UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 461 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1982 April 20 Through June 3, 1983 Together With Opinions of Individual Justices in Chambers HENRY C. LIND REPORTER OF DECISIONS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1985 Erratum 428 U. S. xi, line 26: “322 U. S.” should be “322 So. 2d”. il JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE TIME OF THESE REPORTS WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Associate Justice. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, Associate Justice. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, Associate Justice. retired POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice. OFFICERS OF THE COURT WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, Attorney General. REX E. LEE, Solicitor General. ALEXANDER L. STEVAS, Clerk. HENRY C. LIND, Reporter of Decisions. ALFRED WONG, Marshal. ROGER F. JACOBS, Librarian. in SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, effective nunc pro tunc October 1, 1981, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit, Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Byron R. White, Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Byron R. White, Associate Justice. For the Eleventh Circuit, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice. October 5, 1981. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, It is ordered that the Chief Justice be, and he hereby is, assigned to the Federal Circuit as Circuit Justice, effective October 1, 1982. October 12, 1982. (For next previous allotment, see 423 U. S., p. VI.) IV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1976 edition. Cases reported before page 901 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 901 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Opinions reported on page 1301 et seq. are those written in chambers by individual Justices. Page AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Calvert Distillers Co..................... 919 AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc............. 919 Aaron v. Villalobos............................................ 908 Adams v. Employment Development Dept......................... 933 Adams v. Florida............................................. 959 Adams v. Oklahoma........................................... 932 Adult and Family Services Division; Stoutt v................... 928 Afshar v. Commissioner......................................... 928 Aglow, In re................................................... 902 Agricultural Marketing & Barg. Bd.; Mich. Canners & Freezers v. 924 Ahmed v. Environmental Protection Agency......................... 930 Aikens; U. S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v................ 941 Akbar v. United States........................................... 959 Akermanis; Sea-Land Service, Inc. v.............................. 927 Alabama v. Evans............................................... 230 Alabama; Evans v.............................................. 1301 Alabama v. Johnson............................................... 937 Alcan Sales v. United States.................................... 943 Aldridge v. Florida.............................................. 939 Alfarano v. United States........................................ 931 Alford v. United States.......................................... 936 Allen; Pulliam v................................................. 904 Allsbrook; Folston v............................................. 939 Al Mudarris v. United States..................................... 932 Alston v. Tard.................................................. 935 Alvarez v. United States......................................... 907 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. United States.................. 943 American Airlines, Inc. v. Braniff Airways, Inc................ 944 V VI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page American Benefit Life Ins. Co.; First Colonial Corp, of America v. 915 American Bd. of Otolaryngology; American College of Otor. v.... 930 American College of Otorhinolaryngologists v. Am. Bd. of Otol. .. 930 American Electric Power Service Corp.; American Paper Inst. v. 402 American Electric Power Service Corp.; FERC v..................... 402 American Geri-Care Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd..... 906 American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 956 American Paper Institute v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp... 402 American Stock Exchange, Inc.; Walck v............................ 942 Ammerman; Maras v................................................. 940 Anderson v. Zimmerman............................................. 960 Andre v. Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust......................... 906 Andrews v. Lawson................................................. 915 APS Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Fox...................................... 951 Arana-Arguello v. United States................................... 937 Arcadian Gardens; Becker v........................................ 971 Archdiocese of Milwaukee; Kroening v.............................. 958 Ariyoshi; Windward Partners v.................................... 906 Arizona; Gretzler v............................................... 971 Arizona v. Navajo Tribe of Indians............................ 903,941 Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe............................ 903,941 Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. 903 Arkansas; Hoggard v............................................... 911 Arkansas Electric Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n .. 375 Arkansas Public Service Comm’n; Arkansas Electric Coop. Corp. v. 375 Armstrong v. Wisconsin............................................ 946 Arnold v. Duval County School Bd.................................. 909 Arutunoff v. Oklahoma State Election Bd........................... 913 Associated Milk Producers, Inc. v. National Farmers’ Organization 938 Associated Milk Producers, Inc.; National Farmers’ Organization v. 937 Attorney General; Clemons v....................................... 960 Attorney General; Mississippi v................................... 912 Attorney General of Ill. v. General Electric Co................... 913 Avcollie v. Connecticut........................................... 928 Avery; Homewood City Bd. of Ed. v................................. 943 Badaracco v. Commissioner......................................... 925 Baer; Epps v. ............................................... 929 Bailey v. Oliver.................................................. 933 Bailey; Rothwell v. .............................................. 946 Bailey v. United States........................................... 933 Baker, In re.................................................... 941 Bambrough; Neufeld v.............................................. 915 Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn.; Chote v.... 933 Baranan v. Fulton County.......................................... 929 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED vn Page Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc............................ 958 Barlow v. United States........................................ 945 Barnes; Martin v.............................4.................. 917 Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians; Duffy v. 929 Barrett v. United States........................................ 909 Bartlett; Solem v............................................... 956 Baruch v. Sheriff of Cook County................................ 944 Baxter, In re................................................... 902 Bearden v. Georgia............................................. 660 Becker v. Arcadian Gardens...................................... 971 Beecher v. Boston Chapter, NAACP................................ 477 Begassat v. Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago............... 971 Behrens, In re.................................................. 925 Bell v. New Jersey.............................................. 773 Bemidji; Lacher v............................................... 912 Bennett; Murrell v.............................................. 960 Bennett v. United States.....................................910,959 Benson v. Schwartz.............................................. 944 Bifield v. United States........................................ 931 Bigg v. U. S. Army.............................................. 960 Bildisco & Bildisco; National Labor Relations Bd. v............. 955 Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. . 731 Billups v. United States........................................ 921 Bivins v. United States......................................... 947 Black; Foster v................................................. 935 Blackbum; Elaire v. ............................................ 959 Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ, and School Lands .... 273 Block; North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ, and School Lands v..... 273 Bluestein, In re................................................ 953 Blum v. Stenson................................................. 956 Blume v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co............................. 939 Board of University and School Lands v. Block................... 273 Board of University and School Lands; Block v................... 273 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States................................ 574 Boland & Cornelius, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co............. 901 Bolander v. Florida ............................................ 939 Bolger; Common Cause v.......................................... 911 Bond v. Burks................................................... 952 Bonnin, In re.................................................. 901 Borden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n............................ 940 Bordenkircher; Smith v.......................................... 908 Bordenkircher; Stubbs v......................................... 907 Borders v. United States........................................ 905 Borkowski v. Borkowski.......................................... 905 VIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc............ 904 Boston Chapter, NAACP; Beecher v............................... 477 Boston Chapter, NAACP; Firefighters v.......................... 477 Bouma v. Larry C. Iverson, Inc................................. 916 Bowling v. Strickland.......................................... 918 Bowsher v. SmithKline Corp..................................... 913 Bowsher; SmithKline Corp. v.................................... 913 Boyd v. United States.......................................916,921 Braden v. United States........................................ 908 Bradford v. Pennsylvania....................................... 959 Bradley v. Segal.............................................. 931 Braemoor Associates v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp............... 927 Braniff Airways, Inc.; American Airlines, Inc. v............... 944 Breeding; Harvey v............................................. 934 Bressler v. U. S. District Court............................... 959 Brewer v. Wegmann.............................................. 908 Bridgeforth v. United States................................... 946 Briggs v. Commissioner......................................... 928 Briley v. Director of Dept, of Corrections..................... 918 Brito Enterprises, Inc. v. Westberry........................... 957 Brito’s Boatyard v. Westberry.................................. 957 Broadway, In re................................................ 912 Broadway v. Stafford........................................... 934 Brooks v. Winter............................................... 921 Brooks; Winter v............................................... 921 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept................................. 908 Brown v. United States......................................... 908 Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp............................... 930 Broz; Heckler v................................................ 952 Bryant v. Wainwright........................................... 932 Bryant Electric Co. v. Kiser................................... 929 Bucci, In re................................................... 954 Buchanan; International Fashions v............................. 943 Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth. v. Delaware River Basin Comm’n 943 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA.................. 923 Burks; Bond v.................................................. 952 Burlington Industries, Inc.; Milliken & Co. v. ................ 914 Burlington Industries, Inc.; Milliken Research Corp. v........... 914 Burnette v. United States...................................... 936 Burrows; R. R. Gable, Inc. v................................... 957 Butler, In re................................................ 954 Butler v. Peabody Institute of Baltimore....................... 915 Buttrey v. United States....................................... 927 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED IX Page Butts v. United States.......................................... 947 Bynum; Martinez v............................................... 321 Byrd v. Stephenson.............................................. 908 Calder v. Jones................................................. 955 California; EROS v............................................. 937 California; Jewell Productions, Inc. v.......................... 937 California; Johnson v........................................... 916 California; Sawveil v. ......................................... 917 California v. Watt.............................................. 925 California; Watt v.............................................. 925 California; Western Oil & Gas Assn. v........................... 925 Callahan v. Mississippi......................................... 943 Calvert Distillers Co.; AAA Liquors, Inc. v..................... 919 Campbell; Heckler v............................................. 458 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.; Cordis Corp. v........................ 906 Cardwell v. Taylor.............................................. 571 Carlin v. United States......................................... 958 Carpenters; Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc. v.......................... 942 Carper v. United States......................................... 907 Carter v. Missouri.............................................. 932 Castaneda v. United States...................................... 935 Castro; Police Patrolmen v...................................... 477 Catanio v. United States........................................ 910 Cavanaugh v. United States...................................... 936 Cedar Point Apartments, Ltd.; Cedar Point Investment Corp. v.. 914 Cedar Point Investment Corp. v. Cedar Point Apartments, Ltd. . 914 Central Bank of Nigeria; Verlinden B. V. v...................... 480 Central Milk Producers Cooperative v. National Farmers’ Org., Inc. 938 Chambers v. United States....................................... 927 Chappell v. United States....................................... 931 Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.; Boland & Cornelius, Inc. v. .......... 901 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.; Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. 923 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 956 Chicago Housing Authority v. Gautreaux.......................... 961 Chicago & North Western Transp. Co.; Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. 924 Chin v. St. Luke’s Hospital Center.............................. 959 Chote v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn........ 933 Chrapliwy; Uniroyal, Inc. v..................................... 956 Christian v. Massachusetts.................................... 907 Christopher v. United States.................................... 960 Cintolo v. United States........................................ 957 City. See name of city. Clark v. Paddack................................................ 926 Clark Construction v. Paddack................................... 926 X TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Clemons v. Smith.............................................. 960 Cleveland v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary ................... 917 Clifford; Michigan v.......................................... 942 Cohen; New York v............................................. 930 Cointelpro; Puchala v......................................... 971 Coleman, In re.................................,.............. 901 Collins, In re................................................ 922 Colokathis v. Wentworth-Douglass Hospital..................... 915 Commissioner; Afshar v. ...................................... 928 Commissioner; Badaracco v..................................... 925 Commissioner; Briggs v. ...................................... 928 Commissioner; Dickman v....................................... 955 Commissioner; Druker v...................................... 957 Commissioner v. Engle......................................... 903 Commissioner; Kinslow v....................................... 908 Commissioner; Ronson v........................................ 940 Commissioner v. Tufts......................................... 300 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Committee on Probation; Sampson v............................. 901 Common Cause v. Bolger........................................ 911 Commonwealth. See name of Commonwealth. Comptroller General v. SmithKline Corp........................ 913 Comptroller General; SmithKline Corp. v....................... 913 Conklin; Pearson v............................................ 959 Connecticut; Avcollie v....................................... 928 Connecticut; Martin v. .................................... 933 Connecticut; Seravalli v...................................... 920 Connick v. Myers.............................................. 138 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Halley v............................. 915 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Kaiser v............................. 943 Consolidated Rail Corp.; Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n v... 912 Consumers Union of United States, Inc.; Bose Corp. v. ........ 904 Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co.; Don’t Bankrupt Wash. Comm. v. 950 Cook v. New York.............................................. 946 Cordis Corp. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc....................... 906 Corrado, In re................................................ 925 Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago; Begassat v............. 971 Costa; Markey v............................................... 920 Cotner v. Gardner............................................. 918 Cotner v. United States....................................... 918 Counsell v. Munro-Burns General Contractors.................. 951 County. See name of county. County Court, Orange County, Fla.; Redding v.................. 907 Courts of Ohio; Johnson v..................................... 932 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XI Page Cousino v. Stair.............................................. 929 CPC International, Inc.; Stendebach v......................... 944 Crawford; Wilson v............................................ 931 Criden v. United States....................................... 961 Crowley; Furniture Movers v. ................................. 954 Crumpler v. Mississippi State Highway Comm’n.................. 915 Cumberland Capital Corp.; Robinson v.......................... 945 Cusino v. United States....................................... 932 Cuti v. United States......................................... 958 Cuyler; Sesso v............................................... 936 Cyntje v. Government of Virgin Islands........................ 908 Dabeit v. United States....................................... 953 Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co................................ 957 Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox................................ 924 Dallas County Sheriff; Williams v............................. 935 Darr v. Virginia.............................................. 933 Davis, In re.................................................. 953 Davis v. Davis................................................ 917 Day; Secretary of Health and Human Services v................. 904 De John; Vince v.............................................. 915 Delaware River Basin Comm’n; Bucks Cty. Water & Sewer Auth. v. 943 Deleet Merchandising Corp. v. United States................... 925 Delgado; Immigration and Naturalization Service v............. 904 Delmark Co.; Quenneville v.................................... 957 Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Thornberry........................... 952 DeMichael v. United States.................................... 907 Departmental Disciplinary Comm, for First Jud. Dept.; Kaufman v. 927 Department of Interior; Hayden v.............................. 936 Department of Labor; Leventhal v.............................. 935 Department of Navy; Ray v..................................... 901 Detroit Bd. of Ed.; Stallworth v.............................. 940 Devex Corp.; General Motors Corp. v........................... 648 Dewey v. University of N. H................................... 944 Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc........................ 911 Dickman v. Commissioner....................................... 955 Dills; Marietta v............................................. 905 Director of Dept, of Corrections; Briley v. .................. 918 Director, OWCP; Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co.............. 624 Director of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of director. DiRose v. PK Management Corp.................................. 915 District Court. See U. S. District Court. Dixie Finance Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n..................... 928 Doe; United States v......................................... 913 XII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Donaldson v. Texas........................................... 908 Donovan; Richardson v........................................ 928 Don’t Bankrupt Wash. Comm. v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. 950 Don’t Waste Washington Legal Defense Foundation v. Washington 913 Doran; Leone v............................................... 960 Doranzo v. United States..................................... 926 Dreyfus-de Campos v. United States........................... 947 Druker v. Commissioner....................................... 957 Drury v. United States....................................... 943 Drury v. Westborough Mall, Inc............................. 945 Duchow; N. Y. Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund v. 918 Duckworth; Henderson v. ..................................... 935 Duckworth; Kincaid v. ....................................... 946 Duffy v. Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians 929 Duncan v. United States...................................... 961 Dunn v. Texas................................................ 926 Duris; Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. ...................... 529 Duval County School Bd.; Arnold v............................ 909 Earl B. Miller & Co. v. Hughes............................... 952 Eckerhart; Hensley v.......................................... 424 Ed-Lee, Inc.; Heritage Products, Inc. v....................... 914 Edwards; Heckler v............................................ 955 Edwards v. United States...................................... 909 Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars; United States v. 555 Eisenberg v. United States.................................... 927 Elaire v. Blackbum............................................ 959 Employment Development Dept.; Adams v......................... 933 Engle; Commissioner v,........................................ 903 Enoch v. United States........................................ 932 Environmental Protection Agency; Ahmed v...................... 930 Epps v. Baer.................................................. 929 Erby v. Illinois.............................................. 933 EROS v. California........................................... 937 Escambia River Electric Coop. v. Florida Public Service Comm’n 912 Estelle v. French............................................. 937 Estelle; Harvey v............................................ 934 Estelle; Jackson v............................................ 935 Evanko v. United States....................................... 916 Evans v. Alabama............................................ 1301 Evans; Alabama v............................................. 230 Evans v. Mississippi.......................................... 939 Evans v. United States........................................ 940 Everett v. United States...................................... 936 Everist, Inc. v. United States................................ 957 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xiii Page Fairman; Smith v........................................... 907,946 Falzon; Volkswagenwerk A. G. v................................ 1303 Farese v. United States........................................ 931 Farmar v. United States........................................ 903 Federal Barge Lines, Inc.; Newton v. .......................... 914 FCC; Keystone Cable-Vision Corp. v. ........................... 911 FCC; Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v......................... 938 FCC; National Assn, of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v............ 938 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Braemoor Associates v.............. 921 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.; Sea Pines Co. v.................... 928 FERC v. American Electric Power Service Corp................... 402 FERC; Louisiana v.............................................. 905 FERC v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co................................... 903 FERC; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v............................... 905 Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.; Fidelity Savings & Loan Assn. v.. 914 FLRA; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v................. 923 FLRA; Government Employees v................................... 926 Federal Trade Comm’n; Borden, Inc. v........................... 940 Federal Trade Comm’n; Dixie Finance Co. v...................... 928 Felde v. Louisiana............................................. 918 Fen Chin v. St. Luke’s Hospital Center......................... 959 Fidelity Savings & Loan Assn. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. . 914 Fields; Jackson v............................................. 917 Fields; Johnson v. ............................................ 946 Firefighters v. Boston Chapter, NAACP.......................... 477 Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality; St. Louis v........ 930 First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N. A. v. Martin.............. 938 First Colonial Corp, of America v. American Benefit Life Ins. Co. 915 First National Bank of Boston; Herzog v....................... 906 Fischer & Porter Co.; Melia v. ................................ 946 Fleischmann v. Wethersfield Planning and Zoning Comm’n....... 950 Florida; Adams v............................................... 959 Florida; Aldridge v............................................ 939 Florida; Bolander v. .......................................... 939 Florida; McCrae v.............................................. 939 Florida v. Rodriguez........................................... 940 Florida; Rose v................................................ 909 Florida Public Service Comm’n; Escambia River Electric Coop. v. 912 Folstonu Allsbrook ........................................... 939 Fomash v. Marshall............................................. 940 . Foster v. Black.............................................. 935 Fox; APS Ins. Agency, Inc. v................................... 951 Fox; Daily Income Fund, Inc. v................................. 92A Fox; Lee M. Scarborough & Co. v................................ 951 XIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Frankum v. United States...................................... 936 French; Estelle v. ........................................... 937 Fulton County; Baranan v. .................................... 929 Furniture Movers v. Crowley................................... 954 Gable, Inc. v. Burrows........................................ 957 Gadomski v. United States Steel Corp.......................... 946 Gagnon v. Massachusetts....................................... 921 Galloway, In re............................................... 922 Gardner; Cotner v............................................. 918 Garrison; Locklear v. ........................................ 945 Garrison; Sweezy v............................................ 908 Garza v. United States........................................ 936 Gasque v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Sailing Vessel . 933 Gastelum-Almeida v. United States............................. 961 Gaultney v. United States..................................... 907 Gautreaux; Chicago Housing Authority v........................ 961 General Electric Co.; Hartigan v. ............................ 913 General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp............................ 648 Georgia; Bearden v............................................ 660 Georgia; McAdoo v............................................. 917 Gibbons v. National Steel Service Center, Inc................. 925 Gibbs v. United States........................................ 936 Gilmore v. Koehler........................................... 944 Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States............ 574 Goodpasture, Inc.; M/V POLLUX v............................... 924 Goodrich v. New York.......................................... 960 Gordon v. United States....................................... 932 Gouveia v. Napili Kai Beach Club.............................. 904 Gouveia v. Napili-Kai, Ltd.................................... 904 Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority ... 926 Government of Virgin Islands; Cyntje v........................ 908 Governor of Miss. v. Brooks................................... 921 Governor of Miss.; Brooks v................................... 921 Grace; Springdale School Dist. No. 50 of Washington County v. .. 927 Grace; United States v. ...................................... 171 Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers................................. 757 Graham v. Louisiana........................................... 950 Graham v. United States....................................... 947 Grainger v. United States..................................... 947 Grantt v. United States....................................... 959 Gray v. Lucas................................................. 910 Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. Ison......................... 957 Green, In re.................................................. 920 Green v. Warden, U. S. Penitentiary........................... 960 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xv Page Greer; Saulsbury v............................................ 935 Greger v. United States....................................... 913 Gretzler v. Arizona........................................... 971 Grimes, In re................................................. 902 Grip-Pak, Inc.; Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v................... 958 Grizzell; Wainwright v........................................ 948 Gulf Trading & Transportation Co.; I/S Norexim v.............. 929 Gutierrez v. United States................................ 909,910 Haddix v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center........................ 946 Hall; Helicópteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v............. 955 Hall v. Marshall.............................................. 916 Halley v. Consolidated Rail Corp.............................. 915 Hampares, In re............................................... 922 Hanson, In re................................................. 942 Haring v. Prosise............................................. 954 Harris v. Quinlan............................................. 933 Harrison v. Oklahoma.......................................... 950 Hartford Fire Ins. Co.; Tyler v............................... 915 Hartigan v. General Electric Co............................... 913 Harvey v. Breeding............................................ 934 Harvey v. Estelle............................................. 934 Haslip v. State Public Defender Comm’n........................ 916 Hasting; United States v...................................... 499 Hawkins v. United States...................................... 960 Hayden v. Department of Interior.............................. 936 Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. 924 Heard; Schlang v............................................. 951 Heckler v. Broz............................................... 952 Heckler v. Campbell........................................... 458 Heckler v. Edwards............................................ 955 Heckler; Kirk v............................................... 957 Heckler; Pettway v............................................ 932 Heckler; Rios v............................................... 958 Heckler; Simmons v............................................ 911 Helicópteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall............. 955 Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Rock Island Improvement Co....... 944 Henderson v. Duckworth........................................ 935 Henderson; Mumit v............................................ 945 Hensel v. United States....................................... 958 Hensley v. Eckerhart.......................................... 424 Herbst v. Wisconsin........................................... 906 Heritage Products, Inc. v. Ed-Lee, Inc........................ 914 Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service........... 934 Herzog v. First National Bank of Boston....................... 906 XVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hewitt v. Strickland............................................. 929 Higa v. Mayo...................................................... 948 Hillard v. United States.......................................... 958 Hishon v. King & Spalding......................................... 955 Hoggard v. Arkansas............................................... 911 Hollander v. University of Rochester.............................. 922 Hollingsworth, In re.............................................. 953 Holloway v. Lynch................................................. 947 Holloway v. Michigan.............................................. 917 Homewood City Bd. of Ed. v. Avery................................. 943 Hoover v. Ronwin................,................................. 926 Hoover; Ronwin v.................................................. 938 Horton v. Martin.................................................. 958 Huber, In re...................................................... 902 Hudson v. Rushen.................................................. 916 Huff v. United States......................................... 937,947 Huffman; Reiter v................................................. 934 Hughes; Earl B. Miller & Co. v.................................... 952 Humphries; McDonald v............................................. 946 Humphries v. South Carolina....................................... 905 Hunter v. Maxie................................................... 914 Hunter v. United States........................................... 936 Huntingdon County Comm’rs; Oliver v............................... 937 Hustler Magazine, Inc.; Keeton v.................................. 923 Idaho; Mitchell v................................................. 934 Ulfelder Toy Co.; Toybox Corp. v.................................. 944 Illinois; Erby v. ................................................ 933 Illinois; Miller v................................................ 961 Illinois v. Smith................................................. 937 Illinois; Terry v................................................. 905 Illinois v. Tiller................................................ 944 Illinois; Viens v................................................. 917 Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc........................ 958 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado................. 904 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Hernandez v. ............. 934 Immigration and Naturalization Service; Squires v. ............... 905 Indiana; Lewis v.................................................. 915 Indiana; Minneman v.............................................. 933 Indiana; Powers v................................................. 906 Ingram; United States v........................................... 677 In re. See name of party. International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Business Machines Corp.; Wright v. ................. 910 International Fashions v. Buchanan................................ 943 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XVII Page Interstate Commerce Comm’n; Laird v............................. 927 Iowa; Nitz v.................................................... 944 Isenberg v. United States....................................... 926 I/S Norexim v. Gulf Trading & Transportation Co................. 929 Ison; Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v........................... 957 Israel; Spencer v............................................... 971 Iverson, Inc.; Bouma v.......................................... 916 Jackson v. Estelle.............................................. 935 Jackson v. Fields............................................... 917 Jacobsen; United-States v....................................... 924 Jago; Smith v................................................... 918 James v. United States.......................................... 905 Jefferson Parish School Bd.; Jones v............................ 950 Jewell Productions, Inc. v. California.......................... 937 Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd........................................ 260 Johl v. Moukawsher.............................................. 940 Johnson, In re.................................................. 925 Johnson; Alabama v.............................................. 937 Johnson v. California........................................... 916 Johnson v. Courts of Ohio....................................... 932 Johnson v. Fields............................................... 946 Johnson; Scruggs v............................................. 916 Johnson v. Texas................................................ 933 Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd... 731 Jones; Calder v................................................. 955 Jones v. Jefferson Parish School Bd............................. 950 Jones v. Mitchell............................................... 950 Jones v. Orleans Parish School Bd............................... 951 Jones v. United States.......................................... 947 Joost v. U. S. Parole Comm’n.................................... 934 Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.; AAA Liquors, Inc. v. ........... 919 Judge, Circuit Court of Cooper County, Booneville, Mo.; Martin v. 917 Judge, Court of Common Pleas; Orloski v......................... 945 Judge of Second Circuit of Haw. v. Mayo......................... 948 Juncker, In re.................................................. 953 Kaiser v. Consolidated Rail Corp................................ 943 Karapinka, In re................................................ 942 Kaufman v. Departmental Disciplinary Comm, for First Jud. Dept. 927 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc................................. 923 Keller v. McDaniel.............................................. 919 Kendrick v. United States....................................... 914 Kerr-McGee Corp.; Silkwood v................................ 923,954 Keystone Cable-Vision Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm’n 911 Kilbane v. Marshall............................................ 940 XVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Kincaid v. Duckworth......................................... 946 King v. Mississippi............................................ 919 King v. Montgomery County...................................... 914 King; Ware v................................................... 930 King & Spalding; Hishon v...................................... 955 Kinslow v. Commissioner........................................ 908 Kirk v. Heckler................................................ 957 Kiser; Bryant Electric Co. v................................... 929 Kline v. Louisiana............................................. 906 Koehler; Gilmore v............................................. 944 Kolender v. Lawson............................................. 352 Kondrat v. Willoughby Hills.................................... 929 Kopituk v. United States....................................... 953 Kramer; New Castle Area Transit Authority v.................... 971 Kroening v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee........................... 958 Labor Union. See name of trade. Lacher v. Bemidji.............................................. 912 Lacy v. Lockhart............................................... 917 Laden v. Michigan Dept, of Corrections......................... 947 Laird v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n........................... 927 Lane; Smith v.................................................. 911 Langford v. United States...................................... 959 Langhorne Manor Borough; McGinnis v............................ 944 Larry C. Iverson, Inc.; Bouma v. .............................. 916 Larson; Reich v................................................ 915 Lawrence v. United States...................................... 935 Lawson; Andrews v.............................................. 915 Lawson; Kolender v............................................. 352 Leaver; Sabouni v............................................. 958 Lederer v. United States....................................... 961 Leeke; Plyler v................................................ 935 Lee M. Scarborough & Co. v. Fox................................ 951 Leibowitz, In re............................................... 922 Leone v. Doran................................................. 960 Leventhal v. Department of Labor............................... 935 Lewis v. Indiana............................................... 915 Lewis v. United States..................................... 908,947 L. G. Everist, Inc. v. United States........................... 957 Lieberman, In re............................................... 901 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Locascio v. Teletype Corp...................................... 906 Lochner v. United States....................................... 931 Lockhart; Lacy v............................................... 917 Locklear v. Garrison........................................... 945 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XIX Page London v. Rees.................................................. 933 Lonewolf v. Lonewolf............................................ 924 Long, In re..................................................... 922 Long v. United States........................................... 930 Los Angeles v. Lyons............................................ 95 Los Angeles Dept, of Water and Power v. Manhart................. 951 Louisiana v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n................... 905 Louisiana; Felde v. ............................................ 918 Louisiana; Graham v. ........................................... 950 Louisiana; Kline v.............................................. 906 Louisiana; Navarre v............................................ 945 Louisiana; Perry v.............................................. 961 Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v. FCC.......................... 938 Lucas; Gray v. ............................................... 910 Lumpkins v. United States....................................... 910 Lynch; Holloway v............................................. 947 Lyons; Los Angeles v. ......................................... 95 Maggio; Williams v.............................................. 917 Maggio; Youngblood v............................................ 934 Maine v. Thornton............................................... 924 Manhart; Los Angeles Dept, of Water and Power v................. 951 Maras v. Ammerman............................................. 940 Marcello v. United States....................................... 901 Margiotta v. United States...................................... 913 Marie’s Originals v. U. S. District Court....................... 959 Marietta v. Dills............................................... 905 Marietta v. Mid-Georgia Supply.................................. 905 Marino v. United States......................................... 907 Markey v. Costa................................................. 920 Marshall; Fomash v.............................................. 940 Marshall; Hall v................................................ 916 Marshall; Kilbane v...............*........................... 940 Martin v. Barnes.............................................. 917 Martin v. Connecticut........................................... 933 Martin; First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N. A. v............... 938 Martin; Horton v................................................ 958 Martin v. United States......................................... 960 Martinez v. Bynum............................................... 321 Maryland; Taliaferro v.......................................... 948 Massachusetts; Christian v...................................... 907 Massachusetts; Gagnon v. ....................................... 921 Masters v. Ohio................................................. 960 Maxie; Hunter v................................................. 914 Mayo; Higa v.................................................... 948 XX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Mazzei v. United States....................................... 945 McAdoo v. Georgia............................................. 917 McClellan, In re.............................................. 939 McCrae v. Florida............................................. 939 McCray v. New York............................................ 961 McDaniel; Keller v............................................ 919 McDonald v. Humphries......................................... 946 McDonald v. Metropolitan Govt, of Nashville & Davidson Cty. 934 McDonnell Douglas Corp.; Browne v............................ 930 McDowell v. Western Wash. Laborers-Employers H. & S. Tr. Fund 926 McDowell’s v. Western Wash. Laborers-Employers H. & S. Tr. Fund 926 McGavran v. United States..................................... 960 McGinnis v. Langhorne Manor Borough........................... 944 McGrath, In re................................................ 941 Mclnery v. Shelly............................................. 934 McLean, In re................................................. 902 McNeff, Inc. v. Todd.......................................... 260 McPheeters v. Spalding........................................ 907 Medical Officer at Hamilton County Jail; Thompson v........... 917 Medina-Pena v. United States.................................. 950 Meeks; United States v........................................ 912 Melia v. Fischer & Porter Co.................................. 946 Melkonian v. United States.................................... 918 Mellenberg; Orloski v......................................... 945 Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust; Andre v..................... 906 Merritt v. United States...................................... 916 Metcalfe v. United States..................................... 910 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy.... 912 Metropolitan Govt, of Nashville & Davidson County; McDonald v. 934 Michigan v. Clifford.......................................... 942 Michigan; Holloway v.......................................... 917 Michigan v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.............................. 903 Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn. v. Agric. Mktg. & Barg. Bd. 924 Michigan Dept, of Corrections; Laden v........................ 947 Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. v. National Farmers’ Organization 939 Mid-Georgia Supply; Marietta v................................ 905 Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. ; Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. 903 Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.; Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. .. 903 Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.; Michigan v............................. 903 Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.; Public Service Comm’n of N. Y. v..... 903 Miller v. Illinois............................................ 961 Miller v. Pittston Stevedoring Corp........................... 943 Miller v. United States....................................... 906 Miller v. U. S. Postal Service................................ 916 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxi Page Miller & Co. v. Hughes........................................ 952 Milliken & Co. v. Burlington Industries, Inc.................. 914 Milliken Research Corp. v. Burlington Industries, Inc......... 914 Milo v. Ohio.................................................. 957 Minn, In re.................................................. 902 Minneman v. Indiana........................................... 933 Minnesota v. Murphy...........‘............................... 924 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.; Blume v. ........................ 939 Minor v. Rushen............................................... 917 Mississippi; Callahan v....................................... 943 Mississippi; Evans v.......................................... 939 Mississippi; King v........................................... 919 Mississippi v. Smith.......................................... 912 Mississippi State Highway Comm’n; Crumpler v.................. 915 Missouri; Carter v. .......................................... 932 Missouri State Highway Comm’n; Thrasher v..................... 920 Mitchell v. Idaho............................................. 934 Mitchell; Jones v............................................. 950 Mobley v. United States....................................... 909 Molovinsky, In re....................1........................ 922 Montana v. Northern Cheyenne Tribe........................ 903,942 Montgomery County; King v..................................... 914 Montgomery Ward & Co.; Dabney v............................... 957 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd........ 914 Morris v. Slappy................................................ 1 Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Director, OWCP......... 624 Moses v. United States........................................ 909 Moukawsher; Johl v............................................ 940 M/T Exxon Baltimore; New Orleans Steamboat Co. v............ 930 Mullen v. Starr............................................... 960 Mullen v. United States....................................... 921 Mumit v. Henderson............................................ 945 Munoz v. United States........................................ 932 Munro-Burns General Contractors; Counsell v................... 951 Murphy; Minnesota v........................................... 924 Murphy v. United States................................... 945,961 Murrell v. Bennett............................................ 960 Musico v. Musico.............................................. 928 M/V POLLUX v. Goodpasture, Inc................................ 924 Myers; Connick v.............................................. 138 Myers v. United States........................................ 961 Nalls; Rolls-Royce Ltd. v..................................... 970 Nanez v. United States........................................ 909 Napili Kai Beach Club; Gouveia v.............................. 904 XXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Napili-Kai, Ltd.; Gouveia v. ....................................... 904 National Assn, of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v. FCC................. 938 National Farmers’ Organization v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc. 937 National Farmers’ Organization; Associated Milk Producers, Inc. v. 938 National Farmers’ Organization; Central Milk Producers Coop. v. 938 National Farmers’ Organization; Mid-America Dairymen, Inc. v. . 939 National Labor Relations Bd.; American Geri-Care Inc. v...... 906 National Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco................. 955 National Labor Relations Bd.; Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v.. 731 National Labor Relations Bd.; Montgomery Ward & Co. v..... 914 National Labor Relations Bd.; Randall Division of Textron, Inc. v. 914 National Labor Relations Bd.; Sure-Tan, Inc. v.......... 942 National Labor Relations Bd.; Tamara Foods, Inc. v...... 928 National Labor Relations Bd.; Teamsters v............... 955 National Labor Relations Bd.; Walker Die Casting, Inc. v.. 905 National Steel Service Center, Inc.; Gibbons v. .................... 925 Natural Resources Defense Council; American Iron & Steel Inst. v. 956 Natural Resources Defense Council; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v..... 956 Natural Resources Defense Council; Ruckelshaus v.................... 956 Navajo Tribe of Indians; Arizona v.............................. 903,941 Navarre v. Louisiana................................................ 945 Neely v. Pennsylvania............................................... 930 Neufeld v. Bambrough................................................ 915 Nevada v. United States..................................... 913,923,954 New Banner Institute, Inc.; Dickerson v............................. 911 New Castle Area Transit Authority v. Kramer......................... 971 New Jersey; Bell v.................................................. 773 New Jersey; Rodziewicz v. .......................................... 935 New Orleans Steamboat Co. v. M/T Exxon Baltimore.................... 930 Newton v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc.................................. 914 New York v. Cohen................................................... 930 New York; Cook v.................................................... 946 New York; Goodrich v................................................ 960 New York; McCray v.................................................. 961 New York v. Quarles................................................. 942 New York Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. Fund v. Duchow 918 Nigro v. United States.............................................. 927 Nitz v. Iowa........................................................ 944 Nix v. Williams..................................................... 956 Norfolk Redev. & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. 923 North Carolina; Vaughan v......................................... 943 North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ, and School Lands v. Block .... 273 North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ, and School Lands; Block v..... 273 Northern Cheyenne Tribe; Montana v.............................. 903,942 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXIII Page Norton v. United States........................................ 910 Norwood v. United States....................................... 916 Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n v. Sholly........................ 912 Odendahl, In re................................................ 902 Ohio; Masters v.............................................. 960 Ohio; Milo v................................................... 957 Oklahoma; Adams v.............................................. 932 Oklahoma; Harrison v........................................... 950 Oklahoma; Pittser v............................................ 907 Oklahoma; Ring v............................................... 909 Oklahoma; Webb v............................................... 959 Oklahoma State Election Bd.; Arutunoff v....................... 913 Olim v. Wakinekona............................................. 238 Oliver; Bailey v............................................... 933 Oliver v. Huntingdon County Comm’rs............................ 937 Oregon ex rel. Adult and Family Services Division; Stoutt v.. 928 Orleans Parish School Bd.; Jones v. ......................... 951 Orloski v. Mellenberg.......................................... 945 Overhead Door Co. v. Washington Area Carpenters’ Welfare Fund 926 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Cons. & Dev. Comm’n 190 Paddack; Clark v............................................... 926 Paddack; Richard Clark Construction v.......................... 926 Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris.......................... 529 Parisi v. United States........................................ 936 Parks v. United States......................................... 945 Pasma; Williams v.............................................. 945 Patterson v. United States..................................... 957 Paul v. United States.......................................... 927 Pavkovic v. Tidwell............................................ 905 Peabody Institute of Baltimore; Butler v....................... 915 Pearson v. Conklin............................................. 959 Pennsylvania; Bradford v....................................... 959 Pennsylvania; Neely v.......................................... 930 Pennsylvania; Sopin v......................................... 934 Pennsylvania; Zettlemoyer v.................................... 970 Pennsylvania Dept, of Justice; State Employees v............... 931 Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n v. Consolidated Rail Corp. .. 912 People Against Nuclear Energy; Metropolitan Edison Co. v..... 912 Peppers v. Tard................................................ 959 Perry v. Louisiana............................................. 961 Perry v. South Carolina........................................ 908 Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.; Barger v.......................... 958 Pettway v. Heckler............................................. 932 Pfotzer v. United States....................................... 950 XXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Phillips v. United States..................................... 958 Picard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services.............. 958 Pinckard v. Pinckard.......................................... 913 Pittser v. Oklahoma........................................... 907 Pittston Stevedoring Corp.; Miller v.......................... 943 PK Management Corp.; DiRose v................................. 915 Plyler v. Leeke............................................... 935 Pokomey v. United States...................................... 910 Police Patrolmen v. Castro.................................... 477 Postmaster General; Common Cause v............................ 911 Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. v. United States...... 931 Powers v. Indiana............................................. 906 Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc. v. Carpenters.......................... 942 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside County 923 Preston v. United States...................................... 914 Prince George Dept, of Social Services; Walsh v. ............. 906 Prosise; Haring v............................................. 954 Provost v. United States...................................... 907 Public Service Comm’n of N. Y. v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co...... 903 Puchala v. Cointelpro......................................... 971 Pulliam v. Allen.............................................. 904 Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. 913,923,954 Qasim; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v....... 929 Quarles; New York v........................................... 942 Quenneville v. Delmark Co..................................... 957 Quinlan; Harris v............................................. 933 Quintana v. Virginia........................................ 940 Randall Division of Textron, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. 914 Ray v. Department of Navy..................................... 901 Redding v. County Court, Orange County, Fla................... 907 Reedman v. Russo.............................................. 929 Rees; London v................................................ 933 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington........... 540 Regan; Taxation with Representation of Washington v........... 540 Reich v. Larson............................................... 915 Reiter v. Huffman............................................. 934 Rhodes v. Stewart............................................. 952 Richard Clark Construction v. Paddack......................... 926 Richards v. Solem............................................. 916 Richardson v. Donovan......................................... 928 Ring v. Oklahoma.............................................. 909 Rios v. Heckler............................................... 958 Rivera; Riverside v. ......................................... 952 Rivera v. Smith............................................... 946 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXV Page Riverside v. Rivera........................................... 952 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Warren............................... 904 Roberts; Thigpen v............................................ 956 Robinson, In re............................................... 925 Robinson v. Cumberland Capital Corp........................... 945 Rocap, In re.................................................. 953 Rock Island Improvement Co.; Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v...... 944 Rodgers; United States v...................................... 677 Rodriguez; Florida v.......................................... 940 Rodziewicz v. New Jersey...................................... 935 Rojas v. United States........................................ 945 Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. Nalls..................................... 970 Ronson v. Commissioner........................................ 940 Ronwin v. Hoover.............................................. 938 Ronwin; Hoover v.............................................. 926 Rose v. Florida............................................... 909 Rose; Smith v. ............................................... 917 Rothwell v. Bailey............................................ 946 R. R. Gable, Inc. v. Burrows..........,...................... 957 Rubber Workers; W. R. Grace & Co. v........................... 757 Ruckelshaus v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc......... 956 Rushen; Hudson v.............................................. 916 Rushen; Minor v............................................... 917 RussO; Reedman v.............................................. 929 Sabouni v. Leaver............................................. 958 S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense; United States v. 925 St. Elizabeth Medical Center; Haddix v........................ 946 St. George Packing Co.; S/S Cove Ranger v..................... 930 St. Louis v. Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality....... 930 St. Louis Police Dept.; Brown v............................ 908 St. Luke’s Hospital Center; Shao Fen Chin v................... 959 Sampson v. Committee on Probation............................. 901 San Carlos Apache Tribe; Arizona v........................ 903,941 Saulsbury v. Greer............................................ 935 Sawvell v. California......................................... 917 Scacchetti, In re............................................. 940 Scarborough & Co. v. Fox...................................... 951 Schlacks v. United States..................................... 947 Schlang v. Heard.............................................. 951 Schwartz; Benson v............................................ 944 Scruggs v. Johnson.......................................... 916 Seagram & Sons, Inc.; AAA Liquors, Inc. v..................... 919 Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Akermanis........................... 927 Sea Pines Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.................... 928 XXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Secretary of Agriculture v. N. D. ex rel. Bd. of U. & School Lands 273 Secretary of Education v. New Jersey............................ 773 Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Broz................ 952 Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Campbell............ 458 Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Day................. 904 Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Edwards............. 955 Secretary of Health and Human Services; Kirk v................ 957 Secretary of Health and Human Services; Pettway v. ........... 932 Secretary of Health and Human Services; Picard v.............. 958 Secretary of Health and Human Services; Rios v................ 958 Secretary of Health and Human Services; Sherwin v............. 958 Secretary of Health and Human Services; Simmons v............ 911 Secretary of Interior v. California............................. 925 Secretary of Interior; California v. ........................... 925 Secretary of Labor; Richardson v................................ 928 Secretary of Treasury v. Taxation with Representation of Wash. . 540 Secretary of Treasury; Taxation with Representation of Wash. v.. 540 Segal; Bradley v............................................... 931 Seiders v. U. S. Parole Comm’n.................................. 909 Seravalli v. Connecticut....*................................... 920 Sesso v. Cuyler................................................. 936 Shabazz, In re.................................................. 904 Shao Fen Chin v. St. Luke’s Hospital Center..................... 959 Sheeran v. United States........................................ 931 Shelly; United States ex rel. Mclnery v......................... 934 Sheriff of Cook County; Baruch v................................ 944 Sherwin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services............... 958 Sholly; Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n v............................. 912 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp................................. 923,954 Simmons v. Heckler.............................................. 911 Siviglia v. United States....................................... 918 Slappy; Morris v.................................................. 1 Smith v. Bordenkircher.......................................... 908 Smith; Clemons v................................................ 960 Smith v. Fairman............................................ 907,946 Smith; Illinois v............................................... 937 Smith v. Jago................................................... 918 Smith v. Lane................................................... 911 Smith; Mississippi v............................................ 912 Smith; Rivera v................................................. 946 Smith v. Rose................................................... 917 Smith v. Texas.................................................. 935 Smith v. Wade.................................................... 30 Smith v. Wainwright............................................. 932 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXVII Page Smith v. Wyrick.................................................. 932 SmithKline Corp. v. Bowsher...................................... 913 SmithKline Corp.; Bowsher v...................................... 913 Snyder v. United States.......................................... 907 Sockwell v. United States........................................ 936 Solem v. Bartlett................................................ 956 Solem; Richards v................................................ 916 Sopin v. Pennsylvania............................................ 934 South Carolina; Humphries v...................................... 905 South Carolina; Perry v.......................................... 908 Sowders; Williams v.............................................. 916 Spalding; McPheeters v........................................... 907 Spawr Optical Research, Inc. v. United States.................... 905 Spencer v. Israel............................................... 971 Springdale School Dist. No. 50 of Washington County v. Grace... 927 Squires v. Immigration and Naturalization Service................ 905 S/S Cove Ranger v. St. George Packing Co......................... 930 Stafford; Broadway v............................................. 934 Stair; Cousino v................................................. 929 Stallworth v. Detroit Bd. of Ed.................................. 940 Starr; Mullen v.................................................. 960 State. See name of State. State Employees v. Pennsylvania Dept, of Justice................. 931 State Energy Res. Cons. & Dev. Comm’n; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 190 State Public Defender Comm’n; Haslip v. ......................... 916 Stauffer Chemical Co.; United States v........................... 924 Stendebach v. CPC International, Inc................ 944 Stenson; Blum v.................................................. 956 Stephenson; Byrd v............................................... 908 Stem, In re...................................................... 912 Stewart; Rhodes v................................................ 952 Stewart v. United States......................................... 936 Stillwater; Yellowfish v......................................... 927 Stith v. Virginia................................................ 943 Stoutt v. Oregon ex rel. Adult and Family Services Division... 928 Strickland; Bowling v............................................ 918 Strickland; Hewitt v............................................. 929 Stroh, In re..................................................... 941 Stubbs v. Bordenkircher.......................................... 907 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See name or title of superintendent. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside County; Press-Enterprise Co. v. 923 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd.................... 942 Sweezy v. Garrison............................................... 908 XXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Taliaferro v. Maryland......................................... 948 Tamara Foods, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd.............. 928 Tard; Alston v................................................. 935 Tard; Peppers v................................................ 959 Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Regan............ 540 Taxation with Representation of Washington; Regan v............ 540 Taylor; Cardwell v............................................. 571 Taylor v. United States........................................ 936 Teamsters v. National Labor Relations Bd....................... 955 Teletype Corp.; Locascio v..................................... 906 Territory. See name of Territory. Terry v. Illinois.............................................. 905 Texas; Donaldson v............................................. 908 Texas; Dunn v.................................................. 926 Texas; Johnson v............................................. 933 Texas; Smith v................................................. 935 Thigpen v. Roberts............................................. 956 Thomassen v. United States..................................... 911 Thompson v. Medical Officer at Hamilton County Jail............ 917 Thompson v. United States...................................... 961 Thompson v. Woods.............................................. 907 Thornberry; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v............................ 952 Thornton; Maine v. ............................................ 924 Thrasher v. Missouri State Highway Comm’n...................... 920 Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Res. v. Wold Engineering 904 Tidwell; Pavkovic v. ...................:...................... 905 Tiller; Illinois v............................................. 944 Tilyou, In re.................................................. 922 Timmons v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment........................... 929 Todd; Jim McNeff, Inc. v.................................... 260 Torrance v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. of Cal........... 921 Toybox Corp. v. Illfelder Toy Co............................... 944 Trainello v. United States..................................... 958 Trignani v. United States...................................... 960 Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist.; Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. 913,923,954 Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. United States :..... 913,923,954 Tufts; Commissioner v.......................................... 300 Turner v. United States........................................ 928 Tyler v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co................................. 915 Udell v. University of Lowell................................. 920 Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Sailing Vessel; Gasque v.. 933 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chrapliwy.................................... 956 United. For labor union, see name of trade. TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXIX Page United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n 905 United Scottish Ins. Co.; United States v...................... 925 United States. See name of other party. U. S. Army; Bigg v............................................. 960 U. S. District Court; Bressler v. .■........................... 959 U. S. District Court; Marie’s Originals v..................... 959 United States ex rel. Mclnery v. Shelly........................ 934 U. S. Parole Comm’n; Joost v.................................. 934 U. S. Parole Comm’n; Seiders v................................ 909 U. S. Postal Service; Miller v. .............................. 916 U. S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens............... 941 United States Steel Corp.; Gadomski v.......................... 946 University of Lowell; Udell v.................................. 920 University of N. H.; Dewey v................................... 944 University of Rochester; Hollander v........................... 922 Valle v. United States......................................... 918 Vandoren, In re................................................ 903 Varig Airlines; United States v................................ 925 Vaughan v. North Carolina...................................... 943 Veliz-Vallardes v. United States............................... 937 Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria..................... 480 Viens v. Illinois.............................................. 917 Villalobos; Aaron v............................................ 908 Vince v. DeJohn................................................ 915 Virginia; Darr v.............................................. 933 Virginia; Quintana v........................................... 940 Virginia; Stith v. ............................................ 943 Virgin Islands; Cyntje v....................................... 908 Volkswagenwerk A. G. v. Falzon................................ 1303 Waddell v. United States....................................... 945 Wade; Smith v................................................... 30 Wade v. United States.......................................... 909 Wainwright; Bryant v........................................ 932 Wainwright v. Grizzell......................................... 948 Wainwright; Smith v.......................... x................ 932 Wakinekona; Olim v............................................. 238 Walck v. American Stock Exchange, Inc.......................... 942 Walgren, In re................................................. 941 Walker Die Casting, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd...... 905 Walsh v. Prince George Dept, of Social Services................ 906 Walters v. United States....................................... 906 Ward v. United States.......................................... 934 Warden. See also name of warden. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary; Cleveland v. ................... 917 XXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Warden, U. S. Penitentiary; Green v........................... 960 Ware v. King.................................................. 930 Warren; Roadway Express, Inc. v............................... 904 Washington; Don’t Waste Washington Legal Defense Foundation v. 913 Washington Area Carpenters’ Welfare Fund; Overhead Door Co. v. 926 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Qasim..... 929 Watt v. California.......................................... 925 Watt; California v............................................ 925 Webb v. Oklahoma.............................................. 959 Weech v. United States........................................ 953 Wegmann; Brewer v. ........................................... 908 Welty v. United States........................................ 947 Wentworth-Douglass Hospital; Colokathis v..................... 915 Westberry; Brito Enterprises, Inc. v.......................... 957 Westberry; Brito’s Boatyard v. ............................... 957 Westborough Mall, Inc.; Drury v............................... 945 Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. California......................... 925 Western Wash. Laborers-Employers H. & S. Tr. Fund; McDowell v. 926 Western Wash. Laborers-Employers H. & S. Tr. Fund; McDowell’s v. 926 Wethersfield Planning and Zoning Comm’n; Fleischmann v...... 950 White, In re.................................................. 922 White v. United States........................................ 932 Williams v. Dallas County Sheriff............................. 935 Williams v. Maggio............................................ 917 Williams; Nix v............................................... 956 Williams v. Pasma............................................. 945 Williams v. Sowders........................................... 916 Williams v. United States......................... 928,931,947,971 Willoughby Hills; Kondrat v................................. 929 Wilson v. Crawford............................................ 931 Windward Partners v. Ariyoshi................................. 906 Winter v. Brooks.............................................. 921 Winter; Brooks v.............................................. 921 Wisconsin; Armstrong v........................................ 946 Wisconsin; Herbst v........................................... 906 Wold Engineering; Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Res. v. 904 Woods; Thompson v............................................. 907 Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd. of Cal.; Torrance v....... 921 W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers........................... 757 Wright v. International Business Machines Corp................ 910 Wright v. United States....................................... 909 Wujs v. United States......................................... 909 Wyrick; Smith v............................................... 932 Yeary v. United States........................................ 910 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Yellowfish v. Stillwater................................. 927 Youngblood v. Maggio..................................... 934 Zettlemoyer v. Pennsylvania.............................. 970 Zimmerman; Anderson v.................................... 960 Zoning Bd. of Adjustment; Timmons v...................... 929 TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 600 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 200, 201, 778 780 792 Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 970 Adams v. Wainwright, 512 F. Supp. 948 250 Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 48,53 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 363 Adams County v. Burleigh County, 69 N. D. 780 341 Addair v. Huffman, 156 W. Va. 592 77 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 178 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 35, 36, 51 Adler v. Board of Ed., 342 U.S. 485 144 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 129 Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Assn. v. American Airlines, Inc., 573 F. 2d 960 768 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 549 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600 46 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71 43 Albany Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman, 493 F. 2d 1319 185 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 131 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 771 Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 965 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 487 Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 124, 125, 133, 136 Page Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 429,442-444 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 123 U.S. App. D. C. 310 468 American Laundry Machine Industries v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97 48 American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 536, 537 Amoco Oil Co. v. State Highway Dept., 262 N. W. 2d 726 277 Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482 706 Andros v. Rupp, 433 F. 2d 70 282 Antazo, In re, 3 Cal. 3d 100 664,669 Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F. 2d 1130 246 Appeal of Lawrence County in re Forman, 71 S. D. 49 331 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 358 Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 683, 700 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 20, 328 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 562 Armstrong v. Udall, 435 F. 2d 38 282 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 151, 162, 163 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S. 476 654 Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212 325 Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 104, 123, 124 Ashley v. Board of Ed., 275 Ill. 274 340 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 361 XXXIII XXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 360 U.S. 378 414 Aue v. State, 77 S. W. 2d 606 705 Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 965, 967 Bailey v. Graves, 411 Mich. 510 48 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 101, 114, 125 * Baldwin v. Tiffany, 250 N. Y. 489 341 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 968 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277 80 Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408 646 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 493 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 556, 564-566 Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492 60, 78 Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240 83 Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa. 190 60, 81 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550 35,44 Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F. 2d 910 432 Bateson Co. v. United States ex rel. Bd. of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586 636 Baton Rouge Building & Construction Trades Council v. E. C. Schafer Construction Co., 657 F. 2d 806 265 Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 466 B. C. A. Soc. v. Henrickson, 54 Mise. 337 341 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 130, 133 Berenowski v. Anchor Window Cleaning Co., 221 App. Div. 155 641 Berg v. Reaction Motors Division, 37 N. J. 396 48 Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 486 Berry v. Fletcher, 3 F. Cas. 286 46 Page Beshaw v. Fenton, 635 F. 2d 239 247 Biggs v. D’Aquin Bros., 13 La. Ann. 21 80 Bigley v. Jones, 64 F. Supp. 389 718 Bills v. Henderson, 631 F. 2d 1287 250,257 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 147,214 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 137 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Umversity of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 514 Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 445 U.S. 74 535, 537 Boardman v. Goldsmith, 48 Vt. 403 60,83 Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 657 Board of Ed. v. Hobbs, 8 Okla. 293 341 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 147 Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 292 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 581 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 562 Bonner v. Anderson, 439 F. 2d 764 282 Bonner v. Peterson, 44 Ill. 253 705 Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 550 Borland v. Barrett, 76 Ya. 128 46,82 Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 596 Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1 62, 82 Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824 785 Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 793 Bradshaw v. Buchanan, 50 Tex. 492 82 Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476 745 TABLE OF CASES CITED XXXV Page Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 142, 149 Brewer v. Watson, 65 Ala. 88 61, 78, 88 Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299 35 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 34, 67, 716 Brittenham v. Robinson, 18 Ind. App. 502 342 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 187 Brooke v. Clark, 57 Tex. 105 42,46 Brooks v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1061 234 Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335 638 Brown v. Allen, 35 Iowa 306 79 Brown v. Bakke, 588 F. 2d 634 432, 438, 439, 451, 452 Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U. S. 483 593, 594 Brown v. Boulden, 18 Tex. 431 338 Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 120, 135, 235 Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183 586 Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 285 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 184, 185 Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 383 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 356, 360, 365, 368 Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 509, 510 Brownsville Independent School Dist. v. Gamboa, 498 S. W. 2d 448 343 Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F. 2d 1351 464, 470, 471 Brugh v. White, 267 Ala. 575 705 Brunell v. Brunell, 494 S. W. 2d 621 685 Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 503, 510 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 509, 510 Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152 46 Page Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 549 Buddy Systems, Inc. v. Exer- Genie, Inc., 545 F. 2d 1164 770 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 683, 697 Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261 331 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 699 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 169 Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238 59 Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 361 Busche v. Burkee, 649 F. 2d 509 433 Butcher v. Petranek, 181 Mont. 358 48 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 144 Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282 46 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 562 Calhoun v. Couch, 232 Ga. 467 663 California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59 280, 298 California v. Block, 663 F. 2d 855 782 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 367 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 741, 744, 752 Cameron v. Bryan, 89 Iowa 214 40, 41, 79 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 546, 548, 550, 552, 554 Camp, In re, 126 N. Y. 377 705 Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 37 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 603 Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 53, 54 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 145, 176, 177 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 34, 36, 67, 91, 93 Carli v. Union Depot, Street R. & T. Co., 32 Minn. 101 61,81 XXXVI TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Carlson, In re, 580 F. 2d 1365 691 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 35, 36, 55 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 344 Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320 967 Causee v. Anders, 20 N. C. 246 61,81 Cays v. McDaniel, 204 Ore. 449 58 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557 205 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 11 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 948 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 20 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 147 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 504, 505, 507-510, 512, 516, 519, 520, 524, 525, 528 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 771 Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 185 Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284 39 Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. 146 37, 41 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 429, * 443, 446 Christy v. Butcher, 153 Mo. App. 397 72 Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F. 2d 1265 52-54 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 549 Citizens Against Rent Con-troVCoalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 546 Citizens’ St. R. Co. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563 46 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 413 Page City. See name of city. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 149 Clark v. Holmes, 474 F. 2d 928 146 Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A. G., 332 U.S. 480 421 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U S 311 397 Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 112 Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 594 F. 2d 638 452 Cline v. Knight, 111 Colo. 8 340 Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 674 F. 2d 1252 743 Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d 934 243, 247, 250 Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 778 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 164 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 359 Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266 82 Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 967 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 520 Coleman & Newsome v. Ryan, 58 Ga. 132 61, 79 Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477 48 Collins v. Yancey, 55 N. J. Super. 514 341 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 537 F. 2d 896 652 Columbus Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178 77 Commercial Credit Co. v. Davidson, 112 F. 2d 54 713 Commissioner v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752 612 Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28 311 Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 450 U.S. 156 596 TABLE OF CASES CITED xxxvn Page Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F. 2d 751 309 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 316 Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 693 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 549 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 607, 621 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A. C. 531 589 Commonwealth. See also name of Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Brown, 11 Mass. App. 283 963 Commonwealth v. Kelly, 10 Mass. App. 847 963 Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289 965 Commonwealth v. Reid, 384 Mass. 247 962 Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 962, 966 Commonwealth v. Walker, 379 Mass. 297 963 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 223, 391 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 526 Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 611 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 357 Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 520, 524, 525 Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 249, 255 Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 742 Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engineers Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co., 638 F. 2d 1128 265 Page Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 397 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 593 Cooper v. Cooper, 217 N. W. 2d 584 343 Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U.S. App. D. C. 390 432, 434, 443, 446, 447, 449, 453, 456 Copley v. Richardson, 475 F. 2d 772 476 Cosgriff Brothers v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190 37 Council of Organizations on Phila. Police A. & R. v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 132 County. See name of county. Cowen v. Winters, 96 F. 929 43, 46 Cox v. Califano, 587 F. 2d 988 471,476 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 178 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 177, 178, 186, 187 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 177, 186 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 143,164,165 Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 144 Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 301, 303, 304, 307-313, 315, 317-319 Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Barracuda Tanker Corp., 696 F. 2d 703 538 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 176 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 248 Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F. 2d 81 464 Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 526 Curl v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 Iowa 417 61,79 Currier v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 612 F. 2d 594 476 Curry-Bey v. Jackson, 422 F. Supp. 926 247 Curtis, Ex parte, 106 U.S. 371 144, 151 XXXVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silver-cloud, 351 U.S. 525 533 Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N. W. 2d 63 48 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 88 Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529 78 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 345, 469 Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E. P. D. H 9444 431, 435 Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143 61, 78 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 360, 363, 367 Davis v. Schuchat, 166 U.S. App. D. C. 351 54 Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 35, 42, 70, 71, 74, 75, 82 Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 280 Decker v. Harris, 647 F. 2d 291 464, 469, 470, 474 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 109 De Leon v. Harlingen Consolidated Independent School Dist., 552 S. W. 2d 922 324 Delman’s Estate v. Commissioner, 73 T. C. 15 320 Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d 1302 443 Dennison v. Los Angeles Dept, of Water and Power, 658 F. 2d 694 767 Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597 44 Deterly v. Wells, 53 S. W. 2d 847 332 Devex Corp. v. Houdaille Industries, Inc., 382 F. 2d 17 649 Devine v. Rand, 38 Vt. 621 62, 82 Diabo v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 200 U.S. App. D. C. 225 471 Dibble v. Morris, 26 Conn. 416 78 District of Columbia v. Mur- phy, 314 U.S. 441 340 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 347 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 187 Page Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 526 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 135 Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575 78 Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553 46, 78 Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 666 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 664 Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 771 Drohn v. Brewer, 77 Ill. 280 46 Duckett v. Pool, 34 S. C. 311 60 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 393 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 128, 129, 202, 207, 221 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 363, 365, 367, 572, 573 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 967 Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Director, OWCP, 686 F. 2d 1336 628, 634, 638 Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 487 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 326, 327, 337 Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448 651- 654, 658 Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 635, 644 Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 421 Dwyer v. Matson, 163 F. 2d 299 338 Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 46, 82 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 552 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm’n of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465 378 Economy Plumbing & Heating Co. v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 839 691 TABLE OF CASES CITED xxxix Page Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 92 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 347 Edwards v. New York, 76 S. Ct. 538 236 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 150, 185 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 635, 644 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 421 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 128 Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 49, 58, 59 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 187 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 505, 507 Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538 80 Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 355 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 149 EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F. 2d 1232 767 EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 597 F. 2d 251 453 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 187 Estate. See name of estate. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 344 Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 604 Ex parte. See name of party. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Mar}7 land, 437 U.S. 117 389, 395 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 506 Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F. 2d 468 247, 248 Fano v. Meachum, 520 F. 2d 374 250 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 21 Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 742, 743 Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 706 Page Farwell v. Warren, 51 Ill. 467 77 Fashion Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T. C. 600 309 Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 37, 42, 58, 81 FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 412 FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27 751 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 377, 405, 417 Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 438 FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 380, 381 FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 778 FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 379-382, 390, 392, 397, 398 FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33 467 FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380 417 FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232 779, 780 Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699 73 Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 204, 221, 383, 384, 386, 389, 753 Fiew v. Qualtrough, 624 S. W. 2d 335 686 Filor v. United States, 9 Wall. 45 297 First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 223 First National Bank of Chicago v. Material Service Corp., 597 F. 2d 1110 657 First National Bank of Des Plaines v. Amco Engineering Co., 32 Ill. App. 3d 451 58 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 446 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 101, 125, 127, 128 Fletcher v. Warden, 467 F. Supp. 777 247 XL TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376 53 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 364, 365 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 204, 221, 226 Florida Railway & Navigation Co. v. Webster, 25 Fla. 394 46 Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35 48 Folsom v. United States, 306 F. 2d 361 690, 697, 702, 714 Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182 54 Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 220 Kan. 244 48 Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 520 Fotheringham v. Adams Express Co., 36 F. 252 46 Frady v. Harris, 646 F. 2d 143 464 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 767 Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F. 2d 726 664 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 389 Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298 35, 80 Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555 37, 45, 79 Frost v. Corporation Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515 205 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 562 Fuller v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 31 Iowa 187 79 Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 320 Furtado v. Bishop, 635 F. 2d 915 455 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 666, 669, 671 Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F. 2d 1318 22, 23 Gardner v. Harris, 391 F. 2d 885 282 Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 265, 268 Page Gamer v. Los Angeles Bd. of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 144 Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 185 Gamer v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 752, 754 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 145, 160, 162 Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 20, 26 General Electric Co. v. Sciaky Bros. Inc., 415 F. 2d 1068 653 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U. S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F. 2d 295 653 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 49, 50, 59, 164, 743 Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F. 2d 1238 22 Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 637 F. 2d 1041 308, 318 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 20, 26, 508 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 603, 604 Girouard v. Hogan, 135 Vt. 448 247, 248 Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 143, 146, 148, 152, 159, 167 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 128 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 20, 26 G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 683 Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202 46 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 233 Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28 39, 41, 80 Gold v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 463 F. 2d 38 471 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 471 Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 102, 104, 123, 124 Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F. 2d 324 54 TABLE OF CASES CITED XLI Page Gomez v. Layton, 129 U.S. App. D. C. 289 362 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 187 Goodnow v. Perrin, 120 N. H. 669 247 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 471 Graves v. Barnes, 405 U.S. 1201 1304 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 177, 185, 186, 357 Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 285 Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 578, 582, 592, 601, 607, 619 Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 578, 581 Green v. Southern Express Co., 41 Ga. 515 78 Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 255, 259 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 152, 177-179, 186 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 910, 919, 939, 971 Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill 177, 360 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 503-508, 515, 524, 525 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 594 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 22, 664, 665 Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 638 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 288, 290, 294, 295 Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 793 Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 494 Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F. 2d 782 432, 453, 455 Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329 949 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 125, 133, 177, 184 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 601, 706, 708 Page Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481 61, 74, 81 Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 967 Haley v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 66 Tenn. 239 46 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 445 Hall v. May Department Stores Co., 292 Ore. 131 53, 54 Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506 778, 792, 794 Hamlin v. Spaulding, 27 Wis. 360 83 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 611 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 526 Hannahs v. Noah, 83 S. D. 296 48 Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 433 Harling v. United States, 387 A. 2d 1101 24, 27 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 509-511 Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 587 Harris v. Lambros, 61 App. D. C. 16 646 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 547, 549, 550, 552, 604 Harris v. Pulley, 692 F. 2d 1189 235 Harrison v. Chesshir, 316 S. W. 2d 909 330 Hart v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co., 33 S. C. 427 46 Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Commandante, 598 F. 2d 698 342 Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala. 374 61, 78 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 708 Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404 685 Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 177 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 743 Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. 176 81 XLII TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 601, 654 Herndon v. United States, 501 F. 2d 1219 691, 696, 701, 703 Herreshoff v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 92 82 Herrick v. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co., 200 U.S. 96 286 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 20, 26 Hersee v. Porter, 100 N. Y. 403 695, 729 Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars of Voters, 366 Mass. 570 340, 342 Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265 466 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 246, 250-252, 255-259 Hill v. Hill, 623 S. W. 2d 779 686 Hillen v. Director of Dept, of Social Services, 455 F. 2d 510 247 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 204, 221, 226 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 701 Hite v. Evart Products Co., 34 Mich. App. 247 646 Hoadley v. Watson, 45 Vt. 289 82 Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch 303 491 Hoeper v. Tax Comm’n, 284 U.S. 206 717 Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 355, 357, 359, 370-372 Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 967 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 20, 26, 27 Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 131 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 235 Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 287 Hooker v. Newton, 24 Wis. 292 83 Hooper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 234, 1302 Hopkins v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co., 36 N. H. 9 42 House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 236 Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 766 Page Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473 246 Huber v. Teuber, 10 D. C. 484 59, 61, 78 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 177 Huebsch v. Larson, 291 Minn. 361 48 Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790 669 Huggins v. Deinhard, 127 Ariz. 358 48, 53 Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Comm’n, 2 Ill. 2d 374 331, 339 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 391 Hughes v. Repko, 578 F. 2d 483 432 Hunter v. Dean, 240 Ga. 214 663 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 766 Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 80 Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Serv- ice Co., 314 U.S. 498 379, 380, 390-393 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 34, 35, 67, 716 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 287, 294 Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 Me. 406 331, 339 Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529 S. W. 2d 43 48 Inman v. Ball, 65 Iowa 543 65, 79 In re. See name of party. Intercounty Construction Corp. v. Walter, 422 U.S. 1 645 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Washington Employers, Inc., 557 F. 2d 1345 766 International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537 695, 729 I. O. O. F. v. Board of Ed., 90 W. Va. 8 341 Iowa Land Co. v. Douglas County, 8 S. D. 491 728 Iverson & Robinson v. Dubose, 27 Ala. 418 294 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 205 TABLE OF CASES CITED XLIII Page Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 589 Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F. 2d 623 610 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 755 Jackson v. Waco Independent School Dist., 629 S. W. 2d 201 349 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 150 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 655 Jacobus v. Congregation of Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518 46 Jamaica v. Townshend, 19 Vt. 267 341,342 James, Inc. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, 646 F. 2d 1292 265 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 177, 184 Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 575 185 Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116 61, 62, 79 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 101, 114, 127, 129 Jenkins v. North Shore Dye House, Inc., 277 Mass. 440 331 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714 429, 430, 434, 449, 450 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 36 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 551 Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30 639 Johnson v. Woman’s Hospital, 527 S. W. 2d 133 53, 54 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 252 Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702 58 Jones v. Devore, 8 Ohio St. 430 694, 727 Jones v. Diamond, 636 F. 2d 1364 432,453 Page Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 967 Jones v. Kemp, 144 F. 2d 478 718, 719 Jones v. League, 18 How. 76 343 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 203, 383, 389 Jordan v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448 53 J. W. Bateson Co. v. United States ex rel. Board of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586 636 J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank, 37 N. Y. 2d 220 491 Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 280 Kelly v. Malott, 135 F. 74 63 Kelly v. McDonald, 39 Ark. 387 61, 78 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 358 Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 397 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 142, 144, 156, 168, 187, 359 Kiehne v. Atwood, 93 N. M. 657 331 Killibrew v. Abbott Laboratories, 359 So. 2d 1275 59 King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 272 S. C. 259 48 King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. L. 417 81 Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F. 2d 524 464 Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 491 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 640 Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73 54 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 510, 516 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 186 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 187 Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 185 Laborers District Council of Alabama v. McDowell Contractors, Inc., 680 F. 2d 94 265 XLIV TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. Mac-Mullan, 406 U.S. 498 135 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 44, 74, 75 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 519 46 Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F. 2d 46 432, 453 Lane v. Yamamoto, 2 Haw. App. 176 35 Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197 124-126, 133, 136 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 359, 361 Larimer County v. National State Bank of Boulder, 11 Colo. 564 728 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 281, 282, 285 Lawrence County in re Forman, Appeal of, 71 S. D. 49 331 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 658 Lee v. United States, 98 U.S. App. D. C. 272 21, 22 Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 287 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 548 Leichtamerv. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456 48 Levine’s Estate v. Commis- sioner, 634 F. 2d 12 314, 320 Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 388 Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 187, 360, 373 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ameta & Co., 564 F. 2d 1097 532 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 124, 137 Lindsey v. Lessee of Miller, 6 Pet. 666 295 Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F. 2d 102 449 Page Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 742, 746, 752, 754 Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225 37 Linton v. Perini, 656 F. 2d 207 21, 22, 27 Lisbon v. Landaff, 75 N. H. 324 341 Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigra- tion, 113 U.S. 33 361 Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N. C. 416 342 Local 453 v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F. 2d 25 766 Loch Ridge Construction Corp. v. Barra, 291 Ala. 312 48 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 920 Lombard v. Batchelder, 58 Vt. 558 82 Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F. 2d 13 243, 250 Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138 243, 244, 249, 250, 259 Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 654 Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 101 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 362 Louder v. Hinson, 49 N. C. 369 81 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 494 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 177, 187, 374 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 605 Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F. 2d 255 768 Lucas v. Lucas, 104 Tex. 636 686, 705 Lucas v. Purdy, 142 Iowa 359 694, 727 Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 682 310 Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184 35, 37, 40, 46, 60, 61, 80 Lyon v. Hancock, 35 Cal. 372 77, 78 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 548 Maher v. Gange, 448 U.S. 122 446 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 549, 552 TABLE OF CASES CITED XLV Page Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 65 Maki v. Aluminum Building Products, 73 Wash. 2d 23 59 Malloy v. Bennett, 15 F. 371 46 Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 281, 282, 286 Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 250 77,84 Mancelona v. Township of Custer, 236 Mich. 677 341 Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 212 Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U.S. 326 691, 692, 696, 702, 721-724, 728 Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N. Y. 543 640 Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 968 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 102 Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. 248 706 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 102 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 471, 778 Maun v. United States, 347 F. 2d 970 211 Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 664 Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246 37 Maysville & Lexington R. Co. v. Herrick, 76 Ky. 122 T 45 M’Cabe v. Morehead, 1 Watts & Serg. 513 81 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 144 McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645 326 McConnell v. Kelley, 138 Mass. 372 343 McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F. 2d 1138 464,465 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F. 2d 1082 580 McDaniel v. Celebrezze, 331 F. 2d 426 469 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 603 McDevitt v. Vial, 7 Sadler 585 81 Page McDonnell v. Attorney General, 420 F. Supp. 217 247 McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 349 McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 601, 607 McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430 469 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 604 McKeon v. Citizens’ R. Co., 42 Mo. 79 80 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 605 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 505, 525 McNish v. State, ex rel. Dimick, 74 Neb. 261 341 McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424 83 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 244-250, 253, 255 Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300 42 Meigs v. M’Clung’s Lessee, 9 Cranch 11 281 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 326, 327, 337, 347, 349 Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466 43, 46, 81 Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 564 Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 320 310 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 601, 607 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, Inc., 414 U.S. 117 389 Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 526 Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 486, 497 Meyer v. Nottger, 241N. W. 2d 911 48, 53, 54 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 391 Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 362 XLVI TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 364 Milgo Electronic Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc., 623 F. 2d 645 653 Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F. 2d 212 303, 320 Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T. C. 656 310 Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123 59 Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 46 54 Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 652, 655 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 329 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 340 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 156, 161 Mills v. Bartlett, 377 S. W. 2d 636 330 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 445, 453 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 214 Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 509, 510 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 782 Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 35, 42-44, 49, 70-74 Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 147 Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 35, 44 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 390, 394 Minnesota v. NRC, 195 U.S. App. D. C. 234 197 Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 280, 289, 296 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 368 Mississippi Power Co. v. Jones, 369 So. 2d 1381 48 Mississippi Univ, for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 345, 346, 610 Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 377-380 Page Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 35, 37, 44 Mitchell v. Lawrence, 458 U.S. 1123 234 Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350 338 Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 562 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 112 Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 633 Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 114, 120, 122, 133 Monrosa v. Carbon Black Ex- port, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 336 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 299 Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 244-249, 253, 255 Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 246 Moore v. Crose, 43 Ind. 30 79 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 330 Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 520 Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U.S. 630 708 Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183 61, 83 Morgan v. Moynahan, 86 F. Supp. 522 718 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 87 Morning Journal Assn. v. Rutherford, 51 F. 513 46 Morris v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508 667 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 507, 528 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 252, 564, 666, 671 Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 711 Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall. 12 492, 496 Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 754 TABLE OF CASES CITED XLVII Page Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 143, 145, 153 Mt. Hope School Dist. v. Hendrickson, 197 Iowa 191 341 Mount Sinai Hospital v. Wein- berger, 517 F. 2d 329 782, 785 Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 423 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 377 Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541 60 Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F. 2d 577 432 Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 766 Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F. 2d 275 433, 437, 441, 453 Nagle v. Mullison, 34 Pa. 48 35 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 507 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 187, 188, 359 NAACP v. Claiborne Hard- ware Co., 458 U.S. 886 145, 150 NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 414, 417, 611 National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors, 81 Wash. 2d 886 709 National Bank & Trust Co. of South Bend v. United States, 589 F. 2d 1298 696 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 644 NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 619 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 599, 605 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 751 NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 740 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 740 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 635 NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 265-269, 271 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 742, 751 Page NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 153 NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 384, 738 NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 740 NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344 742 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 790 National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 317, 320 NRDC v. NRC, 178 U.S. App. D. C. 336 218 NRDC v. NRC, 582 F. 2d 166 218 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 968 Neill v. Newton, 24 Tex. 202 82 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 377, 379, 388, 391, 397 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 UjS. 400 429, 443, 445, 446 New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co., 664 F. 2d 215 265 New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662 289, 297 Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 34, 36, 49, 66, 92, 93, 716 Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N. C. 105 48, 53 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 147, 176 New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 640 New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 443, 446 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 37, 145, 150, 161, 162 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 753 Nichols v. Nichols, 538 S. W. 2d 727 343 Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315 35, 78 XLVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 716 Norman v. First Bank & Trust, 557 S. W. 2d 797 698 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 968 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 666 Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 611F. 2d 624 432, 449 Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F. 2d 1143 212 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 562 North Yarmouth v. West Gardiner, 58 Me. 207 339, 341 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 593, 595, 604 Ogg v. Murdock, 25 W. Va. 139 61, 83 Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U.S. 127 791 Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 291 Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F. 2d 163 452 Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N. W. 2d 621 247 Ortman v. Miller, 33 Mich. App. 451 341 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 492, 497 O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 99, 102-105, 107, 108, 110-112, 123, 124 Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303 588 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 49, 65 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 341 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 387 Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Comm’n, 472 F. Supp. 191 200, 226 Page Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571 686, 703, 718, 719 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm’n, 341 U.S. 329 392 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of Ind., 332 U.S. 507 380, 398 Papachristou v. City of Jack- sonville, 405 U.S. 156 357, 360, 373 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F. 2d 421 453 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 390 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 359, 370, 371 Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 510 Parker v. Shackelford, 61 Mo. 68 35 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 65 Parsons v. Harper, 57 Va. 64 82 Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 91 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 967 Paulson v. Forest City Community School Dist., 238 N. W. 2d 344 342 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 508 Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286 664 Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148 342 Pendowski v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 484 48 Penfield v. Chesapeake, O. & S. R. Co., 134 U.S. 351 338 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 150 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 790 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 201 Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 252 U.S. 23 377 TABLE OF CASES CITED XLIX Page Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202 780 People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286 962, 969 People v. Caylor, 6 Cal. App. 3d 51 357 People v. Fuller, 136 Cal. App. 3d 403 962, 969 People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296 969 People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034 966 People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526 963, 969 People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429 356, 357, 359, 367 People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 962, 966, 969 People ex rel. B. C. A. Soc. v. Hendrickson, 54 Mise. 337 341 Peoria Bridge Assn. v. Loomis, 20 Ill. 235 41 Pereira v. International Basic Economy Corp., 95 P. R. R. 28 59 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 216,217 Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465 588,591 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 421, 455 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 142, 143, 145, 147, 156, 545, 554 Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37 152, 177 Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 551 Peru, Ex parte, 318 U.S. 578 486,497 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 967 Pettengill v. Turo, 159 Me. 350 48 Pfoutz v. Comford, 36 Pa. 420 331 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 740 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 394 Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202 35, 40-44, 68-71, 74, 83 Page Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 693, 697 Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 291 Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 140, 142-146, 150, 153, 154, 156-159, 162, 166, 168 Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 358 46,83 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 34, 35, 67, 716 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 390, 393, 394 Pike v. Dilling, 43 Me. 539 62, 80 Pirre v. Printing Developments, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028 54 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 593,595 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 327, 328, 341, 344-348 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 968 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 120 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 277, 299 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 589, 615 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 338 Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 658 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 708 Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62 780 Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268 635 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 20,26 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 495 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 668 Power Reactor Development Co. v. Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396 207, 422, 619 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 285 L TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Press Pub. Co. v. McDonald, 63 F. 238 40, 46 Prince v. Inman, 280 S. W. 2d 779 330,338 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 603 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 33, 34, 55, 67, 514 Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F. 2d 1227 232, 235 Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 496 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 388 Public Systems v. FERC, 196 U.S. App. D. C. 66 412 Public Utilities Comm’n for Kan. v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236 377-379 Public Utilities Comm’n of R. I. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 378-380, 382, 384, 389-393, 396-401 Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 102, 144, 149 Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 112 Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F. 2d 916 250 Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 790 Radcliff v. State, 134 Ga. App. 244 663 Radiator Specialty Co. v. Micek, 395 F. 2d 763 653 Rahrer, In re, 140 U.S. 545 397 Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 201 Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785 48 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 389 Rayner v. Kinney, 14 Ohio St. 283 81 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 505 Redevelopment Comm’n of Greenville v. Capehart, 268 N. C. 114 705 Redfield v. Bartels, 139 U.S. 694 657 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 600 Page Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F. 2d 721 453 Releford v. United States, 288 F. 2d 298 22, 23, 27 Renaldo v. Bank of San Antonio, 630 S. W. 2d 638 685 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 740 Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 267 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 603 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 15 Pet. 233 296 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 204, 206, 213, 225, 389 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 471,473 Ridley v. State, 475 S. W. 2d 769 966 Riggs v. Fremont Ins. Co., 85 Mich. App. 203 60 Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F. 2d 1144 464, 470 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 99 103, 105, 107, 108, 110^ 112, 123-125, 132-134 Robbins v. Barron, 32 Mich. 36 694, 727 Robbins v. Chamberlain, 297 N. Y. 108 342 Roberts v. Heim, 27 Ala. 678 78 Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 664 Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277 81 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 49, 93 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 668 Robison v. Katz, 94 N. M. 314 48 Rodgers v. Ferguson, 36 Tex. 544 35 Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596 533 Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F. 2d 1231 446 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 495 TABLE OF CASES CITED LI Page Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 136 Ronson v. Commissioner of Correction, 604 F. 2d 176 949 Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304 58 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 791 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 237 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 164 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 664, 665 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 145, 147 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 594 Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433 770 Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist. v. FPC, 129 U.S. App. D. C. 117 382, 384, 394 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 328, 329, 345, 346, 548 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 235 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 741, 752, 754 Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F. 2d 925 461, 464, 465 Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466 46 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 161 Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 187 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 34, 88, 716 Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 108 80 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 349 Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321 1304 Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 111 Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 558 F. 2d 982 146 Page Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 177, 185, 374 Schoof’s Estate v. Schoof, 193 Kan. 611 331, 339 School Dist. Bd. v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48 324 School Dist. No. 1 v. Bragdon, 23 N. H. 507 324 School Dist. of Columbia v. Jones, 229 Mo. 510 705 Schooner Exchange v. M’Fad-don, 7 Cranch 116 486 Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 384 Ill. 148 343 Schuman v. Chatman, 184 Okla. 224 77 Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34 466 Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 564 Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 542 Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 35, 44, 75, 91 Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251 695, 729 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 742 Semmes Nurseries, Inc. v. Mc- Dade, 288 Ala. 523 709 Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A. 2d 33 53 Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F. 2d 894 433 Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F. 2d 345 730 Shango v. Jurich, 681 F. 2d 1091 250 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 325, 327, 337, 347, 349 Sheats v. Bowen, 318 F. Supp. 640 48 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 144 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 144, 603 Sherkow v. Wisconsin, 630 F. 2d 498 432 Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 629, 631, 646 Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R. I. 107 48 LII TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Shortle v. Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 137 Vt. 32 48 Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 495 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 358, 374 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 362, 364 Siegel v. Thoman, 156 U.S. 353 706 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 128, 129 Simons v. Vinson, 394 F. 2d 732 282 Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 508 64,81 Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 967 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 175 Sisbarro v. Warden, 529 F. 2d 1 247 Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1 569 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 357, 358, 360, 370, 372, 373 Smith v. Johnston, 591 P. 2d 1260 48 Smith v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 587 F. 2d 857 471 Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547 23, 24 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 562 Snodgrass v. Headco Industries, Inc., 640 S. W. 2d 147 54 Snyder v. Pitts, 150 Tex. 407 330, 339 Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596 286 Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 287, 292 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 338 Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 112 48 South Carolina Highway Dept, v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 393 Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398 40 Page Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 390 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 640 South & N. A. R. Co. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266 40 Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A. 2d 173 48 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 545, 548, 552, 554 Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45 58 Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 124 Spratt v. Spratt, 210 La. 370 331 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 683 Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427 54 Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F. R. D. 680 430, 431 Stams v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 327 State. See also name of State. State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486 962, 966 State v. De Bonis, 58 N. J. 182 664 State v. Huggett, 55 Haw. 632 669 State v. Simpson, 326 So. 2d 54 966 State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601 664 State v. Taylor, 112 Ariz. 68 571 State v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48 341 State Corporation Comm’n v. Witchita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 378 State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N. W. 2d 621 247 State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286 664 State ex rel. School Dist. Bd. v. Thayer, 74 Wis. 48 324 State ex rel. Timo v. Juvenile Court of Wadena County, 188 Minn. 125 341 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 492 Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 764, 765 TABLE OF CASES CITED LIII Page Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 112 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 135, 355 Stenson v. Laclede Gas Co., 553 S. W. 2d 309 48 Stephens v. State, 245 Ga. 835 663 Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 968 Stinson v. Buisson, 17 La. 567 35, 79 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 572, 573 Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 522 294 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 968 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 161 Stuart v. Willis, 244 F. 2d 925 696 Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N. W. 2d 252 54 Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057 327 Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P. 2d 38 48 Sullivan v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 12 Ore. 392 46, 84 Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 573 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 963-967, 969, 970 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 133 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 66 F. R. D. 483 431 Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F. 2d 56 282 Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F. 2d 149 453 Tai v. Thompson, 387 F. Supp. 912 247 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 591, 607 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 664, 665, 667, 668, 672-674, 676 Taylor v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 304 37 Page Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 967, 968 Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F. 2d 663 433 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 762, 767, 768 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 34, 35, 66, 716 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 353, 356, 360, 361, 363-369, 372 Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 286 Texarkana Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Orr, 59 Ark. 215 40, 46 Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 338 Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nige- ria, 647 F. 2d 300 483, 498 Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 597 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 492 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 526 Thirkfield v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., 12 Utah 76 43, 46 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 147 Thomas v. Isett, 1 Greene 470 79 Thomas v. Klein, 99 Idaho 105 709 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 603, 604 Thomas v. Warner, 83 Md. 14 331 Thompson v. Lessee of Carroll, 22 How. 422 706 Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F. 2d 936 471 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 164, 177, 187, 188, 360 Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136 651 Tillery v. Parks, 630 F. 2d 775 705 Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431 605 Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56 37 LIV TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 143, 165 Timo v. Juvenile Court of Wadena County, 188 Minn. 125 341 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 168, 169, 184, 185 Toll v. Moreno, 441 U.S. 458 337 Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52 83 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 144 Torres v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 677 F. 2d 167 464, 465, 470 Town. See name of town. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mattox, 345 S. W. 2d 290 338 Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q. B. 529 483 Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116 60 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 350 Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 590 Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein’s Sons, Inc., 638 F. 2d 661 653 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 508 Turner v. Smith, 14 Wall. 553 727 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 422 Unemployment Compensation Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 423 Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 12, 19 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyo. 27 46 United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 622 F. 2d 342 452 United Mine Workers v. Patton, 211 F. 2d 742 86 United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N. W. 2d 457 295 United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U.S. 7 683 Page United States v. American National Bank of Jacksonville, 255 F. 2d 504 703 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 383 United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 683, 691, 700 United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 683 United States v. Boswell, 605 F. 2d 171 669 United States v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 363, 365, 367, 368 United States v. Buege, 578 F. 2d 187 503, 519 United States v. Burton, 189 U.S. App. D. C. 327 22 United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 507 United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 291, 701 United States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844 966 United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23 599 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 320, 596 United States v. Crystal, 39 F. Supp. 220 646 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 318 United States v. Davis, 437 F. 2d 928 515 United States v. Davis, 639 F. 2d 239 949 United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 285 United States v. Eaves, 499 F. 2d 869 705 United States v. Ebner, No. M-12487-79 (D. C. Super. Ct.) 174 United States v. 818.76 Acres of Land, 310 F. Supp. 210 705 United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 632 United States v. Erie County, 31 F. Supp. 57 714 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U. S. 506 704 TABLE OF CASES CITED LV Page United States v. Flannery, 451 F. 2d 880 504, 520 United States v. 403.15 Acres of Land, 316 F. Supp. 655 705 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 698 United States v. Heasley, 283 F. 2d 422 718 United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 309 United States v. Hershberger, 475 F. 2d 677 701, 702, 705, 718, 723 United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F. 2d 326 703, 719, 720 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 639 United States v. Jiles, 658 F. 2d 194 250 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 253 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 311 United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720 294 United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301 295 United States v. Kocher, 468 F. 2d 503 691 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill 287, 294 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 281 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 603, 604 United States v. Louisiana, 127 U.S. 182 289, 296 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 563, 565, 566 United States v. MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317 665 United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 369 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 364 United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 766 United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 683, 700, 701 United States v. Modica, 663 F. 2d 1173 506 Page United States v. Morrison, 247 F. 2d 285 705 United States v. Nathanson, 60 F. Supp. 193 719 United States v. Nelson, 529 F. 2d 40 966 United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 280 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 216 United States v. One 1976 Mercedes 450 SCL, 667 F. 2d 1171 561 United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 299 United States v. Overman, 424 F. 2d 1142 691, 698, 701, 705 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 505, 507, 526 United States v. Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207 966 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 361 United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 369 United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295 379, 380, 396, 397 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 358 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 111 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 187 United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 966 United States v. Rodriguez, 627 F. 2d 110 504, 520, 527 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 601, 643 United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 716, 717 United States v. Seale, 461 F. 2d 345 22 United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 697 United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 683 United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 287 LVI TABLE OF CASES CITED Page United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 697 United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 587 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 467 United States v. Taylor, 35 F. 484 46 United States v. Taylor, 321 F. 2d 339 669 United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 563 United States v. Thirty-Six Thousand One Hundred & Twenty-Five Dollars in U. S. Currency, 642 F. 2d 1211 561 United States v. 380 Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. 6 705 United States v. Trilling, 328 F. 2d 699 691 United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 683, 701 United States v. U. S. Currency, 626 F. 2d 11 567 United States v. Various Pieces of Semiconductor Mfg. Equipment, 649 F. 2d 606 561 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 520 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 717 United States v. Wilson, 469 F. 2d 368 669 United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 620, 622 United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 136 United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414 782 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 144 United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 629, 631, 646 United States ex rel. Siegel v. Thoman, 156 U.S. 353 706 U. S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114 180 United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F. 2d 359 443 Page Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 21 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 125, 128 Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 383 Veal v. Califano, 610 F. 2d 495 476 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 196, 206, 207, 755 Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65 136 Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515 136 Virginia Railway & Power Co. v. House, 148 Va. 879 82 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 245, 249, 252, 254 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 411 326, 327, 330, 331, 340 Volger v. Ontario Knife Co., 223 App. Div. 550 641 Von Storch v. Winslow, 13 R. I. 23 35 Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N. H. 71 59 Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 355 Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508 655, 656 Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 766, 769 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 544, 593, 595, 599, 608 Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260 48 Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295 78 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 949 Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F. 2d 408 471 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 111, 128, 129 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 514, 623 TABLE OF CASES CITED lvii Page Page Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 14 948 263 177 Washington v. United States, Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 402 F. 2d 3 691 U.S. 183 144 Washington v. W. C. Dawson Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 & Co., 264 U.S. 219 640 s. W. 2d 730 685 Washington Area Carpenters’ Wilkinson v. Drew, 75 Me. Welfare Fund v. Overhead ggp 02 80 WÄ'ÄS V- BpT’-74 °n? ’ æ D. C. 273 265 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. Washington Revenue Dept. v. ?8 . . $4$ Association of Washington Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. Stevedoring Cos,, 435 U.S. 235 664, 665,667, 734 391 668, 670, 672-674, 676 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Williams v. New York, 337 United States, 381 U.S. 252 620 U.S. 241 670 W. C. James, Inc. v. Oil, Williams v. North Carolina, Chemical & Atomic Workers 325 U.S. 226 340 International Union, 646 Williams v. Trans World Air- F. 2d 1292 265 lines, Inc., 660 F. 2d 1267 452 Weber v. Board of Harbor Williams v. Williams, 569 S. W. Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57 288, 2d 867 686 ___ . 2^0’.2$4, 295 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 Weemg v. Wood, 169 Ind. App. u.S. 619 340, 343 413 , „ 54 Wilson v. Eagan, 297 N. W. 2d Weinberger v. Romero- 14g 35 Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 708 Bilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 55 ° 286 .1 D1 1 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, Wentv/orth v. Blackman, 71 442 v g g53 297, 298 WeSn & Southern Life Ins. * Schnetto’ 365 U-S- Co. v. Board of Equalization, .. , _ 451 U.S. 648 388, 389 Wüson v. United States, 149 Western Union Telegraph Co. , ^-S. 60 503, 507, 515, 516 v. Eyser, 91 U.S. 495 43, 44, 73 Wiltshire v. Warburton, 59 F. West Virginia v. Secretary of „T. ‘ ^3 Education, 667 F. 2d 417 782 Winchester v. Town of Bur- Wheeler v. Burrow, 18 Ind. 14 324 lington, 128 Conn. 185 341 White v. Acree, 594 F. 2d WlndJ}^ v‘ Rhame’ 11 s- C-1385 561 L- 283 61> 82 White v. Brock, 41 Colo. App. Winfield v. New York C. & H. 156 48 R. R. Co., 216 N. Y. 284 640 White v. Florida, 458 U.S. Winsettv. McGinnes, 617F. 2d 1301 1302 996 257 Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40 Miss. Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 352 81 524 61, 81 Whitney v. State, 472 S. W. 2d Winters v. New York, 333 524 330,338 U.S. 507 359 Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 545 965, 967 205 603 LVIII TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229 65 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 970 Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645 270 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 245, 251, 255 Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F. 2d 83 185 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 610 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 164 Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 670, 675 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 34, 35, 55, 67 Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586 684 Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 357 312 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 920 Page Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 255, 257 Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (CADC) 585 Yahoola River Mining Co. v. Irby, 40 Ga. 479 78 Yale v. West Middle School Dist., 59 Conn. 489 324, 340 Yerian v. Linkletter, 80 Cal. 135 40 Young, In re, 95 Wash. 2d 216 247 Young v. Pollak & Co., 85 Ala. 439 343 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 112, 134, 135 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 669 Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank, 37 N. Y. 2d 220 491 Zimmerman v. Heiser, 32 Md. 274 80 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 212, 345, 347, 348 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 493 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1982 MORRIS, WARDEN v. SLAPPY CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 81-1095. Argued December 1, 1982—Decided April 20, 1983 When respondent was charged in California Superior Court with various crimes, including rape, robbery, and burglary, all concerning the same female victim, the court assigned the Deputy Public Defender to defend respondent. The Deputy Public Defender represented respondent at the preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation. Shortly before the trial, the Deputy Public Defender was hospitalized for surgery, and six days before the scheduled trial date a senior trial attorney in the Public Defender’s Office was assigned to represent respondent. After the trial was under way, respondent moved for a continuance, claiming that his newly assigned attorney did not have time to prepare the case. The attorney, however, told the court that he was fully prepared and “ready” for trial, and the court denied a continuance. Respondent was convicted on some counts but there was a mistrial on other counts on which the jury could not agree. A second trial, during which respondent refused to cooperate with his lawyer, also resulted in convictions. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions on all counts, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Thereafter, respondent filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court, alleging that the California Superior Court abused its discretion in denying a continuance. The District Court denied the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel with whom the accused has a “meaningful attorney-client relationship,” and that the state trial judge abused his discre- 1 2 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. tion and violated this right by arbitrarily denying a continuance that would have permitted the Deputy Public Defender to try the case. Held: The state trial court did not violate respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying a continuance. Pp. 11-15. (a) Broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances. Here, in the face of an unequivocal and uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the court that he was fully prepared and “ready” for trial, it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance. Nor is there any merit to the claim that the denial of a continuance prevented the substituted attorney from being fully prepared for trial. Pp. 11-12. (b) In holding that the trial judge violated respondent’s right to counsel by arbitrarily refusing a continuance that would have permitted the Deputy Public Defender to try the case, the Court of Appeals misread the record and the controlling law and announced a new constitutional standard—“meaningful attorney-client relationship”—that is unsupported by any authority. The court erred in reading the record as indicating that respondent timely and in good faith moved for a continuance to permit the Deputy Public Defender to represent him. On the contrary, the record shows that the trial court was abundantly justified in denying respondent’s midtrial motion for a continuance so as to have the Deputy Public Defender represent him. The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a “meaningful relationship” between an accused and his counsel. No court could possibly guarantee that an accused will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney that the Court of Appeals thought to be part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel. Pp. 12-14. (c) In creating a novel Sixth Amendment right to counsel with whom the accused has a “meaningful relationship,” and ordering retrial, the Court of Appeals failed to take into account the interest of the victim in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial. There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that respondent was entitled to a new trial, and the District Court properly denied relief. Pp. 14-15. 649 F. 2d 718, reversed and remanded. Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 15. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 29. Dane R. Gillette, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Phili- MORRIS v. SLAPPY 3 1 Opinion of the Court bosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, William D. Stein, Assistant Attorney General, and W. Eric Collins and Herbert F. Wilkinson, Deputy Attorneys General. Michael B. Bassi, by appointment of the Court, 456 U. S. 942, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether it was error for the Court of Appeals to hold that the state trial court violated respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying respondent’s motion for a continuance until the Deputy Public Defender initially assigned to defend him was available. We granted certiorari, 456 U. S. 904 (1982), and we reverse. The issues raised arise out of two trials in the state court, the second trial having been held on two counts on which the first jury could not agree. Respondent was convicted of robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment in the first trial; he was convicted of rape and forcible oral copulation in the second. On review of all five counts, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, affirmed the convictions, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Thereafter the United States District Court denied respondent’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This denial was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, which held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel with whom the accused has a “meaningful attorney-client relation *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Edwin S. Kneedler for the United States; and by Richard J. Wilson and Howard B. Eisenberg for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. Dennis A. Fischer, Jeff Brown, Ephraim Margolin, Robert Altman, John J. Cleary, James R. Dunn, and Terence F. MacCarthy filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. 4 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. ship,” and that the trial judge abused his discretion and violated this right by denying a motion for a continuance based on the substitution of appointed counsel six days before trial. 649 F. 2d 718 (CA9 1981). I Respondent’s pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court set forth two grounds for relief: (a) that the state “[t]rial court abused its discretion by failing to order a substitution of counsel after [respondent and counsel became] embroiled in irreconcilable conflict,” Record 3; and (b) that the trial court had not permitted him to testify in his own behalf in the second trial. Ibid. The facts shown by the record conclusively rebut both these claims and are alone dispositive, independent of the correctness of the novel Sixth Amendment guarantee announced by the Court of Appeals. A After midnight on July 7,1976, the victim, a young woman, left her apartment to shop at a nearby grocery store in San Francisco. There she was accosted by respondent and when she complained to the store manager, he ordered respondent to leave. Respondent waited for the victim outside; when the victim left the store, respondent threw a beer bottle at her. She asked the store manager to call the police, but he told her just to walk away. She then walked home taking the long way around the block, but when she entered her apartment house, respondent was waiting for her in the lobby. From this fact, the jury could have inferred that respondent had been stalking the victim from the time she first left her apartment. Respondent forced the victim into the basement, where, she testified, he raped and sodomized her and then robbed her. The victim managed to escape from respondent and fled from the building into a nearby all-night diner, where she was sheltered until the police came. She gave the police a MORRIS v. SLAPPY 5 Opinion of the Court description of her assailant; he was apprehended two blocks away. He was wearing the green fatigue jacket with fur-trimmed hood and the “Afro” style wig that the victim had described to the police. On his person the police found jewelry taken from the victim. The respondent told the booking officer that he had been given the jewelry by a woman whose last name he did not recall and whose address he did not know. Police found the victim’s clothing scattered on the floor of the basement of her apartment building and a button from respondent’s jacket on the basement steps. Respondent was charged in San Francisco Superior Court with five felonies.1 The court appointed the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office to represent respondent and Deputy Public Defender Harvey Goldfine was assigned to defend the accused. Goldfine represented respondent at the preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation. The trial was scheduled for Thursday, September 23, 1976. Shortly prior to trial, however, Goldfine was hospitalized for emergency surgery. On Friday, September 17, six days before the scheduled trial date, the Public Defender assigned Bruce Hotchkiss, a senior trial attorney in the Public Defender’s Office, to represent respondent. On the day he was assigned the case, Hotchkiss interviewed respondent in jail and advised him of the substitution. Between that date and the following Tuesday, September 21, Hotchkiss reviewed the files and investigation prepared by his colleague. On Tuesday, he conferred with respondent for three hours; on the following day he again met with respondent in the morning and afternoon. 1 Respondent was charged with rape, Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 261, subd. 3 (West 1970); forcible oral copulation, Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 288a (West 1970); second-degree burglary, Cal. Penal Code Ann. §459 (West 1970); second-degree robbery, Cal. Penal Code Ann. §211a (West 1970); and false imprisonment, Cal. Penal Code Ann. §236 (West 1970). 6 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. (a) First Day of First Trial The first trial began as scheduled on Thursday, September 23. At the opening of trial, respondent told the court: "I only have this P. D. [Public Defender] for a day and a half, we have not had time to prepare this case. He came in Tuesday night, last Tuesday night was the first time I saw him. . . . We have not had enough time to prepare this case.” App. 7. Construing respondent’s remarks as a motion for a continuance, the court denied the motion, noting that the case had been assigned to Hotchkiss the previous Friday, six days before the trial date, and that Hotchkiss stated he had “investigated the case, [and] studied it.” Id., at 8. In reply, respondent repeated his claim that Hotchkiss had only been on the case for a day and a half. Respondent then stated: “[T]his past Tuesday was the first time [Hotchkiss interviewed me.] He said he was busy and he couldn’t make it up there. He only [sic] been on this case one day and a half your Honor, he can’t possibly have had enough time to investigate all these things in this case. Some of the major issues have not been investigated. It’s impossible for him to have time enough to take care of this case to represent this case properly, the way it should be represented.” Ibid. Hotchkiss explained Goldfine’s absence and stated that he was prepared to try the case on the basis of his study of the investigation made by Goldfine and his conferences with respondent. “I feel that I am prepared. My own feeling is that a further continuance would not benefit me in presenting the case.” Id., at 11. Respondent replied that he was “satisfied with the Public Defender, but it’s just no way, no possible way, that he has had enough time to prepare this case.” Id., at 12 (emphasis added). The trial judge repeated that he was confident that the Public Defender’s Office was representing respondent ade MORRIS v. SLAPPY 7 1 Opinion of the Court quately and that Hotchkiss was an experienced counsel; the court again denied a continuance. Id., at 9. (b) Second Day of First Trial At the start of the second day of trial, on Friday, September 24, 1976, respondent again complained that Hotchkiss was not prepared. When the court expressed its confidence in Hotchkiss, respondent said: “I don’t mean he’s not a good P. D., I don’t have anything against him. It’s just that he didn’t have time to prepare the case, one day and a half.” Id., at 18 (emphasis added). The trial judge again stated that he was satisfied that the case had been “well prepared” by Goldfine, and that Hotchkiss had been assigned to the case the previous week, had read the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and had “prepared the case, reviewed all the matters, obtained the pictures, and other items that he intends to produce into evidence.” Ibid. In conclusion, the trial judge stated: “I am satisfied . . . that Mr. Hotchkiss is doing a more than adequate job, a very fine job.” Id., at 18-19. When respondent continued to complain that Hotchkiss had not adequately investigated the case, Hotchkiss told the court: “My feeling is that all investigation that needed to be done and that should be done and quite possibly that could have been done has been done.” Id., at 21-22. Finally, Hotchkiss pointed out that he would have the weekend between the close of the prosecution’s case and the beginning of the defense’s case for further conferences with respondent. Id., at 22-23. At this time—on the second day of the first trial—respondent first mentioned Goldfine’s name. After complaining again about Hotchkiss’ alleged lack of time for preparation, respondent said: “Mr. Harvey Goldfine was my attorney, he was my attorney, and he still is. I haven’t seen him in five 8 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. weeks because he’s in the hospital.” Id., at 24. Respondent then claimed that not even Goldfine had had enough time to prepare the case: “Mr. Harvey Goldfine didn’t even have enough time to go over my case with me, he didn’t even have time.” Ibid. Respondent concluded these remarks with additional complaints about Hotchkiss’ preparation. (c) Third Day of First Trial Trial resumed four days later, on Tuesday, September 28, 1976. Out of the presence of the jury, respondent presented the court with a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was unrepresented by counsel. In support of his petition, respondent claimed that Goldfine, not Hotchkiss, was his attorney. Specifically, he said that the writ should be granted on “the grounds that my attorney’s in the hospital, and I don’t legally have no attorney, and this P. D. here told me, this P. D., Mr. Hotchkiss, Bruce Hotchkiss, told me I didn't have no defense to my charges.'1 Id., at 29 (emphasis added). Hotchkiss disputed this charge. The trial court treated the petition as a renewal of respondent’s motion for a continuance, and denied it. Following the court’s ruling, respondent announced that he would not cooperate at all in the trial and asked to be returned to his cell. The court urged respondent to cooperate but respondent refused, claiming that Hotchkiss did not represent him: “I don’t have any Counsel, I just got through telling you, I don’t have no Counsel.” Id., at 32. However, respondent remained in the courtroom and the trial proceeded. Later, respondent renewed his attack: “What do I have to say to get through to you, your Honor, what do I have to say to make you understand. I have told you two or three times, and then you keep telling me about talking to my Counsel. I don’t have MORRIS v. SLAPPY 9 1 Opinion of the Court no attorney, I told you I don’t have no attorney. My attorney’s name is Mr. P. D. Goldfine, Harvey Goldfine, that’s my attorney, he’s in the hospital.” Id., at 37-38. Ultimately, respondent refused to take the stand, ignoring Hotchkiss’ advice that he testify. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment counts, but failed to reach a verdict on the rape and oral copulation counts. (d) Second Trial A week later, a second trial was held on the charges left unresolved as a result of the mistrial and Hotchkiss again appeared for respondent. Once more, respondent ignored Hotchkiss’ advice and refused to take the stand.2 Indeed, respondent refused to cooperate with or even speak to Hotchkiss. The second jury returned a guilty verdict on the sexual assault counts. The California Court of Appeal affirmed respondent’s convictions on all five counts; the California Supreme Court denied review. B The United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Peckham, J.) construed the pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus liberally as including a claim that the trial court abused its discretion both in denying a continuance to allow Hotchkiss additional time to prepare and in denying a continuance to permit Goldfine to defend respondent. In denying the writ, the District Court stated: “The record supports the trial judge’s conclusion that Hotchkiss had adequate time to prepare for the trials 2 After the jury had been charged, but before it had retired to begin deliberations, respondent asked the judge in open court to permit him to take the stand and testify. A chambers conference was then held, at which the judge denied respondent’s motion to testify, concluding it had been made in bad faith: “I am denying it because I am not convinced. All you’re trying to do is make a record for appeal. . . .” App. 52. 10 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. and that he presented an able defense despite [respondent’s] lack of cooperation with him.” App. to Pet. for Cert. D3-D4. The District Court also rejected respondent’s claim that the trial court should have granted the continuance to permit Goldfine to represent respondent, stating that “it was not unreasonable to conclude that the efficient administration of justice required that petitioner be represented by Hotchkiss rather than Goldfine after the latter had fully recovered from surgery.” Id., at D4-D5. The District Court thus rejected any claim that the state trial judge had abused his discretion in denying a continuance.3 In reversing the District Court’s denial of the writ, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “an indigent defendant does not have an unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his own choosing,” but argued that respondent was not seeking appointment of counsel of his own choosing; rather, he “was merely seeking a continuance of the trial date so that his attorney [Goldfine] would be able to represent him at trial.” 649 F. 2d, at 720. The Court of Appeals went on to announce a new component of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right, it held, would “be without substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The court seems to have determined, solely on the basis of respondent’s confusing and contradictory remarks on the subject, that respondent had developed such a “meaningful attorney-client relationship” with Goldfine but not with Hotchkiss. 8 The District Court also rejected the claim that the trial judge had abused his discretion in denying respondent the opportunity to testify after the jury had already been charged in the second trial. MORRIS v. SLAPPY 11 1 Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals next stated that the trial court, having failed to inquire about the probable length of Goldfine’s absence, could not have weighed respondent’s interest in continued representation by Goldfine against the State’s interest in proceeding with the scheduled trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s failure to conduct this balancing test ignored respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to a “meaningful attorney-client relationship” and hence violated respondent’s right to counsel;4 this violation was held to require reversal without any need to show prejudice. The Court of Appeals directed that the writ issue unless respondent received a new trial on all five counts. II Not every restriction on counsel’s time or opportunity to investigate or to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 53-54 (1970). Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary “insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable 4 The Court of Appeals undertook to confine its holding to cases where the defendant requests a continuance in good faith. Here, the court asserted: “The record clearly demonstrates the sincerity of Slappy’s desire to be represented by Goldfine, and the state has not contended that Slappy was acting in bad faith. . . . [T]here is nothing in the record from which it can be inferred that Slappy’s request for a continuance was motivated by a desire to delay his trial for an improper purpose.” 649 F. 2d, at 722. Nothing in the record affords any support for these “findings” of the Court of Appeals. By contrast, the State asserts that it has “always contended that Slappy was acting in bad faith when he demanded that Goldfine rather than Hotchkiss represent him.” Brief for Petitioner 38, n. 23. 12 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. request for delay” violates the right to the assistance of counsel. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575, 589 (1964). We have set out at greater length than usual the record facts showing Hotchkiss’ prompt action in taking Goldfine’s place, his prompt study of the investigation, his careful review of the materials prepared by Goldfine for trial, his conferences with respondent, and his representation to the court that “a further continuance would not benefit me in presenting the case,” App. 11. In the face of the unequivocal and uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the court that he was fully prepared and “ready” for trial, it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance. On this record, it would have been remarkable had the trial court not accepted counsel’s assurances. Nor is there any merit to the claim that the denial of a continuance prevented Hotchkiss from being fully prepared for trial. Despite respondent’s adamant—even contumacious— refusal to cooperate with Hotchkiss or to take the stand as Hotchkiss advised, in spite of respondent’s numerous outbursts and disruptions, and in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, Hotchkiss succeeded in getting a “hung jury” on the two most serious charges at the first trial. Given the undisputed and overwhelming evidence of guilt, the jury’s failure at the first trial to convict the defendant on the more serious charges cannot reflect other than favorably on Hotchkiss’ readiness for trial. Ill In holding that the trial judge violated respondent’s right to the assistance of counsel by arbitrarily refusing a continuance that would have permitted Goldfine to try the case, the Court of Appeals misread the record and the controlling law and announced a new constitutional standard which is unsupported by any authority. A The Court of Appeals’ first error was in reading the record as indicating that respondent timely and in good faith moved MORRIS v. SLAPPY 13 1 Opinion of the Court for a delay to permit Goldfine to continue to represent him. The transcript clearly shows that respondent did not specifically assert a concern for continued representation by Goldfine until the third day of trial, 11 days after Hotchkiss had been substituted for Goldfine. Until then, all that respondent sought was a delay to give Hotchkiss additional time that respondent, but not Hotchkiss, thought necessary to prepare for trial. Moreover, respondent specifically disavowed any dissatisfaction with counsel; he informed the court on the first day of trial that he was “satisfied” with Hotchkiss. Id., at 12. On this record, we cannot fathom how the Court of Appeals could have construed these complaints about Hotchkiss’ alleged lack of time in which to prepare as indicating an unspoken preference for Goldfine. On the contrary, the trial court was abundantly justified in denying respondent’s midtrial motion for a continuance so as to have Goldfine represent him. On this record, it could reasonably have concluded that respondent’s belated requests to be represented by Goldfine were not made in good faith but were a transparent ploy for delay. In our view, the record shows that the trial judge exhibited sensitive concern for the rights of the accused and extraordinary patience with a contumacious litigant.6 B The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “would be without substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship,” 649 F. 2d, at 720 (emphasis added), is without basis in the law. No authority was cited for this novel ingredient of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of course none could be. No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney—privately retained or provided by the public—that 6 Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to testify in the second trial after closing argument had been made and after the jury had been instructed. 14 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel. Accordingly, we reject the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a “meaningful relationship” between an accused and his counsel.6 IV We have gone to unusual length in discussing the facts and relevant authorities in order to evaluate the claim of abuse of discretion by the trial judge and to deal with the novel idea that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a “meaningful attorney-client relationship.” Had the Court of Appeals examined the record more carefully, it would have had no occasion to consider, let alone announce, a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment. In its haste to create a novel Sixth Amendment right, the court wholly failed to take into account the interest of the victim of these crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial in this case. Of course, inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce constitutional rights of an accused: when prejudicial error is made that clearly impairs a defendant’s constitutional rights, the burden of a new trial must be borne by the prosecution, the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution permits nothing less. But in the administration of criminal justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of victims. Apart from all other factors, such a course would hardly encourage victims to report violations to the proper authorities; this is especially so when the crime is one calling for public testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience such as was involved here. Precisely what weight should be given to the ordeal of reliving such an experience for the third time need not be de 6 The Court of Appeals seems to have believed that an appointed counsel with whom the accused did not have a “meaningful relationship” was the equivalent of no counsel; as a consequence, it held that no prejudice need be shown for violations of the right to a “meaningful” attorney-client relationship. Our holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a “meaningful attorney-client relationship” disposes of that argument. MORRIS v. SLAPPY 15 1 Brennan, J., concurring in result cided now; but that factor is not to be ignored by the courts. The spectacle of repeated trials to establish the truth about a single criminal episode inevitably places burdens on the system in terms of witnesses, records, and fading memories, to say nothing of misusing judicial resources. Over 75 years ago, Roscoe Pound condemned American courts for ignoring “substantive law and justice,” and treating trials as sporting contests in which the “inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out strictly?” Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, 29 ABA Ann. Rep. 395, 406 (1906). A criminal trial is not a “game,” and nothing in the record of respondent’s two trials gives any support for the conclusion that he was constitutionally entitled to a new trial. The state courts provided respondent a fair trial, and the United States District Judge properly denied relief. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to reinstate the judgment of the District Court. It is so ordered. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring in the result. The Court states that “[i]n its haste to create a novel Sixth Amendment right, the [Court of Appeals] wholly failed to take into account the interest of the victim of these crimes in not undergoing the ordeal of yet a third trial in this case.” Ante, at 14. Unfortunately, it could just as easily be said of the Court that in its haste to “deal with the novel idea that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a ‘meaningful attorney-client relationship,’” ibid., the Court reaches issues unnecessary to its judgment, mischaracterizes the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and disregards the crucial role of a defendant’s right to counsel in our system of criminal justice. For the reasons described below, I concur only in the Court’s reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. 16 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., concurring in result 461 U. S. I After reviewing the record of the proceedings in the state trial court, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent moved for a continuance based on the unavailability of Harvey Goldfine, the Deputy Public Defender originally appointed to represent him. 649 F. 2d 718, 719-720 (CA9 1981). The court, therefore, proceeded to consider whether the trial court had denied respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to grant his motion for a continuance until Goldfine was well enough to represent him at trial. Id., at 720. In considering this question, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “an indigent defendant does not have an unqualified right to the appointment of counsel of his own choosing.” Ibid. The court stated, however, that after a particular attorney is appointed to represent a defendant, the defendant and his attorney develop a relationship that is encompassed by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Ibid. In the court’s view, the attorney-client relationship is important to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it affects the quality of representation and the defendant’s ability to present an effective defense. Id., at 720-721. In this regard, the court noted that unreasonable demals of continuances when a defendant has retained counsel can amount to a denial of the right to counsel or to a violation of due process. Id., at 721. The court saw no reason “to distinguish between appointed and retained counsel in the context of preserving an attorney-client relationship.” Ibid. In light of “the importance of the attorney-client relationship to the substance of the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel,” the court held that “the sixth amendment (as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment) encompasses the right to have the trial judge accord weight to that relationship in determining whether to grant a continuance founded on the temporary unavailability of a defendant’s particular attorney.” Ibid. The court stated that in consider MORRIS v. SLAPPY 17 1 Brennan, J., concurring in result ing motions for continuances based on the temporary unavailability of counsel, “the trial court must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel against the societal interest in the ‘prompt and efficient administration of justice.’” Ibid, (citation omitted). In this case, the trial judge failed to inquire into the expected length of Goldfine’s unavailability and, therefore, could not “engage in the balancing required to protect [respondent’s] rights.” Id., at 722. As a result, respondent had been denied his right to counsel as that right was construed by the Court of Appeals. Ibid.1 The Court of Appeals next concluded that no showing of prejudice was required for reversal of the conviction. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that this case did not involve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which it previously had held to require a showing of prejudice to justify reversal. Id., at 722, and n. 4. Instead, the court analogized this case to cases in which counsel is either not provided or in which counsel is prevented from fulfilling normal functions. Id., at 723. In such cases a defendant is not required to demonstrate prejudice. Ibid.2 II I agree with the Court that the Court of Appeals misread the record in concluding, at least implicitly, that respondent made a timely motion for a continuance based on Goldfine’s 1 The Court of Appeals stated that there was “nothing in the record from which it [could] be inferred that [respondent’s] request for a continuance was motivated by a desire to delay his trial for an improper purpose.” 649 F. 2d, at 722. The court, therefore, found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the “same result would obtain if it were shown that the defendant’s request for a continuance was made in bad faith.” Ibid. 2 The court limited its holding to cases in which “a trial court does not attempt to ascertain the length of continuance necessary to insure counsel’s presence at trial, and the attorney with whom the defendant has an attorney-client relationship does not appear at trial. . . .” Id., at 723. 18 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., concurring in result 461 U. S. unavailability and on his desire to have Goldfine represent him at trial. Ante, at 12-13.3 Respondent based his initial motion for a continuance on the ground that Hotchkiss had not had enough time to prepare the case. App. 7-13. On the second day of trial, respondent again complained that Hotchkiss had not had enough time to prepare. Id., at 17. For the first time respondent also mentioned Goldfine and stated that Goldfine “was [his] attorney.” Id., at 24. Respondent went on to state that he had not seen Goldfine in five weeks because Goldfine was in the hospital. Ibid. Respondent suggested, however, that Goldfine “didn’t even have time enough to go over my case with me, he didn’t even have time.” Ibid. It is clear, therefore, that respondent was basing his inartful motions for a continuance on the inadequate preparation of his appointed counsel. Even construing respondent’s statements liberally, as a court should, there is no way the trial judge reasonably could have understood that respondent’s motions for a continuance were based on Goldfine’s unavailability and on respondent’s desire to be represented by him. Based on Hotchkiss’ assurances that he was prepared, id., at 10-11; see id., at 21-23, the trial judge clearly did not abuse his discretion in denying a continuance. On the third day of trial, following an intervening weekend, respondent filed a “Writ of Habeas Corpus” with the trial court. Id., at 28. He stated that the writ was based, in part, on the ground that his attorney was in the hospital and that he did not “legally have [an] attorney.” Id., at 29. During his discussion with the trial judge, respondent repeatedly stated that he did not have an attorney and that his at 8 Unlike the Court, ante, at 13, I find no need to reach the issue of respondent’s good faith in moving for a continuance. I also do not endorse the Court’s gratuitous disagreement, ante, at 11, n. 4, with the Court of Appeals’ statement that there was “nothing in the record from which it [could] be inferred that [respondent’s] request for a continuance was motivated by a desire to delay his trial for an improper purpose.” 649 F. 2d, at 722. MORRIS v. SLAPPY 19 1 Brennan, J., concurring in result tomey was in the hospital. See id., at 32, 38, 41. At this point, the trial judge reasonably could be expected to have understood that respondent was moving for a continuance based on Goldfine’s unavailability and on his desire to be represented by Goldfine. As the Court points out, however, respondent finally made clear the grounds for his motions 11 days after Hotchkiss had been substituted for Goldfine, ante, at 13, and 5 days after the trial had begun. I agree with the Court that the trial judge was justified “in denying respondent’s midtrial motion for a continuance. ...” Ibid. See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575, 588-591 (1964). Because respondent did not make a timely motion for a continuance based on Goldfine’s unavailability, I concur in the Court’s reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. We need go no further to support a reversal. The Court recognizes as much when it states that “[t]he facts shown by the record conclusively rebut [respondent’s] claims and are alone dispositive, independent of the correctness of the novel Sixth Amendment guarantee announced by the Court of Appeals.” Ante, at 4. See also ante, at 14. Ill Despite the Court’s recognition that it is unnecessary to its decision, the Court rejects summarily “the claim that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and his counsel.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). The Court states simply that the Court of Appeals cited no authority “for this novel ingredient of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of course none could be.” Ante, at 13. In the Court’s view, “[n]o court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney—privately retained or provided by the public—that the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.” Ante, at 13-14. This is the extent of the Court’s analysis. Properly understood, however, the interest recognized by the Court of Appeals does find 20 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., concurring in result 461 U. S. support in other cases and does not require any court to guarantee that a defendant develop a rapport with his attorney. A We have recognized repeatedly the central role of the defendant’s right to counsel in our criminal justice system. See, e. g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976); Herring n. New York, 422 U. S. 853 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Chandler v. Fretiig, 348 U. S. 3 (1954); Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932). We have described this right as “fundamental,” Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, at 344, and have stated that “[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, at 31. In Powell v. Alabama, supra, the Court stated: “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.” Id., at 68-69. Given the importance of counsel to the presentation of an effective defense, it should be obvious that a defendant has MORRIS v. SLAPPY 21 1 Brennan, J., concurring in result an interest in his relationship with his attorney. As we noted in Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 834 (1975), “[t]he right to defend is personal.” It is the defendant’s interests, and freedom, which are at stake. Counsel is provided to assist the defendant in presenting his defense, but in order to do so effectively the attorney must work closely with the defendant in formulating defense strategy. This may require the defendant to disclose embarrassing and intimate information to his attorney. In view of the importance of uninhibited communication between a defendant and his attorney, attorney-client communications generally are privileged. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981). Moreover, counsel is likely to have to make a number of crucial decisions throughout the proceedings on a range of subjects that may require consultation with the defendant. These decisions can best be made, and counsel’s duties most effectively discharged, if the attorney and the defendant have a relationship characterized by trust and confidence.4 In recognition of the importance of a defendant’s relationship with his attorney, appellate courts have found constitutional violations when a trial court has denied a continuance that was sought so that an attorney retained by the defendant could represent him at trial. 4 The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice state that “[d]efense counsel should seek to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with the accused. ” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.1(a) (2d ed. 1980) (hereinafter ABA Standards). The Standards also suggest that “[n]othing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the establishment of trust and confidence.” Id., at 4-29 (commentary). In Linton v. Perini, 656 F. 2d 207 (CA6 1981), the court stated that “[b]asic trust between counsel and defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance of counsel.” Id., at 212. Similarly, in Lee v. United States, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 235 F. 2d 219 (1956), the court stated that “ ‘[t]he relationship between attorney and client is highly confidential, demanding personal faith and confidence in order that they may work together harmoniously.’ ” Id., at 274, n. 5, 235 F. 2d, at 221, n. 5 (citation omitted). 22 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., concurring in result 461 U. S. In Releford n. United States, 288 F. 2d 298 (CA9 1961), the attorney retained by the defendant was hospitalized. Instead of granting a continuance so that either the retained attorney could represent the defendant at trial or the defendant could secure substitute counsel of his choice, the trial judge ordered another attorney to represent the defendant over the defendant’s objections and in the face of the second attorney’s reluctance. Id., at 299-301. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction because the defendant had been deprived of the assistance of counsel of his own choice. Id., at 301-302. In Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F. 2d 1318 (CA5 1978), the Court of Appeals found that the defendant had been denied due process when the state trial court denied a continuance and forced the defendant to go to trial with an attorney other than the one he had retained. In the court’s view, “the trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when [the defendant] was effectively denied his right to choose his counsel.” Id., at 1327. See also Linton v. Perini, 656 F. 2d 207, 209-211 (CA6 1981); United States v. Seale, 461 F. 2d 345, 356-361 (CA7 1972); Lee v. United States, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 274, 235 F. 2d 219, 221 (1956). Cf. United States n. Burton, 189 U. S. App. D. C. 327, 330-334, 584 F. 2d 485, 488-492 (1978); Giacalone n. Lucas, 445 F. 2d 1238, 1240 (CA6 1971). Admittedly, the cases discussed above involved retained rather than appointed counsel. This ground of distinction, however, is not sufficient to preclude recognition of an indigent defendant’s interest in continued representation by a particular attorney who has been appointed to represent him and with whom the defendant has developed a relationship. Nothing about indigent defendants makes their relationships with their attorneys less important, or less deserving of protection, than those of wealthy defendants. As was stated in a different context in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” Id., at 19 MORRIS v. SLAPPY 23 1 Brennan, J., concurring in result (plurality opinion). Undoubtedly, we must accept the harsh reality that the quality of a criminal defendant’s representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel money can buy. But where an indigent defendant wants to preserve a relationship he has developed with counsel already appointed by the court, I can perceive no rational or fair basis for failing at least to consider this interest in determining whether continued representation is possible.5 In Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P. 2d 65 (1968), the California Supreme Court considered a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order removing the defendant’s attorney in a pending murder trial. The court found that the trial court had no power to remove a court-appointed attorney over the objections of the defendant and the attorney even if the decision to remove the attorney was based on doubts about the attorney’s compe 5 It is arguable that cases like Releford v. United States, 288 F. 2d 298 (CA9 1961), and Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F. 2d 1318 (CA5 1978), are also distinguishable from this one on the ground that they turn largely on a nonindigent defendant’s right to choose his own counsel, a right that indigent defendants do not enjoy. But the considerations that may preclude recognition of an indigent defendant’s right to choose his own counsel, such as the State’s interest in economy and efficiency, see generally Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (1974), should not preclude recognition of an indigent defendant’s interest in continued representation by an appointed attorney with whom he has developed a relationship of trust and confidence. To recognize this interest and to afford it some protection is not necessarily to afford it absolute protection. If a particular jurisdiction has sufficiently important interests, such as the structure of its public defender’s office, which make continued representation by a particular attorney impractical, the trial judge may take this into account in balancing the defendant’s interest in continued representation against the public’s interests. The fact that such interests might exist in some jurisdictions, however, is not a sufficient reason to refuse to recognize that an indigent defendant has an important interest in a relationship that he might develop with his appointed attorney. There is no need to decide on this record which state interests might be sufficient to overcome an indigent defendant’s interest in continued representation by a particular attorney with whom he has developed a relationship. 24 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., concurring in result 461 U. S. tence. Id., at 562, 440 P. 2d, at 75. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the argument that because an indigent defendant does not pay for his attorney he has no cause to complain about the attorney’s removal as long as the attorney currently handling his case is competent. It stated: “But the attorney-client relationship is not that elementary: it involves not just the casual assistance of a member of the bar, but an intimate process of consultation and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and his attorney. This is particularly essential, of course, when the attorney is defending the client’s life or liberty. Furthermore, the relationship is independent of the source of compensation, for an attorney’s responsibility is to the person he has undertaken to represent rather than to the individual or agency which pays for the service. ... It follows that once counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant, whether it be the public defender or a volunteer private attorney, the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship which is no less inviolable than if counsel had been retained. To hold otherwise would be to subject that relationship to an unwarranted and invidious discrimination arising merely from the poverty of the accused.” Id., at 561-562, 440 P. 2d, at 74 (footnote omitted).6 6 See also Harling v. United States, 387 A. 2d 1101 (D. C. 1978). The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice state that “[c]oun-sel initially provided should continue to represent the defendant throughout the trial court proceedings.” ABA Standards 5-5.2. The Standards also suggest that continuity of representation “affords the best opportunity for the development of a close and confidential attorney-client relationship,” id., at 5*54 (commentary), and reject public defender programs in which “stage” or “horizontal” representation is used. Ibid. Finally, the Standards state: “Representation of an accused establishes an inviolable attorney-client relationship. Removal of counsel from representation of an accused therefore should not occur over the objection of the attorney and the client.” Id., at 5-5.3. Based on the case law, the Standards MORRIS v. SLAPPY 25 1 Brennan, J., concurring in result In light of the importance of a defendant’s relationship with his attorney to his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, recognizing a qualified right to continue that relationship is eminently sensible. The Court of Appeals simply held that where a defendant expresses a desire to continue to be represented by counsel who already has been appointed for him by moving for a continuance until that attorney again will be available, the trial judge has an obligation to inquire into the length of counsel’s expected unavailability and to balance the defendant’s interest against the public’s interest in the efficient and expeditious administration of criminal justice. Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 13-14, this does not require a trial court “to guarantee” attorney-defendant “rapport.” The defendant’s expressed desire in continued representation by a particular attorney is a clear indication that an attorney-client relationship has developed. The quality of that relationship, or the reasons that it developed, are of no concern to the court. The trial court’s only duty is to inquire into the expected length of the attorney’s unavailability and to determine whether the existing attorney-client relationship can be preserved consistent with society’s interests. This is a minimal burden. It is one that we should readily impose in order to insure that a defendant’s rights are not arbitrarily denied. The defendant’s interest in preserving his relationship with a particular attorney is not afforded absolute protection. If the attorney is likely to be unavailable for an extended period, or if other factors exist that tip the balance in favor of proceeding in spite of a particular attorney’s absence,* 7 the go on to suggest that “[t]o hold that counsel can be removed from the case of an impecunious defendant regardless of objection from the client and attorney is to subject such an accused to unjustified discrimination based solely on poverty.” Id., at 5-58 (commentary). It is clear that the Standards recognize the importance of the attorney-client relationship to a defendant’s right to counsel. 7 See n. 5, supra. 26 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., concurring in result 461 U. S. defendant’s motion for a continuance clearly may be denied. Such denials would be subject to review under the traditional “abuse of discretion” standard. As the Court of Appeals suggested, however, the balancing is critical. 649 F. 2d, at 722, n. 3. In the absence of a balancing inquiry a trial court cannot discharge its “duty to preserve the fundamental rights of an accused.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S., at 72. B After concluding that respondent had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Court of Appeals proceeded to consider whether a showing of prejudice was necessary to support the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 649 F. 2d, at 722. The Court of Appeals held that it was not. Ibid.3 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which involve specific acts and omissions of counsel, require a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct before relief will be granted. Ibid. This case, however, did not involve an ineffective-assistance claim. Id., at 722, n. 4. The claim in this case was based on the trial court’s arbitrary deprivation of respondent’s interest in continued representation by a particular attorney. This deprivation prevented “counsel from fulfilling normal functions—from forming and exploiting an attorney-client relationship with [respondent].”’ Ibid. As a result, the court found that this case was analogous to cases such as Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978), Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976), Herring v. New York, 422 U. S. 853 (1975), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), Glasser v. United States, supra, and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), in which counsel either was not provided or was prevented from discharging his normal func 8 In view of its “holding” that “there is no Sixth Amendment right to a ‘meaningful attorney-client relationship,’” the Court does not reach the prejudice question. Ante, at 14, n. 6. MORRIS v. SLAPPY 27 1 Brennan, J., concurring in result tions and in which no showing of prejudice was required. 649 F. 2d, at 723. I find the Court of Appeals’ reasoning persuasive. The same conclusion has been reached in other cases in similar contexts. See, e. g., Linton v. Perini, 656 F. 2d, at 211-212; Releford v. United States, 288 F. 2d, at 302; Harting v. United States, 387 A. 2d 1101, 1106 (D.C. 1978). If an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim were at issue here, I might agree that a showing of prejudice was required. Requiring such a showing to support ineffective-assistance claims may be appropriate because courts are able to assess an attorney’s performance and the effect of that performance on a defendant’s rights based on the records before them. The courts, therefore, can make reasonable judgments regarding the presence or absence of prejudice. In cases involving claims such as the one at issue here, however, courts cannot make the same judgments. The fact that a defendant has been arbitrarily denied his interest in preserving his relationship with a particular attorney, with the result that the attorney does not appear, means that there is no record on which to base judgments regarding prejudice. We recognized this problem in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, in the context of joint representation of conflicting interests. We stated: “[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney’s failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry 28 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., concurring in result 461 U. S. into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.” Id., at 490-491 (emphasis in original). In this case, there is no way to know whether the character of the proceedings would have changed, whether counsel would have made different decisions, or whether the defense strategy would have been different if Goldfine had represented respondent. Conclusions based on inquiries into such questions would amount to nothing more than “unguided speculation.” Under these circumstances, it is reasonable and just not to require a showing of prejudice.9 IV While the Court of Appeals may have misread the record, its opinion reflects a thoughtful and dedicated effort to protect the rights of an indigent criminal defendant. Despite their poverty and the fact that they stand accused of a crime, indigent defendants are entitled to the enforcement of procedural rules that protect substantive rights guaranteed by the Constitution.10 The Court of Appeals should be commended, ’There is a difference between a requirement that a defendant suffer some prejudice and a requirement that he show some specific prejudice. In this case the claim is that respondent was deprived arbitrarily of his interest in continued representation by an attorney with whom he had developed a relationship. That attorney did not represent respondent at trial. In this light, and in light of the factors discussed above, it is reasonable to assume that a trial court’s arbitrary denial of a continuance produces some prejudice to the defense without requiring a specific showing of prejudice. I would qualify the Court of Appeals’ analysis in one respect. If a State could show that a defendant’s attorney would have been unavailable for an extended period or that other factors existed which would have made denial of a continuance reasonable, then a trial court’s failure to inquire into the length of the attorney’s expected unavailability and to engage in the necessary balancing would be rendered harmless. Under these circumstances, relief should not be granted. It would no longer be reasonable to assume that the defendant had been prejudiced. 10 Although the Court acknowledges that “inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce constitutional rights of MORRIS v. SLAPPY 29 1 Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment not criticized, for carrying out its obligation to respect this entitlement. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in the judgment. The narrow question before the Court is whether the state trial judge should have inquired about the probable length of attorney Goldfine’s incapacitation in order to balance respondent’s right to counsel against society’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. I agree with the Court that the Court of Appeals erred in construing respondent’s complaints on the first day of trial as indicating a desire to be represented by Goldfine. Absent a timely request by respondent to postpone the trial until Goldfine recovered from his illness, the state trial judge had no reason to inquire into the likely length of Goldfine’s unavailability. For this reason, I concur in the Court’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I also agree with the Court that, “[h]ad the Court of Appeals examined the record more carefully, it would have had no occasion to consider, let alone announce, a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment.” Ante, at 14. It seems to me, however, that this Court, after examining the record carefully and finding it “dispositive,” ante, at 4, similarly has “no occasion to consider” the Sixth Amendment issue. Accordingly, I find the Court’s rather broad-ranging dicta about the right to counsel and the concerns of victims (deserving of sympathy as they may be) to be unnecessary in this case. an accused,” ante, at 14, it nonetheless appears to suggest that the interests of a victim in a particular case should be considered by courts in determining whether to enforce the established rights of a criminal defendant. Ante, at 14-15. Such a suggestion finds no support in our cases. 30 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. SMITH v. WADE CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 81-1196. Argued November 10, 1982—Decided April 20, 1983 Respondent, while an inmate in a Missouri reformatory for youthful first offenders, was harassed, beaten, and sexually assaulted by his cellmates. He brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in Federal District Court against petitioner, a guard at the reformatory, and others, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated. Because of petitioner’s qualified immunity, as a prison guard, from § 1983 liability, the trial judge instructed the jury that respondent could recover only if petitioner was guilty of “gross negligence” or “egregious failure to protect” respondent. The judge also charged the jury that it could award punitive damages in addition to actual damages if petitioner’s conduct was shown to be “a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others.” The District Court entered judgment on a verdict finding petitioner liable and awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. Punitive damages are available in a proper case under § 1983. While there is little in the legislative history of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (from which § 1983 is derived) concerning the damages recoverable for the tort liability created by the statute, the availability of punitive damages was accepted as settled law by nearly all state and federal courts at the time of enactment. Moreover, this Court has rested decisions on related issues on the premise that punitive damages are available under § 1983. Pp. 34-38. 2. A jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when the defendant’s conduct involves reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights, as well as when it is motivated by evil motive or intent. The common law, both in 1871 and now, allows recovery of punitive damages in tort cases not only for actual malicious intent, but also for reckless indifference to the rights of others. Neither the policies nor the purposes of § 1983 require a departure from the common-law rule. Petitioner’s contention that an actual-intent standard is preferable to a recklessness standard because it is less vague, and would more readily serve the purpose of deterrence of future egregious conduct, is unpersuasive. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323. Pp. 38-51. SMITH v. WADE 31 30 Opinion of the Court 3. The threshold standard for allowing punitive damages for reckless or callous indifference applies even in a case, such as here, where the underlying standard of liability for compensatory damages is also one of recklessness. There is no merit to petitioner’s contention that actual malicious intent should be the standard for punitive damages because the deterrent purposes of such damages would be served only if the threshold for those damages is higher in every case than the underlying standard for liability in the first instance. The common-law rule is otherwise, and there is no reason to depart from the common-law rule in the context of § 1983. Pp. 51-55. 663 F. 2d 778, affirmed. Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., joined, post, p. 56. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 92. Robert Presson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, and Paul Robert Otto, Assistant Attorney General. Bradley H. Lockenvitz argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case, 456 U. S. 924 (1982), to decide whether the District Court for the Western District of Missouri applied the correct legal standard in instructing the jury that it might award punitive damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V).1 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sustained the award of punitive damages. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F. 2d 778 (1981). We affirm. 1 Rev. Stat. § 1979, amended, 93 Stat. 1284. Section 1983 reads in relevant part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 32 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. I The petitioner, William H. Smith, is a guard at Algoa Reformatory, a unit of the Missouri Division of Corrections for youthful first offenders. The respondent, Daniel R. Wade, was assigned to Algoa as an inmate in 1976. In the summer of 1976 Wade voluntarily checked into Algoa’s protective custody unit. Because of disciplinary violations during his stay in protective custody, Wade was given a short term in punitive segregation and then transferred to administrative segregation. On the evening of Wade’s first day in administrative segregation, he was placed in a cell with another inmate. Later, when Smith came on duty in Wade’s dormitory, he placed a third inmate in Wade’s cell. According to Wade’s testimony, his cellmates harassed, beat, and sexually assaulted him. Wade brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against Smith and four other guards and correctional officials, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated. At trial his evidence showed that he had placed himself in protective custody because of prior incidents of violence against him by other inmates. The third prisoner whom Smith added to the cell had been placed in administrative segregation for fighting. Smith had made no effort to find out whether another cell was available; in fact there was another cell in the same dormitory with only one occupant. Further, only a few weeks earlier, another inmate had been beaten to death in the same dormitory during the same shift, while Smith had been on duty. Wade asserted that Smith and the other defendants knew or should have known that an assault against him was likely under the circumstances. During trial, the District Judge entered a directed verdict for two of the defendants. He instructed the jury that Wade could make out an Eighth Amendment violation only by showing “physical *abuse of such base, inhumane and barbaric proportions as to shock the sensibilities.” Tr. 639. Further, because of Smith’s qualified immunity as a prison SMITH v. WADE 33 30 Opinion of the Court guard, see Procunier n. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978), the judge instructed the jury that Wade could recover only if the defendants were guilty of “gross negligence” (defined as “a callous indifference or a thoughtless disregard for the consequences of one’s act or failure to act”) or “[e]gregious failure to protect” (defined as “a flagrant or remarkably bad failure to protect”) Wade. Tr. 641-642. He reiterated that Wade could not recover on a showing of simple negligence. Id., at 644. The District Judge also charged the jury that it could award punitive damages on a proper showing: “In addition to actual damages, the law permits the jury, under certain circumstances, to award the injured person punitive and exemplary damages, in order to punish the wrongdoer for some extraordinary misconduct, and to serve as an example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct. “If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and if the conduct of one or more of the defendants is shown to be a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others, then you may assess punitive or exemplary damages in addition to any award of actual damages. “. . . The amount of punitive or exemplary damages assessed against any defendant may be such sum as you believe will serve to punish that defendant and to deter him and others from like conduct.” Id., at 643 (emphasis added). The jury returned verdicts for two of the three remaining defendants. It found Smith liable, however, and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. The District Court entered judgment on the verdict, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F. 2d 778 (1981). In this Court, Smith attacks only the award of punitive damages. He does not challenge the correctness of the in 34 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. structions on liability or qualified immunity, nor does he question the adequacy of the evidence to support the verdict of liability for compensatory damages. II Section 1983 is derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 Stat. 13. It was intended to create “a species of tort liability” in favor of persons deprived of federally secured rights. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 253 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417 (1976). We noted in Carey that there was little in the section’s legislative history concerning the damages recoverable for this tort liability, 435 U. S., at 255. In the absence of more specific guidance, we looked first to the common law of torts (both modern and as of 1871), with such modification or adaptation as might be necessary to carry out the purpose and policy of the statute. Id., at 253-264. We have done the same in other contexts arising under § 1983, especially the recurring problem of common-law immunities.2 2 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325 (1983); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247 (1981); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951). Justice Rehnquist’s dissent faults us for referring to modern tort decisions in construing § 1983. Its argument rests on the unstated and unsupported premise that Congress necessarily intended to freeze into permanent law whatever principles were current in 1871, rather than to incorporate applicable general legal principles as they evolve. Post, at 65—68; see also post, at 92-93 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The dissents are correct, of course, that when the language of the section and its legislative history provide no clear answer, we have found useful guidance in the law prevailing at the time when § 1983 was enacted; but it does not follow that that law is absolutely controlling, or that current law is irrelevant. On the contrary, if the prevailing view on some point of general tort law had changed substantially in the intervening century (which is not the case here), we might be highly reluctant to assume that Congress intended to perpetuate a now-obsolete doctrine. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, SMITH v. WADE 35 30 Opinion of the Court Smith correctly concedes that “punitive damages are available in a ‘proper’ § 1983 action . . . Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 22 (1980); Brief for Petitioner 8. Although there was debate about the theoretical correctness of the punitive damages doctrine in the latter part of the last century, the doctrine was accepted as settled law by nearly all state and federal courts, including this Court.3 It was likewise generally established that individual public officers were liable for punitive damages for their misconduct on the same basis as other individual defendants.4 * See also Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 77-89 (1897) (punitive damages for constitutional tort). Further, although the precise issue of the availability of punitive damages under § 1983 has never come squarely 257-258 (1978) (“[O]ver the centuries the common law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as well”) (footnote omitted); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 231-232 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Pierson, supra, at 555 (citing modem authority for “the prevailing view in this country’ ); Wood, supra, at 318-319, and n. 9; Tenney, supra, at 375, and n. 5. Indeed, in Imbler we recognized a common-law immunity that first came into existence 25 years after § 1983 was enacted, 424 U. S., at 421-422. Under the dissents’ view, Imbler was wrongly decided. 3 See, e. g., the cases cited in nn. 8 and 12, infra; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363 (1852); Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202 (1859); Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489 (1876); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512 (1885); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550 (1886); Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (1889); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897). *E. g., Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315, 324-326 (1861); Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298, 314 (1871); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200-202 (1862); Parker v. Shackelford, 61 Mo. 68, 72 (1875); Rodgers v. Ferguson, 36 Tex. 544 (1871); see, e. g., Stinson v. Buisson, 17 La. 567, 572-573 (1841); Nagle v. Mullison, 34 Pa. 48 (1859); Von Storch v. Winslow, 13 R. I. 23, 24-25 (1880). Cf. Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 307 (1882). See also, e. g., Lane v. Yamamoto, 2 Haw. App. 176, 628 P. 2d 634 (1981); Wilson v. Eagan, 297 N. W. 2d 146, 148-150 (Minn. 1980). 36 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. before us, we have had occasion more than once to make clear our view that they are available; indeed, we have rested decisions on related questions on the premise of such availability.5 6 6 In Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., supra, for example, we held that a municipality (as opposed to an individual defendant) is immune from liability for punitive damages under § 1983. A significant part of our reasoning was that deterrence of constitutional violations would be adequately accomplished by allowing punitive damages awards directly against the responsible individuals: “Moreover, there is available a more effective means of deterrence. By allowing juries and courts to assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against the offending official, based on his personal financial resources, the statute [§ 1983] directly advances the public’s interest in preventing repeated constitutional deprivations. In our view, this provides sufficient protection against the prospect that a public official may commit recurrent constitutional violations by reason of his office.” Id., at 269-270 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), we stated that punitive damages would be available in an action against federal officials directly under the Eighth Amendment, partly on the reasoning that since such damages are available under § 1983, it would be anomalous to allow punitive awards against state officers but not federal ones. Id., at 22, and n. 9. See also Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, at 233 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Carey v. Piphus, supra, at 257, n. 11; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 460 (1975) (punitive damages available under 42 U. S. C. § 1981). Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, without squarely denying that punitive damages are available under § 1983, does its best to cast doubt on the proposition. It argues that the phrase “for redress” at the end of the section means that Congress intended to limit recovery to compensatory damages. Post, at 85; see n. 1, supra. This novel construction is strained; a more plausible reading of the statute is that the phrase “or other proper proceeding for redress” is simply an expansive alternative to the preceding phrases “action at law” and “suit in equity,” intended to avoid any unwanted technical limitations that might lurk in the other phrases. Next Justice Rehnquist points to two other statutes enacted in 1863 and 1870 that provided expressly for punitive remedies. Post, at 85-86. Neither of these statutes enacted a punitive damages remedy as such, although they did create other forms of punitive civil remedies. The Act of March 2, 1863, § 3, 12 Stat. 698, created a civil fine for fraudulent military claims, apparently intended to stimulate suit by private attorneys general. SMITH v. WADE 37 30 Opinion of the Court Smith argues, nonetheless, that this was not a “proper” case in which to award punitive damages. More particularly, he attacks the instruction that punitive damages could be awarded on a finding of reckless or callous disregard of or indifference to Wade’s rights or safety. Instead, he contends that the proper test is one of actual malicious intent— “ill will, spite, or intent to injure.”6 Brief for Petitioner 9. * 6 The Act of July 8, 1870, § 59, 16 Stat. 207, was the treble damages provision of the revised patent code. These statutes do not support Justice Rehnquist’s speculation that Congress acted expressly when it intended to approve punitive damages, since both statutes created new remedies not available at common law; moreover, they undercut his argument that Congress was hostile to punitive civil remedies in favor of private parties. Finally, Justice Rehnquist argues that Congress would not likely have approved “this often-condemned doctrine” in the 1871 Civil Rights Act. Post, at 84. This speculation is remarkable, to say the least, given that Congress did approve a punitive civil remedy in an 1870 Civil Rights Act. Act of May 31, 1870, § 2, 16 Stat. 140 (creating private cause of action for fixed penalty on behalf of persons suffering racial discrimination in voting registration). Cf. 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 64 (enacting punitive damages statute, including awards for “wanton and reckless disregard,” five years after state court held against doctrine). At any rate, the punitive damages debate, though lively, was by no means one-sided. See, e. g., Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, supra, at 521-523; Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 235-237 (1842); Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555, 559-560 (Iowa 1854); Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. 146, 152-153 (1859); Lynd v. Picket, supra, at 200-201; Taylor v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 48 N. H. 304, 320 (1869), overruled, Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 (1872); Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S. E. 58 (1895); Cosgriff Brothers v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190, 236-237, 68 P. 206, 216-217 (1902). See also Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, 63-64 (N. Y. 1808) (Kent, C. J.). 6 Smith uses the term “actual malice” to refer to the standard he would apply. While the term may be an appropriate one, we prefer not to use it, simply to avoid the confusion and ambiguity that surrounds the word “malice.” See n. 8, infra. Indeed, as Smith recognizes, this Court has used the very term “actual malice” in the defamation context to refer to a recklessness standard. Brief for Petitioner 8-9; see Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U. S. 245,251-252 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 280 (1964). We note in passing that it appears quite uncertain whether even Justice Rehnquist’s dissent ultimately agrees with Smith’s view that “ill will, spite, or intent to injure” should be required to allow punitive damages 38 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. He offers two arguments for this position: first, that actual intent is the proper standard for punitive damages in all cases under § 1983; and second, that even if intent is not always required, it should be required here because the threshold for punitive damages should always be higher than that for liability in the first instance. We address these in turn. Ill Smith does not argue that the common law, either in 1871 or now, required or requires a showing of actual malicious in awards. Justice Rehnquist consistently confuses, and attempts to blend together, the quite distinct concepts of intent to cause injury, on one hand, and subjective consciousness of risk of injury (or of unlawfulness) on the other. For instance, his dissent purports to base its analysis on the “fundamental distinction” between “wrongful motive, actual intention to inflict harm or intentional doing of an act known to be unlawful,” versus “very careless or negligent conduct,” post, at 60-61 (emphasis added). Yet in the same paragraph, the dissent inaccurately recharacterizes the first element of this distinction as “acts that are intentionally harmful,” requiring “inquiry into the actor’s subjective motive and purpose.” Post, at 63-64. Consciousness of consequences or of wrongdoing, of course, does not require injurious intent or motive; it is equally consistent with indifference toward or disregard for consequences. This confusion of standards continues throughout the opinion. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent frequently uses such phrases as “intent to injure” or “evil motive”; yet at several points it refers more broadly to “subjective mental state” or like phrases, and expressly includes consciousness (as opposed to intent) in its reasoning. Post, at 63, n. 3, 71-72, n. 7, 72-73. More telling, perhaps, is its citation of cases and treatises, which frequently and consistently includes authority supporting (at most) a consciousness requirement rather than the “actual intent” standard for which the opinion purports to argue elsewhere. See, e. g., post, at 76-77, n. 10, 78-84, n. 12. If Justice Rehnquist does indeed mean to propose a standard reaching subjective consciousness as well as actual injurious intent, one wonders why the instructions given in this case, supra, at 33, do not meet his standard. It is hard to see how Smith could have disregarded or been indifferent to the danger to Wade unless he was subjectively conscious of that danger. If Justice Rehnquist stands by his “fundamental distinction” and his use of authority, then, he has no apparent reason to dissent from our judgment. SMITH v. WADE 39 30 Opinion of the Court tent for recovery of punitive damages. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 9.7 Perhaps not surprisingly, there was significant variation (both terminological and substantive) among American jurisdictions in the latter 19th century on the precise standard to be applied in awarding punitive damages—variation that was exacerbated by the ambiguity and slipperiness of such common terms as “malice” and “gross negligence.”8 Most of the 7 Indeed, the District Judge’s instruction on punitive damages in this case was drawn with only slight alteration from a standard jury instruction manual under Missouri state law. See Tr. 576-577; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 42-43. 8 This terminological difficulty seems to be responsible in some degree for the dissent’s error in asserting that intent was the majority rule in 1871, post, at 68-84. In particular, the dissent argues that “malice,” “wantonness,” and “willfulness” denoted actual ill will or intent to cause injury. See nn. 10, 12, infra; post, at 60-64, n. 3, 73, n. 8, 76-77, n. 10, 78-84, n. 12. See also n. 6, supra (dissent’s confusion of knowledge with intent); n. 9, infra (concerning “criminal indifference”). With regard to “malice,” the assumption is dubious at best; with regard to “wantonness” and “willfulness,” it is just plain wrong. “Malice,” as used by courts and lawyers in the last century, was a hopelessly versatile and ambiguous term, carrying a broad spectrum of meanings. See generally, e. g., 2 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages § 394 (3d ed. J. Berryman, 1903); 25 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 1666-1669 (1907). As the dissent correctly states, post, at 60-64, n. 3, in some instances (especially when it was modified by terms such as “actual” or “express,” or in criminal law, where terms were generally more strictly construed than in civil law), it meant what the dissent says it meant—actual ill will, spite, or intent to injure. On the other extreme, in tort law, it was often used without modification to mean what was sometimes called “implied malice”—a, purely fictional malice that was conclusively presumed to exist whenever a tort resulted from a voluntary act, even if no harm was intended. The term was sometimes, though not often, used in this fictional sense as a ground for punitive damages. E. g., Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284,289,38 P. 903,904-905 (1894). In other cases it was explained to mean an intent to do the act that caused the injury, as opposed to intent to cause the injury itself. E. g., Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28, 32-33 (1858). More commonly in the punitive damages context, the term meant something in between fictional malice and actual injurious 40 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. confusion, however, seems to have been over the degree of negligence, recklessness, carelessness, or culpable indifference that should be required—not over whether actual intent intent—“that form of malice . . . where, without ‘deliberate mind’ or ‘formed design,’ the offender has been so grossly and recklessly negligent, so wantonly indifferent to another’s rights, that he should be required to pay damages in excess of mere compensation as a punishment and example.” Press Pub. Co. v. McDonald, 63 F. 238, 246 (CA2 1894). Accord, e. g., Philadelphia, IV. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 214 (1859); South & N. A. R. Co. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266, 273-275 (1879); Yerian v. Linkletter, 80 Cal. 135, 138, 22 P. 70, 71 (1889) (Paterson, J., concurring); Cameron v. Bryan, 89 Iowa 214, 219, 56 N. W. 434 (1893); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn., at 200-202. There was considerably less ambiguity or confusion concerning the meaning of “wantonness” in tort law: “Wanton means reckless—without regard to the rights of others. . . . Wantonly means causelessly, without restraint, and in reckless disregard of the rights of others. Wantonness is defined as a licentious act of one man towards the person of another, without regard to his rights; it has also been defined as the conscious failure by one charged with a duty to exercise due care and diligence to prevent an injury after the discovery of the peril, or under circumstances where he is charged with a knowledge of such peril, and being conscious of the inevitable or probable results of such failure.” 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 2-4 (2d ed. 1905) (footnotes omitted). The last sentence of that definition could have been written with this case in mind. See also, e. g., 40 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 292-295 (1912). The word was used with the same meaning in the punitive damages context. See, e. g., Texarkana Gas & Electric Light Co. v. Orr, '59 Ark. 215, 224, 27 S. W. 66, 68 (1894); Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182, 184-185 (1869); Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398, 403-404, 16 P. 817, 820 (1888). Finally, “willfulness” did not mean intent to cause injury, but only voluntary action: “Wilful. . . generally, as used in courts of law, implies nothing blamable, but merely that the person of whose action or default the expression is used is a free agent, and that what has been done arises from the spontaneous action of his will. It amounts to nothing more than this: that he knows what he is doing, and intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent. And wilfully does not imply that an act done in that spirit was necessarily a malicious act. ...” 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 529-530 (2d ed. 1905) (footnote omitted). SMITH v. WADE 41 30 Opinion of the Court was essential. On the contrary, the rule in a large majority of jurisdictions was that punitive damages (also called exemplary damages, vindictive damages, or smart money) could be awarded without a showing of actual ill will, spite, or intent to injure. This Court so stated on several occasions, before and shortly after 1871. In Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202 (1859), a diversity libel suit, the Court held erroneous an instruction that authorized the jury to return a punitive award but gave the jury virtually no substantive guidance as to the proper threshold. We described the standard thus: “Whenever the injury complained of has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or indignity, the jury are not limited to the ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person. But the malice spoken of in this rule is not merely the doing of an unlawful or injurious act. The word implies that the act complained of was conceived in the spirit of mischief, or of criminal indifference to civil obligations.” Id., at 214 (emphasis added).9 “Wilful neglect or negligence has been defined as that degree of neglect arising where there is a reckless indifference to the safety of human life, or an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty to the public, in the performance of which the public and the party injured had an interest.” Id., at 535 (footnote omitted). See also, e. g., 40 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 944-947 (1912). Again, the punitive damages cases bear this reading out. Cameron, supra, at 219, 56 N. W., at 434; Goetz, supra, at 32-33; Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky., at 152-155; Peoria Bridge Assn. v. Loomis, 20 Ill. 235, 251 (1858). 9 Justice Rehnquist’s dissent reads this statement as a requirement of actual intent, post, at 68-69. This misreading depends in part on the faulty assumption, see n. 8, supra, that “malice” always meant intent to injure (post, at 68)—a reading particularly inappropriate in light of the Court’s express definition of malice as including “criminal indifference.” As for the latter point, Justice Rehnquist reasons that the term “criminal indifference” must include an element of actual malicious intent. This surprising interpretation of the word “indifference” rests on the unstated 42 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. The Court further explained the standard for punitive damages in Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489 (1876), a diversity railroad collision case: “Redress commensurate to such [personal] injuries should be afforded. In ascertaining its extent, the jury may consider all the facts which relate to the wrongful act of the defendant, and its consequences to the plaintiff; but they are not at liberty to go farther, unless it was done wilfully, or was the result of that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them. In that case, the jury are authorized, for the sake of public example, to give such additional damages as the circumstances require. The tort is aggravated by the evil motive, and on this rests the rule of exemplary damages.” Id., at 493. “ ... To [assess punitive damages], there must have been some wilful misconduct, or that entire want of care and demonstrably false premise that intent to cause injury was always an element of crime. Not only were there crimes of recklessness or negligence (such as reckless homicide), but even crimes of intent commonly required only intent to do the criminal act (and, in some cases, knowledge that the injury would likely follow), rather than actual ill will or purpose to inflict an injury. See, e. g., 1 J. Bishop, Commentaries on Criminal Law §§ 313-322 (5th ed. 1872); J. May, Law ofCrimes §§ 30, 31, 232, 233 (2d ed. J. Beale, 1893); see also, e. g., Model Penal Code §2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The case law clearly illustrates that “criminal” did not mean “with injurious intent” in the punitive damages context. E. g., Hopkins v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co., 36 N. H. 9, 18-19 (1857), overruled on other grounds, Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 (1872); Brooke v. Clark, 57 Tex. 105, 112-114 (1880); Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300, 310-311 (1875). Justice Rehnquist also cites Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852), in support of an actual-intent requirement. Post, at 70. The language used in that case (“wanton and malicious, or gross and outrageous”) was precisely the precedent that the Philadelphia Court was exegeting in the passage quoted in text, when it held that “malice” includes “criminal indifference.” Moreover, the Day case did not present any issue of punitive damages; the Court discussed them merely as a sidelight to the costsand-fees issue presented. SMITH v. WADE 43 30 Opinion of the Court which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.” Id., at 495 (emphasis added). The Court therefore held erroneous a jury instruction allowing a punitive award on “gross negligence”; it concluded that the latter term was too vague, and too likely to be confused with mere ordinary negligence, to provide a fair standard. It remanded for a new trial.10 10 As with Philadelphia, n. 9, supra, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent reads this case as imposing a requirement of actual malicious intent, on the assumption that when the Court said “indifference to consequences” it really meant “intent to cause consequences,” and when it said “recklessness” it really meant “bad motive or intent to injure.” Post, at 70-73. This textual alchemy is untenable. For one thing, Justice Rehnquist’s analysis of the case reflects the confusion in his dissent of motive with consciousness, see n. 6, supra; post, at 71-72, n. 7. Moreover, the Milwaukee Court did not say, or come close to saying, that recklessness is identical to intent, or that it is material only as evidence of intent; rather, it said that recklessness is “equivalent” to intent, meaning that the two are equally culpable and deserving of punishment and deterrence. 91 U. S., at 493. This also explains the Court’s reference, two sentences later, to “evil motive,” ibid. Justice Rehnquist’s great reliance on this sentence confuses the standard for punitive damages with the rationale for them. Plainly, read in context, what the Court meant is that punitive damages are justified by the moral culpability of evil intent, or by the “equivalent” culpability of “reckless indifference to the rights of others.” See also Cowen v. Winters, 96 F. 929, 934-935 (CA6 1899); Alabama G. S.R. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71, 80, 8 So. 90, 93 (1890); Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466, 494-495 (1870); Thirkfield v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., 12 Utah 76, 82, 41 P. 564, 565 (1895). The contrary reading adopted by Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is flatly inconsistent with the Court’s reiteration of the rule, 91 U. S., at 495 (emphasis added): “that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.” Try as he might, Justice Rehnquist cannot transform indifference, conscious or otherwise, into intent. Justice Rehnquist also relies on a four-sentence capsulization by the Reporter of Decisions of our unreported decision in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Eyser, 91 U. S. 495, decided the same day. While the Reporter’s summary does speak of the absence of “intentional wrong,” id., at 496, the factual context suggests that the basis of decision was the jury instruction that ordinary negligence would warrant punitive damages, com- 44 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Ten years later, the Court in dictum suggested that perhaps even gross negligence would suffice after all, at least in some cases: “For injuries resulting from a neglect of duties, in the discharge of which the public is interested, juries are also permitted to assess exemplary damages. These may be perhaps considered as falling under the head of cases of gross negligence, for any neglect of duties imposed for the protection of life or property is culpable, and deserves punishment.” Missouri Pacific R. Co. n: Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 521 (1885). See also Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 34 (1889) (“culpable negligence”).* 11 bined with the fact that the defendant had taken some affirmative (though insufficient) steps to avoid injury to passersby. Thus, in context, the reference to “intentional wrong” is entirely consistent with the Milwaukee decision’s test of “conscious indifference”; the defendant in Western Union was not indifferent to injury, but instead plainly intended to avoid injury. 11 In two other cases the Court reaffirmed the Philadelphia “criminal indifference” standard and the Milwaukee “reckless indifference” standard. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S., at 563; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 609-610 (1887). Justice Rehnquist’s dissent relies on two later decisions of this Court, neither of which supports it. Post, at 74-75. In Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 (1893), the issue was whether a corporation could be liable in punitive damages for the tort of its employee. The Court, reasoning largely from general principles of respondeat superior, held that such vicarious liability could exist only when the employer had authorized or ratified the tort. In so doing, however, it expressly reaffirmed as “well settled” the general standard announced in the Philadelphia case, including liability for “criminal indifference.” 147 U. S., at 107. Justice Rehnquist cites a passage quoting from one state case suggesting an intent requirement, post, at 74, but he omits to mention the court’s extensive quotations from Philadelphia and Milwaukee, 147 U. S., at 112-113, and its express approval of and quotation from other state cases stating unequivocally that an employer can be liable for its own recklessness in hiring unfit employees, id., at 114-116. See also n. 9, supra. In Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S., at 71-90, the issue was whether there was a sufficient amount in controversy. The Court held that allegations of SMITH v. WADE 45 30 Opinion of the Court The large majority of state and lower federal courts were in agreement that punitive damages awards did not require a showing of actual malicious intent; they permitted punitive awards on variously stated standards of negligence, recklessness, or other culpable conduct short of actual malicious intent.12 “intentional, malicious and repeated interference” with federally protected rights, id., at 89, were enough, if proved, to warrant punitive damages. The Court undertook no statement of a general standard for punitive damages beyond noting the unsurprising principle that such damages are awardable on proof of actual evil motive, id., at 86. Under the allegations, of course, no question of liability for less culpable conduct was presented. 12 In the often-cited case of Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182 (1869), for example, the court held that punitive damages were proper where the defendant’s pistol bullet, fired at a target, ricocheted and hit the plaintiff: “In what cases then may smart money be awarded in addition to the damages? The proper answer to this question . . . seems to be, in actions of tort founded on the malicious or wanton misconduct or culpable neglect of the defendant. . . . “In this case the defendant was guilty of wanton misconduct and culpable neglect. ... It is an immaterial fact that the injury was unintentional, and that the ball glanced from the intended direction. . . . [I]f the act is done where there are objects from which the balls may glance and endanger others, the act is wanton, reckless, without due care, and grossly negligent.” Id., at 185. In Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555 (Iowa 1854), punitive damages were awarded against a stage company for employing a known drunkard as a driver, the court saying: “In a case of gross negligence on the part of a stage proprietor, such as the employment of a known drunken driver, and where a passenger has been injured in consequence of such negligence, we think exemplary damages should be entertained. “If a stage proprietor or carrier is guilty of gross negligence, it amounts to that kind of gross misconduct which will justify a jury in giving exemplary damages, even where an ‘intent or design' to do the injury does not appear.” Id., at 559 (emphasis in original). Maysville & Lexington R. Co. v. Herrick, 76 Ky. 122 (1877), held that the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury that “willful or intentional 46 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. The same rule applies today. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979), for example, states: “Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the de wrong” was required to award punitive damages in a railroad accident case, remarking: “The absence of slight care in the management of a railroad train, or in keeping a railroad track in repair, is gross negligence; and to enable a passenger to recover punitive damages, in a case like this, it is not necessary to show the absence of all care, or ‘reckless indifference to the safety of. . . passengers,’ or ‘intentional misconduct’ on the part of the agents and officers of the company.” Id., at 127 (ellipsis in original). Accord, e. g., Cowen v. Winters, 96 F., at 934-935; Press Pub. Co. v. McDonald, 63 F., at 245-247; Morning Journal Assn. v. Rutherford, 51 F. 513, 514-515 (CA2 1892); Fotheringham v. Adams Express Co., 36 F. 252, 253-254 (CC ED Mo. 1888); United States v. Taylor, 35 F. 484, 488 (CC SD Ala. 1888); Malloy v. Bennett, 15 F. 371, 373-374 (CC SDNY 1883); Berry v. Fletcher, 3 F. Cas. 286, 288 (No. 1,357) (CC Mo. 1870); Alabama G. S. R. Co. n. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600, 608, 2 So. 337, 342 (1886); Texarkana Gas & Electric Light Co. n. Orr, 59 Ark., at 224, 27 S. W., at 68; Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553, 555-556 (1860); Florida Railway & Navigation Co. v. Webster, 25 Fla. 394, 419-420, 5 So. 714, 719 (1889); Jacobus v. Congregation of Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518, 521, 33 S. E. 853, 855 (1899); Drohn v. Brewer, 77 Ill. 280, 282-283 (1875); Citizens’ St. R. Co. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 563, 569-570, 33 N. E. 627, 629 (1893); Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466, 470 (1872); Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202, 218 (1869); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn., at 200-202; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss., at 494-495, 500; Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152, 161-162 (1871); Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282, 296 (1872); Sullivan v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 12 Ore. 392, 404-406, 7 P. 508, 517 (1885) (dictum); Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 519, 543-544, 6 A. 545, 552-553 (1886); Hart v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co., 33 S. C. 427, 435-436, 12 S. E. 9,10 (1890); Haley v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 66 Tenn. 239, 242-243 (1874); Brooke v. Clark, 57 Tex., at 112-114; Thirkfield v. Mountain View Cemetery Assn., 12 Utah, at 82, 41 P., at 564-565; Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275, 286-287 (1873) (dictum); Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128, 132-134 (1882); Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 358, 359 (1866); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyo. 27, 35 (1871). Justice Rehnquist’s assertion that a “solid majority of jurisdictions” required actual malicious intent, post, at 84, is simply untrue. In fact, there were fairly few jurisdictions that imposed such a requirement, and fewer yet that adhered to it consistently. Justice Rehnquist’s attempt SMITH v. WADE 47 30 Opinion of the Court fendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” § 908(2) (emphasis added); see also id., Comment b. Most cases under state common law, although varying in to establish this proposition with case citations, post, at 78-84, n. 12, does not offer him substantial support. Because the point is not of controlling significance, see n. 2, supra, we will not tarry here to analyze his citations case-by-case or State-by-State, but will only summarize the main themes. Several of Justice Rehnquist’s cases actually offer unequivocal support for the rule that punitive damages are available on a showing of negligence, recklessness, disregard for or indifference to the rights of others, and various other standards short of actual ill will or injurious intent. In this same vein, Justice Rehnquist continues to try to equate consciousness or knowledge with actual ill will or intent to injure, see n. 6, supra. Other cases do not clearly support either Justice Rehnquist’s view or ours. Some of these contain contradictory language in their formulations, indicating that the present distinction perhaps did not occur to the writers. Others support Justice Rehnquist’s rule only if one makes the questionable assumption, see nn. 8, 9, supra, that terms like “malice,” “wantonness,” and “criminal” always meant actual intent to injure. Still others simply ruled on collateral questions (such as the admissibility of evidence of bad motive or of good faith) without purporting to state any general standard for punitive damages. Some were apparently limited to particular classes of torts. A comparison of this class of cases with those cited supra, this note, reveals that in many instances other decisions of the same courts clear up any ambiguity in favor of a recklessness or negligence standard. A third class of cases are those in which the courts simply affirmed awards of punitive damages based on evidence of, or jury instructions requiring, actual malicious intent, without discussing whether a lesser showing might also be adequate. Often the cases in this category involved assault and battery or similar torts, where the facts presented little problem of negligence or recklessness. See also n. 11, supra. As with the previous category, many of the same courts spoke more directly in other cases, making it clear that injurious intent was not required. Finally, even of those comparatively few cases that do seem to support Justice Rehnquist’s view, many are of debatable authority. In nearly every State there was at least some late 19th-century authority supporting awards on less than ill will or intent to injure. Admittedly, in a few States this was the less accepted view, but in a substantial majority of jurisdictions the prevailing rule (as evidenced by the cases cited supra, this note, and numerous other cases not listed here) was that no such actual malicious intent was required. 48 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. their precise terminology, have adopted more or less the same rule, recognizing that punitive damages in tort cases may be awarded not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness, serious indifference to or disregard for the rights of others, or even gross negligence.13 The remaining question is whether the policies and purposes of § 1983 itself require a departure from the rules of tort common law. As a general matter, we discern no reason why a person whose federally guaranteed rights have 13Loch Ridge Construction Corp. v. Barra, 291 Ala. 312, 280 So. 2d 745 (1973); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P. 2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified on other grounds, 615 P. 2d 621 (1980), and 627 P. 2d 204 (1981); Huggins v. Deinhard, 127 Ariz. 358, 621 P. 2d 45 (App. 1980); White v. Brock, 41 Colo. App. 156, 584 P. 2d 1224 (1978); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A. 2d 825 (1967); Sheats v. Bowen, 318 F. Supp. 640 (Del. 1970) (Delaware law); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A. 2d 173 (D. C. 1977); Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 537 P. 2d 65 (1975); Pendowski n. Patent Scaffolding Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 484, 411 N. E. 2d 910 (1980), appeal denied (Ill. 1981); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N. W. 2d 911 (Iowa 1976); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 220 Kan. 244, 553 P. 2d 254 (1976); Pettengill v. Turo, 159 Me. 350, 193 A. 2d 367 (1963); American Laundry Machine Industries v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A. 2d 407 (1980); Bailey v. Graves, 411 Mich. 510, 309 N. W. 2d 166 (1981); Huebsch v. Larson, 291 Minn. 361,191 N. W. 2d 433 (1971); Mississippi Power Co. v. Jones, 369 So.' 2d 1381 (Miss. 1979); Stenson v. Laclede Gas Co., 553 S. W. 2d 309 (Mo. App. 1977); Butcher v. Petranek, 181 Mont. 358, 593 P. 2d 743 (1979); Berg v. Reaction Motors Division, 37 N. J. 396, 181 A. 2d 487 (1962); Robison v. Katz, 94 N. M. 314, 610 P. 2d 201 (App.), cert, denied, 94 N. M. 675, 615 P. 2d 992 (1980); Soucy v. Greyhound Carp., 27 App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N. Y. S. 2d 173 (1967); Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co., 291 N. C. 105, 229 S. E. 2d 297 (1976); Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N. W. 2d 63 (N. D. 1981); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N. E. 2d 568 (1981); Smith v. Johnston, 591 P. 2d 1260 (Okla. 1978); Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35, 268 A. 2d 157 (1970); Sherman v. McDermott, 114 R. I. 107, 329 A. 2d 195 (1974); King v. Allstate Insurance Co., 272 S. C. 259, 251 S. E. 2d 194 (1979); Hannahs v. Noah, 83 S. D. 296, 158 N. W. 2d 678 (1968); Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529 S. W. 2d 43 (Tenn. 1975); Shortle v. Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 137 Vt. 32, 399 A. 2d 517 (1979); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N. W. 2d 437 (1980). SMITH v. WADE 49 30 Opinion of the Court been violated should be granted a more restrictive remedy than a person asserting an ordinary tort cause of action. Smith offers us no persuasive reason to the contrary. Smith’s argument, which he offers in several forms, is that an actual-intent standard is preferable to a recklessness standard because it is less vague. He points out that punitive damages, by their very nature, are not awarded to compensate the injured party. See Newport n. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 266-267 (1981); Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U. S. 42, 48 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 349-350 (1974). He concedes, of course, that deterrence of future egregious conduct is a primary purpose of both § 1983, see Newport, supra, at 268; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 651 (1980); Robertson v. Weg-mann, 436 U. S. 584, 591 (1978), and of punitive damages, see Newport, supra, at 268; Restatement (Second) of Torts §908(1) (1979). But deterrence, he contends, cannot be achieved unless the standard of conduct sought to be deterred is stated with sufficient clarity to enable potential defendants to conform to the law and to avoid the proposed sanction. Recklessness or callous indifference, he argues, is too uncertain a standard to achieve deterrence rationally and fairly. A prison guard, for example, can be expected to know whether he is acting with actual ill will or intent to injure, but not whether he is being reckless or callously indifferent. Smith’s argument, if valid, would apply to ordinary tort cases as easily as to § 1983 suits; hence, it hardly presents an argument for adopting a different rule under § 1983. In any event, the argument is unpersuasive. While, arguendo, an intent standard may be easier to understand and apply to particular situations than a recklessness standard, we are not persuaded that a recklessness standard is too vague to be fair or useful. In the Milwaukee case, 91 U. S. 489 (1876), we adopted a recklessness standard rather than a gross negligence standard precisely because recklessness would better serve the need for adequate clarity and fair application. Al 50 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. most a century later, in the First Amendment context, we held that punitive damages cannot be assessed for defamation in the absence of proof of “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” Gertz, 418 U. S., at 349. Our concern in Gertz was that the threat of punitive damages, if not limited to especially egregious cases, might “inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms,” ibid.—a concern at least as pressing as any urged by Smith in this case. Yet we did not find it necessary to impose an actual-intent standard there. Just as Smith has not shown why § 1983 should give higher protection from punitive damages than ordinary tort law, he has not explained why it gives higher protection than we have demanded under the First Amendment. More fundamentally, Smith’s argument for certainty in the interest of deterrence overlooks the distinction between a standard for punitive damages and a standard of liability in the first instance. Smith seems to assume that prison guards and other state officials look mainly to the standard for punitive damages in shaping their conduct. We question the premise; we assume, and hope, that most officials are guided primarily by the underlying standards of federal substantive law—both out of devotion to duty, and in the interest of avoiding liability for compensatory damages. At any rate, the conscientious officer who desires clear guidance on how to do his job and avoid lawsuits can and should look to the standard for actionability in the first instance. The need for exceptional clarity in the standard for punitive damages arises only if one assumes that there are substantial numbers of officers who will not be deterred by compensatory damages; only such officers will seek to guide their conduct by the punitive damages standard. The presence of such officers constitutes a powerful argument against raising the threshold for punitive damages. In this case, the jury was instructed to apply a high standard of constitutional right (“physical abuse of such base, inhumane and barbaric proportions as to shock the sensibilities”). It was also instructed, under the principle of SMITH v. WADE 51 30 Opinion of the Court qualified immunity, that Smith could not be held liable at all unless he was guilty of “a callous indifference or a thoughtless disregard for the consequences of [his] act or failure to act,” or of “a flagrant or remarkably bad failure to protect” Wade. These instructions are not challenged in this Court, nor were they challenged on grounds of vagueness in the lower courts. Smith's contention that this recklessness standard is too vague to provide clear guidance and reasonable deterrence might more properly be reserved for a challenge seeking different standards of liability in the first instance. As for punitive damages, however, in the absence of any persuasive argument to the contrary based on the policies of § 1983, we are content to adopt the policy judgment of the common law—that reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights, as well as intentional violations of federal law, should be sufficient to trigger a jury’s consideration of the appropriateness of punitive damages. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). IV Smith contends that even if § 1983 does not ordinarily require a showing of actual malicious intent for an award of punitive damages, such a showing should be required in this case. He argues that the deterrent and punitive purposes of punitive damages are served only if the threshold for punitive damages is higher in every case than the underlying standard for liability in the first instance. In this case, while the District Judge did not use the same precise terms to explain the standards of liability for compensatory and punitive damages, the parties agree that there is no substantial difference between the showings required by the two instructions; both apply a standard of reckless or callous indifference to Wade’s rights. Hence, Smith argues, the District Judge erred in not requiring a higher standard for punitive damages, namely, actual malicious intent. This argument incorrectly assumes that, simply because the instructions specified the same threshold of liability for 52 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. punitive and compensatory damages, the two forms of damages were equally available to the plaintiff. The argument overlooks a key feature of punitive damages—that they are never awarded as of right, no matter how egregious the defendant’s conduct. “If the plaintiff proves sufficiently serious misconduct on the defendant’s part, the question whether to award punitive damages is left to the jury, which may or may not make such an award.” D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 204 (1973) (footnote omitted).14 Compensatory damages, by contrast, are mandatory; once liability is found, the jury is required to award compensatory damages in an amount appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for his loss.15 16 Hence, it is not entirely accurate to say that punitive and compensatory damages were awarded in this case op the same standard. To make its punitive award, the jury was required to find not only that Smith’s conduct met the recklessness threshold (a question of ultimate fact), but also that his conduct merited a punitive award of $5,000 in addition to the compensatory award (a discretionary moral judgment). 14 See also, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, Comment d (1979); J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice § 5.38 (1981); C. McCormick, Law of Damages 296 (1935); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 13 (4th ed. 1971); K. Redden, Punitive Damages § 3.4(A) (1980); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F. 2d 1265, 1277-1278, n. 15 (CA3 1979) (en banc). 16 The instructions in this case recognized this difference in treatment. The jury was instructed: “If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, then you must award the plaintiff such sum as you believe will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for any damages you believe he sustained as a direct result of the conduct of the defendants .... “In addition to actual damages, the law permits the jury, under certain circumstances, to award the injured person punitive and exemplary damages .... “If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and if the conduct of one or more of the defendants is shown to be a reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others, then you may assess punitive or exemplary damages in addition to any award of actual damages.” Tr. 642-643 (emphasis added). SMITH v. WADE 53 30 Opinion of the Court Moreover, the rules of ordinary tort law are once more against Smith’s argument. There has never been any general common-law rule that the threshold for punitive damages must always be higher than that for compensatory liability. On the contrary, both the First and Second Restatements of Torts have pointed out that “in torts like malicious prosecution that require a particular antisocial state of mind, the improper motive of the tortfeasor is both a necessary element in the cause of action and a reason for awarding punitive damages.”16 Accordingly, in situations where the standard for compensatory liability is as high as or higher than the usual threshold for punitive damages, most courts will permit awards of punitive damages without requiring any extra showing. Several courts have so held expressly.16 17 Many other courts, not directly addressing the congruence of compensatory and punitive thresholds, have held that punitive damages are available on the same showing of fault as is required by the underlying tort in, for example, intentional infliction of emotional distress,18 defamation of a public official 16 Restatement of Torts § 908, Comment c (1939); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908, Comment c (1979). Although there is general agreement with the broad principle of § 908, Comment c, there is authority suggesting that the tort of malicious prosecution may have been a poorly chosen illustration of it. See, e. g., Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Jordan v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448, 247 S. E. 2d 739 (1978). 17 Huggins v. Deinhard, 127 Ariz., at 359-360, 621 P. 2d, at 46-47; Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970); Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A. 2d 33, 37-38 (D. C. 1982); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N. W. 2d, at 922; Newton v. Standard Fire Insurance Co., 291 N. C., at 112, 229 S. E. 2d, at 301-302 (dictum); Hall v. May Department Stores Co., 292 Ore. 131, 144-145, 637 P. 2d 126, 134-135 (1981); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, supra, at 1276-1278 (CA3 1979) (en banc) (Pennsylvania law); Johnson v. Woman’s Hospital, 527 S. W. 2d 133, 141-142 (Tenn. App.), cert, denied (Tenn. 1975). 18See, e. g., Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., supra; Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., supra; Cape Publications, Inc. v. 54 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. or public figure,19 and defamation covered by a common-law qualified immunity.20 This common-law rule makes sense in terms of the purposes of punitive damages. Punitive damages are awarded in the jury’s discretion “to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §908(1) (1979). The focus is on the character of the tortfeasor’s conduct—whether it is of the sort that calls for deterrence and punishment over and above that provided by compensatory awards. If it is of such a character, then it is appropriate to allow a jury to assess punitive damages; and that assessment does not become less appropriate simply because the plaintiff in the case faces a more demanding standard of actionability. To put it differently, society has an interest in deterring and punishing all intentional or reckless invasions of the rights of others, even though it some Bridges, 387 So. 2d 436 (Fla. App. 1980); Meyer v. Nötiger, supra; Hall v. May Department Stores Co., supra; Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, supra (en banc) (Pennsylvania law). See also Johnson v. Woman’s Hospital, supra (tort of outrageous conduct). Contra, Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N. E. 2d 157 (1961). 19 See, e. g., Davis v. Schuchat, 166 U. S. App. D. C. 351, 510 F. 2d 731 (1975) (District of Columbia law); Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 334 N. E. 2d 79 (1975); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F. 2d 324 (CA2 1969) (New York law); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 211 S. E. 2d 674 (1975) (dictum). See also Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, supra (false light). In citing the cases in this footnote and in n. 20, infra, we intimate no view on any First Amendment issues they may raise. 20E. g., Pirre v. Printing Developments, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028 (SDNY) (Connecticut and New York law), affirmance order, 614 F. 2d 1290 (CA2 1979); Weenig v. Wood, 169 Ind. App. 413, 349 N. E. 2d 235 (1976); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N. W. 2d 252 (Minn. 1980); Snodgrass v. Headco Industries, Inc., 640 S. W. 2d 147 (Mo. App. 1982); Miller v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 46 (Kan. 1981) (Oklahoma law). See also n. 19, supra. SMITH v. WADE 55 30 Opinion of the Court times chooses not to impose any liability for lesser degrees of fault.21 As with his first argument, Smith gives us no good reason to depart from the common-law rule in the context of § 1983. He argues that too low a standard of exposure to punitive damages in cases such as this threatens to undermine the policies of his qualified immunity as a prison guard. The same reasoning would apply with at least as much force to, for example, the First Amendment and common-law immunities involved in the defamation cases described above. In any case, Smith overstates the extent of his immunity. Smith is protected from liability for mere negligence because of the need to protect his use of discretion in his day-to-day decisions in the running of a correctional facility. See generally Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975). But the immunity on which Smith relies is coextensive with the interest it protects.22 The very fact that the privilege is qualified reflects a recognition that there is no societal interest in protecting those uses of a prison guard’s discretion that amount to reckless or callous indifference to the rights and safety of the prisoners in his charge. Once the protected sphere of privilege is exceeded, we see no reason why state officers should not be liable for their reckless misconduct on the same basis as private tortfeasors.23 21 “Moreover, after Carey punitive damages may be the only significant remedy available in some § 1983 actions where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but the victim cannot prove compensable injury.” Carlson, 446 U. S., at 22, n. 9. 22 As we noted supra, at 33-34, Smith does not challenge the instruction on qualified immunity. We therefore assume for purposes of this case that the instruction was correct. See generally, e. g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978). 23 We reject Justice Rehnquist’s argument, post, at 92, that it somehow makes a difference that this suit was brought in federal court—as though it were inappropriate or unseemly that federal courts dare to enforce federal rights vigorously. Indeed, one wonders whether Justice 56 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. V We hold that a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. We further hold that this threshold applies even when the underlying standard of liability for compensatory damages is one of recklessness. Because the jury instructions in this case are in accord with this rule, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Rehnquist, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Powell join, dissenting. This case requires us to determine what degree of culpability on the part of a defendant in an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V) will permit an award of punitive damages. The District Court instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages in favor of the plaintiff if it concluded that the defendant’s conduct constituted “reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of others.” In my view, a forthright inquiry into the intent of the 42d Congress and a balanced consideration of the public policies at issue compel the conclusion that the proper standard for an award of punitive damages under § 1983 requires at least some degree of bad faith or improper motive on the part of the defendant. Rehnquist would complain as loudly if this § 1983 suit had been brought in state court, as it could have been. Although Justice Rehnquist casts his argument as an attack on meddling by federal courts, the true thrust of his complaint seems to be against federal law—i. e., the Civil Rights Act of 1871. We have explained at length why we think that the policies of that statute call for our holding today. SMITH v. WADE 57 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting The Court rejects a “wrongful intent” standard, instead requiring a plaintiff to show merely “reckless . . . indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” The following justifications are offered by the Court for this result: first, the rule in “[m]ost cases [decided in the last 15 years] under state common law” is “more or less” equivalent to a recklessness standard; second, the Court asserts that a similar rule “prevailed] at the time when §1983 was enacted”; and finally, there is an “absence of any persuasive argument” for not applying existing state tort rules to the federal statutory remedies available against state and local officials under § 1983. In my opinion none of these justifications, taken singly or together, supports the Court’s result. First, the decisions of state courts in the last decade or so are all but irrelevant in determining the intent of the 42d Congress, and thus, the meaning of § 1983. Second, the Court’s characterization of the common-law rules prevailing when § 1983 was enacted is both oversimplified and misleading; in fact, the majority rule in 1871 seems to have been that some sort of “evil intent”—and not mere recklessness—was necessary to justify an award of punitive damages. Third, the Court’s inability to distinguish a state court’s award of punitive damages against a state officer from a federal court’s analogous action under §§ 1983 and 1988 precludes it from adequately assessing the public policies implicated by its decision. Finally, the Court fails utterly to grapple with the cogent and persuasive criticisms that have been offered of punitive damages generally. I Before examining these points, however, it is useful to consider briefly the purposes of punitive damages. A fundamental premise of our legal system is the notion that damages are awarded to compensate the victim—to redress the injuries that he or she actually has suffered. D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §3.1 (1973); C. McCormick, Law of Dam 58 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. ages 1 (1935). In sharp contrast to this principle, the doctrine of punitive damages permits the award of “damages” beyond even the most generous and expansive conception of actual injury to the plaintiff. This anomaly is rationalized principally on three grounds. First, punitive damages “are assessed for the avowed purpose of visiting a punishment upon the defendant.” Id., at 275 (emphasis added); Dobbs, supra, §3.9, at 205; K. Redden, Punitive Damages §2.1 (1980); Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U. S. 42, 48 (1979). Second, the doctrine is rationalized on the ground that it deters persons from violating the rights of others. Ibid. Third, punitive damages are justified as a “bounty” that encourages private lawsuits seeking to assert legal rights. Ibid. Despite these attempted justifications, the doctrine of punitive damages has been vigorously criticized throughout the Nation’s history. Countless cases remark that such damages have never been “a favorite of the law.”1 The year after § 1983 was enacted, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared: “The idea of [punitive damages] is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.” Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 382 (1872).2 Such remarks reflect a number of deeply held reservations regarding punitive damages, which can only be briefly summarized here. *See, e. g., Williams v. Bone, 74 Idaho 185, 189, 259 P. 2d 810, 812 (1953); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 709, 496 P. 2d 939, 946 (1972); Cays v. McDaniel, 204 Ore. 449, 283 P. 2d 658 (1955); First National Bank of Des Plaines v. Amco Engineering Co., 32 Ill App. 3d 451, 455, 335 N. E. 2d 591, 594 (1975). See also the numerous cases cited at 25 C. J. S., Damages § 117(1), p. 1114, n. 18.5 (1966). 2 See also Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 56, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (1891) (“we believe that the doctrine of punitive damages is unsound in principle, and unfair and dangerous in practice . . .”); Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304, 315 (1879). SMITH v. WADE 59 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to receive full compensation for their injuries—but no more. Even assuming that a punitive “fine” should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the State, not to the plaintiff—who by hypothesis is fully compensated. Moreover, although punitive damages are “quasi-criminal,” Huber v. Teuber, 10 D. C. 484, 490 (1877), their imposition is unaccompanied by the types of safeguards present in criminal proceedings. This absence of safeguards is exacerbated by the fact that punitive damages are frequently based upon the caprice and prejudice of jurors. Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis, 49 Marq. L. Rev. 369 (1965). We observed in Electrical Workers v. Foust, supra, at 50-51, n. 14, that “punitive damages may be employed to punish unpopular defendants,” and noted elsewhere that “juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974). Finally, the alleged deterrence achieved by punitive damages awards is likely outweighed by the costs— such as the encouragement of unnecessary litigation and the chilling of desirable conduct—flowing from the rule, at least when the standards on which the awards are based are ill-defined. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 Drake L. Rev. 870 (1976). Because of these considerations, a significant number of American jurisdictions refuse to condone punitive damages awards. See, e. g., Killibrew v. Abbott Laboratories, 359 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1978); Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N. E. 1 (1891) (Holmes, J.); Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 124, 230 N. W. 2d 472, 474 (1975); Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N. H. 71, 73, 289 A. 2d 66, 68 (1972); Pereira v. International Basic Economy Corp., 95 P. R. R. 28 (1967); Maki v. Aluminum Building Products, 73 Wash. 2d 23, 25, 436 P. 2d 186, 187 60 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. (1968). See also Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884) (no punitive damages at common law). Other jurisdictions limit the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded, for example, to the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, see Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 222 A. 2d 220 (1966), or otherwise, Riggs v. Fremont Insurance Co., 85 Mich. App. 203, 270 N. W. 2d 654 (1978). Nonetheless, a number of States do permit juries to award punitive damages in certain circumstances. Historically, however, there has been little uniformity among the standards applied in these States for determining on what basis a jury might award punitive damages. See, e. g., Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1283, and n. 135 (1976); Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 52-53 (1982) (“the law of punitive damages is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty that stems from the use of a multiplicity of vague, overlapping terms”); Duckett v. Pool, 34 S. C. 311, 325, 13 S. E. 542, 547 (1891); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200 (1862). One fundamental distinction is essential to an understanding of the differences among the various standards for punitive damages. Many jurisdictions have required some sort of wrongful motive, actual intention to inflict harm or intentional doing of an act known to be unlawful—“express malice,” “actual malice,” “bad faith,” “wilful wrong” or “ill will.”3 3 See the cases cited in n. 12, infra. Decisions handed down at the time the 42d Congress deliberated leave little question that when a court required a showing of malice in order to recover punitive damages, an inquiry into the actual mental state of the defendant—his motives, intentions, knowledge, or design—was required. The Court reasons that, when used in connection with punitive damages, “malice” really meant something akin to recklessness. The cases simply do not support the claim. The term “malice” often was prefaced with the qualifiers “actual” or “express.” See, e. g., Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492, 496 (1880); Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa. 190, 191 (1865); Boardman v. Goldsmith, 48 Vt. SMITH v. WADE 61 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting Other States, however, have permitted punitive damages awards merely upon a showing of very careless or negligent conduct by the defendant—“gross negligence,” “reek- 403, 407, 411 (1875); Ogg v. Murdock, 25 W. Va. 139, 146-147 (1884). When it was not, the context in which it was used virtually always makes it completely clear that an inquiry into the actual intentions and motives of the defendant was required before punitive damages could be awarded. See, e. g., Brewer n. 'Watson, 65 Ala. 88, 96-97 (1880); Kelly v. McDonald, 39 Ark. 387, 393 (1882); Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143,163-164, 116 P. 530, 539-540 (1911) (“malice of evil motive”); Huber v. Teuber, 10 D. C. 484, 489-491 (1871); Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116,124-125 (1871); Curl v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 Iowa 417, 428-429, 19 N. W. 308 (1884); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184 (1862); Carli v. Union Depot, Street R. & T. Co., 32 Minn. 101,104, 20 N. W. 89, 90 (1884); Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 524, 529 (1854); Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 484-485, 14 A. 488, 489 (1888); Causee v. Anders, 20 N. C. 246, 248 (1839); Windham v. Rhame, 11 S. C. L. 283 (1858). And, even standing alone, the term generally was understood to require inquiry into the defendant’s mental state: “In malicious injuries, the injurer foresees the specific evil result and wills it either explicitly or implicitly; in negligent injuries he may foresee a probable danger and may rashly risk the consequences, without being chargeable with a malicious intent.” F. Wharton, Law of Negligence § 15 (1874). Of course, there was a “technical,” 19 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 623 (2 ed. 1901), definition of the term that had little to do with actual ill will, but which permitted such a mental state to be presumed from the mere occurrence of an injury. This virtually never was the basis for an award of punitive damages: if it had been, such damages would have been available in every tort action, which never was the rule in any jurisdiction. The Court does not seriously argue otherwise. Moreover, malice was often the standard employed injury instructions. E. g., Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala. 374 (1876); Coleman & Newsome v. Ryan, 58 Ga. 132,134 (1877); Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, supra; Lynd v. Picket, supra; Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183 (1869). There is not the slightest question that a jury of lay persons would have understood the phrase as requiring actual ill will, desire to injure, or other improper motive on the part of the defendant. “Malice” was defined by a dictionary published at the approximate time § 1983 was enacted as “extreme enmity of heart; a disposition to injure others unjustly for personal gratification or from a spirit of revenge; spite; deliberate mischief.” Stormonth’s English Dictionary 584 (1885). See also Webster’s Dictionary 804 (1869); Worcester’s Dictionary 873 (1860); 2 Abbott’s Law Dictionary 72 (1879) (“a malig- 62 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. lessness,” or “extreme carelessness.”4 In sharp contrast to the first set of terms noted above, which connote a requirement of actual ill will towards the plaintiff, these latter phrases import only a degree of negligence. This distinction between nant design of evil... is the idea attached to the word in popular use”). In short, the available authorities demonstrate that for purposes of punitive damages at the time of the 42d Congress, “malice” imported an actual ill will, intent, or improper motive requirement. In a few cases decided roughly contemporaneously with the enactment of § 1983, the terms “wanton” and “willful” were used, together with other phrases, to define the proper standard for an award of punitive damages. The Court finds little “ambiguity or confusion” surrounding these terms, and concludes that they clearly indicate a “recklessness” standard. The cases and commentators disagree. As one treatise flatly states: “[T]he term ‘wanton’ has no peculiar legal signification. It has various meanings, depending on the connection in which it is used.” 40 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 292-293 (1912). The “connection in which [‘wanton’] is used,” ibid., in punitive damages cases virtually always reveals that the word was merely an alternative phrasing of the evil motive requirement. See, e. g., Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539 (1861); Wilkinson v. Drew, 75 Me. 360, 363 (1883); Devine v. Rand, 38 Vt. 621 (1866); Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1, 11, 42 A. 607, 610 (1899). In the few cases where context does not make clear what was meant by “wanton,” several considerations suggest that it was likely that an inquiry into the motives and intentions of the defendant was intended. As a general proposition, when used in criminal contexts, wanton meant that “the act done is of a wilful, wicked purpose.” 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 3 (2d ed. 1905). In deciding whether to impose the “quasi-criminal” punishment of punitive damages, this meaning likely would have been that intended by courts using the phrase. Moreover, as used in a jury instruction—as occasionally was the case, see, e. g., Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, supra, at 124-125; Pike v. Dilling, supra—the term would have been understood by laymen to require some sort of evil or dissolute intention. See Stormonth’s English Dictionary 1146 (1885); Webster’s Dictionary 1490 (1869); Worcester’s Dictionary 1645 (1860). “Wantonly” most frequently was defined as “lewdly” which in turn was regarded as synonymous with “wickedly.” Webster’s Dictionary 768 (1869); Worcester’s Dictionary 834 (1860). The Court’s claim that decisions predicating punitive damages on wantonness reflected a recklessness standard is unfounded. The word had no fixed meaning, [Footnote 4 is on p. 64] SMITH v. WADE 63 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting acts that are intentionally harmful and those that are very negligent, or unreasonable, involves a basic difference of kind, not just a variation of degree. W. Prosser, Law of Torts §34, p. 185 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of and decisions using it must be examined individually; to the extent the phrase did have a common meaning, it was, particularly in the context of punitive sanctions, one implying some sort of bad intent. Likewise, the Court’s conclusion regarding the meaning of decisions using the phrase “willful” is unduly simplified. Like “wanton,” the phrase had no fixed meaning, 29 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 114-117 (1895); for the meaning intended in a particular context, reference must be had to the decisions at issue, see n. 12, infra. If one must generalize, criminal law again is useful, given the “quasi-criminal” character of punitive damages: “the word, as ordinarily used, means not merely voluntarily, but with bad purpose,” 29 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 114 (1895). Even more important, however, is the fact that “willful” seldom, if ever, was an independent standard; rather, “willful injury” or “willfully illegal conduct” were the typical contexts in which the phrase appeared. As to these, even apart from the surrounding language of the punitive damages decisions, it was clear that “[t]o constitute wilful injury there must be design, purpose, intent to do wrong and inflict the injury.” 30 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 536 (2d ed. 1905). And, of course, a “willful trespass” or other misdeed meant an intentionally wrongful act. Id., at 525-529. Thus, in jurisdictions using the term “willfully,” the question generally was whether the defendant knowingly and intentionally harmed the plaintiff, or, alternatively, intentionally committed an act he knew to be tortious or unlawful. In both these cases, inquiry into the wrongful motive of the defendant plainly was demanded; of course, recklessness does not satisfy this requirement. The Court’s discussion of the term “willful negligence” is of little relevance to the common-law standard for punitive damages. The phrase seldom was used, particularly in the punitive damages context, and when it was, it justifiably encountered vigorous criticism. As one court remarked, the phrase “willful neglect” made as much sense as “guilty innocence.” Kelly v. Malott, 135 F. 74 (CA7 1905). Faced with what appeared to be a self-contradictory term, the likely reaction of juries, courts, and Members of the 42d Congress would have been to focus on the unequivocal intent and malice requirements common at the time. In short, whatever general statements may have been made in some treatises regarding “wanton” and “willful,” in determining the meaning of the terms in this context, a more careful inquiry is demanded. As the foregoing discussion and the cases discussed infra demonstrate, that inquiry makes it clear that the Court’s 64 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Torts §500, Comment f (1965). The former typically demands inquiry into the actor’s subjective motive and purpose, while the latter ordinarily requires only an objective determination of the relative risks and advantages accruing to society from particular behavior. See id., §282. The importance of this distinction is reflected in what one court, speaking not many years before the time § 1983 was enacted, said: “[I]n morals, and the eye of the law, there is a vast difference between the criminality of a person acting mistakenly from a worthy motive, and one committing the same act from a wanton and malignant spirit, and with a corrupt and wicked design.” Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 508, 522 (1844). The Ohio court, applying this distinction, held that punitive damages could only be awarded where some “evil motive” recklessness standard was seldom used at the time of the enactment of §1983. 4 “Recklessness” generally was defined as “heedlessness” or “negligence,” while synonyms included “careless.” Stormonth’s English Dictionary 832 (1885). In strict legal terms, recklessness is conduct somewhat more dangerous—and therefore unreasonable—than merely negligent conduct, see Restatement (Second) of Torts §500 (1965); despite this distinction, it is plain that recklessness is different from intentionally harmful conduct not just in this type of degree, but in kind, ibid., Comment f. Undoubtedly, the recklessness or objective unreasonableness of particular conduct will be evidence of the intent of the actor, see n. 8, infra. This point has been recognized by commentators on the subject. In 1 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages (1882), for example, the author states the general rule that “[t]here is ... a marked difference legally, as there is practically, between a tort committed with and without malice; between a wrong done in the assertion of a supposed right, and one wantonly committed . . . .” Id., at 716. The author, however, also observed that “such recklessness or negligence as evinces malice or conscious disregard of the rights of others,” will support a punitive damages award. Id., at 724 (emphasis added). It is a far different thing to say, as Sutherland does, that the defendant’s recklessness is relevant to ascertaining ill will than it is to say, as the Court does, that this lack of care itself justifies punitive damages. SMITH v. WADE 65 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting was involved. Ibid. Oliver Wendell Holmes identified precisely the same distinction between intentionally injurious conduct and careless conduct: “Vengeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion, however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done. [E]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.” 0. Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1881).5 It is illuminating to examine the Court’s reasoning with this distinction in mind. II At bottom, this case requires the Court to decide when a particular remedy is available under §1983. Until today, ante, at 34-35, n. 2, the Court has adhered, with some fidelity, to the scarcely controversial principle that its proper role in interpreting § 1983 is determining what the 42d Congress intended. That § 1983 is to be interpreted according to this basic principle of statutory construction, 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §45.05 (4th ed. 1972), is clearly demonstrated by our many decisions relying upon the plain language of the section. See, e. g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 534 (1981); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 635 (1980). The Court’s opinion purports to pursue an inquiry 6 The same point was made in Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 233, 190 N. W. 746, 747 (1922), where the court wrote: “If a cow kicks a man in the face, the consequent physical hurt may equal that from a kick in the face with a hob-nailed boot, but the ‘cussedness’ of the cow raises no sense of outrage, while the malicious motive back of the boot kick adds materially to the victim’s sense of outrage. If a man employs spite and venom in administering a physical hurt, he must not expect his maliciousness to escape consideration when he is cast to make compensation for his wrong.” See also Inman v. Ball, 65 Iowa 543, 546, 22 N. W. 666, 668 (1885) (“To warrant a jury in inflicting damages by way of punishment, it should appear that the act complained of was a willful or malicious wrong. . . . This is a very different state of mind and purpose from that of a person who has no more than good reason to believe his act is wrongful”). 66 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. into legislative intent, yet relies heavily upon state-court decisions decided well after the 42d Congress adjourned, see ante, at 48, n. 13. I find these cases unilluminating, at least in part because I am unprepared to attribute to the 42d Congress the truly extraordinary foresight that the Court seems to think it had. The reason our earlier decisions interpreting § 1983 have relied upon common-law decisions is simple: Members of the 42d Congress were lawyers, familiar with the law of their time. In resolving ambiguities in the enactments of that Congress, as with other Congresses, it is useful to consider the legal principles and rules that shaped the thinking of its Members. The decisions of state courts decided well after 1871, while of some academic interest, are largely irrelevant to what Members of the 42d Congress intended by way of a standard for punitive damages. In an apparent attempt to justify its novel approach to discerning the intent of a body that deliberated more than a century ago, the Court makes passing reference to our decisions relating to common-law immunities under § 1983. These decisions provide no support for the Court’s analysis, since they all plainly evidence an attempt to discern the intent of the 42d Congress, albeit indirectly, by reference to the common-law principles known to Members of that body. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), one of our earliest immunity decisions, we phrased the question whether legislators were immune from actions under § 1983 as follows: “Did Congress by the general language of its 1871 statute mean to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National Governments here? Did it mean to subject legislators to civil liability for acts done within the sphere of legislative activity?” Id., at 376. More recently, in Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 258 (1981), we said: SMITH v. WADE 67 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting “It is by now well settled that the tort liability created by § 1983 cannot be understood in a historical vacuum. . . . One important assumption underlying the Court’s decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.” Likewise, our other decisions with respect to common-law immunities under §1983 clearly reveal that our consideration of state common-law rules is only a device to facilitate determination of congressional intent.6 Decisions from the 6 See also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 337, 345 (1983) (“[N]o evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the traditional common-law witness immunity in § 1983 actions,” and “[i]n 1871, common-law immunity for witnesses was well settled”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417-418 (1976) (“Tenney squarely presented the issue of whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended to restrict the availability in § 1983 suits of those immunities which historically, and for reasons of public policy, had been accorded to various categories of officials”); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 561 (1978) (“Although the Court has recognized that in enacting § 1983 Congress must have intended to expose state officials to damages liability in some circumstances, the section has been consistently construed as not intending wholesale revocation of the common-law immunity afforded government officials”); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 255 (1978) (“The Members of the Congress that enacted § 1983 did not address directly the question of damages, but the principle that damages are designed to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of rights hardly could have been foreign to many lawyers in Congress in 1871”); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 316-318 (1975) (relying upon common-law tradition). Our decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 553-554 (1967), was based squarely on an attempt to determine what the 42d Congress intended in enacting § 1983. Chief Justice Warren wrote: “Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872).” Similarly, our decision in Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 68 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. 1970’s, relied on by the Court, are almost completely irrelevant to this inquiry into legislative intent. Ill The Court also purports to rely on decisions, handed down in the second half of the last century by this Court, in drawing up its rule that mere recklessness will support an award of punitive damages. In fact, these decisions unambiguously support an actual-malice standard. The Court rests primarily on Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202 (1859), a diversity tort action against a railroad. There, we initially observed that in “certain actions of tort,” punitive damages might be awarded, and then described those actions as “[w]henever the injury complained of has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or indignity.” Id., at 214. As discussed previously, n. 3, supra, it was relatively clear at the time that “malice” required a showing of actual ill will or intent to injure. Perhaps foreseeing future efforts to expand the rule, however, we hastened to specify the type of malice that would warrant punitive damages: “the malice spoken of in this rule is not merely the doing of an unlawful or injurious act. The word implies that the act complained of was conceived in the spirit of mischief, or of criminal indifference to civil obligations.” 21 How., at 214 (emphasis added). It would have been difficult to have more clearly expressed the “actual malice” standard. We explicitly rejected an “implied malice” formulation, and then mandated inquiry into the “spirit” in which a defendant’s act was “conceived.” The Court does not address the requirement, explicitly set forth in Quigley, that punitive damages depend on the spirit in which an act was conceived. Instead, focusing only on the words “criminal indifference,” ante, at 41-42, n. 9, the Court at 421, was “predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it” (emphasis added). SMITH v. WADE 69 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting suggests that the use of this phrase indicates that Quigley established no requirement of wrongful intent. This is unlikely. An authority on criminal law in the 1870’s wrote: “In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil more than in its different doctrine concerning the intent. The law, seeking justice between man and man, frequently holds one to the civil consequences of his act, though he neither intended the act, nor suffered himself to be influenced by an evil mind, producing it unintended .... But the different nature of the criminal law admits of no such distinction; for crime proceeds only from a criminal mind .... “. . . There is only one criterion by which the guilt of men is to be tested. It is whether the mind is criminal. ... It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist.” 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law §§286-287 (5th ed. 1872). Of course, as the Court fiotes, there are crimes based on reckless or negligent conduct; it reasons from this that the “criminality” requirement in Quigley is not confined to cases where persons act with wrongful intent. Yet the requirement of “criminal” spirit is far more sensibly interpreted, not as incorporating every possible twist and turn of criminal law, but as reflecting “a principle of our legal system . . . that the essence of an offence is the wrongful intent.” 1 Bishop, supra, §287. Indeed, the Court’s argument proves far too much: if we are to assume that the reference to “criminal indifference” in Quigley was meant, as the Court argues, to incorporate every possible mental state that justifies the imposition of criminal sanctions, then punitive damages would be available for simple negligence. Plainly our decision in Quigley does not stand for this remarkable proposition. 70 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Even assuming some ambiguity in our decision in Quigley, however, the careful discussion of punitive damages in Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371 (1852), dispels any doubts. While the Court dismisses this treatment as “merely ... a sidelight,” ante, at 42, n. 9, in Quigley we evidently thought otherwise: in addition to citing and relying explicitly on Day, see 21 How., at 213-214, we also drew our punitive damages standard from that case. Ibid. Day made it perfectly clear that punitive damages cannot be awarded absent actual evil motive. It reasoned that punitive damages are predicated on the “malice, wantonness, oppression, or outrage of the defendant’s conduct,” and stated the following standard: “In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious, or gross and outrageous, courts permit juries to add to the measured compensation of the plaintiff which he would have been entitled to recover, had the injury been inflicted without design or intention, something further by way of punishment or example.” 13 How., at 371 (emphasis added). Elsewhere in Day we explained that punitive damages are awarded because of “moral turpitude or atrocity.” Ibid. It is obvious from these references that we understood the terms “malice” and “wantonness” as requiring that a defendant have acted with evil purposes or intent to do injury. It was with this understanding of the phrases in question that the Quigley Court framed its rule, and with this background, any fair reading of that decision could not avoid the conclusion that the Court intended to create an actual-malice requirement. Our decisions following 1871 indicate yet more clearly that we adhered to an actual-malice or intent-to-injure requirement in punitive damages actions. In Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489 (1876), a verdict against a railroad in a diversity action was reversed because the jury was erroneously charged that it might award punitive damages on SMITH v. WADE 71 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting a finding of “gross negligence.” The Arms Court first expressed reservations regarding the entire doctrine of punitive damages, remarking that since “the question of intention is always material in an action of tort” in fixing compensatory damages, permitting punitive damages based on the same element posed the threat of double recovery. Nonetheless, acknowledging that the remedy had been approved in Day and Quigley, the Court concluded that the rule set forth in those decisions should be followed. After quoting the passage in Quigley, discussed above, rejecting an implied-malice and adopting an actual-intent-to-injure standard, the Court said: “[The rule permitting punitive damages is] applicable to suits for personal injuries received through the negligence of others. Redress commensurate to such injuries should be afforded. In ascertaining its extent, the jury may consider all the facts which relate to the wrongful act of the defendant, and its consequences to the plaintiff; but they are not at liberty to go farther, unless it was done wilfully, or was the result of that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them.. . . The tort is aggravated by the evil motive, and on this rests the rule of exemplary damages.” 91 U. S., at 493 (emphasis added). Read in context, this language strongly suggests that an actual-malice standard was intended. The rule of exemplary damages “rests” on a defendant’s “evil motive,” and, while “reckless indifference” may justify some awards of punitive damages, it may do so only in “that” class of “reckless indifference . . . which is equivalent to an intentional violation” of the plaintiff’s rights. Ibid, (emphasis added). This interpretation of the opinion in Arms is the only reading that can be squared with the holding of that case.7 The 7 Elsewhere in the Arms opinion, the Court stated that an award of punitive damages is available only where there was “some wilful misconduct, 72 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Court held that it was error to give an instruction that “gross negligence” would support a finding of punitive damages. This instruction was condemned because “gross negligence” is “a relative term,” and “a word of description, and not of definition.” Id., at 495. The Court regarded “gross negligence” as too imprecise and ill-defined a standard to support the extraordinary remedy of punitive damages. Given this, it is more than a little peculiar to read the Arms opinion as supporting the recklessness standard embraced by the Court. A leading authority on the law of torts has written that there “is often no clear distinction at all between [‘recklessness’] and ‘gross’ negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same meaning, of an aggravated form of negligence . . . .” W. Prosser, Law of Torts §34, p. 185 (4th ed. 1971); see also n. 3, supra. Given the virtual identity of the two standards, a Court that held that “gross negligence” was too imprecise a standard to warrant a punitive damages award would not likely have intended its dicta to be read as adopting “recklessness” as an alternative standard. In contrast, a standard of culpability demanding inquiry into the wrongful mental state of the defendant—“evil motive,” or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.” 91 U. S., at 495 (emphasis added). The Court notes the problems in transforming “indifference . . . into intent,” ante, at 43-44, n. 10, without confronting the equally difficult task of transforming “conscious[ness]” into inadvertence. Plainly, the question whether a defendant was “conscious” of a certain fact demands inquiry into his subjective mental state, not merely an objective determination of the reasonableness of his conduct. As others have observed: “When willfullness enters, negligence steps out. The former is characterized by advertence, and the latter by inadvertence.” Christy v. Butcher, 153 Mo. App. 397, 401, 134 S. W. 1058, 1059 (1911). Yet, on reflection, the Arms formulation need not be regarded as self-contradictory: reckless and negligent conduct may be considered, and are highly probative, in determining whether to award punitive damages. They serve, however, as evidence of “willful misconduct,” “evil motive,” or a conscious choice to impose known injury on another, not as the standard for liability itself. SMITH v. WADE 73 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting “conceived in the spirit of mischief, or of criminal indifference,” or “design or intention” to do injury—is different in kind, not just degree, from the “very careless” standard explicitly rejected by the Arms Court. This standard is a significant step away from the “relative” and ill-defined terms of “description” that the Court thought so unsatisfactory; it seems obvious that the Arms Court meant to take just such a step. Moreover, the meaning of the Arms decision was made abundantly clear in a case decided the same day Arms was handed down. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Eyser, 91 U. S. 495 (1876), the Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado holding that on “no view of the evidence was the court below justified in instructing the jury that exemplary damages could be recovered.” The Reporter of Decisions explained: “The [defendant’s] omission to . . . give some other proper warning . . . was an act of negligence, entitling the plaintiff to compensatory damages. But there was nothing to authorize the jury to consider the omission as wilful: on the contrary, the evidence rebuts every presumption that there was any intentional wrong” Id., at 496 (emphasis added).8 The defendant in the case, who left electrical wires strung several feet above the ground across a city street in Denver without any real warning, may well have been reckless; certainly, as in fact occurred, a jury could have reached this conclusion. But this was irrelevant: in order to recover punitive damages an “intentional wrong” is what was needed. 8 This Court’s understanding of the term “willfully” was clearly stated in Felton v. United States, 96 U. S. 699, 702 (1878), where, in an action to recover a $1,000 penalty from a distiller, the Court said: “Doing or omitting to do a thing knowingly and wilfully, implies not only a knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent. . . .” Likewise, it quoted with approval from a Massachusetts decision stating that “wilfully” ordinarily means “not merely ‘voluntarily,’ but with a bad purpose.” Ibid. See also n. 3, supra. 74 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Perhaps, by minute dissection of stray clauses in a few of the foregoing decisions, combined with a studied refusal to confront the plain intent underlying phrases like “evil motive,” “design and intention,” and “intentional wrong,” one could discern some shadowy rule of liability resting on recklessness. Ante, at 39-48. Ninety years ago, however, the Court, after an exhaustive analysis of the foregoing decisions, explicitly and unambiguously reached precisely the opposite conclusion. In Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 (1893), the Court considered whether punitive damages were properly awarded against a railroad in a diversity action. The Court noted that the law on the subject was “well-settled,” id., at 107, and paraphrased the Quigley standard: The jury may award punitive damages “if the defendant has acted wantonly, or oppressively, or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations.” 147 U. S., at 107. Then, as it had in Day and Arms, the Court explained this formulation, observing that a “guilty intention on the part of the defendant is required in order to charge him with exemplary or punitive damages.” 147 U. S., at 107 (emphases added). In addition, the Court quoted, with plain approval, the following statements of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 484, 14 A. 488, 489 (1888): “The right to award [punitive damages] rests primarily upon the single ground—wrongful motive. ... It is the wrongful personal intention to injure that calls forth the penalty. To this wrongful intent knowledge is an essential prerequisite.” 147 U. S., at 110. The Court went on to note that “criminal intent [is] necessary to warrant the imposition of [punitive] damages,” id., at 111, and elsewhere wrote that “wanton, malicious or oppressive intent” and “unlawful and criminal intent,” were required for the award of such damages. Ibid.; id., at 114. Prentice simply leaves no question that actual wrongful intent, not just recklessness, was required for a SMITH v. WADE 75 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting recovery of punitive damages, and, in addition, that this was what “well-settled” law always had required.9 And, once again, in Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 86 (1897), we made it completely clear that actual malice was a prerequisite to a recovery of punitive damages. In Scott, we held that a complaint alleging a constitutional tort stated facts sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. In so holding we carefully analyzed our prior decisions respecting punitive damages beginning with Day and continuing through Prentice. We repeated and applied the “well-settled” rule contained in those cases: “Damages have been defined to be the compensation which the law will award for an injury done, and are said to be exemplary and allowable in excess of the actual loss, where a tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression.” 165 U. S., at 86 (emphasis added). The point could not be clearer. The Court today fashions a federal standard for punitive damages, see 42 U. S. C. §1988 (1976 ed., Supp. V), yet steadfastly refuses to follow those of our decisions speaking to that point. If it did, it would adopt a standard requiring “evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression.” Ibid. In addition, the decisions rendered by state courts in the years preceding and immediately following the enactment of § 1983 attest to the fact that a solid majority of jurisdictions took the view that the standard for an award of punitive dam 9 The Court does not attempt to explain the unequivocal and repeated statements in Prentice regarding the necessity of showing “guilty intention.” It relies instead on the Court’s quotation from a state case that observed in passing that punitive damages have been assessed on “evidence of such willfullness, recklessness or wickedness ... as amounted to criminality.” 147 U. S., at 115. Not only is this statement at best ambiguous, but the Court mentioned the state case only in its discussion of principles of respondeat superior, not in its earlier discussion of the standard for punitive damages. 76 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. ages included a requirement of ill will.10 To be sure, a few jurisdictions followed a broader standard; a careful review of the decisions at the time uncovers a number of decisions .10 Legal treatises in use in the 1870’s do not support the majority’s assertion that punitive damages could be awarded on a showing of gross negligence, recklessness, or serious indifference to the rights of others. Instead, they support the rather unsurprising proposition that among the courts of the several States in the late 1870’s, several views regarding punitive damages had evolved. Addison’s Treatise on the Law of Torts says “in all cases of malicious injuries and trespasses accompanied by personal insult, or oppressive and cruel conduct, juries are told to give what are called exemplary damages.” 2 C. Addison, Law of Torts 645 (1876) (emphasis added). The treatise continues: “Wherever the wrong or injury is of a grievous nature, done with a high hand, or is accompanied with deliberate intention to injure, or with words of contumely and abuse, and by circumstances of aggravation, the jury” may award punitive damages. Ibid. In a footnote Addison indicates that “malice” has been interpreted in several ways, including “an intention to set at defiance the legal rights of others,” “wantonness or a willful disregard of the rights of others,” “such a wanton character that it might properly be said to be willful,” and “a disregard for the rights of others.” Id., at 646-647, n. 1. Plainly, as discussed in greater detail below, different States applied different rules, and that is all the treatise writer purported to say. A similar pattern is followed in other hornbooks popular at the time. The authors make reference to some decisions articulating an actual-ill-will standard, while citing as well ,to decisions accepting a recklessness rule. Compare J. Deering, Law of Negligence § 415, text accompanying n. 1 (1886), with id., at text accompanying n. 7; G. Field, Law of Damages § 78 (1876) (“The rule we have furnished not only requires that the act done should be injurious, and that actual loss be sustained thereby to the plaintiff, but also that it be willfully injurious. The animus of the wrongdoer is an important question to be considered in such cases, as it is in criminal cases. The wrong must be intended, and the result of a spirit of mischief, wantonness, or of criminal indifference to civil obligations, or the rights of others, from which malice may well be inferred”), with id., § 84, at 91, n. 4 (gross negligence applied in an Iowa case); F. Hilliard, Law of Remedies for Torts 598-599 (2d ed. 1873) (detailing different standards prevailing); 2 S. Thompson, Law of Negligence 1264-1265 (1880) (noting conflicting views regarding intent requirement). Moreover, Professor Greenleaf, one of the most respected legal commentators of his time, entirely denied the existence of any doctrine of punitive SMITH v. WADE 77 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting that contain some reference to “recklessness.” And equally clearly, in more recent years many courts have adopted a standard including “recklessness” as the minimal degree of culpability warranting punitive damages.* 11 Most clear of all, however, is the fact that at about the time § 1983 was enacted a considerable number of the 37 States damages. 2 S. Greenleaf, Law of Evidence § 253 (15th ed. 1892). While his view has prevailed in a substantial minority of American jurisdictions, see supra, in many States it concededly has not been followed. Its importance for our purposes, however, lies in the fact that it was the considered judgment of a respected scholar, published and available at the time § 1983 was enacted. Likewise, in 1 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages (1882), the author notes that “bad motive” is necessary for an award of punitive damages, while permitting such a motive to be inferred from proof of negligent or reckless conduct. Id., at 716, 724. Similarly, Judge Mayne’s Treatise on Damages, indicated that the applicable standard for an award of punitive damages required some sort of improper motive. J. Mayne, Law of Damages 41 (1856). 11 See the cases cited by the Court, ante, at 48, n. 13. In this regard, it is useful to consider a position commonly held in 1871, and not infrequently followed today. A number of States adhered to the requirement that actual ill will towards a victim was the standard for punitive damages, but permitted jurors to infer this mental state from the character of the tortfeasor’s conduct. E. g., Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 250, 263 (1864) (jury “may infer malice from want of probable cause, but they are not bound so to infer it”); Lyon v. Hancock, 35 Cal. 372, 376 (1868) (“Malice ... is generally to be inferred from facts and circumstances”); Farwell v. Warren, 51 Ill. 467, 472 (1869) (“actuated by malice” which may be inferred from “wanton, willful or reckless disregard”); Addair v. Huffman, 156 W. Va. 592, 195 S. E. 2d 739 (1973); Columbus Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327 N. E. 2d 654 (1975). As one lower court described it, “fraud, oppression or malice” are necessary to recover punitive damages, but these elements “may be inferred from acts constituting such gross negligence as to warrant the inference of or be deemed equivalent to an evil intent.” Schuman v. Chatman, 184 Okla. 224, 227, 86 P. 2d 615, 618 (1938). It is important to appreciate, however, that there is a fundamental distinction between the standard for punitive damages and the evidence the jury may rely upon in meeting that standard. To say that reckless behavior may, with other evidence, permit the jury to infer a particular mental state, is not to say, as the Court does, that reckless behavior alone satisfies the punitive damages claimant’s standard of proof. 78 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. then belonging to the Union required some showing of wrongful intent before punitive damages could be awarded.12 As the cases set out in the margin reveal, it is but a state 12See,, e. g., Roberts v. Heim, 27 Ala. 678, 683 (1855) (“the law allows [punitive damages] whenever the trespass is committed in a rude, aggravating, or insulting manner, as malice may be inferred from these circumstances”); Brewer v. Watson, 65 Ala., at 96-97 (“it is clear . . . that where [a public] officer acts in good faith, he is not liable to exemplary damages”; “there can clearly be no recovery of exemplary . . . damages, without proof of” acts committed “maliciously, and with intent to injure”); Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala., at 378; Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark., at 496 (instruction that “exemplary damages [are] allowed as a punishment for torts committed with fraud, actual malice, or deliberate violence or oppression” held a “textbook principle”); Kelly v. McDonald, 39 Ark., at 393 (“Exemplary damages ought not to be given, unless in cases of intentional violation of another’s right, or when a proper act is done with an excess of force or violence, or with a malicious intent to injure another in his person or property”); Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295, 299-301 (1883) (emphasis added) (punitive damages denied because “there was no evidence of previous malice, nor of deliberate cruelty, only of hot blood and a certain recklessness”; charge requiring “a wanton and willful manner, and under circumstance of outrage, cruelty and oppression, or with malice” approved); Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553, 558 (1860) (holding that absence of “bad faith,” “wanton or malicious motives,” or “willfully unjust or oppressive” conduct barred punitive damages; reference in dicta to “reckless disregard” not applied); Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315, 325 (1861); Lyon v. Hancock, supra; Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal., at 163-164, 116 P., at 539-540 (“malice of evil motive” necessary to recover punitive damages in California); Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930) (reviewing cases limiting punitive damages to amount of attorney’s fees); Dibble v. Morris, 26 Conn. 416, 426-427 (1857) (“settled” that jury can award “vindictive [damages] in proportion to the degree of malice or wantonness evinced by the defendant”); Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182 (1869) (special rule for ultrahazardous activities); Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529 (1871); Huber v. Teuber, 10 D. C., at 489-491 (punitive damages “are sometimes allowable ... as punishment of a quasi-criminal character for the wantonness and malice which inspired the wrong of the defendant”; “malignant motives” and “improper motive” required); Yahoola River Mining Co. v. Irby, 40 Ga. 479, 482 (1869) (“bonafide belief” by defendant that he was acting lawfully bars punitive damages); Green v. Southern Express Co., 41 Ga. 515 (1871) (jury charge requiring “a desire to injure the accused” approved); SMITH v. WADE 79 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting ment of the obvious that “evil motive” was the general standard for punitive damages in many States at the time of the 42d Congress. Coleman & Newsome v. Ryan, 58 Ga., at 134, 135 (instruction that jury might award “vindictive damages, if they believed that the conduct of [the defendant] was malicious, and for the purpose of breaking up plaintiff’s business”); Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind., at 124-125 (charge requiring “the spirit of oppressive malice or wantonness” approved); Moore v. Crose, 43 Ind. 30, 34-35 (1873) (punitive damages award reversed since “[t]here [were] no elements of malice, insult, or deliberate oppression in the case . . . [and] appellant was acting under the belief that he had a valid right”); Thomas v. Isett, 1 Greene 470, 475 (Iowa 1848) (“wanton, rude, and aggravating manner, indicating malice or a desire to injure,” needed for punitive damages); Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555, 559 (Iowa 1854) (special rule for common carriers); Brown v. Allen, 35 Iowa 306, 311 (1872) (instruction that malice-in-law would support punitive damages reversed; “This was clearly erroneous. It is an abrogation of the distinction between a simple trespass and its consequences, and a malicious one justifying exemplary damages. A simple trespass, because unlawful, might be, under the instruction, visited with punitive damages, however honestly the defendants may have believed they had the lawful right to take possession of the property in question”); Fuller v. Chicago &N.W. R. Co., 31 Iowa 187, 204 (1871); Curl v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 Iowa, at 428-429, 19 N. W. 308 (instruction permitting punitive damages if defendant “willfully used unnecessary force” held improper: “This instruction is erroneous in that it does not make the recovery of exemplary damages dependent upon malice of the wrong doer. It holds that the willful use of unnecessary force is a ground for allowing exemplary damages. An act willfully done may not be accompanied by malice, that is, a spirit of enmity, malevolence or ill will, with a desire to harm and a disposition to injure?’); Inman v. Ball, 65 Iowa, at 465, 22 N. W., at 668 (Rothrock, J.) (“To warrant a jury in inflicting damages by way of punishment, it should appear that the act complained of was a willful or malicious wrong. There must be a purpose or intent to harass, oppress, or injure another. This is a very different state of mind and purpose from that of a person who has no more than good reason to believe his act is wrongful”); Wentworth v. Blackman, 71 Iowa 255, 256-257, 32 N. W. 311, 311-312 (1887) (Rothrock, J.) (reversing award of punitive damages; “malicious act,” which demands inquiry into defendant’s “motives,” required); Cameron v. Bryan, 89 Iowa 214, 56 N. W. 434 (1893) (Rothrock, J.) (“willful and malicious” conduct necessary); Stinson v. Buisson, 17 La. 567, 572 (1841) (“redress in damages should . . . 80 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. In short, a careful examination of the decisions available to the Members of the 42d Congress reveals a portrait different in important respects from that painted by the Court. While be proportioned to the injury sustained, unless it be where they are given as an example to deter others from similar conduct in future, and really for the purpose of punishing men for their bad motives and intentions”); Biggs n. DAquin Bros., 13 La. Ann. 21, 22 (1858) (no punitive damages awardable against party acting in “good faith”); 'Wilkinson v. Drew, 75 Me., at 363 (while punitive damages are recoverable “in case as well as trespass,” to recover them jury must find “that the act or omission of the defendant was willful and wanton,” with “wantonly” explicitly defined as “indicating wicked intent”); Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me., at 543 (court approves instruction that punitive damages are awardable if defendant acted “wantonly,” quoting statement requiring that defendant acted “ ‘under the influence of actual malice, or with the intention to injure the plaintiff’”); Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 108, 122-123 (1858) (“The man who, from bad and malicious intentions, commits a trespass, ought, in justice, to be dealt with more harshly than one who acts from no vicious feelings, but ignorantly”); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277, 287 (1867); Zimmerman v. Heiser, 32 Md. 274, 278 (1869) (no punitive damages unless the defendant acts by “mere pretence for the purpose of perpetrating a wrong”); Friend v. Hamill, 34 Md. 298, 304-307, 314 (1870) (“malice, ill-will or corruption” necessary for punitive damages); Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538, 542, 84 N. E. 1018,1019 (1908) (punitive damages have not been and are not recoverable); Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 198-199 (1867) (refusal to charge that “if from the evidence no evil motive be imputed to the defendant, then the rule of compensation is fixed by law, and . . . exemplary damages are not allowable,” reversed); Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28,32-33 (1858) (“[I]ntention. . . only becomes material in considering the question of exemplary damages. If the injury is not intentional, but results simply from a want of proper care, nothing more should be recovered than will compensate for the actual damage.. . . [But if] wilfulness—a wrongful act, done intentionally ...” exists, punitive damages are available); McKeon v. Citizens’ R. Co., 42 Mo. 79, 87 (1867) (neither recklessness nor gross negligence supports punitive damages, which “can be given, if ever in a civil case, only in cases where the injury is intentionally, willfully, and maliciously done”); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn., at 201 (instruction that if defendants, knowing plaintiff’s property “to be exempt, wilfully and maliciously attached [it with] the purpose of harassing and oppressing” him, then punitive damages are awardable explicitly approved as indicating “the facts necessary to be proved in order to justify [the jury] in SMITH v. WADE 81 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting a few jurisdictions may have adopted a more lenient, if less precise, standard of recklessness, the majority’s claim that the prevailing standard in 1871 was one of recklessness sim- giving exemplary damages”; “malice” includes acts defendant “know[s]” are “wrong and unlawful”); Carli v. Union Depot, Street R. & T. Co., 32 Minn., at 104, 20 N. W., at 90 (punitive damages “properly awarded only where the trespass appears to have been wanton, willful, or malicious,—a conscious violation of the [plaintiff’s] rights”); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352, 366-367 (1866) (punitive damages require “malice, fraud, oppression, or wilful wrong”; no punitive damages if defendant “acts in good faith, and with no intent injuriously to affect plaintiff’s rights”); Memphis & Charleston R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466, 488 (1870) (actual-intent rule “modified somewhat in . . . application, particularly to passenger carriers by steam”); Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342 (1872) (no prior decision adopts rule of punitive damages; doctrine rejected entirely); Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L., at 529 (if official acted “not only . . . without authority, but maliciously, he was liable to exemplary damages”; “maliciously” means “from improper motives”); Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 484-485, 14 A. 488-489 (1888) (punitive damages “res[t] primarily on a single ground—wrongful motive.. . . [I]t is the wrongful personal intention to injure that calls forth the penalty”; “punitive damages res[t] upon a wrongful motive of the defendant”); King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. L. 417, 419-420, 9 A. 705, 706 (1887) (while “malice” may not always mean actual ill will, when awarding punitive damages “malicious motive was required”); Causee v. Anders, 20 N. C., at 248 (punitive damages proper where defendant was “actuated by malice and a total disregard of the laws”); Louder v. Hinson, 49 N. C. 369, 371 (1857) (charge requiring desire “to wreak their vengeance” on the plaintiffs and “harass and insult them” approved); Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277, 279-280 (1859); Simpson v. McCaffrey, 13 Ohio 508, 522 (1884) (punitive damages available “for the wicked, corrupt, and malignant motive and design, which prompted [the guilty party] to the wrongful act”); Rayner v. Kinney, 14 Ohio St. 283, 287 (1863) (exemplary damages are “a punishment which should only attach to a wrongful intention. [W]here no wrongful intention is found, there is no just ground for the punishment of the defendant”); Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa., at 191, 196 (instruction that, absent “actual malice or design to injure, the rule is compensatory damages; but where actual malice exists, a formed design to injure and oppress, the jury may give vindictive damages,” termed “unexceptionable”); M’Cabe v. Morehead, 1 Watts & Serg. 513, 516 (Pa. 1841); Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. 176, 177 (1867); McDevitt v. Vial, 7 Sadler 585, 590, 11 A. 645, 648-649 (Pa. 1887) (charge requiring “a high handed spirit, and a dis- 82 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. ply cannot be sustained. The decisions of this Court, which were likely well known to federal legislators, supported an animus requirement. As we said in Day v. Woodworth, 13 position to oppress and do wrong” approved); Herreshoff v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 92, 94, 23 A. 104, 105 (1885) (punitive damages “only when the defendant has acted maliciously or in bad faith”); Windham v. Rhame, 11 S. C. L., at 285-287 (where evidence “show[s] a malicious motive . . . damages may be awarded not only to recompense the plaintiff but to punish the defendant”; jury must “ascertain if the act be the result of accident or negligence, or of deliberate and evil purpose,” and in latter instance, where injury results from “malfeasance,” “an amount beyond the pecuniary loss should be given, by way of punishment”; “motive,” “malicious purpose,” and “intention” dispositive; statement that punitive damages require showing that defendant “malevolently with a view to harass, vex and insult the plaintiff” quoted with approval); Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266, 268 (1851) (punitive damages if “fraud, malice, or wilful wrong” or “a desire to injure” exist); Neill v. Newton, 24 Tex. 202, 204 (1859) (failure to allege “aggravated circumstances of misrepresentation and deception” bars punitive damages); Bradshaw v. Buchanan, 50 Tex. 492, 494 (1878) (punitive damages award reversed because “there is no evidence tending to show that appellants were actuated by malice ... or that they [acted] wantonly, or with the intent to vex, harass, injure, or oppress him. On the contrary, the evidence strongly tends to show that they were actuated by no such motive”); Parsons v. Harper, 57 Va. 64, 78 (1860) (dictum; if an “act were done without malice, the party might not be liable to exemplary and vindictive damages”); Virginia Railway & Power Co. v. House, 148 Va. 879, 886, 193 S. E. 480, 482 (1927) (“well settled” law requires reversing punitive damages award because there was no evidence of “any malicious or willful wrong”); Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128 (1882) (punitive damages no different from compensatory damages in Virginia); Devine v. Rand, 38 Vt., at 626 (emphasis added) (Since punitive damages “depen[d] entirely upon the character and purpose of the defendant’s acts, the usual evidence must be admissible to ascertain the disposition and intention which prompted them”; punitive damages depend on “wickedness and wilfullness”); Lombard v. Batchelder, 58 Vt. 558, 559-560, 5 A. 511, 512 (1886) (“malicious,” “improper,” and “evil” motive necessary); Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt., at 11, 42 A., at 610 (“wanton desire to injure”); Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275, 287-288 (1873) (after discussing rule in some States, court holds that punitive damages are “to be governed wholly by the malice or wantonness of the defendant”); Hoadley v. Watson, 45 Vt. 289, 292 (1873) (punitive damages available “on account of the bad spirit and wrong intention of the SMITH v. WADE 83 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting How. 363 (1852), and Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202 (1859), a “spirit of mischief” was necessary for an award of punitive damages. Among the States, defendant”); Boardman v. Goldsmith, 48 Vt., at 407, 411 (instruction requiring that defendant “acted with express malice, intending to injure or disgrace the plaintiff” approved); Ogg v. Murdock, 25 W. Va., at 146-147 (approves, as “correct rule,” statement “when. . . there is no actual malice or design to injure, the rule is to allow compensatory damages; but when actual malice exists, a formed design to injure and oppress, the jury may give vindictive damages”; holds “there being no proof of an intent to injure and oppress the plaintiff, the jury were not authorized to find that the defendant was actuated by malice and consequently they were not justified in giving vindictive damages”); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 431 (1854) (“where . . . injury is inflicted under circumstances of aggravation, insult or cruelty, with vindictiveness and malice” punitive damages available); Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. *240, *245 (1862) (punitive damages not awardable “unless the jury should find that the acts [of the defendant] were without apparent cause, and proceeded from wanton or malicious motives”); Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183,186-187 (1869) (charge requiring “aggravation, insult, or cruelty, with vindictiveness or malice” approved; “malice” and “motive” are basis for punitive damages); Hooker v. Newton, 24 Wis. 292, 293 (1869) (approving charge requiring malice and intent to injure); Hamlin v. Spaulding, 27 Wis. 360, 364 (1870) (defendant must act “in bad faith, and, if not with actual malice, at least for the purpose of serving some ulterior object outside of the administration of criminal justice”); Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 358 (1866) (not followed outside context of failure to control vicious animals); Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 70, 126 N. W. 554, 560 (1910) (“the court has uniformly held that punitory damages are not allowable at all without the element of malice[;] the defendant [must have] acted with bad intent of some sort”). The Court’s treatment of law prevailing in 1871 relies principally upon state-court decisions from the 1880’s and 1890’s. These cases are admittedly somewhat more relevant to what the 42d Congress intended than the 20th-century cases cited by the Court; particularly if they explain prior decisions, these cases may reflect a well-settled understanding in a particular jurisdiction of the law regarding punitive damages. Yet, decisions handed down well after 1871 are considerably less probative of legislative intent than decisions rendered before or shortly subsequent to the enactment of § 1983: it requires no detailed discussion to demonstrate that a Member of the 42d Congress would have been more influenced by a decision from 1870 than by one from the 1890’s. Accordingly, the bulk of the cases cited by 84 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. there were many approaches to the imposition of punitive damages, with a variety of standards prevailing throughout the Nation. Nonetheless, a solid majority of jurisdictions followed the rule that punitive damages require some element of “evil motive,” “wickedness,” or “formed design to injure and oppress.” Thus, if we are to adhere to the principle, consistently followed in our previous decisions, that the Members of the 42d Congress intended § 1983 to reflect existing common-law rules, it is very likely that wrongful animus was a prerequisite for an award of punitive damages. IV Even apart from this historical background, I am persuaded by a variety of additional factors that the 42d Congress intended a “wrongful intent” requirement. As mentioned above, punitive damages are not, and never have been, a favored remedy. In determining whether Congress, not bound by stare decisis,13 would have embraced this often-condemned doctrine, it is worth considering the judgment of one of the most respected commentators in the field regarding the desirability of a legislatively enacted punitive damages remedy: “It is probable that, in the framing of a model code of damages to-day for use in a country unhampered by the Court must be ignored; they simply illustrate the historical shift in legal doctrine, pointed out in text, from an actual-intent standard to a recklessness standard. If the Court is serious in its attention to 19th-century law, analysis must focus on the common law as it stood at the time of the 42d Congress. Here, notwithstanding the Court’s numerous attempts to explain why decisions do not mean what they plainly say, it remains clear that in a majority of jurisdictions actual malice was required in order to recover punitive damages. 18 In 1864 the Kansas Supreme Court, although bound by prior precedent, agreed with Professor Greenleaf’s condemnation of punitive damages, see n. 10, supra, and said “were the question an open one, we should be inclined to [compensation only].” Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan., at 261. See also Sullivan v. Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 12 Ore. 392, 7 P. 508 (1885). SMITH v. WADE 85 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting legal tradition, the doctrine of exemplary damages would find no place.” C. McCormick, Law of Damages 276 (1935). In deciding whether Congress heeded such advice, it is useful to consider the language of § 1983 itself—which should, of course, be the starting point for any inquiry into legislative intent. Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress” (emphasis added). Plainly, the statutory language itself provides absolutely no support for the cause of action for punitive damages that the Court reads into the provision. Indeed, it merely creates “liability] to the party injured ... for redress.” “Redress” means “[r]eparation of, satisfaction or compensation for, a wrong sustained or the loss resulting from this.” 8 Oxford English Dictionary 310 (1933). And, as the Court concedes, punitive damages are not “reparation” or “compensation”; their very purpose is to punish, not to compensate. If Congress meant to create a right to recover punitive damages, then it chose singularly inappropriate words: both the reference to injured parties and to redress suggests compensation, and not punishment. Other statutes roughly contemporaneous with § 1983 illustrate that if Congress wanted to subject persons to a punitive damages remedy, it did so explicitly. For example, in § 59, 16 Stat. 207, Congress created express punitive damages remedies for various types of commercial misconduct. Likewise, the False Claims Act, § 5, 12 Stat. 698, provided a civil remedy of double damages and a $2,000 civil forfeiture penalty for certain misstatements to the Government. As one 86 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Court of Appeals has remarked: “Where Congress has intended [to create a right to punitive damages] it has found no difficulty in using language appropriate to that end.” United Mine Workers n. Patton, 211 F. 2d 742, 749 (CA4 1954). And yet, in § 1983 one searches in vain for some hint of such a remedy.14 In the light of the foregoing indications, it is accurate to say that the foundation upon which the right to punitive damages under §1983 rests is precarious, at the best. Given the extraordinary diffidence and obliqueness with which the right was granted—if it was—it seems more than a little unusual to read that grant as incorporating the most expansive of the available views as to the standard for punitive damages. Given the legislative ambiguity, the sensible approach to the problem would be an honest recognition that, if we are to infer a right to punitive damages, it should be a restrained one, reflecting the Legislature’s approach in creating the right. And surely, the right ought to be limited by the view of punitive damages that the Members of the 42d Congress would have had—not by what some state courts have done a century later. An intent requirement, unlike a recklessness standard, is logically consistent with the underlying justification for punitive damages. It is a fundamental principle of American law that penal consequences generally ought to be imposed only where there has been some sort of wrongful animus creating 141 agree with the Court’s conclusion that the Act of May 31,1870, § 2, 16 Stat. 140, is “revealing.” That statute, like § 1983, was a Reconstruction civil rights statute. It created a private cause of action for persons suffering from racial discrimination in voting registration, and explicitly allowed recovery of a $500 civil penalty by the person aggrieved. Similar provision for recovery of punitive damages is conspicuously absent from § 1983. Likewise, the Act clearly conditions the award of damages on a knowing violation of the civil rights laws. It is difficult to see what comfort the Court derives from the section. It merely demonstrates that when Congress wished to impose punitive damages on a party, it did so explicitly, and, even then, required more than recklessness. SMITH v. WADE 87 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting the type of culpability warranting this treatment. As we said in Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 250-251 (1952): “A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory ‘But I didn’t mean to.’” This principle “is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” Id., at 250. Indeed, as indicated previously, 19th-century decisions consistently justified the imposition of a quasi-criminal “fine” by reference to the “wickedness” or “evil” conduct of the defendant, just as Oliver Wendell Holmes drew a sharp distinction between accidentally and intentionally kicking an animal. Given that punitive damages are meant to punish, it is difficult to believe that Congress would have departed from the “instinctive,” “universal and persistent” linkage in our law between punishment and wrongful intent. V Finally, even if the evidence of congressional intent were less clearcut, I would be persuaded to resolve any ambiguity in favor of an actual-malice standard. It scarcely needs repeating that punitive damages are not a “favorite of the law,” see supra, at 58, owing to the numerous persuasive criticisms that have been leveled against the doctrine. The majority reasons that these arguments apply to all awards of punitive damages, not just to those under § 1983; while this is of course correct, it does little to reduce the strength of the arguments, and, if they are persuasive, we should not blindly follow the mistakes other courts have made. Much of what has been said above regarding the failings of a punitive damages remedy is equally appropriate here. It is anomalous, and counter to deep-rooted legal principles and common-sense notions, to punish persons who meant no harm, and to award a windfall, in the form of punitive damages, to someone who already has been fully compen 88 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. sated. These peculiarities ought to be carefully limited—not expanded to every case where a jury may think a defendant was too careless, particularly where a vaguely defined, elastic standard like “reckless indifference” gives free reign to the biases and prejudices of juries. In short, there are persuasive reasons not to create a new punitive damages remedy unless it is clear that Congress so intended. This argument is particularly powerful in a case like this, where the uncertainty resulting from largely random awards of punitive damages will have serious effects upon the performance by state and local officers of their official duties.15 One of the principal themes of our immunity decisions is that the threat of liability must not deter an official’s “willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 240 (1974). To avoid stifling the types of initiative and decisiveness necessary for the “government to govern,” Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting), we have held that officials will be liable for compensatory damages only for certain types of conduct. Precisely the same reasoning applies to liability for punitive damages. Because punitive damages generally are not subject to any relation to actual harm suffered, and because the recklessness standard is so imprecise, the remedy poses an even greater threat to the ability of officials to take decisive, efficient action. After the Court’s decision, governmental officials will be subjected to the possibility of damages awards unlimited by any harm they may have caused or the fact they acted with unquestioned good faith: when swift action is demanded, their thoughts likely will be on personal financial consequences that may result from their conduct— but whose limits they cannot predict—and not upon their 15This is not a new concern, see, e. g., Brewer v. Watson, 65 Ala., at 96-97 (absent an actual-malice standard for punitive damages “few men, fit for such positions, could be induced to accept public trusts of this character”). SMITH v. WADE 89 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting official duties. It would have been difficult for the Court to have fashioned a more effective Damoclean sword than the open-ended, standardless, and unpredictable liability it creates today.16 Moreover, notwithstanding the Court’s inability to discern them, there are important distinctions between a right to 16 The Court relies all but exclusively on the notion that a recklessness standard for punitive damages is necessary to deter unconstitutional conduct by state officials. The issue is a little more complicated. The deterrence the Court pursues necessarily is accompanied by costs: as our decisions regarding common-law immunities explicitly recognize, see cases cited in n. 6, supra, the imposition of personal liability on officials gravely threatens their initiative and judgment, and scarcely serves to make public positions attractive to competent, responsible persons. While constitutional rights are high on our scale of values, so is an effective performance of the countless basic functions that modem governments increasingly have come to perform. In fashioning a punitive damages standard we should seek to achieve that level of deterrence that is most worth the costs it imposes. The Court, however, simply ignores the potential costs of the standard it embraces. This single-minded desire to deter unconstitutional official actions would not logically stop at recklessness; awarding punitive damages on the basis of mere negligence, or on a strict liability basis, might result, in the short term, in even less unconstitutional conduct. Yet, just as with the Court’s recklessness standard, this deterrence would come at too costly a price. The Court is unable to give any reason, related to achieving deterrence at a cost sensibly related to benefits obtained, for its choice of a recklessness standard. It offers no response to the obvious distinctions between the standard for punitive damages in state-law tort actions and that in § 1983 actions, where § 1988 provides attorney’s fees and where issues of federalism are involved. It does not even attempt to discuss the plainly relevant question whether insurance may be obtained against punitive damages awards. While fully recognizing that the issue is a complex one, in my judgment the dangers that accompany the vague recklessness standard adopted by the Court far outweigh the deterrence achieved thereby. Recklessness too easily shades into negligence, particularly when the defendant is an unpopular official—whether because of his official actions, or for more invidious reasons. Punitive damages are not bound by a measure of actual damages, so when a jury does act improperly, the harm it may occasion can be great. These threats occur in an area—the provision of governmental 90 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Rehnquist, J., dissenting 461 U. S. damages under §1983 and a similar right under state tort law. A leading rationale seized upon by proponents of punitive damages to justify the doctrine is that “the award is . . . a covert response to the legal system’s overt refusal to provide financing for litigation.” D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 221 (1973); K. Redden, Punitive Damages § 2.4(C) (1980). Yet, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1976 ed., Supp. V) provides not just a “covert response” to plaintiffs’ litigation expenses but an explicit provision for an award to the prevailing party in a § 1983 action of “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” By permitting punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees, § 1983 plaintiffs, unlike state tort law plaintiffs, get not just one windfall but two—one for them, and one for their lawyer. This difference between the incentives that are present in state tort actions, and those in § 1983 actions, makes the Court’s reliance upon the standard for punitive damages in the former entirely inapposite: in fashioning a new financial lure to litigate under § 1983 the Court does not act in a vacuum, but, by adding to existing incentives, creates an imbalance of inducements to litigate that may have serious consequences.17 services—where it is important to have efficient, competent public servants. I fear that the Court’s decision poorly serves this goal, and that in the end, official conduct will be less useful to our citizens, not better. 17 In this respect, Congress’ attitude towards punitive damages as revealed by its treatment of the subject in the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is highly illuminating. There, in marked contrast to § 1983, Congress explicitly included a right to punitive damages; notably, however, that right was limited to recoveries of $1,000. 42 U. S. C. § 3612(c). While Congress may have thought punitive damages appropriate in some cases, it recognized the dangers that such a remedy creates—unfairness to defendants, stifling of initiative of state officials, comity concerns, and, perhaps most alarmingly, an open-ended incentive to litigate in a field where other such incentives already exist. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Petitioner did not argue, and the Court properly does not decide, whether the $1,000 limit in 42 U. S. C. § 3612(c), also should apply in actions under § 1983. It seems likely that it would. While the Court does not say so, its opinion seems to derive its punitive damages remedy from SMITH v. WADE 91 30 Rehnquist, J., dissenting The staggering effect of § 1983 claims upon the workload of the federal courts has been decried time and again. The torrent of frivolous claims under that section threatens to incapacitate the judicial system’s resolution of claims where true injustice is involved; those claims which truly warrant redress are in a very real danger of being lost in a sea of meritless suits. Yet, apparently oblivious to this, the Court today reads into the silent, inhospitable terms of §1983 a remedy that is designed to serve as a “bounty” to encourage private litigation. Dobbs, supra, at 221. In a time when the courts are flooded with suits that do not raise colorable claims, in large part because of the existing incentives for litigation under § 1983, it is regrettable that the Court should take upon itself, in apparent disregard for the likely intent of the 42d Congress, the legislative task of encouraging yet more litigation.18 There is a limit to what the federal judicial system can bear. “the laws of the United States,” concluding sub silentio that they “are suitable to carry [§ 1983] into effect.” 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1976 ed., Supp. V). (This follows from the Court’s apparent view that, for example, in one of the several States where punitive damages are not available, a § 1983 plaintiff could recover such damages, thus indicating that it is not “the common law ... of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held,” § 1988, that the Court is applying.) If, therefore, we are to apply a punitive damages remedy “in conformity with the laws of the United States,” then the most relevant law is 42 U. S. C. § 3612(c), limiting punitive damages in certain civil rights actions to $1,000. 18 The case is materially different from our decision in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982), where our previous decisions strongly suggested that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required under § 1983. Here, our previous statements as to the standard for a recovery of punitive damages are inconsistent with the Court’s formulation. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S., at 257, n. 11, we implied that the absence of “malicious intention” would preclude an award of punitive damages. And, as discussed above, the standard for punitive damages recoveries in constitutional tort actions was that the case involve “a tort. . . aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression.” Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 86 (1897). 92 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 O’Connor, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Finally, by unquestioningly transferring the standard of punitive damages in state tort actions to federal § 1983 actions, the Court utterly fails to recognize the fundamental difference that exists between an award of punitive damages by a federal court, acting under § 1983, and a similar award by a state court acting under prevailing local laws. While state courts may choose to adopt such measures as they deem appropriate to punish officers of the jurisdiction in which they sit, the standards they choose to adopt can scarcely be taken as evidence of what it is appropriate for a federal court to do. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 677, n. 19 (1974). When federal courts enforce punitive damages awards against local officials they intrude into sensitive areas of sovereignty of coordinate branches of our Nation, thus implicating the most basic values of our system of federalism. Moreover, by yet further distorting the incentives that exist for litigating claims against local officials in federal court, as opposed to state courts, the Court’s decision makes it even more difficult for state courts to attempt to conform the conduct of state officials to the Constitution. I dissent. Justice O’Connor, dissenting. Although I agree with the result reached in Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, I write separately because I cannot agree with the approach taken by either the Court or Justice Rehnquist. Both opinions engage in exhaustive, but ultimately unilluminating, exegesis of the common law of the availability of punitive damages in 1871. Although both the Court and Justice Rehnquist display admirable skills in legal research and analysis of great numbers of musty cases, the results do not significantly further the goal of the inquiry: to establish the intent of the 42d Congress. In interpreting § 1983, we have often looked to the common law as it existed in 1871, in the belief that, when Congress was silent on a point, it intended to adopt the principles of the common law with which it was familiar. See, e. g., Newport v. Fact Con- SMITH v. WADE 93 30 O’Connor, J., dissenting certs, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 258 (1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 255 (1978). This approach makes sense when there was a generally prevailing rule of common law, for then it is reasonable to assume that Congressmen were familiar with that rule and imagined that it would cover the cause of action that they were creating. But when a significant split in authority existed, it strains credulity to argue that Congress simply assumed that one view rather than the other would govern. Particularly in a case like this one, in which those interpreting the common law of 1871 must resort to dictionaries in an attempt to translate the language of the late 19th century into terms that judges of the late 20th century can understand, see ante, at 39-41, n. 8; 61-64, nn. 3, 4, and in an area in which the courts of the earlier period frequently used inexact and contradictory language, see ante, at 45-47, n. 12, we cannot safely infer anything about congressional intent from the divided contemporaneous judicial opinions. The battle of the string citations can have no winner. Once it is established that the common law of 1871 provides us with no real guidance on this question, we should turn to the policies underlying § 1983 to determine which rule best accords with those policies. In Fact Concerts, we identified the purposes of § 1983 as pre-eminently to compensate victims of constitutional violations and to deter further violations. 453 U. S., at 268. See also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584, 590-591 (1978); Carey v. Piphus, supra, at 254-257, and n. 9. The conceded availability of compensatory damages, particularly when coupled with the availability of attorney’s fees under §1988, completely fulfills the goal of compensation, leaving only deterrence to be served by awards of punitive damages. We must then confront the close question whether a standard permitting an award of unlimited punitive damages on the basis of recklessness will chill public officials in the performance of their duties more than it will deter violations of the Constitution, and whether the availability of punitive damages for reckless violations of the Constitution in addition to attorney’s fees will create an 94 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 O’Connor, J., dissenting 461 U. S. incentive to bring an ever-increasing flood of § 1983 claims, threatening the ability of the federal courts to handle those that are meritorious. Although I cannot concur in Justice Rehnquist’s wholesale condemnation of awards of punitive damages in any context or with the suggestion that punitive damages should not be available even for intentional or malicious violations of constitutional rights, I do agree with the discussion in Part V of his opinion of the special problems of permitting awards of punitive damages for the recklessness of public officials. Since awards of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees already provide significant deterrence, I am persuaded that the policies counseling against awarding punitive damages for the recklessness of public, officials outweigh the desirability of any incremental deterrent effect that such awards may have. Consequently, I dissent. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 95 Syllabus CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. LYONS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 81-1064. Argued November 2, 1982—Decided April 20, 1983 Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court against petitioner City of Los Angeles and certain of its police officers, alleging that in 1976 he was stopped by the officers for a traffic violation and that although he offered no resistance, the officers, without provocation or justification, seized him and applied a “chokehold,” rendering him unconscious and causing damage to his larynx. In addition to seeking damages, the complaint sought injunctive relief against petitioner, barring the use of chokeholds except in situations where the proposed victim reasonably appeared to be threatening the immediate use of deadly force. It was alleged that, pursuant to petitioner’s authorization, police officers routinely applied chokeholds in situations where they were not threatened by the use of any deadly force; that numerous persons had been injured as a result thereof; that respondent justifiably feared that any future contact he might have with police officers might again result in his being choked without provocation; and that there was thus a threatened impairment of various rights protected by the Federal Constitution. The District Court ultimately entered a preliminary injunction against the use of chokeholds under circumstances that did not threaten death or serious bodily injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. The case is not rendered moot even though while it was pending in this Court, city police authorities prohibited use of a certain type of chokehold in any circumstances and imposed a 6-month moratorium on the use of another type of chokehold except under circumstances where deadly force was authorized. The moratorium by its terms was not permanent, and thus intervening events have not irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged misconduct. Pp. 100-101. 2. The federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s claim for injunctive relief. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362. Pp. 101-113. (a) To satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement of Art. Ill, a plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct, and the injury or threat of injury must be “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” “Past exposure to illegal conduct 96 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea, supra, at 495-496. Pp. 101-105. (b) Respondent has failed to demonstrate a case or controversy with petitioner that would justify the equitable relief sought. That respondent may have been illegally choked by the police in 1976, while presumably affording him standing to claim damages against the individual officers and perhaps against petitioner, does not establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation. If chokeholds were authorized only to counter resistance to an arrest by a suspect, or to thwart an effort to escape, any future threat to respondent from petitioner’s policy or from the conduct of police officers would be no more real than the possibility that he would again have an encounter with the police and that he would either illegally resist arrest or the officers would disobey their instructions and again render him unconscious without any provocation. The equitable doctrine that cessation of the challenged conduct (here the few seconds while the chokehold was being applied to respondent) does not bar an injunction is not controlling, since respondent’s lack of standing does not rest on the termination of the police practice but on the speculative nature of his claim that he will again experience injury as the result of that practice even if continued. The rule that a claim does not become moot where it is capable of repetition, yet evades review, is likewise inapposite. Pp. 105-110. (c) Even assuming that respondent’s pending damages suit affords him Art. Ill standing to seek an injunction as a remedy for the claim arising out of the 1976 events, nevertheless the equitable remedy is unavailable because respondent failed to show irreparable injury—a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again. Nor will respondent’s injury allegedly suffered in 1976 go unrecompensed; for that injury he has an adequate damages remedy at law. Recognition of the need for a proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the State’s criminal laws in the absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate. Pp. 111-113. 656 F. 2d 417, reversed. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 113. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 97 95 Opinion of the Court Frederick N. Merkin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ira Reiner and Lewis N. Unger. Michael R. Mitchell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Fred Okrand and Charles S. Sims.* Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue here is whether respondent Lyons satisfied the prerequisites for seeking injunctive relief in the Federal District Court. I This case began on February 7, 1977, when respondent, Adolph Lyons, filed a complaint for damages, injunction, and declaratory relief in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The defendants were the City of Los Angeles and four of its police officers. The complaint alleged that on October 6, 1976, at 2 a. m., Lyons was stopped by the defendant officers for a traffic or vehicle code violation and that although Lyons offered no resistance or threat whatsoever, the officers, without provocation or justification, seized Lyons and applied a “chokehold”1—either *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert J. Logan for the City of San Jose, California, et al.; by Myron L. Dale for the National Association of Chiefs of Police et al.; by Benjamin L. Brown, J. Lamar Shelley, James B. Brennan, Henry W. Underhill, Jr., Roy D. Bates, George Agnost, Roger F. Cutler, John Dekker, Lee E. Holt, George F. Knox, Jr., Walter M. Powell, William H. Taube, Aaron A. Wilson, John W. Witt, Max P. Zall, Conard B. Mattox, Jr., and Charles S. Rhyne for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers; and by George J. Franscell, Wayne W. Schmidt, and Courtney E. Evans for the Los Angeles Police Protective League et al. !The police control procedures at issue in this case are referred to as “control holds,” “chokeholds,” “strangleholds,” and “neck restraints.” All these terms refer to two basic control procedures: the “carotid” hold and the “bar arm” hold. In the “carotid” hold, an officer positioned behind a subject places one arm around the subject’s neck and holds the wrist of that arm with his other hand. The officer, by using his lower forearm and bicep muscle, applies pressure concentrating on the carotid arteries located 98 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. the “bar arm control” hold or the “carotid-artery control” hold or both—rendering him unconscious and causing damage to his larynx. Counts I through IV of the complaint sought damages against the officers and the City. Count V, with which we are principally concerned here, sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against the City barring the use of the control holds. That count alleged that the City’s police officers, “pursuant to the authorization, instruction and encouragèment of Defendant City of Los Angeles, regularly and routinely apply these choke holds in innumerable situations where they are not threatened by the use of any deadly force whatsoever,” that numerous persons have been injured as the result of the application of the chokeholds, that Lyons and others similarly situated are threatened with irreparable injury in the form of bodily injury and loss of life, and that Lyons “justifiably fears that any contact he has with Los Angeles Police officers may result in his being choked and strangled to death without provocation, justification or other legal excuse.” Lyons alleged the threatened impairment of rights protected by the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Injunctive relief was sought against the use of the control holds “except in situations where the proposed victim of said control reasonably appears to be threatening the immediate use of deadly force.” Count VI sought declaratory relief against the City, i. e., a judgment that use of the chokeholds absent the threat of immediate use of deadly force is a per se violation of various constitutional rights. The District Court, by order, granted the City’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment for on the sides of the subject’s neck. The “carotid” hold is capable of rendering the subject unconscious by diminishing the flow of oxygenated blood to the brain. The “bar arm” hold, which is administered similarly, applies pressure at the front of the subject’s neck. “Bar arm” pressure causes pain, reduces the flow of oxygen to the lungs, and may render the subject unconscious. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 99 95 Opinion of the Court the City on Counts V and VI.2 The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for the City on Counts V and VI, holding over the City’s objection that despite our decisions in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974), and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), Lyons had standing to seek relief against the application of the chokeholds. Lyons n. City of Los Angeles, 615 F. 2d 1243 (1980). The Court of Appeals held that there was a sufficient likelihood that Lyons would again be stopped and subjected to the unlawful use of force to constitute a case or controversy and to warrant the issuance of an injunction, if the injunction was otherwise authorized. We denied certiorari. 449 U. S. 934 (1980). On remand, Lyons applied for a preliminary injunction. Lyons pressed only the Count V claim at this point. See n. 6, infra. The motion was heard on affidavits, depositions, and government records. The District Court found that Lyons had been stopped for a traffic infringement and that without provocation or legal justification the officers involved had applied a “Department-authorized chokehold which resulted in injuries to the plaintiff.” The court further found that the department authorizes the use of the holds in situations where no one is threatened by death or grievous bodily harm, that officers are insufficiently trained, that the use of the holds involves a high risk of injury or death as then employed, and that their continued use in situations where neither death nor serious bodily injury is threatened “is unconscionable in a civilized society.” The court concluded that such use violated Lyons’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. A preliminary injunc 2 The order also gave judgment for the City on Count II insofar as that Count rested on the First and Eighth Amendments, as well as on Count VII, which sought a declaratory judgment that the City Attorney was not authorized to prosecute misdemeanor charges. It appears from the record on file with this Court that Counts III and IV had previously been dismissed on motion, although they reappeared in an amended complaint filed after remand from the Court of Appeals. 100 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. tion was entered enjoining “the use of both the carotid artery and bar arm holds under circumstances which do not threaten death or serious bodily injury.” An improved training program and regular reporting and recordkeeping were also ordered.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion stating that the District Court had not abused its discretion in entering a preliminary injunction. 656 F. 2d 417 (1981). We granted certiorari, 455 U. S. 937 (1982), and now reverse. II Since our grant of certiorari, circumstances pertinent to the case have changed. Originally, Lyons’ complaint alleged that at least two deaths had occurred as a result of the application of chokeholds by the police. His first amended complaint alleged that 10 chokehold-related deaths had occurred. By May 1982, there had been five more such deaths. On May 6,1982, the Chief of Police in Los Angeles prohibited the use of the bar-arm chokehold in any circumstances. A few days later, on May 12, 1982, the Board of Police Commissioners imposed a 6-month moratorium on the use of the carotidartery chokehold except under circumstances where deadly force is authorized.4 8 By its terms, the injunction was to continue in force until the court approved the training program to be presented to it. It is fair to assume that such approval would not be given if the program did not confine the use of the strangleholds to those situations in which their use, in the view of the District Court, would be constitutional. Because of successive stays entered by the Court of Appeals and by this Court, the injunction has not gone into effect. 4 The Board of Police Commissioners directed the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) staff to use and assess the effectiveness of alternative control techniques and report its findings to the Board every two months. Prior to oral argument in this case, two such reports had been submitted, but the Board took no further action. On November 9, 1982, the Board extended the moratorium until it had the “opportunity to review and evaluate” a third report from the Police Department. Insofar as we are advised, the third report has yet to be submitted. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 101 95 Opinion of the Court Based on these events, on June 3, 1982, the City filed in this Court a memorandum suggesting a question of mootness, reciting the facts but arguing that the case was not moot. Lyons in turn filed a motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. We denied that motion but reserved the question of mootness for later consideration. 457 U. S. 1115 (1982). In his brief and at oral argument, Lyons has reasserted his position that in light of changed conditions, an injunctive decree is now unnecessary because he is no longer subject to a threat of injury. He urges that the preliminary injunction should be vacated. The City, on the other hand, while acknowledging that subsequent events have significantly changed the posture of this case, again asserts that the case is not moot because the moratorium is not permanent and may be lifted at any time. We agree with the City that the case is not moot, since the moratorium by its terms is not permanent. Intervening events have not “irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 625, 631 (1979). We nevertheless hold, for another reason, that the federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons’ claim for injunctive relief. Ill It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. Ill of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94-101 (1968); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 421-425 (1969) (opinion of Marshall, J.). Plaintiffs must demonstrate a “personal stake in the outcome” in order to “assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues” necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must 102 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. show that he “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury” as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” See, e. g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1969); Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89-91 (1947); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923). In O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974), we dealt with a case brought by a class of plaintiffs claiming that they had been subjected to discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law. Among other things, a county magistrate and judge were accused of discriminatory conduct in various respects, such as sentencing members of plaintiff’s class more harshly than other defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the suit by the District Court, ruling that if the allegations were proved, an appropriate injunction could be entered. We reversed for failure of the complaint to allege a case or controversy. Id., at 493. Although it was claimed in that case that particular members of the plaintiff class had actually suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices, we observed that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Id., at 495-496. Past wrongs were evidence bearing on “whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Id., at 496. But the prospect of future injury rested “on the likelihood that [plaintiffs] will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before petitioners.” Ibid. The most that could be said for plaintiffs’ standing was “that if [plaintiffs] proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory prac LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 103 95 Opinion of the Court tices that petitioners are alleged to have followed.” Id., at 497. We could not find a case or controversy in those circumstances: the threat to the plaintiffs was not “sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy simply because they anticipate violating lawful criminal statutes and being tried for their offenses. ...” Id., at 496. It was to be assumed that “[plaintiffs] will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by petitioners.” Id., at 497. We further observed that case-or-controversy considerations “obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief,” id., at 499, and went on to hold that even if the complaint presented an existing case or controversy, an adequate basis for equitable relief against petitioners had not been demonstrated: “[Plaintiffs] have failed, moreover, to establish the basic requisites of the issuance of equitable relief in these circumstances—the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law. We have already canvassed the necessarily conjectural nature of the threatened injury to which [plaintiffs] are allegedly subjected. And if any of the [plaintiffs] are ever prosecuted and face trial, or if they are illegally sentenced, there are available state and federal procedures which could provide relief from the wrongful conduct alleged.” Id., at 502. Another relevant decision for present purposes is Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), a case in which plaintiffs alleged widespread illegal and unconstitutional police conduct aimed at minority citizens and against city residents in general. The Court reiterated the holding in O’Shea that past wrongs do not in themselves amount to that real and immediate threat of injury necessary to make out a case or controversy. The claim of injury rested upon “what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future 104 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. because of that unknown policeman’s perception” of departmental procedures. 423 U. S., at 372. This hypothesis was “even more attenuated than those allegations of future injury found insufficient in O’Shea to warrant [the] invocation of federal jurisdiction.” Ibid. The Court also held that plaintiffs’ showing at trial of a relatively few instances of violations by individual police officers, without any showing of a deliberate policy on behalf of the named defendants, did not provide a basis for equitable relief. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969), a case arising in an analogous situation, is directly apposite. Zwickler sought a declaratory judgment that a New York statute prohibiting anonymous handbills directly pertaining to election campaigns was unconstitutional. Although Zwickler had once been convicted under the statute,5 his sole concern related to a Congressman who had left the House of Representatives for a place on the Supreme Court of New York and who would not likely be a candidate again. A unanimous Court held that because it was “most unlikely” that Zwickler would again be subject to the statute, no case or controversy of “‘sufficient immediacy and reality’” was present to allow a declaratory judgment. Id., at 109. Just as Zwickler’s assertion that the former Congressman could be a candidate for Congress again was “hardly a substitute for evidence that this is a prospect of ‘immediacy and reality,’” ibid., Lyons’ assertion that he may again be subject to an illegal chokehold does not create the actual controversy that must exist for a declaratory judgment to be entered. We note also our per curiam opinion in Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171 (1977). There, the father of a boy who had been killed by the police sought damages and a declaration that the Missouri statute which authorized police officers to use deadly force in apprehending a person who committed a felony was unconstitutional. Plaintiff alleged that he had an 8 Zwickler’s conviction was reversed on state-law grounds. 394 U. S., at 105. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 105 95 Opinion of the Court other son, who “‘if ever arrested or brought under an attempt at arrest on suspicion of a felony, might flee or give the appearance of fleeing, and would therefore be in danger of being killed by these defendants or other police officers ....’” Id., at 172, n. 2. We ruled that “[s]uch speculation is insufficient to establish the existence of a present, live controversy.” Id., at 173, n. 2. IV No extension of O’Shea and Rizzo is necessary to hold that respondent Lyons has failed to demonstrate a case or controversy with the City that would justify the equitable relief sought.6 Lyons’ standing to seek the injunction requested depended on whether he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds by police officers. Count V of the complaint alleged the traffic stop and choking incident five months before. That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on October 6, 1976, while presumably affording Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual officers and perhaps against the City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his part. The additional allegation in the complaint that the police in Los Angeles routinely apply chokeholds in situations where they are not threatened by the use of deadly force falls far short of the allegations that would be necessary to establish a case or controversy between these parties. In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would have had not only to allege that he would have 6 The City states in its brief that on remand from the Court of Appeals’ first judgment “[t]he parties agreed and advised the district court that the respondent’s damages claim could be severed from his effort to obtain equitable relief.” Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 7. Respondent does not suggest otherwise. This case, therefore, as it came to us, is on all fours with O’Shea and should be judged as such. 106 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. another encounter with the police but also to make the incredible assertion either (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation, or for questioning, or (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner. Although Count V alleged that the City authorized the use of the control holds in situations where deadly force was not threatened, it did not indicate why Lyons might be realistically threatened by police officers who acted within the strictures of the City’s policy. If, for example, chokeholds were authorized to be used only to counter resistance to an arrest by a suspect, or to thwart an effort to escape, any future threat to Lyons from the City’s policy or from the conduct of police officers would be no more real than the possibility that he would again have an encounter with the police and that either he would illegally resist arrest or detention or the officers would disobey their instructions and again render him unconscious without any provocation.7 7 The center piece of Justice Marshall’s dissent is that Lyons had standing to challenge the City’s policy because to recover damages he would have to prove that what allegedly occurred on October 6, 1976, was pursuant to city authorization. We agree completely that for Lyons to succeed in his damages action, it would be necessary to prove that what happened to him—that is, as alleged, he was choked without any provocation or legal excuse whatsoever—was pursuant to a city policy. For several reasons, however, it does not follow that Lyons had standing to seek the injunction prayed for in Count V. First, Lyons alleges in Count II of his first amended complaint that on October 6, 1976, the officers were carrying out official policies of the City. That allegation was incorporated by reference in Count V. That policy, however, is described in paragraphs 20 and 23 of Count V as authorizing the use of chokeholds “in situations where [the officers] are threatened by far less than deadly force.” This is not equivalent to the unbelievable assertion that the City either orders or authorizes application of the chokeholds where there is no resistance or other provocation. Second, even if such an allegation is thought to be contained in the complaint, it is belied by the record made on the application for preliminary injunction. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 107 95 Opinion of the Court Under O’Shea and Rizzo, these allegations were an insufficient basis to provide a federal court with jurisdiction to entertain Count V of the complaint.* 8 This was apparently the conclusion of the District Court in dismissing Lyons’ claim for injunctive relief. Although the District Court acted without opinion or findings, the Court of Appeals interpreted its action as based on lack of standing, i. e., that under O’Shea and Rizzo, Lyons must be held to have made an “insufficient showing that the police were likely to do this to the plaintiff again.” 615 F. 2d, at 1246. For several reasons—each of them infirm, in our view—the Court of Appeals thought reliance on O’Shea and Rizzo was misplaced and reversed the District Court. First, the Court of Appeals thought that Lyons was more immediately threatened than the plaintiffs in those cases since, according to the Court of Appeals, Lyons need only Third, even if the complaint must be read as containing an allegation that officers are authorized to apply the chokeholds where there is no resistance or other provocation, it does not follow that Lyons has standing to seek an injunction against the application of the restraint holds in situations that he has not experienced, as for example, where the suspect resists arrest or tries to escape but does not threaten the use of deadly force. Yet that is precisely the scope of the injunction that Lyons prayed for in Count V. Fourth, and in any event, to have a case or controversy with the City that could sustain Count V, Lyons would have to credibly allege that he faced a realistic threat from the future application of the City’s policy. Justice Marshall nowhere confronts this requirement—the necessity that Lyons demonstrate that he, himself, will not only again be stopped by the police but will also be choked without any provocation or legal excuse. Justice Marshall plainly does not agree with that requirement, and he was in dissent in O’Shea v. Littleton. We are at issue in that respect. 8 As previously indicated, supra, at 98, Lyons alleged that he feared he would be choked in any future encounter with the police. The reasonableness of Lyons’ fear is dependent upon the likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct. It is the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective apprehensions. The emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the defendant. Of course, emotional upset is a relevant consideration in a damages action. 108 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. be stopped for a minor traffic violation to be subject to the strangleholds. But even assuming that Lyons would again be stopped for a traffic or other violation in the reasonably near future, it is untenable to assert, and the complaint made no such allegation, that strangleholds are applied by the Los Angeles police to every citizen who is stopped or arrested regardless of the conduct of the person stopped. We cannot agree that the “odds,” 615 F. 2d, at 1247, that Lyons would not only again be stopped for a traffic violation but would also be subjected to a chokehold without any provocation whatsoever are sufficient to make out a federal case for equitable relief. We note that five months elapsed between October 6, 1976, and the filing of the complaint, yet there was no allegation of further unfortunate encounters between Lyons and the police. Of course, it may be that among the countless encounters between the police and the citizens of a great city such as Los Angeles, there will be certain instances in which strangleholds will be illegally applied and injury and death unconstitutionally inflicted on the victim. As we have said, however, it is no more than conjecture to suggest that in every instance of a traffic stop, arrest, or other encounter between the police and a citizen, the police will act unconstitutionally and inflict injury without provocation or legal excuse. And it is surely no more than speculation to assert either that Lyons himself will again be involved in one of those unfortunate instances, or that he will be arrested in the future and provoke the use of a chokehold by resisting arrest, attempting to escape, or threatening deadly force or serious bodily injury. Second, the Court of Appeals viewed O’Shea and Rizzo as cases in which the plaintiffs sought “massive structural” relief against the local law enforcement systems and therefore that the holdings in those cases were inapposite to cases such as this where the plaintiff, according to the Court of Appeals, seeks to enjoin only an “established,” “sanctioned” police practice assertedly violative of constitutional rights. O’Shea and Rizzo, however, cannot be so easily confined to their LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 109 95 Opinion of the Court facts. If Lyons has made no showing that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of his experience of October 1976, then he has not met the requirements for seeking an injunction in a federal court, whether the injunction contemplates intrusive structural relief or the cessation of a discrete practice. The Court of Appeals also asserted that Lyons “had a live and active claim” against the City “if only for a period of a few seconds” while the stranglehold was being applied to him and that for two reasons the claim had not become moot so as to disentitle Lyons to injunctive relief: First, because under normal rules of equity, a case does not become moot merely because the complained of conduct has ceased; and second, because Lyons’ claim is “capable of repetition but evading review” and therefore should be heard. We agree that Lyons had a live controversy with the City. Indeed, he still has a claim for damages against the City that appears to meet all Art. Ill requirements. Nevertheless, the issue here is not whether that claim has become moot but whether Lyons meets the preconditions for asserting an injunctive claim in a federal forum. The equitable doctrine that cessation of the challenged conduct does not bar an injunction is of little help in this respect, for Lyons’ lack of standing does not rest on the termination of the police practice but on the speculative nature of his claim that he will again experience injury as the result of that practice even if continued. The rule that a claim does not become moot where it is capable of repetition, yet evades review, is likewise inapposite. Lyons’ claim that he was illegally strangled remains to be litigated in his suit for damages; in no sense does that claim “evade” review. Furthermore, the capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the alleged illegality. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 319 (1974). As we have indicated, Lyons has not made this demonstration. 110 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. The record and findings made on remand do not improve Lyons’ position with respect to standing. The District Court, having been reversed, did not expressly address Lyons’ standing to seek injunctive relief, although the City was careful to preserve its position on this question. There was no finding that Lyons faced a real and immediate threat of again being illegally choked. The City’s policy was described as authorizing the use of the strangleholds “under circumstances where no one is threatened with death or grievous bodily harm.” That policy was not further described, but the record before the court contained the department’s existing policy with respect to the employment of chokeholds. Nothing in that policy, contained in a Police Department manual, suggests that the chokeholds, or other kinds of force for that matter, are authorized absent some resistance or other provocation by the arrestee or other suspect.9 On the contrary, police officers were instructed to use chokeholds only when lesser degrees of force do not suffice and then only “to gain control of a suspect who is violently resisting the officer or trying to escape.” App. 230. Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals failed to heed O’Shea, Rizzo, and other relevant authority, and that the District Court was quite right in dismissing Count V. 9 The dissent notes that a LAPD training officer stated that the police are authorized to employ the control holds whenever an officer “feels” that there is about to be a bodily attack. Post, at 118. The dissent’s emphasis on the word “feels” apparently is intended to suggest that LAPD officers are authorized to apply the holds whenever they “feel” like it. If there is a distinction between permitting the use of the holds when there is a “threat” of serious bodily harm, and when the officer “feels” or believes there is about to be a bodily attack, the dissent has failed to make it clear. The dissent does not, because it cannot, point to any written or oral pronouncement by the LAPD or any evidence showing a pattern of police behavior that would indicate that the official policy would permit the application of the control holds on a suspect who was not offering, or threatening to offer, physical resistance. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 111 95 Opinion of the Court V Lyons fares no better if it be assumed that his pending damages suit affords him Art. Ill standing to seek an injunction as a remedy for the claim arising out of the October 1976 events. The equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again—a “likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S., at 502. The speculative nature of Lyons’ claim of future injury requires a finding that this prerequisite of equitable relief has not been fulfilled. Nor will the injury that Lyons allegedly suffered in 1976 go unrecompensed; for that injury, he has an adequate remedy at law. Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, it is not at all “difficult” under our holding “to see how anyone can ever challenge police or similar administrative practices.” 615 F. 2d, at 1250. The legality of the violence to which Lyons claims he was once subjected is at issue in his suit for damages and can be determined there. Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal court may not entertain a claim by .any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974). This is not to suggest that such undifferentiated claims should not be taken seriously by local authorities. Indeed, the interest of an alert and interested citizen is an essential element of an effective and fair government, whether on the local, state, or national level.10 A federal court, how 10 The City’s memorandum suggesting a question of mootness informed the Court that the use of the control holds had become “a major civic con 112 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. ever, is not the proper forum to press such claims unless the requirements for entry and the prerequisites for injunctive relief are satisfied. We decline the invitation to slight the preconditions for equitable relief; for as we have held, recognition of the need for a proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the States’ criminal laws in the absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate. O’Shea, supra, at 499; Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 46 (1971). Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225 (1972), held that suits brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 are exempt from the flat ban against the issuance of injunctions directed at state-court proceedings, 28 U. S. C. §2283. But this holding did not displace the normal principles of equity, comity, and federalism that should inform the judgment of federal courts when asked to oversee state law enforcement authorities. In exercising their equitable powers federal courts must recognize “[t]he special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.” Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 120 (1951); O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 500. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S., at 380; Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U. S. 392 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U. S. 381 (1961); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U. S. 458 (1961). The Court of Appeals failed to apply these factors properly and therefore erred in finding that the District Court had not abused its discretion in entering an injunction in this case. As we noted in O’Shea, 414 U. S., at 503, withholding injunctive relief does not mean that the “federal law will exer troversy” and that in April and May 1982 “a spirited, vigorous, and at times emotional debate” on the issue took place. The result was the current moratorium on the use of the holds. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 113 95 Marshall, J., dissenting cise no deterrent effect in these circumstances.” If Lyons has suffered an injury barred by the Federal Constitution, he has a remedy for damages under § 1983. Furthermore, those who deliberately deprive a citizen of his constitutional rights risk conviction under the federal criminal laws. Ibid. Beyond these considerations the state courts need not impose the same standing or remedial requirements that govern federal-court proceedings. The individual States may permit their courts to use injunctions to oversee the conduct of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis. But this is not the role of a federal court, absent far more justification than Lyons has proffered in this case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed. Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join, dissenting. The District Court found that the city of Los Angeles authorizes its police officers to apply life-threatening chokeholds to citizens who pose no threat of violence, and that respondent, Adolph Lyons, was subjected to such a chokehold. The Court today holds that a federal court is without power to enjoin the enforcement of the city’s policy, no matter how flagrantly unconstitutional it may be. Since no one can show that he will be choked in the future, no one—not even a person who, like Lyons, has almost been choked to death—has standing to challenge the continuation of the policy. The city is free to continue the policy indefinitely as long as it is willing to pay damages for the injuries and deaths that result. I dissent from this unprecedented and unwarranted approach to standing. There is plainly a “case or controversy” concerning the constitutionality of the city’s chokehold policy. The constitutionality of that policy is directly implicated by Lyons’ claim for damages against the city. The complaint clearly alleges 114 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. that the officer who choked Lyons was carrying out an official policy, and a municipality is liable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for the conduct of its employees only if they acted pursuant to such a policy. Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978). Lyons therefore has standing to challenge the city’s chokehold policy and to obtain whatever relief a court may ultimately deem appropriate. None of our prior decisions suggests that his requests for particular forms of relief raise any additional issues concerning his standing. Standing has always depended on whether a plaintiff has a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962), not on the “precise nature of the relief sought.” Jenkins n. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 423 (1969) (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Warren, C. J., and Brennan, J.). I A Respondent Adolph Lyons is a 24-year-old Negro male who resides in Los Angeles. According to the uncontradicted evidence in the record,1 at about 2 a. m. on October 6, 1976, Lyons was pulled over to the curb by two officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for a traffic infraction because one of his taillights was burned out. The officers greeted him with drawn revolvers as he exited from his car. Lyons was told to face his car and spread his legs. He did so. He was then ordered to clasp his hands and put them on top of his head. He again complied. After one of the officers completed a patdown search, Lyons dropped his hands, 1 The following summary of the evidence is taken from Lyons’ deposition and his “Notice of Application and Application for Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief; Points and Authorities,” pp. 3-4. Although petitioner’s answer contains a general denial of the allegations set forth in the complaint, petitioner has never presented any evidence to challenge Lyons’ account. Brief for Petitioner 8. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 115 95 Marshall, J., dissenting but was ordered to place them back above his head, and one of the officers grabbed Lyons’ hands and slammed them onto his head. Lyons complained about the pain caused by the ring of keys he was holding in his hand. Within 5 to 10 seconds, the officer began to choke Lyons by applying a forearm against his throat. As Lyons struggled for air, the officer handcuffed him, but continued to apply the chokehold until he blacked out. When Lyons regained consciousness, he was lying face down on the ground, choking, gasping for air, and spitting up blood and dirt. He had urinated and defecated. He was issued a traffic citation and released. On February 7, 1977, Lyons commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the individual officers and the city, alleging violations of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. He claimed that he was subjected to a chokehold without justification and that defendant officers were “carrying out the official policies, customs and practices of the Los Angeles Police Department and the City of Los Angeles.” Count II, H 13.2 These allegations were included or incorporated in each of the Counts in which the city was named as a defendant. See Counts II through VI. Lyons alleged that the city authorizes the use of chokeholds “in innumerable situations where [the police] are not threatened by the use of any deadly force whatsoever.” CountV, 22. B Although the city instructs its officers that use of a chokehold does not constitute deadly force, since 1975 no less than 16 persons have died following the use of a chokehold by 2 Count I of the first amended complaint also stated a claim against the individual officers for damages. 18. 116 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. an LAPD police officer. Twelve have been Negro males.3 The evidence submitted to the District Court4 established that for many years it has been the official policy of the city to permit police officers to employ chokeholds in a variety of situations where they face no threat of violence. In reported “altercations” between LAPD officers and citizens the chokeholds are used more frequently than any other means of physical restraint.5 Between February 1975 and July 1980, LAPD officers applied chokeholds on at least 975 occasions, which represented more than three-quarters of the reported altercations.6 It is undisputed that chokeholds pose a high and unpredictable risk of serious injury or death. Chokeholds are intended to bring a subject under control by causing pain and rendering him unconscious. Depending on the position of the officer’s arm and the force applied, the victim’s voluntary 3 Thus in a city where Negro males constitute 9% of the population, they have accounted for 75% of the deaths resulting from the use of chokeholds. In addition to his other allegations, Lyons alleged racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 111110, 15, 23, 24, 25, 30. Of the 16 deaths, 10 occurred prior to the District Court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction, although at that time the parties and the court were aware of only 9. On December 24,1980, the Court of Appeals stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. Four additional deaths occurred during the period prior to the grant of a further stay pending filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari, 453 U. S. 1308 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers), and two more deaths occurred thereafter. 4 Lyons’ motion for a preliminary injunction was heard on affidavits, depositions, and government records. 6 Statement of Officer Pascal K. Dionne (officer-in-charge of the Physical Training and Self-Defense Unit of the LAPD), App. 240-241. 6 Statement of Officer Pascal K. Dionne, id., at 259. These figures undoubtedly understate the frequency of the use of chokeholds since, as Officer Dionne, a witness for the city, testified, the figures compiled do not include all altercations between police officers and citizens. Id., at 241. Officer Dionne’s statement does not define “altercation” and does not indicate when “altercation reports” must be filed by an officer. The city does not maintain a record of injuries to suspects. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 117 95 Marshall, J., dissenting or involuntary reaction, and his state of health, an officer may inadvertently crush the victim’s larynx, trachea, or hyoid. The result may be death caused by either cardiac arrest or asphyxiation.7 An LAPD officer described the reaction of a person to being choked as “do[ing] the chicken,” 7 The physiological effects of the chokeholds were described as follows by Dr. A. Griswold, an expert in pathology (id., at 364-367): “From a medical point of view, the bar arm control is extremely dangerous in an unpredictable fashion. Pressure from a locked forearm across the neck sufficient to compress and close the trachea applied for a sufficient period of time to cause unconsciousness from asphyxia must, to an anatomical certainty, also result in ... a very high risk of a fractured hyoid bone or crushed larynx. The risk is substantial, but at the same time, unpredictable. “It depends for one thing on which vertical portion of the neck the forearm pressure is exerted. . . . “Another factor contributing to unpredictability is the reaction of the victim. . . . [The] pressure exerted in a bar arm control. . . can result in a laryngeal spasm or seizure which simply shuts off the trachial air passage, leading to death by asphyxiation. Also, it must result in transmission to the brain of nerve messages that there is immediate, acute danger of death. This transmission immediately sets up a ‘flight or flee’ syndrome wherein the body reacts violently to save itself or escape. Adrenalin output increases enormously; blood oxygen is switched to muscles and strong, violent struggle ensues which is to a great extent involuntary. From a medical point of view, there would be no way to distinguish this involuntary death struggle from a wilful, voluntary resistance. Thus, an instruction to cease applying the hold when ‘resistance ceases’ is meaningless. “This violent struggle . . . increases the risk of permanent injury or death to the victim. This reserve may already be in a state of reduction by reason of cardiac, respiratory or other disease. “The LAPD [operates under a] misconception. . . that the length of time for applying the hold is the sole measure of risk. This is simply not true. If sufficient force is applied, the larynx can be crushed or hyoid fractured with death ensuing, in seconds. An irreversible laryngeal spasm can also occur in seconds. “From a medical point of view, the carotid control is extremely dangerous in a manner that is at least as equally unpredictable as the bar arm control. “. . . When applied with sufficient pressure, this control will crush the carotid sheath against the bony structure of the neck, foreseeably shutting 118 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Exh. 44, p. 93, in reference apparently to the reactions of a chicken when its neck is wrung. The victim experiences extreme pain. His face turns blue as he is deprived of oxygen, he goes into spasmodic convulsions, his eyes roll back, his body wriggles, his feet kick up and down, and his arms move about wildly. Although there has been no occasion to determine the precise contours of the city’s chokehold policy, the evidence submitted to the District Court provides some indications. LAPD Training Officer Terry Speer testified that an officer is authorized to deploy a chokehold whenever he “feels that there’s about to be a bodily attack made on him.” App. 381 (emphasis added). A training bulletin states that “[c]ontrol holds . . . allow officers to subdue any resistance by the suspects.” Exh. 47, p. 1 (emphasis added). In the proceedings below the city characterized its own policy as authorizing the use of chokeholds “‘to gain control of a suspect who is violently resisting the officer or trying to escape/” to “subdue any resistance by the suspects,”8 and to permit an officer, “where . . . resisted, but not necessarily threatened with serious bodily harm or death, ... to subdue a suspect who forcibly resists an officer.” (Emphasis added.)9 The training given LAPD officers provides additional revealing evidence of the city’s chokehold policy. Officer down the supply of oxygenated blood to the brain and leading to unconsciousness in approximately 10 to 15 seconds. “However, pressure on both carotid sheaths also results in pressure, if inadvertent or unintended, on both of the vagus nerves. The vagus nerves (right and left) arise in the brain and are composed of both sensory and motor fibers. . . . Stimulation of these nerves by pressure can activate reflexes within the vagus system that can result in immediate heart stoppage (cardiac arrest). . . . There is also evidence that cardiac arrest can result from simultaneous pressure on both vagus nerves regardless of the intensity or duration of the pressure.” 8 City’s Opposition to Application for Preliminary Injunction, No. 77-0420 (CD Cal.), pp. 26, 30. 9 Brief in Opposition to Motion to Stay, in No. A-230 (CD Cal.), p. 4. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 119 95 Marshall, J., dissenting Speer testified that in instructing officers concerning the use of force, the LAPD does not distinguish between felony and misdemeanor suspects. App. 379. Moreover, the officers are taught to maintain the chokehold until the suspect goes limp, id., at 387; App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a, despite substantial evidence that the application of a chokehold invariably induces a “flight or flee” syndrome, producing an involuntary struggle by the victim which can easily be misinterpreted by the officer as willful resistance that must be overcome by prolonging the chokehold and increasing the force applied. See n. 7, supra. In addition, officers are instructed that the chokeholds can be safely deployed for up to three or four minutes. App. 387-388; App. to Pet. for Cert. 48. Robert Jarvis, the city’s expert who has taught at the Los Angeles Police Academy for the past 12 years, admitted that officers are never told that the bar-arm control can cause death if applied for just two seconds. App. 388. Of the nine deaths for which evidence was submitted to the District Court, the average duration of the choke where specified was approximately 40 seconds. C In determining the appropriateness of a preliminary injunction, the District Court recognized that the city’s policy is subject to the constraints imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that “[d]uring the course of this confrontation, said officers, without provocation or legal justification, applied a Department-authorized chokehold which resulted in injuries to plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.) The court found that the “City of Los Angeles and the Department authorize the use of these holds under circumstances where no one is threatened by death or grievous bodily harm.” The court concluded that the use of the chokeholds constitutes “deadly force,” and that the city may not constitutionally authorize the use of such force “in situations where death or serious bodily harm is not threatened.” On the basis of this conclusion, the District Court en 120 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. tered a preliminary injunction enjoining “the use of both the carotid-artery and bar arm holds under circumstances which do not threaten death or serious bodily injury.”10 As the Court of Appeals noted, “[ajll the trial judge has done, so far, is to tell the city that its police officers may not apply life threatening strangleholds to persons stopped in routine police work unless the application of such force is necessary to prevent serious bodily harm to an officer.” 656 F. 2d 417, 418 (1981). II At the outset it is important to emphasize that Lyons’ entitlement to injunctive relief and his entitlement to an award of damages both depend upon whether he can show that the city’s chokehold policy violates the Constitution. An indispensable prerequisite of municipal liability under 42 U. S. C. §1983 is proof that the conduct complained of is attributable to an unconstitutional official policy or custom. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312, 326 (1981); Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S., at 694. It is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff to show that the employees or agents of a municipality have violated or will violate the Constitution, for a municipality will not be held liable solely on a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell, supra, at 694. The Court errs in suggesting that Lyons’ prayer for injunctive relief in Count V of his first amended complaint concerns a policy that was not responsible for his injuries and that therefore could not support an award of damages. Ante, at 106-107, n. 7. Paragraph 8 of the complaint alleges that Lyons was choked “without provocation, legal justification or ex 10 The preliminary injunction provided that the city itself could lift the injunction by obtaining court approval of a training program, and also required the city to keep records of all uses of chokeholds and to make those records available. The District Court refrained from determining the precise nature of the city’s policy given the limited nature of its inquiry at the preliminary injunction stage. Brown v. Chote, 411 U. S. 452, 456 (1973). LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 121 95 Marshall, J., dissenting cuse.” Paragraph 13 expressly alleges that “[t]he Defendant Officers were carrying out the official policies, customs and practices of the Los Angeles Police Department and the City of Los Angeles,” and that “by virtue thereof, defendant City is liable for the actions” of the officers. (Emphasis added.) These allegations are incorporated in each of the Counts against the city, including Count V. There is no basis for the Court’s assertion that Lyons has failed to allege “that the City either orders or authorizes application of the chokeholds where there is no resistance or other provocation.” Ante, at 106, n. 7. I am completely at a loss to understand how paragraphs 8 and 13 can be deemed insufficient to allege that the city’s policy authorizes the use of chokeholds without provocation. The Court apparently finds Lyons’ complaint wanting because, although it alleges that he was choked without provocation and that the officers acted pursuant to an official policy, it fails to allege in haec verba that the city’s policy authorizes the choking of suspects without provocation. I am aware of no case decided since the abolition of the old common-law forms of action, and the Court cites none, that in any way supports this crabbed construction of the complaint. A federal court is capable of concluding for itself that two plus two equals four.11 The Court also errs in asserting that even if the complaint sufficiently alleges that the city’s policy authorizes the use of chokeholds without provocation, such an allegation is in any event “belied by the record made on the application for preliminary injunction.” Ibid. This conclusion flatly contradicts the District Court’s express factual finding, which was left undisturbed by the Court of Appeals, that the officers applied a “Department-authorized chokehold which resulted in “Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 106-107, n. 7, there is clearly no inconsistency between the allegation in paragraph 8 of the complaint that Lyons was choked “without provocation, legal justification or excuse,” and the allegations that the city authorizes chokeholds “in situations where [officers] are threatened by far less than deadly force.” 111120, 23. 122 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. injuries to plaintiff.” (Emphasis added.) The city does not contend that this factual finding is clearly erroneous.12 In sum, it is absolutely clear that Lyons’ requests for damages and for injunctive relief call into question the constitutionality of the city’s policy concerning the use of chokeholds. If he does not show that that policy is unconstitutional, he will be no more entitled to damages than to an injunction. Ill Since Lyons’ claim for damages plainly gives him standing, and since the success of that claim depends upon a demonstration that the city’s chokehold policy is unconstitutional, it is beyond dispute that Lyons has properly invoked the District Court’s authority to adjudicate the constitutionality of the city’s chokehold policy. The dispute concerning the constitutionality of that policy plainly presents a “case or controversy” under Art. III. The Court nevertheless holds that a federal court has no power under Art. Ill to adjudicate Lyons’ request, in the same lawsuit, for injunctive relief with respect to that very policy. This anomalous result is not supported either by precedent or by the fundamental concern underlying the standing requirement. Moreover, by fragmenting a single claim into multiple claims for particular types of relief and requiring a separate showing of standing for each form of relief, the decision today departs from this 12 Even if the issue were properly before us, I could not agree that this Court should substitute its judgment for that of the District Court. One of the city’s own training officers testified that an officer is authorized to use a chokehold whenever he “feels that there’s about to be a bodily attack made on him.” App. 381. This testimony indicates that an officer is authorized to use a chokehold whenever he subjectively perceives a threat, regardless of whether the suspect has done anything to provide an objective basis for such a perception. The District Court’s finding is not refuted by the statement of the city’s policy which is set forth in an LAPD manual, ante, at 110, for municipal liability under § 1983 may be predicated on proof of an official custom whether or not that custom is embodied in a formal policy. Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978). LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 123 95 Marshall, J., dissenting Court’s traditional conception of standing and of the remedial powers of the federal courts. A It is simply disingenuous for the Court to assert that its decision requires “[n]o extension” of O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974), and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976). Ante, at 105. In contrast to this case O’Shea and Rizzo involved disputes focusing solely on the threat of future injury which the plaintiffs in those cases alleged they faced. In O’Shea the plaintiffs did not allege past injury and did not seek compensatory relief.13 In Rizzo, the plaintiffs sought only declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged past instances of police misconduct only in an attempt to establish the substantiality of the threat of future injury. There was similarly no claim for damages based on past injuries in Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171 (1977), or Golden v. Zwick-ler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969),14 on which the Court also relies. 13 Although counsel for the plaintiffs in O’Shea suggested at oral argument that certain plaintiffs had been exposed to illegal conduct in the past, in fact “[n]o damages were sought against the petitioners . . . nor were any specific instances involving the individually named respondents set forth in the claim against these judicial officers.” 414 U. S., at 492. The Court referred to the absence of past injury repeatedly. See id., at 492, 495, and n. 3. 14 The plaintiff in Mattis did originally seek damages, but after the District Court found that the defendant officers were shielded by the goodfaith immunity, he pursued only prospective relief. Although we held that the case had been mooted by the elimination of the damages claim, we in no way suggested that the plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief could not have been entertained had his damages claim remained viable. We held only that where a plaintiff’s “primary claim of a present interest in the controversy is that he will obtain emotional satisfaction from a ruling that his son’s death was wrongful,” 431 U. S., at 172 (footnote omitted), he does not have the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III. In Zwickler the plaintiff did not even allege that he would or might run for office again; he merely asserted that he “can be ‘a candidate for Congress again.’ ” 394 U. S., at 109. We held that this mere logical possibility was insufficient to present an actual controversy. 124 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. These decisions do not support the Court’s holding today. As the Court recognized in O’Shea, standing under Art. Ill is established by an allegation of “‘threatened or actual injury.’” 414 U. S., at 493, quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973) (emphasis added). See also 414 U. S., at 493, n. 2. Because the plaintiffs in O’Shea, Rizzo, Mattis, and Zwickler did not seek to redress past injury, their standing to sue depended entirely on the risk of future injury they faced. Apart from the desire to eliminate the possibility of future injury, the plaintiffs in those cases had no other personal stake in the outcome of the controversies. By contrast, Lyons’ request for prospective relief is coupled with his claim for damages based on past injury. In addition to the risk that he will be subjected to a chokehold in the future, Lyons has suffered past injury.* 16 Because he has a live claim for damages, he need not rely solely on the threat of future injury to establish his personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.16 In the cases relied on by the majority, 16 In Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197 (1966) (en banc), which we cited with approval in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U. S. 802, 816, n. 9 (1974), the Fourth Circuit found standing on facts indistinguishable from this case. In Lankford, the Court of Appeals held that four Negro families who had been subjected to an illegal house search were entitled to seek injunctive relief against the Baltimore Police Department’s policy of conducting wholesale searches based only on uncorroborated anonymous tips, even though the plaintiffs there did not claim that they were more likely than other Negro residents of the city to be subjected to an illegal search in the future. 16 In O’Shea itself the Court suggested that the absence of a damages claim was highly pertinent to its conclusion that the plaintiff had no standing. The Court noted that plaintiffs’ “claim for relief against the State’s Attorney[,] where specific instances of misconduct with respect to particular individuals are alleged,” 414 U. S., at 495 (emphasis added), stood in “sharp contrast” to their claim for relief against the magistrate and judge, which did not contain similar allegations. The plaintiffs did seek damages against the State’s Attorney. See Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 514, 518, n. 5 (1974). Like the claims against the State’s Attorney in O’Shea, Lyons’ claims against the city allege both past injury and the risk of future injury. Whereas in O’Shea the Court acknowledged the significance for standing LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 125 95 Marshall, J., dissenting the Court simply had no occasion to decide whether a plaintiff who has standing to litigate a dispute must clear a separate standing hurdle with respect to each form of relief sought.17 B The Court’s decision likewise finds no support in the fundamental policy underlying the Art. Ill standing requirement—the concern that a federal court not decide a legal issue if the plaintiff lacks a sufficient “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions.” Baker n. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204. As this Court stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101 (1968), “the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.” See also Valley Forge Christian College n. purposes of past injury, the Court today inexplicably treats Lyons’ past injury for which he is seeking redress as wholly irrelevant to the standing inquiry before us. 17 The Court’s reliance on Rizzo is misplaced for another reason. In Rizzo the Court concluded that the evidence presented at trial failed to establish an “affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by [defendants].” 423 U. S., at 371. Because the misconduct being challenged was, in the Court’s view, the result of the behavior of unidentified officials not named as defendants rather than any policy of the named defendants—the City Managing Director, and the Police Commissioner, id., at 372—the Court had “serious doubts” whether a case or controversy existed between the plaintiffs and those defendants. Here, by contrast, Lyons has clearly established a case or controversy between himself and the city concerning the constitutionality of the city’s policy. See supra, at 120-122. In Rizzo the Court specifically distinguished those cases where a case or controversy was found to exist because of the existence of an official policy responsible for the past or threatened constitutional deprivations. 423 U. S., at 373-374, distinguishing Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U. S. 802 (1974); Lankford v. Gelston, supra. 126 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982) (standing requirement ensures that “the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action”). Because Lyons has a claim for damages against the city, and because he cannot prevail on that claim unless he demonstrates that the city’s chokehold policy violates the Constitution, his personal stake in the outcome of the controversy adequately assures an adversary presentation of his challenge to the constitutionality of the policy.18 Moreover, the resolution of this challenge will be largely dispositive of his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. No doubt the requests for injunctive relief may raise additional questions. But these questions involve familiar issues relating to the appropriateness of particular forms of relief, and have never been thought to implicate a litigant’s standing to sue. The denial of standing separately to seek injunctive relief therefore cannot be justified by the basic concern underlying the Art. Ill standing requirement.19 18 It is irrelevant that the District Court has severed Lyons’ claim for damages from his claim for injunctive relief. Ante, at 105, n. 6. If the District Court, in deciding whether to issue an injunction, upholds the city’s policy against constitutional attack, this ruling will be res judicata with respect to Lyons’ claim for damages. The severance of the claims therefore does not diminish Lyons’ incentive to establish the unconstitutionality of the policy. It is unnecessary to decide here whether the standing of a plaintiff who alleges past injury that is legally redressable depends on whether he specifically seek damages. See Lankford v. Gelston, supra (plaintiffs who did not seek damages permitted to seek injunctive relief based on past injury). See n. 15, supra. 19 The Court errs in asserting that Lyons has no standing to seek injunctive relief because the injunction prayed for in Count V reaches suspects who, unlike Lyons, offer resistance or attempt to escape. Ante, at 106-107, n. 7. Even if a separate inquiry into Lyons’ standing to seek injunctive relief as opposed to damages were appropriate, and even if he had no LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 127 95 Marshall, J., dissenting C By fragmenting the standing inquiry and imposing a separate standing hurdle with respect to each form of relief sought, the decision today departs significantly from this Court’s traditional conception of the standing requirement and of the remedial powers of the federal courts. We have never required more than that a plaintiff have standing to litigate a claim. Whether he will be entitled to obtain particular forms of relief should he prevail has never been understood to be an issue of standing. In determining whether a plaintiff has standing, we have always focused on his personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, not on the issues sought to be litigated, Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 99, or the “precise nature of the relief sought.” Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S., at 423 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Warren, C. J., and Brennan, J.). standing to seek the entire injunction he requests, it would not follow that he had no standing to seek any injunctive relief. Even under the Court’s view, Lyons presumably would have standing to seek to enjoin the use of chokeholds without provocation. There would therefore be no justification for reversing the judgment below in its entirety. The Court’s reliance on the precise terms of the injunction sought in Count V is also misplaced for a more fundamental reason. Whatever may be said for the Court’s novel rule that a separate showing of standing must be made for each form of relief requested, the Court is simply wrong in assuming that the scope of the injunction prayed for raises a question of standing. A litigant is entitled to advance any substantive legal theory which would entitle him to relief. Lyons’ entitlement to relief may ultimately rest on the principle that a municipality may not authorize the use of chokeholds absent a threat of deadly force. This principle, which the District Court tentatively embraced in issuing the preliminary injunction, would support the entire injunction sought in Count V. Alternatively, Lyons’ entitlement to relief may rest on some narrower theory. If Lyons prevails, the appropriateness of the injunction prayed for in Count V will depend on the legal principle upon which the District Court predicates its decision. It may well be judicious for the District Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to rest its decision on a theory that would not support the full scope of the injunction that Lyons requests. But this has nothing whatsoever to do with Lyons’ standing. 128 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. 1 Our cases uniformly state that the touchstone of the Art. Ill standing requirement is the plaintiff’s personal stake in the underlying dispute, not in the particular types of relief sought. Once a plaintiff establishes a personal stake in a dispute, he has done all that is necessary to “invok[e] the court’s authority ... to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, supra, at 471-472. See, e. g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 101 (stake in “the dispute to be adjudicated in the lawsuit”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 443 (1972) (plaintiff must have “sufficient interest in challenging the statute’s validity”). The personal stake of a litigant depends, in turn, on whether he has alleged a legally redressable injury. In determining whether a plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a controversy, this Court has asked whether he “personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury,” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979) (emphasis added), whether the injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action,” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41 (1976), and whether plaintiff’s injury “is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id., at 38. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 74 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508 (1975). These well-accepted criteria for determining whether a plaintiff has established the requisite personal stake do not fragment the standing inquiry into a series of discrete questions about the plaintiff’s stake in each of the particular types of relief sought. Quite the contrary, they ask simply whether the plaintiff has a sufficient stake in seeking a judicial resolution of the controversy. Lyons has alleged past injury and a risk of future injury and has linked both to the city’s chokehold policy. Under established principles, the only additional question in determin LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 129 95 Marshall, J., dissenting ing standing under Art. Ill is whether the injuries he has alleged can be remedied or prevented by some form of judicial relief. Satisfaction of this requirement ensures that the lawsuit does not entail the issuance of an advisory opinion without the possibility of any judicial relief, and that the exercise of a court’s remedial powers will actually redress the alleged injury.20 Therefore Lyons needs to demonstrate only that, should he prevail on the merits, “the exercise of the Court’s remedial powers would redress the claimed injuries.” Duke Power Co., supra, at 74. See also Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 508; Simon, supra, at 38. Lyons has easily made this showing here, for monetary relief would plainly provide redress for his past injury, and prospective relief would reduce the likelihood of any future injury. Nothing more has ever been required to establish standing. The Court’s decision turns these well-accepted principles on their heads by requiring a separate standing inquiry with 20 This limited inquiry into remedy, which addresses two jurisdictional concerns, provides no support for the Court’s requirement that standing be separately demonstrated with respect to each particular form of relief sought. First, a court must have the power to fashion some appropriate remedy. This concern, an aspect of the more general case-or-controversy requirement, reflects the view that the adjudication of rights which a court is powerless to enforce is tantamount to an advisory opinion. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 241 (1937) (“[The controversy] must be a real and substantial [one] admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts”) (emphasis added). Second, a court must determine that there is an available remedy which will have a “substantial probability,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508 (1975), of redressing the plaintiff’s injury. This latter concern is merely a recasting of the causal nexus, supra, at 128, that must exist between the alleged injury and the action being challenged, and ensures that the granting of judicial relief will not be an exercise in futility. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 74 (1978). These considerations are summarized by the requirement that a plaintiff need only allege an injury that is “legally redressable.” Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 424 (1969) (emphasis added). 130 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. respect to each request for relief. Until now, questions concerning remedy were relevant to the threshold issue of standing only in the limited sense that some relief must be possible. The approach adopted today drastically alters the inquiry into remedy that must be made to determine standing. 2 The Court’s fragmentation of the standing inquiry is also inconsistent with the way the federal courts have treated remedial issues since the merger of law and equity. The federal practice has been to reserve consideration of the appropriate relief until after a determination of the merits, not to foreclose certain forms of relief by a ruling on the pleadings. The prayer for relief is no part of the plaintiff’s cause of action. See 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice 118.18, p. 8-216, and n. 13 (1983) (Moore), and cases cited therein; C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2664 (1983) (Wright, Miller, & Kane). Rather, “[the usual rule is] that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Bell v. Hood, 321 U. S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote omitted). Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.” The question whether a plaintiff has stated a claim turns not on “whether [he] has asked for the proper remedy but whether he is entitled to any remedy.” (Emphasis added.) Wright, Miller, & Kane §2664. This is fully consistent with the approach taken in our standing cases. Supra, at 128-129 and this page, and n. 20. The Court provides no justification for departing from the traditional treatment of remedial issues and demanding a separate threshold inquiry into each form of relief a plaintiff seeks. It is anomalous to require a plaintiff to demonstrate LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 131 95 Marshall, J., dissenting “standing” to seek each particular form of relief requested in the complaint when under Rule 54(c) the remedy to which a party may be entitled need not even be demanded in the complaint.21 See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 65-66 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 424 (1975). The traditional federal practice is a sound one. Even if it appears highly unlikely at the outset of a lawsuit that a plaintiff will establish that he is entitled to a particular remedy, there are dangers inherent in any doctrine that permits a court to foreclose any consideration of that remedy by ruling on the pleadings that the plaintiff lacks standing to seek it. A court has broad discretion to grant appropriate equitable relief to protect a party who has been injured by unlawful conduct, as well as members of the class, from future injury that may occur if the wrongdoer is permitted to continue his unlawful actions. Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges both past injury and a risk of future injury and presents a concededly substantial claim that a defendant is implementing an unlawful policy, it will rarely be easy to decide with any certainty at the outset of a lawsuit that no equitable relief would be appropriate under any conceivable set of facts that he might establish in support of his claim. In sum, the Court’s approach to standing is wholly inconsistent with well-established standing principles and clashes with our longstanding conception of the remedial powers of a court and what is necessary to invoke the authority of a court to resolve a particular dispute. IV Apart from the question of standing, the only remaining question presented in the petition for certiorari is whether 21 It is not clear from the Court’s opinion whether the District Court is wholly precluded from granting any form of declaratory or injunctive relief, even if it ultimately holds that Lyons should prevail on his claim for damages against the city on the ground that the city’s chokehold policy is unconstitutional and is responsible for his injury. 132 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. the preliminary injunction issued by the District Court must be set aside because it “constitute^] a substantial interference in the operation of a municipal police department.” Pet. for Cert, i.22 In my view it does not. In the portion of its brief concerning this second question, the city argues that the District Court ignored the principles of federalism set forth in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976). Brief for Petitioner 40-47. The city’s reliance on Rizzo is misplaced. That case involved an injunction which “significantly revis[ed] the internal procedures of the Philadelphia police department.” 423 U. S., at 379. The injunction required the police department to adopt “ ‘a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints’ ” to be formulated in accordance with extensive “guidelines” established by the District Court. Id., at 369, quoting Council of Organizations on Phila. Police A. & R. v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1321 (1973). Those guidelines specified detailed revisions of police manuals and rules of procedure, as well as the adoption of specific procedures for processing, screening, investigating, and adjudicating citizen complaints. In addition, the District Court supervised the implementation of the comprehensive program, issuing detailed orders concerning the posting and distribution of the revised police procedures and the drawing up of a “Citizen’s Complaint Report” in a format designated by the court. The District Court also reserved jurisdiction to review the progress of the police department. 423 U. S., at 365, n. 2. This Court concluded that the sweeping nature of the injunctive relief was inconsistent with “the principles of federalism.” Id., at 380. 22 Question 1 of the petition raised the question of Lyons’ standing. Question 2 of the petition states: “Does a federal court order constitute a substantial interference in the operation of a municipal police department where it (a) modifies policies concerning use of force and (b) takes control of such department’s training and reporting systems relative to a particular force technique? ” LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 133 95 Marshall, J., dissenting The principles of federalism simply do not preclude the limited preliminary injunction issued in this case. Unlike the permanent injunction at issue in Rizzo, the preliminary injunction involved here entails no federal supervision of the LAPD’s activities. The preliminary injunction merely forbids the use of chokeholds absent the threat of deadly force, permitting their continued use where such a threat does exist. This limited ban takes the form of a preventive injunction, which has traditionally been regarded as the least intrusive form of equitable relief. Moreover, the city can remove the ban by obtaining approval of a training plan. Although the preliminary injunction also requires the city to provide records of the uses of chokeholds to respondent and to allow the court access to such records, this requirement is hardly onerous, since the LAPD already maintains records concerning the use of chokeholds. A district court should be mindful that “federal-court intervention in the daily operation of a large city’s police department ... is undesirable and to be avoided if at all possible.” Rizzo, supra, at 381 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).23 The modest interlocutory relief granted in this case differs markedly, however, from the intrusive injunction involved in Rizzo, and simply does not implicate the federalism concerns 23 Of course, municipalities may be enjoined under § 1983, Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), and this Court has approved of the issuance of injunctions by federal courts against state or municipal police departments where necessary to prevent the continued enforcement of unconstitutional official policies. See, e. g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U. S. 802 (1974); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197 (CA4 1966) (en banc), cited with approval in Allee, supra, at 816. Although federalism concerns are relevant in fashioning an appropriate relief, we have stated repeatedly that a federal court retains the power to order any available remedy necessary to afford full relief for the invasion of legal rights. See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 14 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 32.1 U. S. 678, 684 (1946). 134 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. that arise when a federal court undertakes to “supervise the functioning of the police department.” 423 U. S., at 380. V Apparently because it is unwilling to rely solely on its unprecedented rule of standing, the Court goes on to conclude that, even if Lyons has standing, “[t]he equitable remedy is unavailable.” Ante, at 111. The Court’s reliance on this alternative ground is puzzling for two reasons. If, as the Court says, Lyons lacks standing under Art. Ill, the federal courts have no power to decide his entitlement to equitable relief on the merits. Under the Court’s own view of Art. Ill, the Court’s discussion in Part V is purely an advisory opinion. In addition, the question whether injunctive relief is available under equitable principles is simply not before us. We granted certiorari only to determine whether Lyons has standing and whether, if so, the preliminary injunction must be set aside because it constitutes an impermissible interference in the operation of a municipal police department. We did not grant certiorari to consider whether Lyons satisfies the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief. See n. 22, supra. Even if the issue had been properly raised, I could not agree with the Court’s disposition of it. With the single exception of Rizzo v. Goode, supra,24 all of the cases relied on by the Court concerned injunctions against state criminal proceedings. The rule of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), that such injunctions can be issued only in extraordinary circumstances in which the threat of injury is “great and immediate,” id., at 46, reflects the venerable rule that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution, the fact that constitu 24 As explained above, Rizzo v. Goode does not support a decision barring Lyons from obtaining any injunctive relief, for that case involved an injunction which entailed judicial supervision of the workings of a municipal police department, not simply the sort of preventive injunction that Lyons seeks. Supra, at 132-133. LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 135 95 Marshall, J., dissenting tional defenses can be raised in such a state prosecution, and an appreciation of the friction that injunctions against state judicial proceedings may produce. See ibid.; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 462 (1974); 28 U. S. C. §2283. Our prior decisions have repeatedly emphasized that where an injunction is not directed against a state criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding, “the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism” that underlie the Younger doctrine “have little force.” Steffel v. Thompson, supra, at 462, citing Lake Carriers’ Assn. n. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498, 509 (1972). Outside the special context in which the Younger doctrine applies, we have held that the appropriateness of injunctive relief is governed by traditional equitable considerations. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 930 (1975). Whatever the precise scope of the Younger doctrine may be, the concerns of comity and federalism that counsel restraint when a federal court is asked to enjoin a state criminal proceeding simply do not apply to an injunction directed solely at a police department. If the preliminary injunction granted by the District Court is analyzed under general equitable principles, rather than the more stringent standards of Younger v. Harris, it becomes apparent that there is no rule of law that precludes equitable relief and requires that the preliminary injunction be set aside. “In reviewing such interlocutory relief, this Court may only consider whether issuance of the injunction constituted an abuse of discretion.” Brown v. Chote, 411 U. S. 452, 457 (1973). The District Court concluded, on the basis of the facts before it, that Lyons was choked without provocation pursuant to an unconstitutional city policy. Supra, at 119. Given the necessarily preliminary nature of its inquiry, there was no way for the District Court to know the precise contours of the city’s policy or to ascertain the risk that Lyons, who had alleged that the policy was being applied in a discriminatory manner, might again be subjected to a chokehold. But in view of the Court’s conclusion that the unprovoked choking of 136 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Lyons was pursuant to a city policy, Lyons has satisfied “the usual basis for injunctive relief, ‘that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation.”’ Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 59 (1975), quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 633 (1953). The risk of serious injuries and deaths to other citizens also supported the decision to grant a preliminary injunction. Courts of equity have much greater latitude in granting injunctive relief “in furtherance of the public interest than . . . when only private interests are involved.” Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U. S. 515, 552 (1937). See Wright, Miller, & Kane §2948; 7 Moore H65.04[l]. In this case we know that the District Court would have been amply justified in considering the risk to the public, for after the preliminary injunction was stayed, five additional deaths occurred prior to the adoption of a moratorium. See n. 3, supra. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that the District Court abused its discretion. Indeed, this Court has approved of a decision that directed issuance of a permanent injunction in a similar situation. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F. 2d 197 (CA4 1966), cited with approval in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U. S. 802, 816, n. 9 (1974). See n. 15, supra. In Lankford, citizens whose houses had been searched solely on the basis of uncorroborated, anonymous tips sought injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction against enforcement of the police department policy authorizing such searches, even though there was no evidence that their homes would be searched in the future. Lyons is no less entitled to seek injunctive relief. To hold otherwise is to vitiate “one of the most valuable features of equity jurisdiction, to anticipate and prevent a threatened injury, where the damages would be insufficient or irreparable.” Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65, 82 (1902). LOS ANGELES v. LYONS 137 95 Marshall, J., dissenting Here it is unnecessary to consider the propriety of a permanent injunction. The District Court has simply sought to protect Lyons and other citizens of Los Angeles pending a disposition of the merits. It will be time enough to consider the propriety of a permanent injunction when and if the District Court grants such relief. VI The Court’s decision removes an entire class of constitutional violations from the equitable powers of a federal court. It immunizes from prospective equitable relief any policy that authorizes persistent deprivations of constitutional rights as long as no individual can establish with substantial certainty that he will be injured, or injured again, in the future. The Chief Justice asked in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 419 (1971) (dissenting opinion), “what would be the judicial response to a police order authorizing ‘shoot to kill’ with respect to every fugitive”? His answer was that it would be “easy to predict our collective wrath and outrage.” Ibid. We now learn that wrath and outrage cannot be translated into an order to cease the unconstitutional practice, but only an award of damages to those who are victimized by the practice and live to sue and to the survivors of those who are not so fortunate. Under the view expressed by the majority today, if the police adopt a policy of “shoot to kill,” or a policy of shooting 1 out of 10 suspects, the federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its continuation. Cf. Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S., at 621 (White, J., dissenting). The federal judicial power is now limited to levying a toll for such a systematic constitutional violation. 138 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. CONNICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS, LOUISIANA v. MYERS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 81-1251. Argued November 8, 1982—Decided April 20, 1983 Respondent was employed as an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans with the responsibility of trying criminal cases. When petitioner District Attorney proposed to transfer respondent to prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court, she strongly opposed the transfer, expressing her view to several of her supervisors, including petitioner. Shortly thereafter, she prepared a questionnaire that she distributed to the other Assistant District Attorneys in the office concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. Petitioner then informed respondent that she was being terminated for refusal to accept the transfer, and also told her that her distribution of the questionnaire was considered an act of insubordination. Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V), alleging that she was wrongfully discharged because she had exercised her constitutionally protected right of free speech. The District Court agreed, ordered her reinstated, and awarded backpay, damages, and attorney’s fees. Finding that the questionnaire, not the refusal to accept the transfer, was the real reason for respondent’s termination, the court held that the questionnaire involved matters of public concern and that the State had not “clearly demonstrated” that the questionnaire interfered with the operation of the District Attorney’s office. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Respondent’s discharge did not offend the First Amendment. Pp. 142-154. (a) In determining a public employee’s rights of free speech, the problem is to arrive “at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568. P. 142. (b) When a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not CONNICK v. MYERS 139 138 Syllabus the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior. Here, except for the question in respondent’s questionnaire regarding pressure upon employees to work in political campaigns, the questions posed do not fall under the rubric of matters of “public concern.” Pp. 143-149. (c) The District Court erred in imposing an unduly onerous burden on the State to justify respondent’s discharge by requiring it to “clearly demonstrate” that the speech involved “substantially interfered” with the operation of the office. The State’s burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s expression. Pp. 149-150. (d) The limited First Amendment interest involved here did not require petitioner to tolerate action that he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy the close working relationships within the office. The question on the questionnaire regarding the level of confidence in supervisors was a statement that carried the clear potential for undermining office relations. Also, the fact that respondent exercised her rights to speech at the office supports petitioner’s fears that the function of his office was endangered. And the fact that the questionnaire emerged immediately after a dispute between respondent and petitioner and his deputies, requires that additional weight be given to petitioner’s view that respondent threatened his authority to run the office. Pp. 150-154. 654 F. 2d 719, reversed. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 156. William F. Wessel argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Victoria Lennox Bartels. George M. Strickler, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ann Woolhandler and Michael G. Collins.* ♦Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Mark C. Rosenblum, Nadine Strossen, and Charles S. Sims for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. ; and by Robert H. Chanin, Laurence Gold, and Marsha S. Berzon for the National Education Association et al. 140 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In Pickering n. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968), we stated that a public employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment. We also recognized that the State’s interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees “differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Id., at 568. The problem, we thought, was arriving “at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Ibid. We return to this problem today and consider whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the discharge of a state employee for circulating a questionnaire concerning internal office affairs. I The respondent, Sheila Myers, was employed as an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans for five and a half years. She served at the pleasure of petitioner Harry Connick, the District Attorney for Orleans Parish. During this period Myers competently performed her responsibilities of trying criminal cases. In the early part of October 1980, Myers was informed that she would be transferred to prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court. Myers was strongly opposed to the proposed transfer1 and expressed her view to several of her supervisors, including Connick. Despite her objections, on October 6 Myers was notified that she was being trans 1 Myers’ opposition was at least partially attributable to her concern that a conflict of interest would have been created by the transfer because of her participation in a counseling program for convicted defendants released on probation in the section of the criminal court to which she was to be assigned. CONNICK v, MYERS 141 138 Opinion of the Court ferred. Myers again spoke with Dennis Waldron, one of the First Assistant District Attorneys, expressing her reluctance to accept the transfer. A number of other office matters were discussed and Myers later testified that, in response to Waldron’s suggestion that her concerns were not shared by others in the office, she informed him that she would do some research on the matter. That night Myers prepared a questionnaire soliciting the views of her fellow staff members concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.2 Early the following morning, Myers typed and copied the questionnaire. She also met with Connick who urged her to accept the transfer. She said she would “consider” it. Connick then left the office. Myers then distributed the questionnaire to 15 Assistant District Attorneys. Shortly after noon, Dennis Waldron learned that Myers was distributing the survey. He immediately phoned Connick and informed him that Myers was creating a “mini-insurrection” within the office. Connick returned to the office and told Myers that she was being terminated because of her refusal to accept the transfer. She was also told that her distribution of the questionnaire was considered an act of insubordination. Connick particularly objected to the question which inquired whether employees “had confidence in and would rely on the word” of various superiors in the office, and to a question concerning pressure to work in political campaigns which he felt would be damaging if discovered by the press. Myers filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V), contending that her employment was wrongfully terminated because she had exercised her constitutionally protected right of free speech. The District Court agreed, ordered Myers reinstated, and awarded backpay, damages, and The questionnaire is reproduced as an Appendix to this opinion. 142 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. attorney’s fees. 507 F. Supp. 752 (ED La. 1981).3 The District Court found that although Connick informed Myers that she was being fired because of her refusal to accept a transfer, the facts showed that the questionnaire was the real reason for her termination. The court then proceeded to hold that Myers’ questionnaire involved matters of public concern and that the State had not “clearly demonstrated” that the survey “substantially interfered” with the operations of the District Attorney’s office. Connick appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed on the basis of the District Court’s opinion. 654 F. 2d 719 (1981). Connick then sought review in this Court by way of certiorari, which we granted. 455 U. S. 999 (1982). II For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-606 (1967); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507, 515-516 (1980). Our task, as we defined it in Pickering, is to seek “a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” 391 U. S., at 568. The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals as well, misapplied our decision in Pickering and consequently, in our view, erred in striking the balance for respondent. 3 Petitioner has also objected to the assessment of damages as being in violation of the Eleventh Amendment and to the award of attorney’s fees. Because of our disposition of the case, we do not reach these questions. CONNICK v. MYERS 143 138 Opinion of the Court A The District Court got off on the wrong foot in this case by initially finding that, “[tjaken as a whole, the issues presented in the questionnaire relate to the effective functioning of the District Attorney’s Office and are matters of public importance and concern.” 507 F. Supp., at 758. Connick contends at the outset that no balancing of interests is required in this case because Myers’ questionnaire concerned only internal office matters and that such speech is not upon a matter of “public concern,” as the term was used in Pickering. Although we do not agree that Myers’ communication in this case was wholly without First Amendment protection, there is much force to Connick’s submission. The repeated emphasis in Pickering on the right of a public employee “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern,” was not accidental. This language, reiterated in all of Pickering’s progeny,4 reflects both the historical evolvement of the rights of public employees, and the common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.5 For most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights. The classic formulation of this position was that of Justice Holmes, who, when sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, observed: “[A policeman] may have a constitutional 4 See Perry v. Sindennann, 408 U. S. 593, 598 (1972); Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 284 (1977); Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U. S. 410, 414 (1979). B The question of whether expression is of a kind that is of legitimate concern to the public is also the standard in determining whether a commonlaw action for invasion of privacy is present. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975) (action for invasion of privacy cannot be maintained when the subject matter of the publicity is matter of public record); Time, Inc. n. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 387-388 (1967). 144 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N. E. 517, 517 (1892). For many years, Holmes’ epigram expressed this Court’s law. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951); Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396 (1930); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371 (1882). The Court cast new light on the matter in a series of cases arising from the widespread efforts in the 1950’s and early 1960’s to require public employees, particularly teachers, to swear oaths of loyalty to the State and reveal the groups with which they associated. In Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952), the Court held that a State could not require its employees to establish their loyalty by extracting an oath denying past affiliation with Communists. In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 (1961), the Court recognized that the government could not deny employment because of previous membership in a particular party. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 490 (1960); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 (1961). By the time Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), was decided, it was already “too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.” Id., at 404. It was therefore no surprise when in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra, the Court invalidated New York statutes barring employment on the basis of membership in “subversive” organizations, observing that the theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, had been uniformly rejected. Id., at 605-606. In all of these cases, the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes and actions sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate in public CONNICK v. MYERS 145 138 Opinion of the Court affairs. The issue was whether government employees could be prevented or “chilled” by the fear of discharge from joining political parties and other associations that certain public officials might find “subversive.” The explanation for the Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery. The First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times Co, v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269 (1964). “[SJpeech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the “ ‘highest rung of the heirarchy of First Amendment values,’” and is entitled to special protection. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 467 (1980). Pickering n. Board of Education, supra, followed from this understanding of the First Amendment. In Pickering, the Court held impermissible under the First Amendment the dismissal of a high school teacher for openly criticizing the Board of Education on its allocation of school funds between athletics and education and its methods of informing taxpayers about the need for additional revenue. Pickering’s subject was “a matter of legitimate public concern” upon which “free and open debate is vital to informed decisionmaking by the electorate.” 391 U. S. at 571-572. Our cases following Pickering also involved safeguarding speech on matters of public concern. The controversy in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), arose from the failure to rehire a teacher in the state college system who had testified before committees of the Texas Legislature and had become involved in public disagreement over whether the college should be elevated to 4-year status—a change opposed by the Regents. In Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. 146 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), a public school teacher was not rehired because, allegedly, he had relayed to a radio station the substance of a memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance that the school principal had circulated to various teachers. The memorandum was apparently prompted by the view of some in the administration that there was a relationship between teacher appearance and public support for bond issues, and indeed, the radio station promptly announced the adoption of the dress code as a news item. Most recently, in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U. S. 410 (1979), we held that First Amendment protection applies when a public employee arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to express his views publicly. Although the subject matter of Mrs. Givhan’s statements were not the issue before the Court, it is clear that her statements concerning the School District’s allegedly racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of public concern. Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us to conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.6 When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. Perhaps the government employer’s dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unrea 6 See, Clark v. Holmes, 474 F. 2d 928 (CA7 1972), cert, denied, 411 U. S. 972 (1973); Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 558 F. 2d 982, 984 (CAIO 1977). CONNICK v. MYERS 147 138 Opinion of the Court sonable. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, supra: Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 349-350 (1976). We do not suggest, however, that Myers’ speech, even if not touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment. “[T]he First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. ‘Great secular causes, with smaller ones, are guarded.’” Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217, 223 (1967), quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 531 (1945). We in no sense suggest that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Roth v. United States, supra; New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982). For example, an employee’s false criticism of his employer on grounds not of public concern may be cause for his discharge but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel action accorded an identical statement made by a man on the street. We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior. Cf. Bishop n. Wood, supra, at 349-350. Our responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for employee grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the State. Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and con 148 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. text of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.7 In this case, with but one exception, the questions posed by Myers to her co-workers do not fall under the rubric of matters of “public concern.” We view the questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers’ co-workers possess in various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a grievance committee as mere extensions of Myers’ dispute over her transfer to another section of the criminal court. Unlike the dissent, post, at 163, we do not believe these questions are of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected official. Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District Attorney’s Office was not discharging its governmental responsibilities in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of Connick and others. Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo. While discipline and morale in the workplace are related to an agency’s efficient performance of its duties, the focus of Myers’ questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors. These questions reflect one employee’s dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause célèbre.8 7 The inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact. See n. 10, infra. 8 This is not a case like Givhan, where an employee speaks out as a citizen on a matter of general concern, not tied to a personal employment dispute, but arranges to do so privately. Mrs. Givhan’s right to protest racial discrimination—a matter inherently of public concern—is not forfeited by her choice of a private forum. 439 U. S., at 415-416. Here, however, a questionnaire not otherwise of public concern does not attain that status because its subject matter could, in different circumstances, have been the topic of a communication to the public that might be of general interest. The dissent’s analysis of whether discussions of office morale and discipline CONNICK v. MYERS 149 138 Opinion of the Court To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark—and certainly every criticism directed at a public official—would plant the seed of a constitutional case. While as a matter of good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs. One question in Myers’ questionnaire, however, does touch upon a matter of public concern. Question 11 inquires if assistant district attorneys “ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates.” We have recently noted that official pressure upon employees to work for political candidates not of the worker’s own choice constitutes a coercion of belief in violation of fundamental constitutional rights. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S., at 515-516; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976). In addition, there is a demonstrated interest in this country that government service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Public Workers n. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947). Given this history, we believe it apparent that the issue of whether assistant district attorneys are pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to the community upon which it is essential that public employees be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal. B Because one of the questions in Myers’ survey touched upon a matter of public concern and contributed to her discharge, we must determine whether Connick was justified in discharging Myers. Here the District Court again erred in imposing an unduly onerous burden on the State to justify could be matters of public concern is beside the point—it does not answer whether this questionnaire is such speech. 150 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Myers’ discharge. The District Court viewed the issue of whether Myers’ speech was upon a matter of “public concern” as a threshold inquiry, after which it became the government’s burden to “clearly demonstrate” that the speech involved “substantially interfered” with official responsibilities. Yet Pickering unmistakably states, and respondent agrees,9 that the State’s burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s expression. Although such particularized balancing is difficult, the courts must reach the most appropriate possible balance of the competing interests.10 C The Pickering balance requires full consideration of the government’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public. One hundred years ago, the Court noted the government’s legitimate purpose in “pro- 9 See Brief for Respondent 9 (“These factors, including the degree of the ‘importance’ of plaintiff’s speech, were proper considerations to be weighed in the Pickering balance”); Tr. of Oral Arg. 30 (counsel for respondent) (“I certainly would not disagree that the content of the questionnaire, whether it affects a matter of great public concern or only a very narrow internal matter, is a relevant circumstance to be weighed in the Pickering analysis”). 10 “The Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority to determine the meaning and application of those words of that instrument which require interpretation to resolve judicial issues. With that responsibility, we are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they [are] made to see whether or not they . . . are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.” Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335 (1946) (footnote omitted). Because of this obligation, we cannot “avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 190 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, J.). See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229, 235 (1963); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 285 (1964); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 915-916, n. 50 (1982). CONNICK v. MYERS 151 138 Opinion of the Court mot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and [in] maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service.” Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S., at 373. As Justice Powell explained in his separate opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168 (1974): “To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency.” We agree with the District Court that there is no demonstration here that the questionnaire impeded Myers’ ability to perform her responsibilities. The District Court was also correct to recognize that “it is important to the efficient and successful operation of the District Attorney’s office for Assistants to maintain close working relationships with their superiors.” 507 F. Supp., at 759. Connick’s judgment, and apparently also that of his first assistant Dennis Waldron, who characterized Myers’ actions as causing a “mini-insurrection,” was that Myers’ questionnaire was an act of insubordination which interfered with working relationships.11 When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public 11 Waldron testified that from what he had learned of the events on October 7, Myers “was trying to stir up other people not to accept the changes [transfers] that had been made on the memorandum and that were to be implemented.” App. 167. In his view, the questionnaire was a “final act of defiance” and that, as a result of Myers’ action, “there were going to be some severe problems about the changes.” Ibid. Connick testified that he reached a similar conclusion after conducting his own investigation. “After I satisfied myself that not only wasn’t she accepting the transfer, but that she was affirmatively opposing it and disrupting the routine of the office by this questionnaire. I called her in. . . [and dismissed her].” Id., at 130. 152 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disru’ .tion of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.12 We caution that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially involved matters of public concern. The District Court rejected Connick’s position because “[u]nlike a statement of fact which might be deemed critical of one’s superiors, [Myers’] questionnaire was not a statement of fact but the presentation and solicitation of ideas and opinions,” which are entitled to greater constitutional protection because “ ‘under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.’” Ibid. This approach, while perhaps relevant in weighing the value of Myers’ speech, bears no logical relationship to the issue of whether the questionnaire undermined office relationships. Questions, no less than forcefully stated opinions and facts, carry messages and it requires no unusual insight to conclude that the purpose, if not the likely result, of the questionnaire is to seek to precipitate a vote of no confidence in Connick and his supervisors. Thus, Question 10, which asked whether or not the Assistants had confidence in and relieu on the word of five named supervisors, is a statement that carries the clear potential for undermining office relations. Also relevant is the manner, time, and place in which the questionnaire was distributed. As noted in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U. S., at 415, n. 4: “Private expression . . . may in some situations bring addi 12 Cf. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 52, n. 12 (1983) (proof of future disruption not necessary to justify denial of access to nonpublic forum on grounds that the proposed use may disrupt the property’s intended function); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976) (same). CONNICK v. MYERS 153 138 Opinion of the Court tional factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered.” Here the questionnaire was prepared and distributed at the office; the manner of distribution required not only Myers to leave her work but others to do the same in order that the questionnaire be completed.13 Although some latitude in when official work is performed is to be allowed when professional employees are involved, and Myers did not violate announced office policy,14 the fact that Myers, unlike Pickering, exercised her rights to speech at the office supports Connick’s fears that the functioning of his office was endangered. Finally, the context in which the dispute arose is also significant. This is not a case where an employee, out of purely academic interest, circulated a questionnaire so as to obtain useful research. Myers acknowledges that it is no coincidence that the questionnaire followed upon the heels of the transfer notice. When employee speech concerning office policy arises from an employment dispute concerning the very application of that policy to the speaker, additional weight must be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office. Although we accept the District Court’s factual finding that Myers’ reluctance to accede to the transfer order was not a sufficient cause in itself for her dismissal, and thus does not constitute a sufficient defense under Mt. Healthy 13 The record indicates that some, though not all, of the copies of the questionnaire were distributed during lunch. Employee speech which transpires entirely on the employee’s own time, and in nonwork areas of the office, bring different factors into the Pickering calculus, and might lead to a different conclusion. Cf. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U. S. 322 (1974). 14 The violation of such a rule would strengthen Connick’s position. See Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S., at 284. 154 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), this does not render irrelevant the fact that the questionnaire emerged after a persistent dispute between Myers and Connick and his deputies over office transfer policy. Ill Myers’ questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense; her survey, in our view, is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy. The limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require that Connick tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships. Myers’ discharge therefore did not offend the First Amendment. We reiterate, however, the caveat we expressed in Pickering, 391 U. S., at 569: “Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by . . . public employees may be thought by their superiors . . . to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged.” Our holding today is grounded in our longstanding recognition that the First Amendment’s primary aim is the full protection of speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities involved in the administration of a government office. Although today the balance is struck for the government, this is no defeat for the First Amendment. For it would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the great principles of free expression if the Amendment’s safeguarding of a public employee’s right, as a citizen, to participate in discussions concerning public affairs were confused with the attempt to constitutionalize the employee grievance that we see presented here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. CONNICK v. MYERS 155 138 Appendix to opinion of the Court APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Questionnaire distributed by respondent on October 7, 1980. PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 2, App. 191 “PLEASE TAKE THE FEW MINUTES IT WILL REQUIRE TO FILL THIS OUT. YOU CAN FREELY EXPRESS YOUR OPINION WITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED. 1. How long have you been in the Office? 2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?_____ 3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] you discussed with you by any superior prior to the notice of them being posted? ________________________________________ 4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have been? ________________________________________________ 5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding transfers has been fair? 6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the office? 7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overall working performance of A.D.A. personnel? 8. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] office morale?_ 9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments through rumor? _______________________________ 10. Do you have confidence in and would you rely on the word of: Bridget Bane___________________________ Fred Harper ___________________________ Lindsay Larson_________________________ Joe Meyer______________________________ Dennis Waldron ________________________ 11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates? ------------ 12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile addition to the office structure? -------------- 156 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., dissenting 461 U. S. 13. How would you rate office morale? 14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have. _________________________________________________ THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY.” Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join, dissenting. Sheila Myers was discharged for circulating a questionnaire to her fellow Assistant District Attorneys seeking information about the effect of petitioner’s personnel policies on employee morale and the overall work performance of the District Attorney’s Office. The Court concludes that her dismissal does not violate the First Amendment, primarily because the questionnaire addresses matters that, in the Court’s view, are not of public concern. It is hornbook law, however, that speech about “the manner in which government is operated or should be operated” is an essential part of the communications necessary for self-governance the protection of which was a central purpose of the First Amendment. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966). Because the questionnaire addressed such matters and its distribution did not adversely affect the operations of the District Attorney’s Office or interfere with Myers’ working relationship with her fellow employees, I dissent. I The Court correctly reaffirms the long-established principle that the government may not constitutionally compel persons to relinquish their First Amendment rights as a condition of public employment. E. g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-606 (1967); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). Pickering held that the First Amendment protects the rights of public employees “as citizens to comment on matters of public interest” in connection with the operation of the government agencies for which they work. 391 U. S., at 568. We recognized, however, that the CONNICK v. MYERS 157 138 Brennan, J., dissenting government has legitimate interests in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from its interests in regulating the speech of people generally. Ibid. We therefore held that the scope of public employees’ First Amendment rights must be determined by balancing “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Ibid. The balancing test articulated in Pickering comes into play only when a public employee’s speech implicates the government’s interests as an employer. When public employees engage in expression unrelated to their employment while away from the workplace, their First Amendment rights are, of course, no different from those of the general public. See id., at 574. Thus, whether a public employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern is relevant to the constitutional inquiry only when the statements at issue—by virtue of their content or the context in which they were made— may have an adverse impact on the government’s ability to perform its duties efficiently.1 The Court’s decision today is flawed in three respects. First, the Court distorts the balancing analysis required under Pickering by suggesting that one factor, the context in which a statement is made, is to be weighed twice—first in 1 Although the Court’s opinion states that “if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge,” ante, at 146 (footnote omitted), I do not understand it to imply that a governmental employee’s First Amendment rights outside the employment context are limited to speech on matters of public concern. To the extent that the Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that the dismissal of a public employee for speech unrelated to a subject of public interest does not implicate First Amendment interests, I disagree, because our cases establish that public employees enjoy the full range of First Amendment rights guaranteed to members of the general public. Under the balancing test articulated in Pickering, however, the government’s burden to justify such a dismissal may be lighter. See n. 4, infra. 158 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., dissenting 461 U. S. determining whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern and then in deciding whether the statement adversely affected the government’s interest as an employer. See ante, at 147-148, 152-153. Second, in concluding that the effect of respondent’s personnel policies on employee morale and the work performance of the District Attorney’s Office is not a matter of public concern, the Court impermissibly narrows the class of subjects on which public employees may speak out without fear of retaliatory dismissal. See ante, at 148-149. Third, the Court misapplies the Pickering balancing test in holding that Myers could constitutionally be dismissed for circulating a questionnaire addressed to at least one subject that was “a matter of interest to the community,” ante, at 149, in the absence of evidence that her conduct disrupted the efficient functioning of the District Attorney’s Office. II The District Court summarized the contents of respondent’s questionnaire as follows: “Plaintiff solicited the views of her fellow Assistant District Attorneys on a number of issues, including office transfer policies and the manner in which information of that nature was communicated within the office. The questionnaire also sought to determine the views of Assistants regarding office morale, the need for a grievance committee, and the level of confidence felt by the Assistants for their supervisors. Finally, the questionnaire inquired as to whether the Assistants felt pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office-supported candidates.” 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 (ED La. 1981). After reviewing the evidence, the District Court found that “[t]aken as a whole, the issues presented in the questionnaire relate to the effective functioning of the District Attorney’s Office and are matters of public importance and concern.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of CONNICK v. MYERS 159 138 Brennan, J., dissenting the District Court’s findings and conclusions. 654 F. 2d 719 (CA5 1981). The Court nonetheless concludes that Myers’ questions about the effect of petitioner’s personnel policies on employee morale and overall work performance are not “of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected official.” Ante, at 148. In so doing, it announces the following standard: “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement . . . .” Ante, at 147-148. The standard announced by the Court suggests that the manner and context in which a statement is made must be weighed on both sides of the Pickering balance. It is beyond dispute that how and where a public employee expresses his views are relevant in the second half of the Pickering inquiry—determining whether the employee’s speech adversely affects the government’s interests as an employer. The Court explicitly acknowledged this in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U. S. 410 (1979), where we stated that when a public employee speaks privately to a supervisor, “the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the . . . message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered.” Id., at 415, n. 4. But the fact that a public employee has chosen to express his views in private has nothing whatsoever to do with the first half of the Pickering calculus—whether those views relate to a matter of public concern. This conclusion is implicit in Givharis holding that the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is not “lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.” 439 U. S., at 415-416. The Court seeks to distinguish Givhan on the ground that speech protesting racial discrimination is “inherently of public concern.” Ante, at 148, n. 8. In so doing, it suggests that there are two classes of speech of public concern: statements “of public import” because of their content, form, and con 160 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., dissenting 461 U. S. text, and statements that, by virtue of their subject matter, are “inherently of public concern.” In my view, however, whether a particular statement by a public employee is addressed to a subject of public concern does not depend on where it was said or why. The First Amendment affords special protection to speech that may inform public debate about how our society is to be governed—regardless of whether it actually becomes the subject of a public controversy.2 “[SJpeech concerning public affairs is more than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government. ” Garrison v. 2 Although the parties offered no evidence on whether the subjects addressed by the questionnaire were, in fact, matters of public concern, extensive local press coverage shows that the issues involved are of interest to the people of Orleans Parish. Shortly after the District Court took the case under advisement, a major daily newspaper in New Orleans carried a 7-paragraph story describing the questionnaire, the events leading to Myers’ dismissal, and the filing of this action. The Times-Picayune/The States-Item, Dec. 6, 1980, section 1, p. 21, col. 1. The same newspaper also carried a 16-paragraph story when the District Court ruled in Myers’ favor, Feb. 11, 1981, section 1, p. 15, col. 2; a 14-paragraph story when the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision, July 28, 1981, section 1, p. 11, col. 1; a 12-paragraph story when this Court granted Connick’s petition for certiorari, Mar. 9,1982, section 1, p. 15, col. 5.; and a 17-paragraph story when we heard oral argument, Nov. 9, 1982, section 1, p. 13, col. 5. In addition, matters affecting the internal operations of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office often receive extensive coverage in the same newspaper. For example, The Times-Picayune/The States-Item carried a lengthy story reporting that the agency moved to “plush new offices,” and describing in detail the “privacy problem” faced by Assistant District Attorneys because the office was unable to obtain modular furniture with which to partition its new space. Jan. 25,1981, section 8, p. 13, col. 1. It also carried a 16-paragraph story when a committee of the Louisiana State Senate voted to prohibit petitioner from retaining a public relations specialist. July 9, 1982, section 1, p. 14, col. 1. In light of the public’s interest in the operations of the District Attorney’s Office in general, and in the dispute between the parties in particular, it is quite possible that, contrary to the Court’s view, ante, at 148-149, Myers’ comments concerning morale and working conditions in the office would actually have engaged the public’s attention had she stated them publicly. CONNICK v. MYERS 161 138 Brennan, J., dissenting Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.” Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931). We have long recognized that one of the central purposes of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression is to protect the dissemination of information on the basis of which members of our society may make reasoned decisions about the government. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S., at 218-219; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269-270 (1964). See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 22-27 (1948). “No aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own destiny.” Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). Unconstrained discussion concerning the manner in which the government performs its duties is an essential element of the public discourse necessary to informed self-government. “Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.” Mills v. Alabama, supra, at 218-219 (emphasis added). Moreover, as a general matter, the media frequently carry news stories reporting that personnel policies in effect at a government agency have resulted in declining employee morale and deteriorating agency performance. 162 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., dissenting 461 U. S. The constitutionally protected right to speak out on governmental affairs would be meaningless if it did not extend to statements expressing criticism of governmental officials. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, we held that the Constitution prohibits an award of damages in a libel action brought by a public official for criticism of his official conduct absent a showing that the false statements at issue were made with “‘actual malice.’” 376 U. S., at 279-280. We stated there that the First Amendment expresses “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” Id., at 270. See Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, at 76. In Pickering we held that the First Amendment affords similar protection to critical statements by a public school teacher directed at the Board of Education for whom he worked. 391 U. S., at 574. In so doing, we recognized that “free and open debate” about the operation of public schools “is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate.” Id., at 571-572. We also acknowledged the importance of allowing teachers to speak out on school matters. “Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.” Id., at 572. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 228 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing “[t]he importance of Government employees’ being assured of their right to freely comment on the conduct of Government, to inform the public of abuses of power and of the misconduct of their superiors . . .”). CONNICK v. MYERS 163 138 Brennan, J., dissenting Applying these principles, I would hold that Myers’ questionnaire addressed matters of public concern because it discussed subjects that could reasonably be expected to be of interest to persons seeking to develop informed opinions about the manner in which the Orleans Parish District Attorney, an elected official charged with managing a vital governmental agency, discharges his responsibilities. The questionnaire sought primarily to obtain information about the impact of the recent transfers on morale in the District Attorney’s Office. It is beyond doubt that personnel decisions that adversely affect discipline and morale may ultimately impair an agency’s efficient performance of its duties. See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 168 (opinion of Powell, J.). Because I believe the First Amendment protects the right of public employees to discuss such matters so that the public may be better informed about how their elected officials fulfill their responsibilities, I would affirm the District Court’s conclusion that the questionnaire related to matters of public importance and concern. The Court’s adoption of a far narrower conception of what subjects are of public concern seems prompted by its fears that a broader view “would mean that virtually every remark—and certainly every criticism directed at a public official—would plant the seed of a constitutional case.” Ante, at 149. Obviously, not every remark directed at a public official by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment.3 But deciding whether a particular matter is of public concern is an inquiry that, by its very nature, is a sensitive one forjudges charged with interpreting a constitutional provision intended to put “the decision as to what views shall be 3 Perhaps the simplest example of a statement by a public employee that would not be protected by the First Amendment would be answering “No” to a request that the employee perform a lawful task within the scope of his duties. Although such a refusal is “speech,” which implicates First Amendment interests, it is also insubordination, and as such it may serve as the basis for a lawful dismissal. 164 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., dissenting 461 U. S. voiced largely into the hands of each of us . . . .” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971).4 The Court recognized the sensitive nature of this determination in Gertz n. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), which held that the scope of the constitutional privilege in defamation cases turns on whether or not the plaintiff is a public figure, not on whether the statements at issue address a subject of public concern. In so doing, the Court referred to the “difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’ and which do not,” and expressed “doubt [about] the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of judges.” Id., at 346. See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In making such a delicate inquiry, we must bear in mind that “the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business.” Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 495 (1975). The Court’s decision ignores these precepts. Based on its own narrow conception of which matters are of public concern, the Court implicitly determines that information con- 4 Indeed, it has been suggested that “a classification that bases the right to First Amendment protection on some estimate of how much general interest there is in the communication is surely in conflict with the whole idea of the First Amendment.” T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 554 (1970). The degree to which speech is of interest to the public may be relevant in determining whether a public employer may constitutionally be required to tolerate some degree of disruption resulting from its utterance. See ante, at 152. In general, however, whether a government employee’s speech is of “public concern” must be determined by reference to the broad conception of the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech found necessary by the Framers “to supply the public need for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times. . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940) (footnote omitted). See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 388 (1962). CONNICK v. MYERS 165 138 Brennan, J., dissenting ceming employee morale at an important government office will not inform public debate. To the contrary, the First Amendment protects the dissemination of such information so that the people, not the courts, may evaluate its usefulness. The proper means to ensure that the courts are not swamped with routine employee grievances mischaracterized as First Amendment cases is not to restrict artificially the concept of “public concern,” but to require that adequate weight be given to the public’s important interests in the efficient performance of governmental functions and in preserving employee discipline and harmony sufficient to achieve that end. See Part III, infra.5 5 The Court’s narrow conception of which matters are of public interest is also inconsistent with the broad view of that concept articulated in our cases dealing with the constitutional limits on liability for invasion of privacy. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), we held that a defendant may not constitutionally be held liable for an invasion of privacy resulting from the publication of a false or misleading report of “matters of public interest” in the absence of proof that the report was published with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for its truth. Id., at 389-391. In that action, Hill had sought damages resulting from the publication of an allegedly false report that a new play portrayed the experience of him and his family when they were held hostage in their home in a publicized incident years earlier. We entertained “no doubt that . . . the opening of a new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest.” Id., at 388. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975) (holding that a radio station could not constitutionally be held liable for broadcasting the name of a rape victim, because the victim’s name was contained in public records). Our discussion in Time, Inc. v. Hill of the breadth of the First Amendment’s protections is directly relevant here: “The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials. . . . ‘Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.’ Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102. ‘No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press bears 166 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Ill Although the Court finds most of Myers’ questionnaire unrelated to matters of public interest, it does hold that one question—asking whether Assistants felt pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office-supported candidates—addressed a matter of public importance and concern. The Court also recognizes that this determination of public interest must weigh heavily in the balancing of competing interests required by Pickering. Having gone that far, however, the Court misapplies the Pickering test and holds— against our previous authorities—that a public employer’s mere apprehension that speech will be disruptive justifies suppression of that speech when all the objective evidence suggests that those fears are essentially unfounded. Pickering recognized the difficulty of articulating “a general standard against which all . . . statements may be judged,” 391 U. S., at 569; it did, however, identify a number of factors that may affect the balance in particular cases. Those relevant here áre whether the statements are directed to persons with whom the speaker “would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work”; whether they had an adverse effect on “discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers”; whether the employment relationship in question is “the kind ... for which it can per an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression.’ Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 269.” 385 U. S., at 388. The quoted passage makes clear that, contrary to the Court’s view, ante, at 143, n. 5, the subjects touched upon in respondent’s questionnaire fall within the broad conception of “matters of public interest” that defines the scope of the constitutional privilege in invasion of privacy cases. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, Comment j (1977): “The scope of a matter of legitimate concern to the public is not limited to ‘news,’ in the sense of reports of current events or activities. It extends also to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.” CONNICK v. MYERS 167 138 Brennan, J., dissenting suasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning”; and whether the statements “have in any way either impeded [the employee’s] proper performance of his daily duties . . . or . . . interfered with the regular operation of the [office].” Id., at 568-573. In addition, in Givhan, we recognized that when the statements in question are made in private to an employee’s immediate supervisor, “the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the . . . message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered.” 439 U. S., at 415, n. 4. See supra, at 159. The District Court weighed all of the relevant factors identified by our cases. It found that petitioner failed to establish that Myers violated either a duty of confidentiality or an office policy. 507 F. Supp., at 758-759. Noting that most of the copies of the questionnaire were distributed during lunch, it rejected the contention that the distribution of the questionnaire impeded Myers’ performance of her duties, and it concluded that “Connick has not shown any evidence to indicate that the plaintiff’s work performance was adversely affected by her expression.” Id., at 754-755, 759 (emphasis supplied). The Court accepts all of these findings. See ante, at 151. It concludes, however, that the District Court failed to give adequate weight to the context in which the questionnaire was distributed and to the need to maintain close working relationships in the District Attorney’s Office. In particular, the Court suggests the District Court failed to give sufficient weight to the disruptive potential of Question 10, which asked whether the Assistants had confidence in the word of five named supervisors. Ante, at 152. The District Court, however, explicitly recognized that this was petitioner’s “most forceful argument”; but after hearing the testimony of four of the five supervisors named in the question, it found that the question had no adverse effect on Myers’ relationship with her superiors. 507 F. Supp., at 759. 168 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., dissenting 461 U. S. To this the Court responds that an employer need not wait until the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action. In the face of the District Court’s finding that the circulation of the questionnaire had no disruptive effect, the Court holds that respondent may be dismissed because petitioner “reasonably believed [the action] would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships.” Ante, at 154. Even though the District Court found that the distribution of the questionnaire did not impair Myers’ working relationship with her supervisors, the Court bows to petitioner’s judgment because “[w]hen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.” Ante, at 151-152. Such extreme deference to the employer’s judgment is not appropriate when public employees voice critical views concerning the operations of the agency for which they work. Although an employer’s determination that an employee’s statements have undermined essential working relationships must be carefully weighed in the Pickering balance, we must bear in mind that “the threat of dismissal from public employment is ... a potent means of inhibiting speech.” Pickering, 391 U. S., at 574. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S., at 604. If the employer’s judgment is to be controlling, public employees will not speak out when what they have to say is critical of their supervisors. In order to protect public employees’ First Amendment right to voice critical views on issues of public importance, the courts must make their own appraisal of the effects of the speech in question. In this regard, our decision in Tinker n. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969), is controlling. Tinker arose in a public school, a context similar to the one in which the present case arose in that the determination of the scope of the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech required consideration of the “special CONNICK v. MYERS 16Ô 138 Brennan, J., dissenting characteristics of the . . . environment” in which the expression took place. See id., at 506. At issue was whether public high school students could constitutionally be prohibited from wearing black armbands in school to express their opposition to the Vietnam conflict. The District Court had ruled that such a ban “was reasonable because it was based upon [school officials’] fear of a disturbance from the wearing of armbands.” Id., at 508. We found that justification inadequate, because “in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Ibid. We concluded: “In order for the State ... to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school/ the prohibition cannot be sustained.” Id., at 509 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Bumside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744, 749 (CA5 1966)). Because the speech at issue addressed matters of public importance, a similar standard should be applied here. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court found that “it cannot be said that the defendant’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services performed through his employees was either adversely affected or substantially impeded by plaintiff’s distribution of the questionnaire.” 507 F. Supp., at 759. Based on these findings the District Court concluded that the circulation of the questionnaire was protected by the First Amendment. The District Court applied the proper legal standard and reached an acceptable accommodation between the competing interests. I would affirm its decision and the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 170 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Brennan, J., dissenting 461 U. S. IV The Court’s decision today inevitably will deter public employees from making critical statements about the manner in which government agencies are operated for fear that doing so will provoke their dismissal. As a result, the public will be deprived of valuable information with which to evaluate the performance of elected officials. Because protecting the dissemination of such information is an essential function of the First Amendment, I dissent. UNITED STATES v. GRACE 171 Syllabus UNITED STATES ET AL. v. GRACE ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 81-1863. Argued January 18, 1983—Decided April 20, 1983 Title 40 U. S. C. § 13k prohibits the “display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement” in the United States Supreme Court building or on its grounds, which are defined to include the public sidewalks constituting the outer boundaries of the grounds. One appellee was threatened with arrest by Court police officers for violation of the statute when he distributed leaflets concerning various causes on the sidewalk in front of the Court. The other appellee was similarly threatened with arrest for displaying on the sidewalk a picket sign containing the text of the First Amendment. Appellees then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking an injunction against enforcement of § 13k and a declaratory judgment that it was unconstitutional on its face. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals, after determining that such dismissal was erroneous, struck down § 13k on its face as an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment rights in a public place. Held: Section 13k, as applied to the public sidewalks surrounding the Court building, is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Pp. 175-184. (a) The conduct of each appellee falls into the statutory ban, and hence it is proper to reach the constitutional question involved. Pp. 175-176. (b) As a general matter, peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving “speech” protected by the First Amendment. “Public places,” such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, are considered, without more, to be “public forums.” In such places, the Government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, but additional restrictions, such as an absolute prohibition of a particular type of expression, will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. Pp. 176-178. (c) The Court grounds are not transformed into “public forum” property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds at practically all times and is admitted to the building during specified hours. But where the sidewalks forming the perimeter of the grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, 172 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. D. C., they should not be treated any differently and thus are public forums for First Amendment purposes. Pp. 178-180. (d) Insofar as it totally bans specified communicative activity on the public sidewalks around the Court grounds, § 13k cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction. A total ban on carrying a flag, banner, or device on the public sidewalks does not substantially serve the purposes of the statute of which § 13k is a part to provide for the maintenance of law and order on the Court grounds. Nor do § 13k’s prohibitions here at issue sufficiently serve the averred purpose of protecting the Court from outside influence or preventing it from appearing to the public that the Court is subject to such influence or that picketing or marching is an acceptable way of influencing the Court, where, as noted, the public sidewalks surrounding the Court grounds are no different than other public sidewalks in the city. Pp. 180-183. 214 U. S. App. D. C. 375, 665 F. 2d 1193, affirmed in part and vacated in part. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., post, p. 184, and Stevens, J., post, p. 188, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, David A. Strauss, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Marc Richman. Sebastian K. D. Graber argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Norman A. Townsend and Bradley S. Stetler.* Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we must determine whether 40 U. S. C. § 13k, which prohibits, among other things, the “display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into pub *A. Stephen Hut, Jr., Arthur B. Spitzer, and Charles S. Sims filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Robert L. Gnaizda and Sidney M. Wolinsky filed a brief for the League of United Latin American Citizens as amicus curiae. UNITED STATES v. GRACE 173 171 Opinion of the Court lie notice any party, organization, or movement”1 in the United States Supreme Court building and on its grounds, violates the First Amendment. I In May 1978 appellee Thaddeus Zywicki, standing on the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building, distributed leaflets to passersby. The leaflets were reprints of a letter to the editor of the Washington Post from a United States Senator concerning the removal of unfit judges from the bench. A Supreme Court police officer approached Zywicki and told him, accurately, that Title 40 of the United States Code prohibited the distribution of leaflets on the Supreme Court grounds, which includes the sidewalk. Zywicki left. In January 1980 Zywicki again visited the sidewalk in front of the Court to distribute pamphlets containing information about forthcoming meetings and events concerning “the oppressed peoples of Central America.” Zywicki again was approached by a Court police officer and was informed that the distribution of leaflets on the Court grounds was prohibited by law. The officer indicated that Zywicki would be arrested if the leafletting continued. Zywicki left. Zywicki reappeared in February 1980 on the sidewalk in front of the Court and distributed handbills concerning oppression in Guatemala. Zywicki had consulted with an attorney concerning the legality of his activities and had been informed that the Superior Court for the District of Columbia had construed the statute that prohibited leafletting, 40 U. S. C. § 13k, to prohibit only conduct done with the specific intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the administration of 1 The provision at issue in this case is part of a statutory scheme enacted in 1949 to govern the protection, care, and policing of the Supreme Court grounds. In its entirety § 13k provides: “It shall be unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” 63 Stat. 617. 174 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. justice.2 Zywicki again was told by a Court police officer that he would be subject to arrest if he persisted in his leafletting. Zywicki complained that he was being denied a right that others were granted, referring to the newspaper vending machines located on the sidewalk. Nonetheless, Zywicki left the grounds. Around noon on March 17, 1980, appellee Mary Grace entered upon the sidewalk in front of the Court and began to display a four foot by two and a half foot sign on which was inscribed the verbatim text of the First Amendment. A Court police officer approached Grace and informed her that she would have to go across the street if she wished to display the sign. Grace was informed that Title 40 of the United States Code prohibited her conduct and that if she did not cease she would be arrested. Grace left the grounds. On May 13, 1980, Zywicki and Grace filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They sought an injunction against continued enforcement of 40 U. S. C. § 13k and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. On August 7, 1980, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.3 Appellees took an appeal, arguing that the District Court’s action was improper and that the Court of Appeals should grant the relief requested in the complaint. The Court of Appeals determined that the District Court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was erroneous and went on to strike down § 13k on its face as an unconstitutional restriction on First Amendment rights in a 2 The case Zywicki’s counsel referred to is United States v. Ebner, No. M-12487-79 (D. C. Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1980). The case is currently on appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals; that court has postponed decision pending the outcome of the present appeal. 3 Grace v. Burger, 524 F. Supp. 815 (1980). UNITED STATES v. GRACE 175 171 Opinion of the Court public place.4 Grace n. Burger, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 375, 665 F. 2d 1193 (1981). The Government appealed from the Court of Appeals’ judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982). II Section 13k prohibits two distinct activities: it is unlawful either “to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds,” or “to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” Each appellee appeared individually on the public sidewalks to engage in expressive activity, and it goes without saying that the threat of arrest to which each appellee was subjected was for violating the prohibition against the display of a “banner or device.” Accordingly, our review is limited to the latter portion of the statute.5 6 Likewise, the controversy presented by appellees concerned their right to use the public sidewalks surrounding the Court building for the communicative activities they sought to carry out, and we shall address only whether the proscriptions of § 13k are constitutional as applied to the public sidewalks. Our normal course is first to “ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitu 4 The court justified its action in this regard by relying primarily on the fact that the case presented a pure question of law that had been fully briefed and argued by the parties both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals. Because the appellants do not take issue with the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ action in addressing the merits rather than remanding to the District Court, we will assume that such action was proper without deciding that question. Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976). 6 Although the Court of Appeals opinion purports to hold § 13k unconstitutional on its face without any indication that the holding is limited to that portion of the statute that deals with the display of a “flag, banner, or device,” the decision must be read as limited to that prohibition. 176 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. tional] question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Appellees did not make a statutory construction argument before the lower courts, but at oral argument, the question was raised whether § 13k reached the types of conduct in which appellees engaged, and we should answer it. We agree with the United States that the statute covers the particular conduct of Zywicki or Grace and that it is therefore proper to reach the constitutional question involved in this case. The statutory ban is on the display of a “flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” 40 U. S. C. § 13k. It is undisputed that Grace’s picket sign containing the text of the First Amendment falls within the description of a “flag, banner, or device.” Although it is less obvious, it is equally uncontested that Zywicki’s leaflets fall within the proscription as well. We also accept the Government’s contention, not contested by appellees, that almost any sign or leaflet carrying a communication, including Grace’s picket sign and Zywicki’s leaflets, would be “designed or adapted to bring into public notice [a] party, organization or movement.” Such a construction brings some certainty to the reach of the statute and hence avoids what might be other challenges to its validity. Ill The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .. ..”® There is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving “speech” protected by the First Amendment. E. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 6 The First Amendment provides in full: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” UNITED STATES v. GRACE 177 171 Opinion of the Court U. S. 455, 460 (1980); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. Ill, 112 (1969); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939). It is also true that “public places” historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be “public forums.” See Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983); Carey v. Brown, supra, at 460; Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 515 (1976); Cox n. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574 (1941); Hague n. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939). In such places, the government’s ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Perry Education Assn., supra, at 45. See, e. g., Heffron n. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647, 654 (1981); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 115 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965) (Cox II). Additional restrictions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. See, e. g., Perry Education Assn., supra, at 46; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). Publicly owned or operated property does not become a “public forum” simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at will. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 836 (1976). Although whether the property has been “generally opened to the public” is a factor to consider in determining whether the government has opened its property to the use of the people for communicative purposes, it is not determinative of the question. We have regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish “to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so when 178 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. ever and however and wherever they please.” Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966). See, e. g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554-555 (1965) (Cox I); Cox II, supra, at 563-564. There is little doubt that in some circumstances the government may ban the entry on to public property that is not a “public forum” of all persons except those who have legitimate business on the premises. The government, “no less than a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Adderley v. Florida, supra, at 47. See Cox II, supra, at 563-564. IV It is argued that the Supreme Court building and grounds fit neatly within the description of nonpublic forum property. Although the property is publicly owned, it has not been traditionally held open for the use of the public for expressive activities. As Greer v. Spock, supra, teaches, the property is not transformed into “public forum” property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter and leave the grounds at practically all times and the public is admitted to the building during specified hours.7 Under this view it would be necessary only to determine that the restrictions imposed by § 13k are reasonable in light of the use to which the building and grounds are dedicated and that there is no discrimination on the basis of content. We need not make that judgment at this time, however, because § 13k covers the public sidewalks as well as the building and grounds in 7 The limitation on the hours during which the public is permitted in the Supreme Court building is the only regulation promulgated under 40 U. S. C. § 13Z. The regulation provides: “The Supreme Court Building at 1 First Street, N. E., Washington, D. C. 20543, is open to the public Monday through Friday, from 9 a. m. to 4:30 p. m., except on Federal holidays. The building is closed at all other times, although persons having legitimate business may be admitted at other times when so authorized by responsible officials.” UNITED STATES v. GRACE 179 171 Opinion of the Court side the sidewalks. As will become evident, we hold that § 13k may not be applied to the public sidewalks. The prohibitions imposed by § 13k technically cover the entire grounds of the Supreme Court as defined in 40 U. S. C. § 13p.8 That section describes the Court grounds as extending to the curb of each of the four streets enclosing the block on which the building is located. Included within this small geographical area, therefore, are not only the building, the plaza and surrounding promenade, lawn area, and steps, but also the sidewalks. The sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the Court grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D. C., and we can discern no reason why they should be treated any differently.9 Sidewalks, of course, are among those areas of public property that traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be public forum property. In this respect, the present case differs from Greer v. Spock, supra. In Greer, the streets and sidewalks at issue were located within an enclosed military reservation, Fort Dix, N. J., and were thus separated from the streets and sidewalks of any municipality. That is not true of the sidewalks surrounding 8 Section 13p provides: “For the purposes of sections 13f to 13p of this title the Supreme Court grounds shall be held to extend to the line of the face of the east curb of First Street Northeast, between Maryland Avenue Northeast and East Capitol Street; to the line of the face of the south curb of Maryland Avenue Northeast, between First Street Northeast and Second Street Northeast; to the line of the face of the west curb of Second Street Northeast, between Maryland Avenue Northeast and East Capitol Street; and to the line of the face of the north curb of East Capitol Street between First Street Northeast and Second Street Northeast.” 9 Because the prohibitions of § 13k are expressly made applicable to the entire grounds under § 13p, the statute cannot be construed to exclude the sidewalks. Thus we must consider Congress’ extension of § 13k’s prohibitions to the sidewalks to be a reasoned choice. 180 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. the Court. There is no separation, no fence, and no indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of the Court grounds that they have entered some special type of enclave. In United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 133 (1981), we stated that “Congress . . . may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the ‘public forum’ status of streets and parks which have historically been public forums . . . .” The inclusion of the public sidewalks within the scope of § 13k’s prohibition, however, results in the destruction of public forum status that is at least presumptively impermissible. Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection and will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property. The public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds, in our view, are public forums and should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes. V The Government submits that § 13k qualifies as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction which may be imposed to restrict communicative activities on public forum property such as sidewalks. The argument is that the inquiry should not be confined to the Supreme Court grounds but should focus on “the vicinity of the Supreme Court” or “the public places of Washington, D. C.” Brief for Appellants 16, n. 5. Viewed in this light, the Government contends that there are sufficient alternative areas within the relevant forum, such as the streets around the Court or the sidewalks across those streets to permit § 13k to be considered a reasonable “place” restriction having only a minimal UNITED STATES v. GRACE 181 171 Opinion of the Court impact on expressive activity. We are convinced, however, that the section, which totally bans the specified communicative activity on the public sidewalks around the Court grounds,10 cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction primarily because it has an insufficient nexus with any of the public interests that may be thought to undergird §13k. Our reasons for this conclusion will become apparent below, where we decide that § 13k, insofar as its prohibitions reach to the public sidewalks, is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently serve those public interests that are urged as its justification. Section 13k was part of an 11-section statute, enacted in 1949, “[r]elating to the policing of the building and grounds of the Supreme Court of the United States.” 63 Stat. 616, 40 U. S. C. §§ 13f-13p. The occasion for its passage was the termination of the practice by District of Columbia authorities of appointing Supreme Court guards as special policemen for the District. This action left the Supreme Court police force without authority to make arrests and enforce the law in the building and on the grounds of the Court. The Act, which was soon forthcoming, was modeled on the legislation relating to the Capitol grounds, 60 Stat. 718, 40 U. S. C. §§ 193a-193m. It authorizes the appointment by the Marshal of special officers “for duty in connection with the policing of the Supreme Court Building and grounds and adjacent streets.” Sections 2-6 of the Act prohibit certain kinds of “Section 13k does not prohibit all expressive conduct: it does not, for example, purport to prohibit any oral expression, on any subject. It is unnecessary, however, to determine what conduct other than the picketing and leafletting at issue here may be fairly within the terms of the statute because the statute at least prohibits the conduct at issue here. We do note that the current Marshal of the Court has interpreted and applied the statute to prohibit picketing and leafletting, but not other expressive conduct. See Grace v. Burger, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 375, 378, n. 7, 665 F. 2d 1193, 1196, n. 7 (1981). Interpreted and applied as an absolute ban on these two types of expressive conduct, it is clear that the prohibition is facially content-neutral. 182 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. conduct in the building or grounds. Section 6, codified as 40 U. S. C. § 13k, is at issue here. Other sections authorize the Marshal to issue regulations, provide penalties for violations of the Act or regulations, and authorize the Court’s special police to make arrests for violation of the Act’s prohibitions or of any law of the United States occurring within the building and grounds and on the adjacent streets. Section 11 of the Act, 13 U. S. C. § 13p, defines the limits of the Court’s grounds as including the sidewalks surrounding the building. Based on its provisions and legislative history, it is fair to say that the purpose of the Act was to provide for the protection of the building and grounds and of the persons and property therein, as well as the maintenance of proper order and decorum. Section 6, 40 U. S. C. § 13k, was one of the provisions apparently designed for these purposes. At least, no special reason was stated for its enactment. We do not denigrate the necessity to protect persons and property or to maintain proper order and decorum within the Supreme Court grounds, but we do question whether a total ban on carrying a flag, banner, or device on the public sidewalks substantially serves these purposes. There is no suggestion, for example, that appellees’ activities in any way obstructed the sidewalks or access to the building, threatened injury to any person or property, or in any way interfered with the orderly administration of the building or other parts of the grounds. As we have said, the building’s perimeter sidewalks are indistinguishable from other public sidewalks in the city that are normally open to the conduct that is at issue here and that § 13k forbids. A total ban on that conduct is no more necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquility on the public sidewalks surrounding the building than on any other sidewalks in the city. Accordingly, § 13k cannot be justified on this basis. The United States offers another justification for § 13k that deserves our attention. It is said that the federal courts represent an independent branch of the Government and that UNITED STATES v. GRACE 183 171 Opinion of the Court their decisionmaking processes are different from those of the other branches. Court decisions are made on the record before them and in accordance with the applicable law. The views of the parties and of others are to be presented by briefs and oral argument. Courts are not subject to lobbying, judges do not entertain visitors in their chambers for the purpose of urging that cases be resolved one way or another, and they do not and should not respond to parades, picketing, or pressure groups. Neither, the Government urges, should it appear to the public that the Supreme Court is subject to outside influence or that picketing or marching, singly or in groups, is an acceptable or proper way of appealing to or influencing the Supreme Court. Hence, we are asked to hold that Congress was quite justified in preventing the conduct in dispute here from occurring on the sidewalks at the edge of the Court grounds. As was the case with the maintenance of law and order on the Court grounds, we do not discount the importance of this proffered purpose for § 13k. But, again, we are unconvinced that the prohibitions of §13k that are at issue here sufficiently serve that purpose to sustain its validity insofar as the public sidewalks on the perimeter of the grounds are concerned. Those sidewalks are used by the public like other public sidewalks. There is nothing to indicate to the public that these sidewalks are part of the Supreme Court grounds or are in any way different from other public sidewalks in the city. We seriously doubt that the public would draw a different inference from a lone picketer carrying a sign on the sidewalks around the building than it would from a similar picket on the sidewalks across the street. We thus perceive insufficient justification for § 13k’s prohibition of carrying signs, banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the building. We hold that under the First Amendment the section is unconstitutional as applied to those sidewalks. Of course, this is not to say that those sidewalks, like other sidewalks, are not subject to reasonable 184 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of Marshall, J. 461 U. S. time, place, and manner restrictions, either by statute or by regulations issued pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 13Z. The judgment below is accordingly affirmed to the extent indicated by this opinion and is otherwise vacated. So ordered. Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I would hold 40 U. S. C. § 13k unconstitutional on its face. The statute in no way distinguishes the sidewalks from the rest of the premises, and excising the sidewalks from its purview does not bring it into conformity with the First Amendment. Visitors to this Court do not lose their First Amendment rights at the edge of the sidewalks any more than “students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Since the continuing existence of the statute will inevitably have a chilling effect on freedom of expression, there is no virtue in deciding its constitutionality on a piecemeal basis. When a citizen is “in a place where [he] has every right to be,” Brown n. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 142 (1966) (opinion of Fortas, J., joined by Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J.), he cannot be denied the opportunity to express his views simply because the Government has not chosen to designate the area as a forum for public discussion. While the right to conduct expressive activities in such areas as streets, parks, and sidewalks is reinforced by their traditional use for purposes of assembly, Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Black, J.), that right ultimately rests on the principle that “one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1943) (emphasis added). Every citizen lawfully present in a UNITED STATES v. GRACE 185 171 Opinion of Marshall, J. public place has a right to engage in peaceable and orderly expression that is not incompatible with the primary activity of the place in question, whether that place is a school,1 a library,2 a private lunch counter,3 the grounds of a statehouse,4 the grounds of the United States Capitol,5 a bus terminal,6 an airport,7 or a welfare center.8 As we stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972), “[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.” “[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939). I see no reason why the premises of this Court should be exempt from this basic principle. It would be ironic indeed if an exception to the Constitution were to be recognized for the very institution that has the chief responsibility for protecting constitutional rights. I would apply to the premises of this Court the same principle that this Court has applied to other public places. Viewed in this light, 40 U. S. C. § 13k is plainly unconstitutional on its face. The statute is not a reasonable regulation 1 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 512-513 (1969). 2Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 142 (1966); id., at 146, and n. 5 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 3Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 201-202 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). 4 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963). 6 Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 575 (DC), summarily aff’d, 409 U. S. 972 (1972). 6Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F. 2d 83 (CA2), cert, denied, 393 U. S. 940 (1968). 7 Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 (CA7), cert, denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973). 8 Albany Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman, 493 F. 2d 1319 (CA2), cert, denied, 419 U. S. 838 (1974). 186 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of Marshall, J. 461 U. S. of time, place, and manner, cf., e. g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 87-89 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 575-576 (1941), for it applies at all times, covers the entire premises, and, as interpreted by the Court, proscribes even the handing out of a leaflet and, presumably, the wearing of a campaign button as well.9 Nor does the statute merely forbid conduct that is incompatible with the primary activity being carried out in this Court. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 116; Greer n. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 843 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). In contrast to 18 U. S. C. § 1507 (1976 ed., Supp. V) and the statute upheld in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965),10 40 U. S. C. § 13k is not limited to expressive activities that are intended to interfere with, obstruct, or impede the administration of justice. In Cox the Court stressed that a prohibition of expression “unrelated to any judicial proceedings” would raise “entirely different considerations.” 379 U. S., at 567. The statute at issue here is a far cry from 9 Separate provisions of the United States Code also make it a crime to solicit contributions or give a speech on the premises. 40 U. S. C. §§ 13h and 13j. 10Title 18 U. S. C. §1507 (1976 ed., Supp. V) provides in pertinent part: “Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty, pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the United States, ... or with such intent uses any sound-truck or similar device or resorts to any other demonstration in or near any such building . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.” The Louisiana statute upheld on its face in Cox provided in pertinent part: “Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the State of Louisiana . . . shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” La. Rev. Stat. § 14:401 (Supp. 1962). UNITED STATES v. GRACE 187 171 Opinion of Marshall, J. both 18 U. S. C. § 1507 (1976 ed., Supp. V) and the statute upheld in Cox, for it imposes a blanket prohibition on the “display” of “any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” (Emphasis added.) The application of the statute does not depend upon whether the flag, banner, or device in any way concerns a case before this Court. So sweeping a prohibition is scarcely necessary to protect the operations of this Court, and in my view cannot constitutionally be applied either to the Court grounds or to the areas inside the Court building that are open to the public. I would therefore hold the prohibition unconstitutional on its face.11 We have repeatedly recognized that a statute which sweeps within its ambit a broad range of expression protected by the First Amendment should be struck down on its face.12 “The existence of such a statute . . . results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discus 111 agree with the Court that the clause of 40 U. S. C. § 13k prohibiting processions or assemblages is not before us, since neither of the appellees engaged in a procession or assemblage. 12 E. g., United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 604, 609-610 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11, 19 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 486 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451 (1938). Indeed, to protect third parties not before the Court, we have held that even “a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.” Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 634 (1980) (emphasis added). E. g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 (1975); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432-433 (1963). If such a showing is made, the statute will be struck down on its face. An overbroad statute should likewise be struck down on its face where, as here, it is challenged by litigants whose own activities are constitutionally protected. 188 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of Stevens, J. 461 U. S. sion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview.” Thornhill n. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (footnote omitted). As Justice Brennan stated in his opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963), First Amendment freedoms “are delicate and vulnerable,” and “[t]he threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.” I would not leave visitors to this Court subject to the continuing threat of imprisonment13 if they dare to exercise their First Amendment rights once inside the sidewalks. Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part. On three occasions Zywicki distributed leaflets and handbills. I would not construe that activity as the “display” of any “flag, banner, or device.” A typical passerby would not have learned Zywicki’s message from the “display” of his literature. Only after the material left Zywicki’s possession would his message have become intelligible. On one occasion Grace carried a sign on which the text of the First Amendment was written. I agree that this was the “display” of a “device,” but I do not agree that her device was “designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” A typical passerby could not, merely by observing her sign, confidently link her with any specific party, organization, or “movement” as that term was understood when this statute was drafted.* I see no reason to stretch the language of the statute to encompass the activities of either Zywicki or Grace. As a matter of statutory interpretation, we should not infer that 13 A person who violates the statute is subject to imprisonment for 60 days or a $100 fine, or both. 40 U. S. C. § 13m. *“A course or series of actions and endeavours on the part of a body of persons, moving or tending more or less continuously towards some special end.” 6 Oxford English Dictionary 729 (1933) (“movement,” definition 6). See also Webster’s International Dictionary 1604 (2d ed. 1934) (“movement,” definition 4). UNITED STATES v. GRACE 189 171 Opinion of Stevens, J. Congress intended to abridge free expression in circumstances not plainly covered by the language of the statute. As a matter of judicial restraint, we should avoid the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions. Because neither of the appellees has violated the statute, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it requires that appellants be restrained from causing appellees’ arrest for engaging in the activities disclosed by this record. 190 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. ET AL. v. STATE ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 81-1945. Argued January 17, 1983—Decided April 20, 1983 Section 25524.1(b) of the California Public Resources Code provides that before a nuclear powerplant may be built, the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission must determine on a case-by-case basis that there will be “adequate capacity” for interim storage of the plant’s spent fuel at the time the plant requires such storage. Section 25524.2 imposes a moratorium on the certification of new nuclear plants until the State Commission finds that there has been developed, and that the United States through its authorized agency has approved, a demonstrated technology or means for the permanent and terminal disposal of high-level nuclear wastes. Petitioner electric utilities filed an action in Federal District Court seeking a declaration that these provisions, inter alia, are invalid under the Supremacy Clause because they were pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The District Court, after finding that the issues presented by the two provisions were ripe for adjudication, held that they were pre-empted by and in conflict with the Atomic Energy Act. The Court of Appeals agreed that the challenge to § 25524.2 was ripe for review, but found that the challenge to § 25524.1(b) was not because it could not be known whether the State Commission will ever find a nuclear plant’s storage capacity to be inadequate. The court went on to hold that § 25524.2 was not designed to provide protection against radiation hazards but was adopted because uncertainties in the nuclear fuel cycle make nuclear power an uneconomical and uncertain source of energy, and therefore that the section was not pre-empted because §§ 271 and 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act constituted authorization for States to regulate nuclear powerplants for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. The court further held that § 25524.2 was not invalid as a barrier to fulfillment of the federal goal of encouraging the development of atomic energy. Held: 1. The challenge to § 25524.2 is ripe for judicial review, but the questions concerning § 25524.1(b) are not. Pp. 200-203. (a) The question of ripeness turns “on the fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 191 190 Syllabus consideration.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149. Both of these factors counsel in favor of finding the challenge to § 25524.2 ripe for adjudication. The question of pre-emption is predominantly legal and to require the industry to proceed without knowing whether the moratorium imposed by § 25524.2 is valid would impose a palpable and considerable hardship on the utilities, and may ultimately work harm on the citizens of California. Moreover, if § 25524.2 is void as hindering commercial development of atomic energy, delayed resolution would frustrate one of the key purposes of the Atomic Energy Act. Pp. 200-202. (b) Under circumstances where it is uncertain whether the State Commission will ever find a nuclear plant’s interim storage capacity to be inadequate, and where, because of this Court’s holding, infra, that § 25524.2 is not pre-empted by federal law, it is unlikely that industry behavior would be uniquely affected by such uncertainty surrounding the interim storage provision, a court should not stretch to reach an early, and perhaps a premature, decision respecting § 25524.1(b). P. 203. 2. Section 25524.2 is not pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act. Pp. 203-223. (a) From the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, through several revisions, and to the present day, Congress has preserved the dual regulation of nuclear-powered electricity generation: the Federal Government maintains complete control of the safety and “nuclear” aspects of energy generation, whereas the States exercise their traditional authority over economic questions such as the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use, and ratemaking. This Court accepts California’s avowed economic rather than safety purpose as the rationale for enacting § 25524.2, and accordingly the statute lies outside the federally occupied field of nuclear safety regulation. Pp. 205-216-. (b) Section 25524.2 does not conflict with federal regulation of nuclear waste disposal, with the decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it is permissible to continue to license reactors, notwithstanding uncertainty surrounding the waste disposal problem, or with Congress’ recent passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 directed at that problem. Because the NRC’s decision does not and could not compel a utility to develop a nuclear plant, compliance with both that decision and §25524.2 is possible. Moreover, because the NRC’s regulations are aimed at insuring that plants are safe, not necessarily that they are economical, § 25524.2 does not interfere with the objective of those regulations. And as there is no attempt on California’s part to enter the field of developing and licensing nuclear waste disposal technology, a field occupied by the Federal Government, § 25524.2 is not pre-empted any more by the NRC’s obligations in the waste disposal 192 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. field than by its licensing power over the plants themselves. Nor does it appear that Congress intended through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to make the decision for the States as to whether there is now sufficient federal commitment to fuel storage and waste disposal that licensing of nuclear reactors may resume. Morover, that Act can be interpreted as being directed at solving the nuclear waste disposal problem for existing reactors without necessarily encouraging or requiring that future plant construction be undertaken. Pp. 217-220. (c) Section 25524.2 does not frustrate the Atomic Energy Act’s purpose to develop the commercial use of nuclear power. Promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished “at all costs.” Moreover, Congress has given the States authority to determine, as a matter of economics, whether a nuclear plant vis-à-vis a fossil fuel plant should be built. California’s decision to exercise that authority does not, in itself, constitute a basis for pre-emption. Pp. 220-223. 659 F. 2d 903, affirmed. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 223. John R. McDonough argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Howard B. Soloway. Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, John H. Garvey, Leonard Schaitman, and Al J. Daniel, Jr. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Roger Beers, William M. Chamberlain, Dian Grueneich, and Ralph Cavanagh.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Leonard M. Trosten, Eugene R. Fidell, and Linda L. Hodge for the Atomic Industrial Forum; by John M. Cannon and Susan W. Wanat for Hans A. Bethe et al.; by Joseph B. Knotts, Jr., and Robert L. Baum for the Edison Electric Institute; by Max Dean for the Fusion Energy Foundation; by David Crump and Wilkes Robinson for the Legal Foundation of America; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robin L. Rivett, Raymond M. Momboisse, and Sam Kaz-man for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 193 190 Opinion of the Court Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The turning of swords into plowshares has symbolized the transformation of atomic power into a source of energy in Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Peter H. Schiff, and Ezra I. Bialik, Assistant Attorney General; Wilson L. Condon, Attorney General of Alaska, and Douglas K. Mertz, Assistant Attorney General; Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, and Anthony B. Ching, Solicitor General; John Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas; Tany S. Hong, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Michael A. Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General; Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Robert Vinson Eye, Assistant Attorney General, and Brian J. Moline; William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, and Kendall L. Vick, Assistant Attorney General; Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Jocelyn F. Olson, Special Assistant Attorney General; Bill Allain, Attorney General of Mississippi, and Mack Cameron, Special Assistant Attorney General; Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, and Mike McGrath, Assistant Attorney General; Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General of Nevada, and Larry Struve, Chief Deputy Attorney General; William J. Brown, Attorney General of Ohio, and E. Dennis Muchnicki, Assistant Attorney General; Jan Eric Cartwright, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Sara J. Drake, Assistant Attorney General; Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina, and Richard P. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General; John J. Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, and Merideth Wright, Assistant Attorney General; Chauncey H. Browning, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Robert R. Rodecker; Steven F. Freudenthal, Attorney General of Wyoming, and Walter Perry III, Senior Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Connecticut by Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General, Robert S. Golden, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Neil T. Proto, Special Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Maine by James E. Tierney, Attorney General, Rufus E. Brown, Deputy Attorney General, H. Cabanne Howard, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Gregory W. Sample, Assistant Attorney General; for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Stephen M. Leonard, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Illinois et al. by Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of New Hampshire, E. Tupper Kinder, Assistant Attorney General, Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General of Illinois, and John Van Vranken, Anne Rapkin, and Jeffrey C. Paulson, Assistant Attorneys General; for the State of Oregon by Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, Stanton F. Long, Deputy Attorney General, William F. Gary, Solicitor General, 194 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. American society. To facilitate this development the Federal Government relaxed its monopoly over fissionable materials and nuclear technology, and in its place, erected a complex scheme to promote the civilian development of nuclear energy, while seeking to safeguard the public and the environment from the unpredictable risks of a new technology. Early on, it was decided that the States would continue their traditional role in the regulation of electricity production. The interrelationship of federal and state authority in the nuclear energy field has not been simple; the federal regulatory structure has been frequently amended to optimize the partnership. This case emerges from the intersection of the Federal Government’s efforts to ensure that nuclear power is safe with the exercise of the historic state authority over the generation and sale of electricity. At issue is whether provisions in the 1976 amendments to California’s Warren-Alquist Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§25524.1(b) and 25524.2 (West 1977), which condition the construction of nuclear plants on findings by the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission that adequate storage facilities and means of disposal are available for nuclear waste, James E. Mountain, Jr., Deputy Solicitor General, and Frank W. Ostrander, Jr., Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Washington by Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General, and Edward B. Mackie, Chief Deputy Attorney General; for the State of Wisconsin et al. by Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Steven M. Schur, and Carl A. Sinderbrand, Assistant Attorney General; Rufus L. Ed-misten, Attorney General of North Carolina; John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri; Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky; Richard H. Levin, Attorney General of New Mexico, and Geoffrey W. Sloan; Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, and James R. Maret; Leroy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania; for the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California et al. by Janice E. Kerr, J. Calvin Simpson, and Paul Rodgers. Joseph D. Alviani filed a brief for the New England Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 195 190 Opinion of the Court are pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2011 et seq. I A nuclear reactor must be periodically refueled and the “spent fuel” removed. This spent fuel is intensely radioactive and must be carefully stored. The general practice is to store the fuel in a water-filled pool at the reactor site. For many years, it was assumed that this fuel would be reprocessed; accordingly, the storage pools were designed as shortterm holding facilities with limited storage capacities. As expectations for reprocessing remained unfulfilled, the spent fuel accumulated in the storage pools, creating the risk that nuclear reactors would have to be shut down. This could occur if there were insufficient room in the pool to store spent fuel and also if there were not enough space to hold the entire fuel core when certain inspections or emergencies required unloading of the reactor. In recent years, the problem has taken on special urgency. Some 8,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel have already accumulated, and it is projected that by the year 2000 there will be some 72,000 metric tons of spent fuel.1 Government studies indicate that a number of reactors could be forced to shut down in the near future due to the inability to store spent fuel.2 1 See U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Managing Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste 9 (Apr. 1982) (hereafter OTA Study). 2 “For the past several years the Department of Energy or one of its predecessors has been warning the Congress almost annually of the imminent closure of a number of nuclear power reactors as a result of the lack of available capacity to store the spent nuclear fuel.... No reactor has yet shut down for these reasons, largely because utilities have expanded their storage capacity.” H. R. Rep. No. 97-785, pt. 1, p. 47 (1982); the Office of Technology Assessment’s analysis found that “reactors are running out of storage space, and some may have to shut down by the mid-1990’s unless more storage space is made available on a timely basis.” OTA Study, at 27. See also Affidavit of Terry R. Lash (staff scientist for Natural Re- 196 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. There is a second dimension to the problem. Even with water pools adequate to store safely all the spent fuel produced during the working lifetime of the reactor, permanent disposal is needed because the wastes will remain radioactive for thousands of years.3 A number of long-term nuclear waste management strategies have been extensively examined. These range from sinking the wastes in stable deep seabeds, to placing the wastes beneath ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica, to ejecting the wastes into space by rocket. The greatest attention has been focused on disposing of the wastes in subsurface geologic repositories such as salt deposits.4 * Problems of how and where to store nuclear wastes has engendered considerable scientific, political, and public debate. There are both safety and economic aspects to the nuclear waste issue: first, if not properly stored, nuclear wastes might leak and endanger both the environment and human health;6 second, the lack of a long-term disposal option increases the risk that the insufficiency of interim storage space for spent fuel will lead to reactor shutdowns, sources Defense Council) U10, App. 419; Affidavit of Dale G. Bridenbaugh (nuclear engineer) UH 28-30, App. 478-480. 8 See H. R. Rep. No. 97-785, supra, at 46. “Waste disposal, at the present stage of technological development, refers to the storage of the very long lived and highly radioactive waste products until they detoxify sufficiently that they no longer present an environmental hazard. There are presently no physical or chemical steps which render this waste less toxic, other than simply the passage of time.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 528, n. 6 (1978). 4 See generally Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, California Energy Commission, Status of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, Spent Fuel Storage and High-Level Waste Disposal, Draft Report (1978) (App. 173-373); Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management 37, 47, 61 (1979). 6 Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Energy in Transition 1985-2010, pp. 314-316 (1979). See also Yellin, High Technology and the Courts, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 534 (1981). PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 197 190 Opinion of the Court rendering nuclear energy an unpredictable and uneconomical adventure.6 The California laws at issue here are responses to these concerns. In 1974, California adopted the Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §25000-25986 (West 1977 and Supp. 1983). The Act requires that a utility seeking to build in California any electric power generating plant, including a nuclear powerplant, must apply for certification to the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission).7 The Warren-Alquist Act was amended in 1976 to provide additional state regulation of new nuclear powerplant construction. Two sections of these amendments are before us. Section 25524.1(b) provides that before additional nuclear plants may be built, the Energy Commission must determine on a case-by-case basis that there will be “adequate capacity” for storage of a plant’s spent fuel rods “at the time such nuclear facility requires such . . . storage.” The law also requires that each utility provide continuous, on-site, “full core reserve storage capacity” in order to permit storage of the entire re 6 The uncertainty is reflected in the fact that since 1979 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been engaged in a proceeding to reassess the evidentiary basis for its position that safety considerations will not be compromised by continuing federal licensing while a waste disposal method is being developed. 44 Fed. Reg. 61373 (1979); see Minnesota v. NRC, 195 U. S. App. D. C. 234, 241, 602 F. 2d 412, 419 (1979). Moreover, the ultimate solution to the waste disposal problem may entail significant expenditures, affecting the economic attractiveness of the nuclear option. 7 The applicant must first file a notice of intention to file an application for certification, after which the Commission conducts a review process for not more than 12 months. If the notice of intention is approved, the applicant must then file an application for certification, after which the Commission conducts a further review process not to exceed 18 months. Unless certification is granted, the proposed plant cannot be constructed; if certification is granted the Commission is authorized to make certain specifications for construction of the plant and is directed to monitor the construction process. 198 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. actor core if it must be removed to permit repairs of the reactor. In short, § 25524.1(b) addresses the interim storage of spent fuel. Section 25524.2 deals with the long-term solution to nuclear wastes. This section imposes a moratorium on the certification of new nuclear plants until the Energy Commission “finds that there has been developed and that the United States through its authorized agency has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste.” “Disposal” is defined as a “method for the permanent and terminal disposition of high-level nuclear waste .. . .” §§ 25524.2(a), (c). Such a finding must be reported to the state legislature, which may nullify it.8 In 1978, petitioners Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and Southern California Edison Co. filed this action in the United States District Court, requesting a declaration th^,t numerous provisions of the Warren-Alquist Act, including the two sections challenged here, are invalid under the Supremacy Clause because they are pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act. The District Court held that petitioners had standing to challenge §§25524.1(b) and 25524.2,9 that the issues presented by these two statutes are ripe for adjudication, and that the two provisions are void because they are pre-empted by and in conflict with the Atomic Energy Act. 489 F. Supp. 699 (ED Cal. 1980). 8 After transmission of a Commission finding to the legislature, the certification of nuclear powerplants continues to be prohibited until 100 legislative days have elapsed without disaffirmance of the findings by either house of the legislature, or, if the findings have been disaffirmed but are then re-adhered to by the Energy Commission, if the legislature fails to void the renewed findings by statute within 100 legislative days after their retransmittal by the Commission. ’The District Court found that §§25524.1 and 25524.2, coupled with the Energy Commission’s failure to make the required findings, made further investment by petitioners in nuclear plants “an unreasonable risk.” The court also found that if those sections and other provisions were held invalid, petitioners would reactivate plans for further nuclear plant development. 489 F. Supp., at 700-701. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 199 190 Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the petitioners have standing to challenge the California statutes, and also agreed that the challenge to §25524.2 is ripe for review. It concluded, however, that the challenge to §25524.1(b) was not ripe “[b]e-cause we cannot know whether the Energy Commission will ever find a nuclear plant’s storage capacity to be inadequate . . . .” 659 F. 2d 903, 918 (1981).10 On the merits, the court held that the nuclear moratorium provisions of §25524.2 were not pre-empted because §§271 and 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U. S. C. §§2018 and 2021(k), constitute a congressional authorization for States to regulate nuclear powerplants “for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.”11 The court held that §25524.2 was not designed to provide protection against radiation hazards, but 10 The court also held unripe challenges to various certification provisions, Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§25500, 25502, 25504, 25511, 25512, 25514, 25516, 25517, 25519, 25520, 25523, 25532 (West 1977 and Supp. 1983), requirements that utilities acquire surrounding development rights, § 25528 (West Supp. 1983), and the reprocessing provisions of § 25524.1(a). The requirement that a utility propose at least three alternative sites, § 25503, was held ripe for review and not pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act for reasons similar to those applied to § 25524.2. 659 F. 2d, at 915-918. 11 Section 271, 68 Stat. 960, as amended and as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 2018, provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission: Provided, That this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State or local agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the Commission.” Section 274(k), 73 Stat. 691, 42 U. S. C. §2021(k), provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.” The role of these provisions in the federal regulatory structure is discussed infra, at 208-211. 200 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. was adopted because “uncertainties in the nuclear fuel cycle make nuclear power an uneconomical and uncertain source of energy.” 659 F. 2d, at 925. Nor was the provision invalid as a barrier to fulfillment of the federal goal of encouraging the development of atomic energy. The granting of state authority in §§271 and 274(k), combined with recent federal enactments, demonstrated that Congress did not intend that nuclear power be developed “at all costs,” but only that it proceed consistent with other priorities and subject to controls traditionally exercised by the States and expressly preserved by the federal statute.12 We granted certiorari limited to the questions of whether §§25524.1(b) and 25524.2 are ripe for judicial review, and whether they are pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act. 457 U. S. 1132 (1982). II We agree that the challenge to §25524.2 is ripe for judicial review, but that the questions concerning §25524.1(b) are not. The basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 12 In the same appeal, the Ninth Circuit consolidated and decided a related challenge to §25524.2 brought by a nuclear engineer hired to work on a proposed nuclear plant who subsequently lost his job when the project was abandoned. The District Court had held that the engineer had standing to challenge the waste disposal law and that the law was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Comm’n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (SD Cal. 1979). The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s standing analysis and reversed. 659 F. 2d, at 911-914. We denied certiorari. 457 U. S. 1133 (1982). PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 201 190 Opinion of the Court U. S. 136,148-149(1967). In Abbott Laboratories, which remains our leading discussion of the doctrine, we indicated that the question of ripeness turns on “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id., at 149. Both of these factors counsel in favor of finding the challenge to the waste disposal regulations in §25524.2 ripe for adjudication. The question of pre-emption is predominantly legal, and although it would be useful to have the benefit of California’s interpretation of what constitutes a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste, resolution of the pre-emption issue need not await that development. Moreover, postponement of decision would likely work substantial hardship on the utilities. As the Court of Appeals cogently reasoned, for the utilities to proceed in hopes that, when the time for certification came, either the required findings would be made or the law would be struck down, requires the expenditures of millions of dollars over a number of years, without any certainty of recovery if certification were denied.13 The construction of new nuclear facilities requires considerable advance planning—on the order of 12 to 14 years.14 Thus, as in the Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 144 (1974), “decisions to be made now or in the short future may be affected” by whether we act. “ ‘One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.’” Id., at 143, quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 593 (1923). To require the industry to proceed without knowing whether the moratorium is valid would impose a pal 13 Pacific Gas & Electric, for example, had spent at least $10 million before even filing a notice of intention to file an application for certification. Opinion at 489 F. Supp. 699 (ED Cal. 1980) (Finding of Fact No. 15, App. to Pet. for Cert. 72). 14 Finding of Fact No. 13, id., at 71. 202 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. pable and considerable hardship on the utilities, and may ultimately work harm on the citizens of California. Moreover, if petitioners are correct that §25524.2 is void because it hinders the commercial development of atomic energy, “delayed resolution would frustrate one of the key purposes of the [Atomic Energy] Act.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 82 (1978). For these reasons, the issue of whether §25524.2 is preempted by federal law should be decided now.15 16 16 Respondents also contend that the waste disposal provision question is not ripe for review because even if the law is invalid, petitioners’ injury— being prevented as a practical matter from building new nuclear powerplants—will not be fully redressed inasmuch as other sections of the Warren-Alquist Act, not before the Court, also prevent such construction. Respondents also suggest that this lack of redressability rises to the level of an Art. Ill concern. Both arguments are predicated entirely upon a statement in petitioners’ reply brief in support of the petition for certiorari that “unless and until the California certification system statutes are reviewed and at least largely invalidated, petitioners will not again undertake to build nuclear power plants in California.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 6. Respondents attempt to draw entirely too much from this statement. The California certification provisions do not impose a moratorium on new construction; in the main, they require that information be gathered on a variety of issues and be considered by the Energy Commission. Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§25500, 25502, 25504, 25511, 25512, 25514, 25516, 25517, 25519, 25520, 25523,25532 (West 1977 and Supp. 1983). It is unreasonable to presume that these informational requirements will exert the same chilling effect on new construction as would a moratorium. The Ninth Circuit concurs: “[A] delay in adjudication will not cause any undue hardship for the parties. The certification scheme, in general, does not have an ‘immediate and substantial impact’ on the utilities. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U. S. 167, 171 . . . (1967); neither [Pacific Gas & Electric] nor [Southern California Edison] has a notice of intention or application for certification pending, and the threat that procedural burdens might someday be imposed or that certification might someday be denied for failure to meet Energy Commission standards is remote at best.” 659 F. 2d, at 916 (footnote omitted). Respondents’ “fears” that petitioners will not seek to pursue the nuclear option, notwithstanding a favorable decision in this litigation, appear greatly exaggerated. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 203 190 Opinion of the Court Questions concerning the constitutionality of the interim storage provision, § 25524.1(b), however, are not ripe for review. While the waste disposal statute operates on a statewide basis, the Energy Commission is directed to make determinations under §25524.1(b) on a case-by-case basis. As the Court of Appeals explained, because “we cannot know whether the Energy Commission will ever find a nuclear plant’s storage capacity to be inadequate,” judicial consideration of this provision should await further developments.16 Furthermore, because we hold today that §25524.2 is not pre-empted by federal law, there is little likelihood that industry behavior would be uniquely affected by whatever uncertainty surrounds the interim storage provisions. In these circumstances, a court should not stretch to reach an early, and perhaps premature, decision respecting § 25524.1(b). Ill It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress’ in- 16 16 The Court of Appeals noted that the draft report by the State Energy Commission’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, which recommended requiring all nuclear plants to provide a specified amount of storage space, see Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, supra n. 4, at 113, does not necessarily render the provision ripe. The Committee report is only an indication of the views of two of five members of the Energy Commission in 1978. Not only may views change in the future, but the report itself cautions that it does not represent final agency action. Indeed, the full Commission’s decision on January 25, 1978, did not adopt this report or the Committee’s recommendations regarding on-site storage. Finally, the recently enacted Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201, 42 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq. (1982 ed.), authorizes the NRC to license technology for the on-site storage of spent fuel, § 133, and directs the Secretary of Energy to provide up to 1,900 metric tons of capacity for the storage of spent fuel, § 135; these provisions might influence the State Commission’s ultimate findings. 204 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. tent to supersede state law altogether may be found from a “‘scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ because ‘the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,’ or because ‘the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.’” Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132,142-143 (1963), or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines n. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). Petitioners, the United States, and supporting amici, present three major lines of argument as to why §25524.2 is pre-empted. First, they submit that the statute—because it regulates construction of nuclear plants and because it is allegedly predicated on safety concerns—ignores the division between federal and state authority created by the Atomic Energy Act, and falls within the field that the Federal Government has preserved for its own exclusive control. Second, the statute, and the judgments that underlie it, conflict with decisions concerning the nuclear waste disposal issue made by Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Third, the California statute frustrates the federal goal of developing nuclear technology as a source of energy. We consider each of these contentions in turn. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 205 190 Opinion of the Court A Even a brief perusal of the Atomic Energy Act reveals that, despite its comprehensiveness, it does not at any point expressly require the States to construct or authorize nuclear powerplants or prohibit the States from deciding, as an absolute or conditional matter, not to permit the construction of any further reactors. Instead, petitioners argue that the Act is intended to preserve the Federal Government as the sole regulator of all matters nuclear, and that § 25524.2 falls within the scope of this impliedly pre-empted field. But as we view the issue, Congress, in passing the 1954 Act and in subsequently amending it, intended that the Federal Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant, but that the States retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, cost, and other related state concerns. Need for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have been characteristically governed by the States. Justice Brandeis once observed that the “franchise to operate a public utility ... is a special privilege which. . . may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the State.” Frost n. Corporation Comm’n, 278 U. S. 515, 534 (1929) (dissenting opinion). “The nature of government regulation of private utilities is such that a utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval for practices a business regulated in less detail would be free to institute without any approval from a regulatory body.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 357 (1974). See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 569 (1980) (“The State’s concern that rates be fair and efficient represents a clear and substantial governmental interest”). With the exception of the broad authority of the 206 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Federal Power Commission, now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, over the need for and pricing of electrical power transmitted in interstate commerce, see Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. §824 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), these economic aspects of electrical generation have been regulated for many years and in great detail by the States.17 As we noted in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 550 (1978): “There is little doubt that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar bodies are empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for power.” Thus, “Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. ... So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, at 230. The Atomic Energy Act must be read, however, against another background. Enrico Fermi demonstrated the first nuclear reactor in 1942, and Congress authorized civilian application of atomic power in 1946, Atomic Energy Act of 1946, see Act of Aug. 1, 1946, 60 Stat. 755, at which time the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created. Until 1954, however, the use, control, and ownership of nuclear technology remained a federal monopoly. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Act of Aug. 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 919, as 17 As early as 1920, many States had adopted legislation empowering utility commissions to regulate electric utilities. See Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 426, 454-455 (1979). Today, every State has a regulatory body with authority for assuring adequate electric service at reasonable rates. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, The Electric Utility Sector: Concepts, Practices, and Problems, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (Comm. Print 1977). For a description of the regulatory framework in effect in the States, see American Bar Association, Special Committee on Energy Law, The Need for Power and the Choice of Technologies: State Decisions on Electric Power Facilities (1981). PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 207 190 Opinion of the Court amended, 42 U. S. C. §2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), grew out of Congress’ determination that the national interest would be best served if the Government encouraged the private sector to become involved in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a program of federal regulation and licensing. See H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-11 (1954). The Act implemented this policy decision by providing for licensing of private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S., at 63. The AEC, however, was given exclusive jurisdiction to license the transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear materials. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2014(e), (z), (aa), 2061-2064, 2071-2078, 2091-2099, 2111-2114 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Upon these subjects, no role was left for the States. The Commission, however, was not given authority over the generation of electricity itself, or over the economic question whether a particular plant should be built. We observed in Vermont Yankee, supra, at 550, that “[t]he Commission’s prime area of concern in the licensing context, . . . is national security, public health, and safety.” See also Power Reactor Development Co. v. Electrical Workers, 367 U. S. 396, 415 (1961) (utility’s investment not to be considered by Commission in its licensing decisions). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which now exercises the AEC’s regulatory authority, does not purport to exercise its authority based on economic considerations, 10 CFR §8.4 (1982), and has recently repealed its regulations concerning the financial qualifications and capabilities of a utility proposing to construct and operate a nuclear powerplant. 47 Fed. Reg. 13751 (1982). In its notice of rule repeal, the NRC stated that utility financial qualifications are only of concern to the NRC if related to the public health and safety.18 It is 18 See also NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, Consolidated Edison Co. ofN. Y., Inc., 7 N. R. C. 31, 34 (1978): “States ... re- 208 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. almost inconceivable that Congress would have left a regulatory vacuum; the only reasonable inference is that Congress intended the States to continue to make these judgments. Any doubt that ratemaking and plant-need questions were to remain in state hands was removed by §271, 42 U. S. C. § 2018, which provided: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect the authority or regulations of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission . . . The legislative Reports accompanying this provision do little more than restate the statutory language, S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 31 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 2181, supra, at 31, but statements on the floor of Congress confirm that while the safety of nuclear technology was the exclusive business of the Federal Government, state power over the production of electricity was not otherwise displaced.* 19 The 1959 amendments reinforced this fundamental division of authority. In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to “clarify the respective responsibilities tain the right, even in the face of the issuance of an NRC construction permit, to preclude construction on such bases as a lack of need for additional generating capacity or the environmental unacceptability of the proposed facility or site.” 19100 Cong. Rec. 12015, 12197-12202 (1954) (remarks of Sen. Hickenlooper); id., at 10559 (statements of AEC Chairman Strauss). Particularly instructive is an exchange on the House floor between Representatives Yates and Cole. Representative Yates inquired if the bill imposed the duty upon the Commission “to determine whether the public convenience and necessity require certain commercial institutions to be licensed to construct reactors for the production of power for civilian purposes?” Representative Cole responded that there was no such imposition to grant licenses based upon public convenience and necessity. “That,” he said, “is regulated by existing Federal and State authorities. We do not touch that in any respect.” Id., at 11689. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 209 190 Opinion of the Court . . . of the States and the Commission with respect to the regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials.” 42 U. S. C. § 2021(a)(1). See S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8,10-12 (1959). The authority of the States over the planning for new powerplants and ratemaking were not at issue. Indeed, the point of the 1959 Amendments was to heighten the States’ role. Section 274(b), 42 U. S. C. § 2021(b), authorized the NRC, by agreements with state governors to discontinue its regulatory authority over certain nuclear materials under limited conditions.20 State programs permitted under the amendment were required to be “coordinated and compatible” with that of the NRC. § 2021(g); S. Rep. No. 870, supra, at 11. The subject matters of those agreements were also limited by § 274(c), 42 U. S. C. § 2021(c), which states: “[T]he Commission shall retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of— “(1) the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility; “(4) the disposal of such . . . byproduct, source, or special nuclear material as the Commission determines . . . should, because of the hazards or potential hazards thereof, not be so disposed of without a license from the Commission.” Although the authority reserved by § 274(c) was exclusively for the Commission to exercise, see S. Rep. No. 870, supra, at 8, 9; H. R. Rep. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 9 (1959), Congress made clear that the section was not intended to cut back on pre-existing state authority outside the 20 Authority could be shifted to the States for control over byproduct and source material, and over special nuclear material “in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass.” California has signed a §274 agreement. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§25875-25876 (West 1967). 210 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. NRC’s jurisdiction.21 Section 274(k), 42 U. S. C. §2021(k), states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.” Section 274(k), by itself, limits only the pre-emptive effect of “this section,” that is, §274, and does not represent an affirmative grant of power to the States. But Congress, by permitting regulation “for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards” underscored the distinction drawn in 1954 between the spheres of activity left respectively to the Federal Government and the States. This regulatory structure has remained unchanged, for our purposes, until 1965, when the following proviso was added to §271: “Provided, that this section shall not be deemed to confer upon any Federal, State or local agency any authority to regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the Commission.” The accompanying Report by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy makes clear that the amendment was not intended to detract from state authority over energy facilities.22 In- 21 In addition to § 274(k), § 274(Z), 42 U. S. C. § 2021(0, created an advisory role for the States respecting activities exclusively within the NRC’s jurisdiction, and § 274(g), 21 U. S. C. § 2021(g), directs the Commission to cooperate with the States even in the formulation of standards for regulation against radiation hazards. 22 “Because of these unique provisions in the act pertaining to AEC’s licensing and regulation of persons operating reactors which could be used to produce electricity, there was some feeling of uneasiness among the drafters of the legislation over the effect of the new law upon other agencies— Federal, State, and local—having jurisdiction over the generation, sale, and transmission of electric power. It was recognized by the drafters that the authority of these other agencies with respect to the generation, sale, and transmission of electric power produced through the use of nuclear facilities was not affected by this new law; and that the AEC’s regulatory PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 211 190 Opinion of the Court stead, the proviso was added to overrule a Court of Appeals opinion which interpreted § 271 to allow a municipality to prohibit transmission lines necessary for the AEC’s own activities. Maun v. United States, 347 F. 2d 970 (CA9 1965). There is no indication that Congress intended any broader limitation of state regulatory power over utility companies. Indeed, Reports and debates accompanying the 1965 amendment indicate that § 271’s purpose “was to make it absolutely clear that the Atomic Energy Act’s special provisions on licensing of reactors did not disturb the status quo with respect to the then existing authority of Federal, State, and local bodies to regulate generation, sale, or transmission of electric power.” Ill Cong. Rec. 19822 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hickenlooper).23 This account indicates that from the passage of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954, through several revisions, and to the present day, Congress has preserved the dual regulation of control was limited to considerations involving the common defense and security and the protection of the health and safety of the public with respect to the special hazards associated with the operation of nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, section 271 was added to make it explicit that licensees of the AEC who produced power though the use of nuclear facilities would otherwise remain subject to the authority of all appropriate Federal, State, and local authorities with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power.” H. R. Rep. No. 567, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1965). “The amendment of this section effected by this bill is intended as a clarification of the meaning of section 271 as originally enacted.” Id., at 10. 23 While expressions of a subsequent Congress generally are not thought particularly useful in ascertaining the intent of an earlier Congress, Senator Hickenlooper, the sponsor of the 1965 amendment, was an important figure in the drafting of the 1954 Act. Senator Pastore, also involved in the writing of the 1954 Act, elaborated: “We were conscious that it was not desired that the AEC should engage in the business of regulating electricity as such. . . . We were trying to keep the AEC out of the business of regulating electricity. That is what gave birth to section 271. We provided that nothing in the act would affect the local supervising authority’s right to control the manufacture of electricity generated by nuclear facilities.” Ill Cong. Rec. 19832 (1965). 212 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. nuclear-powered electricity generation: the Federal Government maintains complete control of the safety and “nuclear” aspects of energy generation; the States exercise their traditional authority over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking, and the like.24 The above is not particularly controversial. But deciding how §25524.2 is to be construed and classified is a more difficult proposition. At the outset, we emphasize that the statute does not seek to regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear powerplant. It would clearly be impermissible for California to attempt to do so, for such regulation, even if enacted out of nonsafety concerns, would nevertheless directly conflict with the NRC’s exclusive authority over plant construction and operation. Respondents appear to concede as much. Respondents do broadly argue, however, that although safety regulation of nuclear plants by States is forbidden, a State may completely prohibit new construction until its safety concerns are satisfied by the Federal Government. We reject this line of reasoning. State safety regulation is not pre-empted only when it conflicts with federal law. Rather, the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States,25 26 When the Federal Govem- 24 Our summary affirmance in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F. 2d 1143 (CA8 1971), summarily aff’d, 405 U. S. 1035 (1972), is fully consistent with this reading of the division of regulatory authority. Minnesota’s effort to regulate radioactive waste discharges from nuclear plants fell squarely within the field of safety regulation reserved for federal regulation. The invalidation of this regulation in Northern States requires no retraction of the state authority preserved in §§ 271 and 274 of the Act. And, as with all summary affirmances, our action “is not to be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting the judgment under review.” Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 64, n. 13 (1982); Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam). 26 In addition to the opportunity to enter into agreements with the NRC under § 274(c), Congress has specifically authorized the States to regulate PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 213 190 Opinion of the Court ment completely occupies a given field or an identifiable portion of it, as it has done here, the test of pre-emption is whether “the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S., at 236. A state moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns falls squarely within the prohibited field. Moreover, a state judgment that nuclear power is not safe enough to be further developed would conflict directly with the countervailing judgment of the NRC, see, infra, at 218-219, that nuclear construction may proceed notwithstanding extant uncertainties as to waste disposal. A state prohibition on nuclear construction for safety reasons would also be in the teeth of the Atomic Energy Act’s objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread development and use— and would be pre-empted for that reason. Infra, at 221-222. That being the case, it is necessary to determine whether there is a nonsafety rationale for §25524.2. California has maintained, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that § 25524.2 was aimed at economic problems, not radiation hazards. The California Assembly Committee on Resources, Land Use, and Energy, which proposed a package of bills including §25524.2, reported that the waste disposal problem was “largely economic or the result of poor planning, not safety related.” Reassessment of Nuclear Energy in California: A Policy Analysis of Proposition 15 and its Alternatives, p. 18 (1976) (Reassessment Report) (emphasis in original). The Committee explained that the lack of a federally approved method of waste disposal created a “clog” in the nuclear fuel cycle. Storage space was limited while more nuclear wastes were continuously produced. Without a permanent means of disposal, the nuclear waste problem could become critical, radioactive air pollutants from nuclear plants, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 122, 42 U. S. C. § 7422 (1976 ed., Supp. V), and to impose certain siting and land-use requirements for nuclear plants, NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1980, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 780. 214 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. leading to unpredictably high costs to contain the problem or, worse, shutdowns in reactors. “Waste disposal safety,” the Reassessment Report notes, “is not directly addressed by the bills, which ask only that a method [of waste disposal] be chosen and accepted by the federal government.” Id., at 156 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals adopted this reading of §25524.2. Relying on the Reassessment Report, the court concluded: “[S]ection 25524.2 is directed towards purposes other than protection against radiation hazards. While Proposition 15 would have required California to judge the safety of a proposed method of waste disposal, section 25524.2 leaves that judgment to the federal government. California is concerned not with the adequacy of the method, but rather with its existence.” 659 F. 2d, at 925. Our general practice is to place considerable confidence in the interpretations of state law reached by the federal courts of appeals. Cf. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U. S. 291, 306 (1982); Bishop n. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346 (1976). Petitioners and amici nevertheless attempt to upset this interpretation in a number of ways. First, they maintain that § 25524.2 evinces no concern with the economics of nuclear power. The statute states that the “development” and “existence” of a permanent disposal technology approved by federal authorities will lift the moratorium; the statute does not provide for considering the economic costs of the technology selected. This view of the statute is overly myopic. Once a technology is selected and demonstrated, the utilities and the California Public Utilities Commission would be able to estimate costs; such cost estimates cannot be made until the Federal Government has settled upon the method of long-term waste disposal. Moreover, once a satisfactory disposal technology is found and demonstrated, fears of having to close down operating reactors should largely evaporate. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 215 190 Opinion of the Court Second, it is suggested that California, if concerned with economics, would have banned California utilities from building plants outside the State. This objection carries little force. There is no indication that California utilities are contemplating such construction; the state legislature is not obligated to address purely hypothetical facets of a problem. Third, petitioners note that there already is a body, the California Public Utilities Commission, which is authorized to determine on economic grounds whether a nuclear powerplant should be constructed.26 While California is certainly free to make these decisions on a case-by-case basis, a State is not foreclosed from reaching the same decision through a legislative judgment, applicable to all cases. The economic uncertainties engendered by the nuclear waste disposal problems are not factors that vary from facility to facility; the issue readily lends itself to more generalized decisionmaking and California cannot be faulted for pursuing that course. Fourth, petitioners note that Proposition 15, the initiative out of which §25524.2 arose, and companion provisions in California’s so-called nuclear laws, are more clearly written with safety purposes in mind.27 It is suggested that §25524.2 shares a common heritage with these laws and should be presumed to have been enacted for the same pur 26 Cal. Pub. Util. Code Ann. § 1001 (West 1975 and Supp. 1983). 27 The 1976 amendments to the Warren-Alquist Act were passed as an alternative to Proposition 15, an initiative submitted to California’s voters in June 1976. (By their terms, these provisions would not have become operative if Proposition 15 had been adopted. Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §25524.2, Historical Note (West 1977). The proposition was rejected.) Like § 25524.2, Proposition 15, among other things, barred the construction of new nuclear powerplants unless a permanent method of waste disposal was developed, though Proposition 15 gave as the reason for its concern the threat of harm to “the land or the people of . . . California.” Similarly, Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 25524.3(b) (West Supp. 1982) requires the State Energy Commission to undertake a study of underground placement and berm containment of nuclear reactors, to determine whether such construction techniques are necessary for “enhancing the public health and safety . . . .” 216 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. poses. The short answer here is that these other state laws are not before the Court, and indeed, Proposition 15 was not passed; these provisions and their pedigree do not taint other parts of the Warren-Alquist Act. Although these specific indicia of California’s intent in enacting §25524.2 are subject to varying interpretation, there are two further reasons why we should not become embroiled in attempting to ascertain California’s true motive. First, inquiry into legislative motive is often an unsatisfactory venture. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383 (1968). What motivates one legislator to vote for a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it. Second, it would be particularly pointless for us to engage in such inquiry here when it is clear that the States have been allowed to retain authority over the need for electrical generating facilities easily sufficient to permit a State so inclined to halt the construction of new nuclear plants by refusing on economic grounds to issue certificates of public convenience in individual proceedings. In these circumstances, it should be up to Congress to determine whether a State has misused the authority left in its hands. Therefore, we accept California’s avowed economic purpose as the rationale for enacting §25524.2. Accordingly, the statute lies outside the occupied field of nuclear safety regulation.28 28 Petitioners correctly cite Perez n. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 651 (1971), for the proposition that state law may not frustrate the operation of federal law simply because the state legislature in passing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration. In Perez, however, unlike this case, there was an actual conflict between state and federal law. Perez involved an Arizona law that required uninsured motorists who had not satisfied judgments against them or had failed to pay settlements after accidents to prove their financial responsibility before the State would license them to drive again. The Arizona law, contrary to the Federal Bankruptcy Act, specified that this obligation would not be discharged in bankruptcy. We held the state law pre-empted, despite the fact that its purpose was to deter irresponsible driving rather than to aid in the collection PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 217 190 Opinion of the Court B Petitioners’ second major argument concerns federal regulation aimed at the nuclear waste disposal problem itself. It is contended that § 25524.2 conflicts with federal regulation of nuclear waste disposal, with the NRC’s decision that it is permissible to continue to license reactors, notwithstanding uncertainty surrounding the waste disposal problem, and with Congress’ recent passage of legislation directed at that problem. Pursuant to its authority under the Act, 42 U. S. C. §§2071-2075, 2111-2114 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), the AEC, and later the NRC, promulgated extensive and detailed regulations concerning the operation of nuclear facilities and the handling of nuclear materials. The following provisions are relevant to the spent fuel and waste disposal issues in this case. To receive an NRC operating license, one must submit a safety analysis report, which includes a “radioactive waste handling syste[m].” 10 CFR § 50.34(b)(2)(i), (ii) (1982). See also 10 CFR § 150.15(a)(l)(i) (1982). The regulations specify general design criteria and control requirements for fuel storage and handling and radioactive waste to be stored at the reactor site. 10 CFR pt. 50, App. A, Criteria 60-64, p. 412 (1982). In addition, the NRC has promulgated detailed regulations governing storage and disposal away from the reactor. 10 CFR pt. 72 (1982). NRC has also promulgated procedural requirements covering license applications for disposal of high-level radioactive waste in geologic repositories. 10 CFR pt. 60 (1982). Congress gave the Department of Energy the responsibility for “the establishment of temporary and permanent facilities for storage, management, and ultimate disposal of nuclear wastes.” 42 U. S. C. §7133(a)(8)(C) (1976 ed., of debts. Only if there were an actual conflict between § 25524.2 and the Atomic Energy Act, such that adherence to both were impossible or the operation of state law frustrated accomplishment of the federal objective, would Perez be apposite. 218 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Supp. V). No such permanent disposal facilities have yet been licensed, and the NRC and the Department of Energy continue to authorize the storage of spent fuel at reactor sites in pools of water. In 1977, the NRC was asked by the Natural Resources Defense Council to halt reactor licensing until it had determined that there was a method of permanent disposal for high-level waste. The NRC concluded that, given the progress toward the development of disposal facilities and the availability of interim storage, it could continue to license new reactors. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. n. NRC, 582 F. 2d 166, 168-169 (CA2 1978). The NRC’s imprimatur, however, indicates only that it is safe to proceed with such plants, not that it is economically wise to do so.29 Because the NRC order does not and could 29 The Natural Resources Defense Council’s petition with the NRC claimed that the Atomic Energy Act required the agency to consider the safety aspects of off-site waste disposal in determining whether to license reactors. The NRC denied the petition, stating that it had to examine only on-site safety risks in its licensing decisions. 42 Fed. Reg. 34391 (1977). The NRC was not asked to consider whether nuclear reactors were sufficiently reliable investments in light of the unresolved waste disposal question, and the NRC did not address this issue. Nor was the issue raised in the review of the NRC’s decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 582 F. 2d 166 (CA2 1978). As the Court of Appeals stated, “the issue ... is whether NRC, prior to granting nuclear power reactor operating licenses, is required by the public health and safety requirement of the [Atomic Energy Act] to make a determination . . . that high-level radioactive wastes can be permanently disposed of safely.” Id., at 170 (emphasis deleted). Similarly, the NRC’s proceeding addressing the extent to which assessments of waste disposal technology should be factored into NRC reactor licensing does not address the economic ramifications of the issue. This matter has been the subject of prolonged litigation, and is presently pending before the Court. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 178 U. S. App. D. C. 336, 547 F. 2d 633 (1976), rev’d sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978), on remand, 222 U. S. App. D. C. 9, 685 F. 2d 459 (1982), cert, granted sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 459 U. S. 1034 (1982). PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 219 190 Opinion of the Court not compel a utility to develop a nuclear plant, compliance with both it and §25524.2 is possible. Moreover, because the NRC’s regulations are aimed at insuring that plants are safe, not necessarily that they are economical, §25524.2 does not interfere with the objective of the federal regulation. Nor has California sought through §25524.2 to impose its own standards on nuclear waste disposal. The statute accepts that it is the federal responsibility to develop and license such technology. As there is no attempt on California’s part to enter this field, one which is occupied by the Federal Government, we do not find §25524.2 pre-empted any more by the NRC’s obligations in the waste disposal field than by its licensing power over the plants themselves. After this case was decided by the Court of Appeals, a new piece was added to the regulatory puzzle. In its closing week, the 97th Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201, a complex bill providing for a multifaceted attack on the problem. Inter alia, the bill authorizes repositories for disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, provides for licensing and expansion of interim storage, authorizes research and development, and provides a scheme for financing. While the passage of this new legislation may convince state authorities that there is now £ sufficient federal commitment to fuel storage and waste disposal that licensing of nuclear reactors may resume, and, indeed, this seems to be one of the purposes of the Act,30 it does not appear that Congress in 30 The Act itself, § 111(b), 42 U. S. C. § 10131(b) (1982 ed.), enumerates the following purposes: “(1) to establish a schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of repositories that will provide a reasonable assurance that the public and the environment will be adequately protected from the hazards posed by high-level radioactive waste and . . . spent nuclear fuel... ; “(2) to establish the Federal responsibility, and a definite Federal policy, for the disposal of such waste and spent fuel.” 96 Stat. 2207. See also H. R. Rep. No. 97-785, pt. 2, pp. 59-60 (1982) (purpose of Act to provide “reasonable assurance that safe waste disposal methods will be 220 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. tended to make that decision for the States through this legislation. Senator McClure attempted to do precisely that with an amendment to the Senate bill providing that the Act satisfied any legal requirements for the existence of an approved technology and facilities for disposal of spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste. The amendment was adopted by the Senate without debate. 128 Cong. Rec. S4310 (Apr. 29, 1982). During subsequent House hearings, it was strongly urged that this language be omitted so as not to affect this case. See Nuclear Waste Disposal Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 356, 406, 553-554 (1982). The bill which emerged from the House Committee did omit the Senate language, and its manager, Representative Ottinger, stated to the House that the language was deleted “to insure that there be no preemption.” 128 Cong. Rec. H8797 (Dec. 2, 1982). The bill ultimately signed into law followed the House language. While we are correctly reluctant to draw inferences from the failure of Congress to act, it would, in this case, appear improper for us to give a reading to the Act that Congress considered and rejected. Moreover, it is certainly possible to interpret the Act as directed at solving the nuclear waste disposal problem for existing reactors without necessarily encouraging or requiring that future plant construction be undertaken. C Finally, it is strongly contended that §25524.2 frustrates the Atomic Energy Act’s purpose to develop the commercial use of nuclear power. It is well established that state law is pre-empted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con- available when needed”); 128 Cong. Rec. H8162 (Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Udall); id., at H8166 (Sept. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Winn) (the Act “demonstrates to the public and industry that the Federal Government is fulfilling its reponsibility to dispose of high-level waste”). PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 221 190 Opinion of the Court gress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S., at 67; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S., at 142-143; Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 153. There is little doubt that a primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act was, and continues to be, the promotion of nuclear power. The Act itself states that it is a program “to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and safety of the public.” 42 U. S. C. § 2013(d). The House and Senate Reports confirmed that it was “a major policy goal of the United States” that the involvement of private industry would “speed the further development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.” H. R. Rep. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1965); H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1954). The same purpose is manifest in the passage of the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U. S. C. §2210, which limits private liability from a nuclear accident. The Act was passed “[i]n order to protect the public and to encourage the development of the atomic energy industry . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §2012(i). Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S., at 63-67. The Court of Appeals’ suggestion that legislation since 1974 has indicated a “change in congressional outlook” is unconvincing. The court observed that Congress reorganized the Atomic Energy Commission in 1974 by dividing the promotional and safety responsibilities of the AEC, giving the former to the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)31 and the latter to the NRC. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U. S. C. §5801 et seq. The evident desire of Congress to prevent safety from being 31 In 1977, ERDA’s functions were transferred to the Department of Energy. 91 Stat. 577, 42 U. S. C. § 7151(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). 222 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. compromised by promotional concerns does not translate into an abandonment of the objective of promoting nuclear power. The legislation was carefully drafted, in fact, to avoid any antinuclear sentiment.32 The continuing commitment to nuclear power is reflected in the extension of the Price-Anderson Act’s coverage until 1987, Pub. L. 94-197, §2-14, 89 Stat. 1111-1115, as well as in Congress’ express preclusion of reliance on natural gas and petroleum as primary energy sources in new power plants, Power plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3291, 42 U. S. C. §§ 8301(b)(3), 8311, 8312(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). It is true, of course, that Congress has sought to simultaneously promote the development of alternative energy sources, but we do not view these steps as an indication that Congress has retreated from its oft-expressed commitment to further development of nuclear power for electricity generation. The Court of Appeals is right, however, that the promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished “at all costs.” The elaborate licensing and safety provisions and the continued preservation of state regulation in traditional areas belie that. Moreover, Congress has allowed the States to determine—as a matter of economics—whether a nuclear plant vis-à-vis a fossil fuel plant should be built. The decision of California to exercise that authority does not, in itself, constitute a basis for pre-emption.33 Therefore, while the argu- 32 The Senate bill had included language prohibiting the ERDA from “giving unwarranted priority to any single energy source” out of concern that the ERDA “may give an unwarranted priority to development of nuclear power to the detriment of competing energy technologies.” S. Rep. No. 93-980, p. 27 (1974). The House bill expressed no concern about giving “unwarranted priority” to nuclear power. H. R. Rep. No. 93-707 (1973). The bill reported by the Conference Committee, and subsequently enacted, did not contain the Senate’s prohibitory language, but instead stated that all technologies were to be promoted. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1445, p. 25 (1974). 33 We recently rejected a similar claim that congressional policy to favor the use of coal as a fuel source pre-empted state legislation that may have PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 223 190 Opinion of Blackmun, J. ment of petitioners and the United States has considerable force, the legal reality remains that Congress has left sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons. Given this statutory scheme, it is for Congress to rethink the division of regulatory authority in light of its possible exercise by the States to undercut a federal objective. The courts should not assume the role which our system assigns to Congress.34 IV The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join the Court’s opinion, except to the extent it suggests that a State may not prohibit the construction of nuclear powerplants if the State is motivated by concerns about the safety of such plants. Since the Court finds that California was not so motivated, this suggestion is unnecessary to the an adverse effect on thevuse of coal. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 633 (1981). 34 Our resolution of this case is not controlled by First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152 (1946). In First Iowa, this Court held that compliance with requirements for a state permit under Iowa law was not necessary in order to secure a federal license for a hydroelectric project. Allowing the States to veto federal decisions could “destroy the effectiveness of the Federal Act. It would subordinate to the control of the State the ‘comprehensive’ planning which the Act provides shall depend upon the judgment of [the Federal Government].” Id., at 164. In the same manner, requiring compliance with state requirements would have reduced the project to a size that the Federal Power Commission had determined was inadequate, and compliance with state engineering requirements could handicap the financial success of the project. The Atomic Energy Act does not give the NRC comprehensive planning responsibility. Moreover, § 25524.2 does not interfere with the type of plant that could be constructed. State regulations which affected the construction and operation of federally approved nuclear powerplants would pose a different case. 224 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of Blackmun, J. 461 U. S. Court’s holding. More important, I believe the Court’s dictum is wrong in several respects. The Court takes the position that a State’s safety-motivated decision to prohibit construction of nuclear powerplants would be pre-empted for three distinct reasons. First, the Court states that “the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.” Ante, at 212. Second, the Court indicates that “a state judgment that nuclear power is not safe enough to be further developed would conflict squarely with the countervailing judgment of the NRC . . . that nuclear construction may proceed notwithstanding extant uncertainties as to waste disposal.” Ante, at 213. Third, the Court believes that a prohibition on construction of new nuclear plants would “be in the teeth of the Atomic Energy Act’s objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread development and use.” Ibid. For reasons summarized below, I cannot agree that a State’s nuclear moratorium, even if motivated by safety concerns, would be pre-empted on any of these grounds. I First, Congress has occupied not the broad field of “nuclear safety concerns,” but only the narrower area of how a nuclear plant should be constructed and operated to protect against radiation hazards.1 States traditionally have possessed the authority to choose which technologies to rely on in meeting their energy needs. Nothing in the Atomic Energy Act limits this authority, or intimates that a State, in exercising this authority, may not consider the features that distinguish nuclear plants from other power sources. On the contrary, § 271 of the Act, 68 Stat. 960, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2018, indicates that States may continue, with respect to nuclear 1 The Court recognizes the limited nature of the federal role, ante, at 205, but then describes that role in more expansive terms, ante, at 212-213. PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 225 190 Opinion of Blackmun, J. power, to exercise their traditional police power over the manner in which they meet their energy needs. There is, in short, no evidence that Congress had a “clear and manifest purpose,” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947), to force States to be blind to whatever special dangers are posed by nuclear plants. Federal pre-emption of the States’ authority to decide against nuclear power would create a regulatory vacuum. See Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California’s Nuclear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U. C. D. L. Rev. 3, 64 (1979). In making its traditional policy choices about what kinds of power are best suited to its needs, a State would be forced to ignore the undeniable fact that nuclear power entails certain risks. While the NRC does evaluate the dangers of generating nuclear power, it does not balance those dangers against the risks, costs, and benefits of other choices available to the State or consider the State’s standards of public convenience and necessity. As Professor Wiggins noted: “If a state utility regulatory agency like California’s Energy Commission is prevented from making a general evaluation of feasibility, on broad grounds of social, economic and ideological policy, then the decision whether to build a nuclear facility in a state will ultimately be made only by the public utility seeking its construction. . . . It would be ironic if public energy utilities, granted a jurisdictional monopoly in large part because of their heavy regulation by the state, were freed from regulatory oversight of the one decision which promises to affect the greatest number of persons over the greatest possible time.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). In short, there is an important distinction between the threshold determination whether to permit the construction of new nuclear plants and, if the decision is to permit construction, the subsequent determinations of how to construct 226 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of Blackmun, J. 461 U. S. and operate those plants. The threshold decision belongs to the State; the latter decisions are for the NRC. See Note, May A State Say “No” to Nuclear Power? Pacific Legal Foundation Gives a Disappointing Answer, 10 Envir. L. 189, 199 (1979) (criticizing District Court decision in the present case). » II The Court’s second basis for suggesting that States may not prohibit the construction of nuclear plants on safety grounds is that such a prohibition would conflict with the NRC’s judgment that construction of nuclear plants may safely proceed. A flat ban for safety reasons, however, would not make “compliance with both federal and state regulations ... a physical impossibility.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963). The NRC has expressed its judgment that it is safe to proceed with construction and operation of nuclear plants, but neither the NRC nor Congress has mandated that States do so.2 See ante, at 205. Ill A state regulation' also conflicts with federal law if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). The Court suggests that a safety-motivated state ban on nuclear plants would be pre-empted under this standard as well. See ante, at 213, 221-222.3 But Congress has merely encouraged the develop- 2 A conflict would exist, of course, if the NRC determined that construction of nuclear plants could not proceed and a State nevertheless chose to go ahead with construction. Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S., at 143. 8 The Court states that such a ban would be “in the teeth of the Atomic Energy Act’s objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe enough for widespread development and use.” Ante, at 213. A State’s decision not to permit construction of nuclear plants, however, affects only indirectly the Atomic Energy Act’s goal of ensuring that nuclear power be safe enough PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 227 190 Opinion of Blackmun, J. ment of nuclear technology so as to make another source of energy available to the States; Congress has not forced the States to accept this particular source. See Note, 10 Envir. L.j at 199 (“Congress has not evidenced a dictatorial intent for every state to build nuclear power plants”). A ban on nuclear plant construction for safety reasons thus does not conflict with Congress’ objectives or purposes. The Atomic Energy Act was intended to promote the technological development of nuclear power, at a time when there was no private nuclear power industry. The Act addressed “the practical question of bringing such an industry into being,”* 4 in order to make available an additional energy source. The Court makes much of the general statements of purpose in the Act and the legislative history, see ante, at 221, but those statements simply reflect Congress’ desire to create a private nuclear power industry. Congress did not compel States to give preference to the eventual product of that industry or to ignore the peculiar problems associated with that product. See Wiggins, 13 U. C. D. L. Rev., at 78. More recent legislation makes it very clear that there is no federal policy preventing a State from choosing to rely on technologies it considers safer than nuclear power. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U. S. C. for widespread development. A safety-motivated ban might highlight a State’s perception that the federal safety goal had not been accomplished, but the ban itself would not interfere with efforts to achieve that goal. The Court apparently believes the Atomic Energy Act’s actual purpose was to maximize the use of nuclear power to satisfy the Nation’s needs. A moratorium on construction of nuclear plants would prevent the accomplishment of this goal, but, as demonstrated infra, the Court is incorrect in attributing this goal to Congress. Moreover, the degree to which a nuclear moratorium hampers achievement of the goal does not depend on the motives of its framers. 4 Address by Congressman Cole, Chairman of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, delivered at International Congress on Nuclear Engineering (June 24, 1954), quoted in Lemov, State and Local Control Over the Location of Nuclear Reactors Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1008, 1018 (1964). 228 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of Blackmun, J. 461 U. S. § 5801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), separated promotional and regulatory functions in the area of nuclear power. The Act established the NRC to perform the regulatory and licensing functions of the Atomic Energy Commission, §5841, and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) to “develop, and increase the efficiency and reliability of use of, all energy sources.” § 5801(a).5 The legislative history of the Act expresses concern about a pronuclear bias in the regulatory agency and demonstrates a desire to have the Federal Government “place greater relative emphasis on nonnuclear energy.” S. Rep. No. 93-980, p. 14 (1974).6 This legislative purpose is consistent with the fact that States retain many means of prohibiting the construction of nuclear plants within their borders. States may refuse to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity for individual nuclear power plants. They may establish siting and land use requirements for nuclear plants that are more stringent than those of the NRC. Cf. NRC Authorization Act for Fiscal 1980, Pub. L. 96-295, § 108(f), 94 Stat. 783. Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, States may regulate radioactive air emissions from nuclear plants and may impose more stringent emission standards than those promulgated by the NRC. 42 U. S. C. §§ 7416, 7422 (1976 ed., Supp. V). This authority may be used to prevent the construction of nuclear plants altogether. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2), ALAB-453, 7 N. R. C. 31, 34, and n. 13 (1978). 5 In 1977, ERDA’s functions were transferred to the Department of Energy. 91 Stat. 577, 42 U. S. C. § 7151(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). 6 In subsequent legislation Congress has continued to promote many sources of energy, without giving preference to nuclear power. See, e. g., Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3291, 42 U. S. C. § 8301 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V) (encouraging greater use of coal and other alternative fuels in lieu of natural gas and petroleum); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, §210, 92 Stat. 3144, 16 U. S. C. §824a-3 (1976 ed., Supp. V) (encouraging development of cogeneration and small power production facilities). PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. v. ENERGY RESOURCES COMM’N 229 190 Opinion of Blackmun, J. In sum, Congress has not required States to “go nuclear,” in whole or in part. The Atomic Energy Act’s twin goals were to promote the development of a technology and to ensure the safety of that technology. Although that Act reserves to the NRC decisions about how to build and operate nuclear plants, the Court reads too much into the Act in suggesting that it also limits the States’ traditional power to decide what types of electric power to utilize. Congress simply has made the nuclear option available, and a State may decline that option for any reason. Rather than rest on the elusive test of legislative motive, therefore, I would conclude that the decision whether to build nuclear plants remains with the States. In my view, a ban on construction of nuclear powerplants would be valid even if its authors were motivated by fear of a core meltdown or other nuclear catastrophe. 230 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Per Curiam 461 U. S. ALABAMA v. EVANS ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY OF EXECUTION No. A-858. Decided April 22, 1983 After the Circuit Justice had denied respondent’s application for a stay of execution of his death sentence, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court, which temporarily stayed the execution. The Court of Appeals denied the State’s motion to vacate the stay, and the State then filed with the Circuit Justice the instant application to vacate the District Court’s stay. The application was referred to the Court. Held: The application to vacate the District Court’s stay is granted. Respondent’s constitutional challenges to Alabama’s capital-sentencing procedures were reviewed exhaustively by several state and federal courts. There is no merit to respondent’s new challenge that the trial court construed in an unconstitutionally broad manner the statutory aggravating factor of his having knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. On the facts, there was no violation of the principle established in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, that aggravating factors must be construed and applied in a nonarbitrary manner. Nor is there any question that application of the aggravating factor involved here was proper under the Alabama statute as construed by the Alabama courts. Application to vacate stay granted. Per Curiam. This matter was presented to Justice Powell on the morning of April 22, 1983, on an application for an order vacating a stay of execution, and by him referred to the Court. It is helpful to review briefly the sequence of events that preceded this application. On April 8, 1983, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered that respondent John Louis Evans III be executed on April 22, 1983, at 12:01 a. m., c. s. t. On April 19, 1983, respondent filed a petition here for a writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court and an application for stay of execution addressed to Justice Powell as Circuit Justice. At approximately 5:45 p. m., e. s. t., on April 21, 1983, Justice ALABAMA v. EVANS 231 230 Per Curiam Powell, acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice, and with the concurrence of six other Members of the Court, denied respondent’s application for a stay of execution pending disposition of his writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court. (See post, p. 1301.) At 5:23 p. m., c. s. t., on April 21, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. At approximately 9:30 p. m., c. s. t., the District Court, stating that “the time available does not permit this Court to make a meaningful review or study,” temporarily stayed the execution. The State sought an order from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacating the stay. At 12:25 a. m., e. s. t., the court denied the motion, stating that “[biased upon the telephonic oral presentation by both parties to the Court we are unable to conclude that the District Judge has abused his discretion in granting the temporary stay . . . .” Pursuant to Alabama law, the warrant to carry out the execution expires at 11:59 p. m., c. s. t., on April 22, 1983. The State seeks an order vacating the District Court’s temporary stay. Respondent has filed a response in opposition to the State’s application. Justice Powell’s order of April 21, 1983, denying respondent’s application for a stay of execution, described the lengthy proceedings that have followed respondent’s conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder committed during the course of a robbery in 1977. Respondent has exhausted his review by way of direct appeal and by way of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in April 1979. He also has had his claims heard a second time by the Alabama Supreme Court acting on a petition for a new sentencing hearing. In sum, respondent’s “constitutional challenges to Alabama’s capital-sentencing procedures have been reviewed exhaustively and repetitively by several courts in both the state and federal systems.” Post, at 1302 (Powell, J., in chambers). 232 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Per Curiam 461 U. S. Following a brief hearing on the evening of April 21, 1983, the District Court found that “counsel for petitioner conceded that all issues raised in the petition were raised in the petition previously filed before [the United States District Court] except for the issue asserted in section 12 of the petition.” Thus, in the latest petition for habeas corpus filed in this case, all but one of the grounds presented have been presented before and rejected. The one new issue now raised by respondent is a claim that the Alabama courts applied a statutory aggravating factor in an unconstitutionally broad manner. The trial court found that on numerous prior occasions respondent “knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. By Mr. Evans’ testimony, he was involved in thirty armed robberies and nine kidnappings with [codefendant] Mr. Ritter, and further claims to have been involved in approximately 250 armed robberies prior to associating with Mr. Ritter.” Evans v. State, 361 So. 2d 654, 663 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977). Respondent contends that by construing this statutory aggravating factor to encompass acts not involving the offense for which he was found guilty, the trial court construed the statute in an unconstitutionally broad manner. Respondent does not appear to have raised this challenge at any time in any of the many prior state and federal proceedings in his case. Nor was the existence of this claim made known to this Court in any of the papers filed by respondent before Justice Powell’s denial of respondent’s application for a stay of execution. The claim thus was raised for the first time in respondent’s second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed approximately seven hours before his scheduled execution. His only justification for raising this issue now is that, in his view, the decision in Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F. 2d 1227, 1265-1266 (CA11), decided in September 1982, some seven months ago, has changed the applicable law. Proffitt, however, does not address the ALABAMA v. EVANS 233 230 Per Curiam question whether this particular aggravating factor may be applied to acts unrelated to the capital offense itself. The decision in that case only applies the principle established in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980), that aggravating factors must be construed and applied in a nonarbitrary manner. On the facts of respondent’s case, there was no violation of the Godfrey principle in finding this particular aggravating circumstance. Nor is there any question that application of this aggravating factor was proper under the Alabama statute as construed by the Alabama courts. After carefully reviewing the record, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in sustaining respondent’s death sentence, stated: “The aggravating circumstances were here averred and proved at trial, and also determined by the trial judge in a public hearing, as required by law. In addition, this Court has weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently.” 361 So. 2d, at 662. Respondent’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on April 21, 1983, thus seeks to litigate several issues conclusively resolved in prior proceedings and a claim never before raised. This new claim, challenging the validity of one of the aggravating circumstances found to exist in this case, is a question of law as to which no further hearing is required. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the claim is without merit.* Accordingly, the application of the State *In a case of this kind, a district court normally should find and state substantive grounds for granting a stay of execution. In the circumstances of this case, however, we understand the difficult situation in which the District Court found itself. Judge Cox was not the judge who had reviewed this case on the previous habeas corpus petition. Apparently without notice, this second habeas corpus petition and application for a stay of execution, filed by the same counsel who had filed the previous application for a stay in this Court, was not filed until about seven hours prior to the scheduled execution time. No explanation has been offered by counsel for the timing of these applications. 234 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Burger, C. J., concurring 461 U. S. of Alabama to dissolve and vacate the stay ordered by the United States District Court is granted. It is so ordered. Justice Brennan would deny the application. Chief Justice Burger, concurring: I agree with the Court’s action vacating the temporary stay entered by Judge Emmett Cox, United States District Court, Mobile, Ala. This matter had never been before Judge Cox prior to April 21 and had been referred to him due to the absence of Judge William B. Hand, who had previously acted on the case and who was out of the State on judicial business. Far from being a matter in which there is hasty judicial action, this case has been heard and reviewed over the past six years, by not less than 14 state appellate judges and 13 federal judges, and this Court has previously acted on this case, see Hopper v. Evans, 456 U. S. 605 (1982). This case falls within a familiar* pattern of literal “eleventh hour” efforts to frustrate judicial decrees after careful and painstaking judicial consideration over a period of years. For more than six months prior to April 21 the courts were open to consider the petition presented to Judge Cox at or about 5:30 p. m., Thursday, April 21, but counsel failed to present any application for relief during that period. At that late hour a petition that could have been presented long before was thrust upon a judge who had no previous contact with the case. This Court is fully familiar with the records in the state and federal courts on Evans’ case; the claim now presented is wholly without merit and the Court appropriately vacates the stay of execution granted yesterday. *See Brooks v. Estelle, 459 U. S. 1061 (1982), and Mitchell v. Lawrence, 458 U. S. 1123 (1982). ALABAMA v. EVANS 235 230 Marshall, J., dissenting Justice Marshall, dissenting. It has long been recognized that this Court’s power to dissolve a stay “should be exercised with the greatest of caution and should be reserved for exceptional circumstances.” Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U. S. 1304, 1308 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers). Exercise of this power is proper only where the record demonstrates that the grant of a stay was clearly an abuse of discretion. Brown v. Chote, 411 U. S. 452, 457 (1973). On the basis of the papers before us, lam frankly at a loss to comprehend how the majority can conclude, in the brief time we have had to consider the matter, that the District Court abused its discretion in granting the stay and that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to vacate the stay. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Evans claimed that the Alabama Supreme Court has never determined whether his sentence is proportional to his crime in light of the sentences received by other defendants in Alabama, and that the sentencing judge gave an unconstitutionally broad construction to one of the aggravating circumstances on which the sentence was based. Although the first claim was previously considered by a Federal District Court, the relevant law has changed since that earlier decision, see Harris n. Pulley, 692 F. 2d 1189 (CA9 1982), cert, granted, 460 U. S. 1036 (1983), and the decisions of this Court firmly establish that a state prisoner may relitigate a constitutional claim “upon showing an intervening change in the law.” Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 17 (1963). The second claim has never been considered by any federal court and finds support in the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F. 2d 1227, 1265-1266 (1982). The District Court concluded that “the time available” did not “permit [the] meaningful review or study” that would be necessary to decide Evans’ claims on the merits. Evans v. 236 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Smith, Civ. Action No. 83-0391-H (SD Ala., Apr. 21, 1983). Under these circumstances, it was completely proper for the court to grant a stay of execution to afford an opportunity to decide whether Evans’ death sentence is indeed unconstitutional.* As Justice Harlan once stated, when a prisoner under a sentence of death presents a constitutional claim, a court should grant a stay even if it has “grave doubt... as to whether [the prisoner] . . . presents any substantial federal question.” Edwards v. New York, 76 S. Ct. 538, 100 L. Ed. 1523 (1956) (in chambers). This Court’s action today is particularly indefensible in view of the fact that Evans has never had an opportunity to respond to the supplementary papers that the State has filed in support of its application to vacate the stay. The State has done nothing to serve those papers, which were filed today, other than placing a copy in the mail. The papers obviously will not be received by Evans’ counsel until after it is too late. “It is . . . important that before we allow human fives to be snuffed out we be sure—emphatically sure—that we act *The issue before us is not affected by the fact that on April 21, 1983, Justice Powell, acting as Circuit Justice, denied an application for a stay of execution pending filing of a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama. Post, p. 1301. The standard governing an application for a stay pending the filing of a petition for certiorari is entirely different from the standard governing an application to vacate a stay granted by a lower court. A stay pending the filing of a petition for certiorari will be granted only where there is “ ‘a reasonable probability that four Members of the Court would find that [the] case merits review.’ ” Post, at 1302. In denying the application for a stay, Justice Powell concluded that there was no such probability. That determination has no bearing on the merits of the claims that respondent has presented to the District Court. Since the denial of certiorari “imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case,” House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42, 48 (1945), certainly a conclusion by a Circuit Justice that the Court would deny certiorari likewise is not an expression of opinion upon the merits. ALABAMA v. EVANS 237 230 Marshall, J., dissenting within the law.” Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273, 321 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The execution of Evans prior to a decision of his claims on the merits will ensure that such certainty is never achieved. I dissent. The world will not come to an end if the execution is stayed at least until Monday, to permit the District Court to hold a hearing. 238 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. OLIM ET AL. v. WAKINEKONA CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 81-1581. Argued January 19, 1983—Decided April 26, 1983 Petitioner members of a prison “Program Committee,” after investigating a breakdown in discipline and the failure of certain programs within the maximum control unit of the Hawaii State Prison outside Honolulu, singled out respondent and another inmate as troublemakers. After a hearing—respondent having been notified thereof and having retained counsel to represent him—the same Committee recommended that respondent’s classification as a maximum security risk be continued and that he be transferred to a prison on the mainland. Petitioner administrator of the Hawaii prison accepted the Committee’s recommendation, and respondent was transferred to a California state prison. Respondent then filed suit against petitioners in Federal District Court, alleging that he had been denied procedural due process because the Committee that recommended his transfer consisted of the same persons who had initiated the hearing, contrary to a Hawaii prison regulation, and because the Committee was biased against him. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Hawaii regulations governing prison transfers did not create a substantive liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: 1. An interstate prison transfer does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in and of itself. Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State so as to implicate the Due Process Clause directly when an intrastate prison transfer is made, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215; Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State. Statutes and interstate agreements recognize that, from time to time, it is necessary to transfer inmates to prisons in other States. Confinement in another State is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the transferring State to impose. Even when, as here, the transfer involves long distances and an ocean crossing, the confinement remains within constitutional limits. Pp. 244-248. 2. Nor do Hawaii’s prison regulations create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Although a State creates a protected liberty in OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 239 238 Syllabus terest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion, Hawaii’s prison regulations place no substantive limitations on the prison administrator’s discretion to transfer an inmate. For that matter, the regulations prescribe no substantive standards to guide the Program Committee whose task is to advise the administrator. Thus no significance attaches to the fact that the prison regulations require a particular kind of hearing before the administrator can exercise his unfettered discretion. Pp. 248-251. 664 F. 2d 708, reversed. Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, and in Part I of which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 251. Michael A. Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was James H. Dannenberg, Deputy Attorney General. Robert Gilbert Johnston argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Clayton C. Ikei* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, J. Kirk Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Judith W. Rogers, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Wilson L. Condon of Alaska, Aviata F. Fa’alevao of American Samoa, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Jim Smith of Florida, David H. Leroy of Idaho, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, William A. Allain of Mississippi, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Richard H. Brygn of Nevada, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert Wefald of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Island, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, William M. Leech, Jr., of Tennessee, John J. Easton of Vermont, Gerald L. Baliles of Virginia, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry of Washington, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and Steven F. Freudenthal of Wyoming; and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Stephen R. Delinsky, Barbara A. H. Smith, and Leo J. Cushing, Assistant Attorneys General, Anthony Ching, Solicitor General of Arizona, and the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Wilson L. Condon of Alaska, Aviata F. Fa’alevao of American Samoa, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, 240 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether the transfer of a prisoner from a state prison in Hawaii to one in California implicates a liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I A Respondent Delbert Kaahanui Wakinekona is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a result of his murder conviction in a Hawaii state court. He also is serving sentences for various other crimes, including rape, robbery, and escape. At the Hawaii State Prison outside Honolulu, respondent was classified as a maximum security risk and placed in the maximum control unit. Petitioner Antone Olim is the Administrator of the Hawaii State Prison. The other petitioners constituted a prison “Program Committee.” On August 2, 1976, the Committee held hearings to determine the reasons for a breakdown in discipline and the failure of certain programs within the prison’s maximum control unit. Inmates of the unit appeared at these hearings. The Committee singled out respondent and another inmate as troublemakers. On August 5, respondent received notice that the Committee, at a hearing to be held on August 10, would review his correctional program to determine whether his classification within the system should be changed and whether he should be transferred to another Hawaii facility or to a mainland institution. Jim Smith of Florida, David H. Leroy of Idaho, 'William A. Allain of Mississippi, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert 0. Wefald of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Island, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, William M. Leech, Jr., of Tennessee, John J. Easton of Vermont, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, and Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin. OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 241 238 Opinion of the Court The August 10 hearing was conducted by the same persons who had presided over the hearings on August 2. Respondent retained counsel to represent him. The Committee recommended that respondent’s classification as a maximum security risk be continued and that he be transferred to a prison on the mainland. He received the following explanation from the Committee: “The Program Committee, having reviewed your entire file, your testimony and arguments by your counsel, concluded that your control classification remains at Maximum. You are still considered a security risk in view of your escapes and subsequent convictions for serious felonies. The Committee noted the progress you made in vocational training and your expressed desire to continue in this endeavor. However your relationship with staff, who reported that you threaten and intimidate them, raises grave concerns regarding your potential for further disruptive and violent behavior. Since there is no other Maximum security prison in Hawaii which can offer you the correctional programs you require and you cannot remain at [the maximum control unit] because of impending construction of a new facility, the Program Committee recommends your transfer to an institution on the mainland.” App. 7-8. Petitioner Olim, as Administrator, accepted the Committee’s recommendation, and a few days later respondent was transferred to Folsom State Prison in California. B Rule IV of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations of the Corrections Division, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, approved in June 1976, recites that the inmate classification process is not concerned with punishment. Rather, it is intended to promote the best inter 242 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. ests of the inmate, the State, and the prison community.1 Paragraph 3 of Rule IV requires a hearing prior to a prison transfer involving “a grievous loss to the inmate,” which the Rule defines “generally” as “a serious loss to a reasonable man.” App. 21.2 The Administrator, under T2 of the Rule, is required to establish “an impartial Program Committee” to conduct such a hearing, the Committee to be “composed of at least three members who were not actively involved in the process by which the inmate . . . was brought before the Committee.” App. 20. Under 113, the Committee must give the inmate written notice of the hearing, permit him, with certain stated exceptions, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, afford him an opportunity to be heard, and apprise him of the Committee’s findings. App. 21-24.3 The Committee is directed to make a recommendation to the Administrator, who then decides what action to take: “[The Administrator] may, as the final decisionmaker: “(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or “(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or welfare of the staff, inmate 1 Paragraph 1 of Rule IV states: “An inmate’s . . . classification determines where he is best situated within the Corrections Division. Rather than being concerned with isolated aspects of the individual or punishment (as is the adjustment process), classification is a dynamic process which considers the individual, his history, his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division, the other inmates . . . , the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors. It never inflicts punishment; on the contrary, even the imposition of a stricter classification is intended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and the community. In short, classification is a continuing evaluation of each individual to ensure that he is given the optimum placement within the Corrections Division.” App. 20. 2 Petitioners concede, “for purposes of the argument,” that respondent suffered a “grievous loss” within the meaning of Rule IV when he was transferred from Hawaii to the mainland. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 25. 3 Rule V provides that an inmate may retain legal counsel if his hearing concerns a “potential Interstate transfer.” App. 25. OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 243 238 Opinion of the Court . . . , other inmates . . . , institution, or community and refer the matter back to the Program Committee for further study and recommendation.” Rule IV, 5I3d(3), App. 24. The regulations contain no standards governing the Administrator’s exercise of his discretion. See Lono n. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 144-145, 621 P. 2d 976, 980-981 (1981). C Respondent filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against petitioners as the state officials who caused his transfer. He alleged that he had been denied procedural due process because the Committee that recommended his transfer consisted of the same persons who had initiated the hearing, this being in specific violation of Rule IV, 112, and because the Committee was biased against him. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the complaint, holding that the Hawaii regulations governing prison transfers do not create a substantive liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 459 F. Supp. 473 (1978).4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed. 664 F. 2d 708 (1981). It held that Hawaii had created a constitutionally protected liberty interest by promulgating Rule IV. In so doing, the court declined to follow cases from other Courts of Appeals holding that certain procedures mandated by prison transfer regulations do not create a liberty interest. See, e. g., Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d 934 (CA2 1979); Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F. 2d 13 (CAI 1977). The court reasoned that Rule IV gives Hawaii prisoners a justifiable expectation that they will not be transferred to the mainland absent a hearing, before an impartial committee, concerning the facts alleged in the 4 Respondent also had alleged that the transfer violated the Hawaii Constitution and state regulations and statutes. In light of its dismissal of respondent’s federal claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over these state-law claims. 459 F. Supp., at 476. 244 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. prehearing notice.6 Because the Court of Appeals’ decision created a conflict among the Circuits, and because the case presents the further question whether the Due Process Clause in and of itself protects against interstate prison transfers, we granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 1005 (1982). II In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montanye n. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976), this Court held that an intrastate prison transfer does not directly implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Meachum, inmates at a Massachusetts medium security prison had been transferred to a maximum security prison in that Commonwealth. In Montanye, a companion case, an inmate had been transferred from one maximum security New York prison to another as punishment for a breach of prison rules. This Court rejected “the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.” Meachum, 427 ,U. S., at 224 (emphasis in original). It went on to state: “The initial decision to assign the convict to a particular institution is not subject to audit under the Due Process Clause, although the degree of confinement in one prison may be quite different from that in another. The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant’s lib 6 Several months before the Court of Appeals handed down its decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii had held that because Hawaii’s prison regulations do not limit the Administrator’s discretion to transfer prisoners to the mainland, they do not create any liberty interest. Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 621 P. 2d 976 (1981). In a petition for rehearing in the present case, petitioners directed the Ninth Circuit’s attention to the Lono decision. See 664 F. 2d, at 714. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the Hawaii court’s interpretation of the regulations was not different from its own; the Hawaii court merely had reached a different result on the “federal question.” The Court of Appeals thus adhered to its resolution of the case. Id., at 714-715. OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 245 238 Opinion of the Court erty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons. “Neither, in our view, does the Due Process Clause in and of itself protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Id., at 224-225 (emphasis in original). The Court observed that, although prisoners retain a residuum of liberty, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-556 (1974), a holding that “any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts.” 427 U. S., at 225 (emphasis in original). Applying the Meachum and Montanye principles in Vitek n. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980), this Court held that the transfer of an inmate from a prison to a mental hospital did implicate a liberty interest. Placement in the mental hospital was “not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects ah individual,” because it brought about “consequences . . . qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime.” Id., at 493. Respondent argues that the same is true of confinement of a Hawaii prisoner on the mainland, and that Vitek therefore controls. We do not agree. Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State.6 Often, con 6 Indeed, in Vitek itself the Court did not read Meachum and Montanye as stating a rule applicable only to intrastate transfers. The Court stated: “In Meachum n. Fano . . . and Montanye v. Haymes ... we held that the 246 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. finement in the inmate’s home State will not be possible. A person convicted of a federal crime in a State without a federal correctional facility usually will serve his sentence in another State. Overcrowding and the need to separate particular prisoners may necessitate interstate transfers. For any number of reasons, a State may lack prison facilities capable of providing appropriate correctional programs for all offenders. Statutes and interstate agreements recognize that, from time to time, it is necessary to transfer inmates to prisons in other States. On the federal level, 18 U. S. C. § 5003(a) authorizes the Attorney General to contract with a State for the transfer of a state prisoner to a federal prison, whether in that State or another. See Howe v. Smith, 452 U. S. 473 (1981).* 7 Title 18 U. S. C. §4002 (1976 ed. and Supp. V) permits the Attorney General to contract with any State for the placement of a federal prisoner in state custody for up to three years. Neither statute requires that the prisoner remain in the State in which he was convicted and sentenced. On the state level, many States have statutes providing for the transfer of a state prisoner to a federal prison, e. g., Haw. Rev. Stat. §353-18 (1976), or another State’s prison, e. g., Alaska Stat. Ann. §33.30.100 (1982). Corrections compacts between States, implemented by statutes, authorize incarceration of a prisoner of one State in another State’s prison. See, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 11189 (West 1982) (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); §11190 (codifying Western Interstate Corrections Compact); Conn. Gen. transfer of a prisoner from one prison to another does not infringe a protected liberty interest.” 445 U. S., at 489 (emphasis added). The Court’s other cases describing Meachum and Montanye also have eschewed the narrow reading respondent now proposes. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 467-468 (1983); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976). 7 This statute has been invoked to transfer prisoners from Hawaii state facilities to federal prisons on the mainland. See Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F. 2d 1130 (CA7 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hawaii v. Mederios, 453 U. S. 902 (1981). OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 247 238 Opinion of the Court Stat. § 18-102 (1981) (codifying New England Interstate Corrections Compact); § 18-106 (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); Haw. Rev. Stat. §355-1 (1976) (codifying Western Interstate Corrections Compact); Idaho Code § 20-701 (1979) (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 196.610 (1982) (same). And prison regulations such as Hawaii’s Rule IV anticipate that inmates sometimes will be transferred to prisons in other States. In short, it is neither unreasonable nor unusual for an inmate to serve practically his entire sentence in a State other than the one in which he was convicted and sentenced, or to be transferred to an out-of-state prison after serving a portion of his sentence in his home State. Confinement in another State, unlike confinement in a mental institution, is “within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Meachum, 427 U. S., at 225.8 Even when, as here, the transfer involves long distances and an ocean crossing, the confinement remains within constitutional limits. The difference between such a transfer and an intrastate or interstate transfer of 8 After the decisions in Meachum and Montanye, courts almost uniformly have held that an inmate has no entitlement to remain in a prison in his home State. See Beshaw v. 'Fenton, 635 F. 2d 239, 246-247 (CA3 1980), cert, denied, 453 U. S. 912 (1981); Cof one v. Manson, 594 F. 2d 934, 937, n. 4 (CA2 1979); Sisbarro v. Warden, 592 F. 2d 1, 3 (CAI), cert, denied, 444 U. S. 849 (1979); Fletcher v. Warden, 467 F. Supp. 777, 779-780 (Kan. 1979); Curry-Bey v. Jackson, 422 F. Supp. 926, 931-933 (DC 1976); McDonnell v. United States Attorney General, 420 F. Supp. 217, 220 (ED IU. 1976); Goodnow v. Perrin, 120 N. H. 669, 671, 421 A. 2d 1008, 1010 (1980); Girouard v. Hogan, 135 Vt. 448, 449-450, 378 A. 2d 105, 106-107 (1977); In re Young, 95 Wash. 2d 216, 227-228, 622 P. 2d 373, 379 (1980); cf. Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F. 2d 468 (CA9 1974) (pre-Meachum transfers from Alaska to other States); Hillen v. Director of Department of Social Services, 455 F. 2d 510 (CA9), cert, denied, 409 U. S. 989 (1972) (pre-Meachum transfer from Hawaii to California). But see In re Young, 95 Wash. 2d, at 233, 622 P. 2d, at 382 (concurring opinion); State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N. W. 2d 621 (N. D. 1977); cf. Tai n. Thompson, 387 F. Supp. 912 (Haw. 1975) (pre-Meachum transfer). 248 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. shorter distance is a matter of degree, not of kind,9 and Meachum instructs that “the determining factor is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight.” 427 U. S., at 224. The reasoning of Meachum and Montanye compels the conclusion that an interstate prison transfer, including one from Hawaii to California, does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in and of itself. Ill The Court of Appeals held that Hawaii’s prison regulations create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In Meachum, however, the State had “conferred no right on the 9 Respondent’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. The Court in Montanye took note that among the hardships that may result from a prison transfer are separation of the inmate from home and family, separation from inmate friends, placement in a new and possibly hostile environment, difficulty in making contact with counsel, and interruption of educational and rehabilitative programs. 427 U. S., at 241, n. 4. These are the same hardships respondent faces as a result of his transfer from Hawaii to California. Respondent attempts to analogize his transfer to banishment in the English sense of “beyond the seas,” arguing that banishment surely is not within the range of confinement justified by his sentence. But respondent in no sense has been banished; his conviction, not the transfer, deprived him of his right freely to inhabit the State. The fact that his confinement takes place outside Hawaii is merely a fortuitous consequence of the fact that he must be confined, not an additional element of his punishment. See Girouard v. Hogan, 135 Vt., at 449-450, 378 A. 2d, at 106-107. Moreover, respondent has not been exiled; he remains within the United States. In essence, respondent’s banishment argument simply restates his claim that a transfer from Hawaii to the mainland is different in kind from other transfers. As has been shown in the text, however, respondent’s transfer was authorized by his conviction. A conviction, whether in Hawaii, Alaska, or one of the contiguous 48 States, empowers the State to confine the inmate in any penal institution in any State unless there is state law to the contrary or the reason for confining the inmate in a particular institution is itself constitutionally impermissible. See Montanye, 427 U. S., at 242; id., at 244 (dissenting opinion); Cruz n. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972); Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F. 2d, at 470. OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 249 238 Opinion of the Court prisoner to remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of misconduct,” 427 U. S., at 226, and “ha[d] not represented that transfers {would] occur only on the occurrence of certain events,” id., at 228. Because the State had retained “discretion to transfer [the prisoner] for whatever reason or for no reason at all,” ibid., the Court found that the State had not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Similarly, because the state law at issue in Montanye “impose[d] no conditions on the discretionary power to transfer,” 427 U. S., at 243, there was no basis for invoking the protections of the Due Process Clause. These cases demonstrate that a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion. An inmate must show “that particularized standards or criteria guide the State’s decisionmakers.” Connecticut Board of Pardons n. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 467 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). If the decisionmaker is not “required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria,” but instead “can deny the requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all,” ibid., the State has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See id., at.466-467 (opinion of the Court); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S., at 488-491 (summarizing cases). Hawaii’s prison regulations place no substantive limitations on official discretion and thus create no liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause. As Rule IV itself makes clear, and as the Supreme Court of Hawaii has held in Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw., at 144-145, 621 P. 2d, at 980-981, the prison Administrator’s discretion to transfer an inmate is completely unfettered. No standards govern or restrict the Administrator’s determination. Because the Administrator is the only decisionmaker under Rule IV, we need not decide whether the introductory para 250 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. graph of Rule IV, see n. 1, supra, places any substantive limitations on the purely advisory Program Committee.10 The Court of Appeals thus erred in attributing significance to the fact that the prison regulations require a particular kind of hearing before the Administrator can exercise his unfettered discretion.11 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently stated in Shango v. Jurich, 681 F. 2d 1091, 1100-1101 (1982), “[a] liberty interest is of course a substantive interest of an individual; it cannot be the right to demand needless formality.”12 Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement. See generally Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 146, 186 (1983). If officials may transfer a prisoner “for whatever reason or for no reason at all,” Meachum, 427 U. S., at 228, there is no such interest for process to protect. The State may choose to require procedures for reasons other than protection against deprivation of substantive 10 In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983), unlike this case, state law limited the decisionmakers’ discretion. To the extent the dissent doubts that the Administrator’s discretion under Rule IV is truly unfettered, post, at 258, and n. 11, it doubts the ability or authority of the Hawaii Supreme Court to construe state law. 11 In Meachum itself, the Court of Appeals had interpreted the applicable regulations as entitling inmates to a pretransfer hearing, see Fano v. Meachum, 520 F. 2d 374, 379-380 (CAI 1975), but this Court held that state law created no liberty interest. 12 Other courts agree that an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e. g., United States v. Jiles, 658 F. 2d 194, 200 (CA3 1981), cert, denied, 455 U. S. 923 (1982); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F. 2d 1287, 1298-1299 (CA6 1980); Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F. 2d 916, 924-925 (CA2 1980); Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d, at 938; Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F. 2d 13, 14-16 (CAI 1977); Adams v. Wainwright, 512 F. Supp. 948, 953 (ND Fla. 1981); Lono n. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw., at 144-145, 621 P. 2d, at 980-981. OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 251 238 Marshall, J., dissenting rights, of course,13 but in making that choice the State does not create an independent substantive right. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 471 (1983). IV In sum, we hold that the transfer of respondent from Hawaii to California did not implicate the Due Process Clause directly, and that Hawaii’s prison regulations do not create a protected liberty interest.14 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joins, and with whom Justice Stevens joins as to Part I, dissenting. In my view, the transfer of respondent Delbert Kaahanui Wakinekona from a prison in Hawaii to a prison in California implicated an interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I respectfully dissent. I An inmate’s liberty interest is not limited to whatever a State chooses to bestow upon him. An inmate retains a significant residuum of constitutionally protected liberty following his incarceration independent of any state law. As we stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-556 (1974): “[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons 13 Petitioners assert that the hearings required by Rule IV not only enable the officials to gather information and thereby to exercise their discretion intelligently, but also have a therapeutic purpose: inmate participation in the decisionmaking process, it is hoped, reduces tension in the prison. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-53. 14 In light of this conclusion, respondent’s claim of bias in the composition of the prison Program Committee becomes irrelevant. 252 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. of this country. . . . [Prisoners] may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” In determining whether a change in the conditions of imprisonment implicates a prisoner’s retained liberty interest, the relevant question is whether the change constitutes a sufficiently “grievous loss” to trigger the protection of due process. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 488 (1980). See Morrissey n. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972), citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The answer depends in part on a comparison of “the treatment of the particular prisoner with the customary, habitual treatment of the population of the prison as a whole.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 486 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This principle was established in our decision in Vitek, which held that the transfer of an inmate from a prison to a mental hospital implicated a liberty interest because it brought about “consequences . . . qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime.” 445 U. S., at 493. Because a significant qualitative change in the conditions of confinement is not “within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual,” ibid., such a change implicates a prisoner’s protected liberty interest. There can be little doubt that the transfer of Wakinekona from a Hawaii prison to a prison in California represents a substantial qualitative change in the conditions of his confinement. In addition to being incarcerated, which is the ordinary consequence of a criminal conviction and sentence, Wakinekona has in effect been banished from his home, a punishment historically considered to be “among the severest.”1 For an indeterminate period of time, possibly the 14 J. Elliott, Debates on the Federal Constitution 555 (1836). Whether it is called banishment, exile, deportation, relegation, or transportation, compelling a person “to quit a city, place, or country, for a specified period of time, or for life,” has long been considered a unique and severe deprivation, and was specifically outlawed by “[t]he twelfth section of the English OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 253 238 Marshall, J., dissenting rest of his life, nearly 2,500 miles of ocean will separate him from his family and friends. As a practical matter, Waki-nekona may be entirely cut off from his only contacts with the outside world, just as if he had been imprisoned in an institution which prohibited visits by outsiders. Surely the isolation imposed on him by the transfer is far more drastic than that which normally accompanies imprisonment. I cannot agree with the Court that Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236, 243 (1976), compel the conclusion that Wakinekona’s transfer implicates no liberty interest. Ante, at 248. Both cases involved transfers of prisoners between institutions located within the same State in which they were convicted, and the Court expressly phrased its holdings in terms of inirastate transfers.2 Both decisions rested on the premise that no liberty interest is implicated by an initial decision to place a prisoner in one institution in the State rather than another. See Meachum, supra, at 224; Montanye, supra, at 243. On the basis of that premise, the Court concluded that the subsequent transfer of a prisoner to a different facility within the State likewise implicates no liberty interest. In this case, however, we cannot assume that a State’s initial placement of an individual in a prison far removed from his family and residence would raise no due process questions. None of our Habeas Corpus Act, 31 Car. II, one of the three great muniments of English liberty.” United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 269-270 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 2 Thus in Meachum the Court stated that the State, by convicting the defendant, was “empower[ed] to confine him in any of its prisons,” 427 U. S., at 224 (emphasis deleted), that a “transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system” implicated no due process interest, id., at 225, and that “[c]onfinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Ibid. See also Montanye, 421 U. S., at 242 (“We held in Meachum v. Fano, that no Due Process Clause liberty interest of a duly convicted prison inmate is infringed when he is transferred from one prison to another within the State”). 254 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. prior decisions has indicated that such a decision would be immune from scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. Actual experience simply does not bear out the Court’s assumptions that interstate transfers are routine and that it is “not unusual” for a prisoner “to serve practically his entire sentence in a State other than the one in which he was convicted and sentenced.” Ante, at 247. In Hawaii less than three percent of the state prisoners were transferred to prisons in other jurisdictions in 1979, and on a nationwide basis less than one percent of the prisoners held in state institutions were transferred to other jurisdictions.3 Moreover, the vast majority of state prisoners are held in facilities located less than 250 miles from their homes.4 Measured against these norms, Wakinekona’s transfer to a California prison represents a punishment “qualitively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime.” Vitek v. Jones, supra, at 493. I therefore cannot agree that a State may transfer its prisoners at will, to any place, for any reason, without ever implicating any interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. II Nor can I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Hawaii’s prison regulations do not create a liberty interest. This Court’s prior decisions establish that a liberty interest 8U. S. Dept, of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1981, Table 6.27, pp. 478-479 (T. Flanagan, D. Van Alstyne, & M. Gottfredson eds. 1982). These figures reflect “all inmates who were transferred from one State’s jurisdiction to another to continue sentences already in force,” and “[d]oes not include the release if [the] State does not relinquish jurisdiction.” Id., at 590. 4U. S. Dept, of Justice, Profile of State Prison Inmates: Sociodemographic Findings from the 1974 Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities 1 (1979). Over 70 percent of state inmates are held in institutions located less than 250 miles from their homes. OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 255 238 Marshall, J., dissenting may be “created”5 by state laws, prison rules, regulations, or practices. State laws that impose substantive criteria which limit or guide the discretion of officials have been held to create a protected liberty interest. See, e. g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983); Wolff n. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979); Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (ND Cal. 1976), summarily aff’d, 434 U. S. 1052 (1978). By contrast, a liberty interest is not created by a law which “imposes no conditions on [prison officials’] discretionary power,” Montanye, supra, at 243, authorizes prison officials to act “for whatever reason or for no reason at all,” Meachum, supra, at 228, or accords officials “unfettered discretion,” Connecticut Board of Pardons n. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 466 (1981). The Court misapplies these principles in concluding that Hawaii’s prison regulations leave prison officials with unfettered discretion to transfer inmates. Ante, at 249-250. Rule IV establishes a scheme under which inmates are classified upon initial placement in an institution, and must subsequently be reclassified before they can be transferred to another institution. Under the Rule the standard for classifying inmates is their “optimum placement within the Corrections Division” in light of the “best interests of the individual, the State, and the community.”6 In classifying inmates, the Program 6 But see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 488 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Prison regulations “provide evidentiary support for the conclusion that the transfer affects a constitutionally protected interest in liberty,” but they “do not create that interest” (emphasis in original)). 6 Paragraph 1 of Rule IV provides: “An inmate’s/ward’s classification determines where he is best situated within the Corrections Division. Rather than being concerned with isolated aspects of the individual or punishment (as is the adjustment process), classification is a dynamic process which considers the individual, his history, his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division, the other inmates/wards, the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors. It never inflicts punishment; on 256 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Committee may not consider punitive aims. It may consider only factors relevant to determining where the individual will be “best situated,” such as “his history, his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Divisions, the other inmates/wards, the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors.” Paragraph 3 of Rule IV establishes a detailed set of procedures applicable when, as in this case, the reclassification of a prisoner may lead to a transfer involving a “grievous loss,” a phrase contained in the Rule itself.* 7 The procedural rules are cast in mandatory language, and cover such matters as notice, access to information, hearing, confrontation and cross-examination, and the basis on which the Committee is to make its recommendation to the facility administrator. The limitations imposed by Rule IV are at least as substantial as those found sufficient to create a liberty interest in Hewitt v. Helms, supra, decided earlier this Term. In Hewitt an inmate contended that his confinement in administrative custody implicated an interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. State law provided that a prison official could place inmates in administrative custody “upon his assessment of the situation and the need for control,” or “where it has been determined that there is a threat of a serious disturbance, or a serious threat to the individual or others,” and mandated certain procedures such as notice and a the contrary, even the imposition of a stricter classification is intended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and the community. In short, classification is a continuing evaluation of each individual to ensure that he is given the optimum placement within the Corrections Division.” App. 20. 7 While the term “grievous loss” is not explicitly defined, the prison regulations treat a transfer to the mainland as a grievous loss entitling an inmate to the procedural rights established in Rule IV, 113. This is readily inferred from Rule IV, 113, which states that intrastate transfers do not involve a grievous loss, and Rule V, which permits inmates to retain counsel only in specified circumstances, one of which is a reclassification that may result in an interstate transfer. App. 25. OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 257 238 Marshall, J., dissenting hearing.8 This Court construed the phrases “‘the need for control,’ or ‘the threat of a serious disturbance,’ ” as “substantive predicates” which restricted official discretion. Id., at 472. These restrictions, in combination with the mandatory procedural safeguards, “demanfded] a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest.” Ibid. Rule IV is not distinguishable in any meaningful respect from the provisions at issue in Helms. The procedural requirements contained in Rule IV are, if anything, far more elaborate than those involved in Helms, and are likewise couched in “language of an unmistakably mandatory character.” Id., at 471. Moreover, Rule IV, to no less an extent than the state law at issue in Helms, imposes substantive criteria restricting official discretion. In Helms this Court held that a statutory phrase such as “the need for control” constituted a limitation on the discretion of prison officials to place inmates in administrative custody. In my view Rule IV, which states that transfers are intended to ensure an inmate’s “optimum placement” in accordance with considerations which include “his changing needs [and] the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division,” also restricts official discretion in ordering transfers.9 The Court suggests that, even if the Program Committee does not have unlimited discretion in making recommendations for classifications and transfers, this cannot give rise to a state-created liberty interest because the prison Administrator retains “completely unfettered” “discretion to transfer 8See 459 U. S., at 470-471, n. 6. 9 See also Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F. Supp. 397 (ND Cal. 1976), summarily aff’d, 434 U. S. 1052 (1978). In that case, the District Court held that the language of a prison policy statement, stating that “[i]nmates may be segregated for medical, psychiatric, disciplinary, or administrative reasons,” 462 F. Supp., at 403, was sufficient to create a protected expectation that an inmate would not be segregated for arbitrary reasons. See also Bills v. Henderson, 631 F. 2d 1287, 1293 (CA6 1980), cert, denied, 449 U. S. 1093 (1981); Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F. 2d 996, 107 (CA3 1980) (en banc). 258 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Marshall, J., dissenting 461 U. S. an inmate,” ante, at 249. I disagree. Rule IV, 513(d)(3), provides for review by the prison Administrator of recommendations forwarded to him by the Program Committee.10 Even if this provision must be construed as authorizing the Administrator to transfer a prisoner for wholly arbitrary reasons,11 that mere possibility does not defeat the protectible expectation otherwise created by Hawaii’s reclassification and transfer scheme that transfers will take place only if required to ensure an inmate’s optimum placement. In Helms a prison regulation also left open the possibility that the Superintendent could decide, for any reason or no reason at all, whether an inmate should be confined in administrative custody.12 This Court nevertheless held that the state scheme as a whole created an interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 459 U. S., at 471-472. Helms thus necessarily rejects the view that state laws which impose substantive 10 Rule IV, T 3(d)(3), provides: “The facility administrator will, within a reasonable period of time, review the Program Committee’s recommendation. He may, as the final decisionmaker: “(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or “(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or welfare of the staff, inmate/ward, other inmates/wards, institution, or community and refer the matter back to the Program Committee for further study and recommendation.” App. 21. 111 doubt that Rule IV would be construed to permit the Administrator to order a transfer for punitive reasons, since Rule IV expressly disallows punitive transfers. 12 That provision stated: “All decisions of the Program Review Committee shall be reviewed by the Superintendent for his sustaining the decision or amending or reversing the decision in favor of the inmate.” Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction Administrative Directive BC-ADM 801, Rule 111(H)(7). App. to Brief for Respondent in Hewitt v. Helms, 0. T. 1982, No. 81-638, p. 12a. Because an inmate could be confined in administrative custody only if the Program Review Committee determined that such confinement is and continues to be “appropriate,” id., at 18a, the Superintendent in Helms was the “decisionmaker,” ante, at 249-250, who determined whether inmates would be held in administrative custody. OLIM v. WAKINEKONA 259 238 Marshall, J., dissenting limitations and elaborate procedural requirements on official conduct create no liberty interest solely because there remains the possibility that an official will act in an arbitrary manner at the end of the process.13 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 13 This view was also implicitly rejected in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979). The Court held that the Nebraska statute governing the decision whether or not to grant parole created a “pro-tectible entitlement,” id., at 12, even though the statute, which listed a number of factors to be considered in the parole decision, also authorized the Parole Board to deny parole on the basis of “[a]ny other factors the board determines to be relevant.” Id., at 18. To the extent that Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 144-145, 621 P. 2d 976, 980-981 (1981), on which the majority relies, ante, at 249, suggests that no liberty interest is created as state law has not entirely eliminated the possibility of arbitrary action, it is inconsistent with both Helms and Greenholtz. 260 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. JIM McNEFF, INC. v. TODD ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 81-2150. Argued January 17, 1983—Decided April 27, 1983 Section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) authorizes construction industry employers and unions to enter into so-called “prehire” agreements setting the terms and conditions of employment for workers hired by the signatory employer without the union’s majority status first having been established under § 9 of the Act. Section 8(f) also provides that such an agreement shall not bar a petition for a representative election under § 9. A local union and a contractors association entered into a Master Labor Agreement which provided that work at jobsites was to be performed only by subcontractors who had signed a labor agreement with the union and that covered employees, including those of subcontractors, must become union members. The agreement also required employers to make monthly contributions to fringe benefit trust funds on behalf of covered employees. When petitioner subcontractor began work on a jobsite, it was not a signatory to a labor agreement with the union, and none of its employees on the jobsite were union members. Upon being notified by representatives of the union and the general contractor that it was required to do so, petitioner became a signatory to the Master Labor Agreement, and its employees signed union cards. After petitioner submitted monthly reports to the union trust funds, falsely stating that “no members of this craft were employed during this month,” petitioner on several occasions postponed audits requested by respondents, the trustees of the funds, to verify the monthly reports. Respondents then filed suit in Federal District Court under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act to compel an accounting and to recover payment of any trust fund contributions found to be due. The District Court entered summary judgment for respondents and ordered payment of unpaid contributions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Monetary obligations assumed by an employer under a prehire contract authorized by § 8(f) may be recovered in a § 301 action brought by a union prior to repudiation of the contract by the employer, even though the union has not obtained majority support in the relevant unit. Pp. 265-272. (a) In authorizing § 8(f) prehire contracts even though the union’s majority status was not first established, Congress recognized that because of the uniquely temporary, transitory, and sometimes seasonal nature of JIM McNEFF, INC. v. TODD 261 260 Syllabus construction industry employment, unions often would not be able to establish majority support with respect to many bargaining units. Congress also recognized that an employer must know labor costs in preparing contract bids and must have available a supply of skilled craftsmen for quick referral. Pp. 265-267. (b) The question presented was not decided by NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, which held that § 8(b)(7)(C) of the NLRA, prohibiting picketing to force an employer to recognize a union that is not the certified representative of the employees in the relevant unit, was violated by a union’s picketing to enforce a § 8(f) contract with the employer where the union had failed to request a timely representative election. That decision was based on Congress’ intent, when it enacted § 8(f), to protect employees’ rights to select their own bargaining representatives, and to ensure that prehire agreements are arrived at voluntarily and are voidable until the union attains majority support in the relevant unit. However, union enforcement, by way of a § 301 suit, of monetary obligations incurred by an employer under a prehire contract prior to its repudiation does not impair the right of employees to select their own bargaining agent, or trench on the voluntary and voidable characteristics of a § 8(f) prehire agreement. Allowing an action such as respondents’ vindicates Congress’ policies in authorizing prehire contracts to meet problems unique to the construction industry. When a § 8(f) agreement is voluntarily executed, as here, both parties must abide by its terms until it is repudiated. Pp. 267-271. 667 F. 2d 800, affirmed. Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. James T. Winkler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Steven D. Atkinson. Wayne Jett argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Julius Reich* *Richard P. Markey filed a brief for Associated Builders and Contractors Inc. as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Barbara E. Etkind, and T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., for the United States; by J. Albert Woll, Laurence J. Cohen, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.; by Denis F. Gordon for the National Coordinating Committee for Multiemployer Plans; by John H. Stephens, George M. Cox, and Michael Futch for the Carpenters 262 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to resolve conflicts in the Circuits as to whether monetary obligations that have accrued under a prehire contract authorized by § 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 73 Stat. 545, 29 U. S. C. § 158(f), can be enforced, prior to the repudiation of such a contract, in a suit brought by a union against an employer under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185, absent proof that the union represented a majority of the employees. I Petitioner is engaged in the construction industry and, in September 1978, was a subcontractor on a jobsite in southern California. The general contractor was contractually bound to the Master Labor Agreement negotiated between the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 12, and the Southern California General Contractors Associations. The Master Labor Agreement provided that work at the jobsite was to be performed only by subcontractors who had signed a labor agreement with the Union.* 1 The Master Labor Agreement also contained a union security clause requiring covered employees, including those of subcontrac Trust Funds for Southern California et al.; and by Daniel L. Stewart for the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. 1 Article IV, § D, of the agreement provides: “The Contractor agrees that neither he nor any of his subcontractors on the jobsite will subcontract any work to be done at the site of construction, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or other work (including quarries, rock, sand and gravel plants, asphalt plants, ready-mix concrete plants, established on or adjacent to the jobsite to process or supply materials for the convenience of the Contractor for jobsite use), except to a person, firm or corporation, party to an appropriate, current labor agreement with the appropriate Union, or subordinate body signatory to this Agreement.” App. 39. JIM McNEFF, INC. v. TODD 263 260 Opinion of the Court tors, to become members of the Union.2 At the time petitioner began work on the jobsite as a subcontractor, it was not a signatory to a labor agreement with the Union and none of its employees on the jobsite were members of the Union. On September 13, 1978, petitioner’s president, McNeff, was approached on the jobsite by a representative of the Union who informed him that in order to remain on the project he was required to sign the Master Labor Agreement. McNeff refiised. Later that day, the Union representative returned with a representative of the general contractor who also informed McNeff that he was required to sign the agreement in order to remain on the project. McNeff then signed the agreement on behalf of petitioner.3 Petitioner’s employees signed union cards that same day. The Master Labor Agreement required petitioner to make monthly contributions to fringe benefit trust funds on behalf of each covered employee.4 From October 1978 through 2 Article II, §§ D and E, of the agreement provide: “D. Employees employed by one or more of the Contractors for a period of eight (8) days continuously or accumulatively under the work jurisdiction of a particular Union as that term is defined herein shall be or become on the eighth (Sth) day or eight (8) days after the effective date of this Agreement, whichever is later, members of such Union and shall remain members of such Union as a condition of continued employment. Membership in such Union shall be available upon terms and qualifications not more burdensome than those applicable at such times to other applicants for membership to such Union. “E. The Contractor shall discharge any employee pursuant to the foregoing section upon written notice from the Union of such employee’s nonpayment of initiation fees or dues.” App. 38. 8 Specifically, petitioner entered into an agreement that adopted the Master Labor Agreement “in its entirety,” with certain exceptions that are not relevant to this case. Id., at 9-13. 4 The agreement provides: “The undersigned employer by his signature acknowledges receipt of a true and correct copy of the Agreement establishing the Operating Engineers Trusts: “AND, further by his signature, accepts all of the terms and conditions of said Trust Agreements and agrees to be bound thereto in every way, 264 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. March 1979 petitioner submitted required monthly reports to the trust funds, but made no contributions. Each form was submitted by petitioner with the false notation that “no members of this craft were employed during this month.” In November 1978, after petitioner had filed the first of such reports, respondents, the trustees of the funds, requested permission from petitioner to audit its records to verify the statements made in its monthly report. Petitioner purported to agree, but postponed the audit several times. On April 4, 1979, respondents brought this suit under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 185,* 6 to compel an accounting and payment of any contributions found to be due the trust funds. An audit performed in pretrial discovery proceedings revealed that petitioner had five employees covered by the agreement during the period October 1978 through March 1979 and therefore owed a total of $5,316.79 in trust fund contributions for that period. The District Court for the Central District of California granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment and ordered payment of the unpaid trust fund contributions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 667 F. 2d 800 (1982). including the obligation to make periodic contributions and payments pursuant to the requirement of the Board of Trustees consistent with said Trust Agreements and the Collective Bargaining Agreement between said employer and Local 12, International Union of Operating Engineers.” Id., at 12-13. The record shows that McNeff initialed petitioner’s acceptance of the following trust fund obligations: (1) pension trust; (2) health and welfare trust; (3) vacation-holiday trust; (4) apprentice trust; (5) journeyman training trust; and (6) industry fund trust. Id., at 13. 6 Section 301(a) provides: “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 61 Stat. 156. JIM McNEFF, INC. v. TODD 265 260 Opinion of the Court We granted certiorari, 458 U. S. 1120 (1982), in part to resolve Circuit conflicts on this issue,6 and we affirm. II By authorizing so-called “prehire” agreements like that at issue in this case, § 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(f), exempts construction industry employers and unions from the general rule precluding a union and an employer from signing “a collective-bargaining agreement recognizing the union as the exclusive bargaining representative when in fact only a minority of the employees have authorized the union to represent their interests.” NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 344-345 (1978) (Higdon). See Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 731, 737-738 (1961). Section 8(f) provides in pertinent part: “It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building and construction employees are members . . . because (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established under the provisions of section 9 of this Act prior to the making of such agreement. . . : Provided . . . That any agreement * 1 6 Compare 'Washington Area Carpenters’ Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co. of Metropolitan Washington, 220 U. S. App. D. C. 273, 681 F. 2d 1 (1982); 667 F. 2d 800 (CA9 1982) (case below); W. C. James, Inc. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, 646 F. 2d 1292 (CA8 1981); New Mexico District Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co., 664 F. 2d 215 (CAIO 1981); and Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engineers Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co., 638 F. 2d 1128 (CAS 1981), with Laborers District Council of Alabama v. McDowell Contractors, Inc., 680 F. 2d 94 (CA11 1982), and Baton Rouge Building & Construction Trades Council v. E. C. Schafer Construction Co., 657 F. 2d 806 (CA5 1981). 266 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e).” 73 Stat. 545. Thus, §8(f) allows construction industry employers and unions to enter into agreements setting the terms and conditions of employment for the workers hired by the signatory employer without the union’s majority status first having been established in the manner provided for under § 9 of the Act. One factor prompting Congress to enact § 8(f) was the uniquely temporary, transitory, and sometimes seasonal nature of much of the employment in the construction industry. Congress recognized that construction industry unions often would not be able to establish majority support with respect to many bargaining units. See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 55-56 (1959), 1 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, pp. 451-452 (Leg. Hist.). Congress was also cognizant of the construction industry employer’s need to “know his labor costs before making the estimate upon which his bid will be based” and that “the employer must be able to have available a supply of skilled craftsmen for quick referral.” H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 777. See generally, Higdon, supra, at 348-349. We first addressed the enforceability of a §8(f) prehire agreement in Higdon. In response to the employer’s violation of a prehire agreement, the minority union in that case picketed the employer for more than 30 days without filing an election petition. The National Labor Relations Board concluded that such picketing violated § 8(b)(7)(C). Section 8(b)(7)(C) was intended to ensure voluntary, uncoerced selection of a bargaining representative by employees; unless a union is the certified representative of the employees in the relevant unit, it prohibits picketing to force an employer “to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees.” In Higdon, we affirmed the Board’s view that a prehire agreement does not make a union JIM McNEFF, INC. v. TODD 267 260 Opinion of the Court the “representative of [an employer’s] employees” as that language is used in § 8(b)(7)(C): “[Absent] majority credentials . . . , the collectivebargaining relationship and the union’s entitlement to act as the exclusive bargaining agent had never matured. Picketing to enforce the § 8(f) contract was the legal equivalent of picketing to require recognition as the exclusive agent, and § 8(b)(7)(C) was infringed when the union failed to request an election within 30 days.” 434 U. S., at 346. Ill We did not decide in Higdon whether prehire agreements are enforceable in a § 301 action. There is a critical distinction between an employer’s obligation under the Act to bargain with the representative of the majority of its employees and its duty to satisfy lawful contractual obligations that accrued after it enters a prehire contract. Only the former obligation was treated in Higdon.1 In upholding the Board’s view that a union commits an unfair labor practice by picketing to enforce a prehire agreement before it has attained majority status, we noted in 7 In Higdon, we addressed the question whether holding a prehire contract to be unenforceable in a § 301 suit would be contrary to Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U. S. 17 (1962). In Lion Dry Goods the Court stated that § 301(a) confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to entertain suits on contracts between an employer and a minority union, as well as suits on contracts between an employer and actual collectivebargaining agents. Section 8(f) contracts were noted as being within a federal court’s § 301(a) jurisdiction. Id., at 29. In Higdon, we merely noted that “[i]t would not be inconsistent with Lion Dry Goods for a court to hold that the union’s majority standing is subject to litigation in a § 301 suit to enforce a § 8(f) contract . . . and that absent a showing that the union is the majority’s chosen instrument, the contract is unenforceable.” 434 U. S., at 351-352. This statement was intended to show that the question of jurisdiction under §301 is different from the question of enforceability of a prehire agreement in a § 301 action. We did not decide the latter question. 268 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. Higdon that this view protects two interests that Congress intended to uphold when it enacted § 8(f). First, our holding in Higdon protects the § 7 rights of employees to select their own bargaining representative.8 To be sure, §8(f) affects the § 7 rights of employees by allowing a minority union to reach an agreement with the employer setting the terms and conditions of employment. This is the direct and intended consequence of § 8(f) and, in any event, is limited by the final proviso in § 8(f) that permits employees—and other parties mentioned in §§ 9(c) and (e) of the Act—to challenge a prehire agreement at any time by petitioning the Board for a representative election. If, however, an employer could be compelled by picketing to treat a minority union as the exclusive bargaining agent of employees, the §7 rights of those employees would be undermined to an extent not contemplated by Congress. As we noted in Higdon, 434 U. S., at 338, a union that is the certified representative of the employees in the relevant unit does not commit an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(7)(C) by picketing to compel compliance with a collective-bargaining agreement. Consequently, freeing a minority union from the confines of § 8(b)(7)(C) would grant that union power otherwise accorded only to certified bargaining representatives chosen by a majority of the affected employees. It is up to those employees to decide what organization, if any, will enter into a collective-bargaining agreement on their behalf and have the consequent right to engage in picketing, if necessary, to enforce it; the union signatory to a 8 Section 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, guarantees employees the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. Section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159(a), provides that the bargaining agent for all employees in the appropriate unit must be the representative “designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees . . . .” It is an unfair labor practice for an employer under §§ 8(a)(1) and (2) and for a union under § 8(b)(1)(A) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to select their representative. See generally Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 731 (1961). JIM McNEFF, INC. v. TODD 269 260 . Opinion of the Court prehire agreement cannot arrogate such power to itself until it “successfully seeks majority support.” Higdon, supra, at 350. Second, our decision in Higdon promotes Congress’ “intention . . . that prehire agreements were to be arrived at voluntarily . . . .” Higdon, 434 U. S., at 348, n. 10. In accord with this intention, we approved the Board’s conclusion that a “prehire agreement is voidable” “until and unless [the union] attains majority support in the relevant unit.” Id., at 341. Allowing the union to picket to enforce a prehire agreement before it attains majority status is plainly inconsistent with the voidable nature of a prehire agreement. The concerns with the §7 rights of employees to select their own bargaining representative and our fidelity to Congress’ intent that prehire agreements be voluntary—and voidable—that led to our decision in Higdon are not present in this case. Union enforcement, by way of a § 301 suit, of monetary obligations incurred by an employer under a prehire contract prior to its repudiation does not impair the right of employees to select their own bargaining agent. Unlike the situation in Higdon, enforcement of accrued obligations in a § 301 suit does not mean that the union represents a majority of the employer’s employees. In a §301 suit, the District Court merely enforces a contract entered into by the employer—a contract that Congress has legitimated to meet a special situation even though employees themselves have no part in its negotiation or execution. Such enforcement does not grant the plaintiff union a right otherwise enjoyed only by a majority union except in the very narrow sense, expressly intended by Congress, that employers and minority unions in the construction industry do not violate the Act by entering into prehire agreements. There is no sense in which respondents’ contract action has a recognitional purpose like that forbidden in Higdon. Neither does respondents’ § 301 action trench on the voluntary and voidable characteristics of a § 8(f) prehire agree 270 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. ment. It is clear in this case that petitioner entered into the prehire agreement voluntarily.* & * * 9 Moreover, although the voidable nature of prehire agreements clearly gave petitioner the right to repudiate the contract, it is equally clear that petitioner never manifested an intention to void or repudiate the contract. For the relevant period of time,10 the record shows conclusively that petitioner accepted the benefits of the prehire agreement and misled the union of its true intention never to fulfill its contractual obligations. Whatever may be required of a party wishing to exercise its undoubted right to repudiate a prehire agreement before the union attains majority support in the relevant unit, no appropriate action was taken by petitioner to do so in this case.11 Consequently, respondents’ suit does not enervate the voluntary and voidable characteristics of the prehire agreement. ’There is no merit to petitioner’s claim that it was coerced into entering the agreement. Petitioner was simply informed that the general contractor on the jobsite was bound by a union signatory subcontracting clause in its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. That clause required petitioner to enter into a similar agreement with the Union if it wanted to stay on the jobsite. Such clauses are lawful under the construction industry proviso of § 8(e) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(e). As we said in Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U. S. 645 (1982), whatever pres- sures petitioner complains of as a result of the union signatory subcontract- ing clause are “implicit in the construction industry proviso.” Id., at 663. Petitioner cannot rely on such “pressure,” made lawful by the construction industry proviso, to support its contention that it entered the prehire agreement at issue in this case involuntarily. “The only time period relevant to this case is that between September 13, 1978 (the date the prehire agreement was entered into), and April 26, 1979 (the date respondents’ § 301 suit was filed). The District Court entered judgment for respondents for the trust fund obligations incurred by petitioner for this period of time only. App. to Pet. for Cert. 10-11. Respondents did not appeal the amount of their recovery. 11 It is not necessary to decide in this case what specific acts would effect the repudiation of a prehire agreement—sending notice to the union, engaging in activity overtly and completely inconsistent with contractual obligations, or, as respondents suggest, precipitating a representation elec JIM McNEFF, INC. v. TODD 271 260 Opinion of the Court Apart from not offending the concerns noted in Higdon, allowing a minority union to enforce overdue obligations accrued under a prehire agreement prior to its repudiation vindicates the policies Congress intended to implement in § 8(f). Congress clearly determined that prehire contracts should be lawful to meet problems unique to the construction industry. However limited the binding effect of a prehire agreement may be, it strains both logic and equity to argue that a party to such an agreement can reap its benefits and then avoid paying the bargained-for consideration. Nothing in the legislative history of § 8(f) indicates Congress intended employers to obtain free the benefits of stable labor costs, labor peace, and the use of the union hiring hall.12 Having had the music, he must pay the piper. By the same token, the union cannot simply accept the employer’s performance under a prehire contract without upholding its end of the bargain. Neither party is compelled to enter into a § 8(f) agreement. But when such an agreement is voluntarily executed, both parties must abide by its terms until it is repudiated.13 IV A § 8(f) prehire agreement is subject to repudiation until the union establishes majority status. However, the monetary obligations assumed by an employer under a prehire tion pursuant to the final proviso in § 8(f) that shows the union does not epjoy majority support. 12 Petitioner received another benefit not expressly contemplated by Congress. Here, the Union had a collective-bargaining agreement with the general contractor requiring that work at the jobsite was to be performed only by subcontractors who had signed an agreement with the Union. See n. 1, supra. Thus, the direct consequence of petitioner’s entering into the prehire agreement was to enable petitioner to remain on the job. 13 We need not consider in this case whether considerations properly cognizable by a court under § 301 might prevent either party, in particular circumstances, from exercising its option under § 8(f) to repudiate a prehire agreement before the union demonstrates majority status. 272 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. contract may be recovered in a §301 action brought by a union prior to the repudiation of the contract, even though the union has not attained majority support in the relevant unit. There having been no repudiation in this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 273 Syllabus BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. NORTH DAKOTA ex rel. BOARD OF UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL LANDS CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 81-2337. Argued February 23, 1983—Decided May 2, 1983* North Dakota filed suit in Federal District Court against several federal officials to resolve a dispute as to ownership of certain portions of a riverbed within the State. The United States claims title to most of the disputed area on the basis of its status as a riparian landowner on a non-navigable river, while the State asserts that the river was navigable when North Dakota was admitted to the Union in 1889 and thus it owns the riverbed under the equal-footing doctrine. In addition to seeking injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief under various federal statutes, North Dakota asserted a claim under the Quiet Title Act of 1972 (QTA), by which the United States, subject to certain exceptions, has waived its sovereign immunity and has permitted plaintiffs to name it as a party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes involving real property. After trial, the court entered judgment for the State, holding that the QTA’s 12-year statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(f), does not apply where the plaintiff is a State. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. The legislative history establishes that Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants can challenge the United States’ title to real property. Thus there is no merit to North Dakota’s contention that even if suit under the QTA is time-barred under § 2409a(f), the judgment below is still correct because the suit is maintainable as an “officer’s suit” for injunctive or mandamus relief against the federal officials charged with supervision of the disputed area. The rule that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies is applicable here. Cf. Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820. Pp. 280-286. 2. The limitations provision in §2409a(f) is as fully applicable to a State as it is to all others who sue under the QTA. When Congress at *Together with No. 82-132, North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and School Lands v. Block, Secretary of Agriculture, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 274 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. taches conditions, such as a statute of limitations, to legislation waiving the United States’ sovereign immunity, those conditions must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be lightly implied. Section 2409a(f) expressly states that any civil action is time-barred unless filed within 12 years after the date it accrued. Even assuming that the canon of statutory construction that a sovereign is normally exempt from the operation of a generally worded statute of limitations in the absence of express contrary intent has relevance in construing the applicability to the States of a congressionally imposed statute of limitations not expressly including the States, here the legislative history shows that Congress did not intend to exempt the States from compliance with §2409a(f). Pp. 286-290. 3. Nor is § 2409a(f) invalid under the equal-footing doctrine and the Tenth Amendment, as North Dakota asserts. A federal law depriving a State of land vested in it by the Constitution would not be invalid on such grounds, but would constitute a taking of the State’s property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Section 2409a(f), however, does not purport to strip anyone of any property or to effectuate a transfer of title. A dismissal pursuant to the statute does not quiet title to the disputed land in the United States; the title dispute remains unresolved. Thus there is no constitutional infirmity in §2409a(f). Pp. 291-292. 4. If North Dakota’s suit is barred by § 2409a(f), the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits. Since the lower courts made no findings as to the date on which North Dakota’s suit accrued for purposes of the statute, the cases must be remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 292-293. 671 F. 2d 271, reversed and remanded. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 293. Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for petitioners in No. 81-2337. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Jacques B. Gelin, and Edward J. Shawaker. Robert 0. Wefald, Attorney General of North Dakota, argued the cause for respondents in No. 81-2337. With him on the brief was Owen L. Anderson A tBriefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Colorado by J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Charles G. Howe, Dep BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 275 273 Opinion of the Court Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Quiet Title Act of 1972 (QTA),1 the United States, subject to certain exceptions, has waived its sover uty Attorney General, Joel W. Cantrick, Solicitor General, Janet L. Miller, First Assistant Attorney General, and Kathleen M. Bowers, Assistant Attorney General; and for the State of California et al. by George Deukmejian, Attorney General of California, N. Gregory Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Dennis M. Eagan, Bruce S. Flushman, and Joseph Barbieri, Deputy Attorneys General; Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of Alabama; Norman C. Gorsuch, Attorney General of Alaska, and Michael W. Sewright, Assistant Attorney General; Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, and Anthony Ching, Solicitor General; John Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas; Richard S. Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware, and J. Calvin Williams, Deputy Attorney General; Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida; Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia; Tany S. Hong, Attorney General of Hawaii; David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho; Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General of Illinois; Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa; William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, and Gary L. Keyser, Assistant Attorney General; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, and Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General; Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota; Michael T. Greely, Attorney General of Montana; Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General of Nevada; Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General of New Jersey; Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York; Jan Eric Cartwright, Attorney General of Oklahoma; Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon; LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania; Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General of Rhode Island; Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina; Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, and Roxanne Giedd, Assistant Attorney General; John J. Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, and John H. Chase, Assistant Attorney General; Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington; and A. G. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming. !Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176, codified at 28 U. S. C. § 2409a, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(f), and 28 U. S. C. § 1402(d). The provision relevant to the present case, 28 U. S. C. § 2409a, states: “(a) The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands, nor does it apply to or affect actions which may be or could have 276 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. eign immunity and has permitted plaintiffs to name it as a party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes involving real property in which the United States claims an interest. These cases present two separate issues concerning the QTA. The first is whether Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive procedure by which a claimant can judicially challenge the title of the United States to real been brought under sections 1346, 1347, 1491, or 2410 of this title, sections 7424, 7425, or 7426 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended (26 U. S. C. 7424, 7425, and 7426), or section 208 of the Act of July 10,1952 (43 U. S. C. 666). “(b) The United States shall not be disturbed in possession or control of any real property involved in any action under this section pending a final judgment or decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty days; and if the final determination shall be adverse to the United States, the United States nevertheless may retain such possession or control of the real property or of any part thereof as it may elect, upon payment to the person determined to be entitled thereto of an amount which upon such election the district court in the same action shall determine to be just compensation for such possession or control. “(c) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the right, title, or interest claimed by the United States. “(d) If the United States disclaims all interest in the real property or interest therein adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior to the actual commencement of the trial, which disclaimer is confirmed by order of the court, the jurisdiction of the district court shall cease unless it has jurisdiction of the civil action or suit on ground other than and independent of the authority conferred by section 1346(f) of this title. “(e) A civil action against the United States under this section shall be tried by the court without a jury. “(f) Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States. “(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession.” BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 277 273 Opinion of the Court property. The second is whether the QTA’s 12-year statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. §2409a(f), is applicable in instances where the plaintiff is a State, such as respondent North Dakota. We conclude that the QTA forecloses the other bases for relief urged by the State, and that the limitations provision is as fully applicable to North Dakota as it is to all others who sue under the QTA. I It is undisputed that under the equal-footing doctrine first set forth in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), North Dakota, like other States, became the owner of the beds of navigable streams in the State upon its admission to the Union. It is also agreed that under the law of North Dakota, a riparian owner has title to the center of the bed of a nonnavigable stream. See N. D. Cent. Code §47-01-15 (1978); Amoco Oil Co. v. State Highway Dept., 262 N. W. 2d 726, 728 (N. D. 1978). Because of differing views of navigability, the United States and North Dakota assert competing claims to title to certain portions of the bed of the Little Missouri River within North Dakota. The United States contends that the river is not now and never has been navigable, and it claims most of the disputed area based on its status as riparian landowner.2 North Dakota, on the other hand, asserts that the river was navigable on October 1, 1889, the date North Dakota attained statehood, and therefore that title to the disputed bed vested in it under the equal-footing doctrine on that date. Since at least 1955, the United States has been issuing riverbed oil and gas leases to private entities. Seeking to resolve this dispute as to ownership of the riverbed, North Dakota filed this suit in the District Court 2 In some parts of the disputed area, the United States’ claim to the bed is founded on reasons other than its status as riparian landowner. See Tr. 38-48. 278 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. against several federal officials.3 The State’s complaint requested injunctive and mandamus relief directing the defendants to “cease and desist from develop[ing] or otherwise exercising privileges of ownership upon the bed of the Little Missouri River within the State of North Dakota,” and it further sought a declaratory judgment “[d]eclaring the Little Missouri River to be a navigable river for the purpose of determining ownership of the bed.” App. 9. As the jurisdictional basis for its suit, North Dakota invoked 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U. S. C. § 1361 (mandamus); 28 U. S. C. §§2201-2202 (declaratory judgment and further relief); and 5 U. S. C. §§701-706 (the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act). App. 6. North Dakota’s original complaint did not mention the QTA. However, the District Court required the State to amend its complaint to recite a claim thereunder. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 81-2337, pp. A-14—A-16. The State complied and filed an amended complaint. App. 13-16.4 The matter thereafter proceeded to trial. North Dakota introduced evidence in support of its claim that the river was navigable on the date of statehood.5 6 The federal defendants, while denying navigability, presented no evidence on 3 The complaint named as defendants the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of the United States Bureau of Land Management, and the Chief of the United States Forest Service. App. 6. The defendants were alleged to have “final authority” over the agencies that were “presently unlawfully asserting ownership over sovereign lands of the State of North Dakota.” Id., at 7. 4 North Dakota’s amended complaint did not name the United States as a party defendant, even though the United States appears to be the only proper federal defendant under 28 U. S. C. § 2409a(a). The Solicitor Gen- eral has expressly waived any objection the United States or the defendants might have as to this point. Brief for Petitioners in No. 81-2337, p. 31, n. 20. 6 North Dakota’s case consisted of documentary evidence of canoe travel on the river prior to statehood, an effort to float logs down the river shortly after statehood, present-day recreational canoe traffic, and other small craft usage over the years. BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 279 273 Opinion of the Court this point;6 their evidence was limited to showing, for statute of limitations purposes, that the State had notice of the United States’ claim more than 12 years prior to the commencement of the suit. After trial, the District Court rendered judgment for North Dakota. The court first concluded that the Little Missouri River was navigable in 1889 and that North Dakota attained title to the bed at statehood under the equal-footing doctrine and the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U. S. C. § 1311(a). 506 F. Supp. 619, 622-624 (ND 1981). Then, applying what it deemed to be an accepted rule of construction that statutes of limitations do not apply to sovereigns unless a contrary legislative intention is clearly evident from the express language of the statute or otherwise, the court rejected the defendants’ claim that North Dakota’s suit was barred by the QTA’s 12-year statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. §2409a(f). 506 F. Supp., at 625-626.6 7 The District Court accordingly entered judgment quieting North Dakota’s title to the bed of the river. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 81-2337, pp. A-29—A-30.8 The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. 671 F. 2d 271 (CA8 1982). 6 The federal defendants took the position that the State’s evidence of navigability was so weak that it actually supported the view that the river was nonnavigable. 7 To further support this conclusion, the court stated, albeit without elaboration, that the legislative history of the QTA showed that Congress intended the statute of limitations “to apply exclusively to persons, be they private citizens or private or public corporations.” 506 F. Supp., at 625. The court also commented that the federal defendants’ position was contrary to the express will of Congress, as indicated by the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U. S. C. § 1311(a). 506 F. Supp., at 626. The defendants also argued in the District Court that the United States had acquired title to the bed by adverse possession, and that, in any event, the suit was barred by laches. The District Court rejected both of these contentions, id., at 624-626, and the defendants did not pursue them further. 8 The judgment excluded those portions of the bed in which the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation had an interest. The 280 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. The defendants’ petition for certiorari, which we granted, 459 U. S. 820 (1982), challenged only the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the QTA’s statute of limitations is inapplicable to States. North Dakota filed a conditional crosspetition, No. 82-132, asserting that even if its suit under the QTA is barred by §2409a(f), the judgment below is still correct because the QTA remedy is not exclusive and its suit against the federal officers is still maintainable wholly aside from the QTA. This submission, which the Court of Appeals did not find it necessary to address, is also urged by the State, as respondent in No. 81-2337, as a ground for affirming the judgment in its favor. See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419 (1977). We now grant the cross-petition, which heretofore has remained pending, and we first address the question presented byit- II The States of the Union, like all other entities, are barred by federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States in the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by Congress. California v. Arizona, 440 U. S. 59, 61-62 (1979); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 387 (1939); Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 342 (1907). Only upon passage of the QTA did the United States waive its immunity with respect to suits involving title to land. Prior to 1972, States and all others asserting title to land claimed by the United States had only limited means of obtaining a resolution of the title dispute—they could attempt to induce the United States to file a quiet title action against them, or they could petition Congress or the Executive for discretionary relief. Also, since passage of the Tucker Act in 1887, those claimants willing to settle for monetary damages rather than Tribes were not named as parties to the State’s suit, and the court concluded that their rights should be left unaffected by the judgment. Id., at 622. BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 281 273 Opinion of the Court title to the disputed land could sue in the Court of Claims and attempt to make out a constitutional claim for just compensation. See 28 U. S. C. § 1491; Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 647, n. 8 (1962). Enterprising claimants also pressed the so-called “officer’s suit” as another possible means of obtaining relief in a title dispute with the Federal Government. In the typical officer’s suit involving a title dispute, the claimant would proceed against the federal officials charged with supervision of the disputed area, rather than against the United States. The suit would be in ejectment or, as here, for an injunction or a writ of mandamus forbidding the defendant officials to interfere with the claimant’s property rights. As a device for circumventing federal sovereign immunity in land title disputes, the officer’s suit ultimately did not prove to be successful. This Court appeared to accept the device in early cases. See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882); Meigs v. M‘Clung’s Lessee, 9 Cranch 11 (1815). Later cases, however, were inconsistent; some held that such suits were barred by sovereign immunity, while others did not, and “it is fair to say that to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field . . . would be a Procrustean task.” Malone v. Bowdoin, supra, at 646. Compare, e. g., the cases cited 369 U. S., at 646, n. 6, with those cited id., at 646, n. 7. In Malone, the Court cut through the tangle of the previous decisions and applied to land disputes the rule announced in Larson n. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949): “[T]he action of a federal officer affecting property claimed by a plaintiff can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if the officer’s action is ‘not within the officer’s statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void.’” Malone, supra, at 647 (quoting Larson, supra, at 702). 282 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. The Larson-Malone test plainly made it more difficult for a plaintiff to employ a suit against federal officers as a vehicle for resolving a title dispute with the United States. Thus, in the decade after Malone, claimants having disputes with the United States over real property met with little success in most courts.9 Against this background, Congress considered and passed the QTA in 1972. At a hearing on the bill, the officer’s-suit possibility was called to the attention of Congress.10 The predominant view, however, was that citizens asserting title to or the right to possession of lands claimed by the United States were “without benefit of a recourse to the courts,” because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.11 Congress sought to rectify this state of affairs. The original version of S. 216, the bill that became the QTA, was short and simple. Its substantive provision provided for no qualifications whatsoever. It stated in its entirety: “The United States may be named a party in any civil action brought by any person to quiet title to lands claimed by the United States.” 117 Cong. Rec. 46380 (1971). The Executive Branch opposed the original version of S. 216 and proposed, 9 See, e. g., County of Bonner v. Anderson, 439 F. 2d 764 (CA9 1971); Simons v. Vinson, 394 F. 2d 732 (CA5), cert, denied, 393 U. S. 968 (1968); Gardner v. Harris, 391 F. 2d 885 (CA5 1968); Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 337 F. 2d 56 (CA4 1964), cert, denied, 380 U. S. 914 (1965). One Court of Appeals, however, construed Malone narrowly. See Armstrong v. Udall, 435 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA9 1970); Andros v. Rupp, 433 F. 2d 70, 73-74 (CA9 1970) (holding Malone to be inapplicable where the plaintiff has record title to the disputed land). 10 See Hearing on S. 216 et al. before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 64 (1971) (statement of Prof. J. Steadman); id., at 81 (letter from L. Gendron, Esq.). 11S. Rep. No. 92-575, p. 1 (1971). See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. 6 (1972); id., at 9 (letter from the Attorney General); Hearing, supra n. 10, at 8 (Sen. Church); id., at 2, 19 (M. Melich, Solicitor, Dept, of the Interior); id., at 45 (letter from Sen. Hansen); id., at 55 (T. McKnight); id., at 74 (letter from R. Reynolds); id., at 77 (statement of T. Cavanaugh). BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 283 273 Opinion of the Court in its stead, a more elaborate bill, reprinted in S. Rep. No. 92-575, pp. 7-8 (1971), providing several “appropriate safeguards for the protection of the public interest.”12 This Executive proposal, made by the Justice Department, limited the waiver of sovereign immunity in several important respects. First, it excluded Indian lands from the scope of the waiver. The Executive Branch felt that a waiver of immunity in this area would not be consistent with “specific commitments” it had made to the Indians through treaties and other agreements.13 Second, in order to insure that the waiver would not “serve to disrupt costly ongoing Federal programs that involve the disputed lands,” the proposal allowed the United States the option of paying money damages instead of surrendering the property if it lost a case on the merits.14 Third, the Justice Department proposal provided that the legislation would have prospective effect only; that is, it would not apply to claims that accrued prior to the date of enactment. This was deemed necessary so that the workload of the Justice Department and the courts could develop at a rate which could be absorbed.15 Fourth, to insure that stale claims would not be opened up to litigation,16 the proposed bill included a 6-year statute of limitations.17 The Senate accepted the Justice Department’s proposal, with the notable exception of the provision that would have 12 Hearing, supra n. 10, at 21 (S. Kashiwa, Assistant Attorney General); see id., at 32 (J. McGuire, Dept, of Agriculture). ™Id., at 2, 19 (M. Melich, Solicitor, Dept, of the Interior). uIbid. See also id., at 3, 32 (views of Dept, of Agriculture); S. Rep. No. 92-575, pp. 5-6 (1971) (letter from the Attorney General). 16Id., at 7 (letter from the Attorney General). 16 H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. 7 (1972) (letter from the Deputy Attorney General). 17 The Justice Department proposal contained other, relatively minor limitations on the waiver. For example, it expressly stated that no one could claim against the United States by adverse possession, and it provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction. All of these changes were ultimately included in the legislation. 284 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. given the bill prospective effect only. The Senate-passed version of the bill contained a “grandfather clause” that would have allowed old claims to be asserted for two years after the bill became law.18 Primarily because of the grandfather clause, the Executive Branch could still not accept the bill. The Department of Justice argued that this clause could cause “a flood of litigation on old claims, many of which had already been submitted to the Congress and rejected,” thereby putting “an undue burden on the Department and the courts.”19 As a compromise, the Department proposed to give up its insistence on “prospective only” language and to accept an increase in the statute of limitations to 12 years, in exchange for elimination of the grandfather clause.20 This proposal had the effect of making the bill retroactive for a 12-year period. The House included this compromise in the version of the bill passed by it, and the Senate acquiesced and the bill became law with the compromise language intact. In light of this legislative history, we need not be detained long by North Dakota’s contention that it can avoid the QTA’s statute of limitations and other restrictions by the device of an officer’s suit. If North Dakota’s position were correct, all of the carefully crafted provisions of the QTA deemed necessary for the protection of the national public in 18 This provision stated that an action would be barred unless an action was begun “within six years after the claim for relief first accrues or within two years after the effective date of this Act, whichever is later.” 117 Cong. Rec. 46380 (1971) (emphasis added). 19 H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. 7 (1972) (letter from the Deputy Attorney General). 20 Id., at 7-8. The Department of Justice also objected to a provision in the Senate-passed version that would have made the limitations period begin to run only on the date that the plaintiff obtained actual knowledge of the United States’ claim. The Department contended that the limitations period should begin to run on the date the claimant knew or should have known of the United States’ claim, see ibid., and Congress agreed to this change. BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 285 273 Opinion of the Court terest could be averted. “It would require the suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading.” Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 833 (1976). If we were to allow claimants to try the Federal Government’s title to land under an officer’s-suit theory, the Indian lands exception to the QTA would be rendered nugatory. The United States could also be dispossessed of the disputed property without being afforded the option of paying damages, thereby thwarting the congressional intent to avoid disruptions of costly federal activities. Finally, and most relevant to the present cases, the QTA’s 12-year statute of limitations, the one point on which the Executive Branch was most insistent, could be avoided, and, contrary to the wish of Congress, an unlimited number of suits involving stale claims might be instituted. Brown v. GSA, supra, is instructive here. In that case, we held that § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16, was the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination. There, as here, it was “problematic” whether any judicial relief at all was available prior to passage of the Act; the prevailing congressional view was that there was none. 425 U. S., at 826-828. There, as here, the “balance, completeness, and structural integrity” of the statute belied the contention that it “was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial relief.” Id., at 832. Thus, we applied the rule that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies. Id., at 834.21 That rule is equally applicable in the present context. Accordingly, we need not reach the question whether, prior to 1972, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 21 See also Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 366, 375-377 (1979); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 488-490 (1973); United States v. Demko, 385 U. S. 149, 151-152 (1966); 1A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction §23.16 (4th ed. 1972). 286 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. U. S. 682 (1949), and Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643 (1962), would have permitted an officer’s suit to be maintained under the present circumstances.22 We hold that Congress intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States’ title to real property.23 22 We also reject North Dakota’s claim that, even if the QTA pre-empted alternative remedies in 1972, Congress created a new supplemental remedy four years later when it amended 5 U. S. C. § 702 with Pub. L. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721. That statute waived federal sovereign immunity for suits against federal officers in which the plaintiff seeks relief other than money damages, but it specifically confers no “authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” The QTA is such an “other statute,” because, if a suit is untimely under the QTA, the QTA expressly “forbids the relief” which would be sought under § 702. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1656, p. 13 (1976) (§ 702 provides no authority to grant relief “when Congress has dealt in particularity with a claim and [has] intended a specified remedy to be the exclusive remedy”). 23 The legislative history is clear that Congress intended to foreclose totally any suit on claims that accrued more than 12 years prior to the effective date of the QTA. The Constitution, however, requires that statutes of limitations must “ ‘allow a reasonable time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon existing causes of action.’” Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 527, n. 21 (1982) (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1902)). Therefore, if an “officer’s suit” was available prior to 1972, and if the laches or limitations period for such a suit was longer than 12 years (and we express no opinion on either of these points), §2409a(f) arguably was unconstitutional to the extent it extinguished claims that could have been brought at the time of its passage. See Herrick v. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co., 200 U. S. 96, 102 (1906); Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 599 (1873). North Dakota has not raised this issue, and it could not do so successfully, because, although the QTA was passed in 1972, the State did not bring this suit until 1978. However long the “reasonable time” period must be, it clearly need not be six years. Hence, even if North Dakota had a constitutional right to bring its suit within a short time after enactment of the QTA, it could not do so six years later solely by virtue of the QTA’s failure to provide for the requisite “reasonable time.” BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 287 273 Opinion of the Court III We also cannot agree with North Dakota’s submission, which was accepted by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that the States are not subject to the operation of §2409a(f). This issue is purely one of statutory interpretation, and we find no support for North Dakota’s position in either the plain statutory language or the legislative history. The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress. A necessary corollary of this rule is that when Congress attaches conditions to legislation waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States, those conditions must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be lightly implied. See, e. g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 160-161 (1981); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. Ill, 117-118 (1979); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 (1967); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 591 (1941). When waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, although we should not construe such a time-bar provision unduly restrictively, we must be careful not to interpret it in a manner that would “extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.” United States v. Kubrick, supra, at 117-118 (citing Soriano v. United States, supra; Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955)). Accordingly, before finding that Congress intended here to exempt the States from satisfying the time-bar condition on its waiver of immunity, we should insist on some clear indication of such an intention. Proceeding in accordance with these well-established principles, we observe that §2409a(f) expressly states that any civil action is time-barred unless filed within 12 years after the date it accrued. The statutory language makes no exception for civil actions by States. Nor is there any evidence 288 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. in the legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to exempt the States from the condition attached to the immunity waiver.24 These facts alone, in the light of our approach to sovereign immunity cases, would appear to compel the conclusion that States are not entitled to an exemption from the strictures of §2409a(f). The State, however, relies on the well-known canon of statutory construction that “[statutes of limitation are not . . . held to embrace the State, unless she is expressly designated, or necessarily included by the nature of the mischiefs to be remedied.” Weòer v. Board of Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57, 70 (1873). Accord, Guaranty Trust Co. n. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 132-133 (1938). Because §2409a(f) does not expressly include the State, North Dakota urges, and the Court of Appeals held, that the State was not barred by the statute. While recognizing that immunity waivers by the United States are to be carefully construed, the Court of Appeals concluded that precedence should be given to the competing canon of statutory construction that statutes of limitations should not apply to the States absent express legislative inclusion. 671 F. 2d, at 275-276. We do not agree. In fashioning sovereign-immunity waiver legislation, Congress is certainly free to exempt the States from a statute of limitations or any other condition of the waiver. But there is no merit to North Dakota’s assertion that a condition on a congressional waiver of federal sovereign immunity should be regarded as inapplicable to 24 Recognizing that no express legislative history supports its position, North Dakota relies on congressional silence. As did the Court of Appeals, 671 F. 2d 271, 274-275 (CA8 1982), North Dakota notes the references in the House Committee Report, H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559 (1972), to “persons,” “citizens,” and “individual citizens,” and the absence of any references to “States.” However, to the extent that such general language has any relevance at all, the Report also refers to “plaintiff[s],” “owners of adjacent property,” “land owner[s],” and “claimants”—all terms that can easily encompass States. See also S. Rep. No. 92-575 (1971) (using similar terms). BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 289 273 Opinion of the Court States in the absence of express intent to the contrary. This Court has never sanctioned such a rule. Quite the contrary, in United States v. Louisiana, 127 U. S. 182 (1888), the Court held that a general statute of limitations, one that did not expressly mention States, barred a State’s claim against the Federal Government. And in Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S., at 388-389, where the United States had waived its immunity on the condition that any suit against it had to be brought in a federal court, we concluded without hesitation that the plaintiff State’s suit should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because it had been filed in state court, even though the federal-court condition did not expressly apply to States. Thus, neither Congress nor the decisions of this Court have suggested that the States are presumed to be exempt from satisfying the conditions placed by Congress on its immunity waivers; and, in light of our Constitution, which makes the federal law ultimately supreme, these holdings should not have been surprising.25 26 Contrary to Justice O’Connor’s contention, post, at 297, this Court has never “recognized sovereign prerpgatives of other governmental units as bars to defenses asserted by the United States.” In support of this novel proposition, Justice O’Connor’s dissent relies on New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662 (1836). In fact, to the extent that case is at all apposite, it supports the contrary view. The case involved a title dispute between the United States and the New Orleans municipal corporation. The National Government contended, inter alia, that certain official federal actions regarding the disputed property, “some of which were induced by the special application of the corporation, afford[ed] strong evidence, . . . not only of the right of the United States to the property in question, but that such right was fully recognized by the corporation.” Id., at 735. The Court found that these facts constituted an “admission” by the city that the Federal Government had title, and that the city’s acts, if left unexplained, would have “strengthened] the argument against the claim set up by the city.” Ibid. The Court ultimately did not regard this evidence as prejudicing the city’s claim, however, primarily because the city authorities were found to have acted in ignorance of their rights, due to their foreign language and habits, their civil law background, and their lack of familiarity with our Government and the principles of our jurisprudence. Id., at 735-736. The Court also assumed that the city authorities did not have 290 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. We do not discount the importance of the generally applicable rule of statutory construction relied upon by the Court of Appeals. The judicially created rule that a sovereign is normally exempt from the operation of a generally worded statute of limitations has retained its vigor because it serves the public policy of preserving the public rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, supra, at 132. Thus, in these cases, the rule would further the interests of the citizens of North Dakota, by affording them some protection against the negligence of state officials in failing to comply with the otherwise applicable statute of limitations. Even assuming, however, that this rule has relevance in construing the applicability to the States of a congressionally imposed statute of limitations not expressly including the States, here the will of Congress is apparent and we must follow it. As the legislative history outlined in Part II above shows, Congress agreed with the Executive that §2409a(f) was necessary for protection of national public interests. In general, a suit by a State against the United States affects the congressionally recognized national public interests to the same degree as does a suit by a private entity. Therefore, the judge-created rule designed to protect the interests of the citizens of one particular State must yield in the face of the evidence that Congress has determined that the national interest requires a contrary rule. We are convinced that Congress had no intention of exempting the States from compliance with §2409a(f). That section must be applied to the States because they are “necessarily included by the nature of the mischiefs to be remedied.” Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm’rs, supra, at 70. We thus conclude that States must fully adhere to the requirements of § 2409a(f) when suing the United States under the QTA. the power, by the acts relied on by the United States, to divest the city of a vested interest in the property. The Court’s decision was in no way based, as the dissent suggests, post, at 297, n. 3, on the rule that “estoppel could not be asserted against a sovereign.” BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 291 273 Opinion of the Court IV North Dakota finally argues that, even if Congress intended to apply §2409a(f) to it, and even if valid when applied in suits relating to other kinds of land, the section is unconstitutional under the equal-footing doctrine and the Tenth Amendment insofar as it purports to bar claims to lands constitutionally vested in the State. We are unable to agree. The State probably is correct in stating that Congress could not, without making provision for payment of compensation, pass a law depriving a State of land vested in it by the Constitution. Such a law would not run afoul of the equal-footing doctrine or the Tenth Amendment, as asserted by North Dakota, but it would constitute a taking of the State’s property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.26 Section 2409a(f), however, does not purport to strip any State, or anyone else for that matter, of any property rights. The statute limits the time in which a quiet title suit against the United States can be filed; but, unlike an adverse possession provision, §2409a(f) does not purport to effectuate a transfer of title. If a claimant has title to a disputed tract of land, he retains title even if his suit to quiet his title is deemed time-barred under § 2409a(f). A dismissal pursuant to §2409a(f) does not quiet title to the property in the United States. The title dispute remains unresolved.27 Nothing prevents the claimant from continuing to 26 The United States can, of course, exercise its eminent domain power to take title to state property. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534 (1941). See also United States v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230, 236-242 (1946). 27 This discussion also answers the argument that our holding conflicts with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U. S. C. § 1311, which confirmed in the States title to lands beneath navigable waters within their boundaries. If the river is navigable, the land in question belongs to North Dakota, in accordance with the Constitution and the Submerged Lands Act, regardless of whether North Dakota’s suit to quiet its title is time-barred under § 2409a(f). 292 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. assert his title, in hope of inducing the United States to file its own quiet title suit, in which the matter would finally be put to rest on the merits.28 Thus, we see no constitutional infirmity in §2409a(f). A constitutional claim can become time-barred just as any other claim can. See, e. g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S. 478 (1980); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957). Nothing in the Constitution requires otherwise. V Admittedly, North Dakota comes before us with an appealing case. Both lower courts held that the Little Missouri is navigable and that the State obtained title to the disputed land at statehood. The federal defendants have not asked this Court to review the correctness of these substantive holdings other than to submit that these determinations are time-barred by the QTA.29 We agree with this submission. Whatever the merits of the title dispute may be, the federal defendants are correct: If North Dakota’s suit is barred by § 2409a(f), the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. North Dakota’s action may proceed, if at 28 Whether, in the absence of a suit by it, the United States would ever acquire good title to the disputed area would, under the present status of the law, be strictly a matter of state law. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. 10 (1972) (letter from the Attorney General) (“The State law of real property would of course apply to decide all questions not covered by Federal law”). In many instances, the United States would presumably eventually take the land by adverse possession, but, if so, it would be purely by virtue of state law. Here, North Dakota asserts that the disputed land is public trust land that cannot ever be taken by adverse possession under North Dakota law. 29 The federal defendants stress that the United States still disputes the lower courts’ conclusion that the Little Missouri River is navigable. They state that they did not seek review of that finding in this Court only because they deemed it inappropriate to burden this Court with this purely factual issue. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. See this Court’s Rule 17. BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 293 273 O’Connor, J., dissenting all, only under the QTA. If the State’s suit was filed more than 12 years after its action accrued, the suit is barred by § 2409a(f). Since the lower courts made no findings as to the date on which North Dakota’s suit accrued, the cases must be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Justice O’Connor, dissenting. I agree with the Court that the sole remedy available to North Dakota is an action under the Quiet Title Act. Having concluded that Congress has permitted such suits, though, I would not reject the usual rule that statutes of limitation do not bar a sovereign, a rule that is especially appropriate in the context of these cases. Consequently, I dissent. Since the Quiet Title Act is the sole relief available to North Dakota, we confront the question whether Congress intended the statute of limitations to bar actions by States. The Court resolves the question by invocation of the principle that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed. See ante, at 287? The question is not that simple. Although it is indeed true that the Court construes waivers of sovereign immunity strictly, that principle of statutory construction is no more than an aid in the task of determining congressional intent. In a close case, it may help the Court xThe Court’s reliance on this principle is surprising, since it expressly declines to decide whether, without the Quiet Title Act, sovereign immunity would bar this action. Ante, at 285-286. Thus, as far as the Court is concerned, the Quiet Title Act may not in fact be a waiver of sovereign immunity, and these cases then would not present the predicate for the application of the principle that waivers are construed narrowly. Since I believe, for the reasons suggested by the Court, ante, at 281-282, that the Quiet Title Act was necessary to permit this action, in my view the principle of strict construction does inform, although it does not control, our inquiry into congressional intent. 294 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 O’Connor, J., dissenting 461 U. S. choose between two equally plausible constructions. It cannot, however, grant the Court authority to narrow judicially the waiver that Congress intended. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. Ill, 118 (1979); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 69 (1955). The mere observation that a statute waives sovereign immunity, then, cannot resolve questions of construction. The Court still must consider all indicia of congressional intent. Considering all the evidence, I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that Congress intended to subject the States to a statute of limitations that would prevent their assertion of title to lands held in trust for the public. The common law has long accepted the principle “nullum tempus occurrit regi”—neither laches nor statutes of limitations will bar the sovereign. See, e. g., 10 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 355 (1938); D. Gibbons, A Treatise on the Law of Limitation and Prescription 62 (1835). The courts of this country accepted the principle from English law. See, e. g., Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall. 57 (1873); United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, 735 (1824); Iverson & Robinson v. Dubose, 27 Ala. 418, 422 (1855); Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 522, 528 (1803); see generally J. May, Angell on Limitations 29-30 (5th ed. 1869). As this Court observed: “So complete has been its acceptance that the implied immunity of the domestic ‘sovereign,’ state or national, has been universally deemed to be an exception to local statutes of limitations where the government, state or national, is not expressly included.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 133 (1938). In this country, courts adopted the rule, not on the theory that an “impeccable” sovereign could not be guilty of laches, but because of the public policies served by the doctrine. The public interest in preserving public rights and property from injury and loss attributable to the negligence of public officers and agents, through whom the public must act, justified a special rule for the sovereign. BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 295 273 O’Connor, J., dissenting These policies reach their apex in the case of lands held in trust for the public. The interests of the sovereign, so widespread and varied, hinder it in the exercise of the vigilance in protecting rights that we require of private parties. Yet the public must not lose its rights because of the constraints on the sovereign. “If a contrary rule were sanctioned, it would only be necessary for intruders upon the public lands to maintain their possessions, until the statute of limitations shall run; and then they would become invested with the title against the government, and all persons claiming under it. In this way the public domain would soon be appropriated by adventurers. Indeed it would be utterly impracticable, by the use of any power within the reach of the government, to prevent this result. It is only necessary, therefore, to state the case, in order to show the wisdom and propriety of the rule that the statute never operates against the government.” Lindsey v. Lessee of Miller, 6 Pet. 666, 673 (1832). Accord, Guaranty Trust Co. n. United States, supra, at 132; Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm’rs, supra, at 68, 70; United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 314 (1840); J. May, supra, at 29.2 The lands in controversy here are held in trust for the public by North Dakota, see App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 81-2337, p. A-6; United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State 2 The case for protecting the sovereign from the running of time is weaker when the lands are held other than as public trust lands. When, for instance, a sovereign holds lands in its proprietary capacity, as the United States would hold the title that it asserts to these lands, ante, at 277, time may run against the sovereign. See Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm’rs, 18 Wall., at 68 (“Where lands are held by the State simply for sale or other disposition, and not as sovereign in trust for the public, there is some reason in requiring the assertion of her rights within a limited period . . .”) (dictum). 296 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 O’Connor, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N. W. 2d 457 (N. D. 1976). This case, therefore, implicates the core policies underlying the doctrine, and we should be extremely reluctant to reject the usual rule that time will not bar the sovereign. The Court, however, dismisses this rule, apparently on the theory that it does not apply in actions between two sovereigns. But the authority that it cites for that proposition is weak at best. United States v. Louisiana, 127 U. S. 182 (1888), involved a claim for money rather than a dispute to title over public trust lands. More important, the parties never argued for the application of the rule that time does not bar the sovereign. See Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee in United States v. Louisiana, 0. T. 1887, No. 1388. The Court’s decision in that case therefore cannot serve as authority for rejecting the rule when, as is the situation here, it is raised. Nor does Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382 (1939), support the Court. There, a State sought to sue the United States in state court. Construing the waiver of sovereign immunity narrowly, we held that the United States had only waived its immunity as to suits in federal court, and we applied that condition against the State. Since no general rule permits a sovereign to maintain a suit in any forum it chooses, the holding of Minnesota reflects nothing more than the usual reluctance to construe waivers of sovereign immunity broadly in the absence of any countervailing considerations. Thus, our precedents do not reject the principle that time does not bar the sovereign in conflicts between sovereigns. On the contrary, our precedents suggest that a sovereign can invoke this principle against another sovereign. In Rhode Island n. Massachusetts, 15 Pet. 233 (1841), the Court declined to apply the ordinary rule of limitations in a dispute between sovereign States. Chief Justice Taney observed: “[I]t would be impossible with any semblance of justice to adopt such a rule of limitation in the case before us. For here two political communities are concerned, who cannot act with the BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 297 273 O’Connor, J., dissenting same promptness as individuals . . . .” Id., at 273. In particular, when lands held in trust for the public are at stake, the Court has recognized sovereign prerogatives of other governmental units as bars to defenses asserted by the United States. See New Orleans n. United States, 10 Pet. 662 (1836).3 Consequently, I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the principle that time will not bar the sovereign has no application in these cases. Turning to the statute at issue here, the circumstances of its enactment indicate that Congress did not intend to bar actions by States. As general background, we know that Congress was aware of the rule that, to affect the government, an enactment imposing a burden or a limitation must expressly include the sovereign. See, e. g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U. S. 653, 667 (1979). The particular incident that spurred Congress to pass the Quiet Title Act was a dispute between private landowners and the Federal Government. See Hearings on S. 216 et al. before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 83-85 (1971) (affidavit of A. L. Robinson). The statements in the hearings reflect a focus on disputes between private citizens and the Federal Government. See, e. g., id., at 20 (statement of Shiro 3 In New Orleans v. United States, the United States argued that the city of New Orleans was estopped to assert title to certain lands held for the public. At the time, estoppel could not be asserted against a sovereign, see, e. g., Filor v. United States, 9 Wall. 45, 49 (1870), and the Court declined to estop the city, largely on the ground that the lands were held in trust for the public and, since the sovereign could not by act convey them, the sovereign’s acts could not estop it from asserting that they were not conveyed. Although the protection against estoppel has since largely dissipated, see generally Note, Equitable Estoppel: Does Governmental Immunity Mean Never Having to Say You’re Sorry? 56 St. John’s L. Rev. 114 (1981); K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies § 17.01 (1976), the application of that protection in New Orleans contradicts the view of the majority that in controversies between the United States and another sovereign, only the United States can rely on sovereign attributes. 298 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 O’Connor, J., dissenting 461 U. S. Kashiwa) (referring to claims of “private citizens”); id., at 55, 58 (statement of T. E. McKnight) (observing that “private landowners” had no right to sue the Government). See also S. Rep. No. 92-575, pp. 1, 2 (1971) (recognizing inequity of denying action to “private citizen” and explaining that bill would enable “citizen” to have his day in court). Finally, the House Report explained the limitations provision in the Quiet Title Act as designed to give “persons” a certain amount of time to sue. H. R. Rep. No. 92-1559, p. 5 (1972). Indeed, this Court has already been called upon to conform the provisions of the Quiet Title Act—enacted by Congress with private citizens in mind—to the special requirements of litigation involving States. In California v. Arizona, 440 U. S. 59 (1979), California sought to sue Arizona and the United States, in a quiet title action in which both defendants were indispensable parties. Under the Constitution, this Court had original jurisdiction over the claim against Arizona, U. S. Const., Art. Ill, §2, and Congress had conferred exclusive jurisdiction on this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1251(a)(1). The claim against the United States, however, could only be maintained under the Quiet Title Act, which vested exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts. 28 U. S. C. § 1346(f). In spite of the general language placing all quiet title actions against the United States in the district courts, we concluded that Congress did not intend to divest this Court of its jurisdiction. Thus, while Congress clearly intended that States be able to maintain quiet title actions, the procedural provisions drafted with the private citizen in mind need not be applied with slavish literalness to States.4 Finally, we cannot ignore the special nature of the lands at issue in this case. The beds of navigable waters pass to the States when they achieve statehood under the constitutional 4 Cf. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U. S. 653, 667 (1979) (rule that statute must expressly include sovereign is particularly applicable “where the statute imposes a burden or limitation, as distinguished from conferring a benefit or advantage”). BLOCK v. NORTH DAKOTA 299 273 O’Connor, J., dissenting equal footing doctrine, as an incident of sovereignty. Montana n. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 551 (1981); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845). And the lands are of critical importance to North Dakota, which holds them in its sovereign capacity in trust for its citizens.5 Congress has recognized the special importance of these lands in the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 30, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq.6 Until today, the Court too has shown special sensitivity to the importance of these lands, recognizing the strongest presumption that Congress will not act to convey the lands rather than to preserve them for the State. Montana v. United States, supra, at 552. Given that solicitude for the State’s ownership of these lands, it becomes extremely difficult to believe that Congress intended to deny States dominion over these lands by silently extinguishing their right to quiet title. I would affirm the judgment below. 6Cf. United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 14 (1935) (“Dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil under them are so identified with the sovereign power of government that a presumption against their separation from sovereignty must be indulged, in construing either grants by the sovereign of the lands to be held in private ownership or transfer of sovereignty itself.... For that reason, upon the admission of a State to the Union, the title of the United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the States passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the State of local sovereignty, and is subject only to the paramount power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce”). 6 In § 3(a) of the Act, 60 Stat. 30, 43 U. S. C. § 1311(a), Congress provided: “It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States . . . .” 300 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 461 U. S. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. TUFTS ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 81-1536. Argued November 29, 1982—Decided May 2, 1983 Section 752(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) provides that liabilities involved in the sale or exchange of a partnership interest are to be treated “in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated with partnerships.” Under § 1001(a) of the IRC, the gain or loss from a sale or other disposition of property is defined as the difference between “the amount realized” on the disposition and the property’s adjusted basis. Section 1001(b) defines the “amount realized” as “the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received.” A general partnership formed by respondents in 1970 to construct an apartment complex entered into a $1,851,500 nonrecourse mortgage loan with a savings association. The complex was completed in 1971. Due to the partners’ capital contributions to the partnership and income tax deductions for their allocable shares of ordinary losses and depreciation, the partnership’s claimed adjusted basis in the property in 1972 was $1,455,740. Because of an unanticipated reduction in rental income, the partnership was unable to make the payments due on the mortgage. Each partner thereupon sold his interest to a third party, who assumed the mortgage. The fair market value on the date of transfer did not exceed $1,400,000. Each partner reported the sale on his income tax return and indicated a partnership loss of $55,740. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, determined that the sale resulted in a partnership gain of approximately $400,000 on the theory that the partnership had realized the full amount of the nonrecourse obligation. The United States Tax Court upheld the deficiencies, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Held: When a taxpayer sells or disposes of property encumbered by a nonrecourse obligation exceeding the fair market value of the property sold, as in this case, the Commissioner may require him to include in the “amount realized” the outstanding amount of the obligation; the fair market value of the property is irrelevant to this calculation. Cf. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1. Pp. 304-317. COMMISSIONER v. TUFTS 301 300 Opinion of the Court (a) When the mortgagor’s obligation to repay the mortgage loan is canceled, he is relieved of his responsibility to repay the sum he originally received and thus realizes value to that extent within the meaning of § 1001(b). To permit the taxpayer to limit his realization to the fair market value of the property would be to recognize a tax loss for which he has suffered no corresponding economic loss. A taxpayer must account for the proceeds of obligations he has received tax-free and has included in basis. Nothing in either § 1001(b) or in this Court’s prior decisions requires the Commissioner to permit a taxpayer to treat a sale of encumbered property asymmetrically, by including the proceeds of the nonrecourse obligation in basis but not accounting for the proceeds upon transfer of the property. Pp. 304-314. (b) Section 752(c) of the IRC—which provides that for purposes of § 752 “a liability to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the fair market value of such property, be considered as a liability of the owner of the property”—does not authorize this type of asymmetrical treatment in the sale or disposition of partnership property. Rather, the legislative history indicates that the fair market value limitation of § 752(c) was intended to apply only to transactions between a partner and his partnership under §§ 752(a) and (b), and was not intended to limit the amount realized in a sale or exchange of a partnership interest under § 752(d). Pp. 314-317. 651 F. 2d 1058, reversed. Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 317. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Michael L. Paup, and Gilbert S. Rothenberg. Ronald M. Mankoff argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Charles D. Pulman.* Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Over 35 years ago, in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1 (1947), this Court ruled that a taxpayer, who sold property encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage (the amount of the *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Louis Regenstein for the Empire Real Estate Board, Inc.; and by Wayne G. Barnett, pro se. 302 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. mortgage being less than the property’s value), must include the unpaid balance of the mortgage in the computation of the amount the taxpayer realized on the sale. The case now before us presents the question whether the same rule applies when the unpaid amount of the nonrecourse mortgage exceeds the fair market value of the property sold. I On August 1, 1970, respondent Clark Pelt, a builder, and his wholly owned corporation, respondent Clark, Inc., formed a general partnership. The purpose of the partnership was to construct a 120-unit apartment complex in Duncanville, Tex., a Dallas suburb. Neither Pelt nor Clark, Inc., made any capital contribution to the partnership. Six days later, the partnership entered into a mortgage loan agreement with the Farm & Home Savings Association (F&H). Under the agreement, F&H was committed for a $1,851,500 loan for the complex. In return, the partnership executed a note and a deed of trust in favor of F&H. The partnership obtained the loan on a nonrecourse basis: neither the partnership nor its partners assumed any personal liability for repayment of the loan. Pelt later admitted four friends and relatives, respondents Tufts, Steger, Stephens, and Austin, as general partners. None of them contributed capital upon entering the partnership. The construction of the complex was completed in August 1971. During 1971, each partner made small capital contributions to the partnership; in 1972, however, only Pelt made a contribution. The total of the partners’ capital contributions was $44,212. In each tax year, all partners claimed as income tax deductions their allocable shares of ordinary losses and depreciation. The deductions taken by the partners in 1971 and 1972 totalled $439,972. Due to these contributions and deductions, the partnership’s adjusted basis in the property in August 1972 was $1,455,740. COMMISSIONER v. TUFTS 303 300 Opinion of the Court In 1971 and 1972, major employers in the Duncanville area laid off significant numbers of workers. As a result, the partnership’s rental income was less than expected, and it was unable to make the payments due on the mortgage. Each partner, on August 28, 1972, sold his partnership interest to an unrelated third party, Fred Bayles. As consideration, Bayles agreed to reimburse each partner’s sale expenses up to $250; he also assumed the nonrecourse mortgage. On the date of transfer, the fair market value of the property did not exceed $1,400,000. Each partner reported the sale on his federal income tax return and indicated that a partnership loss of $55,740 had been sustained.1 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on audit, determined that the sale resulted in a partnership capital gain of approximately $400,000. His theory was that the partnership had realized the full amount of the nonrecourse obligation.2 Relying on Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F. 2d 212, 215 (CA3), cert, denied, 439 U. S. 1046 (1978), the United States Tax Court, in an unreviewed decision, upheld the asserted deficiencies. 70 T. C. 756 (1978). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 651 F. 2d 1058 (1981). That court expressly disagreed with the Millar analysis, and, in limiting Crane v. Commissioner, supra, to its facts, questioned the theoretical underpinnings of the Crane ‘The loss was the difference between the adjusted basis, $1,455,740, and the fair market value of the property, $1,400,000. On their individual tax returns, the partners did not claim deductions for their respective shares of this loss. In their petitions to the Tax Court, however, the partners did claim the loss. 2 The Commissioner determined the partnership’s gain on the sale by subtracting the adjusted basis, $1,455,740, from the liability assumed by Bayles, $1,851,500. Of the resulting figure, $395,760, the Commissioner treated $348,661 as capital gain, pursuant to § 741 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 741, and $47,099 as ordinary gain under the recapture provisions of § 1250 of the Code. The application of § 1250 in determining the character of the gain is not at issue here. 304 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. decision. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 456 U. S. 960 (1982). II Section 752(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 752(d), specifically provides that liabilities involved in the sale or exchange of a partnership interest are to “be treated in the same manner as liabilities in connection with the sale or exchange of property not associated with partnerships.” Section 1001 governs the determination of gains and losses on the disposition of property. Under § 1001(a), the gain or loss from a sale or other disposition of property is defined as the difference between “the amount realized” on the disposition and the property’s adjusted basis. Subsection (b) of §1001 defines “amount realized”: “The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received.” At issue is the application of the latter provision to the disposition of property encumbered by a nonrecourse mortgage of an amount in excess of the property’s fair market value. A In Crane v. Commissioner, supra, this Court took the first and controlling step toward the resolution of this issue. Beulah B. Crane was the sole beneficiary under the will of her deceased husband. At his death in January 1932, he owned an apartment building that was then mortgaged for an amount which proved to be equal to its fair market value, as determined for federal estate tax purposes. The widow, of course, was not personally liable on the mortgage. She operated the building for nearly seven years, hoping to turn it into a profitable venture; during that period, she claimed income tax deductions for depreciation, property taxes, interest, and operating expenses, but did not make payments upon the mortgage principal. In computing her basis for the depreciation deductions, she included the full amount of the COMMISSIONER v. TUFTS 305 300 Opinion of the Court mortgage debt. In November 1938, with her hopes unfulfilled and the mortgagee threatening foreclosure, Mrs. Crane sold the building. The purchaser took the property subject to the mortgage and paid Crane $3,000; of that amount, $500 went for the expenses of the sale. Crane reported a gain of $2,500 on the transaction. She reasoned that her basis in the property was zero (despite her earlier depreciation deductions based on including the amount of the mortgage) and that the amount she realized from the sale was simply the cash she received. The Commissioner disputed this claim. He asserted that Crane’s basis in the property, under § 113(a)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 490 (the current version is § 1014 of the 1954 Code, as amended, 26 U. S. C. §1014 (1976 ed. and Supp. V)), was the property’s fair market value at the time of her husband’s death, adjusted for depreciation in the interim, and that the amount realized was the net cash received plus the amount of the outstanding mortgage assumed by the purchaser. In upholding the Commissioner’s interpretation of §113 (a)(5) of the 1938 Act,3 the Court observed that to regard merely the taxpayer’s equity in the property as her basis would lead to depreciation deductions less than the actual physical deterioration of the property, and would require the basis to be recomputed with each payment on the mortgage. 331 U. S., at 9-10. The Court rejected Crane’s claim that any loss due to depreciation belonged to the mortgagee. The effect of the Court’s ruling was that the taxpayer’s basis was the value of the property undiminished by the mortgage. Id., at 11. 3 Section 113(a)(5) defined the basis of “property . . . acquired by . . . devise ... or by the decedent’s estate from the decedent” as “the fair market value of such property at the time of such acquisition.” The Court interpreted the term “property” to refer to the physical land and buildings owned by Crane or the aggregate of her rights to control and dispose of them. 331 U. S., at 6. 306 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. The Court next proceeded to determine the amount realized under § 111(b) of the 1938 Act, 52 Stat. 484 (the current version is § 1001(b) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1001(b)). In order to avoid the “absurdity,” see 331 U. S., at 13, of Crane’s realizing only $2,500 on the sale of property worth over a quarter of a million dollars, the Court treated the amount realized as it had treated basis, that is, by including the outstanding value of the mortgage. To do otherwise would have permitted Crane to recognize a tax loss unconnected with any actual economic loss. The Court refused to construe one section of the Revenue Act so as “to frustrate the Act as a whole.” Ibid. Crane, however, insisted that the nonrecourse nature of the mortgage required different treatment. The Court, for two reasons, disagreed. First, excluding the nonrecourse debt from the amount realized would result in the same absurdity and frustration of the Code. Id., at 13-14. Second, the Court concluded that Crane obtained an economic benefit from the purchaser’s assumption of the mortgage identical to the benefit conferred by the cancellation of personal debt. Because the value of the property in that case exceeded the amount of the mortgage, it was in Crane’s economic interest to treat the mortgage as a personal obligation; only by so doing could she realize upon sale the appreciation in her equity represented by the $2,500 boot. The purchaser’s assumption of the liability thus resulted in a taxable economic benefit to her, just as if she had been given, in addition to the boot, a sum of cash sufficient to satisfy the mortgage.4 4 Crane also argued that even if the statute required the inclusion of the amount of the nonrecourse debt, that amount was not Sixteenth Amendment income because the overall transaction had been “by all dictates of common sense ... a ruinous disaster.” Brief for Petitioner in Crane v. Commissioner, O. T. 1946, No. 68, p. 51. The Court noted, however, that Crane had been entitled to and actually took depreciation deductions for nearly seven years. To allow her to exclude sums on which those deductions were based from the calculation of her taxable gain would permit her COMMISSIONER v. TUFTS 307 300 Opinion of the Court In a footnote, pertinent to the present case, the Court observed: “Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case.” Id., at 14, n. 37. B This case presents that unresolved issue. We are disinclined to overrule Crane, and we conclude that the same rule applies when the unpaid amount of the nonrecourse mortgage exceeds the value of the property transferred. Crane ultimately does not rest on its limited theory of economic benefit; instead, we read Crane to have approved the Commissioner’s decision to treat a nonrecourse mortgage in this context as a true loan. This approval underlies Crane’s holdings that the amount of the nonrecourse liability is to be included in calculating both the basis and the amount realized on disposition. That the amount of the loan exceeds the fair market value of the property thus becomes irrelevant. When a taxpayer receives a loan, he incurs an obligation to repay that loan at some future date. Because of this obligation, the loan proceeds do not qualify as income to the taxpayer. When he fulfills the obligation, the repayment of the loan likewise has no effect on his tax liability. Another consequence to the taxpayer from this obligation occurs when the taxpayer applies the loan proceeds to the purchase price of property used to secure the loan. Because of the obligation to repay, the taxpayer is entitled to include the amount of the loan in computing his basis in the property; the loan, under § 1012, is part of the taxpayer’s cost of the “a double deduction ... on the same loss of assets.” The Sixteenth Amendment, it was said, did not require that result. 331 U. S., at 15-16. 308 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 461 U. S. property. Although a different approach might have been taken with respect to a nonrecourse mortgage loan,5 the Commissioner has chosen to accord it the same treatment he gives to a recourse mortgage loan. The Court approved that choice in Crane, and the respondents do not challenge it here. The choice and its resultant benefits to the taxpayer are predicated on the assumption that the mortgage will be repaid in full. When encumbered property is sold or otherwise disposed of and the purchaser assumes the mortgage, the associated 5 The Commissioner might have adopted the theory, implicit in Crane’s contentions, that a nonrecourse mortgage is not true debt, but, instead, is a form of joint investment by the mortgagor and the mortgagee. On this approach, nonrecourse debt would be considered a contingent liability, under which the mortgagor’s payments on the debt gradually increase his interest in the property while decreasing that of the mortgagee. Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1498, 1514 (1982); Lurie, Mortgagor’s Gain on Mortgaging Property for More than Cost Without Personal Liability, 6 Tax L. Rev. 319, 323 (1951); cf. Brief for Respondents 16 (nonrecourse debt resembles preferred stock). Because the taxpayer’s investment in the property would not include the nonrecourse debt, the taxpayer would not be permitted to include that debt in basis. Note, 82 Colum. L. Rev., at 1515; cf. Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 637 F. 2d 1041, 1047-1048 (CA5 1981) (contingent nature of obligation prevents inclusion in basis of oil and gas leases of nonrecourse debt secured by leases, drilling equipment, and percentage of future production). We express no view as to whether such an approach would be consistent with the statutory structure and, if so, and Crane were not on the books, whether that approach would be preferred over Crane’s analysis. We note only that the Crane Court’s resolution of the basis issue presumed that when property is purchased with proceeds from a nonrecourse mortgage, the purchaser becomes the sole owner of the property. 331 U. S., at 6. Under the Crane approach, the mortgagee is entitled to no portion of the basis. Id., at 10, n. 28. The nonrecourse mortgage is part of the mortgagor’s investment in the property, and does not constitute a coinvestment by the mortgagee. But see Note, 82 Colum. L. Rev., at 1513 (treating nonrecourse mortgage as coinvestment by mortgagee and critically concluding that Crane departed from traditional analysis that basis is taxpayer’s investment in property). COMMISSIONER v. TUFTS 309 300 Opinion of the Court extinguishment of the mortgagor’s obligation to repay is accounted for in the computation of the amount realized.6 See United States v. Hendler, 303 U. S. 564, 566-567 (1938). Because no difference between recourse and nonrecourse obligations is recognized in calculating basis,7 Crane teaches that the Commissioner may ignore the nonrecourse nature of the obligation in determining the amount realized upon disposition of the encumbered property. He thus may include in the amount realized the amount of the nonrecourse mortgage assumed by the purchaser. The rationale for this treatment is that the original inclusion of the amount of the mortgage in basis rested on the assumption that the mortgagor incurred an obligation to repay. Moreover, this treatment balances the fact that the mortgagor originally received the proceeds of the nonrecourse loan tax-free on the same assumption. 6 In this case, respondents received the face value of their note as loan proceeds. If respondents initially had given their note at a discount, the amount realized on the sale of the securing property might be limited to the funds actually received. See Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F. 2d 751, 752 (CA2 1932) (cancellation of indebtedness); Fashion Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T. C. 600, 606 (1954) (same). See generally J. Sneed, The Configurations of Gross Income 319 (1967) (“[I]t appears settled that the reacquisition of bonds at a discount by the obligor results in gain only to the extent the issue price, where this is less than par, exceeds the cost of reacquisition”). 7 The Commissioner’s choice in Crane “laid the foundation stone of most tax shelters,” Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 Tax L. Rev. 277, 283 (1978), by permitting taxpayers who bear no risk to take deductions on depreciable property. Congress recently has acted to curb this avoidance device by forbidding a taxpayer to take depreciation deductions in excess of amounts he has at risk in the investment. Pub. L. 94-455, § 204(a), 90 Stat. 1531 (1976), 26 U. S. C. §465; Pub. L. 95-600, §§201-204, 92 Stat. 2814-2817 (1978), 26