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**VEHICLE SEARCHES.** See **Constitutional Law, VII, 2.**

**VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965.**

*School District Trustees—Change in election laws—Attorney General's approval.*—Where (1) Attorney General originally filed an objection to a change in South Carolina's statutes that proposed election at November 1982 general election of District Boards of Trustees for Hampton County's public schools, and required candidates to file between August 16 and 31, (2) shortly after November elections were held under prior, approved statutory provisions, Attorney General withdrew his objection to new law, and (3) County Election Commission—which, in contemplation of Attorney General's reconsideration of objection, had accepted candidate filings under new law—then scheduled an election under new law for March 15, 1983, use of August filing period in conjunction with March election, and setting of March election itself, were changes that should have been submitted to Attorney General under §5 of Voting Rights Act. *NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n*, p. 166.

**WAIVER OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT CRIMINAL TRIAL.** See **Constitutional Law, I, 4.**

**WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.** See **Constitutional Law, IV.**

**WARSAW CONVENTION.**

*Airlines—Liability for passenger's injury—"Accident."*—An airline's liability under Article 17 of Convention for a passenger's injury caused by an "accident" arises only if injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual

**WARSAW CONVENTION**—Continued.

event or happening that is external to passenger, and not where injury results from passenger's own internal reaction to usual, normal, and expected operation of aircraft (such as respondent passenger's loss of hearing in one ear allegedly caused by pressurization system of petitioner's jetliner during a landing). *Air France v. Saks*, p. 392.

**WATERS.** See **Clean Water Act; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.**

**WELFARE BENEFITS.** See **Social Security Act.**

**WORDS AND PHRASES.**


1. "*Accident.*" Art. 17, Warsaw Convention, note following 49 U. S. C. App. § 1502. *Air France v. Saks*, p. 392.


2. "*Income.*" § 402(a)(7)(A), Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(7)(A). *Heckler v. Turner*, p. 184.

3. "*Maritime employment.*" § 2(3), Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 902(3). *Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray*, p. 414.


4. "*Payment.*" § 22(a), Indian Claims Commission Act, 25 U. S. C. § 70u(a) (1976 ed.). *United States v. Dann*, p. 39.


**WORKERS' COMPENSATION.** See **Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.**

















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