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5. “[S]eaman.” Jones Act, 46 U. S. C. App. § 688. *McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander*, p. 337.
6. “[W]itness in attendance.” 18 U. S. C. § 1821(a)(1). *Demarest v. Manspeaker*, p. 184.

WRIT OF CERTIORARI. See Supreme Court, 7, 8.

WRONGFUL-DEATH ACTIONS. See Admiralty.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 1.

ZONE OF INTERESTS. See Administrative Procedure Act.



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