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2. *Illegitimate child—Inheritance from father.*—Where (1) appellant's father died at a time when a Texas statute prohibited an illegitimate child from inheriting from father unless parents had subsequently married, (2) four months after father's death, *Trimble v. Gordon*, 430 U. S. 762, held such statutes unconstitutional, and (3) appellant then filed a state-court claim to a share in her father's estate, Fourteenth Amendment interest in avoiding unjustified discrimination against illegitimate children required that appellant's claim be protected by full applicability of *Trimble*. *Reed v. Campbell*, p. 852.

3. *Social Security Act—Survivor's benefits.*—Equal protection principles were not violated by Social Security Act's provision that authorized survivor's benefits to a wage earner's widowed spouse who remarried after age 60 but not to a similarly situated divorced widowed spouse who remarried. *Bowen v. Owens*, p. 340.

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5. *Veterans' preference in public employment—Validity of New York law.*—Where (1) New York law granted a civil service employment preference to New York residents who were honorably discharged military veterans, had served during time of war, and were New York residents when they entered military service, (2) appellee veterans, New York residents, were denied preference because they were not New York residents when they joined Army, (3) they brought an action alleging that residency requirement violated Equal Protection Clause and their constitutional right to travel, and (4) District Court dismissed complaint, Court of Appeals' reversal of District Court's judgment was affirmed. *Attorney General of N. Y. v. Soto-Lopez*, p. 898.

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Denial of cable television franchise—Dismissal of complaint.—Where respondent alleged a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights by petitioner city's refusal to grant respondent a cable television franchise and by petitioner Department of Water and Power's refusal to grant respondent access to power-line poles and underground conduits, District Court erred in dismissing complaint for failure to state a cause of action, since activities in which respondent sought to engage plainly implicated First Amendment interests and a fuller development of disputed factual issues was necessary. *Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.*, p. 488.

IX. Right to Abortion.

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sylvania abortion statute, Court of Appeals properly held to be unconstitutional provisions requiring, *inter alia*, (1) that a woman seeking an abortion be informed of specified matters, including availability of medical assistance, father's financial responsibilities if child was born, and detrimental effects and medical risks of an abortion, (2) that woman be furnished printed materials describing fetus and listing agencies offering alternatives to abortion, (3) that physician report such matters as woman's race, age, marital status, and prior pregnancies, and physician's basis for his determination, after first trimester, that child is not viable, (4) that a physician performing a postviability abortion use technique affording best opportunity for a live birth, unless it would present a significantly greater risk to woman's life or health, and (5) that a second physician attend a postviability abortion and take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve child's life and health. *Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists*, p. 747.

X. Right to Jury Trial.

1. *Fair-cross-section representation—Bifurcated trial—“Death qualification” at guilt phase.*—Removal for cause, prior to guilt phase rather than sentencing phase of a state-court bifurcated murder trial, of prospective jurors whose opposition to death penalty would prevent or substantially impair performance of their duties as jurors at sentencing phase, does not violate Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement. *Lockhart v. McCree*, p. 162.

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2. *EPA aerial observation of plant complex—Aerial photographs.*—Where (1) petitioner refused to permit Environmental Protection Agency to conduct an on-site inspection of petitioner's chemical plant complex, which was protected from ground-level public view, and (2) EPA did not then seek an administrative search warrant, but instead employed a com-

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mercial aerial photographer, using a standard precision aerial mapping camera, to take photographs of complex from various altitudes within lawful navigable airspace, EPA's use of aerial observation and photography was within its authority under Clean Air Act, and its taking of photographs was not a search prohibited by Fourth Amendment. *Dow Chemical Co. v. United States*, p. 227.

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1. *Accused's confession—Circumstances of interrogation—Admissibility of evidence.*—Where (1) prior to petitioner's murder trial, state court determined that his confession was voluntary and refused to suppress it, (2) at trial, petitioner sought to introduce testimony describing length of interrogation and manner in which it was conducted, thereby hoping to show that confession was unworthy of belief, and (3) court ruled that testimony was inadmissible as pertaining solely to issue of voluntariness, exclusion of testimony deprived petitioner of his fundamental constitutional right—whether under Due Process Clause, Compulsory Process Clause, or Confrontation Clause—to a fair opportunity to present a defense. *Crane v. Kentucky*, p. 683.

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2. *Income tax—Business expense—Slot machines—Liability for "progressive" jackpots.*—Respondent taxpayer, which operated slot machines at its casino that had "progressive" jackpots which, under state regulations, could not be reduced from indicated amount before being paid out, was entitled, under its accrual method of accounting, to claim as a business deduction for fiscal year accrued liability for progressive jackpots even though they had not yet been won by a patron. *United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc.*, p. 593.

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Indian allotment lands—Action against Government—Limitations period.—Where (1) at respondent's request, Bureau of Indian Affairs, in 1967, provided her with a list of her inherited interests in Indian land allotments but did not include three allotments that Government, as trustee, had sold in 1954, (2) in response to a specific inquiry in 1981, Bureau informed her that such allotments had been sold, and (3) alleging that sale was void, she filed a federal-court suit against Government, action was one to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which United States claimed an interest within meaning of Act, and was barred by Act's 12-year limitations period, which began to run at least by 1967. *United States v. Mottaz*, p. 834.

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RATES FOR INTRASTATE TELEPHONE SERVICE. See *Communications Act of 1934*.

RATES OF MOTOR CARRIERS. See *Antitrust Acts*, 2.

REED-BULWINKLE ACT. See *Antitrust Acts*, 2.

REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973.

Discrimination against handicapped infants—Hospital care—Validity of regulations.—Court of Appeals properly held that § 504 of Act, prohibiting discrimination against handicapped persons under any federally funded program, did not authorize Secretary of Health and Human Services' regulations providing, in effect, that federally funded hospitals could not withhold health care from infants on basis of their mental or physical impairments even when no parental consent for such care was given. *Bowen v. American Hospital Assn.*, p. 610.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. See *Constitutional Law*, VII.

REMARriage AS AFFECTING SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS. See *Constitutional Law*, VI, 3.

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR VETERANS' PREFERENCE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT. See *Constitutional Law*, VI, 5.

RESTRAINTS OF TRADE. See *Antitrust Acts*, 1.

RETROACTIVITY OF DECISIONS. See *Constitutional Law*, VI, 2.

RIGHT TO ABORTION. See *Constitutional Law*, IX.

RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL. See *Constitutional Law*, X.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. See *Speedy Trial Act*.

RIGHT TO TRAVEL. See *Constitutional Law*, VI, 5.

SCHOOLTEACHER LAYOFFS. See Constitutional Law, VI, 4.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. See Constitutional Law, XI.

SECRETARY OF LABOR'S RECOVERY OF MISUSED FEDERAL GRANTS. See Comprehensive Employment and Training Act.

SELECTION OF JURORS. See Constitutional Law, VI, 1; X.

SHERMAN ACT. See Antitrust Acts.

SHIPS' TURBINES. See Admiralty.

SIXTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, II; X; Criminal Law, 1.

SLOT MACHINE OPERATOR'S TAX LIABILITY. See Internal Revenue Code, 2.

SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. See also Constitutional Law, VI, 3; VII.

1. *Disability benefits—Validity of administrative procedure—Class action.*—Where federal-court class action was brought against federal officials to challenge internal policy relating to administrative procedure for terminating or determining eligibility for disability benefits under Act, District Court properly certified class to include (1) claimants who had not complied with Act's requirement that judicial review be sought within 60 days of Secretary of Health and Human Services' final decision, since 60-day requirement was a statute of limitations and was tolled while claimants, because of challenged internal policy, did not know of a violation of their rights, and (2) claimants who failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. *Bowen v. City of New York*, p. 467.

2. *Medicare program—Judicial review of regulations.*—Judicial review of federal regulations governing payment of benefits under Part B of Medicare program is not barred by Act's provisions (42 U. S. C. §§ 1395ff, 1395ii (1982 ed. and Supp. II)) relating to Part A of Medicare program and review of "amount determinations." *Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians*, p. 667.

SOUTH CAROLINA. See Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act.

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT.

Limitations period—Delays from pretrial hearings.—Act's provision excluding from prescribed limitations period (requiring trial within 70 days of filing of an indictment or information, or of defendant's first appearance before a judge or magistrate) any delay resulting from other proceedings concerning defendant, excludes from 70-day limitation all time between filing of a pretrial motion and conclusion of hearing on that motion and any delay for additional filings from parties needed for motion's disposition, whether or not delay in holding such hearing is "reasonably necessary";

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT—Continued.

record established no violation of 70-day requirement with regard to petitioners' federal-court trial, which was delayed pending disposition of their pretrial motion to suppress evidence. *Henderson v. United States*, p. 321.

STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT. See **Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.**

STANDING TO SUE. See **Jurisdiction.**

STATE COURTS' JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN TRIBES' SUITS.
See **Indians, 2.**

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. See **Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act; Comprehensive Employment and Training Act; Quiet Title Act of 1972; Social Security Act, 1; Speedy Trial Act.**

STAYS.

Judgment invalidating death penalty.—California's application to stay enforcement of State Supreme Court's judgment invalidating respondent's death sentence for murder on grounds that failure to properly instruct jury on issue of intent to kill violated due process requirements and that such error was not harmless, is granted. *California v. Hamilton* (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers), p. 1301.

SUPREME COURT. See **Jurisdiction.**

SURVIVOR'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. See **Constitutional Law, VI, 3.**

TAXES. See **Internal Revenue Code.**

TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976. See **Internal Revenue Code, 1.**

TELEPHONE RATES. See **Communications Act of 1934.**

TELEVISION FRANCHISES. See **Constitutional Law, VIII.**

TEXAS. See **Constitutional Law, VI, 2.**

TOLLING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. See **Social Security Act, 1.**

TRAVEL RIGHTS. See **Constitutional Law, VI, 5.**

TREBLE-DAMAGES ACTIONS. See **Antitrust Acts, 2.**

TUCKER ACT. See **Quiet Title Act of 1972.**

TURBINES FOR SHIPS. See **Admiralty.**

TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law, I.**

UNFAIR COMPETITION. See **Antitrust Acts, 1.**

UNIONS. See **Certiorari; National Labor Relations Act.**

UNITED STATES' IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. See Quiet Title Act of 1972.

UNLOADED HANDGUN AS "DANGEROUS WEAPON." See Criminal Law, 2.

VETERANS' PREFERENCE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT. See Constitutional Law, VI, 5.

WEAPONS. See Criminal Law, 2.

WHOLESALE LIQUOR PRICES. See Constitutional Law, I.

WITNESSES. See Constitutional Law, II; Criminal Law, 1.

WORDS AND PHRASES.

1. "*Dangerous weapon.*" 18 U. S. C. § 2113(d). *McLaughlin v. United States*, p. 16.

2. "*Deposit.*" 12 U. S. C. § 1813(l)(1). *FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp.*, p. 426.

X-RAY POLICY OF DENTISTS' ORGANIZATION. See Antitrust Acts, 1.

















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