose employer is neither paying compensation to worker nor yet subject to an order to pay under Act at time worker settles third-party claim. *Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co.*, p. 469.

LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1985. See **Constitutional Law**, XI.

MASSACHUSETTS. See **Constitutional Law**, I.

MISSISSIPPI. See **Constitutional Law**, VI, 3.

MURDER. See **Constitutional Law**, II; IV; **Habeas Corpus**, 1.

NINTH AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law**, IX.

NONPUBLIC FORUMS. See **Constitutional Law**, VIII, 2.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970.

Pre-emption of state law—Hazardous waste disposal—Worker training.—A state-law requirement that directly, substantially, and specifically regulates occupational safety and health is an occupational safety and health standard within meaning of Act regardless of whether it has another, nonoccupational purpose; Illinois licensing acts are pre-empted by Act to extent that they establish occupational safety and health standards for training those who work with hazardous wastes. *Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn.*, p. 88.

OLYMPIC GAMES. See **Stays**, 2.

OVERSEAS FEDERAL EMPLOYEES. See **Constitutional Law**, I.

PARADE ORDINANCES. See **Constitutional Law**, VIII, 3.

PENNSYLVANIA ABORTION CONTROL ACT OF 1982. See **Constitutional Law**, IX.

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. See **Constitutional Law**, VI, 2.

PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See **Constitutional Law**, VII.

- PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAW.** See **Constitutional Law, XII; Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.**
- PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE STANDARD.** See **Constitutional Law, IV.**
- PROPERTY RIGHTS.** See **Constitutional Law, V.**
- PROPERTY TAXES.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 1.**
- PROPOSITION 13.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 1.**
- PUBLIC FORUMS.** See **Constitutional Law, VIII, 2.**
- PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION SEGREGATION.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 3.**
- PUBLIC SCHOOL PRAYER.** See **Constitutional Law, VII.**
- RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 2, 3.**
- RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL.** See **Constitutional Law, XI.**
- REAPPORTIONMENT.** See **Constitutional Law, I.**
- REASONABLENESS STANDARD.** See **Constitutional Law, VIII, 2.**
- RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS.** See **Constitutional Law, VIII, 1, 2.**
- REMOVAL FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT.** See **Jurisdiction.**
- RESTAURANT TRADE DRESS.** See **Trademark Act of 1946.**
- RIGHT TO ABORTION.** See **Constitutional Law, IX; Stays, 1.**
- RIGHT TO PRIVACY.** See **Constitutional Law, IX; Stays, 1.**
- RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.** See **Constitutional Law, X.**
- RU-486.** See **Stays, 1.**
- SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS.** See **Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.**
- SCHOOL PRAYER.** See **Constitutional Law, VII.**
- SCHOOL SEGREGATION.** See **Constitutional Law, VI, 3.**
- SENTENCING.** See **Constitutional Law, II.**
- “SIMILAR MOTIVE” REQUIREMENT FOR ADMISSION OF HEARSAY.** See **Federal Rules of Evidence.**
- SIXTH AMENDMENT.** See **Constitutional Law, X.**
- SOLICITATION BAN.** See **Constitutional Law, VIII, 2.**

SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT. See **Attorney's Fees.**

SOUTH CAROLINA. See **Constitutional Law, V.**

SPEEDY TRIALS. See **Constitutional Law, X.**

STANDARDS OF PROOF. See **Constitutional Law, IV; Habeas Corpus, 1.**

STATE-LAW DAMAGES ACTIONS. See **Constitutional Law, XII.**

STATES' POWERS. See **Constitutional Law, XI.**

STATE TAXES. See **Constitutional Law, III; VI, 1; Taxes.**

STAYS.

1. *Confiscation of RU-486.*—Application to vacate stay of a District Court order compelling federal officials to return Benten's supply of RU-486—an abortion-inducing drug—to her is denied. *Benten v. Kessler*, p. 1084.

2. *Participation in Olympic trials.*—Applicant is granted a stay of a Court of Appeals' order staying a preliminary injunction that barred respondents from impeding or interfering with his ability to compete in 1992 United States Olympic Trials. *Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation (STEVENS, J., in chambers)*, p. 1301.

"SUE OR BE SUED" CLAUSES. See **Jurisdiction.**

SUPREMACY CLAUSE. See **Constitutional Law, XII.**

SUPREME COURT.

Term statistics, p. 1303.

TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE. See **Constitutional Law, V.**

TAXES. See also **Constitutional Law, III; VI, 1.**

Immunity from state corporate income taxes.—Wisconsin activities of a Chicago-based chewing gum manufacturer—which consisted of selling through a sales force consisting of a regional manager and various "field" managers—fell outside protection of 15 U. S. C. §381(a), which prohibits a State from taxing income of a corporation whose only business activities within State consist of soliciting orders for tangible goods, provided that orders are sent outside State for approval and goods are delivered from outside State. *Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.*, p. 214.

TENTH AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law, XI.**

THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS. See **Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.**

TORTS. See **Jurisdiction.**

TRADEMARK ACT OF 1946.

Trade dress infringement—Restaurants.—A restaurant's trade dress may be protected under Act, also known as Lanham Act, based on a finding of inherent distinctiveness, without proof that trade dress has secondary meaning. *Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.*, p. 763.

UNIVERSITY SEGREGATION. See **Constitutional Law**, VI, 3.

VOTING. See **Constitutional Law**, I.

WASTE DISPOSAL. See **Constitutional Law**, XI.

WISCONSIN. See **Taxes.**

WORKERS' COMPENSATION. See **Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.**