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4. *Personal jurisdiction—Failure to comply with discovery order.*—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)—authorizing a district court, as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery orders, to enter an order that matters regarding which discovery was sought shall be taken to be established—may be applied to support a finding of personal jurisdiction without violating due process, and District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying Rule in diversity action when foreign insurance companies raised defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and then failed to comply with court's orders for production of information sought by plaintiff to establish jurisdiction. *Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee*, p. 694.

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Dismissal of military charges—Subsequent indictment on civilian charges.—Where military murder charges against respondent, an officer in Army Medical Corps, were dismissed in 1970 but Army, at Justice Department's request, continued its investigation and respondent was ultimately indicted in 1975 on murder charges and was thereafter convicted, time between dismissal of military charges and indictment on civilian charges could not be considered in determining whether delay in bringing respondent to trial violated his right to a speedy trial under Sixth Amendment. *United States v. MacDonald*, p. 1.

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1. *Collateral attack on sentence—Trial-court jury instructions—Standard of review.*—In reversing District Court's denial of respondent's motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to vacate life sentence for first-degree murder on alleged ground that instructions to trial jury as to malice had eliminated any possibility of a manslaughter verdict—District Court's denial of motion having been based on respondent's failure to challenge instructions on direct appeal of conviction or in prior collateral attacks on sentence—Court of Appeals erred in applying "plain error" standard of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) governing relief on direct appeal from errors not objected to at trial, instead of "cause and actual prejudice" standard; and respondent did not sustain burden of showing that alleged trial error had worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage so as to infect trial with error of constitutional dimensions. *United States v. Frady*, p. 152.

2. *Death sentence—Invalidity of one of aggravating circumstances found by jury.*—In federal habeas corpus proceedings by state prisoner challenging constitutionality of Georgia death sentence that was upheld by Georgia Supreme Court, which, while setting aside jury's finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance, had concluded that sentence was not impaired since evidence supported jury's findings of two other aggravating circumstances, this Court will, pursuant to a Georgia statute, certify question to Georgia Supreme Court as to what premises of state law supported conclusion that death sentence was not impaired by invalidity of one of aggravating circumstances found by jury. *Zant v. Stephens*, p. 410.

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INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT.

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2. *Supreme Court—Conviction in District Court for District of Columbia—Collateral attack under 28 U. S. C. § 2255.*—Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals' judgment reversing judgment of Federal District Court for District of Columbia—respondent having filed motion in District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 collaterally attacking his sentence in prosecution in 1963 when District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over local felonies committed in District—and Supreme Court is not required to refrain from reviewing decision on alleged ground that Court of Appeals' decision was based on an adequate and independent local ground of decision; equal protection principles do not require that a § 2255 motion by a prisoner convicted in 1963 be treated as though it was a motion under District of Columbia Code after 1970. *United States v. Frady*, p. 152.

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3. *Supreme Court—Review of “final” judgments.*—Supreme Court has no jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which provides for review of “final” judgments, to review Colorado Supreme Court’s judgment remanding case for trial. *O’Dell v. Espinoza*, p. 430.

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2. *Unfair labor practice—Refusal to handle Russian cargo—Secondary boycott.*—Petitioner union's refusal to handle ships' cargo arriving from or destined for Soviet Union—as a protest against Russian invasion of Afghanistan—thus completely disrupting respondent's business of importing Russian goods shipped by an American shipper that employed a stevedoring company that in turn employed union members, constituted an illegal secondary boycott under § 8(b)(4)(B) of Act; application of § 8(b)(4)(B) here does not infringe First Amendment rights of petitioner or its members. *Longshoremen v. Allied International, Inc.*, p. 212.

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- PRICE MANIPULATION.** See Commodity Exchange Act.
- PRIMARY ELECTIONS.** See Reapportionment.

- PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.** See **Antitrust Acts.**
- PRISONERS.** See **Criminal Law; Habeas Corpus, 2.**
- PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION.** See **Commodity Exchange Act.**
- PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES.** See **Antitrust Acts.**
- PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT RESULTING IN MISTRIAL.** See **Constitutional Law, II.**
- PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.** See **Freedom of Information Act.**
- PUBLIC EMPLOYEES.** See **Armed Forces; Tucker Act.**
- PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY POLICIES ACT OF 1978.** See **Constitutional Law, I; IX.**
- RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.**
- RAILROAD FREIGHT CHARGES.** See **Interstate Commerce Act.**
- RATES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES.** See **Constitutional Law, I; IX.**
- REAPPORTIONMENT.**
Texas congressional districts—Legislative plan.—In an action challenging validity of Texas Legislature's reapportionment plan for congressional districts, District Court having delayed proceeding pending review of plan under Voting Rights Act of 1965 by Attorney General, who ultimately objected to certain districts in south Texas but otherwise approved plan—District Court erred in formulating plan which, in addition to resolving Attorney General's objection to specified districts, also established new districts for Dallas County, Attorney General not having objected to Dallas County districts under Texas Legislature's plan and District Court not having found constitutional or statutory violation as to those districts; however, District Court in first instance should determine whether forthcoming congressional primary elections for Dallas County should be rescheduled or should proceed under court's interim plan. *Upham v. Seamon*, p. 37.
- RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.** See **Constitutional Law, V; Standing to Sue.**
- REPORTING AND REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS AS TO RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS.** See **Constitutional Law, V; Standing to Sue.**
- RES JUDICATA.** See **Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1.**
- RETRIALS.** See **Constitutional Law, II; III, 1.**
- RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.** See **Constitutional Law, VII.**

- SAFETY CODES.** See Antitrust Acts.
- SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DISCOVERY ORDERS.** See Constitutional Law, III, 4.
- SCHOOL BOARD EMPLOYEES.** See Education Amendments of 1972.
- SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.** See Constitutional Law, VIII.
- SECONDARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS.** See National Labor Relations Act, 1.
- SECONDARY BOYCOTTS.** See Labor Management Relations Act; National Labor Relations Act, 2.
- SELF-DEFENSE.** See Habeas Corpus, 2.
- SENIORITY SYSTEMS.** See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.
- SERVICE OF PROCESS.** See Constitutional Law, III, 2.
- SEX DISCRIMINATION.** See Education Amendments of 1972.
- SHERMAN ACT.** See Antitrust Acts.
- SHIPPERS.** See National Labor Relations Act, 2.
- SIXTH AMENDMENT.** See Constitutional Law, VII.
- SOCIAL SECURITY ACT.** See Constitutional Law, III, 3; Jurisdiction, 1.
- SOLICITATION OF RELIGIOUS CONTRIBUTIONS.** See Constitutional Law, V; Standing to Sue.
- SPECULATORS IN FUTURES CONTRACTS.** See Commodity Exchange Act.
- SPEEDY TRIAL.** See Constitutional Law, VII.
- STANDING TO SUE.**
- Unification Church and its followers—Registration and reporting requirements—Validity of Minnesota statute.*—Unification Church and individuals following its tenets have Art. III standing to challenge validity, under Establishment Clause of First Amendment, of Minnesota statute which provides that only those religious organizations that receive more than half of their total contributions from members or affiliated organizations are exempt from statutory registration and reporting requirements. *Larson v. Valente*, p. 228.
- STATE DEPARTMENT.** See Freedom of Information Act, 1.
- STATES' POWERS.** See Constitutional Law, IX.
- STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.** See Constitutional Law, IV.

STEVEDORES. See **National Labor Relations Act, 2.**

SUBCONTRACTING CLAUSES IN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LABOR AGREEMENTS. See **National Labor Relations Act, 1.**

SUMMARIES OF AGENCY FILES AS EXEMPT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. See **Freedom of Information Act, 2.**

SUMMONSES. See **Constitutional Law, III, 2.**

SUPPORT OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. See **Constitutional Law, IV.**

SUPREME COURT. See also **Jurisdiction, 2, 3.**

1. Notation of the death of Justice Fortas (resigned), p. v.
2. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 1013.
3. Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, p. 1021.
4. Amendments to Rules Governing 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254 and 2255 Proceedings, p. 1031.

TENANTS' RIGHT TO EVICTION NOTICE. See **Constitutional Law, III, 2.**

TENTH AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law, IX.**

TEXAS. See **Constitutional Law, IV; Reapportionment.**

TRADEMARK ACT OF 1946.

Prescription drugs—Trademark infringement—Court of Appeals' review of District Court findings.—In an action under Act by respondent manufacturer of prescription drug who sold drug to retail pharmacists under registered trademark—alleging that petitioner generic drug manufacturers had copied appearance of respondent's capsules and, with petitioner wholesalers, had contributed to some pharmacists' dispensing generic drugs mislabeled under respondent's trademark—Court of Appeals erred in setting aside District Court's findings that respondent failed to show that petitioners intentionally induced pharmacists' mislabeling or continued to supply pharmacists who petitioners knew or should have known were mislabeling, where Court of Appeals acted on its own review of evidence, rather than on basis of "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). *Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.*, p. 844.

TREATIES. See **Armed Forces.**

TUCKER ACT. See also **Jurisdiction, 1.**

Jurisdiction—Discharge from Government employment—Express or implied contract.—Act's provisions giving federal courts jurisdiction over certain suits against United States founded upon express or implied con-

TUCKER ACT—Continued.

tracts did not confer jurisdiction on Federal District Court over respondent's damages claim for alleged wrongful discharge from employment with Army and Air Force Exchange Service in violation of Service's regulations, since respondent had been appointed to his positions in Service, rather than employed pursuant to an express contract, and since relevant regulations did not furnish a basis for implying a contract. *Army and Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan*, p. 728.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES. See *Labor Management Relations Act*; *National Labor Relations Act*.

UNIFICATION CHURCH. See *Constitutional Law, V*; *Standing to Sue*.

UNIONS. See *Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4*; *Labor Management Relations Act*; *Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959*; *National Labor Relations Act*.

UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES. See *Civil Rights Act of 1964*.

VEHICLE SEARCHES. See *Constitutional Law, VIII*.

VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965. See *Reapportionment*.

VOTING RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS. See *Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959*.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES. See *Constitutional Law, VIII*.

WATER BOILERS SAFETY CODE. See *Antitrust Acts*.

WATER POLLUTION. See *Federal Water Pollution Control Act*.

WEAPONS TRAINING. See *Federal Water Pollution Control Act*.

WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. See *Freedom of Information Act*.

WORDS AND PHRASES.

1. "*Damages.*" § 303(b), *Labor Management Relations Act*, 29 U. S. C. § 187(b). *Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. Carpenters*, p. 717.

2. "*Discipline.*" § 609, *Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959*, 29 U. S. C. § 529. *Finnegan v. Leu*, p. 431.

3. "*Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes.*" *Freedom of Information Act*, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(7). *FBI v. Abramson*, p. 615.


4. "*No person.*" § 901(a), *Education Amendments of 1972*, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). *North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell*, p. 512.

WORDS AND PHRASES—Continued.

5. "*Personnel and medical files and similar files.*" Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6). *Department of State v. Washington Post Co.*, p. 595.

6. "*Treaty.*" § 106, Pub. L. 92-129, note following 5 U. S. C. § 7201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). *Weinberger v. Rossi*, p. 25.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. See Tucker Act.



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1. The first part of the book is devoted to a general introduction to the subject of the history of the United States. It is written in a clear and concise style, and is well adapted for use in the classroom.

2. The second part of the book is devoted to a detailed account of the history of the United States from 1776 to 1876. It is written in a clear and concise style, and is well adapted for use in the classroom.

3. The third part of the book is devoted to a detailed account of the history of the United States from 1876 to 1898. It is written in a clear and concise style, and is well adapted for use in the classroom.

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
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
13. The thirteenth part of the book is devoted to a detailed account of the history of the United States from 1939 to 1942. It is written in a clear and concise style, and is well adapted for use in the classroom.


14. The fourteenth part of the book is devoted to a detailed account of the history of the United States from 1942 to 1945. It is written in a clear and concise style, and is well adapted for use in the classroom.


15. The fifteenth part of the book is devoted to a detailed account of the history of the United States from 1945 to 1948. It is written in a clear and concise style, and is well adapted for use in the classroom.



















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