PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNITED STATES REPORTS VOLUME 419 CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT OCTOBER TERM, 1974 (Beginning of Term) October 9, 1974, Through January 22, 1975 Together With In-Vacation Dismissals and Opinions of Individual Justices in Chambers HENRY PUTZEL, jr. REPORTER OF DECISIONS UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1976 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing- Oilice Washington, D.C. 20402- Price $17.00 (Buckram) Stock No. 028-001-00388-5 Erratum 417 U. S. 8: an omission occurs in the second sentence of the first paragraph. That sentence should read as follows: In Tiidee, the Board refused to order reimbursment of excess organizational costs because “ ‘no nexus between [the employer’s] unlawful conduct... and the Union’s preelection organizational expenses’ ” had been proved. n JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE TIME OF THESE REPORTS WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, Jr., Associate Justice. POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice. BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice. THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice. LEWIS F. POWELL, Jr., Associate Justice. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Associate Justice. retired STANLEY REED, Associate Justice. TOM C. CLARK, Associate Justice. officers of the court WILLIAM B. SAXBE, Attorney General. ROBERT H. BORK, Solicitor General. MICHAEL RODAK, Jr., Clerk. HENRY PUTZEL, jr.^REPORTER of Decisions. FRANK M. HEPLER, Marshal. EDWARD G. HUDON, Librarian. hi SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Allotment of Justices It is ordered that the following allotment be made of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court among the circuits, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 42, and that such allotment be entered of record, viz.: For the District of Columbia Circuit, Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice. For the First Circuit, William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice. For the Second Circuit, Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice. For the Third Circuit, William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice. For the Fourth Circuit; Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice. For the Fifth Circuit, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice. For the Sixth Circuit, Potter Stewart, Associate Justice. For the Seventh Circuit, William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice. For the Eighth Circuit, Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice. For the Ninth Circuit, William O. Douglas, Associate Justice. For the Tenth Circuit, Byron R. White, Associate Justice. January 7, 1972. (For next previous allotment, see 403 U. S., p. iv.) IV J TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Note: All undesignated references herein to the United States Code are to the 1970 edition. Cases reported before page 801 are those decided with opinions of the Court or decisions per curiam. Cases reported on page 801 et seq. are those in which orders were entered. Opinions reported on page 1301 et seq. are those written in chambers by individual Justices. Page Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v. Lasker...................... 870 A-Advanced Products Co. v. California...................... 808 Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corp........................... 998 Aaron; Los Angeles v....................................... 1122 Aaron; Warren v............................................ 1024 Abate v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co......................... 900 Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP........................ 822 Abetta Electric Service Corp. v. Levine.................... 832 Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Assn.; Kinee v. ... 998 Abramo v. United States.................................... 826 Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery County. .. . 836 A Cherney Disposal Co'? Chicago Refuse Disposal Assn. v.. 887 Ackerson v. United States................................. 1099 Acme Fast Freight; Mohasco Industries v.................... 842 Acting Comm’r of Social Services of N. Y. v. Hurley. .. . 1045,1103 Acting Director, U. S. Board of Parole; McIntosh v....... 1100 Acting Secretary of Air Force; McDonald v................ 987 Adams v. New Jersey........................................ 846 Adams v. Southern California First National Bank.......... 1006 Adams v. United States..................................... 897 Adamszewski v. Machinists.................................. 997 Adey v. United Action for Animals.......................... 842 Adkins v. Florida.......................................... 1125 Administrator, EPA v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc.......... 818,990 Administrator, EPA v. Natural Resources Defense Council.. 823 Administrator, EPA v. New York City...................... 818,990 Administrator, EPA; Texas v................................ 840 Administrator, Federal Aviation Admin, v. Robertson...... 1067 v VI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Administrator, Federal Energy Office; California v........ 1021 Administrator, Federal Energy Office; Louisiana v......... 1021 Administrator, Public Welfare Division; Blondell v......... 866 Administrator, Veterans’ Administration; Cook v........... 1115 Adolph Coors Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n.................. 1105 Adolph Coors Co.; Federal Trade Comm’n v.................. 1105 Aetna Life & Casualty Co.; Nassau County Ins. Agents v. .. 968 Affiliated Fund, Inc. v. Papilsky......................... 1048 Agnew v. United States.................................... 1091 Agur v. Wilson............................................ 1072 Aiken v. Hopper........................................... 1091 Aiken; Twentieth Century Music Corp, v.................... 1067 Airco Engineers v. United States........................... 994 Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp......... 815 Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp..................... 997 Alabama; Ballew v......................................... 1130 Alabama; Cordle v......................................... 1033 Alabama; Curtis v.......................................... 852 Alabama; Daniels v................................... 1026,1114 Alabama; Funches v........................................ 1114 Alabama; Gaines v.......................................... 851 Alabama; Grayson v......................................... 862 Alabama; Hall v............................................ 887 Alabama; Lee v........................................ 864,1061 Alabama; Lockett v........................................ 1112 Alabama; Mathis v......................................... 1106 Alabama; McCants v........................................ 1054 Alabama; Morrow v.......................................... 853 Alabama; Parmley v........................................ 1104 Alabama; Pierce v......................................... 1130 Alabama; Shiflett v........................................ 867 Alabama; Wilson v.......................................... 845 Alabama Director of Conservation v. Mobil Oil Corp.......... 1022 Alameda County Water Dist.; Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v. .....869 Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona......................... 962 Alaska; Gonzales v......................................... 868 Alaska; United States v................................... 1045 Albany Welfare Rights Organization; Lavine v............... 838 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.............................. 1068 Albert; Williams v........................................ 1018 Alberto-Culver Co. v. LaMaur, Inc.......................... 902 Alberto-Culver Co.; Scherk v............................... 885 Alcala; Burns v.................................. 823,1087,1102 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED vn Page Aiderman; Philadelphia Housing Authority v.................. 844 Alers v. San Juan.................................... 1031,1099 Alers v. Toledo............................................. 960 Alexander v. California.................................... 1122 Alexander v. Estelle....................................... 1073 Alexander v. United States................................. 1107 Alfin v. Ladies’ Garment Workers............................ 840 Allen v. Hopper............................................ 1055 Allen v. Illinois........................................... 865 Allen v. Rose.............................................. 1080 Allen v. United States..................................... 1035 Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman.......................... 20,815 Allen Co. v. United States................................. 1067 Allen Estate; Simon v.............................. 843 Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley........................ 815 Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators v. Peoples National Bank. .. . 967 Allison v. United States.................................... 851 Allison v. Wisconsin....................................... 1071 Allred v. North Carolina................................... 1127 Almeida v. Lucey............................................ 806 Alonso v. United States..................................... 845 Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery............ 842 Altsman v. Texas............................................ 842 Alvarez v. New York......................................... 859 Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.......... 823 Amato; Divine v............................................ 1014 Amato v. United States..................................... 1013 American Building Maintenance Industries; LTnited States v. 1104 American Dairy of Evansville v. Kraftco Corp................ 883 American Federation of Television Artists; Buckley v....... 1093 American Federation of Television Artists; Lewis v......... 1093 American Friends Service Committee; United States v.............. 7 American Home Products Corp.; Clarion Corp, v........ 870,1027 American Home Products Corp. v. Reyes...................... 1096 American Institute for Shippers’ Assns. v. United States... 1042 American Machine & Foundry Co.; Foster v............... 833,1061 American Plant Food Corp. v. Texas......................... 1098 American President Lines; R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. ... 1070 American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S. S. Assn............... 215,816 American Renaissance Lines ;HTnited States v............... 1020 American Security & Trust Co.; Fletcher v................... 900 Amos v. United States....................................... 896 Ampex, Inc.; Myers v.............................. 851,1037,1115 VIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ampex, Inc.; Romyco Stereo v...................... 851,1037,1115 Analla v. United States..................................... 813 Anchor Motor Freight v. Scott.............................. 868 Andersen & Co.; Ohio v..................................... 1034 Anderson v. Illinois........................................ 821 Anderson; L’Aquarius ................................. 871 Anderson; Lewellen v........................................ 871 Anderson v. Reed........................................... 1045 Anderson; Steigler v....................................... 1002 Anderson v. Trimble......................................... 995 Anderson v. United States........................... 821,827,875 Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard; Napper v. 1023 Andrea Dumon, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc..................... 873, 1060 Andrews v. Los Angeles...................................... 986 Andrews; Minnesota v........................................ 881 Andrews v. United States.................................... 884 Andrino v. United States............................... 991,1048 Angel v. Coiner........................................ 850, 1041 Angiulo v. United States.................................... 896 Anita Associates; Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v................. 1034 Ann Arbor R, Co. v. United States........................... 807 Antoine v. Washington...................................... 1043 Apodaca v. California...................................... 1091 Appellate Court of Illinois; Hunter vi...................... 887 Aranda v. Committee on Examinations for Arizona State Bar. 844 Arber v. Essex Wire Corp.................................... 830 Arends v. Arends............................................ 881 Arizona; Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v.......................... 962 Arizona; Cassius v...................................... 824 1045 Arizona; Everett v......................................... 880 Arizona; Jones v.......................................... 1004 Arizona; Miller v......................................... 1004 Arizona; Moore v........................................... 871 Arizona; Nevarez v....................................... 1073 Arizona; Parle v.......................................... 1003 Arizona Highway Dept.; Mendoza v........................... 1055 Arizona Public Service Co. v. Chemehuevi Tribe.............. 962 Arkansas; McDonald v...................................... 1004 Arkansas; Mississippi v................................. 375 814 Arkansas; Pinnell v........................................ H10 Arkansas; Shepherd v....................................... 808 Arkansas; Walters v........................................ 833 Arkansas-Best Freight System; Bowman Transportation v... 281 ■ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ix Page Arkansas-Best Freight System; Johnson Motor Lines v....... 281 Arkansas-Best Freight System; Lorch-Westway Corp, v....... 281 Arkansas-Best Freight System; Red Ball Motor Freight v. .. 281 Arkansas-Best Freight System; United States v............... 281 Arnold v. Superior Court of California..................... 1073 Arnold v. United States.................................... 1027 Arrowood; Lee 22........................................... 1116 Arroyo v. LTnited States.................................... 827 Arthur Andersen & C ¡Colorado Magnetics v.. 819,1120 Edward B. Marks Music Corp.; Sound Values, Inc. v.... 819,1120 Edwards; Bates v..................................................... 811 Edwards; Driskell v.................................................. 812 Edwards; Griffith v.................................................. 861 Edwards v. Healy..................................................... 816 Edwards v. United States............................................. 954 E. & E. J. Pfotzer v. Warholic..................................... 1047 Efiler v. Tennessee.................................................. 841 E. F. Timme & Son; Fur Information & Fashion Council v.. 1022 Eggleston v. United States........................................... 858 Ehrlichman v. Sirica............................................... 1310 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin........................................ 815 ■ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxi Page Eldridge; Weinberger v.............................................. 1104 Election Comm’r of Delaware; Cassidy v.............................. 1042 Electrical Workers v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co..................... 879 Electrical Workers; International Telephone & Tel. v... 428,818 Electrical Workers v. Labor Board................................ 835,896 Electrical Workers v. Sperry Rand Corp............................... 831 Electrical Workers v. Sperry Systems Management Div....................... 831 Electronic Data Systems Corp.;'Sigma Systems Corp. v.... 1070 Eli v. Britt........................................................ 1058 Elison; Bray v....................................................... 841 El Khadem; Equity Securities Corp, v................................. 900 Ellingburg v. United States......................................... 1046 Ellis v. Hawaii........................................ 959,1109 Ellis v. Oklahoma ......................................... 1035 Ellis v. Powers............................................. 959 Ellis v. United States..................................... 1052 Ellisor; Kanapaux v.................................................. 891 Ellwein; First American Bank & Trust Co. v..................... 1026,1117 El Monte Board of Education; Calderon v.......................... 807,1047 Emerine v.‘United States............................................. 854 Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Meyerhofer................... 998 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org. 816 Emprise Corp. v. United States...................................... 1120 England v. Chrysler Corp............................................. 869 Englefield v. Englefield........................................ 958,1061 English v. Davis.................................................... 1125 English; Lewis v.................................................... 1045 Enslow v. Watson..................................................... 880 Environmental Defense Fund v. Stamm................................... 1041 Environmental Prot. Agency v. Campaign Clean Water. .. 818, 990 Environmental Prot. Agency v. Natural Resources Council. .. 823 Environmental Prot. Agency v. New York City...................... 818,990 Environmental Prot. Agency; Texas v........................ 840 Ephraim v. Estelle.............................................. 897,1061 Epps v. Maryland....................................................... 809 Equal Employment Opp’ty Comm’n; Standard Forge Co. v. 1106 Equity Securities Corp. v. El Khadem................................... 900 Erber v. New Jersey........................................ 861 Erickson v. Feather....................................... 1044 Ernest Renda Contracting Co. v. Male................................... 839 Ervin v. United States..................................... 850 Erwin v. Leeke............................................ 1037 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville.............................................. 822 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxni Page Falk v. California Adult Authority.......................... 1000 Falkner v. Blanton..................................... 977,1080 Falkner v. Goodhart.......................................... 809 Falley v. United States...................................... 987 Fann; Zaun v............................................ 854,1060 Fannon v. United States.................................. 1012 Fanner v. Illinois........................................... 849 Farmer v. United States................................... 848 Farries v. United States.................................... 1054 Farries v. U. S. District Court............................. 1104 Farris v. United States...................................... 852 Fearnow; McWhirt v.......................................... 1020 Feaster v. United States.................................... 1036 Feather; Erickson v......................................... 1044 Featheringham v. Ohio........................................ 821 Aviation Administration v. Robertson......................... 1067 Communications Comm’n; King’s Garden, Inc. v.... 996 Communications Comm’n v. TV 9, Inc................ 986 Electric Corp. v. United States...................... 874 Energy Office’ California v......................... 1021 Energy Office; Louisiana v.......................... 1021 Maritime Comm’n; Longshoremen v................ 964 Federal Maritime Comm’n; New York Shipping Assn, v......... 964 Federal Power Comm’n v. Chemehuevi Tribe..................... 962 Chemehuevi Tribe v.................. 962 Distrigas Corp, v................... 834 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v....... 882 Federal Power Comm’n; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v....... 882 Power Comm’n; Southern California Gas Co. v................. 882 Power Comm’n; Willcox v.............................. 882 Prescription Service v. Labor Board................. 1049 Federal Reserve Bank; Community Bank v...................... 1089 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Adolph Coors Co..................... 1105 Federal Trade Comm’n; Adolph Coors Co. v.............. 1105 Federal Trade Comm’n; Mervin v............................... 886 Federal Trade Comm’n; National Dynamics Corp, v.......... 993 Federal Trade Comm’n; Rodgers v.............................. 834 Federal Trade Comm’n; Spiegel, Inc. v........................ 896 Fedrick, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization of Cal........ 1120 Felicia v. United States..................................... 849 Fell v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles............................ 1010 Felts v. United States................................. 1051,1071 Fenner v. Strickland........................................ 1121 Federal Federal Federal Federal Federal Federal federal Power Comm’n; Federal Power Comm’n; Federal Power Comm’n: Federal Federal xxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Ferguson v. District of Columbia............................ 860 Ferguson v. United States................................... 900 Ferraro v. United States.................................... 896 Ferri v. United States....................................... 1024 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Borel.................... 869 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.; Ford Wholesale Co. v.... 876 Fico v. United States...................................... 1091 Ficorelli v. United States................................. 1009 Field Enterprises; Mark Trail Camp Grounds v............... 1043 Fields v. United States.................................... 1071 Fields, Inc. v. Brennan....................................... 881 Finley Coal Co.; United States w........................... 1089 Finnerman; McCormick v..................................... 1049 Fiorella v. United States..................................... 885 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.; General Tire & Rubber Co. v.. 886 First American Bank & Trust Co. v. Ellwein............ 1026,1117 First Presbyterian Church of Forest Park v. Lowe............ 895 Fisher v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp...................... 1033 Fithian v. Fithian..................................... 825,1060 Fitzgerald v. Boslow........................................ 994 Fitzgerald v. DiGrazia..................................... 1065 565 East Broad, Inc.; Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth Co. v... 868 Five Smiths, Inc. v. Hollaway............................... 896 Flambeau Paper Co. v. Department of Industry................ 870 Flammia v. United States................................... 1035 Flaxman v. United States................................... 1031 Fletcher v. American Security & Trust Co.................... 900 Fletcher; Department of Housing and Urban Develop, v....... 812 Fletcher; Housing Authority of Louisville v................. 812 Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Bank............... 1001 Flint v. Mullen............................................ 1026 Florida; Adkins v...................................... 1125 Florida; Beamon v...................................... 1124 Florida; Booze v...................................... 959,997 Florida; Broge v........................................ 845 Florida; Camm v....................................... 866 Florida; Dillingham v................................. 871,1028 Florida; Dunbar v...................................... 1049 Florida; Dykman v...................................... 1105 Florida; Frankenberry v................................. 854 Florida ; Hedden v...................................... 1031 Florida; Ivory v....................................... 1043 Florida; Johnson v...................................... HO® TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXXV Page Florida; Jones v.................................................. 1081 Florida; Martin v................................................... 1125 Florida; Murphy v................................................... 1088 Florida; Ransom v............................................... 821 Florida; Reed v.................................................... 995 Florida; Rojas v................................................... 851 Florida; Rollins v................................................ 1009 Florida; Seay v.................................................... 847 Florida; United States v..................................... 814 Florida; Washington v........................................ 993 Flournoy; Marks v............................................ 835 Flowers v. United States.................................... 1003 Folks v. United States.................................. 849,1080 Follette; Lombardi v........................................ 1037 Fongone v. United States..................................... 864 Fonseca v. United States.................................... 1072 Fontaine U. S. Court of Appeals............................. 1031 Ford; Dickson v............................................. 1085 Ford v. United States........................................ 994 Ford Motor Co.; Dean v...................................... 1109 Ford Motor Co.; Moulton v.................................... 870 Ford Motor Co.; Rea v........................................ 868 Ford Motor Co.; Vella v...................................... 894 Ford Motor Co.; Zenith Vinyl Fabrics Corp, v................. 967 Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp....... 876 Foreman v. Texas............................................. 851 Forest City Publishing Co.; Cantrell v....................... 245 Forgy v. Tennessee.......................................... 1034 Forkert v. California........................................ 825 Forman; New York v.......................................... 1120 Forman; United Housing Foundation v.................... 1067,1120 Fornaro v. Maryland......................................... 1126 Forrow v. Estelle........................................... 1013 Fort Lauderdale; Payne v................................ 875,1060 Foss; Olden v................................................ 869 Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co................. 833,1061 Foster v. Dravo Corp......................................... 823 Foster v. Maryland.......................................... 1036 Fountain; River Farms v..................................... 1027 Fowler v. North Carolina................................ 963,1030 Franchise Tax Board of California v. United Americans...... 890 Francis; Mason v............................................ 1042 Francisco v. Gathright........................................ 59 XXXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Frank v. United States................................... 828 Frankenberry v. Florida.................................. 854 Franks; Bowman Transportation v............................ 1050 Frasier v. Indiana....................................... 1092 Frazier v. Commissioner.................................. 886 Freeman v. Wnited States.................................... 996 Fresno; Pettitt v..................................... 810,1060 Fresta v. United States.................................... 1048 Freudmann v. Blankstem................................... 841 Friedman v. United States.................................. 1054 Fritz v. Clermont........................................ 832 Fruge v. United States...................................... 856 Fry v. United States.................................. 816,961 Fulford v. Louisiana........................................ 846 Fuller; Nichols v........................................ 871 Fulton; Bearden v........................................... 821 Funehes v. Alabama....................................... 1114 Fur Information & Fashion Council v. E. F. Timme & Son. .. 1022 Fusari v. Steinberg................................ 379,816,990 Gables by the Sea, Inc. v. Lee........................... 1105 Gabriel v. United States................................. 1086 Gaffney; Kinnell v........................................ 861 Gagliardi; Williams v.................................... 1107 Gaines v. Alabama......................................... 851 Gaines; Lavine v......................................... 1040 Gaito v. Matson.......................................... 1092 Gallman; Woodside Savings & Loan Assn, v.................. 810 Ganci v. Henderson........................................ 866 Ganos v. United States.................................... 846 Garcia v. United States............................... 897,1004 Garcia-Quesada v. United States.......................... 1004 Garey Corp.; Home Insurance Co. v....................... 843 Gardner v. Oregon......................................... 998 Gardner v. United States.................................. 895 Garelli v. United States................................. 1107 Gargallo v. Gargallo..................................... 1065 Gargallo v. Presiding Judge, Franklin County Court....... 811 Garis v. Compania Maritima San Basilio................... 1065 Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co....................... 816 Garner v. Louisiana State Board of Education.............. 830 Garrison; Hicks v......................................... 854 Garrison; Perkins v....................................... 994 Garver; Gibbs v.......................................... 1039 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XXXVII Page Garvey v. United States..................................... 1113 Gaskins v. Titeflex Employees Bargaining Assn........... 1035, 1117 Gates Rubber Co.; Goodyear v................................ 1090 Gathright; Francisco v........................................ 59 Gearin v. United States..................................... 1113 Gearin v. Weyerhaeuser Line............................. 884,1061 General Dynamics Corp.; Duckstein v....................... 835 General Electric Co.; Kreager v.............................. 861 General Motors Corp.; Hunter v............................... 988 General Motors Corp.; New Jersey v.......................... 1080 General Portland Cement Co. v. Coolidge...................... 843 General Security Services v. Wedren.......................... 831 General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co... 886 General Tire & Rubber Co.; Jefferson Chemical Co. v........ 968 Generes v. Stich............................................ 1097 Generes v. Superior Court of California...................... 998 Genovese v. United States................................... 1038 Gentile v. United States..................................... 979 George Steinberg & Co. v. Butz............................... 830 George Transfer & Rigging Co. v. United States... 1042 Campbell v................................................... 862 Cauley v.............................................. 877 Humphrey v............................................ 839 Georgia; Jones v............................................ 1115 Georgia Power Co.; Brown v................................... 838 Germaise, In re............................................. 1102 Gerstein v. Pugh............................................. 815 Gerstein; United Mini-Adult Theatre v..................... 1028 Gerstein; United Theatres of Florida v..................... 1028 Sayles v....................................................... 888 v. Dann.............................................. 839 v. Garver........................................... 1039 v. Howell........................................... 1086 v. Henderson........................................ 1072 Z. United States................................ 1071,1106 Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Com. v. United States...... 1021 Gilkerson v. Curry........................................... 847 Gilligan v. Korzen........................................... 841 Gillikin v. United States................................... 1091 Giordano v. United States, ................................. 1120 Giovine v. Mack Trucks....................................... 863 Gisher v. United States...................................... 900 Gissel v. United States..................................... 1012 Georgia; Georgia; Gesser Gibbs Gibbs Gibson Gibson XXXVI11 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Glatstein v. Walsh........................................ 839 Glimco v. United States................................... 843 Glinsey v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co......................... 968 Glodgett; Philbrook v..................................... 963 Glodgett; Weinberger v.................................... 963 Gloria v. United States................................... 995 Godin v. United States.................................... 995 Goggins; New York v...................................... 1012 Golden Eagle v. Johnson.................................. 1105 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar................... 963,991,1103 Goldman v. Commissioner.................................. 1021 Goldman v. New York....................................... 833 Goldmark; Randall v....................................... 879 Gold on behalf of Susquehanna Corp. v. Scurlock........... 873 Goldstein v. Virginia..................................... 928 Gong v. United States.................................... 1072 Gonzales v. Alaska....................................... 868 Gonzales v. Checker Cabs, Inc....................... 834 Gonzales v. Texas........................................ 856 Gonzales v. United States............................... 1051 Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union.............. 90 Gonzalez v. Longshoremen................................. 1070 Gonzalez v. United States............................. 826,827 Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co.................................... 997 Goodbody & Co. v. Palomar Financial Corp.................. 968 Gooden v. Mississippi State University................... 1093 Goodhart; Falkner v....................................... 809 Goodrich v. South Dakota................................. 1092 Goodwin v. Iowa...................................... 846,1027 Goodyear v. Gates Rubber Co.............................. 1090 Gorden v. United States................................... 833 Gordon; Barnett v......................................... 988 Gordon v. Laborers........................................ 836 Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange............... 1018,1104 Gordon; Random House, Inc. v........................... Gordon v. United States................................ Gore v. Sielaff........................................ Gormley v. Committee on Examinations of Arizona Sup. Ct.. Goshay v. gnited States...................... Goss v. Lopez................................ Government of the Virgin Islands; Rodriguez ........... Governor. See name of State. Graham v. DeWinter..................................... 1123 1055 810 1054 565 858 1113 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xxxix Page Graham v. Hales.......................................... 1037 Grant v. Grant.......................................... 867 Grant v. United States.................................. 849 Grant v. Washington..................................... 849 Graves v. Lynn........................................... 1029 Gray; Barnes v......................................... 1002 Gray v. New York......................................... 1055 Grayson v. Alabama........................................ 862 Great Lakes Steel Division v. Michie...................... 997 Green; Pyne v............................................. 998 Green v. United States..................... 827,1004,1041,1046 Greenberg v. United States............................... 1089 Greene v. United States............................... 977, 1041 Gregg v. United States.................................... 848 Gregorio v. United States................................ 1024 Greyhound Lines; Brennan v....................... 1122 Grier v. United States.................................... 989 Griffin v. Griffin........................................ 837 Griffin; United States v............................. 1050 Griffith v. Edwards....................................... 861 Grigg; Michigan National Bank v......................... 840 Griggs; Coppola v......................................... 871 Groendyke Transport v. Labor Board....................... 1021 Gromatsky; Jacobs v....................................... 868 Groner v. United States.................................. 1010 Groomes; Brown v...................................... 866, 868 Gross v. National Assn, of Securities Dealers............. 843 Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley............. 815 Group Health Assn.; Berman v.............................. 842 Grove v. United States.................................... 847 Guam Federation of Teachers; Ysrael v..................... 872 Guana-Sanchez; United States v........................ 961,990 Guarantee Reserve Ins. Co.; Stockmen’s Ins. Agency v..... 869 Gubins v. California...................................... 854 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co...................... 186,961 Gulledge v. United States................................. 849 Gurley v. Rhoden........................................ 1018 Gurley Oil Co. v. Rhoden................................ 1018 Gusick v. Cardwell....................................... 866 Gutierrez v. Estelle..................................... 1073 Gutierrez v. United States................................ 846 Hackett v. Hunt........................................... 854 Hadley; Baldridge v....................................... 886 XL TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Haldeman v. Sirica....................................... 997 Hale v. United States.................................... 999 Hale; United States v..................................... 1045 Hales; Graham v......................................... 1037 Hall v. Alabama......................................... 887 Hall v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail................... 977 Hall v. United States................................... 1114 Hall; United States v................................ 824,1087 Hall v. Witzenfeld....................................... 858 Hallaway v. United States............................... 1112 Hallmark Industry v. Reynolds Metals Co................... 1028 Hamar Theatres; Cryan v.............................. 815,1085 Hamilton; Kimble v....................................... 821 Hamilton; United States v................................ 880 Hamlin v. United States................................. 1024 Handing v. United States................................ 885 Hammonds v. California................................... 999 Handy v. California..................................... 1025 Handy v. Nelson......................................... 994 Hankinson, In re........................................ 1119 Hanrahan; Christman v................................... 1050 Hanzimanolis v. Murphy................................... 997 Harbolt v. United States................................ 848 Hardaway v. United States................................ 884 Hardwick v. Wall......................................... 888 Hardwick; Wall v.................................... 888,1061 Hardy v. California...................................... 863 Hardy; Carter v......................................... 1073 Harmon v. Falgoust....................................... 854 Harrelson v. United States.............................. 821 Harris v. New York..................................... 1054 Harris v. Procunier..................................... 970 Harris v. United States................................. 993 Harris County Commissioners Court v. Moore............... 818 Harrison v. Kentucky..................................... 871 Harrison v. United States............................... 1019 Harsany v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board......... H25 Hart v. Bank of California............................... 844 Hart v. United States................................... 1049 Hartford Fire Insurance Co.; Pacific Far East Line v.... 873 Hartley v. Chattanooga.................................. Hartmann v. New York.................................... ^054 Hass; Oregon v........................................... 823 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XLI Page Hasty v. United States.................................... 1069 Haswell v. United States................................. 1107 Hawaii; Ellis v....................................... 959,1109 Hawaii; Sotomura v....................................... 872 Hawk v. United States...................................... 838 Hawkins v. LaVallee....................................... 1092 Hawkins v. United States......................... 969,1052,1079 Hayes v. Cady............................................. 1058 Hayes v. United States..................................... 863 Haygood v. United States.................................. 1114 Hayles v. United States.................................. 892 Haymes; Montanye v........................................ 1044 Haymes v. New York........................................ 1003 Healy; Edwards v........................................... 816 Heard v. United States..................................... 849 Hearn v. United States.................................... 1048 Heater; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v........................ 1013 Heat & Frost Insulators; Leona Lee Corp, v................. 829 Heck v. United States..................................... 1088 Hedden v. Florida......................................... 1031 Hedden v. Ohio............................................. 999 Hedgewald; Ray v.......................................... 1099 Hein; Burns v.............................................. 989 Heirs of Buras v. Board of Levee Comm’rs.................. 1049 Heirs of Buratev. Board of Levee Comm’rs.................. 1049 Helfant v. Kugler......................................... 1019 Helfant; Kugler v......................................... 1019 Helms v. North Carolina.................................... 977 Hemlock v. United States................................... 828 Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States......................... 826 Henderson v. Atkins....................................... 1125 Henderson v. Barksdale..................................... 880 Henderson; Bryant, v...................................... 866 Henderson; Caesar v...................................... 866 Henderson; Combs v...................................... 965 Henderson; Ganci v......................................... 866 Henderson; Gibson v..................................... 1072 Henderson; Lewis v......................................... 848 Henderson v. Moye.......................................... 884 Henderson; Starks v....................................... 1002 Hendricks; Bishop v....................................... 1056 Hennigan d. Placid Oil Co................................. 1092 Henry v. Middendorf................................... 895,1018 XLII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Henry; Middendorf v.................................. 895,1018 Henry; Sneiders v.................................... 832,1060 Hereford; Huntsville Board of Education v............... 1101 Herman & Co.; Taub, Hummel & Schnall v.................... 885 Herman Investment Co. v. Loeffler......................... 964 Hernandez v. Craven....................................... 866 Hernandez v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare... 860 Hernandez v. Travelers Insurance Co..................... 844 Hernon v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc...................... 867 Herring v. New York....................................... 893 Herships v. California...................................... 851 Herships v. Young........................................... 866 Hess; Baylor v.............................................. 990 Hettleman v. Chicago Law Institute.......................... 870 Heymann; B & L Motor Freight v........................... 1042 Hicks v. Garrison........................................... 854 Hicks v. Miranda........................................... 1018 Hicks v. Walnut Properties................................. 1018 Hickson n. Massachusetts.................................... 856 Hight v. Belgrade State Bank................................ 994 Hightower v. United States.................................. 847 Highway Drivers v. Suburban Transit Corp................... 1089 Highwood Services, Inc.; Coniglio v........................ 1022 Hill v. Louisiana........................................ 1090 Hill v. Oklahoma......................................... 1055 Hill v. Pace.............................................. 995 Hill v. Printing Industries of Gulf Coast........ 805,960,1088 Hill v. Stone."........................................... 822 Hill v. United States................................ 898,1052 Hilliard v. McCarthy........................................ 856 Hinsdale; Koplin v.......................................... 888 Hite; Waldrop v............................................. 832 H & M Cake Box v. Bakery Workers............................ 839 Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange........................ 875 Hodge v. United States...................................... 897 Hoffer v. United States..................................... 828 Hoffman; Longshoremen v..................................... 993 Hoffman; Muniz v............................................ 992 Hogan; Dorrough v........................................... 820 Holden v. New York.......................................... 859 Holiday Health Club v. Keator............................ 1043 Holland v. Cardwell......................................... 853 Holland v. United States.................................... 995 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XLIII Page Hollaway; Five Smiths, Inc. v.............................. 896 Holley v. United States.................................... 861 Hollywood; Mailman Development Corp, v..................... 844 Holmes v. United States.................................... 964 Holsapple v. Woods.......................................... 901 Holsey v. Maryland........................................ 1036 Home Insurance Co. v. Garey Corp........................... 843 Honeywell, Inc.; Dann v........................... 1080 Hood v. United States....................................... 852 Hoogasian v. Regional Transportation Authority............. 988 Hoots; Churchill Area School District v..................... 884 Hopper; Aiken v........................................... 1091 Hopper; Allen v........................................... 1055 Hopper; Clark v............................................ 851 Hopper; Clements v........................................ 1020 Hopper; Lee v............................................. 1053 Horn v. North Carolina..................................... 974 Hornsby v. United States.................................. 1120 Horvitz Publishing Co^_ Mead v............................. 887 Hourihan v. Dakin.......................................... 954 House v. Maryland.......................................... 821 Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau v. Terrell................ 987 Housing Authority of Louisville^. Fletcher................. 812 Howard v. Cincinnati....................................... 875 Howard v. Pennsylvania..................................... 900 Howard v. United States............................... 899,1100 Howell; Gibbs v........................................... 1086 Howell; Riley v............................................ 999 Howes v. United States.................................... 1123 Hubbard v. United States.............................. 859,1114 Huckabay v. California..................................... 864 Hudak; Economic Research Analysts v....................... 1122 Hudson v. Chattanooga..................................... 1070 Hudson Berlind Corp. v. Labor Board........................ 897 Hudson Waterways Corp.; Lewis v............................ 844 Hudspeth v. Virginia...................................... 1112 Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court........................... 955 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd..................................... 892 Huguez v. California....................................... 886 Humphrey v. Georgia........................................ 839 Hunt; Hackett v............................................ 854 Hunt; Johnson v............................................ 867 Hunt; Walker v............................................. 995 XLIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Hunter v. Appellate Court of Illinois............................. 887 Hunter v. Buick Motor Division.................................... 988 Hunter v. General Motors Corp..................................... 988 Hunter Shipping Co.; Stamatakos v................................. 831 Huntley v. United States.......................................... 898 Huntley Cotton Co. v. United States............................... 837 Huntsville Board of Education v. Hereford........................ 1101 Hurd v. Hurd..................................................... 1099 Hurd v. Marshal of Riverside County.............................. 1024 Hurd v. Supreme Court of California............................... 864 Hurley; Van Lare v.......................................... 1045,1103 Hurst v. United States.................................. 859,960,1123 Hurt v. Britton.................................................. 1105 Husman Express Co. v. Bryan Truck Line........................... 1023 Hutter v. Chicago.................................................. 870 Hymes v. Ohio..................................................... 871 Hysell v. California............................................... 855 I. C. Herman & Co.; Taub, Hummel & Schnall v..................... 885 Idaho Tax Comm’n v. Mahoney...................................... 1089 Ideal Cement Co.; Mihalopoulos v................................... 870 I. F. P. Corp.; Owens v.......................................... 807 Illinois; Allen v................................................. 865 Illinois; Anderson v.............................................. 821 Illinois; Brandys v............................................... 841 Illinois; Brown v............................................ 894,1086 Illinois; DeMoon v................................................ 842 Illinois; Duckett v............................................. 965 Illinois; Farmer v............................................. 849 Illinois; Johnson v............................................. 865 Illinois; Kessler v............................................ 1054 Illinois; Mackins v.............................................. 1111 Illinois; McCollough v........................................... 1043 Illinois; Morrow v................................................. HU Illinois; Parker v................................................ 865 Illinois; Pruitt v................................................ 96$ Illinois; Rooney v............................................... 1025 Illinois; Trigg v................................................ 105® Illinois; Williams .............................................. 1926 Illinois Appellate Court; Hunter ................................. 887 Illinois Bell Telephone Co.; Electrical Workers .................. 879 Illinois Director of Public Aid v. Randle........................ 1028 Illinois Director of Public Aid v. Rodriguez...................... $$® Illinois Governor; Troopers Lodge No. 41 ........................ 1058 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlv Page Illinois Industrial Comm’n; Crane v......................... 1050 Im v. Saxbe................................................. 1048 Immigration and Naturalization Service. See also Immigration Director. Immigration and Nat. Service; DiMattina v................. 1088 Immigration and Nat. Service^ Dunn v.................. 919,1106 Immigration and Nat. Service; Macias-Gonzalez v........... 846 Immigration and Nat. Service; Martin-Mendoza v.......... 1113 Immigration and Nat. Service; Perez-Lopez v................ 841 Immigration and Nat. Service; Reid v....................... 823 Immigration and Nat. Service; Rodriguez-Preaiado v......... 1112 Immigration and Nat. Service; Sotelo v.................. 859,1061 Immigration and Nat. Service; Zampitella v.................. 1088 Immigration Director; Barbour v.............................. 873 Immigration Director; Kan Kam Lin v.......................... 874 Impeach Nixon ®»mmittee; Buck v......................... 891,1102 Impson v. United States...................................... 832 Indiana; Cherry v........................................... 1125 Indiana; Frasier v.......................................... 1092 Indiana; Klebs v............................................. 869 Indiana; Sumpter v........................................... 811 Indiana State Board of Health; Smith v....................... 836 Industrial Comm’r of N. Y.; Abetta Electric Serv. Corp. v... 832 Industrial Comm’n of Illinois; Crane v...................... 1050 Industrial Equipment Co. v. Commerce Union Bank............ 896 Industro Motive Corp. v. Monogram Models, Inc................ 843 Infelice v. United States................................... 1107 Ingle v. Michigan............................................ 865 Inmates of Suffolk County Jail; Hall v....................... 977 Inmont Corp.; Mulhall v...................................... 863 Inquipco, Inc. v. Commerce Union Bank........................ 896 In re. See name of party. Insurance Company of North America; Stebbins v............... 857 Intercounty Construction Corp. v. Walter.................... 1119 Internal Improv. Trust Fund of Fla.; Coastal Petrol. Co. v... 842 Internal Revenue Service. See Commissioner; District Director of Internal Revenue. International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Development v. Utah-Louisiana Investment Co. 810 International Harvester Co.; Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip, v. 1023 International Shoe Machine Corp. v. United States.................... 834 International Telephone & Tel. v. Electrical Workers.... 498,818 Interstate Commerce Comm’n; Long Island R. Co. v.................. 884 XLVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Interstate Commerce Comm’n; United States v............................ 807 Iowa; Goodwin v....................................................846,1027 Iowa; O’Kelly v........................................................ 887 Iowa; Sosna v.......................................................... 393 Iowa Beef Processors; Bailey v............................. 830 Iowa Beef Processors v. United States............................. 806 Iowa Comm’r of Social Services v. Alcala..................... 823, 1087,1102 Irving Berlin Music Corp. v. United States............................. 832 Ishler v. Toledo Bar Assn............................................. 1108 Isola v. United States................................................. 933 Ivan Allen Co. v. United States....................................... 1067 Ivanov v. United States................................................ 881 Iveli v. United States................................................. 895 Ivory v. Florida...................................................... 1043 Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair........................... 1009 Izzi v. United States................................................. 1039 Jack Daniel Distillery; Alpha Distributing Co. v....................... 842 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.......................... 345 Jackson v. New York City Transit Authority............................. 831 Jackson v. United States..................................... 999,1000,1020 Jackson v. Wyoming.................................................... 1055 Jacksonville; Erznoznik v.............................................. 822 Jacobs v. Gromatsky.................................................... 868 James v. United States............................................. 849,899 Jamison v. United States............................................... 847 Janler Plastic Mold Corp.; Estep v........................ 1109 Janler Plastic Mold Corp.; Stanley v....................... 1109 Jefferson v. California............................................... 1024 Jefferson Chemical Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co................... 968 Jefferson County Board of Education; Robinson v................... 862,1132 Jeffries v. United States.............................. Jenkins v. United States............................... Jerrold v. United States............................... Jerry Miller, Inc.; Wilson v........................... J. M. Fields, Inc. v. Brennan.......................... Jobst; Weinberger v.................................... Jno. McCall Coal Co. v. Culbertson..................... Johnson; Austine v..................................... Johnson v. Camden County Prosecutor.................... Johnson v. Commissioner................................ Johnson v. Cowan....................................... Johnson; Cronrath .......................................................................... Johnson; Davis ......................................... 897 846 864 881 811 1033 1105 1002 1040 854 882 878 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xlvh Page Johnson v. Florida................................................. 1108 Johnson; Golden Eagle v............................................ 1105 Johnson v. Hunt..................................................... 867 Johnson v. Illinois................................................. 865 Johnson v. Laramie County School District No. 1..................... 808 Johnson v. Mississippi.............................................. 893 Johnson v. Nebraska................................................. 949 Johnson v. Ohio................................................ 924,1071 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency.................................. 1030 Johnson; Raymond v........................................ 1072 Johnson; Regan v.......................................... 1015 Johnson v. United States.......................... 825,853,860,1021,1025 Johnson v. Virginia................................................. 856 Johnson, v-. Wainwright............................................. 860 Johnson; Williams v................................................ 1001 Johnson Motor Lines v. Arkansas-Best Freight System............... 281 Joiner v. Dallas.............................................. 1042,1132 Joiner v. United States............................................ 1002 I Jones v. Arizona........................................... 1004 Jones; Breed v............................................ 894 Jones v. Butz....................................................... 806 I Jones v. Florida......................................... 1081 I Jones v. Georgia......................................... 1115 I Jones v. Jones........................................... 1032 I Jones v. McCarthy........................................ 1037 I Jones v. Nelson........................................... 865 I Jones v. Ohio............................................. 860 I Jones v. Pennsylvania.................................... 1000 I Jones; Smart v.......................................... 1090 I Jones v. United States................. 907,965,1034,1053,1113 I Jones v. Vincent............................................ 877 I Jones v. Wainwright........................................ 1112 I Jordan v. United States................................. 853,1052 I Jordan v. Wainwright........................................ 865 I Journeymen. For labor union, see name of trade. I Joyce v. United States..................................... 1031 I Joyner v. United States..................................... 995 I Juarez v. Estelle.......................................... 1046 I Judges of U. S. Court of Appeals; Begun v................. 1031 I Junior Chamber of Commerce of Philadelphia v. Jaycees..... 1026 I Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester v. Jaycees........ 1026 I Juras ; Blondell v.......................................... 866 I Kam Lin v. Rinaldi.......................................... 874 xlviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Kanapaux v. Ellisor.................................... Kane v. The Leda....................................... Kane’s Diesel & Truck Repair v. The Leda............... Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi................................. Kansas; Woody v........................................ Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. United States........... Kansas City Star Co. v. Department of Industry......... Kansas Secretary of Social Services fr Seneca Nursing Home.. Kaplanfe. Associated-East Mortgage Co........... Kaplan v. California............................ Kaplan v. U. S. Postal Service.................. Karlan v. Cincinnati............................ Karp v. Cooley.................................. Kastner v. Pennsylvania Dept, of Transportation Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp...................... Kaufmann; Luetkemeyer v......................... Kearns v. Weinberger............................ Keator; Holiday Health Club v................... Keator; Smith v................................. Kele v. United States........................... Keller v. Carter................................ Keller v. Mixon................................. Keller; Smith v.................................. Kelley v. Mobil Oil Corp......................... Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co.................... Kelley v. United States.'... ::.................. Kelton W United States........................... Kemper v. United States.......................... Kennedy v. Meacham............................... Kennedy v. United States......................... Kennedy v. Wyoming............................... Kensinger v. Ohio................................ Kent Trailer Park; Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Kentucky; Cardin v............................... Kentucky; Deskins v.............................. Kentucky; Evans v................................ Kentucky; Harrison ............................................................ Kentucky; Smyzer v............................... Kentucky; Webster .............................................................. Kern; Lane v..................................... Kern v. Virginia................................. Kerr, In re........................................ Kerr-McGee Corp.; Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Page 891 865 865 874 1003 807 870 841 887 915 1029 1056 845 1109 885 888 965 1043 1043 1020 .. 880,1061 .. 880,1061 ..... 1024 ..... 1022 ......318 ......845 ......856 ..... 1124 ..... 1073 . 1035,1047 ..... 1045 .... 1062 ..... 1108 .. 868,1061 ..... 1122 ..... 868 871 .. 832,1060 ..... 1070 887 ” " 1106 1118 ’ 1097 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XLIX Page Kessler v. Illinois................................................ 1054 Ketcham, In re..................................................... 1101 Keys v. Sawyer...................................................... 901 Keystone Insurance Co.; Stebbins v.................................. 854 Kibert v. Superintendent............................................ 995 Kilgariff v. California............................................. 898 Kimball; Callahan v............................................... 1019 Kimbell v. United States»*........................................ 833 Kimble v. Hamilton................................................ 821 Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Assn. ... 999 King v. Moore...................................................... 1053 King v. New York.................................................... 858 King-Seeley Thermos Co.; Borg-Warner Corp, v........................ 830 King’s Garden, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n.... 996 Kinnell v. Gaffney.................................................. 861 Kirtley v. Bickerstaff.............................................. 828 Kitchens v. Mississippi............................................ 1056 Kittyhawk, Ltd. v. Middletown....................................... 901 Klarman; Connecticut v............................................. 1110 Klassen; Phillips v................................................. 996 Klebs v. Indiana.................................................... 869 Klee v. United States............................................... 835 Klein v. United States............................................. 1091 Knapp-Sherrill Co. v. Labor Board............................ 829 Knight v. United StatoMH......................................... 855 Knopf; Association of Motion Picture & TV Producers v... 1121 Knopp; Parsons!« .*... .*........................................... 886 Koblein v. United States*........................................ 1003 Kochel v. United States........................................... 1124 Kohn v. United States.............................................. 965 Kokoszka v. Belford................................................ 886 Koniecki v. United States......................................... 1089 Konigsberg v. Nixon................................................ 886 Kopas-u. United StaW^W?....................................... 857,1041 Kopas v. U. S. Tax Court......................................... 857,1041 Koplin v. Hinsdale................................................. 888 Kopp v. United States.............................................. 899 Korzen; Gilligan v................................................. 841 Kovach v. Schubert................................................ 1117 Kovach; Schubert v................................................ 1130 Kovash v. Oklahoma................................................. 830 Kraftco Corp.; American Dairy of Evansville v...................... 883 Krappatsch v. Capps............................................... 1112 L TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Krause v. Commissioner........................................... 1108 Kreager v. General Electric Co.................................. 861,1041 Kreshik v. United States......................................... 1051 Kreutz v. Mississippi............................................ 1035 Kristovich v. California.......................................... 872 Kryder v. Virginia............................................... 1000 Kugler v. Helfant................................................ 1019 Kugler; Helfant v................................................ 1019 Kuhns v. California.............................................. 1066 Kuklevich v. Union Local School District.......................... 845 Kunkle, In re........................................... 1036 Kuntzweiler v. United States........................................ 886 Kurth v. Warden..................................................... 820 Kyros; Stewart v................................................. 1108 Labor Board; Boatel, Inc. v......................................... 831 Labor Board; Cement Transport, Inc. v............................... 828 Labor Board; Dollar General Corp, v................................. 840 Labor Board; Electrical Workers v............................... 835, 896 Labor Board; Fairview Nursing Home v............... 827,1060 Labor Board; Federal Prescription Service v............. 1049 Labor Board; Groendyke Transport v...................... 1021 Labor Board; Hudson Berlind Corp, v...................... 897 Labor Board; Knapp-Sherrill Co. v....................... 829 Labor Board; Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v.................... 998 Labor Board; Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v.... 301,817 Labor Board; Longshoremen v............................. 1040 Labor Board; Machinists v................................ 881 Labor Board; Matlock Truck Body & Trailer Corp, v...... 964 Labor Board; Nickey Chevrolet Sales v................... 834 Labor Board; Packerland Packing Co. v.................... 096 Labor Board; Provision House Workers ................... 828 Labor Board; Quick Shop Markets ........................ 1031 Labor Board; Rollins Telecasting, Inc. .................. 064 Labor Board; Rushton & Mercier Woodworking Co. v....... 99® Labor Board; Shawnee Plastics ........................... 888 Labor Board; Summer & Co. ........................... 301,817 Labor Board v. Truck Drivers.................................. 301,817 Labor Board; Wellman Industries v................................. 834 Labor Board v. Western Addition Community Org..................... 816 Labor Board ; Zim’s Foodliner, Inc. v............................. 888 Labor Board; Zim’s IGA Foodliner v................................ $3$ Labor Board Regional Director; Longshoremen v............. Labor Board Regional Director; Muniz ...................... TABLE OF CASES REPORTED li Page Laborers; Gordon v................................................... 836 Laborers v. Magallanes.............................................. 1121 Labor Union. See name of trade. Lacouture v. United States................................... 1053 LaCrosse County Court; Betts v...................................... 1057 Ladies’ Garment Workers; Alfin v..................................... 840 Laffal; Rosenberg vl .................................... 831 LaFrance v. Meachum................................................. 1080 LaFrance; Meachum v................................................. 1080 Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club............................. 832 Laing v. United States.......................................... 824,1087 Lake Transport, Inc..a. Railroad Comm’n of Texas..................... 839 Laliberte; Lovely v................................................. 1038 Laman; Tollett v.................................................... 1088 LaMaur, Inc.; Alberto-Culver Co. v................................... 902 Lambros; Dolloff Industries v........................................ 827 Lam Man Chung v. United States....................................... 828 Landaw v. United States.............................................. 854 Landis v. United States............................................. 1003 Lane v. Kern......................................................... 887 Lane v. United States................................................ 846 Lansberry v. Pittsburgh National Bank................................ 864 L’Aquarius v. Anderson............................................... 871 Laramie County School District No. 1; Johnson v...................... 808 Larkin; Withrow v.................................................... 962 Larkins; Ross v.................................................. 821 LaRuffa v. New York................................................. 959 LaSane v. United States............................................. 832 Lascaris v. Shirley............................................. 817,1044 Laser Alignment, Inc.; Woodruff & Sons v............................ 874 Lasker; Aaaeon Auto Transport, Inc. v..................... 870 LaTorr; Vassallo v................................................. 1108 LaTurner v. Burlington Northern, Inc.................... 1109 Laughlin v. United States.......................................... 1114 Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers; Mahoney v......................... 825 LaVallee; Hawkins v................................................ 1092 La Vallee; Mayo v................................................... 864 LaVallee; McCoy v.................................................. 1053 LaVallee; Paquette v............................................... 1073 LaVallee; Rossilli v............................................... 1004 LaVallee; Sommer v................................................. 1001 Lavine v. Albany Welfare Rights Organization........................ 838 Lavine; Beame v..................................................... 806 LII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Lavine v. Boines............................................... 1040 Lavine v. Gaines............................................... 1040 Lavine; Padilla v.............................................. 1084 Lavine v. Shirley.......................................... 817,1044 Lavine; Taylor v.......................................... 1046,1103 Lawhon v. United States........................................ 1121 Lawrence; Rosen v.............................................. 1106 Lawrence v. United States...................................... 1112 Leach, In re................................................... 1101 Lea County Prosecutors; Rogers uV.:....................... 1000 Leasco Response, in*.; Response of Carolina, Inc. v............ 1050 LeBlanc v. Craven.............................................. 1002 Lebron v. United States......................................... 968 Lecci v. Levitt................................................. 997 Leda, The; Kane v............................................... 865 Leda, The; Kane’s Diesel & Truck Repair v...................... 865 Ledford; Fahrig v.......................................... 967,1132 Lee v. Alabama................................. 864,1061 Lee v. Arrowood.................................... 1116 Lee v. California................................... 969 Lee v. Chattanooga.............................................. 869 Lee; Gables by the Sea, Inc. v......................... 1105 Lee v. Hopper.................................................. 1053 Lee v. United States........................................... 1003 Leeke; Erwin v................................................. 1037 Leeson v. Damon................................................. 954 Leeson; Damon v................................................. 954 Leesona Corp.; Sauquoit Fibers Co. ....................... 1057 LeFebre v. Cady................................................. 878 LeFebre v. Schmidt.................................................. 856 Lefkowitz; Vallis .................................................. 955 LeFlore v. United States............................................ 969 Leggett; Davidson .................................................. 833 Lego v. United States.............................................. Leona Lee Corp. v. Asbestos Workers................................ ° Leonard v. Strauss.............................................. 901,1061 LePage v. Picard................................................... Levine; Abetta Electric Service Corp, v............................... ' Levinson v. United States............................................ ^0 T -.. T ■ 99/ Levitt; Lecci .............................................. 992 Levy v. Parker..................................................... J 871 Lewellen v. Anderson............................................... t ■ t? v n 1045 Lewis v. English................................................... TABLE OF CASES REPORTED liii Page Lewis v. Henderson............................................ 848 Lewis v. Hudson Waterways Corp......................... 844 Lewis; Pittman v.............................................. 1037 Lewis v. Television and Radio Artists........................ 1093 Lewis v. United States................................... 853,994,1029 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Labor Board............................... 998 Liberty Bell Discount v. Pennsylvania Dept, of Transp........... 1109 Liberty Corp.; D’Amico v.......................................... 1054 Liberty Loan Corp. v. United States............................... 1089 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.; Pitt County Transp. Co. r.............. 819 Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Battle.............................. 1110 Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Edgar H. Battle Funeral Home. 1110 Liddy v. United States............................................ 1100 Liebsch v. Liebsch.............................................. 879 Liles v. United States.............................................. 852 Lilienthal v. United States........................................ 1056 Limback v. Weinberger............................................... 875 Lin v. Rinaldi...................................................... 874 Lincoln v. United States........................................... 1124 Linda Pollin Memorial Housing Corp. v. Marshall..................... 970 Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. Labor Board.................. 301,817 Lippman v. United States........................................... 1107 Liquifin AG; Ronson Corp, v......................................... 870 LiRocehi; Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co. v..................................... 968 Lisi v. United States............................................... 968 Little v. United States............................................. 861 Litton Industries Leasing Corp.; Scranton Constr. Corps'll’.. 1105 Local. For labor union, see name of trade. Lockett v. Alabama........................................... 1112 Lodge. For labor union, se^name of trade. Loeffler; Herman Investment Co. v................................... 964 Loeser v. Loeser................................................... 1122 Logan v. Butler..................................................... 853 Lombardi v. Casscles............................................... 1037 Lombardi v. Follette............................................... 1037 Lombera v. United States............................................ 858 Long v. Porelie.................................................... 1053 Long Island R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n.................. 884 Long Island R. Co. v. United States.-.............................. 1042 Longshoremen v. Federal Maritime Comm’n............................. 964 Longshoremen; Gonzalez v........................................... 1070 Longshoremen v. Hoffman............................................. 993 Longshoremen v. Labor Board........................................ 1040 LIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Longshoremen v. Wilmington Shipping Co.......................... 1022 Lonis v. Campbell................................................ 862 Lonquest v. Meacham............................................. 1036 Lopez; Goss v.................................................... 565 Lopez v. Rivera.................................................. 842 Lorch-Westway Corp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System............. 281 Lord v. United States............................................ 878 Los Angeles v. Aaron............................................ 1122 Los Angeles; Andrews tj.,........................................ 986 Los Angeles City Council; Yorty v........................ 1023 Loschiavo v. United States....................................... 872 Loughran v. New Jersey........................................... 801 Louisiana; Chavers v.................................... 1111 Louisiana»« Fulford v..................................... 846 Louisiana; Hill v............................................... 1090 Louisiana; Placid Oil Co. v..................................... 1110 Louisiana v. Sawhill............................................ 1021 Louisiana; Taylor v....................................... 522 Louisiana; Texaco Inc. v................................. 1110 Louisiana; United States v............................. 814,990 Louisiana Boundary Case...................................... 814,990 Louisiana Collector of Revenue; Colonial Pipeline Co. v..... Louisiana Governor; Bates v................................. Louisiana Governor; Driskell v.............................. Louisiana Governor v. Healy................................. Louisiana Governor; Parker v................................ Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n; Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Louisiana State Board of Education; Gamer v................. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners; Mooring v.... Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Rosen......... Louisiana Tax Comm’n; Williamson Marine Transport v... Louisville; Seidenfaden v................................... Louisville Housing Authority v. Fletcher.................... Love v. United States....................................... Lovely v. Laliberte......................................... Lowder v. United States..................................... Lowe; First Presbyterian Church of Forest Park v............ Lowe v. Union Oil Co. of California......................... Lucey; Almeida .............................................. Lucky Distributors v. United States.......................... Lue v. United States......................................... Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann...................................... Luttrell; Whisnant ........................................... 811 812 816 838 810 830 993 1098 870 1084 812 1001 1038 1092 895 886 806 1010 1031 QOC OOU 868 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lv Page Lybrand; McCain v......................................... 1032 Lyles v. United States...................................... 851 Lynn; Graves v............................................ 1029 Lynn; Tenants’ Council of Tiber Island v................... 970 Lysyj; Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v......................... 1108 Mabe v. Clinchfield Coal Co............................... 1010 Machinists; Adamszewski v.-................................. 997 Machinists v. Labor Board................................... 881 Machinists; Modern Air Transport, Inc. v.................. 1050 Macias-Gonzalez v. Immigration and Nat. Service............ 846 Mack v. United States..................................... 1047 Mackay v. United States................................... 1047 Mackin v. United States................................... 1052 Mackins v. Illinois....................................... 1111 Mack Trucks; Giovine v..................................... 863 Madden; Public Utility Dist. of Douglas County v......... 808 Madden v. United States.................................... 828 Maddox v. United States.................................... 851 Magallanes; Laborers v.................................... 1121 Magee v. Britt............................................ 1115 Magee v. Superior Court of California................ 1104,1114 Magid v. United States.................................... 1053 Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority....... 1108 Maher; Tucker v............................................ 997 Maher v. United States..................................... 826 Mahin; Consolidated Distilled Products v.................. 809 Mahoney; Idaho Tax Comm’n v............................... 1089 Mahoney v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers................ 825 Mahoney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority................. 1122 Mahoning County Board of Revision; Stanjim Co. v......... 1109 Mailman Development Corp. v. Hollywood................... 844 Maine; New Hampshire v..................................... 814 Maine; United States^^........................... 814,1087,1102 Makah Development Corp. v. Stanley T. Scott & Co......... 837 Male; Ernest Renda Contracting Co. v....................... 839 Malloy; Wright v...................................... 987 Malnik v. United States............................... 826 Malone v. United States.............................. 1069,1124 Man Chung v. United States............................ 828 Mancusi; Rosenberg v y, • 1020 Mandarelli v. Auburn.................................. 810 Mandujano v. United States........................... 1114 Maness v. Meyers.................................. 449,961,1016 LVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Manj arres-Arce United States.......................... 1112 Manor Drug Stores; Blue Chip Stamps v................... 992 Manson v. United States.................................... 994 Manzardo v. Pullman Co..................................... 886 Marcello v. Saxbe.......................................... 969 Marihart v. United States.................................. 827 Marine Exhibition Corp.; Dade County v................. 1027 Marion v. United States................................. 872 Marker v. United States................................. 1020 Markham v. United States............................... 1069 Marks; Bonner v...................................... 863,1027 Marks v. Flournoy....................................... 835 Marks Music. Corp.; Colorado Magnetics w........... 819,1120 Marks Music Corp.; Sound Values, Inc. v........... 819,1120 Mark Trail Camp Grounds v. Field Enterprises........... 1043 Mark Trail Camp Grounds v. Publishers-Hall Syndicate.... 1043 Marlow; Premier Industrial Corp, v...................... 1033 Marquez v. United States................................ 826 Marrero; Warden v...................................... 1014 Marshall; Linda Pollin Memorial Housing Corp, v......... 970 Marshall v. Ohio....................................... 1062 Marshall v. Seattle.................................... 1023 Marshall v. United States.......................... 899,1112 Marshal of Riverside County; Hurd v.................... 1024 Martain v. United States................................ 840 Marth v. Dannerbeck.................................... 1050 Martin v. Estelle....................................... 868 Martin, k Florida...................................... 1125 Martinez v. Texas....................................... 969 Martinez v. United States................. 878,966,1051,1056 Martinez-Miramontes v. United States.................... 897 Martin-Mendoza v. Immigration and Nat. Service.......... 1H3 Martinolich v. Pennsylvania............................ 106$ Martley v. Oklahoma..................................... 863 Maryland; Ayre v....................................... 1073 Maryland; Epps v........................................ 809 Maryland; Fornaro v..................................... H-® Maryland; Foster ...................................... 1036 Maryland; Holsey ...................................... 103® Maryland; House v........................................ ®1 Maryland; Miller ....................................... 10^ Maryland; Pennington .................................. 1019 Maryland; Sykes ........................................ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lvii Page Maryland; Vilkaitis v................................... 1114 Maryland; Wentz v....................................... 1072 Maryland Board of Public Works; Roemer v................ 1030 Maryland Dept, of Transportation v. CAB................ 1048 Massachusetts; Massachusetts; Massachusetts: Maryland Governor; Twilley v................................ 840 Maryland Park and Planning Comm’n v. Simon................. 1069 Mas; Perry v................................................ 842 Masheter; Ohio Holding Co. v................................ 835 Mason v. Francis........................................... 1042 Mason; Sprinkle v.......................................... 1130 Mason v. United States................................. 848,1009 Costarelli v............................. 893,1066 Hickson “ '.................................. 856 McAlister v................................. 1115 White v..................................... 1111 Massachusetts Governor; Robinowitz v....................... 1014 Massachusetts Secretary of Human ResouCes; Randall v.... 879 Massengale v. United States................................ 1091 Mathis v. Alabama.......................................... 1106 Matlock v. United States.................................... 864 Matlock Truck Body & Trailer'Corp. v. Labor Board......... 964 Matson; Gaito v............................................ 1092 Matter; Sholars v........................................... 970 Matthes; Merrill v.......................................... 820 Matthews v. United States................................... 877 Matthews Co. v. Williams................................... 1021 Matthews Co.; Williams v................................... 1027 Maupin v. Estelle........................................... 877 Mauro v. United States...................................... 969 Mayfield v. United States-................................. 1124 LaVallee.......................................... 864 New York; Duchein v............................... 809 New York v. Lavine................................ 806 Philadelphia; Philadelphia Anti-Poverty Comm’n v. 1108 United States.................................... 1089 United States v............................... 544,961 Mazurkiewicz; Catanzarite v................................ 1126 Mazza; Dillinger v.......................................... 967 McAlister v. Massachusetts................................. 1115 McAllister v. Colorado..................................... 1084 McBride v. United States.................................... 878 McCain v. Lybrand.......................................... 1032 McCall v. United States..................................... 849 mayo v. Mayor of Mayor of Mayor of Mayse v. Mazurie ; LVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED McCall Coal Co. v. Culbertson..................................... Page 1033 McCants v. Alabama......................................... 1054 McCarthy; Hilliard v................................ 856 McCarthy; Jones v.................................. 1037 McCarthy; Washington v.............................. 966 McClure v. United States............................. 848 McCollough v. Illinois.... McCormick v. Finnerman McCoy v. La Vallee........... McCravy v. Rose............... McDermott, In re.............. McDonald, In re............... McDonald v. Arkansas... McDonald v. McLucas McGarvey; Merck & Co. v.................... McGhee, In re.............................. McGraw-Edison Cg.«; Umphrey v....... McGuire; Souder v.................... McHale; McHar v...................... McHar v. McHale...................... McIntosh; Chaney v................... McIntosh v. Woodward................. McKeithen; Parker v.................. McKernie v. United States............ McKiernan; Ballas v.................. McLucas v. DeChamplain............... McLucas; McDonald v.................. McManus v. Oklahoma.................. McMillan; Doe v...................... McNamara v. United States............ McNeal v. California................. McNeal v. United States.............. McNeil v. United States.............. McNeil Corp.; Akron Presform Mold Co. v McNellis v. United States............ McQuaid; Cissna v.................... McRae v. United States............... McWhirt v. Fearnow................... McWilliams v. United States.......... Meacham ; Meacham ; Meacham ; Meachum Cosco v... Kennedy v Lonquest v v. LaFrance . 1043 . 1049 . 1053 . 966 . 1016 . 1118 . 1004 . 987 . 836 . 820 . 886 . 820 . 1115 . 1115 . 864 . 1100 . 838 . 887 . 1034 818,990 . 987 . 1090 . 1043 . 1047 . 845 . 1020 . 1057 . 997 . 850 . 1050 . 1032 1020 862 1116 . 1073 1036 1080 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lix Page Meachum; LaFrance v....................................... 1080 Mead v. Horvitz Publishing Co.............................. 887 Meade Estate v. Commissioner.......................... 882,1060 Means; Wainwright v....................................... 1116 MEBA Pension Trust; DeLoraine v........................... 1009 Medenica v. Callaway...................................... 1107 Medina v. United States................................... 1038 Meek v. Pittenger................................ 822, 1087,1103 Mefford v. Warden............................................ 847 Meier v. Boldt............................................ 1116 Mendes v. Railway Express Agency............................. 887 Mendoza v. Campbell....................................... 1055 Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Education............... 1081 Merck & Co. v. McGarvey...................................... 836 Mercury Record Productions; Economic Consultants v........ 960 Mercury Record Productions; E-C Tape Service v............ 960 Merrill v. Matthes......................................... 820 Mervin v. Federal Trade Comm’n............................. 886 Metropolitan Edison Co.; Jackson v........................ 345 Meyer v. Boyle............................................. 999 Meyerhofer; Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v.......... 998 Meyers; Maness v.................................. 449,961,1016 Meyers v. Venable......................................... 1090 Michie; Great Lakes Steel Division v....................... 997 Michie; National Steel Corp, v............................. 997 Michigan; Bailey v......................................... 858 Michigan; Bennett v....................................... 1072 Michigan; Collins v........................................ 866 Michigan v. Davis......................................... 1080 Michigan; Ingle v.......................................... 865 Michigan v. Mosley........................................ 1119 Michigan; Trudeau v................................... 868,1026 Michigan; Yopp v.......................................... 1054 Michigan Governor v. Bradley............................... 815 Michigan National Bank v. Grigg............................ 840 Michigan National Corp.; United States v..................... 1 Michigan State Board of Education; Mercer v............... 1081 Middendorf; Crosby v...................................... 1030 Middendorf; Doe v......................................... 1091 Middendorf v. Henry................................... 895,1018 Middendorf; Henry v................................... 895,1018 Middletown; Kittyhawk, Ltd. v.............................. 901 Mid-Florida Television Corp. v. TV 9, Inc.................. 986 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LX Page Midwest Stock Exchange; Hochfelder v......................... 875 Mihalopoulos v. Ideal Cement Co.............................. 870 Mike v. New York............................................ 1028 Milam v. United States.................................... 835 Miles v. Pullman Co.......................................... 870 Miles v. United States...................................... 1021 Miller v. Arizona.......................................... 1004 Miller v. Bratton.......................................... 1038 Miller v. California....................................... 1087 Miller v. Dale.............................................. 826 Miller; Dale v............................................... 826 Miller; Davidson v........................................... 833 Miller v. Maryland......................................... 1072 Miller v. Nelson........................................... 1053 Miller v. United States.................... 828,862,965,970,1069 Miller v. Virginia......................................... 1024 Miller; Youakim v............................................ 819 Miller Freight Systems; Transamerican Freight Lines v....... 819 Miller, Inc.; Wilson v....................................... 864 Millette v. United States.................................... 850 Milliken v. Bradley.......................................... 815 Milne v. United States...................................... 1123 Milwaukee County Director of Institutions & Depts.; Doe v.. 813 Minnesota v. Andrews......................................... 881 Minnesota v. Reserve Mining Co............................... 802 Minnesota Attorney General; Scarrella v.................. 991 Minnesota State Bar Assn.; Thibodeau v................. 1023 Minnesota Vikings Football Club; Laing v..................... 832 Miranda; Hicks v............................................ 1018 Miranda v. United States..................................... OS® Mirelez v. United States..................................... 10® Mirin v, Clark County Taxicab Authority...................... 859 Mississippi v. Arkansas.................................. 375,814 Mississippi; Baldwin v.................................... 1090 Mississippi; Brown ........................................ 1001 Mississippi; Clingon ....................................... 1^ Mississippi; Johnson v..................................... 8®° Mississippi; Kitchens .................................... 1®®® Mississippi; Kreutz ........................................ 1^® Mississippi; Polk ........................................... 8^ Mississippi; Poole v........................................ 1^® Mississippi; Thomas ........................................... „ Mississippi Comm’r of Public Safety v. Morrow.................. ° TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxi Page Mississippi State University; Gooden v..................... 1093 Mississippi Tax Comm’n; Gurley v........................ 1018 Mississippi Tax Comm’n; Gurley Oil Co. v................ 1018 Mississippi Tax Comm’n; United States v................. 1104 Missouri; Bibbs v......................................... 852 Missouri; Wallace v...................................... 847 Missouri; Wells v........................................ 1075 Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc............... 883 Mr. Steak, Inc. v. Edina State Bank........................ 883 Mitchell v. New Hampshire.................................. 821 Mitchell v. Ohio............................................ 850 Mitchell v. United States............................. 897,1035 Mitsubishi Electric Corp. v. United States.................. 811 Mitzner v. United States.................................. 1088 Mixon; Keller v........................................ 880, 1061 Mobile S. S. Assn.; American Radio Assn, v.............. 215,816 Mobil Oil Corp.; Kelley v.................................. 1022 Modern Air Transport, Inc. v. Machinists................... 1050 Mohasco Industries v. Acme Fast Freight..................... 842 Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia..... 1021 Money Tree Co.; Carter v............................... 865,1115 Monogram Models, Inc.; Industro Motive Corp, v.............. 843 Monroe v. New York......................................... 1024 Monroe; Wheeler v.......................................... 1014 Montana Attorney General; Straub v.......................... 845 Montana Supreme Court; Huffman v............................ 955 Montanye v. Haymes......................................... 1044 Monteer v. Chief Judge, U. S. Court of Appeals............. 1067 Montgomery v. California.............................. 1057,1117 Montgomery v. United States................................. 859 Montgomery County Board of Education; Acanfora v.......... 836 Monticello v. Monticello.................................... 880 Monty v. New York.......................................... 1071 Mon Valley Terminal v. United States........................ 837 Moody; Albemarle Paper Co. v............................... 1068 Moody; Papermakers & Paperworkers v........................ 1068 Moody v. United States...................................... 964 Moore v. Arizona............................................ 871 Moore, Education/Instruccion, Inc. v....................... 1109 Moore; Harris County Commissioners Court v.................. 818 Moore; King v.............................................. 1053 Moore; Shultz v............................................. 930 Moore v. United States..................................... 1086 LXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Moore; Walt Shultz Equipment Co. v...................... 930 Mooring v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners... . 993 Mora-Chavez v. United States............................ 878 Morales v. California.................................. 852 Moreno v. Texas...................................... 1115 Morgan v. Clark...................................... 1013 Morgan v. New York................................... 1013 Morgan; Phelps v........................................ 807 Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co............ 836 Morrow v. Alabama....................................... 853 Morrow; Crisler v..................................... 895 Morrow v. Illinois..................................... 1111 Morrow v. United States................................ 1025 Morse v. Wilson........................................ 1121 Morton; Barton v....................................... 1021 Morton; Bud Brown Enterprises v....................... 806 Morton; Smith v......................................... 835 Mosinee Paper Corp.; Rondeau v....................... 1067 Mosley; Michigan v..................................... 1119 Moths v. United States............................... 1088 Motion Picture & Television Producers v. Knopf......... 1121 Motorists Mutual. Insurance Co. v. Simpson............. 901 Moulton v. Ford Motor Co................................ 870 Mounce v. Ross.......................................... 860 Mt. Lebanon School District; Wiest v.................... 967 Mount Vernon Housing Authority; Spady v................. 983 Moye; Henderson v....................................... 884 Moye; Tailant v......................................... 821 Moynier v. Valuch...................................... 1072 Mulcahy v. New York.................................... 1025 Mulhall v. Inmont Corp.................................. 863 Mullaney 'v. Wilbur................................ 823,1017 Mullen; Flint ......................................... 1026 Mundt v. United States.................................. 19/1 Mundy; Doe .............................................. 813 Muniz v. Hoffman......................................... 992 Murphree v. United States................................ 863 Murphy v. Florida....................................... 1088 Murphy; Hanzimanolis ..................................... 99 Murray v. United States.......................... 942,966,1038 Murtagh v. University Computing Co...................... Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co.; Commissioner v....... Myers v. Ampex, Inc............................... 851,1037,11 . LX IV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page New Jersey; Erber v......................................... 861 New Jersey v. General Motors Corp.......................... 1080 New Jersey; Loughran v................................... 801 New Jersey; Robinson v................................... 901 New Jersey v. Sheffield.................................... 1051 New Jersey; Tillem v...................................... 900 New Jersey; Triano v...................................... 883 New Jersey Attorney General v. Helfant..................... 1019 New Jersey Attorney General; Helfant v..................... 1019 New Jersey Dept, of Health; Passaic Valley Water Comm’n v. 999 New Jersey State Lottery Comm’n; United States v........... 991 Newkirk; Preiser v.......................................... 894 New Mexico; Baylors v................................... 1072 New Mexico; Paul v....................................... 1054 New Mexico; Sedillo v.............................. 1072,1092 New Orleans Book Mart v. United States.............. 1007,1116 New York; New York; New York; New York; New York; New New New New New York; York; York; York; York; Alvarez v... . Brown v...... Burton v.... Bush v....... Callahan v... Cameron v.. Christian v.. Christofora v Davis v..... Dodson v... New York v. Forman.. New York v. Goggins.. New York; Goldman v New York; Gray v.... New York; Harris v... New York; New New New New New York-York; York; York; York: New York; New New New New New York; York; York;. York; York; Hartmann v. Haynies v. . Herring v.. Holden v... King v...... LaRuffa v.. Mike v...... Monroe v.. Monty v... Morgan v.. Mulcahy v. Osterhout v . 859 . 1012 . 1000 . 848 . 1072 . 1049 . 1010 . 867 821,871 . 1115 . 1120 . 1012 . 833 . 1055 . 1054 . 1054 . 1003 . 893 , 859 . 858 . 959 . 1028 1024 , 1071 1013 1025 . 1126 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXV Pago New York; Rosario v.................................... 1002 New York; Roundtree v.................................... 1000 New York; Santana v............................. 866,1027 New York; Selikoff v............................ 1086,1122 New York; Tallent v.................................... 1126 New York; Turetsky v................................... 838 New York; Varacalli v................................... 859 New York; Vermont ii.............................. 955,961 New York; Wedra v.................................... 1025 New York; West v.......................................... 846 New York Acting Comm’r of Social Services v. Hurley.. 1045,1103 New York Attorney General; Vallis v....................... 955 New York Board of Parole v. Johnson...................... 1015 New York Board of Regents; Pordum v...................... 843 New York City; Thistlethwaite v......................... 1093 New York City; Train v............................... 818,990 New York City Police Comm’r; Hanzimanolis v.............. 997 New York City Transit Authority; Jackson v............... 831 New York Comm’r of Mental Hygiene v. Dale................. 826 New York Comm’r of Mental Hygiene; Dale v................. 826 New York Comm’r of Social Services v. Albany Welf. Org. . 838 New York Comm’r of Social Services ; Bearne v............... 806 New York Comm’r of Social Services v. Shirley.......... 817,1044 New York Comm’r of Social Services; Taylor v.......... 1046,1103 New York Comptroller; Lecci v............................... 997 New York County v. United Skates.......................... ’*^88 New York Governor; Agur v.................................. 1072 New York Governor; Cronin v................................. 867 New York Industrial Comm’r; Abetta Electric Serv. Corp. v. . 832 New York Mayor; Duchein v................................... 809 New York Mayor v. Lavine.................................... 806 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. Trustee v. United Stated* . 102,801 ^ew York on behalf of New York County v. United States.. 888 New York Shipping Assn. v. Federal Maritime Comm’n........ 964 New York Stock Exchange; Gordon v..................... 1018,1104 New York Stock Exchange; Whitney v.......................... 837 New York University; Wahba v................................ 874 Nichols v. Fuller............................................ 871 Nichols v. Woodward & Lothrop.............................. 1108 Nickens v. Virginia........................................ 1118 Nickey Chevrolet Sales v. Labor Board....................... 834 Niezek v. United States...................................... 873 1 $and & Gravel Co. v. Alameda County Water Dist.... 869 LX VI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Nitsberg, In re............................................ 1016 Nixon; Konigsberg v......................................... 886 Nixon; Sloan v......................................... 958,1097 Nixon Hotel v. Redevelopment Authority of Butler............ 842 Nobles; United States v.................................... 1120 Nocar v. United States..................................... 1038 Noga v. United States....................................... 838 Noland v. United States..................................... 966 Norman v. Clanon........................................... 1115 North v. Russell........................................... 1085 North Carolina; Allred v................................. 1127 North Carolina; Boyd v.................................... 860 North Carolina; Bryant v.................................. 974 North Carolina; Davis v................................... 857 North Carolina; Fowler v............................. 963,1030 North Carolina; Helms v................................... 977 North Carolina; Horn v.................................... 974 North Carolina; Somerset v................................ 964 North Carolina; Thompson v.............................. 867 North Carolina; Vester v................................... 1116 North Carolina; Whitted v.............................. 1120 Northeast Master Executive Council v. CAB.................. 1110 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc............... 601 Northway Coin-Clean, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp............... 836 Northwestern Ins. Co.; Delphi School Bldg. Corp, v......... 883 Norton; Roe v........................................... 820,893 Norton v. United States.................................... 1113 Norwalk; Pfotzer v......................................... 1047 Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc..................... 1006 Nunez-Villalobos v. United States.......................... 1090 Nyberg; Virginia v.......................................... 891 Oakland Raiders v. Office of Emergency Preparedness........ 1009 O’Brien v. California............................. 887,1036,1111 O’Brien; Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v.. 1121 O’Bryan v. Chandler......................................... 986 O’Callaghan v. Sheldon..................................... 1090 O’Callaghan; Sheldon ...................................... 1090 Occidental Life Ins. Co.; Pat Ryan & Associates v.......... 1023 Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n; Caribtow Corp. v... 830 O’Connell v. Cincinnati.................................... •..........................................................1122 O’Connell; Economic Research Analysts ..................... - O’Connor v. Donaldson.............................. 894,991,1119 O’Dell v. Chattanooga...................................... TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXVII Odin School District Superintendent; Holsapple v. ... Odland v. United States........................... Odom; Washington v................................ O’Donnell; Carey v................................ Office of Emergency Preparedness; Oakland Raiders v Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co...................... Ohio; Ohio; Ohio; Ohio; Ohio; Ohio; Ohio; Ohio; Ohio; Curry v........ Doran v........ Featheringham v Hedden v....... Hymes v........ Johnson v...... Jones v........ Kensinger v.... Marshall v..... Page . . 901 .. 1088 .. 1013 .. 1110 .. 1009 .. 1034 .. 871 .. 1071 .. 821 .. 999 .. 871 924,1071 Ohio; Mitchell v................................ Ohio; Piatak v.................................. Ohio; Sander v.................................. Ohio ; Winkfield v.............................. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Kent Trailer Park Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Lysyj.............. Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co. v. Cable Climber Co......... Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co. v. LiRocchi................. Ohio Holding Co. v. Masheter.................... Ohmert v. Young................................. O’Kelly v. Iowa................................. O’Kier; Wallis v................................ Oklahoma ; Oklahoma ; Oklahoma; Oklahoma ; Oklahoma; Oklahoma ; Oklahoman Bredy v....... Castleberry v Dennis v...... Disheroon v. . Ell is v...... Hill v........ Kovash v.... Oklahoma; Martley v...................................... Oklahoma; McManus v...................................... Oklahoma; Perkins v...................................... Oklahoma; Smith v........................................ Oklahoma Corporation Comm’n; Radiocall Paging Service v. . Oklahoma County District Court; Cothrum v................ Olden v. Foss............................................ Olenz v. Teletype Corp......... Olivares-Vega v. United States 860 1062 1062 850 810 1026 887 1108 1108 968 968 835 863 887 901 1126 1079 1014 881 1035 1055 830 863 1090 1037 865 840 861 869 865,1961 .. 1020 LX VIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Oliver v. United States..................................... 853 Ollis v. Paderiek........................................... 856 Olshine’s Credit Clothing Co.; Owens v...................... 807 Olson v. Texas.............................................. 1088 Onondaga County Cornm’r of Social Services v. Shirley. .. 817, 1044 Operating Engineers v. Dayton Power & Light Co............. 1050 O’Quinn v. Estelle.......................................... 863 Orange County District Attorney v. Miranda................. 1018 Orange County District Attorney v. Walnut Properties...... 1018 Oregon; Ayers v.......................................... 1093 Oregon; Gardner v........................................ 998 Oregon v. Hass.............................................. 823 Oregon; Pagel v........................................... 867 Oregon; Taggart v........................................ 877 Ore-Ida Foods; Treasure Valley Potato Assn, v............... 999 Orrin v. Simon............................................. 1106 Ortiz; United States v................................. 824,1017 Osborne, In re............................................. 1016 O’Shea; Pennsylvania v..................................... 1092 Osterhout v. New York...................................... 1126 Ostrer v. United States................................ 829,1044 Otte v. United States........................................ 43 Outlaw v. United States..................................... 844 Overshon v. United States............................... 853,878 Oviatt; Cannon v....................................... 810,1060 Owen v. United States....................................... 965 Owens v. Cannon............................................ 1111 Owens v. I. F. P. Corp...................................... 807 Owens v. Olshine’s Credit Clothing Co....................... 807 Pace; Hill v................................................ 995 Pacelli v. United States.................................... 826 Pacente v. United States................................... 1048 Pacific Far East Line v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co....... 873 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n........ 882 Packerland Packing Co. v. Labor Board....................... 996 Paderiek; Ollis v........................................... 856 Paderiek; Parrigan v..................................... 1108 Padilla v. Lavine.......................................... 1084 Pagel v. Oregon............................................. 867 Palmeri v. United States.................................... 898 Palomar Financial Corp.; Goodbody & Co. v................... 968 Papermakers & Paperworkers v. Moody........................ 1068 Papierz v. Rauth............................................ 835 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LX IX Page Papilsky; Affiliated Fund, Inc. v............................ 1048 Paquette v. LaVallee......................................... 1073 Paris v. Wedren............................................... 831 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton............................... 887 Park; United States .................................... 992 Parker v. Estelle......................................... 1100 Parker v. Illinois......................................... 865 Parker v. Levy............................................. 992 Parker v. McKeithen........................................ 838 Parker v. Prudential Insurance Co.......................... 867 Parker v. Walters............................................ 1001 Parle v. Arizona............................................. 1003 Parmley v. Alabama........................................... 1104 Pamess v. United States...................................... 1105 Parrigan v. Paderick......................................... 1108 Parsons v. Knopp............................................. 886 Passaic Valley Water Comm’n v. New Jersey Dept, of Health. 999 Paster; Reynolds v.......................................... 1111 Patch v. United States...................................... 1049 Paterno v. United States.................................... 1106 Patrizzi v. United States.................................... 860 Pat Ryan & Associates v. Occidental Life Ins. Co............ 1023 Patterson v. Estelle......................................... 871 Patterson v. United States............................... 846,876 Patton v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn.................... 1090 Patton; Vandygrift v........................................ 1036 Paul v. New Mexico.......................................... 1054 Payne v. Fort Lauderdale................................ 875,1060 Payne v. United States....................................... 876 Peachtree News Co. v. United States.......................... 887 Peacock v. Estelle.......................................... 1055 Pearl Brewing Co.; Smallwood vi». v....................... 873 Pearson v. U. S. Court of Appeals............................ 821 Pecina v. United States..................................... 1072 Peichev v. United States..................................... 966 Pellicci v. United States................................... 1122 Pelliccioni v. Schuyler Packing Co.......................... 1099 Peltier; United States v................................ 993,1044 Pemberton v. United States.................................. 1114 Penick v. United States...................................... 897 Penn Central Transportation Co.; Sewell v.................... 845 Penn Central Trustees v. Connecticut General Corp........ 102,801 Penn Central Trustees; Transportation Union v................ 839 LXX TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Pennick v. United States................................... 1051 Pennington v. Maryland................................... 1019 Pennsylvania; Howard v..................................... 900 Pennsylvania; Jones v..................................... 1000 Pennsylvania; Martinolich v............................... 1065 Pennsylvania v. O’Shea..................................... 1092 Pennsylvania; Skufca v..................................... 1028 Pennsylvania v. Woods....................................... 880 Pennsylvania Board of Osteopathic Examiners; Boyd v........ 1086 Pennsylvania Dept, of Transp.; Kastner fa.................. 1109 Pennsylvania Dept, of Transp.; Liberty Bell Discount v.... 1109 Pennywell v. California..................................... 995 Peoples Nat. Bank of Washington; Allied Metal Fabricators v. 967 Perez v. United States.................................. 827,855 Perez-Lopez v. Immigration and Nat. Service................. 841 Perini v. Brooks............................................ 998 Perkins v. Garrison.,....................................... 994 Perkins v. Oklahoma........................................ 1037 Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting System....................... 883 Perry v. District of Columbia............................... 836 Perry v. Mas................................................ 842 Perry v. United States..................................... 1051 Persico v. United States............................... 924,1060 Persky v. United States..................................... 895 Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor............................. 1038 Peters v. Clark............................................ 1110 Peterson v. United States........................... 828,831,964 Pettitt v. Fresno...................................... 810,1060 Petty v. United States..................................... 1009 Pfister v. Phoenix of Hartford Insurance Co................. 966 Pfizer, Inc.; Republic of Vietnam v....................... 1015 Pfotzer v. Norwalk......................................... 1047 Pfotzer v. Warholic........................................ 1047 Phelps v. Morgan............................................ 807 Phelps v. United States................................ 836,1068 Phelps v. U. S. Court of Appeals............................ 821 Philadelphia Anti-Poverty Action Comm’n v. Rizzo........... 1108 Philadelphia Electric Co.; Ward v.......................... 1049 Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Aiderman.............. 844 Philadelphia Housing Authority; Mahoney v.................. 1122 Philadelphia Mayor; Philadelphia Anti-Poverty Comm’n v.. 1108 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.; Ditter v.................... 1096 Philbrook v. Glodgett....................................... 963 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXI Page Phillips v. Klassen............................................ 996 Phillips v. United States...................................... 847 Phillips v. Warden............................................. 820 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States........................ 886 Phoenix of Hartford Insurance Co.; Pfister v................. 966 Piatak v. Ohio................................................. 810 Picard; LePage v............................................... 879 Picard v. Rhode Island........................................ 1109 Pickens v. Texas............................................. 880 Pierce v. Alabama............................................. 1130 Pietras v. United States...................................... 1071 Pietrunti v. Board of Education of Brick Township............. 1057 Pillis v. Russo............................................... 1125 Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.; Teamsters ..................... 869 Pinnell v. Arkansas........................................... 1110 Pitt County Transp. Co. v. Carolina Freight Carriers....... 819 Pitt County Transp. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co............ 819 Pittenger; Meek v.................................. 822,1087,1103 Pittman; Allenberg Cotton Co. v........................ 20,815 Pittman v. Lewis............................................ 1037 Pittman v. United States.................................... 1046 Pitt River Tribe v. United States............................ 831 Pittsburgh National Bank; Lansberry v........................ 864 Pittsburgh Plate (Hass Co.; Abate v.......................... 900 Place v. Weinberger......................................... 1040 Placid Oil Co.; Hennigan v.................................. 1092 Placid Oil Co. v. Louisiana................................. 1110 Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Associates.................. 1034 Planned Parenthood Assn.; Wohlgemuth v...................... 1100 Plantation City Council; Donaldson v......................... 830 Plumbers; Connell Construction Co. v.......... 818, 962,1030, 1066 Plummer v. United States..................................... 968 Police Comm’r of New York City; Hanzimanolis v............... 997 Polite v. United States...................................... 854 Polizzi v. United States.................................... 1120 Polk v. Mississippi.......................................... 867 Pollard D.^jjnited States.................................... 851 Pomares v. United States.................................... 1032 Pommerening v. United States................................ 1088 Ponzio v. United States...................................... 832 Poole v. Mississippi........................................ 1019 Pope v. Texas................................................ 845 Pordum v. Board of Regents of New York....................... 843 LX XII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Forelle; Long v............................................... 1053 Porter, In re................................................. 1056 Porter v. United States....................................... 1123 Postmaster General; Phillips v................................. 996 Poston v. United States..................................... 1052 Powell v. Rogers............................................ 1032 Powell v. United States................................. 866,1046 Powers; Ellis v................................................ 959 Prader v. United States..................................... 1047 Pratt v. California....................................... 879,1020 Preiser v. Newkirk............................................. 894 Preiser v. Williams........................................... 1058 Preller; Star v................................................ 956 Premier Industrial Corp. v. Marlow............................ 1033 Prepakt Concrete Co.; Naples v................................. 843 President of the United States; Dickson v..................... 1085 President of the United States; Sloan v................... 958,1097 Presiding Judge, Franklin County Court; Gargallo v........... 811 Presta v. United States........................................ 825 Price v. Virginia.............................................. 902 Prince v. United States....................................... 1107 Printing Industries of Gulf Coast; Hill v............. 805,960, 1088 Process Equipment Eng. Col DPTennessee Eastman Co............ 1040 Procunier; Harris v............................................ 970 Procunier; Squires v........................................... 852 Procunier; Williams v.......................................... 820 Professional Auto Sales, Inc.; Nowlin v....................... 1006 Proffitt v. Becker............................................ 1034 Proffitt v. United States..................................... 1002 Progressive Finance Co.; Bierman v............................ 1033 Project Construction Co.; Smith v............................... 811 Provident Life Ins. Co. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co............... 1107 Provident Life Ins. Co.; Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. 1.......... 1107 Provision House Workers v. Labor Board......................... 828 Prudential-Grace Lines; Bates v............................... 1009 Prudential-Grace Lines; Blohm & Voss AG v...................... 840 Prudential Insurance Co.; Parker v............................. 867 Pruitt v. Illinois............................................. 968 Pruitt; South Gwinnett Venture v............................... 837 Pryba v. United States........................................ 1127 Pryor v. United States.................................... 977,1060 Public Utilities Comm’n of Cal.; Moving & Storage Assn. v. 1109 Public Utility Dist. of Douglas County v. Madden............... 808 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxiii Page Publishers-Hall Syndicate; Mark Trail Camp Grounds v.... 1043 Pugh; Gerstein v......................................... 815 Pullman Co.; Manzardo v............................... 886 Pullman Co.; Miles v.................................. 870 Pullman Co.; Westermayer v.......................... 875 Purcell; Ault v........................................ 858 Pursue, Ltd.; Huffman v................................ 892 Pyne v. Green............................................ 998 Qadir v. Santa Clara County......................... 1037, 1117 Quality Mfg. Co.; Garment Workers v...................... 816 Qualls v. United States.................................. 1051 Quick Shop Markets v. Labor Board....................... 1031 Quigg v. Warden.......................................... 848 Quiroz-Santi v. United States........................... 1024 Rachal v. United States................................. 1047 Rachal v. U. S. Bureau of Prisons........................ 836 Rademaker v. United States.............................. 1037 Radiocall Paging Service v. Corporation Comm’n of Okla. ... 840 Rafter v. Commissioner................................... 826 Rafter v. Fairfield County Trust Co...................... 997 Railroad Comm’n of Texas; Lake Transport, Inc. v........ 839 Railway Express Agency; Johnson v....................... 1030 Railway Express Agency; Mendes v......................... 887 Railway Labor Executives’ Assn.; Patton v............... 1090 Raimondi, In re......................................... 1118 Rainey v. California.................................... 1002 Ramirez v. California.................................. 1116 Ramirez v. United States............................... 1112 Ramsey v. United States................................ 994 Randall v. Goldmark..................................... 879 Randle; Weaver v........................................ 1028 Rando v. Estelle.................................... 820,1028 Random House, Inc. v. Gordon............................. 812 Ransom v. Florida........................................ 821 Rastetter v. Weinberger................................. 1098 Ratcliff v. Texas....................................... 1103 Rauth; Papierz v......................................... 835 Raven v. United States.................................. 1124 Rawls v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent DePaul..... 1032 Ray v. Hedgewald........................................ 1099 Rayburn; Carter v........................................ 821 Raymond v. Johnson...................................... 1072 Rea v. Ford Motor Co..................................... 868 lxxiv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rea v. U. S. Court of Appeals.............................. 821 Reamer v. Beall...................................... 1015,1029 Rechtman v. United States.................................. 876 Red Ball Motor Freight v. Arkansas-Best Freight System.... 281 Redevelopment Authority of Butler; Nixon Hotel v......... 842 Reed; Anderson v.......................................... 1045 Reed v. California........................................ 1108 Reed v. Carlyle & Martin, Inc,............................. 859 Reed v. Florida............................................ 995 Reed; Schick v......................................... 256,819 Reeder v. Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Wyoming........ 1018 Reeder v. Supreme Court of Wyoming....................... 1018 Regan v. Johnson.......................................... 1015 Regan; Tyler v............................................. 991 Regester; Whiten...................................... 991,1044 Regional Director, Labor Board; Longshoremen v............. 993 Regional Director, Labor Board; Muniz v.................... 992 Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases................. 102,801 Regional Transportation Authority; Hoogasian v............. 988 Register; Blanks v......................................... 841 Registrar of Voters; Sobottka v........................... 1098 R. E. Huntley Cotton Co. v. United States.................. 837 Reicin v. United States.................................... 996 Reid v. Immigration and Nat. Service....................... 823 Reliable Transfer Co.; United States v.................... 1018 Remmers v. Brewer......................................... 1012 Remmers; Brewer v......................................... 1012 Remsco Associates v. Beaver Falls Municipal Authority 1070 Renda Contracting Co. v. Male. 839 Rendon v. District of Columbia Board of Elections........ 1121 Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc....................... 1015 Research Corp. v. Nasco Industries........................ 1096 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co........... 1107 Reserve Life Ins. Co.; Provident Life Ins. Co. v.......... 1107 Reserve Mining Co.; Minnesota v............................ 802 Reserve Mining Co.; United States v........................ 802 Resnick v. United States............................. 1053,1071 Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc........ 1050 Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.; Hernon v...................... 867 Reyes; American Home Products Corp, v...................... 1096 Reyes v. California........................................ 995 Reyes; Wyeth Laboratories v............................. 1096 Reynolds v. Paster.......................................... HH TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXV Page Reynolds Metals Co.; Hallmark Industry v.................. 1028 Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. American President Lines.......... 1070 Rhode Island; Picard v.................................... 1109 Rhode Island Hospital Trust Bank; Fletcher v.............. 1001 Rhoden; Gurley v.......................................... 1018 Rhoden; Gurley Oil Co. v.................................. 1018 Rice v. United States................................. 1032,1044 Rice v. Vincent........................................... 880 Rich v. Texas............................................. 1091 Rich v. United States...................................... 862 Richardson v. United States............................... 1020 Richey; Nestler v.......................................... 884 Richey; Varfis v.......................................... 1123 Richmond v. United States................................. 1067 Rici v. Riverside County.................................. 1022 Ricketson v. United States................................. 965 Ridland v. United States................................... 994 Riley v. Howell............................................ 999 Rimka v. United States..................................... 850 Rinaldi; Kan Kam Lin v..................................... 874 Rincon Band of Mission Indians; San Diego County v........ 1008 Ring v. United States....................................... 18 Ringsby Truck Lines v. National Small Shipments Conf.... 833 Rivera; Lopez v............................................ 842 River Farms v. Fountain................................... 1027 Riverside County; Rici v.................................. 1022 Riverside County Marshal; Hurd v.......................... 1024 Rizzo; Philadelphia Anti-Poverty Action Comm’n v.......... 1108 R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. American President Lines.... 1070 Roberts v. United States......................... 854, 1070, 1113 Robertson; Butterfield v.................................. 1067 Robinowitz v. Sargent..................................... 1014 Robinson v. Jefferson County Board of Education..... 862,1132 Robinson v. New Jersey.................................... 901 Robinson v. Tennessee.................................... 877 Robinson v. United States................................ 1003 Rockwell v. United States................................ 1051 Rodgers v. Federal Trade Comm'n............................ 834 Rodovich v. United States................................. 1125 Rodriguez v. Government of the Virgin Islands.............. 858 Rodriguez; Swank v......................................... 885 Rodriguez v. United States................................ 1124 Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States........................ 898 lxxvi TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Rodriguez-Preciado v. Immigration and Nat. Service....... 1112 Roe v. Doe......................................... 819,892,991 Roe v. Norton.......................................... 820,893 Roe v. United States....................................... 858 Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland............... 1030 Rogers v. Lea County Prosecutors.......................... 1000 Rogers; Powell v.......................................... 1032 Rogers v. Rogers........................................... 837 Rogers v. United States................................ 824,846 Rogers v. Washington...................................... 1053 Rojas v. Florida........................................... 851 Rollins v. Florida........................................ 1009 Rollins Telecasting, Inc. v. Labor Board................... 964 Romero v. United States............................... 995,1124 Romyco Stereo v. Ampex, Inc...................... 851,1037,1115 Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp............................. 1067 Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin AG................................ 870 Ronwin v. Committee on Examinations of Arizona Sup. Ct.. 967 Rooney v. Illinois........................................ 1025 Rosa v. United States...................................... 850 Rosario v. New York....................................... 1002 Rose; Allen v............................................. 1080 Rose v. Commissioner....................................... 833 Rose; McCravy v............................................ 966 Rose v. United States.................................. 848,969 Rose v. U. S. District Court............................... 960 Rosen, In re............................................... 964 Rosen v. Lawrence......................................... 1106 Rosen; Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v...... 1098 Rosenberg v. Laffal...................................... 831 Rosenberg v. Mancusi.................................... 1020 Rosenblatt v. United States.............................. 1032 Rosoto v. California..................................... 897 Ross, In re............................................... 1102 Ross v. Larkins............................................ 821 Ross; Mounce v............................................. 860 Ross v. United States............................ 969,1048,1088 Rossi v. United States..................................... 838 Rossilli ii. LaVallee..................................... 1004 Roundtree v. New York..................................... 1000 Rovner v. United States................................... 1106 Ruark v. United States.................................... 1035 Rucker v. United States.................................... 965 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxvii Page Ruderer v. Wood........................................... 1099 Ruggiero v. United States................................. 841 Ruhm v. Turner.............................................. 882 Ruiz v. California........................................ 1053 Ruiz v. United States..................................... 899 Rural Foods, Inc. v. U. S. Dept, of Agriculture............. 827 Rush v. United States..................................... 1091 Rushton & Mercier Woodworking Co. v. Labor Board.......... 996 Russell; North v.......................................... 1085 Russo; Pillis v........................................... 1125 Ryan & Associates v. Occidental Life Ins. Co............... 1023 Saffioti v. United States................................. 808 St. Clair; Izaak Walton League of America v................ 1009 St. Lawrence v. United States............................. 858 St. Louis; Streckfus v...................................... 810 Saladin v. United States.................................. 1025 Salem Inn, Inc.; Doran v................................... 1119 Salfi; Weinberger v....................................... 992 Salinas v. Estelle........................................ 858 Samuels v. Craven.......................................... 1002 San Bernardino County; DeBlasis v......................... 843 Sanchez v. United States.................................... 827 Sander v. Ohio............................................. 1026 Sanders Brine Shrimp Co. v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.... 1033 San Diego County v. Rincon Band of Mission Indians........ 1008 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n...... 882 Sandquist v. California.................................... 1066 Sangster v. United States................................... 887 Sanguandikul v. United States.............................. 1052 San Juan; Alers v..................................... 1031,1099 Sanney v. Smith............................................ 1027 Sano v. United States....................................... 895 Santa Clara County; Qadir v........................... 1037,1117 Santana v. New York.............■..................... 866,1027 Santana v. United States................................... 1053 Santana v. U. S. District Court............................ 1073 Sappington v. United States................................. 863 Sargent; Robinowitz v...................................... 1014 Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service....................... 1079 Sauquoit Fibers Co. v. Leesona Corp........................ 1057 Savannah Sugar Refining Corp. v. Baxter.................... 1033 Savard v. United States..................................... 896 Save Crystal Beach Assn. v. Callaway........................ 813 lxxviii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Sawhill; California v..................................... 1021 Sawhill; California Lands Comm’n v........................ 1021 Sawhill; Louisiana v..................................... 1021 Sawyer; Keys v............................................ 901 Saxbe; Bramble v........................................... 1069 Saxbe v. Bustos.............................................. 65 Saxbe; Cardona v.......................................... 65 Saxbe; Cook v............................................... 846 Saxbe; Im v................................................ 1048 Saxbe; Marcello v......................................... 969 Sayles v. Gesell............................................ 888 Sayles v. Sirica............................................ 888 Sayre v. Cleveland.......................................... 837 Scagliola v. Scagliola..................................... 1004 Scales v. Virginia......................................... 1123 Scappatone v. United States................................. 827 Scarrella v. Spannaus....................................... 991 Scata v. United States..................................... 1019 Schein v. Caesar’s World, Inc............................... 838 Schellenberg v. United States............................... 849 Schenker v. United States.................................. 1106 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co................................. 885 Schick v. Reed.......................................... 256,819 Schlesinger v. Ballard...................................... 498 Schlesinger; Cole v........................................ 1120 Schlesinger v. Councilman.................................. 1043 Schmidt; LeFebre v.......................................... 856 Schmidt; National Nutritional Foods Assn, v................. 874 Schmidt v. United States.................................... 863 Schneider v. United States................................. 1121 Schubert v. Kovach......................................... 1130 Schubert; Kovach v......................................... 1117 Schulingkamp; Times-Picayune Publishing Corp, v........... 1301 Schulman v. United States.................................. 1088 Schuyler Packing Co.; Pelliccioni v........................ 1099 Scott; Anchor Motor Freight v............................... 868 Scott; Teamsters v.......................................... 997 Scott v. Tennessee......................................... 1033 Scott v. United States................................. 820,1113 Scott & Co.; Makah Development Corp, v...................... 837 Scott Paper Co. v. United States............................ 807 Scranton Construction Co. v. Litton Industries Leasing.... 1105 SCRAP; Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v......................... 822 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED lxxix Page SCRAP; United States v.............................................. 822 Scurlock; Gold on behalf of Susquehanna Corp, v..................... 873 Scurlock; Susquehanna Corp, v....................................... 873 Sea-Land Service v. United States................................... 840 Seals v. United States.............................................. 850 Seattle; Deering v................................................. 1050 Seattle; Marshall v................................................ 1023 Seattle Trust & Savings Bank v. Bank of California.................. 844 Seay v. Florida..................................................... 847 Sechrest v. United States........................................... 826 Secretary, Dept, of Employment & Social Serv. v. Francis... 1042 Secretary of Agriculture; George Steinberg & Son v.................. 830 Secretary of Agriculture; Jones v.................................. 806 Secretary of Air Force v. DeChamplain.......................... 818,990 Secretary of Army; Galley v....................................... 1015 Secretary of Army; Medenica v..................................... 1107 Secretary of Army; Save Crystal Beach Assn, v...................... 813 Secretary of Defense v. Ballard.................................... 498 Secretary of Defense; Cole v...................................... 1120 Secretary of Defense v. Councilman................................ 1043 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Bailey v.... 953,1061 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Dawson v..... 854 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Eldridge.... 1104 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Glodgett... 963 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Hernandez v.. 860 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Jobst...... 811 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Kearns v..... 965 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Limback v.... 875 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Place v 1040 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; Rastetter «... 1098 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Salfi. 992 Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Wiesenfeld.. 822 Secretary of Health & Rehab. Serv. of Fla. v. Carter 880, 1061 Secretary of Health & Rehab. Serv. of Fla. v. Mixon. 880,1061 Secretary of Health & Social Services; LeFebre v................... 856 Secretary of HUD; Graves v......................................... 1029 Secretary of HUD; Tenants’ Council of Tiber Island v....... 970 Secretary of Human Relations Agcy. v. California Org.... 959,1022 Secretary of Human Resources of Massachusetts; Randall v.. 879 Secretary of Interior; Barton v.................................... 1021 Secretary of Interior; Bud Brown Enterprises v...................... 806 Secretary of Interior; Smith v...................................... 835 Secretary of Labor v. Bachowski.................................... 1068 lxxx TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Secretary of Labor; California v......................... 1100 Secretary of Labor; Digilab, Inc. v....................... 840 Secretary of Labor v. Greyhound Lines.................... 1122 Secretary of Labor; J. M. Fields, Inc. v.................. 881 Secretary of Labor; National Indep. Coal Operators v. .. 955,1132 Secretary of Labor; National League of Cities v...... 1100,1321 Secretary of Labor; National Roofing Contractors Assn. v.. 1105 Secretary of Labor; Pesikoff v........................... 1038 Secretary of Labor; Texas City Dike & Marina v........ 896 Secretary of Navy v. Avrech.................................. 885 Secretary of Navy; Crosby v.............................. 1030 Secretary of Navy; Doe v................................. 1091 Secretary of Navy v. Henry.............................. 895,1018 Secretary of Navy; Henry v.............................. 895,1018 Secretary of Social Services of Kan. v. Seneca Nursing Home. 841 Secretary of State of Texas v. Regester................ 991,1044 Secretary of Transportation; Ditlow v..................... 974 Secretary of Treasury; Dulles v.......................... 1001 Secretary of Treasury; Maryland Park and Plan. Comm’n v. . 1069 Secretary of Treasury; Orrin v.............................. 1106 Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour.............. 894 Sedillo v. New Mexico................................... 1072,1092 Sedillo v. United States..................................... 947 Seidenfaden v. Louisville................................... 1084 Seldin; Warth v.............................................. 823 Selikoff v. New York................................... 1086,1122 Seneca Nursing Home; Secretary of Soc. Serv. of Kansas v.. 841 Service Employees; Children’s Rehabilitation Center v....... 1090 Sewell v. Penn Central Transportation Co..................... 845 Shabazz v. California........................................ 965 Shad v. United States........................................ 830 Shadletsky v. United States.................................. 830 Shawnee Plastics v. Labor Board.............................. 838 Sheffield; New Jersey v..................................... 1051 Sheldon v. O’Callaghan...................................... 1090 Sheldon; O’Callaghan v...................................... 1090 Shenker v. United States.................................... 1106 Shepard v. United States.................................... 1048 Shepherd v. Arkansas......................................... 808 Sheppard v. United States................................... 1019 Sheris; Travelers Insurance Co. v............................ 831 Shiflett v. Alabama.......................................... 867 Shine v. California......................................... 1116 TABLE OF CASES 'REPORTED lxxxi Page Shipp v. United States.................................... 857 Shird v. United States.................................... 860 Shirley; Lascaris v................................... 817,1044 Shirley; Lavine v...................................... 817, 1044 Shirley v. State National Bank of Connecticut............. 1009 Sholars v. Matter.......................................... 970 Shop & Save Super Markets v. U. S. Dept, of Agriculture.... 827 Short v. United States.................................... 1000 Shrout v. Commissioner..................................... 828 Shultz v. Moore............................................ 930 Shultz v. United States.................................... 859 Shultz Equipment Co. v. Moore.............................. 930 Siegel v. United States................................... 1048 Siegferth v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co........................ 998 Sielaff; Gore v........................................... 1055 Sigal v. United States.................................... 954 Sigma Systems Corp. v. Electroic Data Systems Corp........ 1070 Signal Mountain Portland Cement v. Coolidge................ 843 Silverman v. United States.,............................... 874 Simmons v. Texas...................................... 829 Simmons v. United States......................... 1004,1048 Simmons v. Wainwright...................................... 861 Simon v. Allen Estate...................................... 843 Simon je* Dixon..................................... 1013 Simon; Maryland Park and Planning Comm’n v................ 1069 Simon; Orrin v............................................ 1106 Simpson; Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v.................. 901 Simpson v. Simpson......................................... 897 Sims v. United States...................................... 850 Sims v. Utah............................................... 887 Singleton v. Atkins........................................ 859 Sirica; Ehrlichman v...................................... 1310 Sirica; Haldeman v......................................... 997 Sirica; Sayles v........................................... 888 Sisca v. United States.................................... 1008 Skelley v. United States.................................. 1051 Skelly Oil Co.; Gooch v.................................... 997 Skidmore v. National Railroad Adjustment Board............ 1038 Skufca v. Pennsylvania.................................... 1028 Slaton; Paris.Adult Theatre I v........................... 887 Sloan v. Nixon........................................ 958,1097 Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co............................. 873 Smart v. Jones............................................ 1090 lxxxii TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Smith v. California......................... 808,988,1097,1118 Smith v. Central Los Angeles Health Project............. 1024 Smith v. Chennault........................................ 986 Smith v. Indiana State Board of Health.................... 836 Smith v. Keator.......................................... 1043 Smith v. Keller.......................................... 1024 Smith v. Morton........................................... 835 Smith; Neal v............................................. 863 Smith v. Oklahoma......................................... 865 Smith v. Project Construction Co.......................... 811 Smith; Sanney v.......................................... 1027 Smith v. Stewart.......................................... 873 Smith; Terraciano v....................................... 875 Smith v. United States................................... 102, 801,846,852, 856,857,900,964,1037,1060,1089,1124 Smyzer v. Kentucky................................... 832,1060 Sneiders v. Henry.................................... 832,1060 Snider v. United States.............................. 989,1115 Snyder v. United States.................................. 1058 Soboleski v. United States............................... 1035 Sobottka v. Brown........................................ 1098 Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General.............. 1314 Sokolsky v. Cie-Ware Industries........................... 829 Somers v. United States................................... 832 Somerset v. North Carolina................................ 964 Sommer v. LaVallee....................................... 1001 Sorrentino v. United States.............................. 1056 Sosna v. Iowa............................................. 393 Sotelo v. Immigration and Nat. Service................ 859,1061 Sotomura v. Hawaii........................................ 872 Souder v. McGuire......................................... 820 Sound Values, Inc. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp.... 819,1120 South Carolina; Williams v................................ 835 South Dakota; Goodrich v................................. 1092 South Dakota; Nelson v................................... 1110 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad................... 892 Southern California First National Bank; Adams v......... 1006 Southern California Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n...... 882 Southern Haulers, Inc. v. Department of Public Safety.... 891 Southern Pacific Co.; Kelley v............................ 318 Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n. 810 Southern Pacific Transp. Co.; Sanders Brine Shrimp Co. v... 1033 South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt.......................... 837 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXXIII Page Southwest Airlines Co.; Dallas v............................ 1079 Spady v. Mount Vernon Housing Authority...................... 983 Spannaus; Searrella v........................................ 991 Sperry Rand Corp.; Electrical Workers v...................... 831 Sperry Systems Management Div.; Electrical Workers v....... 831 Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n........................ 896 Springer v. United,3tates................................... 834 Sprinkle v. Mason.......................................... 1130 Squires v. Procunier........................................ 852 Stafford v. United States................................... 852 Stamatakos v. Hunter Shipping Co............................. 831 Stamm; Environmental Defense Fund v......................... 1041 Standard Forge & Axle Co. v. EEOC........................... 1106 Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Rev. of Wash.. 560 Stanjim Co. v. Board of Revision of Mahoning County........ 1109 Stanley v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp........................ 1109 Stanley T. Scott & Co.; Makah Development Corp, v.......... 837 Stanton v. Stanton........................................... 893 Stapleton v. United States................................... 1002 Star v. Preller.............................................. 956 Starks v. Henderson.......................................... 1002 State. See also name of State. State Admin. Board of Election Laws; Calvert v.............. 1110 State Bar of California; Yokozeki v.......................... 900 State Board of Equalization of California; Fedrick, Inc. v.. 1120 State Examiner of Banking; First Amer. Bank & Tr. v.. 1026,1117 State National Bank of Connecticut ; Shirley v.............. 1009 Steamship Mutual Underwriting Assn. v. Westchester Ins... 1070 Stebbins v. Insurance Company of North America............ 857 Stebbins v. Keystone Insurance Co.......................... 854 Steelworkers; United States Gypsum Co. v................ 998,1097 Steigler v. Anderson........................................ 1002 Steinberg; Fusari v.................................. 379,816,990 Steinberg v. United States.................................. 1024 Steinberg & Co. v. Butz...................................... 830 Stejskal v. United States.................................... 866 Stephens v. Estelle.......................................... 848 Stephens v. United States.................................... 852 Stevens v. Asch............................................. 1055 Stewart v. California....................................... 1111 Stewart v. Kyros............................................ 1108 Stewart; Smith v............................................. 873 Stich; Generes v............................................ 1097 LXXXIV TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Stockmen’s Ins. Agency v. Guarantee Reserve Ins. Co........ 869 Stokes v. Buchignani........................................ 988 Stollings v. United States................................. 1121 Stone v. California........................................ 1115 Stone; Crane v............................................ 1086 Stone; Hill v.............................................. 822 Strader v. Estelle......................................... 994 Straub v. Woodahi......................................... 845 Straughn; Camp v............................................ 891 Strauss; Leonard v..................................... 901,1061 Streckfus v. St. Louis...................................... 810 Strickland; Fenner v....................................... 1121 Strickland v. United States................................. 801 Stroupe v. Tidwell.......................................... 860 Students Challenging Reg. Agcy.; Aberdeen & R. R. Co. v.. 822 Students Challenging Reg. Agcy.; United States v............ 822 Studer v. Texas............................................. 996 Sturgeon v. United States.................................. 1071 Stypmann v. U. S. District Court........................... 1123 Suburban Transit Corp.; Highway Drivers v.............. 1089 Suburban Transit Corp.; Teamsters v........................ 1089 Sulaiman v. United States................................... 911 Sullivan v. United States............................... 853,993 Summer & Co. v. Labor Board............................. 301,817 Sumpter v. Indiana.......................................... 811 Sundstrom v. United Stateäiilö^J*^ 934 Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States........... 1021 Superintendent; Kibert ..................................... 995 Superintendent, Motor Vehicle Division; Mendoza v.......... 1055 Superintendent, Odin School District; Holsapple v........... 901 Superintendent of penal or correctional institution. See also name or state title of superintendent. Superior Court of California; Arnold ...................... 1073 Superior Court of California; Generes .................... 998 Superior Court of California * -Magee v.............. H04,1114 Supreme Court of California; Hurd ....................... 864 Supreme Court of Wyoming; Blackrose .................... 1018 Supreme Court of Wyoming; Reeder ....................... 1018 Surles v. California....................................... Susquehanna Corp. v. Scurlock.............................. °' Susquehanna Valley Teachers Assn. v. Central School Dist... 1033 Sutton v. Commissioner..................................... 1021 Sw’ad Chrysler-Plymouth Co. v. 565 East Broad, Inc......... 868 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXXV Page Swank v. Rodriguez........................................... 885 Swanson v. United States..................................... 1046 Swoap v. Cooper.............................................. 1022 Swoap v. Waits........................................... 960,1022 Sykes v. Maryland............................................ 1126 Szekula v. United States..................................... 963 Taggart v. Oregon............................................ 877 Talbert v. United States..................................... 885 Tallant v. Moye.............................................. 821 Tallent v. New York.......................................... 1126 Talley v. United States...................................... 1125 Tantillo v. United States.................................... 1020 Tarlton v. Dill............................................... 847 Tarr, In re.................................................. 1016 Tasby v. United States....................................... 1125 Tate v. United States........................................ 1001 Taub, Hummel & Schnall v. I. C. Herman & Co................... 885 Tax Comm’n of Mississippi; United States v............... 1104 Taylor v. Bratton...................................... 1038 Taylor v. Estelle....................................... 820 Taylor v. Lavine........................................ 1046,1103 Taylor v. Louisiana...................................... 522 Taylor v. United States............................. 848,877,1048 Teachers v. Central School Dist.............................. 1033 Teachers; Ysrael v............................................ 872 Teamsters v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc...................... 869 Teamsters v. Scott............................................ 997 Teamsters v. Suburban Transit Corp........................... 1089 Technical Development Corp. W United States................... 886 Teletype Corp.; Olenz v.................................. 865,1061 Television and Radio Artists; Buckley v...................... 1093 Television and Radio Artists; Lewis v........................ 1093 Tenants’ Council of Tiber Island v. Lynn...................... 970 Tennessee; Becton v.......................................... 847 Tennessee; Bridges!1.................................... 1097,1132 Tennessee; Effler v.......................................... 841 Tennessee; Forgy v.......................................... 1034 Tennessee; Robinson v........................................ 877 Tennessee; Scott v.......................................... 1033 Tennessee Eastman Co.; Process Equipment Eng. Co. v.......... 1040 Teran II United States....................................... 1124 Teresi v. United States......................................... 834 Terraciano v. Smith............................................. 875 LX XXVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Terrell; Household Goods Carriers' Bureau v................ 987 Terrell v. United States............................... 813,861 Texaco Inc. v. Louisiana.................................. 1110 Texas; Altsman v........................................... 842 Texas; American Plant Food Corp. |Jk...................... 1098 Texas; Carver v............................................ 841 Texas; Chase v............................................. 840 Texas; Crandall v.......................................... 887 Texas; Foreman v........................................... 851 Texas; Gonzales v.......................................... 856 Texas; Martinez v.......................................... 969 Texas; Moreno v........................................... 1115 Texas; Olson v............................................ 1088 Texas; Pickens v........................................... 880 Texas; Pope v.............................................. 845 Texas; Ratcliff v......................................... 1103 Texas; Rich v............................................. 1091 Texas; Simmons v........................................... 829 Texas; Studer v............................................ 996 Texas v. Train............................................. 840 Texas; Ward v.............................................. 864 Texas; Winkle v............................................ 843 Texas; Yates v............................................. 996 Texas Attorney General v. Printing Industries..... 805,960,1088 Texas Attorney General v. Stone............................ 822 Texas City Dike & Marina v. Brennan........................ 896 Texas Dept, of Corrections; Young v....................... 1036 Texas Highway Dept.; Bush v................................ 806 Texas Highway Dept.; Bush Distributing Co. v............... 806 Texas Railroad Comm’n; -Lake Transport, Incf^y............. 839 Texas Secretary of State v. Regester.................. 991, 1044 Texeira v. United States................................... 825 Thalasinos v. Dolcino..................................... 1014 Thatcher v. United States................................. 1035 Theriault v. Carlson...................................... 1003 Thevis v. United States................................ 801,886 Thibodeau v. Minnesota State Bar Assn..................... 1023 Thistlethwaite v. New York City........................... 1093 Thomas v. Cannon........................................... 879 Thomas; Cannon v...................................... 813,1041 Thomas v. Mississippi...................................... 826 Thomas v. United States.................................... 856 Thomas v. U. S. Board of Parole........................... 1068 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXXVII Page Thompson v. Clark...................................... 988, 1097 Thompson v. North Carolina.................................. 867 Thompson; Tonasket v........................................ 871 Thompson v. United States....................... 825,834,848,850 Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States.. 901 Threlkeld; Tucker v........................................ 1023 Tibbitts v. Cussen.......................................... 830 Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States.......................... 886 Tidwell; Stroupe v.......................................... 860 Tillem v. New Jersey........................................ 900 Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp............ 1301 Timme & Son; Fur Information & Fashion Council v.......... 1022 Titeflex Employees Bargaining Assn.; Gaskins v......... 1035, 1117 Tjaden v. Tjaden........................................... 1022 Tobalina v. California...................................... 926 Toledo; Alers v............................................. 960 Toledo Bar Assn.; Bartlett v........................... 989,1073 Toledo Bar Assn.; Ishler v................................ 1108 Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co. v. W’asson................ 844 Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co.; Wasson v................. 844 Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Ccmkj Wasson Towing Co...... 844 Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co.; Wasson Towing Co. v... 844 Toliver v. United States................................... 1056 Tollett v. Laman........................................... 1088 Tonasket v. Thompson......................................... 871 Torbert v. United Statep..................................... 857 Torres v. United States...................................... 898 Tosini v. United States...................................... 896 Town. See name of town. Traigle; Colonial Pipeline Co. v............................. 819 Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc...................... 818,990 Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council.................. 823 Train v. New York City................................. 818,990 Train; Texas v.............................................. 840 Tramunti v. United States.................................. 1079 Transamerican Freight Lines v. Brada Miller Freight....... 819 Transportation Union v. Baker............................... 839 Transportation Union v. Penn Central Trustees............... 839 Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp............... 1097 Trapnell v. United States................................... 851 Travelers Insurance Co.; Hernandez v........................ 844 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Sheris........................... 831 Treasurer of DuPage County; Thompson v................. 988, 1097 LXXXVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Treasurer of United States; Von Clemm v................... 1079 Treasure Valley Potato Assn. v. Ore-Ida Foods.............. 999 Triano v. New Jersey....................................... 883 Trigg v. Illinois......................................... 1055 Trimble; Anderson v...................................... 995 Tripodi; Esser v.......................................... 1054 Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Walker........................... 1058 Truck Drivers; Labor Board v........................... 301,817 Trudeau v. Michigan................................... 868, 1026 Tubbs v. United States.................................... 1124 Tucker v. Bowers.......................................... 1086 Tucker; Cheramie v......................................... 868 Tucker v. Crikelair....................................... 1023 Tucker v. Maher............................................ 997 Tucker v. Threlkeld....................................... 1023 Tucker v. Wiggins......................................... 1048 Turetsky v. New York....................................... 838 Turman v. United States.................................... 861 Turner v. California...................................... 1099 Turner; Ruhm v............................................. 882 TV 9, Inc.; Federal Communications Comm’n v................ 986 TV 9, Inc.; Mid-Florida Television Corp, v................. 986 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.................... 1067 Twenty Grand Offshore, Inc.; West India Carriers v........ 836 Twilley v. Maryland Governor............................... 840 Tyler v. Regan............................................. 991 Tyler v. Wyrick............................................ 999 Umphrey v. McGraw-Edison Co................................ 886 Union. For labor union, see name of trade. Union Bank & Trust Co.; Brantley v........................ 1034 Union Local School District; Kuklevich v................... 845 Union Oil Co. of California; Lowe v........................ 886 United. For labor union, see name of trade. United Action for Animals; Adey v.......................... 842 United Americans for Public Schools; Franchise Tax Bd. v... 890 United Housing Foundation v. Forman................... 1067,1120 United Mini-Adult Theatre v. Gerstein..................... 1028 United Parcel Service; Satterwhite v...................... 1079 United Presb. Church; Brooklyn Heights Presb. Church v. .. 1023 United States; Abramo v................................... 826 United States; Ackerson v................................ 1099 United States; Adams v.................................... 897 United States; Agnew v................................... 1091 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED LXXXIX Page United States; Aireo Engineers v............................... 994 United States v. Alaska....................................... 1045 United States.; Alexander v................................... 1107 United States ; Alleni v..................................... 1035 United States; Allison v...................................... 851 United States; Alonso v...................................... 845 United States; Amato v..................................... 1013 United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries. . 1104 United States''v. American Friends Service Committee......... 7 United States; American Institute for Shippers’ Assns. v. ... 1042 United States v. American Renaissance Lines................... 1020 United States; Amos v......................................... 896 United States; Analla v...................................... 813 United States; Anderson v............................ 821,827,875 United States; Andrews v..................................... 884 United States; Andrino v................................. 991,1048 United States; Angiulo v...................................... 896 United States; Ann Arbor R. Co. v............................. 807 United States v. Arkansas-Best Freight System.................. 281 United Statar^ Arnold v'.-................................. 1027 United States; Arroyo v..................................... 827 United States; Artieri v..................................... 878 United States; Baca v........................................ 862 United States; Bailey v...................................... 859 United States; Bailley v..................................... 899 United States; Baker v................................ 902,1112 United States; Ballard v..................................... 1025 United States v. Bankers Trust Co.............................. 883 United Stateti Banks v........................................ 1124 United States; Barcenas v..................................... 1036 United States; Bardahi Mfg. Corp, v............................ 832 United States; Bartemio v...................................... 994 United States; Bartholomew v................................... 849 United. States ; Baxter v................................. 964,1080 United States; Beasley v-..................................... 1066 United States; Beer v.......................................... 822 United States; Bell v......................................... 1013 United States; Benson v;. 1035 United States; Berardelli v................................... 1000 United Stages; Bey v.......................................... 1003 United States; Bishop v........................................ 833 United States; Blackshear v................................ 1035 United States; Bland v......................................... 856 xc TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Bodey v...................................... 899 United States; Boehm v...................................... 849 United States; Bone v...................................... 1046 United States; Borgman v.................................... 828 United States; Boria v...................................... 830 United States; Boruski v.................................. 808,861 United States; Bowdach v.................................... 900 United States; Bowden v..................................... 897 United States; Bowen v.............................. 824,1003,1017 United States; Bowser v........................................ 857 United States; Bradford v...................................... 834 United States v, Bradshaw...................................... 895 United States; Bra wer v...................................... 1051 United States; Brenner v....................................... 831 United States; Brewer v.................................. 1000,1047 United States; Brewington v.................................... 839 United States; Bridges v...................................... 1010 United States; Brierly v...................................... 1052 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.......................... 824,1017 United States; Brinlee v....................................... 878 United States; Brooks v........................................ 898 United States; Brown v........................................ 837, 850, 853, 865, 885,965,1046,1047,1054,1112 United States; Bruce v......................................... 825 United States; Bruno v........................................ 1001 United States; Bryan v................................... 1079,1117 United States; Bryant v....................................... 1051 United States ; Burke v.................................. 966,1079 United States; Burns v......................................... 876 United States; Buster v........................................ 966 United States; Buttons v...................................... 1003 United States; Caldwell v...................................... 999 United States ; Campbell v............................. 828, 849, 857 United States; Cangiano v................................... 904 United States; Canton v....................................... 1001 United States; Card v.......................................... 995 United States; Carew v......................................... 847 United States; Carratello v................................... 862 United States; Carter v........................................ 969 United States; Caruse v........................................ 847 United States; Casamento v..................................... 827 United States; Casey v........................................ 1107 United States; Castaphney v................................... 1054 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xci Page United States; Castillo-Burgos v........................... 1010 United States; Catalano v..................................... 825 United States; Catena v...................................... 1047 United States; Caulton v...................................... 898 United States; Chaney v....................................... 855 United States; Charbonier v.................................. 1079 United States; Chrisco v...................................... 847 United States; Ciaccio v.................................... 1111 United States; Cioffi v....................................... 917 United States; Cirillo v..................................... 1056 United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank. ... 893,1087,1119 United States; Clanton v...................................... 877 United States; Clark v................................... 899,1037 United States; Clay v......................................... 937 United States; Cleveland Browns v............................ 1057 United States; Cochran v................................ 1120,1124 United States Coleman v.................................. 855,1004 United States; Collier v...................................... 831 United States; Collins v................................. 857, 1052 United States; Combes v...................................... 1001 United States; Comcowich v.................................... 845 United States; Congress of Railway Unions v................... 811 United States; Conlon v....................................... 850 United States v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp...... 102, 802 United States; Contracting Plumbers Restoration Corp. v.... 827 United States; Cook v.................................. 1020 United States; Cooley v............................... 1123 United States; Cooper v.................................. 859, 860 United States; Corbin v................................. 902 United States; Cote v................................... 885 United States; Coulter n................................ 850,1060 United States; Cowles v................................ 1113 United States; Cox v.................................... 885,1047 United States; Crandall v............................... 852 United States; Crane v................................. 1002 United States; Crawford v.................................... 862 United States; Crawley v.................................... 1034 United States; Crook v...................................... 1123 United States; Crowder v.................................... 1010 United States; Cruz-Guerra v............................... 862 United States; Cubic Corp, v................................ 900 United States; Cunningham v................................... 876 United States; Curry v....................................... 1035 xcn TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Cushnie v...................................... 968 United States; Daee v........................................ 1121 United States; D’Amato v........................................ 826 United States; D’Andrea v..................................... 855 United States; Darrow v...................................... 1013 United States; Davis v.............................. 966,1024,1052 United States; Dellacroce v................................... 825 United States; Dellinger v................................... 1029 United States ; Del Valle v..................................... 801 United States; DeMontijo v................................... 1125 United States; Denson v...................................... 1114 United States; Denti v....................................... 1106 United States.; De Veste v.................................... 1107 United States; DeVoti v....................................... 864 United States; DiBella v..................................... 1032 United States; Diggs v........................................ 861 United States; DiJohn v....................................... 967 United States; Dilworth v.................................... 1071 United States.; Dioguardi v................................... 873 United States; Disher v....................................... 899 United States; Dixon v........................................ 856 United States; Doe v.......................................... 848 United States; Donner v...................................... 1047 United States; Dorman v14'?'. ............................. 945 United States " Dornan v...................................... 872 United States.;. Douglas v. 1052 United States; Downen v......................................... 897 United States; Duhart v......................................... 967 United States; Dunn v........................................... 855 United States; Duran v......................................... 1071 United States; Durkin v......................................... 878 United States; Dyman v.......................................... 848 United States; East Haven v..................................... 958 United States; Ecologistics Institute v......................... 849 United States; Edwards v........................................ 954 United States; Eggleston v...................................... 858 United States; Ellingburg v.................................... 1046 United States; Ellis v......................................... 1052 United States; Emerine v.................................... 854 United States; Emprise Corp, v............................ 1120 United States; Ervin v....................................... 850 United States; Estevez v................................... 1097 United States; Ethridge v................................... 1025 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED xcin Page United States; Eyraud v........................................ 829 United States; Falley v........................................ 987 United States; Fannon v....................................... 1012 United States; Farmer v........................................ 848 United States; Farries v...................................... 1054 United States; Farris v........................................ 852 United States; Feaster v...................................... 1036 United States; Federal Electric Corp, v........................ 874 United States; Felicia v....................................... 849 United States; Felts v.................................... 1051,1071 United States; Ferguson v...................................... 900 United States; Ferraro v....................................... 896 United States; Ferri v........................................ 1024 United States; Fico v......................................... 1091 United Stated; Ficorelli v.................................... 1009 United States; Fields v....................................... 1071 United Slates v. Finley Coal Co............................... 1089 United States; Fiorella v..................................... 885 United States; Flammia’b.-.................................... 1035 United States; Flaxman v...................................... 1031 United States v. Florida...................................... 814 United States; Flowers v...................................... 1003 United States; Folks v.................................... 849,1080 United States; Fongone v...................................... 864 United States; Fonseca v...................................... 1072 United States; Ford v: a. ............................... 994 United States; Frank v......................................... 828 United States; Freeman v....................................... 996 United States; Fresta v....................................... 1048 United States; Friedman v..................................... 1054 United States; Fruge v......................................... 856 United States; Fry v....................................... 816,961 United States; Gabriel v...................................... 1086 United States; Ganos v......................................... 846 United States; Garcia v........................................ 897 United States; Garcia-Quesada v............................... 1004 United States; Gardner v....................................... 895 United States; Garelli v...................................... 1107 United Sidtes; Garvey v....................................... 1113 United States; Gearin v....................................... 1113 United States’^.Genovese v.................................... 1038 United States; Gentile v....................................... 979 United States; George Transfer ............................ 942,966,1038 United States v. National Assn, of Securities Dealers...... 822 United States; Nelson v................................... 1052 United States; Nevarez-Alcantar v.......................... 878 United States; New v....................................... 1026 United States; Newell v.................................... 993 United States v. New Jersey State Lottery Comm’n........... 991 United States; New Orleans Book Mart v............ 1007,1116 United States; New York on behalf of New York County v. . 888 United States; Niezek v...................................... 873 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED XCIX Page United States v. Nobles....................................... 1120 United States; Nocar v........................................ 1038 United States; ,$Toga v....................................... 838 United States; Noland v....................................... 966 United States; Norton v....................................... 1113 United States; Nunez-Villalobos v............................. 1090 United States; Ödland v........................................ 1088 United States; Olivares-Vega v................................. 1020 United States; Oliver v......................................... 853 United States v. Ortiz................................... 824,1017 United States; Ostrer v................................ 829,1044 United States; Otte v......................................... 43 United States; Outlaw Vf,................................... 844 United States; Overshon v................................... 853,878 United Stated Owen v...................................... 965 United States; Pacelli v...................................... 826 United States; Pacente v.................................. 1048 United States; Palmeri v................................... 898 United States v. Park........................................... 992 United States; Parness v..................................... 1105 United States ; Patch v..................................... 1049 United States; Paterno v..................................... 1106 United States; Patrizzi v..................................... 860 United States; Patterson v................................ 846,876 United States; Payne v........................................ 876 United States; Peachtree News Co. v........................... 887 United States; Pecina v...................................... 1072 United States; Peichev v........................................ 966 United States; Pellicci v...................................... 1122 United States v. Peltier.................................. 993,1044 United States; Pemberton v..................................... 1114 United States; Penick v......................................... 897 United States; Pennick v....................................... 1051 United States; Perez v...................................... 827,855 United States; Perry Vt,....................................... 1051 United States; Persico^!................................... 924,1060 United States; Persky v......................................... 895 United States; Peterson v............................... 828,831,964 United States; Petty v......................................... 1009 United States; Phelps v.................................... 836,1068 United States; Phillips v....................................... 847 United States; Phillips Petroleum Co. v......................... 886 United States; Pietras v....................................... 1071 c TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Pittman v.................................... 1046 United States; Pitt River Tribe v............................ 831 United States; Plummer v.................................... 968 United States; Polite v..................................... 854 United States; Polizzi v.................................... 1120 United States; Pollard v.................................... 851 United States; Pomares v.................................... 1032 United States; Pommerening v............................. 1088 United States; Ponzio v..................................... 832 United States; Porter v..................................... 1123 United States; Poston v.................................... 1052 United States; Powell v................................ 866,1046 United States; Prader v.................................... 1047 United States; Presta v...................................... 825 United States; Prince vti.»............................... 1107 United States; Proffitt v................................... 1002 United States; Pryba v..................................... 1127 United States; Pryor v................................. 977,1060 United States; Quails vm ................................ 1051 United States; Quiroz-Santi v.............................. 1024 United States; Rachal v.................................... 1047 United States; Rademaker v................................. 1037 United States; Ramirez v.................................... 1112 United States; Ramsey v..................................... 994 United States; Raven v...................................... 1124 United States; Rechtman v.................................... 876 United States; R. E. Huntley Cotton Co. v.................... 837 United States; Reicin v...................................... 996 United States v. Reliable Transfer Co........................ 1018 United States v. Reserve Mining Co............................ 802 United States; Resnick v.............................. 1053,1071 United States; Rice v................................. 1032,1044 United States; Rich v......................................... 862 United States; Richardson v-............................... 1020 United States; Richmond v.................................. 1067 United States; Ricketson v................................... 965 United States; Ridland v.................................... 994 United States; Rimka v....................................... 850 United States; Ring v........................................ 18 United States; Roberts v........................... 854,1070,1113 United States; Robinson v.................................. 1003 United States; Rockwell v.................................. 1051 United States; Rodovich v.................................. 1125 TABLE OF CASES REPORTEE ci Page United States; Rodriguez v.................................. 1124 United States; Rodriguez-Gonzalez v......................... 898 United States; Roe v........................................ 858 United States ; Rogers v.................................. 824, 846 United States; Romero v................................ 995,1124 United States; Rosa v...................................... 850 United States; Rose v................................... 848,969 United States; Rosenblatt v.................................. 1032 United States; Ross v............................. 969,1048,1088 United States; Rossi v...................................... 838 United States; Rovner v.................................... 1106 United States; Ruark v..................................... 1035 United States; Rucker v..................................... 965 United States; Ruggiero v.................................. 841 United States; Ruiz v........................................ 899 United States; Rush v...................................... 1091 United States; Saffioti v.................................... 808 United States; St. Lawrence v................................ 858 United States; Saladin v................................... 1025 United States; Sanchez v.................................... 827 United States; Sangster v................................... 887 United States; Sanguandikul v.............................. 1052 United States; Sano v....................................... 895 United States; Santana v..................................... 1053 United States; Sappington v................................. 863 United States; Savard v..................................... 896 United States; Scappatone v................................. 827 United States; Scata v..................................... 1019 United States; Schellenberg v............................... 849 United States; Schenker v.................................. 1106 United States; Schmidt v................................... 863 United States; Schneider v................................. 1121 United States; Schulman v.................................. 1088 United States; Scott v................................. 820,1113 United States; Scott Paper Co. v............................ 807 United States v. SCRAP........................................ 822 United States; Sea-Land Service v.......................... 840 United States; Seals v...................................... 850 United States; .Séchrest v.................................. 826 United States; Sedillo v.................................... 947 United States; Shad v....................................... 830 United States; Shadletsky v................................. 830 United States; Shenker v................................... 1106 cn TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Shepard v................................... 1048 United States; Sheppard v.................................. 1019 United States; Shipp v........................................ 857 United States; Shird v....................................... 860 United States; Short v...................................... 1000 United States; Shultz v.................................... 859 United States; Siegel v.................................... 1048 United States; Sigal v...................................... 954 United States; Silverman v.................................. 874 .United States; Simmons v............................... 1004,1048 United States; Sims v....................................... 850 United States; Sisca v..................................... 1008 United States; Skelley v................................... 1051 United States; Smith v..................................... 102, 801, 846, 852, .856, 857, 900, 964,1037,1060, 1089,1124 United States; Snider v................................ 989,1115 United States; Snyder K".................................. 1058 United States; Soboleski v................................. 1035 United States; Somers v..................................... 832 United States; Sorrentino v.................................. 1056 United States; Springer v.................................... 834 United States; Stafford v.................................... 852 United States; Stapleton v................................ 1002 United States; Steinberg v................................ 1024 United States; Stejskal v................................... 866 United States; Stephens v................................. 852 United States; Stollings v................................ 1121 United States; Strickland v.................................... 801 United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency.............. 822 United States; Sturgeon v................................... 1071 United States; Sulaiman v.................................... 911 United States; Sullivan v................................ 853,993 United States; Sundstrom v................................... 934 United States; Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.............. 1021 United States; Swanson v.................................... 1046 United States; Szekula y..................................... 963 United States; Talbert v..................................... 885 United States; Talley v..................................... 1125 United States; Tantillo v................................... 1020 United States; Tasby v...................................... 1125 United States; Tate v....................................... 1001 United States v. Tax Comm’n of Mississippi.................... 1104 United States; Taylor v............................... 848,877,1048 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cm Page United States; Technical Development Corp, v.................... 886 United States; Teran v....................................... 1124 United States; Teresi v....................................... 834 United States; Terrell v.................................. 813,861 United States; Texeira v...................................... 825 United States; Thatcher v.................................... 1035 United States; Thevis v..................................... 801,886 United States; Thomas v......................................... 856 United States; Thompson v............................ 825, 834, 848, 850 United States; Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. 901 United States; Tidewater Oil Co. v............................ 886 United States; Toliver v..................................... 1056 United States; Torbert v...................................... 857 United States; Torres v....................................... 898 United States; Tosini v....................................... 896 United States; Tramunti v.................................... 1079 United States; Trapnell v..................................... 851 United States; Tubbs v....................................... 1124 United States; Turman v....................................... 861 United States; Untiedt v...................................... 862 United States; Utah v......................................... 814 United States; Valdez v...................................... 1105 United States; Valen v........................................ 901 United States; Valenti v...................................... 966 United States; Vallejo v...................................... 965 United States; Valle-Rojas v................................ 1027 United States; Valley v....................................... 888 United States; Van Drunen v................................ 1091 United States; Van Gundy v.............................. 1004,1116 United States; Vasquez-Casillaz v............................ 1052 United States; Venetucci v................................... 1056 United States; Verive v...................................... 1088 United States; Vessi v........................................ 855 United States; Viera v........................................ 899 United States; Vigorito v.................................... 1056 United States; Villarreal v.................................. 1114 United States; Villone v...................................... 898 United States; Vowteras v.................................... 1069 United States; Wagoner v..................................... 1052 United States; Walker v.............................. 825,1037, 1057 United States; Wall v.......................................... 1025 United States; Wallace v....................................... 1031 United States; Ward v................................;.......... 899 civ TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page United States; Warren v................................... 1089 United States; Washburn v................................... 1106 United States; Washington v............................. 1025,1032 United States; Weaver v.................................... 850 United States; Webb v........................................ 865 United States; Weems v.................................. 860,898 United States; Weir v....................................... 1038 United States; Weiss v....................................... 833 United States; Welch v....................................... 857 United States; Wells v...................................... 1036 United States; Werts v...................................... 1093 United States; West v....................................... 899 United States; Whitaker v..................................... 1113 United States; White v..................................... 872, 901 United States; Whittington v................................. 898 United States; Wiemer v..................................... 1051 United States; Wilbanks v.................................. 1051 United States; Wilcox County Board of Education v............ 1031 United States; Wiley v....................................... 879 United States; Wilford v..................................... 851 United States; Williams v..... 852,858,955,996,1003,1047,1113 United States; Williams & Wilkins-Co. v..................... 962 United States; Willis v................................. 993,1113 United States v. Wilson........................................ 817 United States; Wilson v................................. 858,1069 United States; Windsor v.................................... 938 United States; Wingate v.................................... 872 United States; Witt v........................................ 855 United States; Wright v.................................... 1000 United States; Wynn v....................................... 898 United States; Yates v....................................... 857 United States; Yeager i>.................................... 1029 United States; Yellow Cab of Boca Raton v...................... 806 United States; Young v............................ 1002,1069,1132 United States; Zane v....................................... 895 United States; Zanfardino v.................................. 830 United States-; Ziruolo v.................................... 845 U. S. Attorney; Reamer v............................... 1015,1029 U. S. Attorney; Tucker v.................................... 1086 U. S. Board of Parole; McIntosh v.......................... 1100 U. S. Board of Parole; Thomas............................... 1068 U. S. Bureau of Prisons; Rachal v............................ 836 U. S. Congress; Dorrough v................................... 899 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cv Page U. S. Court of Appeals; Draughon v............................ 1104 U. S. Court of Appeals; Fontaine^............................. 1031 U. S. Court of Appeals; Pearson v.............................. 821 U. S. Court of Appeals; Phelps v............................... 821 U. S. Court of Appeals; Rea v.................................. 821 U. S. Court of Appeals Chief Judge; Merrill v.................. 820 U. S. Court of Appeals Chief Judge; Monteer v................. 1067 U. S. Court of Appeals Judges; Begun v........................ 1031 U. S. Dept, of Agriculture; Rural Foods, Inc. v................ 827 U. S. Dept, of Agriculture; Shop & Save Super Markets v... 827 U. S. Dept, of Labor; Tnlmpounty Construction Corp. v.... 1119 U. S. District Court; Campbell v................................. 879 U. S. District Court; Cupp v.................................... 1045 U. S. District Court; Farries v.......................... 1104 U. S. District Court; Rose v.............................. 960 U. S. District Court; Santana v.......................... 1073 U. S. District Court; Stypmann v......................... 1123 U. S. District Court; Williams v............................ 1119 U. S. District Court; Williamson v......................... 821 U. S. District Court Chief Judge; Bearden v................. 821 U. S. District Court Chief Judge; Proffitt v............... 1034 U. S. District Judge; Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v... 870 U. S. District Judge; Dolloff Industries v................ 827 U. S. District Judge: Haldeman v................................. 997 U. S. District Judge; Meier v........................... 1116 U. S. District Judge; Miller v........................... 1038 U. S. District Judge; Nestler v.................................. 884 U: S. District Judge; O’Bryan v.................................. 986 U. S. District Judge; Phelps v................................... 807 U. S. District Judge v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.......... 1096 U. S. District Judge; Ross v..................................... 821 U. S. District Judge; Sayles v................................... 888 U. S. District Judge; Tallant v.................................. 821 U. S. District Judge; Taylor v.................................. 1038 U. S. District Judge; Tyler v.................................... 991 U. S. District Judge; Varfis v.................................. 1123 U. S. District Judge; Williams v................................ 1107 U. S. ex rel. See name of real party in interest. United States Gypsum Co. v. Steelworkers.................... 998,1097 United States Jaycees; Junior Chamber of Commerce v........... 1026 U. S. Marshal; Graham v......................................... 1113 U. S. Postal Service; Kaplan v.................................. 1029 United States Railway Assn. v. Connecticut Gen. Corp.. 102, 802, 893 CVI TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page U. S. Servicemen's Fund; Eastland v..................... 823,1103 U. S. Tax Court; Kopas v................................ 857,1041 United Theatres of Florida v. Gerstein...................... 1028 Universal Builders, Inc. v. Clark........................... 1070 Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp.; Weidinger Chevrolet v...... 1033 University Computing Co.; Murtagh v......................... 835 Untiedt v. United States..................................... 862 Upper Missouri River Corp. v. Board of Review................ 809 Utah; Sims v................................................. 887 Utah v. United States........................................ 814 Utah-Louisiana Investment Co.; International Development v. 810 Valdez v. United States..................................... 1105 Valen v. United States....................................... 901 Valenti v. United States..................................... 966 Valenzuela v. California..................................... 994 Vallejo v. United States..................................... 965 Valle-Rojas v. United States................................ 1027 Valley v. United States...................................... 888 Vallis v. Lefkowitz.......................................... 955 Valuch; Moynier v........................................... 1072 Van Drunen v. United States................................. 1091 Vandygrift v. Patton........................................ 1036 Van Gundy v. United States............................. 1004,1116 Van Lare v. Hurley..................................... 1045,1103 Varacalli v. New York........................................ 859 Varfis v. Richey............................................ 1123 Vasquez-Casillaz v. United States........................... 1052 Vassallo v. LaTorr.......................................... 1108 Vella v. Ford Motor Co....................................... 894 Venable; Meyers v........................................... 1090 Venetucci v. United States.................................. 1056 Venore Transportation Co.; Banco Do Brasil "v................ 998 Verive v. United States..................................... 1088 Vermont v. New York...................................... 955,961 Verville v. Botsford General Hospital....................... 1038 Vessels v. Estelle........................................... 969 Vessi v. United States....................................... 855 Vester v. North Carolina.................................... 1116 Veterans’ Administration; Cook v............................ 1115 Viera v. United States....................................... 899 Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc...................................... 1015 Vigorito v. United States................................... 1056 Vilkaitis v. Maryland....................................... 1114 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED evil Page Village. See name of village. Villarreal v. United States................................. 1114 Villone v. United States..................................... 898 Vinal; Essex v.............................................. 1107 Vincent; Benanti v.......................................... 1001 Vincent; Jones v............................................. 877 Vincent; Rice v.............................................. 880 Virginia; Bigelow v......................................... 1017 Virginia; Brown v............................................ 966 Virginia v. Civil Aeronautics Board......................... 1048 Virginia; Clay v............................................ 1078 Virginia; Cramer v........................................... 875 Virginia; Goldstein v........................................ 928 Virginia; Hudspeth v........................................ 1112 Virginia; Johnson v.......................................... 856 Virginia; Kern v............................................ 1106 Virginia; Kryder v.......................................... 1000 Virginia; Miller v.......................................... 1024 Virginia; Nickens v......................................... 1118 Virginia v. Nyberg........................................... 891 Virginia; Price v............................................ 902 Virginia; Scales v.......................................... 1123 Virginia; Winslow v.......................................... 906 Virginia; Woods v........................................... 1123 Virginia State Bar; Goldfarb v...................... 963,991,1103 Virginia State Penitentiary Supt.; Carrington v............. 1111 Virgin Islands; Rodriguez v.................................. 858 Von Clemm v. Banuelos....................................... 1079 Vowteras v. United States................................... 1069 Vulcan Forging Co. v. Dahlberg, Simon, J., W. & G........... 1034 Wagner v. Wagner............................................. 825 Wagoner v. United States.................................... 1052 Wahba v. New York University................................. 874 Wahpeton; Drake-Henne, Inc. v................................ 986 Wainwright; Brown v.......................................... 856 Wainwright; Dolphus v....................................... 1067 Wainwright; Johnson v.............................. 860 Wainwright; Jones v......................................... 1112 Wainwright; Jordan v......................................... 865 Wainwright v. Means......................................... 1116 Wainwright; Simmons vli'I............................... 861 Wainwright; Whitlow v.................................. 1036,1117 Wainwright; Young v.......................................... 855 CVIII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Waits; Swoap v..................................... 960,1022 Waldrop v. Hite......................................... 832 Walker v. Hunt.......................................... 995 Walker; Troopers Lodge No. 41 v........................ 1058 Walker v. United States........................ 825,1037,1057 Wall v. Hardwick................................... 888,1061 Wall; Hardwick v........................................ 888 Wall v. United States.................................. 1025 Wallace v. Missouri..................................... 847 Wallace v. United States.................................. 1031 Wallis v. O’Kier......................................... 901 Walnut Properties; Hicks v.............................. 1018 Walsh; Glatstein v....................................... 839 Walter; Intercounty Construction Corp, v................ 1119 Walters v. Arkansas...................................... 833 Walters; District of Columbia v......................... 1065 Walters; Parker v....................................... 1001 Walt Shultz Equipment Co. v. Moore....................... 930 Ward v. Philadelphia Electric Co........................ 1049 Ward v. Texas............................................ 864 Ward ^WUnited States..................................... 899 Warden. See also name of warden. Warden; Berkley v........................................ 820 Warden; Kurth v.......................................... 820 Warden v. Marrero....................................... 1014 Warden; Mefford v........................................ 847 Warden; Phillips v....................................... 820 Warden ; Quigg v......................................... 848 Warden; Whitfield v...................................... 876 Warholic; E. & E. J. Pfotzer v.......................... 1047 Warholic; Pfotzer v..................................... 1047 Warren v. Aaron......................................... 1024 Warren v. United States................................. 1089 Warth v. Seldin.......................................... 823 Washburn v. United States............................... 1106 Washington; Antoine v................................... 1043 Washington v. Florida.................................... 993 Washington; Grant v...................................... 849 Washington v. McCarthy................................... 966 Washington v. Odom...................................... 1013 Washington; Rogers v.................................... 1053 Washington v. United States........................ 1025,1032 Washington Dept, of Rev.; Standard Pressed Steel Co. v... 560 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED cix Page Wasson v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co................. 844 Wasson; Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co. P................ 844 Wasson Towing Co. v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co..... 844 Wasson Towing Co.; Toledo, Peoria & Western R. Co. v.... 844 Waters v. Estelle....................................... 1056 Watson; Enslow v......................................... 880 Weaver v. Cannon........................................ 1053 Weaver v. Randle........................................ 1028 Weaver v. United States.................................. 850 Webb v. United States.................................... 865 Webster v. Kentucky..................................... 1070 Wedra v. New York....................................... 1025 Wedren; General Security Services v...................... 831 Wedren; Paris v..—....................................... 831 Weems v. United States............................... 860,898 Weidinger Chevrolet v. Universal *C. I. T. Credit Corp.. 1033 Weinberger; Bailey v................................ 953,1061 Weinberger; Dawson v..................................... 854 Weinberger v. Eldridge.................................. 1104 Weinberger v. Glodgett................................... 963 Weinberger v. Jobst...................................... 811 Weinberger; Kearns vtft*................................ 965 Weinberger; Limback v.................................... 875 Weinberger; Place v..................................... 1040 Weinberger; Rastetter v................................. 1098 Weinberger v. Salii...................................... 992 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld................................. 822 Weir v. United States................................... 1038 Weiss v. United States................................... 833 Welch v. United States................................... 857 Wellco Chemical Products, v. Cascade Chemical Coatings.... 841 Wellman Industries v. Labor Board........................ 834 Wells v. Missouri....................................... 1075 Wells v. United States.................................. 1036 Wentz v. Maryland....................................... 1072 Werts v. United States.................................. 1093 West v. New York......................................... 846 West v. United States.................................... 899 Westchester Fire Ins. Co.; Steamship Underwriting Assn. v.. 1070 Westermayer v. Pullman Co................................ 875 Wèstern Addition Community Org.; Emporium Capwell Co. v. 816 Western Addition Community Org.; Labor Board v.......... 816 Western Alfalfa Corp.; Air Pollution Variance Bd. v..... 815 ex TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page West India Carriers v. Twenty Grand Offshore, Inc.......... 836 Weyerhaeuser Line; Gearin v.............. 884,1061 Whalen v. Cie-Ware Industries.............................. 829 Wheeler v. Monroe......................................... 1014 Whisnant v. Davis......................................... 1036 Whisnant v. Luttrell....................................... 868 Whitaker v. United States................................. 1113 White v. Eyman........................................ 867 White v. Massachusetts............................... 1111 White v. Regester.................................... 991,1044 White v. United States.............................. 872,901 Whitehead; Crowder v....................................... 900 Whitfield v. Warden........................................ 876 Whitlock v. Commissioner.............................. 839,1041 Whitlow v. Wainwright................................ 1036,1117 Whitney v. New York Stock Exchange................ 837 Whitted v. North Carolina................................. 1120 Whittington v. United States............................... 898 Wiemer v. United States................................... 1051 Wiener v. Chance........................................... 867 Wiesenfeld; Weinberger v................................... 822 Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School District................ 967 Wiggins; Tucker v......................................... 1048 Wigoda; Cousins v.................................. 477,817,990 Wilbanks v. United States............................... 1051 Wilbur; Mullaney v.................................... 823,1017 Wilcox County Board of Education v. United States......... 1031 Wilderness Society; Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v......... 823 Wiles v. Commissioner...................................... 996 Wiley v. United Stat^...................................... 879 Wilford v. United States................................... 851 Willcox v. Federal Power Comm’n............................ 882 Williams v. Albert........................................ 1018 Williams v. California.................. 863,884,1046,1055,1132 Williams v. Comstock...................................... 1031 Williams v. Court of Appeal of California........ 851 Williams v. Dana Corp............................... 1024,1117 Williams v. Estelle...................................... 1125 Williams v. Gagliardi.................................... 1107 Williams v. Illinois...................................... 1026 Williams v. Johnson...................................... 1001 Williams v. Matthews Co.................................. 1027 Williams; Matthews Co. v.................................. 1021 TABLE OF CASES REPORTED CXI Page Williams; Preiser v...................................... 1058 Williams v. Procunier.................................... 820 Williams v. South Carolina............................... 835 Williams v. United States..... 852,858,955,996,1003,1047,1113 Williams v. U. S. District Court ....................... 1119 Williamson v. U. S. District Court........................ 821 Williamson Marine Transport v. Louisiana Tax Comm’n...... 870 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States................... 962 Willis v. California...................................... 875 Willis; Cassidy v........................................ 1042 Willis v. United States.............................. 993,1113 Wilmington Shipping Co.; Longshoremen v.................. 1022 Wilson; Agur v........................................... 1072 Wilson v. Alabama........................................ 845 Wilson v. Clanon......................................... 1073 Wilson; Cronin v......................................... 867 Wilson v. Jerry Miller, Inc............................... 864 Wilson; Morse v.......................................... 1121 Wilson v. United States.............................. 858,1069 Wilson; United States 1................................... 817 Windsor v. United States.................................. 938 Wingate v. United States.................................. 872 Winkfield v. Ohio......................................... 887 Winkle v. Texas........................................... 843 Winslow v. Virginia....................................... 906 Wisconsin; Allison v..................................... 1071 Wisconsin; Estrada v..................................... 1093 Withrow v. Larkin......................................... 962 Witt v. United States..................................... 855 Witzenfeld; Hall v........................................ 858 Wohlgemuth v. Planned Parenthood Assn.................... 1100 Wolder v. Commissioner.................................... 828 Wolman v. Essex........................................... 820 Wood; Ruderer v.......................................... 1099 Woodahi; Straub v......................................... 845 Woodbury County Bd. of Review; Upper Mo. River Corp. v. 809 Woodruff & Sons v. Laser Alignment, Inc................... 874 Woods; Holsapple v........................................ 901 Woods; Pennsylvania v..................................... 880 Woods v. Virginia........................................ 1123 Woodside Savings & Loan Assn. v. Gallman............ 810 Woodward; McIntosh v..................................... 1100 Woodward & Lothrop; Nichols v........................ 1108 CXII TABLE OF CASES REPORTED Page Woody v. Kansas........................................ 1003 Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board; Brimm v............ 1084 Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board; Harsany v.......... 1125 Wright v. Malloy......................................... 987 Wright v. United States........................... 1000 Wyeth Laboratories v. Reyes.............................. 1096 Wynn v. United States..................................... 898 Wyoming; Jackson v....................................... 1055 Wyoming; Kennedy v....................................... 1045 Wyoming Supreme Court; Blaekrose v..................... 1018 Wyoming Supreme Court; Reeder v.......................... 1018 Wyoming Supreme Court Chief Justice; Reeder v............ 1018 Wyrick; Tyler v........................................... 999 Yakima Tribe v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation. 967 Yates v. Texas............................................ 996 Yates v. United States.................................... 857 Yeager v. United States.................................. 1029 Yedor v. California...................................... 1000 Yellow Cab of Boca Raton v. United States................. 806 Yokozeki v. State Bar of California....................... 900 Yopp v. Michigan......................................... 1054 York International Building v. Chaney.................... 1049 Yorty v. City Council of Los Angeles..................... 1023 Yorty v. Court of Appeal of California................... 1023 Youakim v. Miller......................................... 819 Young; Bibler v......................................... 996 Young v. Cobb............................................ 1098 Young; Herships v......................................... 866 Young; Ohmert v........................................... 863 Young v. Texas Dept, of Corrections...................... 1036 Young v. United States......................... 1002,1069,1132 Young v. Wainwright....................................... 855 Your Host, Inc. v. Commissioner........................... 829 Ysrael v. Guam Federation of Teachers..................... 872 Zampitella v. Immigration and Nat. Service............... 1088 Zane v. United States..................................... 895 Zanfardino v. United States............................... 830 Zaun v. Fann......................................... 854,1060 Zenith Vinyl Fabrics Corp. v. Ford Motor Co............... 967 Zim’s Foodliner, Inc. v. Labor Board...................... 838 Zim’s IGA Foodliner v. Labor Board........................ 838 Ziruolo v. United States.................................. 845 Zlotnick v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency...... 963 TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187 1039,1078 Ablet-t v. Brownell, 240 F. 2d 625 923 Adickes v.^SÜH. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 362, 374 Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 4,138 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 943 Albert Hanson Lumber v. United States, 261 U. S. 581 149 Alberts v. California, 354 U. S. 476 1130 Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70 142-143 Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 98 Almota Fanners Elevator v. United States, 409 U. S. 470 150 Alstate Construction v. Durkin, 345 U. S. 13 196,198 Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667 399 Amell v. United States, 384 U. S. 158 133 American Commuters v. Levitt, 279 F. Supp. 40 100 American Trial Lawyers v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 409 U. S. 467 95 American Trucking Assns. v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 U. B 133 288 Anderson v. Stale,«267 So. 2d 8 270 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 407 Ann Arbor R. Co., In re/*t No. 74-90833 (ED Mich.) 110 Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 207 Page Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 528,538,541 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 179 Arlan’s Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U. S. 218 15 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545 579 Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71 ' 461 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 389, 573-574,586-587, 594 Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F. 2d 277 908 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 1039,1077-1078 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 138,931 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 295 Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 177-178 Augenblick v. United States. 180 Ct. Cl. 131 ' 908 Bailev v. Anderson, 326 U/S. 203 1083 Bailev v. George, 259 U. S. 16“ 16 Bailev v. Patterson, 369 U/S. 31 95,97,403,414 Bailev v. Richardson, 86 U/S. App. D. C. 248 599 Bailv v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594 353 Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 95,212 Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Ed, 307 F. Supp' 517 578 Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co, 359 U. S. 227 323, 331,334-335,340-343 cxni TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 579 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 951-952 Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187 527,531-532 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States, 386 U. S. 372 161 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 37 Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 578 Banks v. California, 395 U. S. 708 1066 Bantam Books v.( Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 1307 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 404 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 926 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121 1039 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 488, 491-492 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548 151 Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 407 Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 588, 594, 985 Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 212 Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81 279 Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F. 2d 175 200 Benes v. United States, 276 F. 2d 99 971 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 1077 Benz v. Sompania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 222223, 226-227, 235, 241 Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 155 Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 “ 255 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U. S. 480 273, 278 Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist., 484 F. 2d 1040 577 Page Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 959,1040,1077 Black Students of North Fort Myers v. Williams, 470 F. 2d 957 577 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 178 Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323 400 Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 889 Board of Regents v. New Left Project, 404 U. S. 541 98 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 573-574,576, 586, 588-589, 599, 985 Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725 9-14 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 389-391,405, 410, 420,422, 576, 588 Bode v. National Democratic Party, 146 U. S. App. D. C.373 484 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 500 Boston & Maine Corp., In re, 378 F. Supp. 68 110 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 458 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 925 Boys’ Markets v. Retail < Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 168 Branzburg v. Hayes, >-*408 U. S. 665 1307 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 . 15 Brazier v. Commissioner of Immigration, 5 F. 2d 162 273-274 Bricklayers v. NLRB, 155 U. S: App. D. C. 47 432 Bridges v. ^California, 314 U. S. 252 1307,1309 Briscoe v. Commonwealth’s Bank, 8 Pet. 118 617 Broderick’s Executor v. Magraw, 8 Wall. 639 617 Bronson v. Consolidated Edison, 350 F. Supp. 443 373 TABLE OF CASES CITED cxv Page Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96 316 Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 251‘ If. S. 396 122 Brotherhood. For labor union, see name of trade. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 63, 527, 538-539 Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U. S. 483 576 Brown v. O’Brien, 152 U. S. App. D. C. 157 »485 Brown v. Unitc-d_8tat.cs, 483 F. 2d 116 946 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 461 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. /S,(294 207 Buck v. Carter, 308 F. Supp. 1246 577-578 Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm’n, 254 U. S. 513 122 Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 271,945-946 Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 LT. S. 156 285 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 910 Burton v. Wilmington Parking, 365 U. S. 715 350- 351,357-360, 366, 369 Byrne v. Pennsylvania. R. Co., 262 F. 2d 906 336,339 Cafeteria Workers v. Mc- Elroy, 367 U. ,S. 886 389, 578-579, 610 California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 39 California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121 388,391 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 949,951 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498 50 Camp v. Camp, 21 Mise. 2d 908 426 Capler v. State, 268 So. 2d 338 270 Page Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F. 2d 1 953 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Conference, 383 U. S. 213 5 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 943 Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U. S. 238 143 Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320 528,538-539 Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669 95 Central R. Co., In re, Bky. No. 401-67 (NJ) 110 Chapman v. Scott, 10 F. 2d 156 273 Charleston Savings v. Aider-son, 324 U. S. 182 23 Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U. S. 584 40 Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 923 Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641 125 Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168 4 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 30, 39 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449 329 Cimorelli v. New York Central R. Co., 148 F. 2d 575 320,336 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. W * 402 284-285 City. See name of city. Ciuzio v.-United States, 419 U. S. 995 1077 CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 134 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 349,354, 369 Clay v. United States, 403 U. S. 698 939 Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F. 2d 940 401 Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506 951 Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 425 Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29 610 CXVI TABLE OF CASES CITED Pag« Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 1083 Cole v. United States, 329 F. 2d 437 470 Coles Case, Moore K. B. 466 277 Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U. k 355 317 Colorado Gas v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581 286 Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic Committee, 412 U. S. 94 371 Commissioner v. “Americans United,” 416 U. S. 752 9-11, 14 Commissioner of Internal Revenue. See Commissioner. Committee for Public Ed. v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 889-890 Commonwealth. See also name of Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 449 Pa. 19 “ 270 Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 1077 Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U. S. 1 146 Concrete- Appliances v. Aluminum Products, 301 U. S. 544 931 Cone Mills Corp. v. Hurdle, 369 F. Supp. 426 26 Connecticut Motor Lines, In re, 336 F. 2d 96 47-48 Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207 573 Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 F. Supp. 156 597 Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073 401,413 Console v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607 299 Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U. S. 542 217 Continental Illinois Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. C0.4H 294 U. S. 648 123,153- 154,158,163,179,184 Cook v. Cook, 342 U. S. 126 425 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 948,980 Page Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 919 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 461,473 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 922,936 Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 ‘ 1307,1309 Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833 100 ■Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 177,910 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. K. 47 " 37 Dahnke-Wallte* Milling v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 29-30,37-39 Daigle, In re, 111 F. Supp. 109 48 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 421 Davies v. Clifford, 393 F. 2d 496 908 Davis v. Richardson, 460 F. 2d 772 953 DeGfegory v. New Hampshire Atty. Gen., 383 U. S. 825 " 1319 DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 577 Del Vecchio v. Pennsylvania R. Co, 233 F. 2d 2 330 Denton v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. Co, 284 U. S. 305 330 Denver & R, G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 387 U. S. 485 298 D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U. S. 174 619 Diffenderfer v. Central Church, 404 U. S. 412 387 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 39 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 950, 952 Dixon v. Alabama Bd. of Ed, 294 F. 2d 150 576 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 1098 Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424 989 TABLE OF CASES CITED cxvn Page Doud v. Hodge, 350 U. S. 485 95 Drago v. Central R. Co., 93 N. J. L. 176 320 Draper v. United States, 358 ,< S. 307 944 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. 6. 145 526, 529- 530, 540-541, 950-953 Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U. S. 127 1078 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 400-401, 405-406, 409, 414-415, 418, 421, 423-424, 489 Dunn v. Tyler School Dist., '* 460 F. 2d 137 577 Dvke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 Ü. S. 216 951 Ebert v. Maryland Censors, 19 Md.jApp. 300 1074 Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U. S. 426 139 Ecker v. Western Pacific R. Corp., 318 U. S. 448 179,183 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 391-392,396 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-lin, 417 U. S. 156 397 Eisenstadt v. Baird ' 405 U. S. 438 520 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On- Drugs, 366 U. S. 276 32-33, 36, 42 Employers’ Liability Cases!4", 207 U. S. 463 333 England v. Louisiana Bd. of Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 4 Enochs v. Williams Packing, 370 U S. 1 9,14 Epperson v* Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 578, 590 Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F. , 2d 1205 978 Erie Lackawanna R. Co., In re, No. B72-2S38 (ND _ Ohio) HO Estate." Seo name of estate. Esteban v, Central Missouri . . College, 415 F. 2d 1077 577 Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 910 Page Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532 1307 Evans v. Abney, 396 U/S. 435 349 Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 352, 354, 371-372 Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U. S. 1 889-890 Ex parte. See name of party. Far East Conference v. "United States, 342 U. S. 570 5 Farrell v. Joel, 437 F. 2d 160 577 Fawcett v. Missouri Pacific R. Co, 242 F. Supp. 675 320, 336 Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261 536,538 Federal Compress v. Mc- Lean, 291 U. S. 17 40 FHA v. The Darlington, 358 U. S. 84 95 FMC v.‘ Sfeatrain Lines, 411 U. S. 726 87 FMC v. Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U. S. 238 298 FTC v. American Tobacco, 264 U. S. 298 177-178 FTC v. Bunte Bros, 312 U. S. 349 197, 201 Fein v. Selectiv^Service, 405 U. S. 365 939 Ficklen v. Shelby County, 145 U. S. 1 ' “ 564 Field^ v. Board of Ed. of Winnebago, 346 F. Supp. 722 577 Fitzgerald Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U. S. 720 208 FlaR v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 95,410-411,418 Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100 9 Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73 95 Food Employees v. Logan Vall^', 391 U. S. 308 230 Ford Motor v. department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459 396 TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147 951-952 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 956-957 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 1311 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 501, 506-507,511,519-520 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 364, 576, 588, 594, 605- 606,608-609, 614-616 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 259,268-272,525 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 985 Garcia v. State, 501 P. 2d 1128 270 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S 273 464,476 Garland, Ex parte, 4 Wall. 333 266,279 Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 731 313 Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485 244 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 474-475 Gas Light. Co. v. Georgia Power, 440 F. 2d 1135 363 General Amer. Tank v. El Dorado Terminal, 308 U. S. 422 5 General Motors v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436 563 Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 145 U. S. App. D. C. 102 483 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 251,812 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 391 Gibson v. Florida Legis. Comm., 372 U. S. 539 1319 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 945, 952 Giglio v. Neelly, 208 F. 2d 337 923 Girard Life Ins. v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 353 Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 578 Page Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 527,537,539 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530 149,180 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 364, 383, 389, 573, 594, 610, 939, 984 Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 143,365,403,411 Goldsbv v. United States, 160 U. S. 70 1311 Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U. S. 471 97-98 Gonzalez v. Automatic Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90 1065,1085 Gooch v. Clark, 433 F. 2d 74 69, 72, 84 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 1082-1083 Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512 94,97 Government Employees v. Windsor, 353 U. S. 364 4 Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F. 2d 1137 374 Grafton v. »United States, 206 U. S. 333 1078 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1 931 Grain Elevator Workers v. NLRB, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 219 225,241 Granite Falls Bank v. Schneider, 402lU>.'S. 1006 95 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385 579 Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201 1305 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 484,494 Great A&P Tea v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 147 Great A&P Tea v. Supermarket Equipment, 340 U. S. 147 932 Great Northern R. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U. S. 444 333 Green, In re, 134 U S. 377 495 Grossman, Ex parte, 267 U. S. 87 266, 279 TABLE OF CASES CITED cxix Page Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 370 Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F. 2d 399 923 Gulf States Utilities v. FPC, 411 U. S. 747 298 Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas, 292 U. S. 16 95 Gunn v. University Commit- tee, 399 U. S. 383 98 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 564 Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F. 2d 201 576 Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45 387, 403, 414 Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 904-905, 912, 914, 916, 928, 934, 976, 1006, 1008, 1012, 1014, 1064, 1129, 1132 Hammond v. Hammond, 45 Wash. 2d 855 426 Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 158 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 403 Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579 388 Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55 1077 Hart v. Kennedy, 314 F. Supp. 823 100 Hatter v. Los Angeles School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 1309 578 Hattiesburg Trades Coun-jjcil v. Broome, 377 U. Stti 126 225-226, 238-239, 243 Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U. S. 251 193 Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 160-161,185 Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 491 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 197 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 141 Page Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483 904- 905, 907, 912, 914, 916, 928, 930, 934, 958, 976, 1006, 1008, 1012, 1064, 1075, 1127, 1129, 1131 Hemes v. McNulty, 432 F. 2d 1182 942 Hensley Equipment v. Esco Corp., 375 F. 2d 432 932 Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 617 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 23 Hernandez v. School Dist. No. One, 315 F. Supp. 289 578 Highway Express v. Pennsylvania Utility Comm'n, 195 Pa. Super. 92 352 Highway Freight v. Public Service Comm’n, 108 Pa. Super. 178 350 Hinds v. Hinds, 1 Iowa 36 426 Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, 407 F. 2d 4 200 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 919 Hoffman v. United States,7^ 341 U. S. 479 461-462 Honevman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14 23 Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525 31-32 Hooe v. United States, 218 U. S. 322 127 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35 248 Houston & Texas R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 205 Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181 458 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57 533-537, 539-540, 542 Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 252 U. S. 475 323,330 Hunter v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 258 F. Supp. 20 320 Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95 127,149,179 cxx TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Idlewild Liquor v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713 94-95,97,100 Ihrke v. Northern States Power, 459 F. 2d 566 349 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 459 Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. United States, 292 U. S. 474 295 lucres S. S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S. 24 222, 235 Indiana Employment Div. v. Burnev, 409 U. S. 540 402,414 In re. See name of party. International. For labor union, see name of trade. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 610 International Steel v. National Surety, 297 U. S. 657 ' 23 International Textbook v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 37 ICC v. Jersey Citv, 322 U. S. 503 294-295 ICC v. J-T Transport, 368 U. S. 81 294, 298 Irish v. Democratic-Farmer- Labor Party, 399 F. 2d 119 484 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 üj. S. 717 1307 Isaacs v. Ünited States, 159 U. S. 487 1311 Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 214 972-973 Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22 266 Jackson v. Barksdale, 17 Ga. App. 461 607 Jaconski v. Avisun Corp., 359 F. 2d 931 213 James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128 519-520 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411 410 John Horne Co., In re, 220 F. 2d 33 47, 56 Johnson v. Geralds, 234 U. S. 422 554 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 425 Page Johnson v. New York Ed. Dept., 409 U. S. 75 427 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 420, 520 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458- 925,981 Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 138,579- 580, 588-589,595,985 Joseph v. United Stated 405 U. S. 1006 939 Joslin Co. v. Providence, 262 U. S. 668 125 Julson v. Julson, 255 Iowa 301 424 Kadlec v. Illinois Bell, 407 F. 2d 624 349 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 406,508,511,518 Kaplan v. California, 413 U. S. 115 914 Karnuth v. Albro, 279 U. S. 231 77 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 462, 464,473, 475 Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 918 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 197 Kauffman v. Secretary of Air Force, 135 U. S. App. D. C. 1 908,910 Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Ed., 293 F. Supp. 485 597 Kellev v. Southern Pacific, 419 U. S. 318 1099 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 95 Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 978 Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153 96,98 Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22 910 King Mfg. Co. v. City Coun- cil of Augusta, 277^1?' S. 100 97 Kingslev Pictures v. Regents', 360 U. S. 684 957 TABLE OF CASES CITED CXXI Page Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U. S. 847 271 Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383 978 Korsrud v. Korsrud,^242 Iowa 178 404,424,426 Kosydar v. National Cash Register, 417 U. S. 62 40 Kotch v. Board of Comm’rs, 330 U. S. 552 420 Kramer v. Union School Dist, 395 18 S. 621 489 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 487-488 Labor Board. See NLRB. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1 1317-1318 Lake Carriers v. MacMul-lan, 406 U. S. 498 4 Lambert v. California, 355 U. S. 225 937 Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 213-214 LaRuffa v. New York, 419 U. S. 959 1039 1 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820 1095 Law Students v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 978 Leake v. Tvner, 112 Ga. 919 - 613 Leary v. United -States, 395 U. S. 6 86 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70 464,473,475-476 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 617-618 Lehigh & Hudson River R. Co., In re, 377 F. Supp. 475 110 Lehigh.Valley R. Co., In re, 382 F. Supp. 854 110 Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 891 Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130 1083 Lewis v. United Stines, 385 U. S. 206 919 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. .517 363 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 1?. S. 614 410 Page Lines v. California Employmerit Dept., 242 F. 2d 201 47-48,56 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 270 Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F. 2d 14 1095 Linstead v. Chd&peake n, 283 U. S. 697 1307 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 353 newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 484,490,495 New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U. S. 392 117, 123,156-157,161,166 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336 804 New York ex rei. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610 426 New York Times v. Sulli- van, 376 U. S. 254 249,251,255 New York Times v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 1307 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 910 Nicholas v. United States, 384 U. S. 678 55 Nielson, In re, 131 U. S. 176 1078 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 352,369,483 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 483 Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co, 294 U. S. 240 162 Norman v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 458 F. 2d 497 402 CXXIV TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Norman v. Spokane-Portland & S. R. Co., 101 F. Supp. 350 326 North American Co. v. SEC,' 327 U. S. 686 154-155 North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248 341 Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 162 Northrup v. Administrator, 148 Conn. 475 381 Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U. S. 534 562 Norwegian Nitrogen Products v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 80 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 889 O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U. S. 1 485-486, 491-494 O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258 909 Office of United Church v. FCC, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 328 291 Ohio Telephone1 v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U. S. 292 288 O’Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277 13 On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 918 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 421,424,495 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 1307 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U$S. 83 510 Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 918-919 O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 403,410,412,414 Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U. S. 125 196,208,210 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 610 Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F. 2d 153 349,364,373 Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 ‘ 556 Page Pan American Airways v. United States, 371 U. S. 296 5 Paris Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 902-904 906-907, 911, 913-916, 926-929, 933, 958, 974, 976, 1005, 1007, 1010, 1015, 1062, 1064, 10731074, 1126, 1129, 1131 Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 35,40 Penn-Central Co., In re, 382 F. Supp. 831 164 Penn-Central Co., In re, 382 F. Supp. 856 110,139 Penn-Central Co., In re, 384 F. Supp. 895 164,173 Penn-Central Co. (Second- ary Debtors},' In re, 382 F. Supp. 821 110 Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S. 486 117,161 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 1309 Pennington v. Birmingham Club, 277 Ala. 336 231 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 404 Pennsylvania v. West Vir- ginia, 262 U. S. 553 143 Pennsylvania. UtilityComm’n v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400 350 People v. Jaworski, 387 Mich. 21 925 People v. White, 390 Mich. 245 1077 Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146 197,208 Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478 554-555 Perrv v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 985 Pervis v. LaMarque School Dist., 466 F. 2d 1054 577 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 526, 528,532 Philadelphia Transit v. Philadelphia, 309 Pa. 84 350 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 149,610 Phillips v. Klassen, 163 U. S. App. D. C. 360 403 TABLE OF CASES CITED cxxv Page Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246 97-98 Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 63 Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 271 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510" 143 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 978 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 39 Plumbers v. Door County, 359 U. S. 354 227-228, 239 Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U. S. 192 232 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U< 497 138 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan, 157 U. S. 429; 158 U. S. 601 618 Pomper v. United States, 196 F. 2d 211 56 Poreskv, Ex parte, 290 U. S. 30 " 97,100 Potts v. Creager, 155 U. S. 597 931 Pottsville Traction v. Public Service Comm’n, 67 Pa. Super. 301 352 Powe v. Miles, 407 F. 2d 73 370 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 466,471 Powell v. Powell, 95 Ga. App. 122 607,613 Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U. S. Ill 143 Public Service Comm’n v. Wykoff Co., 344 U. S. 237 . 146-147 Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451 350,352,356,361,369 Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 411 Ragoni v. United States, 424 F. 2d 261 908 Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 4 Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 264 U. S. 79 122 Page Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 362,367,1094-1095 Railway Express v. Virginia, 282 U. S. 440 42 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423 922,936,1083 Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638 534,538 Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214 489, 495 Reading Co., In re, 378 F. Supp. 481 110 Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347 931 RFC v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 328 U. S. 495 123,153,155,184 Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 506-507,519 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 362,369,1095 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 392,489 Richardson v. Kennedy, 401 U. S. 901 95 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24 398,414 Richmond Screw Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331 177 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 1307 Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159 401 Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869 248 Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 489 564 Roberts v. LaVallec, 389 U. S. 40 62-63 Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F. 2d 387 401,413 Robinson v. Baltimore & O. R. Co, 237 U. S. 84 323,328 Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505 270,1040 Rockefeller v. Catholic Med. Center, 397 U. S. 820 97 Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 1098 Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co, 352 U. S. 500 334 cxxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED Page Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367 462 Romero v. International Terminal, 358 U. S. 354 213 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 388 Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1354 100 Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752 401,403 Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449 924 Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 926, 974, 1004, 1007, 1010, 1014, 1062, 1073, 1130 Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1 460 St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 295,910 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 420, 586 San Diego Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 220. 238, 242 Sanford, Estate of v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 80 Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm’r, 392 U. S. 280 476 Sayre Land Co. v. Pennsylvania Utility Comm’n, 21 D. & C. 2d 469 350 Schackman v. Arnebergh, 387 U. S. 427 100 Schaefer v. Schaefer, 245 Iowa 1343 426 Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65 950-951 Schneekloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 925,981 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163 500 Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S. W. 2d 840 426 Schreiner v. United States, 404 U. S. 67 813 Schroeder v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 397 F. 2d 452 324, 336 Schuman v. United States, 208 F. 2d 801 940 Page Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 618 Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 177,931 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492 333 Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 206,333 SEC v. Chenerv Corp., 332 U. S. 194 286,941 SEC v. Medical Committee, 404 U. S. 403 101,399,402 Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 555 Shafer v. Farmers Grain, 268 U. S. 189 31,37-39 Shaker Corp. v. Shaker Heights Comm’n, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 272 582 Shanlev v. Northeast School Dist, 462 F. 2d 960 577 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 405-406. 409, 418- 419,421-422.424, 427 Sharp v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 269 60-61 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 349,362 She'ton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 424 Shenker v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 374 U. S. 1 330.340-341 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 1307,1313 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 15,424 Sheerer v. Sherrer, 334 IT. S. 343 407,425 Shiftman v. Askew. 359 F. Sunp. 1225 401,409 Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476 546, 551 Sicurella v. United States, _ 348 U. S. 385 941 Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark. 332 U. S. 469 149 Simmons v. United States, 348 U. S. 397 936 Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162 404 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 483,493 TABLE OF CASES CITED cxxvii Page Smith v. McNamara, 395 F. 2d 896 908 Smith v. Norfolk & Western R. Co, 407 F. 2d 501 320,336,339 Smith v. State Democratic Committee, 288 F. Supp. 371 483 Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 527-528,539 Smith v. Whitman Saddle, 148 U. S. 674 931 Sniadach v. Family Finance, 395 U. S. 337 392, 576, 588, 594 605,608,611,614-615 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U. S. 332 397,416 Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 . 577 South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros, 303 U. S. 177 39 Southern Pacific v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498 399 Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 80 Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 4 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 943 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 29, 39 Standard Fashion v. Ma-grane-Houston Co, 258 U. S. 346 201,207 Standard Oil v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215 329-330 Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U. S. 293 202 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 421 Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 409 State. See also name of State. State v. Brown, 262 Ore. 442 1077 State v. Conway, 351 Mo. 126 1076 State v. DeSantis, 65 N. J. 462 1085 Page State v. Griffey, 35 Ohio St. 2d 101 926 State v. Johnson, 31 Ohio St. 2d 106 270 State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199 1076 State v. Square, 263 La. 291 270 State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis. 2d 354 1014 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co, 323 U. S. 192 367 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 143,427 Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605 180 Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U. S. 845 270 Stratton v.JSS. Louis S. W. R. Co, 282 U. S. 10 95 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 536 Street, v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 1083 Stricklin v. Regents of Univ, of Wis, 297 F. Supp. 416 577-578 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 1130 Stuckev v. Weinberger, 488 F. 2d 904 953 Sullivan v. Houston School Dist, 475 F. 2d 1071 577 Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587 957 Sutherland v. Kroger Co, 144 W. Va. 673 248 Svalina v. Saravana, 341 Ill. 236 486 Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U._ S. 191 619 Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441 54 Sweezy v. New Hampshirefw 354'U. S. 234 488 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 29, 39, 205 Swift . Respondent had the immediate responsibility for supervision and control of the work, though this task was carried out by others who, like petitioner, were servants of Pacific Motor Trucking Co. Id. § 220 (2)(a).3 There are basically two reasons for the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District Court’s holding in peti- 3 The value of examining multiple factors such as these is that it permits the analyst to avoid reliance on abstract inquiries as to kinds and degrees of control. Some factors—such as who is responsible for supervision, whose work is being performed, and who supplies the tools and place of work—are of obvious relevance. Other factors, though perhaps of less weight, are also helpful. For example, the skill of the worker and the manner in which he is paid are relevant to the ease with which control over him may be shifted from one master to another. And the length of time that the nominal servant of one master has been aiding in the business of another is likewise indicative of a shift in control. Section 220 (2) of the Restatement provides a number of factors which it states should be considered “among others.” Another factor which might be considered in this case is that Pacific Motor Trucking Co. is a wholly owned subsidiary of respondent. The Court of Appeals noted that no case has been made for piercing the corporate veil and thus disregarding the fact that the railroad and the trucking company are separate entities. Indeed, petitioner does not urge that we do so. Brief for Petitioner 6 n. 3. If the corporate veil were to be pierced that would presumably end the inquiry, an inappropriate result on this record. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to take into account as one of many factors the relationship between the trucking company and the respondent. KELLEY v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. 339 318 Douglas, J., dissenting tioner’s favor. First, the District Court found that petitioner was an employee of the trucking company. But this does not mean that petitioner was not also an employee of the railroad for the purposes of the FELA. In Byrne v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 262 F. 2d, at 910, the victim was an employee of Westinghouse who was working on a railroad locomotive at the time of his death. The Court of Appeals noted in that case that “[t]here is, of course, no question but that [the victim] was an employee of Westinghouse. The issue is whether sufficient evidence was adduced to enable the jury to conclude that [the victim] was also an employee of the Railroad.” See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 226 and 227. If the mere fact that an individual is on the payroll of someone other than the railroad sufficed to make that individual not an employee of the railroad for FELA purposes, then this Court wrnuld not have found it necessary to reverse in the Baker case. Such a simple test could be devised, but whether such a change in the law is to be made should be up to Congress to decide. The second reason the Court of Appeals used for reversing the District Court was that the District Court had rejected a finding that petitioner was an employee of the railroad. The trial judge was relying on the “agency” language of Smith v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., supra, and he therefore apparently had his labels confused. He was using the concept of employment in a narrow and restricted way, yet was expanding it to accommodate decisions such as Baker by including both employment and agency relationships within the scope of the FELA. If the District Judge did not find an employment relationship in this narrow sense, that fact is unimportant, for he did find a relationship sufficient to satisfy the correct test. While he used language of agency he gave that language the substantive content 340 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. of Baker and of the source relied upon by Baker— Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220. He made findings of fact easily sufficient to support the existence of an employment relationship under the correct substantive test, and he in fact found that the requisite relationship existed. The fact that he used the word “agency” rather than the word “employment” to describe this relationship is thus of no more than technical, abstract concern. This is not the sort of concern that should motivate us in the FELA context. The majority here has taken a different tack from that of the Court of Appeals. Citing numerous cases from the era before the 1939 amendments to the Act, the majority argues that the railroad here exercised insufficient control over the petitioner to establish the requisite employment relationship. Under the approach taken in Baker and Ward, however, the existence of a masterservant relationship is to be determined from an examination of many factors. This is quite different from the majority’s concentration on technical distinctions regarding kinds and degrees of control and cooperation.4 As I have indicated, I think that a judgment in favor of the petitioner is quite justified on the basis of facts already found by the District Court. I have no strong objection to the decision that the case be remanded for new findings in light of the correctly stated legal standard, but I dissent from the rigid and old-fashioned standard of liability which the majority indicates should be made applicable. In a strictly doctrinal sense this case may not have a great impact on the coverage of the FELA, but I fear 4 The majority relies on two modern cases, Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U. S. 227 (1959), and Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., .374 U. S. 1 (1963). But there is nothing in these cases to indicate that technical distinctions between control and cooperation are the only subjects of investigation in considering whether a master-servant relationship exists under the FELA. KELLEY v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. 341 318 Blackmun, J., dissenting that the precedent set today bodes ill for the future. It distorts the accepted meaning of the Act and reflects a judicial hostility to the FELA of the kind that existed prior to the 1939 amendments. I would reverse the judgment below. Me. Justice Blackmun, dissenting. The Court in its decided cases has traveled far in order to accord Federal Employers’ Liability Act coverage to a variety of employment situations. See, e. g., Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 374 U. S. 1, 5 (1963), and North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 260 (1914). Its many decisions are now a well-chalked slate that should not be significantly erased without good reasons. Neither should the Court change a mature and highly developed legal standard, long accepted by Congress, wuthout explaining those reasons or even saying what the effect will be. For me, the Court’s per curiam opinion in Baker v. Texas <& Pacific R. Co., 359 U. S. 227 (1959), controls this case. There the injured workman had been hired by a corporation engaged in work along the railroad’s main-line right-of-way. The work consisted of pumping sand and cement into the roadbed in order to strengthen and stabilize it. The workman was struck by a train while engaged at this job. The petitioners contended that he was killed while he was “employed” by the railroad, within the meaning of the Act. Evidence on the question was introduced, but the trial judge declined to submit the issue to the jury, holding as a matter of law that the workman was not in such a relationship to the railroad at the time of his death as to entitle him to the Act’s protection. The state courts refused to disturb the judgment for the railroad. This Court, however, held that the Act does not use the terms “employee” and “employed” in any special 342 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Blackmun, J., dissenting sense, and that the familiar general legal problems as to whose employee or servant a worker is at a given time present themselves as matters of federal law under the Act. Each case, the Court said, must be decided on its peculiar facts and “ ‘ordinarily no one feature of the relationship is determinative.’ ” The Court concluded that it was “perfectly plain” that the question “contains factual elements such as to make it one for the jury under appropriate instructions as to the various relevant factors under law.” Id., at 228. It pointed out that the petitioners introduced evidence tending to prove that the work “was part of the maintenance task of the railroad”; that the road “furnished the material to be pumped into the roadbed”; and that a supervisor, admittedly in the employ of the railroad, in the daily course of the work exercised directive control over the details of the job. Ibid. The railroad introduced evidence tending to controvert this. The Court then held that an issue for determination by the jury was presented. So it is here. Kelley was injured at the railroad’s loading-and-unloading ramp in San Francisco. He and others were unchaining new automobiles for unloading when he fell from the third level of the railroad car. He was hired, paid by, and could be discharged by the railroad’s wholly owned subsidiary. All the officers and directors of that subsidiary were officers or directors of the railroad. The subsidiary was the only company then having a contract with the railroad to unload cars at that ramp. Kelley had been employed at this particular job and at this site for eight years and was paid on an hourly basis. The unloading was the railroad’s responsibility pursuant to its contractual obligation to its shipper. The railroad supplied the necessary working area. The work performed by Kelley was unskilled. Railroad employees had the responsibility daily to check the safety of the cars and to make necessary repairs. There was evidence KELLEY v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. 343 318 Blackmun, J., dissenting that the railroad exercised a degree of control over the unloading operation and that PMT employees performing this work frequently felt they had to heed the railroad supervisor’s command.* All this, it seems to me, is enough to create an issue for the trier of fact, just as the Baker case illustrates and as it teaches. The trier could find that Kelley was doing work of a kind and in a way and under such supervision of the Southern Pacific as made him an employee of that railroad for purposes of the FELA. I feel the Court, ante, at 325 n. 6, gives undue emphasis to the District Court’s treatment of findings of fact proposed by the petitioner. Every actively practicing trial attorney knows that some judges readily adopt findings presented by counsel; that other judges almost always reject proposed findings and prefer to draft their own or have their clerks prepare them; and that still others adopt a middle course. In this case the District Court produced a judgment for the injured workman. I doubt whether there can be much significance in the adjustment-of-proposed-findings route by which that judgment was reached. While the Court disclaims any modification of the standards for allowing questions of fact in FELA cases to go to the jury, its decision here suggests otherwise. The Court implies that supervision must be “day-to-day” in order to constitute “supervision” for purposes of creating “employee” status under the FELA. Ante, at 331. Does this mean that orders must be issued with a certain frequency (e. g., every day, or most days) or merely in a certain manner ft. g., the “daily” normal “course of the work,” Baker, 359 E. S., at 228-229)? The *There was testimony by PMT employees that in practice they took instructions and directions from Southern Pacific supervisors, and that failing to follow them could jeopardize their jobs. E. g., App. 57. 344 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Blackmun, J., dissenting 419 U. S. Court does not say. I suspect that trial judges will be inclined to resolve most doubts against plaintiffs if their findings are to be so vulnerable to challenge. I also fear that the Court’s holding may be one that opens the way for the railroads of this country to avoid FELA liability. That way apparently is to contract out large portions of maintenance and loading and unloading responsibilities that normally are part of the railroad’s operation. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and I therefore dissent. JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 345 Syllabus JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 73-5845. Argued October 15, 1974—Decided December 23, 1974 Petitioner brought suit against respondent, a privately owned and operated utility corporation which holds a certificate of public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania Utility Commission, seeking damages and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for termination of her electric service allegedly before she had been afforded notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any amounts found due. Petitioner claimed that under state law she was entitled to reasonably continuous electric service and that respondent’s termination for alleged nonpayment, permitted by a provision of its general tariff filed with the Commission, was state action depriving petitioner of her property without due process of law and giving rise to a cause of action under § 1983. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. Held: Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with the challenged termination to make respondent’s conduct attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, petitioner having shown no more than that respondent was a heavily regulated private utility with a partial monopoly and that it elected to terminate service in a manner that the Commission found permissible under state law. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163. Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, distinguished. Pp. 349-359. 483 F. 2d 754, affirmed. Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., post, p. 359, Brennan, J., post, p. 364, and Marshall, J., post, p. 365, filed dissenting opinions. Jack Greenberg argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Alan Linder and Jonathan M. Stein. 346 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. Thomas M. Debevoise argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.* Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Metropolitan Edison Co. is a privately owned and operated Pennsylvania corporation which holds a certificate of public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission empowering it to deliver electricity to a service area which includes the city of York, Pa. As a condition of holding its certificate, it is subject to extensive regulation by the Commission. Under a provision of its general tariff filed with the Commission, it has the right to discontinue service to any customer on reasonable notice of nonpayment of bills.1 *Briefs of amic» curiae urging reversal were filed by Franklin A. Martens for the National Consumer Law Center, Ine., et al., and by Richard A. Weisz, Stefan M. Rosenzweig, Michael B. Weisz, and Anthony G. Amsterdam for the Legal Aid Foundation of Long Beach et al. Gilbert Stein filed a brief for the city of Philadelphia as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Peter H. Schiff and Richard A. Solomon filed a brief for the Public Service Commission of New York as amicus curiae. 1 Metropolitan Edison Company Electrical Tariff, Electric Pa. P. U. C. No. 41, Rule 15. This portion of Metropolitan’s general tariff, filed with the Utility Commission under the notice-filing requirement of Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1142 (1959) (since the general tariff involved a rate increase), provides in pertinent part: “(15)—Cause for discontinuance of service. “Company reserves the right to discontinue its service on reasonable notice and to remove its equipment in case of nonpayment of bill . . . Its filed tariff also gives it the right to terminate service for fraud or for tampering with a meter but Metropolitan did not seek to assert these grounds below. JACKSON V. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 347 345 Opinion of the Court Petitioner Catherine Jackson is a resident of York, who has received electricity in the past from respondent. Until September 1970, petitioner received electric service to her home in York under an account with respondent in her own name. When her account was terminated because of asserted delinquency in payments due for service, a new account with respondent was opened in the name of one James Dodson, another occupant of the residence, and service to the residence was resumed. There is a dispute as to whether payments due under the Dodson account for services provided during this period were ever made. In August 1971, Dodson left the residence. Service continued thereafter but concededly no payments were made. Petitioner states that no bills were received during this period. On October 6, 1971, employees of Metropolitan came to the residence and inquired as to Dodson’s present address. Petitioner stated that it was unknown to her. On the following day, another employee visited the residence and informed petitioner that the meter had been tampered with so as not to register amounts used. She disclaimed knowledge of this and requested that the service account for her home be shifted from Dodson’s name to that of one Robert Jackson, later identified as her 12-year-old son. Four days later on October 11, 1971, without further notice to petitioner, Metropolitan employees disconnected her service. Petitioner then filed suit against Metropolitan in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking damages for the termination and an injunction requiring Metropolitan to continue providing power to her residence until she had been afforded notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any amounts found due. She urged that under state law she had an 348 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. entitlement to reasonably continuous electrical service to her home 2 and that Metropolitan’s termination of her service for alleged nonpayment, action allowed by a provision of its general tariff filed with thg’Commission, constituted “state action” depriving her of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.3 2 The basis for this claimed entitlement is Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1171 (1959), providing in part: “Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities .... Such sendee also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or delay. . . Mrs. Jackson finds in this provision a state-law entitlement to continuing utility service to her residence. She reasons that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment she cannot be deprived of this entitlement to utility service without adequate notice and a hearing before an impartial body: until these are completed, her service must continue. Because of our conclusion on the threshold question of state action, we do not reach questions relating to the existence of a property interest or of what procedural guarantees the Fourteenth Amendment would require if a property interest were found to exist. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, post, at 364, concludes that there is no justiciable controversy between petitioner and respondent because whatever entitlement to service petitioner had was previously terminated by respondent in accordance with its tariff. We do not believe this to be any less a determination of the merits of the action than is our conclusion that whatever deprivation she may have suffered was not caused by the State. Issues of whether a claimed entitlement is “property” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), and whether if so its deprivation was consistent with due process, see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974), are themselves constitutional questions which wc find no occasion to reach in this case. 3 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without JACKSON V. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 349 345 Opinion of the Court The District Court granted Metropolitan’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the ground that the termination did not constitute state action and hence was not subject to judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, also finding an absence of state action.5 We granted certiorari to review this judgment.6 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “ [N] or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” In 1883, this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in that Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, “however discriminatory or wrongful,” against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948). We have reiterated that distinction on more than one occasion since then. See, e. g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U. S. 435, 445 (1970); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 LT. S. 163, 171-179 (1972). While the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is “private,” on due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 4 The decision is reported at 348 F. Supp. 954 (1972). 5 The decision is reported at 483 F. 2d 754 (1973). 6 415 U. S. 912 (1974). Compare Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 407 F. 2d 624 (CA7), cert, denied, 396 U. S. 846 (1969); Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 466 F. 2d 638 (CA7 1972), cert, denied, 409 U. S. 1114 (1973), with Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F. 2d 153 (CA6 1973), modified in Turner v. Impola Motors, 503 F. 2d 607 (CA6 1974). Cf. Ihrkc v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F. 2d 566 (CA8), vacated as moot, 409 U. S. 815 (1972). 350 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion of the Court the one hand, or “state action,” on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 723 (1961); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 172. Here the action complained of was taken by a utility company which is privately owned and operated, but which in many particulars of its business is subject to extensive state regulation. The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 407 U. S., at 176— 177. Nor does the fact that the regulation is extensive and detailed, as in the case of most public utilities, do so. Public Utilities Comm’n n. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 462 (1952). It may well be that 7 Enterprises subject to the same regulatory system as Metropolitan are enumerated in the definition of “public utility” contained in Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1102 (17) (1959 and Supp." 1974-1975). Included in this definition are all companies engaged in providing gas, power, or water; all common carriers, pipeline companies, telephone and telegraph companies, sewage collection and disposal companies; and corporations affiliated with any company engaging in such activities. Among some of the enterprises held subject to this regulatory scheme are freight forwarding and storage companies (Highway Freight Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 108 Pa. Super. 178, 164 A. 835 (1933)), real estate developers who, incident to their business, provide water services (Sayre Land Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n, 21 D. & C. 2d 469 (1959)), and individually owned taxicabs. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400, 52 A. 2d 317 (1947). In Philadelphia Rural Transit Co. v. Philadelphia, 309 Pa. 84, 93, 159 A. 861, 864 (1932), the court estimated that there were 26 distinct types of enterprises subject to this regulatory system, and a fair reading of Pennsylvania law indicates a substantial expansion of included enterprises since that case. The incidents of regulation do not appear materially different between enterprises. If the mere existence of this regulatory scheme made Metropolitan’s action that of the State, then presumably the actions of a lone Philadelphia cab driver could also be fairly treated as those of the State of Pennsylvania. JACKSON V. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 351 345 Opinion of the Court acts of a heavily regulated utility with at least something of a governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to be “state” acts than will the acts of an entity lacking these characteristics. But the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. Moose Lodge No. 107, supra, at 176. The true nature of the State’s involvement may not be immediately obvious, and detailed inquiry may be required in order to determine whether the test is met. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra. Petitioner advances a series of contentions which, in her view, lead to the conclusion that this case should fall on the Burton side of the line drawn in the Civil Rights Cases, supra, rather than on the Moose Lodge side of that line. We find none of them persuasive. Petitioner first argues that “state action” is present because of the monopoly status allegedly conferred upon Metropolitan by the State of Pennsylvania. As a factual matter, it may well be doubted that the State ever granted or guaranteed Metropolitan a monopoly.8 But assuming that it had, this fact is not determinative in consider- 8 It is provided in Pa. Stat. .'Ann., Tit. 66, §1121 (Supp. 1974— 1975), that issuance of a certificate of public convenience is a prerequisite for engaging in the utility business in Pennsylvania. The requirements for obtaining such a certificate are described in Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, §§ 1122, 1123 (1959 and Supp. 1974—1975). There is nothing in either Metropolitan’s certificate or in the statutes under which it was issued indicating that the State has granted or guaranteed to Metropolitan monopoly status. In fact Metropolitan does face competition within portions of its service area from another private utility company and from municipal utility companies. Metropolitan was organized in 1874, 39 years before Pennsylvania’s adoption of its first utility regulatory scheme in 1913. There is no indication that it faced any greater competition in 1912 than today. As petitioner admits, such public utility companies are natural mo- 352 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion of the Court ing whether Metropolitan’s termination of service to petitioner was “state action” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Pollak, supra, where the Court dealt with the activities of the District of Columbia Transit Co., a congressionally established monopoly, we expressly disclaimed reliance on the monopoly status of the transit authority. 343 U. at 462. Similarly, although certain monopoly aspects were presented in Moose Lodge No. 107, supra, we found that the Lodge’s action was not subject to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of those cases, there was insufficient relationship between the challenged actions of the entities involved and their monopoly status. There is no indication of any greater connection here. Petitioner next urges that state action is present because respondent provides an essential public service required to be supplied on a reasonably continuous basis by Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1171 (1959), and hence performs a “public function.” We have, of course, found state action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. See, e. g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932) (election); Terry v. A dams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953) (election); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946) (company towm); Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 (1966) (municipal park). If nopolies created by the economic forces of high threshold capital requirements and virtually unlimited economy of scale. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, 11 Col. L. Rev. 514 (1911); H. Trachsel, Public Utility Regulation 7-8, 52 (1947). Regulation was superimposed on such natural monopolies as a substitute for competition and not to eliminate it: ‘The primary object of the Public Utility Law is not to establish monopolies or to guarantee the security of investments in public service corporations, but to serve the interests of the public.” Highway Express Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm’n, 195 Pa. Super. 92, 100, 169 A. 2d 798, 802 (1961); cf. Pottsville Union Traction Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 67 Pa. Super. 301, 304 (1917). JACKSON V. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 353 345 Opinion of the Court we were dealing with the exercise by Metropolitan of some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain, our case wrould be quite a different one. But while the Pennsylvania statute imposes an obligation to furnish service on regulated utilities, it imposes no such obligation on the State. The Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility services is either a state function or a municipal duty. Girard Life Insurance Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 393 (1879); Baily v. Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594, 39 A. 494 (1898). Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the supplying of utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State, petitioner invites the expansion of the doctrine of this limited line of cases into a broad principle that all businesses “affected with the public interest” are state actors in all their actions. We decline the invitation for reasons stated long ago in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934), in the course of rejecting a substantive due process attack on state legislation: “It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest . . . . The phrase ‘affected with a public interest’ can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good. In several of the decisions of this court wherein the expressions ‘affected with a public interest,’ and ‘clothed with a public use,’ have been brought forward as the criteria ... it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of definition and form an unsatisfactory test . . . .” Id., at 536. See, e. g., Tyson & BrotheA v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 451 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). 354 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. Doctors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan, and Nebbia’s upstate New York grocery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated businesses, providing arguably essential goods and services, “affected with a public interest.” We do not believe that such a status converts their every action, absent more, into that of the State.9 We also reject the notion that Metropolitan’s termination is state action because the State “has specifically authorized and approved” the termination practice. In the instant case, Metropolitan filed with the Public Utility Commission a general tariff—a provision of which states Metropolitan’s right to terminate service for nonpayment.10 This provision has appeared in Metropolitan’s previously filed tariffs for many years and has never been the subject of a hearing or other scrutiny by the Commission.11 Although the Commission did hold 8 The argument has been impliedly rejected by this Court on a number of occasions. See, e. g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 8 (1883). It is difficult to imagine a regulated activity more essential or more “clothed with the public interest” than the maintenance of schools, yet we stated in Evans v. Newton, 382 IT. S. 296, 300 (1966): “The range of governmental activities is broad and varied, and the fact that government has engaged in a particular activity does not necessarily mean that an individual entrepreneur or manager of the same kind of undertaking suffers the same constitutional inhibitions. While a State may not segregate public schools so as to exclude one or more religious groups, those sects may maintain their own parochial educational systems.” 10 See n. 1, supra. The same provision appeared in all of Metropolitan’s prior general tariffs. The sole reason for substituting the new general tariff, which contains all the terms and conditions of Metropolitan’s service, was to procure a rate increase. This was the sole change between Metropolitan’s Electrical Tariff No. 41 and its predecessor. 11 Petitioner does not contest the fact that Metropolitan had this right at common law before the advent of regulation. Brief for Petitioner 31. JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 355 345 Opinion of the Court hearings on portions of Metropolitan’s general tariff relating to a general rate increase, it never even considered the reinsertion of this provision in the newly filed general tariff.12 The provision became effective 60 days after filing when not disapproved by the Commission.13 As a threshold matter, it is less than clear under state law that Metropolitan was even required to file this provision as part of its tariff or that the Commission would have had the power to disapprove it.14 The District Court observed that the sole connection of the Commission with this regulation was Metropolitan’s simple notice filing with the Commission and the lack of any Commission action to prohibit it.15 12 Petitioner concedes that the hearing was solely devoted to the question of the proposed rate increase. Id., at 30. 13 See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1148 (1959); Pa. P. U. C. Tariff Regulations, § II, “Public Notice of Tariff Changes.” These provisions specify that utility companies must give 60 days’ notice to the public before changing their rules filed in their general tariff. Since Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1171 (1959), provides that. “[s]ub-ject to . . . the regulations or orders of the commission, every public utility may have reasonable rules and regulations governing the conditions under which it shall be required to render service,” the Commission arguably had the power to disapprove utility rules. There is no evidence that it has ever even considered the provision in question. When the 60-day notice period passed, the provisions became effective. 14 Pennsylvania P. U. C. Tariff Regulations, § VIII, “Discount for Prompt Payment, and Penalties for Delayed Payment of Bills,” is the only authority cited for a state-imposed requirement that Metropolitan file its termination provision as part of its general tariff. This section requires the filing of “penalties” imposed upon customers for failures to pay bills promptly. Respondent argues that this applies only to monetary penalties. There is no Pennsylvania case law on the question. 15 “The only apparent state involvement with the activity complained of here is in Tariff Reg. VIII of the Pennsylvania P. U. C.... [T]he purpose of Tariff Reg. VIII is to insure that public utilities inform their patrons of any possible penalty for failing to pay their JACKSON V. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 357 345 Opinion of the Court practice “in fact, through the creation of better will among passengers, . . . tends to improve the conditions under which the public ride.” Ibid. Here, on the other hand, there was no such imprimatur placed on the practice of Metropolitan about which petitioner complains. The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that a utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval for practices a business regulated in less detail would be free to institute without any approval from a regulatory body. Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into “state action.” At most, the Commission’s failure, to overturn this practice amounted to no more than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was authorized to employ such a practice if it so desired. Respondent’s exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State,17 does not make its action in doing so “state action” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also find absent in the instant case the symbiotic relationship presented in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). There where a private lessee, who practiced racial discrimination, leased space for a restaurant from a state parking authority in a publicly owned building, the Court held that the State had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the restaurant that it was a joint participant in 17 As in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 173 (1972), there is no suggestion in this record that the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission intended either overtly or covertly to encourage the practice. See n. 15, supra. 358 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion of the Court the enterprise. Id., at 725. We cautioned, however, that while “a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment’s embrace,” differences in circumstances beget differences in law, limiting the actual holding to lessees of public property. Id., at 726. Metropolitan is a privately owned corporation, and it does not lease its facilities from the State of Pennsylvania. It alone is responsible for the provision of power to its customers. In common with all corporations of the State it pays taxes to the State, and it is subject to a form of extensive regulation by the State in a way that most other business enterprises are not. But this was likewise true of the appellant club in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, where we said: “However detailed this type of regulation may be in some particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage racial discrimination. Nor can it be said to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in the club’s enterprise.” 407 U. S., at 176-177. All of petitioner’s arguments taken together show no more than that Metropolitan was a heavily regulated, privately owned utility, enjoying at least a partial monopoly in the providing of electrical service within its territory, and that it elected to terminate service to petitioner in a manner which the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission found permissible under state law. Under our decision this is not sufficient to connect the State of Pennsylvania with respondent’s action so as to make the latter’s conduct attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that the State of Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with respondent’s action in terminating petitioner’s service so as to make respondent’s JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 359 345 Douglas, J., dissenting conduct in so doing attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore have no occasion to decide whether petitioner’s claim to continued service was “property” for purposes of that Amendment, or whether “due process of law” would require a State taking similar action to accord petitioner the procedural rights for which she contends. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is therefore Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. I reach the opposite conclusion from that reached by the majority on the state-action issue. The injury alleged took place when respondent discontinued its service to this householder without notice or opportunity to remedy or contest her alleged default, even though its tariff provided that respondent might “discontinue its service on reasonable notice.” 1 May a State allow a utility—which in this case has no competitor—to exploit its monopoly in violation of its own tariff? May a utility have complete immunity under federal law when the State allows its regulatory agency to become the prisoner of the utility or, by a listless attitude of no concern, to permit the utility to use its monopoly power in a lawless way? In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961), we said: “Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the 1 Rule 15 of the tariff provides in part: “Company reserves the right to discontinue its service on reasonable notice and to remove its equipment in case of nonpayment of bill or violation of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s or Company’s Rules and Regulations; or, without notice, for abuse, fraud, or tampering with the connections, meters or other equipment of Company. Failure by Company to exercise this right shall not be deemed a waiver thereof.” 360 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.” Id., at 722. A particularized inquiry into the circumstances of each case is necessary in order to determine whether a given factual situation falls within “the variety of individual-state relationships which the [Fourteenth] Amendment was designed to embrace.” Ibid. As our subsequent discussion in Burton made clear, the dispositive question in any state-action case is not whether any single fact or relationship presents a sufficient degree of state involvement, but rather whether the aggregate of all relevant factors compels a finding of state responsibility.2 Id., at 722-726. See generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972). It is not enough to examine seriatim each of the factors upon which a claimant relies and to dismiss each individually as being insufficient to support a finding of state action. It is the aggregate that is controlling. It is said that the mere fact of respondent’s monopoly status, assuming arguendo that that status is state conferred or state protected,3 “is not determinative in con- 2 The court below in Burton had relied heavily on a number of facts indicating minimal state involvement, but we regarded that court’s analysis as unduly restricted in its scope: “While these factual considerations are indeed validly accountable aspects of the enterprise upon which the State has embarked, we cannot say that they lead inescapably to the conclusion that state action is not present. Their persuasiveness is diminished when evaluated in the context of other factors which must be acknowledged.” 365 U. S., at 723. After discussing those additional factors in greater detail, we concluded: “Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of the Authority, the benefits mutually conferred, together with the obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building devoted to a public parking service, indicates that degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.” Id., at 724. 3 It seems irrelevant that Metropolitan was organized prior to the inauguration of utility regulation in Pennsylvania, and that a utility JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 361 345 Douglas, J., dissenting sidering whether Metropolitan’s termination of service to petitioner was ‘state action’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.’-’ Ante, at 351-352. Even so, a state-protected monopoly status is highly relevant in assessing the aggregate weight of a private entity’s ties to the State.4 It is said that the fact that respondent’s services are “affected with a public interest” is not determinative. I agree that doctors, lawyers, and grocers are not transformed into state actors simply because they provide arguably essential goods and services and are regulated by the State. In the present case, however, respondent is not just one person among many; it is the only public utility furnishing electric power to the* city. When power is denied a householder, the home, under modern conditions, is likely to become unlivable. Respondent’s procedures for termination of service may never have been subjected to the same degree of state scrutiny and approval, whether explicit or implicit, that was present in Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 J,S. 451^1952). Yet in the present case the State is heavily involved in respondent’s termination procedures, getting into the approved tariff a requirement of “reasonable notice.” Pennsylvania has undertaken to regulate numerous aspects of respondent’s operations in some d« of this sort is, for all practical purposes, a natural monopoly. Whatever its origins, the existing situation presents a monopoly enterprise subject to detailed state regulation; the nature and extent of that regulation take on particular significance in light of the lack of any alternative source of service available to Metropolitan’s customers. 4 Our disclaimer of reliance upon this factor in Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 462 (1952), should not be read as holding that monopoly status is wholly irrelevant; the “disclaimer” on its face simply states’that monopoly status was not used as an ingredient of the finding of federal governmental involvement in that case. 362 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. tail,5 and a^hands-off” attitude of permissiveness or neutrality toward the operations in this case is at war with the state agency’s functions of supervision over respondent’s conduct in the area of servicing householders, particularly where (as here) the State would presumably lend its weight and authority to facilitate the enforcement of respondent’s published procedures. Cf. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967); Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 (1956): Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948). In the aggregate, these factors depict a monopolist providing essential public services as a licensee of the State and within a framework of extensive state supervision and control. The particular regulations at issue, promulgated by the monopolist, were authorized by state law and were made enforceable by the weight and authority of the State. Moreover, the State retains the power of oversight to review and amend the regulations if the public interest so requires. Respondent’s actions are sufficiently intertwined with those of the State, and its termination-of-service provisions are sufficiently buttressed by state law to warrant a holding that respondent’s actions in terminating this householder’s service were “state action” for the purpose of giving federal jurisdiction over respondent under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Though the Court pays lip service to the need for assessing the totality of the State’s involvement in this enterprise, ante, at 358, its underlying analysis is 5 The Public Utility Commission is given extensive control over utility rates, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1141 et seq. (1959 and Supp. 1974—1975), and over the character and quality of utility services and facilities, §§ 1171, 1182-1183; it is given broad power to receive and investigate complaints, §§ 1391, 1398, and to regulate and supervise the activities, rules, and contractual undertakings of utilities, §§ 1171, 1341-1343, 1360. JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 363 345 Douglas, J., dissenting fundamentally sequential rather than cumulative. In that perspective, what the Court does today is to make a significant departure from our previous treatment of stateaction issues. Mr. Justice Brandeis in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517 (1933), in speaking of the competition among the States to ease the opportunities and methods of incorporation, said: “The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.” Id., at 559 (dissenting opinion). One has only to peruse the 84-part Utility Corporations Report by the Federal Trade Commission (under the direction of its able counsel the late Robert E. Healy) to realize that state regulation of utilities has largely made state commissions prisoners of the utilities. See especially S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 73-A (1936); and see id., pt. 72-A, p. 880. In this connection it should be noted that successful attempts by public utilities to exclude themselves from the antitrust laws have been based on the assertion that their monopoly activity constitutes “state action.” See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 438 F. 2d 248, 250-252 (CA4 1971); Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F. 2d 1135, 1138-1140 (CA5 1971). By like token the tariff prescribing termination-of-service procedures was possible only because of “state action.” And it would be compatible only with administrative abdication of authority to equate “administrative silence with abandonment of administrative duty.” Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., supra, at 252. Section 1983 was designed to give citizens a federal forume for civil rights complaints wherever, by direct or 6 There is no requirement for an exhaustion of state remedies before suing under § 1983 (see Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971)), though suggestions for statutory changes in that regard 364 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Brennan, J., dissenting 419 U. S. indirect actions, a State, acting “in cahoots” with a private group or through neglect or listless oversight, allows a private group to perpetrate an injury. The theory is that in those cozy situations, local politics and the pressure of economic overlords on subservient state agencies make recovery in state courts unlikely. I realize we are in an area where we witness a great retreat from the exercise of federal jurisdiction which the Congress has conferred on federal courts. The sentiment here is that state courts are as hospitable as federal courts to federal claims. That may well be true, in some instances. But it is for the Senate and the House to make that decision. We should not tolerate an erosion of the policy Congress expressed in drafting § 1983. Section 1983 addresses itself to grievances inflicted “under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation ... of any State . . . The regulatory regime imposed by Pennsylvania on respondent utility seems to fit this statute like a glove. Electrical service, being a necessity of life under the circumstances of this case, is an entitlement which under our decisions may not be taken without the requirements of procedural due process. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F. 2d 153 (CA6 1973). Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting. I do not think that a controversy existed between petitioner and respondent entitling petitioner to be heard in this action. Under Pennsylvania law respondent’s duty under Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, § 1171 (1959), to provide service was limited by § 25 of the General Rules and Regulations, the Electric Service Tariff, on file with the have been made. Judd, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 60 A. B. A. J. 938, 941 (1974). JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 365 345 Marshall, J., dissenting Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, to provision of such service only to “customers,” defined as “[a]ny person [s] . . . lawfully receiving service from [the] Company.” Petitioner, as the Court notes, ceased being a “customer” in September 1970 when her account was terminated for nonpayment of bills. That termination was pursuant to Rule 15 of the tariff quoted by the Court in n. 1. From September 1970 to September 1971, respondent’s “customer” was James Dodson; and his delinquency in payment for service during that period, not petitioner’s delinquency before September 1970, was the occasion for the termination of service on October 11, 1971. An effort by petitioner at that time to have service continued if she paid $30 on account on her delinquent 1970 bill failed when respondent rejected the offer and shut off the service. In these circumstances petitioner had no basis in my view for the claimed entitlement under § 1171 quoted by the Court in n. 2, and therefore no controversy existed between petitioner and respondent which could be the subject of her action. I would therefore intimate no view upon the correctness of the holdings below whether the termination of service on October 11, 1971, constituted state action but would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals with direction that the case be remanded to the District Court with instruction to enter a new judgment dismissing the complaint. See Golden v. Zmckler, 394 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1969). Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting. I agree with my Brother Brennan that this case is a very poor vehicle for resolving the difficult and important questions presented today. The confusing sequence of events leading to the challenged termination makes it unclear whether petitioner has a property right under state la-w to the service she was receiving from the 366 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Marshall, J., dissenting 419 U. S. respondent company. Because these complexities would seriously hamper resolution of the merits of the case, I would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Since the Court has disposed of the case by finding no state actionijihowever, I think it appropriate to register my dissent on that point. The Metropolitan Edison Co. provides an essential public service to the people of York, Pa. It is the only entity, public or private, that is authorized to supply electric service to most of the community. As a part of its charter to the company, the State imposes extensive regulations, and it cooperates with the company in myriad ways. Additionally, the State has granted its approval to the company’s mode of service termination—the very conduct that is challenged here. Taking these factors together, I have no difficulty finding state action in this case. As the Court concluded in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 725 (1961), the State has sufficiently “insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the company] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Our state-action cases have repeatedly relied on several factors clearly presented by this case: a state-sanctioned monopoly; an extensive pattern of cooperation between the “private identity and the State; and a service uniquely public in nature. Today the Court takes a major step in repudiating this line of authority and adopts a stance that is bound to lead to mischief when applied to problems beyond the narrow sphere of due process objections to utility terminations. When the State confers a monopoly on a group or organization, this Court has held that the organization assumes many of the obligations of the State. Railway JACKSON V. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 367 345 Marshall, J., dissenting Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 (1956). Even when the Court has not found state action based solely on the State’s conferral of a monopoly, it has suggested that the monopoly factor weighs heavily in determining whether constitutional obligations can be imposed on formally private entities. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944). Indeed, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 177 (1972), the Court was careful to point out that the Pennsylvania liquor-licensing scheme^'falls far short of conferring upon club licensees a monopoly in the dispensing of liquor in any given municipality or in the State as a whole.” The majority distinguishes this line of cases with a cryptic assertion that public utility companies are “natural monopolies.” Ante, at 351-352, n. 8. The theory behind the distinction appears to be that since the State’s purpose in regulating a natural monopoly is not to aid the company but to prevent its charging monopoly prices, the State’s involvement is somehow less significant for state-action purposes. I cannot agree that so much should turn on so narrow a distinction. Initially, it is far from obvious that an electric company would not be subject to competition if the market w7ere unimpeded by governmental restrictions. Certainly the “start-up” costs of initiating electric service are substantial, but the rewards available in a relatively inelastic market might well be sufficient under the right circumstances to attract competitive investment. Instead, the State has chosen to forbid the high profit margins that might invite private competition or increase pressure for state ownership and operation of electric pow'er facilities. The difficulty inherent in this kind of economic analysis counsels against excusing natural monopolies from the reach of state-action principles. To invite inquiry into whether a particular state-sanctioned monopoly might have survived without the State’s express approval 368 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Marshall, J., dissenting grounds the analysis in hopeless speculation. Worse, this approach ignores important implications of the State’s policy of utilizing private monopolies to provide electric service. Encompassed within this policy is the State’s determination not to permit governmental competition with the selected private company, but to cooperate with and regulate the company in a multitude of ways to ensure that the company’s service will be the functional equivalent of service provided by the State.1 B The pattern of cooperation between Metropolitan Edison and the State has led to significant state involvement in virtually every phase of the company’s business. The majority, however, accepts the relevance of the State’s regulatory scheme only to the extent that it demonstrates state support for the challenged termination procedure. Moreover, after concluding that the State in this case had not approved the company’s termination procedures, the majority suggests that even state authorization and approval would not be sufficient: the State would apparently have to order the termination practice in question to satisfy the majority’s state-action test, see ante, at 357. 1 The State’s regulatory pattern makes it amply clear that it expects utility companies to behave more like governmental entities than private corporations. The rates are fixed by the Public Utility Commission, as are the standards of service and the company’s system of accounting. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 66, §§ 1141, 1149, 1171, 1182, 1183, 1211 (1959). The character of the facilities is subject to state approval and continuing supervision, and the State also requires that the service “shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or delay.” § 1171. The certificate of public convenience confers certain eminent domain rights upon the company, § 1124 (Supp. 1974-1975), as well as the right of entry onto a customer’s property to maintain and inspect its equipment. Pa. P. U. C. Electric Regulations, Rule 14D. JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 369 345 Marshall, J., dissenting I disagree with the majority’s position on three separate grounds. First, the suggestion that the State would have to “put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it” seems to me to mark a sharp departure from our previous state-action cases. From the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), to Moose Lodge, supra, we have consistently indicated that state authorization and approval of “private” conduct would support a finding of state action.2 Second, I question the wisdom of giving such short shrift to the extensive interaction between the company and the State, and focusing solely on the extent of state support for the particular activity under challenge. In cases where the State’s only significant involvement is through financial support or limited regulation of the private entity, it may be well to inquire whether the 2 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court suggested that state action might be found if the conduct in question were “sanctioned in some way by the State,” 109 U. S., at 17. Later cases made it clear that the State’s sanction did not need to be in the form of an affirmative command. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151 (1914); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451 (1952). In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 725 (1961), the Court noted that by its inaction, the State had “elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination,” although the State did not actually order the discrimination. See id., at 726-727 (Stewart, J., concurring). And in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 381 (1967), the Court based its “state action” ruling on the fact that the California constitutional provision “was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market.” Even in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 176-177 (1972), the Court suggested that if the State’s regulation had in any way fostered or encouraged racial discrimination, a state-action finding might have been justified. Certainly this is a less rigid standard than the Court’s requirement in this case that the Public Utility Commission be shown to have ordered the challenged conduct, not merely to have approved it. 370 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Marshall, J., dissenting 419 U. S. State’s involvement suggests state approval of the objectionable conduct. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F. 2d 73, 81 (CA2 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University, 287 F. Supp. 535, 547-548 (SDNY 1968). But where the State has so thoroughly insinuated itself into the operations of the enterprise, it should not be fatal if the State has not affirmatively sanctioned the particular practice in question. Finally, it seems to me in any event that the State has given its approval to Metropolitan Edison’s termination procedures. The State Utility Commission approved a tariff provision under which the company reserved the right to discontinue its service on reasonable notice for nonpayment of bills. The majority attempts to make something of the fact that the tariff provision was not challenged in the most recent Utility Commission hearings, and that it had apparently not been challenged before. But the provision had been included in a tariff required to be filed and approved by the State pursuant to statute. That it was not seriously questioned before approval does not mean that it was not approved. It suggests, instead, that the Commission was satisfied to permit the company to proceed in the termination area as it had done in the past. The majority’s test puts potential plaintiffs in a difficult position : if the Commission approves the tariff without argument or a hearing, the State has not sufficiently demonstrated its approval and support for the company’s practices. If, on the other hand, the State challenges the tariff provision on the ground, for example, that the “reasonable notice” does not meet the standards of fairness that it expects of the utility, then the State has not put its weight behind the termination procedure employed by the company, and again there is no state action. Apparently, authorization and approval would require the JACKSON v. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 371 345 Marshall, J., dissenting kind of hearing that was held in Pollak, where the Public Utilities Commission expressly stated that the bus company’s installation of radios in buses and streetcars was not inconsistent with the public convenience, safety, and necessity. I am afraid that the majority has in effect restricted Pollak to its facts if it has not discarded it altogether.3 C The fact that the Metropolitan Edison Co. supplies an essential public service that is in many communities supplied by the government weighs more heavily for me than for the majority. The Court concedes that state action might be present if the activity in question were “traditionally associated with sovereignty,” but it then undercuts that point by suggesting that a particular service is not a public function if the State in question has not required that it be governmentally operated. This reads the “public function” argument too narrowly. The whole point of the “public function” cases is to look behind the State’s decision to provide public services through private parties. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946). In my view, utility service is traditionally identified with the State through universal public regulation or ownership to a degree sufficient to render it a “public function.” 31 cannot accept the majority’s characterization of Pollak as not necessarily deciding the state-action question there presented. Ante, at 356. Whatever doubt on that score may have been created by the original opinion has long since been resolved by this Court. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296, 301 (1966); id., at 319-320 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 119 (1973) (opinion of Burger, LJ.); id., at 133 (Stewart, J., concurring). 372 419 U.S. OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Marshall, J., dissenting I agred with the majority that it requires more than a finding that a particular business is “affected with the public interest” before constitutional burdens can be imposed on that business. But when the activity in question is of such public importance that the State invariably either provides the service itself or permits private companies to act as state surrogates in providing it, much more is involved than just a matter of public interest. In those cases, the State has determined that if private companies wish to enter the field, they will have to surrender many of the prerogatives normally associated with private enterprise and behave in many ways like a governmental body. And when the State’s regulatory scheme has gone that far, it seems entirely consistent to impose on the public utility the constitutional burdens normally reserved for the State. Private parties performing functions affecting the public interest can often make a persuasive claim to be free of the constitutional requirements applicable to governmental institutions because of the value of preserving a private sector in which the opportunity for individual choice is maximized. See Evans v. Newton, supra, at 298; H. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra (1969). Maintaining the private status of parochial schools, cited by the majority, advances just this value. In the due process area, a similar value of diversity may often be furthered by allowing various private institutions the flexibility to select procedures that fit'their particular needs. See Wahba v. New York University, 492 F. 2d 96, 102 '(CA2), cert, denied, post, p. 874. But it is hard to imagine any such interests that are furthered by protecting privately owned public utility companies from meeting the constitutional standards that would apply if the companies were state owned. The values of pluralism and diversity are JACKSON V. METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. 373 345 Marshall, J., dissenting simply not relevant when the private company is the only electric company in town. II The majority’s conclusion that there is no state action in this case is likely guided in part by its reluctance to impose on a utility company burdens that might ultimately hurt consumers more than they would help them. Elaborate hearings prior to termination might be quite expensive, and for a responsible company there might be relatively few cases in which such hearings would do any good. The solution to this problem^ however, is to require only abbreviated pretermination procedures for all utility companies, not to free the “private” companies to behave however they see fit. At least on occasion, utility companies have failed to demonstrate much sensitivity to the extreme importance of the service they render, and in some cities, the percentage of error in service termination is disturbingly high. See Palmer v. Columbia Qas Co. of Ohio, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 241, 243 (ND Ohio 1972), aff’d, 479 F. 2d 153 (CA6 1973); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 448 (SDNY 1972).4 Accordingly, I think that at the minimum, due process would require advance notice of a proposed termination with a clear indication that a responsible company official can readily be contacted to consider any claim of error. Ill What is perhaps most troubling about the Court’s opinion is that it would appear to apply to a broad range of claimed constitutional violations by the company. The Court has not adopted the notion, accepted elsewhere, that different standards should apply to state- 4 In Bronson, Judge Tyler noted that the state utility commission had found that 16% of the complaints investigated resulted in adjustments in favor of the customer. 350 F. Supp., at 448 n. 11. 374 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Marshall, J., dissenting action analysis when different constitutional claims are presented. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 190-191 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) ; Grajton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F. 2d 1137, 1142 (CA2 1973). Thus, the majority’s analysis would seemingly apply as well to a company that refused to extend service to Negroes, welfare recipients, or any other group that the company preferred, for its own reasons, not to serve. I cannot believe that this Court would hold that the State’s involvement with the utility company was not sufficient to impose upon the company an obligation to meet the constitutional mandate of nondiscrimination. Yet nothing in the analysis of the majority opinion suggests otherwise. I dissent. MISSISSIPPI v. ARKANSAS 375 Decree MISSISSIPPI v. ARKANSAS DECREE No. 4§iOrig. Decided February 26, 1974—Decree entered February 26, 1974—Amended decree entered December 23, 1974 Opinion reported: 415 U.0. 289. Decree reported: 415 U. S. 302. AMENDED DECREE It Is Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed as Follows: 1. Luna Bar, depicted in Mississippi’s Exhibits 1 and 2, constituting, respectively, Appendix A and part of Appendix B to the Special Master’s report, and appended hereto and hereby made a part of this decree, came into existence by accretion to »Garter Point and is, and was, a part of the State of Mississippi. 2. The boundary line between the State of Mississippi and the State of Arkansas in the areas between the upstream and the downstream ends of Tarpley Cut-off is as follows: “That part of the abandoned bed of the Mississippi River between the upstream end of the Tarpley Cutoff and the downstream end of Tarpley Cut-off as defined and identified in Mississippi’s said Exhibit 2, being a plat prepared by Austin B. Smith. The above described State boundary line being more particularly described as follows, to-wit: “Beginning at the head of Tarpley Cut-off Channel at Point P-36 as shown on said Smith’s Mississippi Exhibit P-2 at Latitude 33°26'24" and Longitude 91°06'46"; ^thence west to Point P-1, Lat. 33°26'25" and Long. 91°07'30"; 376 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Decree “thence southwesterly to Point P-2, Lat. 33°26'0.0" and Long. 91°07'56"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-3, Lat. 33°25'47" and Long. 91°08'17"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-4, Lat. 33°25'40" and Long. 91°08'42"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-5, Lat. 33°25'36" and Long. 91°09'0.0"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-6, Lat. 33°25'30" and Long. 91°09'29"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-7, Lat. 33°25'25" and Long. 91° 10'0.0"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-8, Lat. 33°25'21" and Long. 91° 10'28"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-9, Lat. 33°25'16" and Long. 91°H'0.0"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-10, Lat. 33°25'10" and Long. 91° 11'29"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-11, Lat. 33°25'06" and Long. 91 ° 11'46"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-12, Lat. 33°25'00" and Long. 91°12'04"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-13, Lat. 33°24'52" and Long. 91012' 17"; “thence southwesterly to Point P-14, Lat. 33°24'46" and Long. 91°12'23"; “thence southward to Point P-15, Lat. 33°24'37" and Long. 91° 12'28"; “thence southward to Point P-16, Lat. 33°24'23" and Long. 91°12'32"; “thence southward to Point P-17, Lat. 33°24'11.5" and Long. 91°12'30"; “thence southeasterly to Point P-18, Lat. 33°24'0.0" and Long. 91°12'21"; “thence southeasterly to Point P-19, Lat. 33°23'44.5" and Long. 91° 12'0.0"; MISSISSIPPI v. ARKANSAS 377 375 Decree “thence southeasterly to Point P-20, Lat. 33°23'37" and Long. 91° 11'49.5"; “thence southeasterly to Point P-21, Lat. 33°23'06" and Long. 91°ll'0.0"; “thence southeasterly to Point P-22, Lat. 33°23'0.0" and Long. 91°10'48"; “thence southeasterly to Point P-23, Lat. 33°22'54" and Long. 91°10'34"; “thence southeasterly to Point P-24, Lat. 33°22'49" and Long. 91° 10'18"; “thence eastward to Point P-25, Lat. 33°22'48" and Long. 91°10'10"; “thence eastward to Point P-26, Lat. 33°22'47" and Long. 91° 10'0.0"; “thence eastward to Point P-27, Lat. 33°22'43.5" and Long. 91°09'14.5"; “thence eastward to Point P-28, Lat. 33°22'44" and Long. 91°09'0.0"; “thence northeasterly to Point P-29, Lat. 33°22'46.5" and Long. 91°08'45"; “thence northeasterly to Point P-30, Lat. 33°22'53" and Long. 91°08'24"; “thence northeasterly to Point P-31, Lat. 33°23'0.0" and Long. 91°08'04.5" ; “thence northeasterly to Point P-32, Lat. 33°23'01.5" and Long. 91°08'0.0"; “thence northeasterly to Point P-33, Lat. 33°23'09.5" and Long. 91°07'40"; “thence northeasterly to Point P-34, Lat. 33°23'13" and Long. 91°07'31"; “thence northeasterly to Point P-35, Lat. 33°23'25" and Long. 91°06'39" at the foot of Tarpley Cut-off Channel”; 3. The costs of this suit, including the expenses of the Special Master and the printing of his report, have been 378 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. Decree paid out of the fund made up of equal contributions by the State of Mississippi and the State of Arkansas and said fund has been sufficient to defray all said expenses to the date of the issuance of the report. Any costs and expenses that may be incurred beyond the amount so contributed by the respective litigants shall be borne by the State of Arkansas. FUSARI v. STEINBERG 379 Opinion of the Court FUSARI, COMMISSIONER OF LABOR v. STEINBERG et al. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT No. 73-848. Argued October 15-16, 1974—Decided January 14, 1975 The judgment of a three-judge District Court holding that the Connecticut “seated interview” procedures for assessing continuing eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits violated due process is vacated, and the case is remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening ' changes in Connecticut law. Pp. 385-389. 364 F. Supp. 922, vacated and remanded. Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 390. Donald E. Wasik, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Robert K. Killian, Attorney General. John M. Creane, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 990, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Raymond J. Kelly and John A. DziambaA Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case comes to us on appeal from a three-judge District Court determination that thè Connecticut “seated interview” procedures for assessing continuing *Dennis R. Yeager, E. Richard Larson, Stephen M. Randels, John M. Levy, Jerry L'Gvvington, Marttie Louis Thompson, Stephen E. Gottlieb, C. Christopher Broivn, and C. Lyonel Jones filed a brief for the National Employment Law Project, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Stephen P. Berzon, Stefan M. Rosenzweig, J. Albert Woll, and Bernard Kleiman filed a brief for Ellenmae Crow et al. as amici curiae. 380 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion of the Court eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 364 F. Supp. 922 (Conn. 1973). Our independent examination of Connecticut law reveals that the State significantly revised its unemployment compensation system following the District Court’s decision. Some of the amendments are designed to ameliorate problems that the court identified. In these circumstances, we think it inappropriate to decide the issues tendered by the parties. We therefore vacate the decision of the District Court and remand for reconsideration in light of the intervening changes in Connecticut law. I In Connecticut, unemployment compensation benefits are paid from a trust fund maintained by employer contributions. Appellant Fusari, State Commissioner of Labor and Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, administers the fund. Under the Connecticut statute, a claimant first must file an initiating claim and establish his general entitlement to receive state unemployment compensation benefits. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 31-230 and 31-235 (1973). Thereafter, the claimant must report to the local unemployment compensation office biweekly and demonstrate continued eligibility for benefits for the preceding two-week period. The claimant must submit forms swearing to his availability for work and to his reasonable efforts to obtain employment during the period in question. He also must submit a form listing the persons to whom he has applied for employment during the preceding two weeks. Upon receipt of the forms, the paying official may make routine inquiries. If no serious question of eligibility arises, immediate payment is made. If, however, the forms or responses to questions raise suspicion of possible disqualification, the claimant is directed to a FUSARI v. STEINBERG 381 379 Opinion of the Court “seated interview” with a factfinding examiner for a more thorough inquiry into the possible factors that might render him ineligible for benefits. Although the claimant bears the burden of establishing eligibility, Northrup v. Administrator, 148 Conn. 475, 480, 172 A. 2d 390, 393 (1961); Waskiewicz v. Egan, 15 Conn. Supp. 286, 287 (1947), doubtful cases are to be decided in his favor. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 31-274 (c). An examiner’s favorable determination of eligibility results in immediate payment of benefits. If, however, the examiner concludes that the claimant is ineligible, no payment is made. Within a few days the claimant receives a written statement indicating the reasons for disqualification and notifying him of the right to appeal. Benefits for the period in question normally are withheld pending resolution of the administrative appeal.1 The State’s policy, sometimes honored in the breach, is that pendency of an appeal does not affect the claimant’s eligibility to receive benefits for subsequent periods.2 This appeal arises from a class action challenging the legality of the procedures used for determining continued 1 Prior to the 1974 amendments, the Administrator could authorize payment of benefits during pendency of an administrative appeal if “good cause” was shown. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 31-241. The record provides no indication of the frequency of such authorizations. One of the 1974 amendments requires that benefits be paid in accordance with the Administrator’s determination, regardless of the filing of an appeal. The amendment removes the Administrator’s specific authority to award benefits during appeal for “good cause shown.” See Conn. Pub. Act 74-339, § 14 (1974). We cannot determine whether this amendment was intended to deprive the Administrator of the power to award benefits for cause following an adverse ruling of eligibility. 2 The stipulation of facts indicates only that some claimants subsequently were denied benefits because they had appeals pending. App. 39a. It does not reveal the frequency of this occurrence. 382 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court, 419 U. S. eligibility for benefits.3 Appellees asserted that Connecticut violated the federal statutory requirement that state procedures be designed reasonably to assure the payment of benefits ^when due^ 42 U. S. C. § 503/ and 3 Each of the named plaintiffs had filed a valid initiating: claim and received benefitfor a period of time. Each subsequently was denied benefits following a seated interview in which the examiner concluded that he or she had made insufficient efforts to obtain employment. The District Court defined the class to be all present and future unemployment benefit recipients whose benefits were or would be subject to termination without a prior hearing, excepting those persons whose benefits terminate due to exhaustion of entitlement. 364 F. Supp. 922, 927-928. 4 The “when due” requirement is one- of a number of conditions imposed on state receipt of federal assistance. The Federal Government plays a cooperative role in the implementation of state unemployment compensation programs, bearing the costs of administration of those programs that satisfy federal requirements. On determining that state laws and practices satisfy the standards of § 303 of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 626, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 503, the Secretary of Labor must certify that the State should receive the amount that he considers necessary for the proper and efficient administration of such law during the fiscal year in which payment is made. § 502 (a). In addition to imposing restrictions on-the fiscal administration of state unemployment compensation funds, § 303 establishes specific procedural safeguards for benefit claimants. 42 U. S. C. §§ 503 (a) (1) and (a)(3). It provides: “(a) The Secretary of Labor shall make no certification for payment to any State unless he finds that the law of such State, approved by the Secretary of Labor under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, includes provision for— “(1) Such methods of administration (including after January 1, 1940, methods relating to the establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on a merit basis, except that the Secretary of Labor shall exercise no authority with respect to the selection, tenure of office, and compensation of any individual employed in accordance with such methods) as are found by the Secretary of Labor to be L FUSARI v. STEINBERG 383 379 Opinion of the Court. also that the Connecticut seated-interview procedures were constitutionally defective in failing to provide a pretermination hearing satisfying the standards of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). At appellees’ request, a three-judge court was convened to hear the matter.5 The District Court’s findings of fact provide some indication of the actual operation of the Connecticut system. The findings reveal that the reversal rate of appealed denials of benefits was significant, ranging from 19.4% to 26.1% during the periods surveyed.6 The District Court also found that a significant delay was required for obtaining administrative review of the examiner’s determination: 89.9% of the 461 intrastate appeals 7 filed in reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due; “(3) Opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied.” (Emphasis added.) 5 The action was brought pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U. S. C. § 1343. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U. S. C. § 1253. 6 During the period July 1971 to June 1972, there were 6,534 appealed denials, of which 26.1% were reversed. The reversal rate for July to October 1972 remained at approximately 26%, but fell to 19.4% during the three-month period from January to March 1973. 364 F. Supp., at 936-937, n. 28. The director of the Waterbury office testified that the reversal rate had fallen to 18.8% by May 1973. See App. 215a. A more complete assessment of the operation of the Connecticut system might be obtained by attempting to determine the overall error rate for all denials of benefits. The District Court made no finding on this point. 7 The State of Connecticut has entered into reciprocal agreements with other States, enabling claimants who have moved into Connecticut to rely on wage credits earned elsewhere. Appeals of denials of interstate claims often require transfer of information 384 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. the month of December 1972 required more than 100 days to resolve. The average delay during that period exceeded 126 days. Moreover, the court determined that the December 1972 figures probably were typical of the delays that might be encountered in other time periods.8 The District Court expressed serious reservations whether the Connecticut system satisfied the “when due” requirement of federal law. It felt foreclosed from so ruling on this statutory issue, however, by this Court’s summary affirmance in Torres v. New York State Dept, o/ Labor, 405 T’. S. 949 (1972). The District Court concluded that Torres was distinguishable on the constitutional issue, and held that the Connecticut procedures violated due process “because (a) a property interest has been denied (b) at an inadequate hearing (c) that is not reviewable de novo until an unreasonable length of time.” 364 F. Supp., at 937-938. After suggesting a number of alterations of the state system that might raise its operation to a constitutionally adequate level, the court enjoined appellant from denying unemployment benefits under then-existing procedures without first providing a constitutionally sufficient prior hearing. Id., at 938. At appellant’s request, the District Court stayed its injunction pending resolution of an appeal to this from the reciprocating State and thus' consume a greater period of time. 8 In 1973, the Connecticut administrative appellate procedure was the slowest in the Nation. Statistics reveal that during that calendar year the Commission decided only 5.3% of the appeals within 30 days. During that same period the Commission decided only 15.5% of appeals within 45 days and resolved appeals’yithin 75 days of filing in only 31.4% of the JWbs. See Unemployment Insurance Statistics, Table 17B—Appeals^Decisions Under State Programs, Time Lapse Between Date of Filing Appeal and Date of Decisions, January-December 1973. U. S. Dept, of Labor, Manpower Administration (March-April 1974). FUSARI v. STEINBERG 385 379 Opinion of the Court Court. We subsequently noted probable jurisdiction. 415 U. S. 912 (1974). II Following our notation of probable jurisdiction, the Connecticut Legislature enacted major revisions of the procedures by which unemployment compensation claims are determined. Conn. Pub. Act 74-339 (1974).° Section 31-241, one of the sections under consideration in this appeal, was amended to require that examiners only consider evidence presented in person or in writing at a hearing provided for that purpose.10 Id., § 14, amending Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 31-241. The legislature also completely altered the structure of the Connecticut system of administrative review, substituting a two-tiered Employment Security Appeals Division for the Unem-ploym^pt Compensation Commission. âConn. Pub. Act 74—339, supra, 1-12. The amended statute provides for the creation of a staff of referees to review the examiners’ decisions de novo. § 15. Referees are to be appointed by an Employment Security Board of Review, § 9,11 the three mem 9 The record available to us suggests that the Department of Labor was instrumental in encouraging reform. See Conn. H. Proc. 5132, 5151 flkay 2, 1974). That record isTilent as to whether the District Court’s decision or this Court’s "notation of jurisdiction provided additional encouragement. 10 As noted by the District Court, factfinding examiners often telephoned employers to obtain evidence relating to the validity of benefit claims. 364 F. Supp., at 925. The amendment appears designed to eliminate that practice. 11 Under Connecticut’s prior system, the Commissioners who decided appeals were appointed by the Governor. See Conn. Genl Stat. Rev. § 31-238. The legislative debates indicate that they held other employment and served only on a part-time basis. See Conn. S. Proc. 2630; Conn. H. Proc. 5152. In revising the Connecticut system, the legislators expressed a desire to insulate the referee system from the influences of partisan politics. Conn. S. Proc. 2629; Conn. H. Proc. 5153-5154. The revised Connecticut sys 386 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. bers of which are appointed by the Governor. § 3. The statute further provides that the referee section “shall consist of such referees as the board deems necessary for the prompt processing of appeals hearings and decisions and for the performance of the duties imposed by this act.” § 9. Appeals from the referees’ decisions are to be taken to the Employment Security Board of Review and thereafter to th^-J state1 courts. §§15 and 21, amending Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 31-242 and 31-248, and new § 25 added by the 1974 amendments. The legislative history indicates that the Connecticut Legislature anticipated that these amendments would have a significant impact on the speed and fairness of the resolution off contested claims. Legislators repeatedly characterized the amendments as a “true reform” of important consequence. See Conn. S. Proc. 2578, 2624, 2629 (May 7, 1974). Particular emphasis was placed on the need to improve the State’s treatment of administrative appeals. It was recognized that Connecticut’s torpid system of administrative appeal was markedly inferior to those used in other States. Id., at 2578, 2621; Conn. H. Proc. 5133-5135, 5152 (May 2, 1974). Revision of the appellate system was designed to remedy that problem. In the words of one member of the House: “The bill . . . sets up a unique system which is designed to cut down that [appellate] backlog.” Id., at 5152. Ill The amendments to the Connecticut statute, which became effective on July 1, 1974, Conn. Pub. Act 74-339, § 36^1974), may alter significantly the character of the tem provides that referee^ must be members of the State’s civil service, Conn. Pub. Act 74-339, §9 (1974), and the history of the amendments clearly indicates that the referees’ commitment to the professing, of appeals will be full time. Conn. S. Proc. 2628, 2630; Conn. H. Proc. 5142, 5147. FUSARI v. STEINBERG 387 379 Opinion of the Court system considered by the District Court. Although the precise significance of the amendment to § 31-241 is unclear, the court’s concern for the absence of a right of confrontation, 364 F. Supp., at 935, may be diminished by the requirement that examiners base their decisions only on evidence submitted in person or in writing. Perhaps of greater importance is the revision of the State’s system of administrative appeal. Both in distinguishing Torres and in determining that the Connecticut system failed to satisfy the minimal requirements of procedural due process, the District Court placed substantial reliance on the length of time required to obtain administrative review of the examiner’s decision. The amendments to Connecticut law are designed to remedy this problem. This Court must review the District Court’s judgment in light of presently existing Connecticut law, not the law in effect at the time that judgment was rendered.12 Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U. S. 412, 414 (1972); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969); United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604 (1960). We are unable meaningfully to assess the issues in this appeal on the present record. Both the statutory and constitutional questions are significantly affected by the length of the period of deprivation of benefits.13 The basic thrust of the 12 Our determination of the existence and significance of Connecticut’s amendments to its unemployment compensation act was largely unassisted by counsel. Indeed, initial examination of the briefs and consideration of oral argument led us to believe that the system considered by the District Court remained substantially intact. We find it difficult to understand the failure of counsel fully to inform the Court of these amendments to Connecticut law. 13 The District Court ruled that our summary affirmance in Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 405 U. S. 949 (1972), precluded any determination that the Connecticut system failed to satisfy the federal “when due” requirement. Appellees did not cross-appeal to question that ruling, and appellant maintains 388 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. statutory “when due” requirement14 is timeliness. See California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121, 130-133 (1971). While we can determine on this record that Connecticut’s previous system often failed to deliver benefits in a timely manner,15 we can only specu that the issue is not before the Court. We observed in United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 27 n. 7 (1960), that an appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 brings the “whole case” before the Court. Thus, issues that might provide alternative grounds for support of the District Court judgment can be considered by this Court even though not specifically presented by cross-appeal. The same principle governs appeals brought under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We therefore have jurisdiction to decide the point, and we would feel compelled to re-examine a statutory claim that may be dispositive before considering a difficult constitutional issue. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 402 (1970); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579, 581 (1958). 14 See n. 4, supra. 15 The District Court interpreted our summary affirmance in Torres to indicate that benefits are not “due” under §303 until administratively deemed payable. 364 F. Supp., at 930. While this is a plausible reading of the evolution and affirmance of Torres, it is not one that we can endorse. Such a definition of the “when due” requirement of federal law would leave little vitality to Java and would nullify the congressional intention of requiring prompt administrative provision of unemployment benefits. See 402 U. S., at 130-133. By reading our summary affirmance in Torres at its broadest, the District Court heightened the tension betwTeen that judgment and our more considered disposition of Java. A narrower interpretation of Torres would have been appropriate. Any statutory requirement that embodies notions of timeliness, accuracy, and administrative feasibility inevitably will generate factspecific applications. In this instance, many of the factual distinctions that the District Court relied on to distinguish Torres on the constitutional issue apply equally to the “when due” question. For example, the delay in resolving administrative appeals is considerably greater in Connecticut than in the New York system, where administrative appeals were resolved in an average of 45 days. See Torres v. New York State Dept, of Labor, 321 F. Supp. 432, 439 (SDNY 1971). And, as the District Court observed, the Torres court apparently FUSARI v. STEINBERG 389 379 Opinion of the Court late how the new system might operate. And, assuming that the federal statutory requirements were satisfied, it would prove equally difficult to assess the question of procedural due process. Identification of the precise dictates of due process requires consideration of both the governmental function involved and the private interests affected by official action. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S., at 263-266. As the Court recognized in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378 (1971): “The formality and procedural requisites for [a due process] hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” In this context, the possible length of wrongful deprivation of unemployment benefits is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 ,168-169 (1974) (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 190, 192 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Prompt and adequate administrative review provides an opportunity for consideration and correction of errors made in initial eligibility determinations. Thus, the rapidity of administrative review is a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of the entire process. The record, of course, provides no indication of the promptness and adequacy of review under the new system. We are unable, therefore, to decide this appeal on its merits. did not consider the probable accuracy of the challenged procedure in determining whether it adequately assured delivery of benefits “when due.” See 364 F. Supp., at 936. We do not undertake to identify the combination of factors that justify the Torres decision. Having once decided the case summarily, we decline to do so again. Wgonly indicate that the District Court should not have felt precluded from undertaking a more precise analysis of the statutory issue than it felt empowered to do in this case. 390 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Burger, C. J., concurring 419 U. S. The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case remanded for reconsideration in light of the intervening changes in Connecticut law. It is so ordered. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court; however, it may be useful to mention two points which bear further discussion. First, as the Court notes, ante, at 387 n. 12, all parties failed to inform us that after the District Court entered judgment the Connecticut Legislature significantly changed its unemployment compensation system. I agrde with the Court that this failure is “difficult to understand.” Ibid. It is disconcerting to this Court to learn of relevant and important developments in a case after the entire"Court has come to the Bench to hear arguments. Even at oral argument we were not informed of the changes in state law although both parties filed their briefs after the new statute was passed. The Connecticut Legislature appears to have changed the system at least in part , to expedite administrative appeals and thereby treat claimants more fairly, see ante, at 380, 386, thus meeting in part, at least, the basis of the attack on the system. All parties had an obligation to inform the CourPthat the system which the District Court had enjoined had been changed; however, only a cryptic reference was made to the change of law. The appellees’ brief is 122 pages long and notes the change once, at the end of a footnote. Brief for Appellees 65 n. 52. At that point appellees are contending that the long delay between the seated interview’ and administrative review7 of a decision to withhold benefits aggravates the defects which they contend exist in the seated interview itself. There appellees quote Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S FUSARI v. STEINBERG 391 379 Burger, C. J., concurring 371, 378 (1971^ where the Court said: “The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” (Brief for Appellees 64; emphasis appellees’-: )•' '-Given the fact that the changes in the procedures may well have an effect on “subsequent proceedings^’ ante, at 386, the Court should have been explicitly advised that changes had occurred. The only reference to changes in the law actually gives the impression that their effect is negligible. This Court must rely on counsel to present issues fully and fairly, and counsel have a continuing duty to inform the Court of any development which may conceivably affect an outcome. Second, although I agree wholeheartedly with the Court’s reasoned discussion of the tension between the summary affirmance in Torres v. New York State Dept, of Labor, 405 U. S. 949 (1972), aff’g 333 F. Supp. 341 (SDNY 1971), and the Court’s opinion in California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121 (1971), ante, at 388-389, n. 15, we might well go beyond that and make explicit w’hat is implicit in some prior holdings. E. g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 576 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974). When wye summarily affirm, without opinion, the judgment of a threSjudge district court we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached.* An *Some are quick to use the district court opinion to define this Court’s judgment. Sot Note, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 102 (1955);'‘Note,"Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of Limited Discretion and a Thgory of Limited Precedent, 52 B. U. L. Rev. 373, 409 (1972). Another common response to summary affirmances of three-judge-court judgments is confusion a^ to what they actually do mean. See' Currie, The Three-Judge District Court, in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 74 n. 365 (1964); Shanks, Book Review, 84 392 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Burger, C. J., concurring unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument. Indeed, upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary review, the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmances may appear to have established. E. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 671; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 343-344 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 350 (Black, J., dissenting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 614 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harv. L. Rev. 256, 257-258, n. 17 (1970); Note, Impact of the Supreme Court’s Summary Disposition Practice on its Appeals Jurisdiction, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 952, 962 (1974) ; Note, 52 B. U. L. Rev., supra, at 407-415. SOSNA v. IOWA 393 Syllabus SOSNA v. IOWA et al. appeal from the united states district court for THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA No. 73-762. ASued October 17, 1974—Decided January 14, 1975 Appellant’s petition for divorce was" dismissed by an Iowa trial court for lack of jurisdiction bebause she failed to meet the Iowa statutory requirement thft a petitioner in a divorce action be a resident of the State for one year preceding the filing of the petition. Appellant then brought a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 in the Pen! nd DdriRj Court against appellees State and state trial judge, asserting that Iowa’s durational residency requirement violated the Federal Constitution on equal protection and due process grounds and seeking injurictive and declaratory relief. After certifying that appellant represented the class of persons residing in Iowa for less than a year who desired to initiate divorce actions, the three-judge District Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Held: 1. The fact that appellant had long since satisfied the durational residency requirement by the time the case reached this Court does not moot the case, since the controversy remains very much alive for the class of unnamed persons whom she represents and who, upon certification of the class action, acquired a legal status separate from her asserted interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330. Pp. 397-403. (a) Where, as here, the issue sought to be litigated escapes full appellate review at the behest of any single challenger, the case does not inexorably become moot by the intervening resolution of .t.I^'controversÿ as to the named plaintiffs. P. 401. (b) At the time the class action was certified, appellant demonstrated a “real and immediate” threat of injury and belonged to the class thaPshe sought to represent. Pp. 402-403. (c) The test of Rule 23 (a) that the named representative in a class action “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” is met here, where it is unlikely that segments of the class represented would have interests conflicting with appellant’s, and the interests of the class have been competently urged at each level of the proceeding. P. 403. 394 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Syllabus 419 U. S. 2. The Iowa durational residency requirement for divorce is not unconstitutional. Pp. 404-410. (a) Such requirement is not unconstitutional on the alleged ground that it establishes two classes of persons and discriminates against those who have recently exercised their right to travel to Iowa. Appellant was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought, and such requirement may reasonably be justified on grounds of the State’s interest in requiring those seeking a divorce from its courts to be genuinely attached to the State, as well as of the State’s desire to insulate its divorce decrees from the likelihood of successful collateral attack. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618; Dunn, supra; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, distinguished. Pp. 406-409. (b) Nor does the durational residency requirement violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the asserted ground that it denies a litigant the opportunity to make an individualized showing of bona fide residence and thus bars access to the divorce courts. Even if appellant could make an individualized showing of physical presence plus the intent to remain, she would not be entitled to a divorce, for Iowa requires not merely “domicile” in that sense, but residence in the State for one year. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 452. Moreover, no total deprivation of access to divorce courts but only delay in such access is involved here. Boddie n. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, distinguished. Pp. 409-410. 360 F. Supp. 1182, affirmed. Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 410. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 418. James H. Reynolds argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Paul E. Kempter. Elizabeth A. Nolan, Assistant Attorney General of Iowa, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and George W. Murray, Special Assistant Attorney General. SOSNA v. IOWA 395 393 Opinion of the Court Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which date they separated but continued to live in New York. In August 1972, appellant moved to Iowa with her three children, and the following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for a dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna, who had been personally served with notice of the action when he came to Iowa to visit his children, made a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the Iowa court. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Michael Sosna was not a resident of Iowa and appellant had not been a resident of the State of Iowa for one year preceding the filing of her petition. In so doing the Iowa court applied the provisions of Iowa Code § 598.6 (1973) requiring that the petitioner in such an action be “for the last year a resident of the state.” 1 Instead of appealing this ruling to the Iowa appellate courts, appellant filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa asserting that Iowa’s durational residency requirement for in 1 Iowa Code §598.6 (1973) provides: "Except where the respondent is a resident of this state and is served by personal sendee, the petition for dissolution of marriage, in addition to setting forth the information required by section 598.5, must state that the petitioner has been for the last year a resident of the state, specifying the county in which the petitioner has resided, and the length of such residence therein after deducting all absences from the state; and that the maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a marriage dissolution only.” Iowa Code § 598.9 (1973) requires dismissal of the action “[i]f the averments as to residence are not fully proved.” 396 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. yoking its divorce jurisdiction violated the United States Constitution. She sought both injunctive and declaratory relief against the appellees in this case, one of which is the State of Iowa,2 and the other of whom is the judge of the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, who had previously dismissed her petition. A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, held that the Iowa durational residency requirement was constitutional. 360 F. Supp. 1182 41973). We noted probable jurisdiction, 415 U. S. 911 ¿1974), and directed the parties to discuss “whether the United States District Court should have proceeded to the merits of the con^itutional issue presented in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) and related cases.” For reasons stated in this opinion, we decide that this case is not moot, and hold that the Iowa durational residency requirement for divorce does not offend the United States Constitution.3 - In their answer to the complaint, appellees asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction over the State by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, but thereafter abandoned this! defense to the action. While th^'ailure of the State to r^e the defense of sovereign immunity in the District-Court would not have barred Iowa from raising that isaie in this Court, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459 (1945), no such defense has been advanced in this Court. The failure of Iowa to raise the issue has likewise left us without any guidance from the parties’ briefs as to the circumstances under which Iowa law permits waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity by attorneys representing the State. Our own examination of Iowa precedents discloses, however, that the Iowa*Supreme Court has held that the State consents to suit and w’aives any defense of sovereign immunity by entering a voluntary appearance and defending a suit on the merits. McKeown v. Brown, 167 Iowa 489, 499, 149 N. W. 593, 597 (1914). The law of Iowa on the point therefore appears to be different from the law of Indiana treated in Ford, supra. 3 Our request that the partic?'address themselv&s to Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971)? and related cases, indicated our concern SOSNA v. IOWA 397 393 Opinion of the Court I Appellant sought certification of her suit as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 so that she might represent the “class of those residents of the State of Iowa who have resided therein for a period of less than one year and who desire to initiate actions for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, and who are barred from doing so by the one-year durational residency requirement embodied in Sections 598.6 and 598.9 of the Code of Iowa.” 4 The parties stipulated that there were in the State of Iowa “numerous people in the same situation as plaintiff,” that joinder of those persons was impracticable, that appellant’s claims were representative of the class, and that she would fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See Rule 23 (a). This stipulation was approved by the District as to whether either this Court or the District Court should reach the merits of the constitutional issue presented by the parties in light of appellant Sosna’s failure to appeal the adverse ruling of the State District Court through the state appellate network. In response to our request, both parties urged that we reach the merits of appellant’s constitutional attack on Iowa’s durational residency requirement. In this posture of the case, and in the absence of a disagreement between the parties, we have no occasion to consider whether any consequences adverse to appellant resulted from her first obtaining an adjudication of her claim on the merits in the Iowa state court and only then commencing this action in the United States District Court. 4 Since jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), this case presents no problem of aggregation of claims in an attempt to satisfy the requisite amount in controversy of 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a). Cf. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U. S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U. S. 332 (1969). Although the complaint did not so specify, the absence of a claim for monetary relief and the nature of the claim asserted disclose that a Rule 23 (b) (2) class action was contemplated. Therefore, the problems associated with a Rule 23 (b) (3) class action, which were considered by this Court last Term in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156 (1974), are not present in this case. 398 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. Court in a pretrial order.5 After the submission of briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties, the three-judge court by a divided vote upheld the constitutionality of the statute. While the parties may be permitted to waive non-jurisdictional defects, they may not by stipulation invoke the Judicial power of the United States in litigation which does not present an actual “case or controversy,” Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24 (1974), and on the record before us we feel obliged to address the question of mootness before reaching the merits of appellant’s claim. At the time the judgment of the three-judge court was handed down, appellant had not yet resided in Iowa for one year, and that court was clearly presented with a case or controversy in every sense contemplated by Art. Ill of the Constitution.6 By the time her case reached this Court, however, appellant had long since satisfied the Iowa durational residency requirement, and Iowa Code § 598.6 (1973) no longer stood as a barrier to her attempts to secure dissolution of her marriage in the Iowa courts.7 This is not an unusual develop-men^in a case challenging the validity of a durational residency requirement, for in many cases appellate review 5 The defendant state-court judge neither raised any claims of immunity as a defense to appellant’s taction, nor questioned the propriety of the appellant’s effort to represent a statewide clasauagainst a judge like him who apparently sat in a single county or judicial district within the State. 0 The District Court was aware of the possibility of mootness, 360 F. Supp. 1182, 1X83 n. 5 (ND Iowa 1973), and expressed the view that even the “termination of plaintiff’s deferral period . . . would not render this case moot since the cause beforeiius-ds a class abtion and the court is confronted with the reasonable likelihood that the problem 'will occur to members of the class of which plaintiff is currently a member.” 7 Counsel for appellant disclosed at oral argument that appellant has in fact obtained a divorce in New York. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. SOSNA v. IOWA 399 393 Opinion of the Court will not be completed until after the plaintiff has satisfied the residency requirement about which complaint was originally made. If appellant had sued only on her own behalf, both the fact that she now satisfies the one-year residency requirement and the fact that she has obtained a divorce elsewhere would make this case moot and require dismissal. Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667 (CA3 1953), dismissed as moot, 347 U. S. 610 (1954)^SE'C' v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972). But appellant brought this suit as a class action and sought to litigate the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement in a representative capacity. When the District Court certified the propriety of the class action, the class of unnamed parsons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by appellant.8 We areuof the view that this factor significantly affects the mootness determination. In Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC\ 219 U. S. 498 (1911), where a challenged ICC order had expired, and in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), where petitioners sought to be certified as candidates in an election that had already been held, the Court expressed its concern that the defendants in those cases could be expected again to act contrary to the rights asserted by the particular named plaintiffs involved, and in each case the controversy was held not to be moot because the questions presented were “capable of repetition, yet 8 The certification of a suit as a class action has important consequences for the unnamed members of the class. If the suit proceeds to judgment on the merits, it is contemplated that the decision will bind all persons who have been found at the time of certification to be members of the class. Rule 23 (c).(3); Advisory Committee'Note, 28 U. S. C. App., pp. 7765-7766. Once the suit is certified as a class action, it may not be settled or dismissed without the approval of the court. Rule 23 (e). 400 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. evading review.” That situation is not presented in appellant’s case, for the durational residency requirement enforced by Iowa does not at this time bar her from the Iowa courts. Unless we were to speculate that she may move from Iowa, only to return and later seek a divorce within one year from her return, the concerns that prompted this Court’s holdings in Southern Pacific and Moore do not govern appellant’s situation. But even though appellees in this proceeding might not again enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against appellant, it is clear that they will enforce it against those persons in the class that appellant sought to represent and that the District Court certified. In this sense the case before us is one in which state officials will undoubtedly continue to enforce the challenged statute and yet^, because of the passage of time, no single challenger will remain subject to its restrictions for the period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion. This problem was present in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and was there implicitly resolved in favor of the representative of the class. Respondent Blumstein brought a class action challenging the Tennessee law which barred persons from registering to vote unless, at the time of the next election, they would have resided in the State for a year and in a particular county for three months. By the time the District Court opinion was filed, Blumstein had resided in the county for the requisite three months, and the State contended that his challenge to the county requirement was moot. The District Court rejected this argument, Blumstein v. Ellington, 337 F. Supp. 323, 324-326 (MD Tenn. 1970). Although the State did not raise a mootness argument in this Court, we observed that the District Court had been correct: “Although appellee now can vote, the problem to voters posed by the Tennessee residence require- SOSNA v. IOWA 401 393 Opinion of the Court merits is ‘ “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” ’ ” 405 U. S., at 333 n. 2. Although the Court did not expressly note the fact, by the time it decided the case Blumstein had resided in Tennessee for far more than a year. The rationale of Dunn controls the present case. Although the controversy is no longer live as to appellant Sosna, it remains very much alive for the class of persons she has been certified to represent. Like the other voters in Dunn, new residents of Iowa are aggrieved by an allegedly unconstitutional statute enforced by state officials. We believe that a case such as this,,in which, as in Dunn, the issue sought to be litigated escapes full appellate review’ at the behest of any single challenger, does not inexorably become moot by the intervening resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs.9 Dunn, supra; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 756 n. 5 (1973); Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37, 40 (Ariz.), aff’d, 400 U. S. 884 (1970).10 We note, how- 9 This view draws strength from the practical demands of time. A blanket rule under which a class action challenge to a short durational residency requirement would be dismissed upon the intervening mootness of the named representative’s dispute would permit a significant class of federal claims to remain unredressed for want of a spokesman who could retain a personal adversary position throughout the coui&e« of the litigation. Such a consideration would not itself justify any relaxation of the provision of Art. Ill which limits our jurisdiction to “cases and controversies,” but it is a factor supporting the result we reach if consistent with Art. III. For the reasons stated in the text, infra, we believe that our holding here does comport with both the language of Art. Ill and our prior decisions. 10 This has been the prevailing view in the Circuits. See, e. g., Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F. 2d 940 (CA9 1974); Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159 (CAO 1972); Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073 (CA3 1972); Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F. 2d 387 (CA6 1973); Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (MD Fla. 1973), aff’d sub nom. Makres v. Askew, 500 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1974); Moss v. Lane 402 419 U.S. OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court ever, that the same exigency that justifies this doctrine serves to identify its limits. In cases in which the alleged harm would not dissipate during the normal time required for resolution of the controversy, the general principles of Art. Ill jurisdiction require that the plaintiff’s personal stake in the litigation continue throughout the entirety of the litigation. Our conclusion that this case is not moot in no way detracts from the firmly established requirement that the judicial power of Art. Ill courts extends only to “cases and controversies” specified in that Article. There must not only be a named plaintiff who has such a case or controversy at the time the complaint is filedjMand at the time the class action is certified by the District Court pursuant to Rule 23,11 but there must be a live controversy at the time this Court reviews the case.12 SEC V. Medical Committee for Human Rights, supra. The controversy may exist, however, between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot. In so holding, we disturb no principles established by our decisions with respect to class-action litigation. A Co., Inc., 471 F. 2d 853 (CA4 1973). Contra: Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority, 406 F. 2d 1234 (CA7 1969); cf. Norman v. Connecticut State Board of Parole, 458 F. 2d 497 (CA2 1972). 11 There may be cases in which the controversy involving the named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to them before the district court can reasonably bi impeded to rule on a certification motion. In such instances, whether the certification can be said to “relate back” to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstanres of the particular case and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review. 12 When this Court has entertained doubt about the continuing nature of a case or controversy, it has remanded the case to the lower court for consideration of the possibility of mootness. Indiana Employment Div. v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973). SOSNA v. IOWA 403 393 Opinion of the Court named plaintiff in a class action must show that the threat of injury in a case such as this is “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hypothetical^ O’Shea n. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1969). A litigant must be a member of the class which he or she seeks to represent at the time the class action is certified by the district court. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962); Rosario, supra; Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45 (1969). Appellant Sosna satisfied these criteria. This conclusion does not automatically establish that appellant is entitled to litigate the interests of the class she seeks to represent,1'but it does shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciability to the ability of the named representative to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of th^class.” Rule 23 (a). Since it is contemplated that all members of the class will be bound by the ultimate ruling on the merits, Rule 23 (c)(3), th^* district court must assure itself that the named representative will adequately protect the interests of the class. In the present suit, where it is unlikely that segments of the class appellant represents would have interests conflicting with those she has sought to advance,13 and where the interests of that class have been competently urged at each level of the proceeding, we believe that the test of Rule 23 (a) is met. We therefore address ourselves to the merits of appellant’s constitutional claim. 13 There are frequently cases in which it appears that the particular class a party seeks to represent does not have a sufficient homogeneity of interests to warrant certification. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 44 Üp40); Phillips v. Klassen, 163 U S. App. D. C. 360, 502 F. 2d 362^1974), cert, denied, post, p. 996. In this case. however, it-is difficult to imagine why any person in the class appellant represents would have an interest in seeing Iowa Code § 598.6 (1973) upheld. 404 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. Opinion of the Court II The durational residency requirement under attack in this case is a part of Iowa’s comprehensive statutory regulation of domestic relations, an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States. Cases decided by this Court over a period of more than a century bear witness to this historical fact. In Barber v. Barber, 21 Howt. 582, 584 (1859), the Court said: “We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce . . . In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 734r-735 (1878), the Court said: “The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved,” and the same view was reaffirmed in Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162, 167 (1899). The statutory scheme in Iowa, like those in other States, sets forth in considerable detail the grounds upon which a marriage may be dissolved and the circumstances in which a divorce may be obtained. Jurisdiction over a petition for dissolution is established by statute in “the county where either party resides,” Iowa Code § 598.2 (1973), and the Iowa courts have construed the term “resident” to have much the same meaning as is ordinarily associated with the concept of domicile. Korsrud v. Korsrud, 242 Iowa 178, 45 N. W. 2d 848 (1951). Iowa has recently revised its divorce statutes, incorporating the no-fault concept,14 but it retained the one-year durational residency requirement. The imposition of a durational residency requirement for divorce is scarcely unique to Iowa, since 48 States impose such a requirement as a condition for maintaining 14 See generally Peters, Iowa Reform of Marriage Termination, 20 Drake L. Rev. 211 (1971). SOSNA v. IOWA 405 393 Opinion of the Court an action for divorce.15 As might be expected, the periods vary among the States and range from six weeks16 to two years.17 The one-year period selected by Iowa is the most common length of time prescribed.18 Appellant contends that the Iowa requirement of one year’s residence is unconstitutional for two separate reasons: first, because it establishes two classes of persons and discriminates against those who have recently exercised their right to travel to Iowa, thereby contravening the Court’s holdings in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Dunnv. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); and Memorial Hospital N. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974); and, second, because it denies a litigant the opportunity to make an individualized showing of bona fide residence and therefore denies such residents access to the only method of legally dissolving their marriage. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973); Boddie n. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). 15 Louisiana and Washington are the exceptions. La. Code Civ. Proc., Art. IDA (7) (Supp. 1974); but see Art. 10B providing that “if a spouse has established and maintained a residence in a parish of this state for a period of twelve months, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that he has a domicile in this state in the parish of such residence.” Wash. Laws 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., c. 157. Among the other 48 States, the durational residency requirements are of many varieties, with some applicable to all divorce actions, others only when the respondent is not domiciled in the State, and still others applicable depending on where the grounds for divorce accrued. See the 50state compilation issued by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Divorce, Annulment and’Separation in the United States (1973). 16 See, e. g., Idaho Code §32-701 (1963); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.020 (1973). 17 See, e. g., R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5-12 (1970); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 208, §§ 4-5 (1958 and Supp. 1974). 38 A majority of the States impose a one-year residency requirement of some kind. Divorce, Annulment and Separation in the United States, supra, n. 15. 406 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. State statutes imposing durational residency requirements were, oficourse, invalidated when imposed by States as a qualification for welfare payments, Shapiro, supra; for voting, Dunn, supra; and for medical care, Maricopa County, supra. But none of those cases intimated that the States might never impose durational residency requirements, and such a proposition was in fact expressly disclaimed.19 What those cases had in common was that the durational residency requirements they struck down were justified on the basis of budgetary or recordkeeping considerations which were held insufficient to outweigh the constitutional claims of the individuals. But Iowa’s divorce residency requirement is of a different stripe. Appellant was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought, as was the case with the welfare recipients in Shapiro, the voters in Dunn, or the indigent patient in Maricopa County. She would eventually qualify for the same sort of adjudication which she demanded virtually upon her arrival in the State. Iowa’s requirement delayed her access to the courts, but, by fulfilling it, she could ultimately have obtained the same opportunity for adjudication which she asserts ought to have been hers at an earlier point in time. Iowa’s residency requirement may reasonably be justified on grounds other than purely budgetary considerations or administrative convenience. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974). A decree of divorce is not a matter in which the only interested parties are the State as a sort of “grantor,” and a divorce petitioner such as appellant in the role of “grantee.” Both spouses are obviously interested in the proceedings, since it will affect their marital status and very likely their property rights. Where a married couple has minor children, a decree of 19 Shapiro, 394 U. S., at 638 n. 21; Maricopa County, 415 U. S., at 258-259. SOSNA v. IOWA 407 393 Opinion of the Court divorce would usually include provisions for their custody and support. With consequences of such moment riding on a divorce decree issued by its courts, Iowa may insist that one seeking to initiate such a proceeding have the modicum of attachment to the State required here. Such a requirement additionally furthers the State’s parallel interests both in avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in which another State has a paramount interest, and in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral attack. A State such as Iowa may quite reasonably decide that it does not wish to become a divorce mill for unhappy spouses who have lived there as short a time as appellant had when she commenced her action in the state court after having long resided elsewhere. Until such time as Iowa is convinced that appellant intends to remain in the State, it lacks the “nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance.W Williams v. North Caroliva, 325 U. S. 226, 229 (1945). Perhaps even more important, Iowa’s interests extend beyond its borders and include the recognition of its divorce decrees by other States under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, § 1. For that purpose, this Court has often stated that “judicial power to grant a divorce—jurisdiction, strictly speaking—is founded on domicil.” Williams, supra; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903) ; Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901). Where a divorce decree is entered after a finding of domicile in ex parte proceedings,20 this Court has held that the 20 When a divorce decree is not entered on the basis of ex parte proceedings, this Court held in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 351-352 (1948): “[T]he requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been participation by the 408 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion of the Court finding of domicile is not binding upon another State and may be disregarded in the face of “cogent evidence” to the contrary. Williams, supra, at 236. For that reason; the State asked to enter such a decree is entitled to insist that the putative divorce petitioner satisfy something more than the bare minimum of constitutional requirements before a divorce may be granted. The State’s decision to exact a one-year residency requirement as a matter of policy is therefore buttressed by a quite permissible inference that this requirement not only effectuates state substantive policy but likewise provides a greater safeguard against successful collateral attack than would a requirement of bona fide residence alone.21 This is precisely the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered the decree." Our Brother Marshall argues in dissent that the Iowa durational residency requirement “sweeps too broadly” since it is not limited to ex parte proceedings and could be narrowed by a waiver provision. Post, at 425. But Iowa’s durational residency requirement cannot be tailored in this manner without disrupting settled principles of Iowa practice and pleading. Iowa’s rules governing special appearances make it impossible for the slate court to know, either at the time a petition for divorce is filed or when a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is filed, whether or not a respondent will appear and participate in the divorce J proceedings. Iowa Rules Civ. Proc. 66, 104. The faii that the sta^e-, legislature might conceivably adopt a system of waivers and Revise court rules governing special appearances does not make such detailed rewriting appropriate business for the federal judiciary. 21 Since the majority of States require residence for at least a year, see n. 18, supra, it is reasonable to assume that Iowa’s one-year “floor” makes its decrees less susceptible to successful collateral attack in other States. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed in upholding a six-month durational residency requirement imposed by Florida, an objective test may impart to a State’s divorce decrees “a verity that tends to safeguard them against the suspicious eyes of other states’ prosecutorial authorities, the suspicions of private SOSNA v. IOWA 409 393 Opinion of the Court sort of determination that a State in the exercise of its domestic relations jurisdiction is entitled to make. We therefore hold that the state interest in requiring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the State, as well as a desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack, requires a different resolution of the constitutional issue presented than was the case in Shapiro, supra, Dunn, supra, and Maricopa County, supra. Nor are we of the view that the failure to provide an individualized determination of residency violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), relied upon by appellant, held that Connecticut might not arbitrarily invoke a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence against students who sought to obtain in-state tuition rates when that presumption was not necessarily or universally true in fact. But in Vlandis the Court warned that its decision should not “be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement.” Id., at 452. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970), aff’d, 401 U. S. 985 (1971). An individualized determination of physical presence plus the intent to remain, which appellant apparently seeks, w’ould not entitle her to a divorce even if she could have made such a showing.22 For counsel in other states, and the post-decree dissatisfactions of parties to the divorce who wish a second bite. Such a reputation for validity of divorce decrees is not, then, merely cosmetic.” Makres v. Askew, 500 F. 2d 577, 579 (1974), aff’g 359 F. Supp. 1225 (MD Fla. 1973). 22 In addition to a showing of residence within the State for a year, Iowa Code § 598.6 (1973) requires any petition for dissolution to state "that the maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a marriage dissolution only.” In dismissing appellant’s petition in state court, Judge Keck observed 410 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. White, J., dissenting Iowa requires not merely “domicile” in that sense, but residence in the State for a year in order for its courts to exercise their divorce jurisdiction. In Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, this Court held that Connecticut might not deny access to divorce courts to those persons who could not afford to pay the required fee. Because of the exclusive role played by the State in the termination of marriages, it was held that indigents could not be denied an opportunity to be heard “absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance.” 401 U. S., at 377. But the gravamen of appellant Sosna’s claim is not total deprivation, as in Boddie, but only delay. The operation of the filing fee in Boddie served to exclude forever a certain segment of the population from obtaining a divorce in the courts of Connecticut. No similar total deprivation is present in appellant’s case, and the delay which attends the enforcement of the one-year durational residency requirement is, for the reasons previously stated, consistent with the provisions of the United States Constitution. Affirmed. Mr. Justice White, dissenting. It is axiomatic that Art. Ill of the Constitution imposes a “threshold requirement . . . that those who seek to invoke the power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94101 (1968); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 421425 (1969) (opinion of Marshall, J.). To satisfy the requirement, plaintiffs must allege “some threatened or actual injury,” Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973), that is “real and immediate” and not con- that appellant had failed to allege good-faith residence. (Jurisdictional Statement App. B. 2.) SOSNA v. IOWA 411 393 White, J., dissenting jectural or hypothetical. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 108-109 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941); Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89-91 (1947). Furthermore, and of greatest relevance here: “The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. The ‘gist of the question of standing’ is whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). In other words, when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 99-100 (footnote omitted). All of this the Court concedes. It is conceded as well that had the named plaintiff in this case not brought a class action, the case would now be dismissed as moot because the plaintiff, appellant here, has now satisfied the Iowa residency requirement and, what is more, has secured a divorce in another State. Appellant could not have begun this suit either for herself or for a class if at the time of filing she had been an Iowa resident for a year or had secured a divorce in another jurisdiction. There must be a named plaintiff initiating the action who has an existing controversy with the defendant, whether the plaintiff is suing on his own behalf or on behalf of a class as well. However unquestioned it may 412 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. White, J., dissenting be that a class of persons in the community has a “real” dispute of substance with the defendant, an attorney may not initiate a class action without having a client with a personal stake in the controversy who is a member of the class, and who is willing to be the named plaintiff in the case. The Court recently made this very clear when it said that “if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.” O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 494 (footnote omitted). The Court nevertheless holds that once a case is certified as a class action, the named plaintiff may lose that status which had qualified him to bring the suit and still be acceptable as a party to prosecute the suit to conclusion on behalf of the class. I am unable to agree. The appellant now satisfies the Iowa residence requirement and has secured a divorce. She retains no real interest whatsoever in this controversy, certainly not an interest that would have entitled her to be a plaintiff in the first place, either alone or as representing a class. In reality, there is no longer a named plaintiff in the case, no member of the class before the Court. The unresolved issue, the attorney, and a class of unnamed litigants remain. None of the anonymous members of the class is present to direct counsel and ensure that class interests are being properly served. For all practical purposes, this case has become one-sided and has lost the adversary quality necessary to satisfy the constitutional “case or controversy” requirement. A real issue unquestionably remains, but the necessary adverse party to press it has disappeared. The Court thus dilutes the jurisdictional command of Art. Ill to a mere prudential guideline. The only specific, identifiable individual with an evident continuing SOSNA v. IOWA 413 393 White, J., dissenting interest in presenting an attack upon the residency requirement is appellant’s counsel. The Court in reality holds that an attorney’s competence in presenting his case, evaluated post hoc through a review of his performance as revealed by the record, fulfills the “case or controversy” mandate. The legal fiction employed to cloak this reality is the reification of an abstract entity, “the class,” constituted of facelesi, unnamed individuals who are deemed to have a live case or controversy with appellees.1 1 The Court contends that its rationale is the prevailing view in the circuits and lists five?'Circuits in support and two opposing. Ante, at 401-402, n. 10. Of the five decisions [«ted in support, four are without weight or inapposite in the present, context. Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1081-1082 (CA3 1973), contains only dictum. Makros v. Askew, 500 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1974), is only an affirmance of a District Kourt decusion without discussion of moot-nfe^J Two other cas^s, Moss v. Lane'Co., Inc., 471 F. 2d 853 (CA4 1973), and Roberts v. Union Co., '4§7 F 2d 387 (CA6 1973), deal with claims of racial and sexual discrimination, respectively, in employment practices, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. In such cases, Congress has expressed an intention and provided that any person “claiming to be aggrieved” could bring suit under Title VII to challenge discriminatory employment practices. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5; Trafficante v. Metropolitan Lije Insurance. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 209 (1972). Since any discrimination in employment based upon sexual or racial characteristics aggrieves an employee or an applicant for employment having such characteristics by 'stigmatization and explicit or implicit, application - of a badge of inferiority, Congress gave such persons standing by statute to continue an attack upon such discrimination even though they fail to establish particular injury to themselves in being denied employment unlawfully. Cf. Trafficante, supra. Congress has expressed no similar intention as to the subject matter of the instant litigation, that is, to allow suits by “ ‘private attorneys general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highesthpriority,’ ” 409 IT. S., ai^ll, nor arc the circumstances present here analogous to aW of racial or sexual discrimination which inherently is cites based. Hence, these cases provide no 414 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. White, J., dissenting No prior decision supports the Court’s broad rationale. In cases in which the inadequacy of the named representative’s claim has become apparent prior to class certifi-fication, the Court has been emphatic in rejecting the argument that the class action could still be pursued. O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 494-495; Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 32-33 (1962). Cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24 (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48—19 (1969). It is true that Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333 n. 2 (1972), looks in the other direction. There, by the time the Court rendered its decision, the class representative in an action challenging a durational residency requirement for voting had satisfied the requirement and was eligible to vote in the next election. The Court indicated that the case was not moot, saying that the issue was “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” But the question was not contested between the parties and was noted only in passing. Its ramifications for the question of mootness in a class action setting were not explored. Although I joined the opinion in that case, I do not deem it dispositive of the jurisdictional issue here, especially in light of Indiana Employment Division v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973). There the class representative’s claim had been fully settled, and the Court remanded the case to the District Court for consideration of mootness, a course which the majority, relying on Dunn, rejects here. As I see it, the question of whether a class action survives after the representative’s claim has been mooted remains unsettled by prior decisions. Indeed, what authority there is provides more support for a conclusion that when the personal stake of the named plaintiff terminates, the class action fails. authority for the Court’s expansive construction of Art. Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement. SOSNA v. IOWA 415 393 White, J., dissenting Although the Court cites Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, as controlling authority, the principal basis for its approach is a conception of the class action that substantially dissipates the case-or-controversy requirement as well as the necessity for adequate representation under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 ^a)(4). In the Court’s view, the litigation before «us is saved from mootness only by the fact that class certification occurred prior to appellant’s change in circumstance. In justification, the Court points to two significant consequences of certification. First, once certified, the class action may not be settled or dismissed without the district court’s approval. Second, if the action results in a judgment on the merits, the decision will bind all members found at the time of certification to be members of the class. These are significant aspects of class-action procedure, but it is not evident and not explained how and why these procedural consequences of certification modify the normal mootness considerations which would otherwise attach. Certification is no substitute for a live plaintiff with a personal interest in the case sufficient to make it an adversary proceeding. Moreover, certification is not irreversible or inalterable; it “may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.” Rule 23(c)(1).2 Furthermore, under Rule 23 (d)’ the court may make various types of orders in conducting the litigation, including an order that notice be given /of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action” and “requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation 2 See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1785, pp. 137-138 (1972); 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice T 23.50, p. 23-1103 (1974). 416 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 White, J., dissenting 419 U. S. of absent persons . . . .”3 , Class litigation is most often characterized by its complexity and concomitant flexibility of a court in managing it, and emphasis upon one point in the process flies in the face of that reality. The new certification procedure of Rule 23 (c)(1), as amended in 1966, was not intended to modify the strictures of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 82 that “[t]hese rules shall not be construed to extend . . . the jurisdiction of the United States district courts . . . Cf. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U. S. 332, 337-338 (1969x The intention behind the certification amendment, which had no counterpart in the earlier version of the rule, was merely “to give clear definition to the action . . . ,” Advisory Committee Note, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 7767; 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 1123.50, pp. 23-1101 to 23-1102 (1974), not as the Court would now have it, to avoid jurisdictional problems of mootness.4 It is claimed that the certified class supplies the necessary adverse parties for a continuing case or controversy 3 See 7A Wright & Miller, supra, n. 2, §§ 1793, 1974; 3B Moore, supra, n. 2, fl 23.72-23.74. 4 The Court apparently also does not view certification as the key to its holding since it mentions in dicta that some class actions will not be moot- even though the named representatives’ claims become moot prior to certification. If the district court does not have a reasonable amount of time within which to decide the certification question prior to the mooting of the named parties’ controversies, the Court says,i^[i]n such instances, whether the certification can be said to ‘relate back’ to the filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances of the particular case and especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review.” Ante, at 402 n. 11. If certification is not the factor which saves the case from mootness, it appears that the Court is satisfied that the case is a live controversy as long as an issue would otherwise not be reviewable here. The Court does not say whether the same flexible standard of mootness applies to cases appealable to the courts of appeals. SOSNA v. IOWA 417 393 White, J., dissenting with appellees. This is not true; but even if it were, the Court is left with the problem of determining whether the class action is still a good one and whether under Rule 23 (a)(4) appellant is a fair and adequate representative of the class. That appellant can no longer in any realistic sense be considered a member of the class makes these determinations imperative. The Court disposes of the problem to its own satisfaction by saying that it is unlikely that segments of the class appellant represents would have conflicting interests with those she has sought to advance and that because the interests of the class have been competently urged at each level of the proceeding the test of Rule 23 (a)(4) is met. The Court cites no authority for this retrospective decision as to the adequacy of representation which seems to focus on the competence of counsel rather than a party plaintiff who is a representative member of the class.5 At the very least, the case should be remanded to the District Court where these considerations could be explored and the desirability of issuing orders under Rule 23 (d) to protect the class might be considered. The Court’s refusal to remand for consideration of mootness and adequacy of representation can be explained only by its apparent notion that there may be categories of issues which will permit lower courts to pass upon them but which by their very nature will become moot before this Court can address them. Thus it is said that “no single challenger will remain subject to [the residency requirement] for the period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion.” Ante, at 400. Hence, 5 The general rule has been that the “[q]uality of representation embraces both the competence of the legal counsel of the representatives and the stature and interest of the named parties themselves.” 7 Wright & Miller, supra, n. 2, § 1766, pp. 632-633 (footnotes omitted). The decisions in the past have rested on several considerations. See id., at 633-635. 418 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Marshall, J., dissenting 419 U. S. the Court perceives the need for a general rule which will eliminate the problem. Article III, however, is an “awkward” limitation. It prevents all federal courts from addressing some important questions; there is nothing surprising in the fact that it may permit only the lower federal courts to address other questions. Article III is not a rule always consistent with judicial economy. Its overriding purpose is to define the boundaries separating the branches and to keep this Court from assuming a legislative perspective and function. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 96 (1968). The ultimate basis of the Court’s decision must be a conclusion that the issue presented is an important and recurring one which should be finally resolved here. But this notion cannot override constitutional limitations. Because I find that the case before the Court has become moot, I must respectfully dissent. Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting. The Court today departs sharply from the course we have followed in analyzing durational residency requirements since Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). Because I think the principles set out in that case and its progeny compel reversal here, I respectfully dissent. As we have made clear in Shapiro and subsequent cases, any classification that penalizes exercise of the constitutional right to travel is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest. As recently as last Term we held that the right to travel requires that States provide the same vital governmental benefits and privileges to recent immigrants that they do to longtime residents. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 261 (1974). Although we recognized that not all durational residency requirements are penalties SOSNA v. IOWA 419 393 Marshall, J., dissenting upon the exercise of the right to travel interstate,1 we held that free medical aid, like voting, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and welfare assistance, see Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, was of such fundamental importance that the State could not constitutionally condition its receipt upon long-term residence. After examining Arizona’s justifications for restricting the availability of free medical services^ we concluded that the State had failed to show that in pursuing legitimate objectives it had chosen means that did not impinge unnecessarily upon constitutionally protected interests. The Court’s failure to address the instant case in these terms suggests a new distaste for the mode of analysis we havdilapplied to this corner of equal protection law. In its stead, the Court has employed what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test, under which the State’s putative interest in ensuring that its divorce petitioners establish some roots in Iowra is said to justify the one-year residency requirement. I am concerned not only about the disposition of this case, but also about the implications of the majority’s analysis for other divorce statutes and for durational residency requirement cases in general. I The Court omits altogether what should be the first inquiry: whether the right to obtain a divorce is of sufficient importance that its denial to recent immigrants constitutes a penalty on interstate travel. In my view, it clearly meets that standard. The previous decisions of this Court make it plain that the right of marital association is one of the most basic rights conferred on the individual by the State. The interests associated 1 Memorial Hospital, v. Maricopa. County, 415 U. S., at 256-259; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 638 n. 21. 420 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Marshall, J., dissenting with marriage and divorce have repeatedly been accorded particular deference, and the right to marry has been termed “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971^ we recognized that the right to seek dissolution of the marital relationship was closely related to the right to marry, as both involve the voluntary adjustment of the same fundamental human relationship. Id., at 383. Without further laboring the point, I think it is clear beyond cavil that the right to seek dissolution of the marital relationship is of such fundamental importance that denial of this right to the class of recent interstate travelers penalizes interstate travel within the meaning of Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County. II Having determined that the interest in obtaining a divorce is of substantial social importance, I would scrutinize Iowa’s durational residency requirement to determine whether it constitutes a reasonable means of furthering important interests asserted by the State. The Court, however, has not only declined to apply the “compelling interest” test to this case, it has conjured up possible justifications for the State’s restriction in a manner much more akin to the lenient standard we have in the past applied in analyzing equal protection challenges to business regulations. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-428 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U. S. 552, 557 (1947); but see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 376 (1974). I continue to be of the view that the “rational basis” test has no place in equal protection analysis when important individual interests with constitutional implications are at stake, see San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 SOSNA v. IOWA 421 393 Marshall, J., dissenting U. S. 1,109 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471,520-522 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But whatever the ultimate resting point of the current readjustments in equal protection analysis, the Court has clearly directed that the proper standard to apply to cases in which state statutes have penalized the exercise of the right to interstate travel is the “compelling interest” test. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 634, 638; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 238 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 342-343; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S., at 262-263. The Court proposes three defenses for the Iowa statute: first, the residency requirement merely delays receipt of the benefit in question—it does not deprive the applicant of the benefit altogether; second, since significant social consequences may follow from the conferral of a divorce, the State may legitimately regulate the divorce process; and third, the State has interests both in protecting itself from use as a “divorce mill” and in protecting its judgments from possible collateral attack in other States. In my view, the first two defenses provide no significant support for the statute in question here. Only the third has any real force. A With the first justification, the Court seeks to distinguish the Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County cases. Yet the distinction the Court draws seems to me specious. Iowa’s residency requirement, the Court says, merely forestalls access to the courts; applicants seeking welfare payments, medical aid, and the right to vote, on the other hand, suffer unrecoverable losses throughout the waiting period. This analysis, however, ignores the severity of the deprivation suffered by the divorce petitioner who is forced to wait a year for relief. See Stanley v. Illinois, 422 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Marshall, J., dissenting 405 U. S. 645, 647 (1972). The injury accompanying that delay is not directly measurable in money terms like the loss of welfare benefits, but it cannot reasonably be argued that when the year has elapsed, the petitioner is made whole. The year’s wait prevents remarriage and locks both partners into what may be an intolerable, destructive relationship. Even applying the Court’s argument on its own terms, I fail to see how the Maricopa County case can be distinguished. A potential patient may well need treatment for a single ailment. Under Arizona statutes he would have had to wait a year before he could be treated. Yet the majority’s analysis would suggest that Mr. Evaro’s claim for nonemergency medical aid is not cognizable because he would “eventually qualify for the same sort of [service],” ante, at 406. The Court cannot mean that Mrs. Sosna has not suffered any injury by being foreclosed from seeking a divorce in Iowa for a year. It must instead mean that it does not regard that deprivation as being very severe.2 B I find the majority’s second argument no more persuasive. The Court forgoes reliance on the usual justifications for durational residency requirements—budgetary considerations and administrative convenience, see Shapiro, 394 U. S., at 627-638; Maricopa County, 415 U. S., at 262-269. Indeed, it would be hard to make a persuasive argument that either of these interests is significantly 2 The majority also relies on its “mere delay” distinction to dispose of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), see ante, at 410. Yet even though the majority in Boddie relied on due process rather than equal protection, I am fully convinced that if the Connecticut statute in question in that case had required indigents to wait a year for a divorce, the statute would still have been constitutionally infirm, see 401 U. S., at 383-386 (Douglas, J., concurring in result), a point the Court implicitly rejects today. SOSNA v. IOWA 423 393 Marshall, J., dissenting implicated in this case. In their place, the majority invokes a more amorphous justification—the magnitude of the interests affected and resolved by a divorce proceeding. Certainly the stakes in a divorce are weighty both for the individuals directly involved in the adjudication and for others immediately affected by it. The critical importance of the divorce process, however, weakens the argument for a long residency requirement rather than strengthens it. The impact of the divorce decree only underscores the necessity that the State’s regulation be evenhanded.3 It is not enough to recite the State’s traditionally exclusive responsibility for regulating family law matters; some tangible interference with the State’s regulatory scheme must be shown. Yet in this case, I fail to see how any legitimate objective of Iowa’s divorce regulations would be frustrated by granting equal access to new state residents.4 To draw’ on an analogy, the States have great interests in the local voting process and wide latitude in regulating that process. Yet one regulation that the States may not impose is an unduly long residency requirement. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330,^1972). To remark, as the Court does, that because of the consequences riding on a divorce decree “Iowa may insist that one seeking to initiate such a proceeding have the modicum of attachment to the State required here” 3 The majority identifies marital status, property rights, and custody and support arrangements as the important concerns commonly resolved by divorce proceedings. But by declining to exercise divorce jurisdiction over its new citizens, Iowa does not avoid affecting these weighty social concerns; instead, it freezes them in an unsatisfactory state that it would not require its long-time residents to endure. 4 A durational requirement such as Iowa’s 90-day conciliation period would not, of course, be subject to an equal protection challenge, as it is required uniformly of all divorce petitioners. 424 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Marshall, J., dissenting 419 U. S. is not to make an argument, but merely to state the result. C The Court’s third justification seems to me the only one that warrants close consideration. Iowa has a legitimate interest in protecting itself against invasion by those seeking quick divorces in a forum with relatively lax divorce laws, and it may have some interest in avoiding collateral attacks on its decree in other States.5 These interests, however, would adequately be protected by a simple requirement of domicile—physical presence plus intent to remain—which would remove the rigid one-year barrier while permitting the State to restrict the availability of its divorce process to citizens who are genuinely its own.6 5 Appellees do not rely on these factors to support the Iowa statute. In their brief appellees argue that the legislature’s determination to impose a one-year residency requirement was reasonable “in the light of the interest of the State of Iowa in a dissolution proceeding.” Brief for Appellees 8. The full faith and credit argument* • is mentioned only in the middle of a long quotation from another court’s opinion, id., at 9. This is hardly sufficient to meet the requirement of a “clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest.” Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 238 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 406-409 (1963). 6 The availability of a less restrictive alternative such as a domicile requirement weighs heavily in testing a challenged state regulation against the “compelling interest” standard. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 638; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 342, 350352 (1972); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S., at 267; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). Since the Iowa courts have in effect interpreted the residency statute to require proof of domicile as well as one year’s residence, see Korsrud v. Korsrud, 242 Iowa 178, 45 N. W. 2d 848 (1951); Jvlson v. Jvlson, 255 Iowa 301, 122 N. W. 2d 329 (1963), a shift to a “pure” domicile test would impose no new burden on the State’s factfinding process. SOSNA v. IOWA 425 393 Marshall, J., dissenting The majority notes that in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945), the Court held that for ex parte divorces one State’s finding of domicile could, under limited circumstances, be challenged in the courts of another. From this, the majority concludes that since Iowa’s findings of domicile might be subject to collateral attack elsewhere, it should be permitted to cushion its findings with a one-year residency requirement. For several reasons, the year’s waiting period seems to me neither necessary nor much of a cushion. First, the Williams opinion was not aimed at States seeking to avoid becoming divorce mills. Quite the opposite, it was rather plainly directed at States that had cultivated a “quickie divorce” reputation by playing fast and loose with findings of domicile. See id., at 236-237; id., at 241 (Murphy, J., concurring). If Iowa wishes to avoid becoming a haven for divorce seekers, it is inconceivable that its good-faith determinations of domicile would not meet the rather lenient full faith and credit standards set out in Williams. A second problem with the majority’s argument on this score is that Williams applies only to ex parte divorces. This Court has held that if both spouses were before the divorcing court, a foreign State cannot recognize a collateral challenge that would not be permissible in the divorcing State. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951); Cook v. Coo/cS342 U. S. 126 (1951). Therefore, the Iowa statute sweeps too broadly even as a defense to possible collateral attacks*since it imposes a one-year requirement whenever the respondent does not reside in the State, regardless of whether the proceeding is ex parte." ~ This problem could be cured in large part if the State waived its year's residency requirement whenever the respondent agrsed to consent to the court’s jurisdiction. 426 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Marshall, J., dissenting 419 U. S. Third, even a one-year period does not provide complete protection against collateral attack. It merely makes it somewhat less likely that a second State will be able to find “cogent evidence” that Iowa’s determination of domicile was incorrect. But if the Iowa court has erroneously determined the question of domicile, the year’s residence will do nothing to preclude collateral attack under Williams. Finally, in one sense the year’s residency requirement may technically increase rather than reduce the exposure of Iowa’s decrees to collateral attack. Iowa appears to be among the States that have interpreted their divorce residency requirements as being of jurisdictional import.8 Sincfe a State’s divorce decree1 is subject to collateral challenge in a foreign forum for any jurisdictional flaw that would void it in the State’s own courts, New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610 (1947), the* residency requirement exposes Iowa divorce proceedings to attack both for failure to prove domicile and for failure to prove one year’s residence. If nothing else, this casts doubt on the majority’s speculation that Iowa’s residency requirement may have been intended as a statutory shield for its divorce decrees. In sum, concerns about the need 8 See Hinds v. Hinds, 1 Iowa 36 (1855); Williamson v. Williamson, 179 Iowa 489, 495, 161 N. W. 482, 485 (1917); Korsrud v. Korsrud, supra; Schaefer v. Schaefer, 245 Iowa 1343, 1350, 66 N. W. 2d 428, 433 (1954); cf. White v. White, 138 Conn. 1, 81 A. 2d 450 (1951); Wyman v. Wyman, 212 N. W. 2d 368 (Minn. 1973); Camp v. Camp, 21 Mise. 2d 908, 189 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (1959) (construing Florida law). While the Williams case establishes .that collateral attack can always be mounted against the divorcing State’s finding of domicile, other States have provided that failure to meet the durational residency requirement is not jurisdictional and thus does nor provide an independent basis for collateral attack, see, e. g., Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S. W. 2d 840 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1973};' Hammond v. Hammond, 45 Wash. 2d 855, 278 P. 2d 387 (1954) (construing Idaho law). SOSNA v. IOWA 427 393 Marshall, J., dissenting for a long residency requirement to defray collateral attacks on state judgments seem more fanciful than real. If, as the majority assumes, Iowa is interested in assuring itself that its divorce petitioners are legitimately Iowa citizens, requiring petitioners to provide convincing evidence of bona fide domicile should be more than adequate to the task.9 Ill I conclude that the course Iowa has chosen in restricting access to its divorce courts unduly interferes with the right to “migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 629. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for entry of an order granting relief if the court finds that there is a continuing controversy in this case. See Staff el v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974); Johnson v. New York State Education Dept., 409 U. S. 75, 79 n. 7 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 9 The majority argues that since most States require a year’s residence for divorce, Iowa gains refuge from the risk of collateral attack in the understanding solicitude of States with similar laws. Of course, absent unusual circumstances, a judgment by this Court striking down the Iowa statute would similarly affect the other States with one- and two-year residency requirements. For the same reason, the risk of subjecting Iowa to an invasion of divorce seekers seems minimal. If long residency requirements are held unconstitutional, Iowa will not stand conspicuously alone without a residency requirement “defense.” Moreover, its 90-day conciliation period, required of all divorce petitioners in the State, would still serve to discourage peripatetic divorce seekers who are looking for the quickest possible adjudication. 428 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Syllabus 419 U. S. INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CORP., COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT & SYSTEMS DIVISION v. LOCAL 134, INTERNATIONAL BROTHER- HOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 73-1313. Argued November 19, 1974— Decided January 14, 1975 Petitioner employer filed an unfair labor practice charge against respondent union under § 8 (b) (4) (D) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to induce employees to strike to force an employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization. Section 10 (k) of the NLRA provides that whenever a §8 (b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice charge is filed, the National Labor Relations Board shall hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice arose, unless within 10 days after notice that such charge has been filed the parties submit evidence that they have adjusted the dispute, in which case or upon compliance with the Board’s decision, such charge shall be dismissed. Pursuant to § 10 (k) a hearing was held before a hearing officer, and subsequently the Board rendered a decision adverse to respondent, which then indicated it would not comply therewith. The Board’s General Counsel thereafter issued a complaint on the unfair labor practice charge, and at a trial examiner’s hearing, at which the General Counsel was represented by the same attorney who had been the hearing officer in the § 10 (k) proceeding, the trial examiner concluded that respondent had violated §8 (b)(4)(D), and the Board issued a cease-and-desist order. The Court of Appeals, on respondent’s petition to set aside the order, agreed that respondent had violated §8 (b)(4)(D), but refused to enforce the order, on the ground that because the § 10 (k) hearing officer had participated in both the § 10 (k) and the §8 (b)(4)(D) proceedings, the Board had not complied with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 1 ITT v. ELECTRICAL WORKERS 429 428 Syllabus U. S. C. § 554 (a), which prohibits commingling prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in agency proceedings, and generally applies to “every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.,” 5 U. S. C. § 551 (7) defining “adjudication” as “agency process for the formulation of an order,” and § 551 (6) defining “order” as “the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making.” Held: The APA, 5 U. S. C. § 554, does not govern proceedings conducted under § 10 (k) of the NLRA. Pp. 441-448. (a) The § 10 (k) determination is not itself a “final disposition” within the meaning of “order” and “adjudication” in the APA. When Congress defined “order” in terms of a “final disposition,” it required that “final disposition” to have some determinate consequences for the party to the proceeding, and here the Board does not order anybody to do anything at the conclusion of the § 10 (k) proceeding. Pp. 441-444. (b) Nor is such determination “agency process for the formulation of an order” within the meaning of 5 U. S. C. §551 (7). Although important prh’otical consequences in the § 8 (b) (4) (D) proceeding result.'from the Board’s determination in the §10 (k) proceeding, they do not alone make the § 10 (k) proceeding related to the § 8 (b) (4) (D) proceeding in a manner that would make the former “agency process” for the formulation of the order of the latter. The § 10 (k) proceeding is unlike the typical hearing before an administrative law judge which is then subject to consideration by the* agency. The issues in a § 10 (k) proceeding are similar to but not identical with the focus of the § 8 (b) (4) (D) proceeding. The standard of proof is different, and the inquiry in a § 8 (b) (4) (D) proceeding is whether the union engaged in forbidden conduct with a forbidden objective. The proceedings are separate, and the agency makes the determination in each of them. Pp. 444-448. 486 F. 2d 863, reversed and remanded. Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Matthew E. Murray argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was John D. O’Brien. Robert E. Fitzgerald, Jr., argued the cause for respondent Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical 430 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. Workers. With him on the brief was Edward J. Calihan, Jr. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent National Labor Relations Board in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, and Patrick Hardin. Charles V. Koons, Irving M. Friedman, and Harold A. Katz filed a brief for respondent Communications Workers of America in support of petitioner. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1947 Congress responded to the labor unrest caused by jurisdictional disputes by adding §8 (b)(4)(D) to the National Labor Relations Act, which made it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to induce the employees of any employer to strike in the hopes of forcing an employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization.1 In the belief 1 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 542, §8 (b)(4)(D), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (D), presently provides: “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is— “(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is ITT v. ELECTRICAL WORKERS 431 428 Opinion of the Court that resolution of jurisdictional disputes was more important to industrial peace than the imposition of unfair labor practice sanctions, NLRB v. Radio Engineers, 364 U. S. 573, 576-577 (1961) ^hereinafter CBS), Congress at the same time enacted § 10 (k), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (k),2 to induce unions to settle their differences without awaiting unfair labor practice proceedings and enforcement of Board orders by courts of appeals. One year earlier Congress had responded to the many expressed concerns for fairness and regularity in the administrative process summarized in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 36-41 (1950), by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (Act).3 Section 5 of that Act, nowr 5 U. S. C. § 554, establishes requirements governing certain agency proceedings that come within the Act’s definition of “adjudication.” We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work.” 2 Title 29 U. S. C. § 160 (k) provides: “Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 158 (b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge * has been filed, the part ies to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidencS that they' have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.” 3 60 Stat. 237, as codified by an Act to enact Title 5, United States Code, 80 Stat. 378. Slight modifications in the Act sections under consideration in this case were made at the time of codification, but no substantive changes were intended. H. R. Rep. No. 901, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965); S. Rep. No. 1380, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1966). 432 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the "Court 419 U. S. case, 416 U. S. 981 (1974), to review its conclusion that 5 U. S. C. § 554 applied to a § 10 (k) proceeding conducted by the Board, 486 F. 2d 863 (1973). Another Court of Appeals had decided a short time earlier that such a Board proceeding was not subject to § 554, Bricklayers v. NLRB, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 47, 475 F. 2d 1316 (1973). The case now before us arose out of a jurisdictional dispute between respondent Local 134 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (JBEWr) (hereafter respondent) and the Communications Workers of America (CWA) over whose members would perform certain telephone installation work in Cook County, Ill. Petitioner International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., which had a nationwide collective-bargaining agreement with the CWA, had established a communications equipment and systems division to sell and install private telephone systems.'1 In 1970 petitioner entered into a contract with the village of Elk Grove, Ill., for the installation and sale of a switching system and relafcd telephone and circuitry work. Since employees of the Illinois Bell Telephone Co., who were members of respondent, had already run trunklines from the local operating telephone system to the Administrative Office of the village, petitioner’s contract covered only the remaining two stages necessary to complete installation of the system. First the telephone cable had to be routed from the telephone room in the basement to the telephone instruments in particular rooms and offices by a process known as “pulling cable”; petitioner subcontracted this work to the C. A. Riley Electric Construction Co., 4 The division was organized to take advantage of a ruling by the Federal Communications Commission that private telephone systems could be interconnected with an operating telephone company system. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F. C. C. 2d 420 (1968). ITT v. ELECTRICAL WORKERS 433 428 Opinion of the Court whose employees are represented by respondent. Second, by a process known as “terminating the cable,” the cable would be connected to the telephone instruments. Petitioner planned to have its own technicians, who were represented by the CWA, perform this work. C. A. Riley had hoped to perform the terminating work and inquired of petitioner’s supervisor whether that was possible. The supervisor informed Riley of petitioner’s plan to have its own employees do the work, and Riley told the supervisor that petitioner’s representatives had better meet with the business agent of respondent. On two occasions petitioner’s representative^ met with the union business agent, who told them that respondent installed all telephone equipment in Cook County and that CWA members would install no telephone equipment in Cook ^County. On the second occasion the respondent’s business agent was quite explicit: “We’d better get that work or there will be trouble.” 5 When CWA employes appeared at the jobsite on December 3, 1970, to begin their portion of the work, all of respondent’s members left their jobs.6 That after 5197 N. L. R. B. 879ffc81 (1972). G The respondent’s business agent had been notified the previous evening that petitioner’s employees; would begin their work on December 3. When petitioner’s two employees reported to the basement telephone room for work, two of respondent's members, who were employed by the Illinois? Bell Telephone Co., packed up their tools and left because they would not work with CWA members. Respondent’s steward entered the room and demanded to see petitioner’s employees’ union cards. When they could not produce Local 134 membership cards, the steward announced, “I can’t work here” or "we can’t work here.” Ibid. Aft|l this comment, four or five employees of the Johnson Electric Co., who also were members of Local 134, drifted away. At a coffee break a few moments lifter, the steward told all the assembled members of Local 134 that he was going home because he did not want to work with “nonunion” men. 434 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. noon a representative of the village of Elk Grove met with petitioner’s regional sales manager, and they agreed to pull petitioner’s employees off the job temporarily. Representatives of respondent were informed, and all Local 134 employees thereafter returned to work.7 On December 3, 1970, petitioner filed a charge alleging that respondent had violated §8 (b^(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(4)(D). The Board’s Regional Director found reasonable cause to believe that the charge had merit and proceeded in accordance with the language of § 10 (k): “Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 158 (b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (k). Respondent was notified that a hearing would be conducted by a hearing officer 8 upon the dispute alleged in The other Local 134 members also left the jobsite at that time, and none worked on the job for the rest of the day. 7 Petitioner’s employe^, remained off the job until December 21, at which time they returned and performed the terminating work. Respondent’s members, who had worked on the project as employees of Riley, Illinois Bell, and the Johnson Electric Co., had completed their work by December 21 so that no second confrontation occurred. 8 The Board’s regulations provided that a “hearing officer” is ITT v. ELECTRICAL WORKERS 435 428 Opinion of the Court the charge, and the hearing was held on March 12, 15, and 17, 1971, with Stephen S. Schulson, an attorney in the regional office, presiding. All parties appeared at the hearing and were given full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to adduce evidence bearing on the issues. In accordance with NLRB regulations, the record was transmitted to the Board for decision without any recommendation from the hearing officer.9 The Board received briefs from petitioner, respondent, and the CWA, and concluded that employees represented by the CWA were entitled to perform the work in dispute. 191 N. L. R. B. 828 (1971). On August 30, 1971, respondent notified the Regional Director that it would not comply with the Board’s § 10 (k) determination. The Regional Director, on behalf of the Board’s General Counsel, then issued a complaint upon the § 8 (b)(4)(D) unfair labor practice charge that had been held in abeyance pending the attempt to resolve the dispute pursuant to the § 10 (k) proceeding. At the hearing before a trial examiner, the General Counsel was represented by the same attorney who had presided over the compilation of testimony for “the agent of the Board conducting the hearing in a proceeding under section 9 or in a dispute proceeding under section 10 (k) of the act.” 29 CFR § 102.6 (1971). A hearing officer “normally is an attorney or field examiner attached to the regional office but may be another qualified official.” 29 CFR § 101.20(c). The “hearing officer” is to be distinguished from a “trial examiner,” who presides over unfair labor practice proceedings. 29 CFR §102.6. The Board's current regulation is identical to the regulation in force at the time of the § 10 (k) proceeding of the present case except that the term “trial examiner” has been changed to “administrative law judge,” 29 CFR § 102.6 (1974). See 37 Fed. Reg. 16787 (1972). ' 9 The Board’s regulations, 29 CFR §101.34, require the hearing officer to transmit the record to the Board but provide that he shall make “no recommendations in regard to resolution of the dispute.” 436 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. the Board in the § 10 (k) proceeding. The trial examiner concluded that respondent had violated § 8 (b)(4)(D) and he recommended that it bei‘(6) the certification of worker representatives. “(b) Persons entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of— “(1) the time, place, and nature of the hearings; “(2) the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; and “(3) the matters of fact and law asserted. “When private persons are the moving parties, other parties to the proceeding shall give prompt notice of issues controverted in fact or law; and in other instances agencies may by rule require responsive pleading. In fixing the 'time and place for hearings, due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives. “(c) The agency shall give all interested parties opportunity for— “(1) the submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment when time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit; and “(2) to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine a controversy by consent, hearing and decision on notice and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title. “(d) The employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section 556 of this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision required by section 557 of this title, unless he becomes unavailable to the agency. Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law, such an employee may not— “(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate; or “(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency. “An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this ■ 438 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion of the Court 419 U. S. § 554 (d), which prohibits commingling prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. See n. 12, supra. Even though the Board had argued that the § 10 (k) proceeding “was without binding effect on anyone” so that “it was not improper for the same person to perform the functions of hearing officer and subsequently prosecute an unfair labor practice charge based upon the evidence adduced at that hearing,” the Court of Appeals relied upon this Court’s opinion in NLRB v. Plasterers’ Union, 404 U. S. 116 (1971)* to support its conclusion that “the hearing officer’s rulings at the § 10 (k) hearing largely determine what evidence the Board will have to consider at the Unfair Labor Practice Hearing . . . .” 486 F. 2d, at 866-867. With that perspective, the Court of Appeals found the attorney’s participation to be “plainly inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of the Act.” Id., at 868. I To determine whether § 554 governs proceedings conducted under § 10 (k) of the National Labor Relations Act necessitates some understanding of both statutory provisions which, as noted above, were enacted within a year of each other. The Administrative Procedure Act was aptly described in Wong Yang Sung, supra, as “a new, basic and comprehensive regulation of procedures in many agencies,” 339 U. S., at 36. The Court there title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This subsection does not apply— “(A) in determining applications for initial licenses; “(B) to proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities or carriers; or “(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency. “ (e) The agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty.” ITT v. ELECTRICAL WORKERS 439 428 Opinion of the Court further observed that the Act “contains many compromises and generalities and, no doubt, some ambiguities.” Id., at 40-Al. Because it was designed to regulate administrative proceedings throughout a wide spectrum of agency activities, its language is necessarily abstract in many places. The more we may know about the particular agency proceeding to which the Act is sought to be applied, the better we w’ill be able to apply it. The events leading up to the enactment of § § 8 (b)(4)(D) and 10 (k) have been recounted by this Court in CBS, supra, and Plasterers’ Union, supra, and need not here be reviewed in detail. Congress made the judgment “that it is more important to industrial peace that jurisdictional disputes be settled permanently than it is that unfair labor practice sanctions for jurisdictional strikes be imposed upon unions.” CBS, 364 U. S., at 577. Voluntary and therefore prompt resolution of such jurisdictional disputes is encouraged both by the 10-day grace period following notice of the filing of an unfair labor practice charge, and by the dismissal of such a charge if the union complies with the Board’s adverse § 10 (k) determination. 29 CFR § 101.36. To effectuate the congressional objective of prompt resolution of jurisdictional disputes, almost from the date of the enactment of § 10 (k), the Board has applied procedures to proceedings under that section that are quite different from those of a proceeding under § 8 (b) (4) (D). The § 10 (k) hearing is described in the Board’s regulations: “If the parties have not adjusted the dispute or agreed upon methods of voluntary adjustment, a hearing, usually open to the public, is held before a hearing officer. The hearing is nonadversary in character, and the primary interest of the hearing officer is to insure that the record contains as full a 440 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion of the Court statement of the pertinent facts as may be necessary for a determination of the issues by the Board. All parties are afforded full opportunity to present their respective positions and to produce evidence in support of their contentions. The parties are permitted to argue orally on the record before the hearing officer. At the close of the hearing, the case is transmitted to the Board for decision. The hearing officer prepares an analysis of the issues and the evidence, but makes no recommendations in regard to resolution of the dispute.” 29 CFR § 101.34. Streamlined procedures were both designed and justified because “the decision in the proceedings under Section 10 (k) is a preliminary administrative determination made for the purpose of attempting to resolve a dispute within the meaning of that section; the unfair labor practice itself is litigated at a subsequent hearing before a Trial Examiner in the event the dispute remains unresolved.” National Union of Marine; Cooks & Stewards (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.), 83 N. L. R. B. 341 (1949).13 13 The Board has adhered consistently to this position. See, e. g., International Longshoremen’s . v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 417 U. S. 932 ; No. 73-5265. Kokoszka v. Belford, Trustee in Bankruptcy, 417 U. S. 642; No. 73-5547. Huguez v. California, 418 U. S. 905; and No. 73-6298. Frazier v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 416 U. S. 990. Petitions for rehearing denied. ORDERS 887 419 U. S. October 15, 1974 No. 73-6305. O’Brien v. California, 417 U. S. 936; No. 73-6328. O’Kelly v. Iowa, 417 U. S. 936; No. 73-6397. Sims v. Utah, 417 U. S. 970; No. 73-6447. McKernie v. United States. 417 U. S. 934; No. 73-6518. Crandall v. Texas, 417 U. S. 902; No. 73-6519. Winkfield v. Ohio, 417 U. S. 902; No. 73-6525. Mendes v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., et al., 417 U. S. 916; No. 73-6570. Hall v. Alabama, 417 U. S. 917; No. 73-6597. Carter v. Estelle, Corrections Director, et al., 417 U. S. 966 ; No. 73-6615. Lane v. Kern, Sheriff, 417 U. S. 972; No. 73-6619. Hunter v. Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division, et al., 417 U. S. 966; No. 73-6653. Bartos v. Brigham Young University et al., 417 U. S.973; No. 73-6654. Sangster v. United States, 417 U. S. 950; and No. 73-6688. Kaplan v. Associated-East Mortgage Co., 417 U. S. 950. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 73-740. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Assn, et al. v. A. Cherney Disposal Co. et al., 414 U. S.1131; No. 73-1091. Peachtree News Co., Inc. v. United States, 418 U. S. 932; No. 73-1161. Paris Adult Theatre I et al. v. Slaton, District Attorney, et al., 418 U. S. 939; No. 73-1388. Mead et al. v. Horvitz Publishing Co. etal.,416U. S. 985; and No. 73-5150. O’Brien v. California, 414 U. S. 1006. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. 888 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 15, 21, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-5863. Valley v. United States, 416 U. S. 936; 417 U. S. 927; and No. 73-6195. Sayles v. Gesell, U. S. District Judge, 416 U. S. 934 ; 417 U. S. 937. Motions for leave to file second petitions for rehearing denied. No. 73-6589. Sayles v. Sirica, U. S. District Judge, et al., 417 U. S. 943. Petition for rehearing and other relief denied. October 21, 1974 Affirmed on Appeal No. 73-1371. New York on Behalf of New York County et al. v. United States et al. ; and No. 73-1740. New York on Behalf of New York County et al. v. United States et al. Affirmed on appeals from D. C. D. C. No. 74-183. Koplin et al. v. Village of Hinsdale et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. No. 74-194. Wall et al. v. Hardwick et al.; and No. 74 196. Hardwick et al. v. Wall et al. Affirmed on appeals from D. C. N. D. Ga. Reported below: 379 F. Supp. 175. No. 73-1612. Luetkemeyer et al. v. Kaufmann et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. W. D. Mo. Reported below: 364 F. Supp. 376. Mr. Justice White, joined by The Chief Justice, dissenting. Missouri provides bus transportation to school for public school children, but not for private* school children, living specified distances from their schools. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 167.231, 167.251, 163.161 (1969). Appellant Urban Luetkemeyer, a Missouri taxpayer, sends his children, in accordance with his religious conscience, to ORDERS 889 888 White, J., dissenting a school related to the Roman Catholic Church. He brought this lawsuit claiming that that the denial of bus transportation to parochial school children violates his and his children’s due process, equal protection, and free exercise rights. The District Court, Judge Gibson dissenting, ruled in favor of appellees, and this Court now summarily affirms. In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), the Court upheld a state statute authorizing local school districts to provide bus transportation to school for parochial school children. This case presents the question whether in some circumstances a State may be constitutionally compelled to provide such transportation. This Court has never ruled on this question. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 (1973); Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 16. In Everson the Court noted that persons could not be excluded by a State “because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). The Court found that the New Jersey statute in question “does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.” Id., at 18. Clearly this Court viewed the program of bus transportation as a service “so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function . . .” that it could not be considered aid to religious schools in violation of the Establishment Clause. Ibid. See also Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 781782 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 242 (1968). The District Court in this case rejected appellants’ equal protection claim on the ground that the Missouri program, in excluding private school children from the bus service, was in pursuit of a valid state interest in 890 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U.S. “maintaining a very high wall between church and state.” 364 F. Supp. 376, 383 (WD Mo. 1973). The enforcement of church-state separation could in many instances be a valid state interest, but after Everson it would be difficult to assert that refusal to extend busing to parochial school children, without more, furthers a legitimate state interest in avoiding church-state entanglements. On the contrary, the “benefits of public welfare legislation”—here a “general program to help parents get their childen . . . safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools,” Everson, supra, at 16, 18— seem to be denied because certain students are seeking religious training. Without a valid interest supporting the different treatment accorded public school and parochial school students, that classification would violate federal equal protection principles. Moreover, the arbitrariness of the denial of a general public service raises the question whether the State has not become the “adversary” of the religion and has placed burdens on appellants’ free exercise rights. I would note probable jurisdiction and set this case for argument. No. 73-1718. Franchise Tax Board ok California et al. v. United Americans for Public Schools et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. Mr. Justice White, joined by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting. The District Court struck down the California statute providing state income-tax reductions for taxpayers sending their children to nonpublic schools. The Court summarily affirms this judgment. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 813-824 (1973), I disagree and respectfully dissent. ORDERS 891 419 U.S. October 21, 1974 No. 74-377. Kanapaux v. Ellisor, Director, South Carolina State Election Commission, et al. Appeal from D. C. S. C. Motions of John C. West et al. and Charles D. Ravenel for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Judgment affirmed. Appeals Dismissed No. 73-7028. Bulgren v. California. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. No. 74-143. Camp et al. v. Straughn, Director, Department of Revenue, et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 293 So. 2d 689. No. 74-148. Southern Haulers, Inc. v. Department of Public Safety et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ala. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 292 Ala. 380, 295 So. 2d 242. No. 74-192. City of Virginia, Minnesota, et al. v. Nyberg et al. Appeal from C. A. 8th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Mr. Justice White would postpone question of jurisdiction to hearing of case on the merits. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1342. Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded No. 73-2047. Buck et al. v. Impeach Nixon Committee et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to ascertain whether a case or controversy still exists, and, if so, for reconsideration in light of Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974). Reported below: 498 F. 2d 37. 892 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-6795. Hayles v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Upon representation of the Solicitor General set forth in his brief for the United States filed September 19, 1974, judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated and case remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas to permit the Government to dismiss the charges against petitioner. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissent. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 125. Miscellaneous Orders No. 73-296. Huffman et al. v. Pursue, Ltd. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ohio. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 415 U. S. 974.] Brief for appellants does not comply with this Court’s Rules 39 and 40 with respect to conciseness, statement of questions without unnecessary detail, and printing of appendices thereto. Accordingly, as provided in paragraph 5 of Rule 40, brief of appellants is hereby stricken. Counsel for appellants may file a brief complying with the Rules within 20 days of the date of this order. Oral argument will be allowed only by counsel who have filed briefs that conform to the Rules. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. No. 73-1004. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad et al. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 912.] Motion of Charles H. Keating, Jr., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. No. 73-1446. Roe et al. v. Doe. Ct. App. N. Y. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 907.] Motion of American Civil Liberties Union et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae denied. Motions of Association of American Publishers, Inc., and American Psychiatric Assn, et al. for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. ORDERS 893 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 No. 73-6033. Roe et al. v. Norton, Commissioner of Welfare. Appeal from D. C. Conn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 415 U. S. 912.] Motion of children of appellants for divided argument with appellants and for additional time for oral argument granted, and 10 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Appellee also allotted 10 additional minutes for oral argument. No. 74- 167. United States Railway Assn. v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp, et al. Appeal from D. C. E. I). Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 802.] Motion of Trustees of Reading Co. for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Probable Jurisdiction Noted or Postponed No. 73-1461. Stanton v. Stanton. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Utah. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P. 2d 1010. No. 73-1933. United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 372 F. Supp. 616. No. 73-6587. Herring v. New York. Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Motion of appellant for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 43 App. Div. 2d 816, 351 N. Y. S. 2d 368. No. 73-6739. Costarelli v. Massachusetts. Appeal from Municipal Ct. of Boston. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits. Certiorari Granted No. 73-1531. Johnson et al. v. Mississippi et al. 0. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 488 F. 2d 284. 894 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-8. O’Connor v. Donaldson. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 507. No. 73-1994. Vella v. Ford Motor Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Question 1 presented by the petition which reads as follows: “Is a disabled seaman who contracted by trauma a permanent disease while in the service of a vessel entitled to maintenance and cure payments during the interim between the period the incident occurred and the time the disease was medically diagnosed and proclaimed incurable?” Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1374. No. 73-1995. Breed, Director, California Youth Authority v. Jones. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1160. No. 73-2055. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to the following questions: 1. Whether customers of a Member have an implied private right of action to compel SIPC to meet its alleged obligations to them under the Act, despite § 7 (b) thereof which grants that right only to the Securities and Exchange Commission? 2. If such a right of action can be implied, whether a receiver of a Member has standing to maintain it? Reported below; 496 F. 2d 145. No. 73-6650. Brown v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Reported below; 56 Ill. 2d 312, 307 N. E. 2d 356. No. 74-107. Preiser, Commissioner of Correctional Services of New York, et al. v. Newkirk. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma ORDERS 895 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 pauperis and certiorari granted. In addition to question presented by the petition, parties are directed to brief and argue question of mootness. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 1214. No. 74r-175. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy, et al. v. Henry et al. ; and No. 74-5176. Henry et al. v. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of petitioner in No. 74-5176 for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1231. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 73-7028 and 74-192, supra.) No. 73-1578. Iveli v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1237. No. 73-1663. Gardner v. United States; and No. 73-6631. Sano v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1399. No. 73-1809. United States v. Bradshaw. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 490 F. 2d 1097. No. 73-1838. Crisler, Commissioner of Public Safety of Mississippi, et al. v. Morrow et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 1053. No. 73-1878. Zane et al. v. United States; and No. 73-1901. Persky v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 683. No. 73-1922. First Presbyterian Church of Forest Park et al. v. Lowe et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 Ill. 2d 404, 308 N. E. 2d 801. 896 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U.S. No. 73-1930. Jeffries v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 315 A. 2d 163. No. 73-1952. Tosini v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below7: 495 F. 2d 1371. No. 73-1955. Amos v. United States. C. A. Sth Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1269. No. 73-1960. Angiulo v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 440. No. 73-1975. Ferraro v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 922. No. 73-1988. Texas City Dike & Marina, Inc. v. Brennan, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1115. No. 73-2003. Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 59. No. 73-2009. Savard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 490. No. 73-2032. Local 399, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 56. No. 73-2036. Inquipco, Inc., dba Industrial Equipment Co., et al. v. ¿Commerce Union Bank. Ct. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 515 S. W. 2d 651. No. 73-2046. Five Smiths, Inc. v. Hollaway et al. Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 1321. ORDERS 897 419 U.S. October 21, 1974 No. 73-2054. Hudson Berlind Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1200. No. 73-2067. Simpson v. Simpson. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 490 F. 2d 803. No. 73-6682. Martinez-Miramontes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 808. No. 73-6774. Ephraim v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 1405. No. 73-6807. Bowden v. United States; No. 73-6842. Adams v. United States; and No. 73-6906. Jenkins v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6841. Rosoto et al. v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 3d 939, 519 P. 2d 1065. No. 73-6846. Penick v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1105. No. 73-6885. Downen et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 314. No. 73-6901. Hodge v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1399. No. 73-6924. Garcia v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 395. No. 73-6927. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 9. 898 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-6960. Wynn v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6962. Hill v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6967. Villone v. United States; and No. 73-7002. Palmeri v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6970. Caulton v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 412. No. 73-6974. Torres v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 489 F. 2d 753. No. 73-6976. Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1371. No. 73-6977. Brooks v. Blackledge, Warden. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6979. Brooks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1371. No. 73-6984. Whittington v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 460. No. 73-7000. Huntley v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1370. No. 73-7009. Kilgariff v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7011. Weems v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 899 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 No. 73-7016. Viera v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7021. Howard v. United States et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7023. West v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1314. No. 73-7034. Clark v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 492. No. 73-7043. Ruiz v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1. No. 73-7044. Dorrough v. Congress of the United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7048. James v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 434. No. 73-7052. Ward v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 922. No. 73-7053. Bailley v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 19, 495 F. 2d 1075. No. 73-7056. Marshall v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1375. No. 73-7057. Disher et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below; 497 F. 2d 1265. No. 73-7062. Kopp v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7065. Bodey v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1370. 900 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-7068. Bowdach v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1172. No. 73-7072. Crowder v. Whitehead et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7078. Gisher v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1403. No. 73-7083. Ferguson v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U.S App. D. C. 268, 498 F. 2d 1001. No. 73-7100. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-38. Yokozeki v. State Bar of California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 3d 436, 521 P. 2d 858. No. 74-42. Cubic Corp. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-46. Equity Securities Corp, et al. v. El Khadem. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1224. No. 74-60. Tillem v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 N. J. Super. 421, 317 A. 2d 738. No. 74-64. Abate et al. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 799. No. 74-72. Fletcher v. American Security & Trust Co., Trustee. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 490 F. 2d 481. No. 74-79. Howard v. Pennsylvania. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 226 Pa. Super. 22, 312 A. 2d 54. ORDERS 901 419U.S. October 21, 1974 No. 74-82. Kittyhawk, Ltd., et al. v. City of Middletown, Ohio, et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. No. 74-86. Leonard v. Strauss. App. Term, Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 74-113. Keys v. Sawyer. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 876. No. 74-130. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Simpson, Administratrix, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 850. No. 74-134. Holsapple, a Minor, by Holsapple v. Woods, Superintendent, Odin Community Unit School District No. 700, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 49. No. 72-1727. Valen v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 479 F. 2d 467. No. 73-1950. Wallis v. O’Kier. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 1323. No. 73-2062. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 73-6760. Robinson v. New Jersey. Sup. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 65 N. J. 273, 321 A. 2d 234. No. 73-6909. White v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 3. 902 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-7022. Corbin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-106. Alberto-Culver Co. et al. v. LaMaur, Inc. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 618. No. 74^5058. Baker v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1370. No. 73-1477. Price v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. '1Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari in this case and summarily reverse the judgment. Reported below: 214 Va. 490, 201 S. E. 2d 798. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner, the manager of a movie theater, was convicted in the Corporation Court of the city of Danville, Va., of exhibiting an allegedly obscene motion picture entitled “Anomalies.” The statute under which he was convicted, Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-230 (Supp. 1973), provides in pertinent part: “Every person who knowingly . . . [p]reduces, promotes, prepares, presents, manages, directs, carries on or participates in, any obscene exhibitions or performances, including the exhibition or performance of any obscene motion picture . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” ORDERS 903 902 Brennan, J., dissenting As used in that section: “The word ‘obscene' . . . shall mean that which considered as a whole has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.” § 18.1-227 (1960). The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. This Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Virginia Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15‘(1973), and companion cases. 413 U. S. 912. On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed the conviction. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 18.1-230, as it incorporates the definition of “obscene” in § 18.1-227, is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, and because the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court was rendered after Miller, I would reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See *AIthough four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. 904 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. October 21, 1974 Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed material was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1526. Cangiano v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari in this case and summarily reverse the judgment. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 906. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Steav-art and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of transporting allegedly obscene materials in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1465, which provides in pertinent part as follows: “Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, ORDERS 905 904 Brennan, J., dissenting silhouette, drawing, figure, image^cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 491 F. 2d 906 (1974). I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which is similar in scope to § 1465,1 expressed the view that “[w]hatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face'?*’ 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 H973), I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his con * Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. 906 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U.S. viction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1548. Winslow v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42^47 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari in this case and summarily reverse the judgment. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the Corporation Court of the city of Norfolk, Virginia, of selling and distributing an allegedly obscene movie and an allegedly obscene magazine. The statute under which he was convicted, Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-228 (Supp. 1973), provides in pertinent part: “Every person who knowingly... [publishes, sells, rents, lends, transports in intrastate commerce, or distributes or exhibits any obscene item . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” As used in that section: “The word 'obscene’ . . . shall mean that which considered as a whole has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.” § 18.1-227 (1960). The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed by order on ORDERS 907 419 U.S. October 21, 1974 October 17, 1972. This Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), and companion cases. 413 U. S. 913. The Supreme Court of Virginia again affirmed the conviction. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 18.1-228, as it incorporates the definition of “obscene” in § 18.1-227, is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, and because the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia was rendered after Miller, I would reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). No. 73-1562. Jones v. United States et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. Petitioner, a lieutenant in the Air Force, was convicted by court-martial under Arts. 92 (failure to obey order or regulation), 10 U. S. C. § 892, and 134 (general article), 10 U. S. C. § 934, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. *Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. 908 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. His offense was “failure to do monitor duty.” Petitioner’s punishment was a fine of $1,500, to be paid in six monthly installments to be deducted from his paycheck.1 After exhausting his appeals, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court, 28 U. S. G. § 2241, on the ground that Art. 92 is unconstitutionally vague. The writ was denied below on the sole ground that petitioner was not in “custody” as required by § 2241. In my view, the District Court should have treated petitioner’s complaint as either one seeking a declaration that his punishment was not lawfully imposed, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, or one to compel expunction of his conviction, 28 U. S. C. § 1361, and reached the merits. Several Courts of Appeals have entertained actions to remove penalties imposed by military tribunals where the aggrieved plaintiffs were not confined, but presented constitutional challenges to the imposition of punishment. See Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 135 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 415 F. 2d 991 (1969) (suit protesting discharge and forfeiture of all pay and allowances); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F. 2d 277 (CAI 1965) (suit to compel correction of dishonorable discharge); Smith v. McNamara, 395 F. 2d 896 ^A10 1968) (dishonorable discharge); Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F. 2d 197 (CA5 1971) (protesting involuntary transfer to reserve status). See also Ragoni v. United States, 424 F. 2d 261 (CA3 1970) (bad-conduct discharge).2 1 The fine had not been fully paid when he filed the application for habeas corpus. 2 In addition, the Court of Claims has reviewed alleged constitutional defects in a court-martial conviction in adjudicating claims for backpay, 28 uiLc. § 1346; Augenblick v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 131, 377 F. 2d 586 (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 393 U. S. 348 (1969). In the two Courts of Appeals decisions to reject nonhabeas review, it did not appear that the Complainant was under a continuing disability as a result of disciplinary action. In Davies n. Clifford, ORDERS 909 907 Douglas, J., dissenting Petitioner’s lawsuit represents an effort to have his constitutional challenges to his conviction considered by an Art. Ill court. A determination of these claims by a federal court is an indispensable safeguard of the constitutional rights of an accused subject to military process. While the military tribunals have responded to some constitutional claims of criminal defendants—self-incrimination for example3—they have been less sensitive to others. We noted in O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U. S. 258, 265-266 (1969), that the military justice system has been ill-equipped to deal with claims of overbreadth and vagueness. The Uniform Code of Military Justice itself is fraught with opportunity for conflict between military authority and individual liberties. Articles 88 (contempt toward officials), 10 U. S. C. §888, 133 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman), 10 U. S. C. § 933, and 134 (general article), 10 U. S. C. §934, permit military authority to overbear protected individual expression. When this occurs, it is not surprising that military tribunals, reared in a setting where obedience and conformity are the watchwords, should tend to come down on the side of authority. Servicemen may challenge their confinement by habeas corpus to insure that constitutional objections to their 393 F. 2d 496 (CAI 1968), the court dismissed a suit to set aside a military conviction, but the dishonorable discharge it had produced had already been changed to an honorable one, and the plaintiff alleged no continuing penalty. In United States v. Carney, 406 F. 2d 1328 (CA2 1969), the court dismissed a similar suit without mentioning the penalty. 3 A privilege against self-incrimination is codified in Art. 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 831. By interpretation it has been expanded to include the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), by the Court of Military Appeals. See United States v. Tempia, 16 U. S. C. M. A. 629, 37 C. M. R. 249 (1967). 910 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. convictions received “fair consideration” before the military tribunals. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 144 (1953). To withhold the same opportunity from servicemen subjected to nonconfinement penalties raises a substantial federal question of a denial of equal protection. The absence of confinement does not render the punishment trivial. Penalties not involving imprisonment—discharges, forfeitures, demotions—are frequently employed by military authorities, often with devastating effect upon the life and livelihood of the affected serviceman. Judge Edgerton, writing for the Court of Appeals in Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, supra, stated the need for an alternative mechanism of review: “To hold that collateral review is contingent on confinement in every case would arbitrarily condition the serviceman’s access to civilian review of constitutional errors upon a factor unrelated to the gravity of the offense, the punishment, and the violations of the serviceman’s rights.” 135 U. S. App. D. C., at 6, 415 F. 2d, at 996. Moreover, refusal to entertain petitioner’s lawsuit gives rise to the substantial constitutional question posed by denial of access to the federal courts. Whether the Constitution permits Congress to forbid an Art. Ill court to review constitutional challenge to administrative penalties is a question the Court has not addressed explicitly. Instead the Court has construed statutory review provisions to permit a limited scrutiny to assure fair proceedings, Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22 (1939), and, on occasion, de novo determination of facts bearing upon constitutional claims, see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (1922); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). ORDERS 911 419U.S. October 21, 1974 See also 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 28.18 (1958). To hold that petitioner here is not entitled to a judicial determination of the constitutional objection is to impute to Congress a deliberate exclusion of review for a class of convictions, a course fraught with constitutional dangers which Congress has heretofore eschewed. I would grant certiorari. No. 73-1639. Sulaiman et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari in this case and summarily reverse the judgment. Reported below: 490 F. 2d 78. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioners were convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida of using the mails to distribute allegedly obscene materials in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, which provides in pertinent part as follows: “Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance; and— “Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made . . . 912 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Brennan, J., dissenting “Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier. “Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing ... of anything declared by this section ... to be nonmailable . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . . The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 490 F. 2d 78 (1974). I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which is similar in scope to § 1461,1 expressed the view that “[w]hatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.” 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J.,dissenting). Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioners must be given an opportunity to have * Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 913 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 their cases decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which their convictions have ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioners should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1682. Blank v. California. App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42^47 ( Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., di& senting), would grant certiorari in this case and summarily reverse the judgment. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles of exhibiting an allegedly obscene motion picture in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 311.2 (a) (1970), which provides in pertinent part as follows: “Every person who knowingly... exhibits to others, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.” As used in § 311.2: “ ‘Obscene matter’ means matter, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the average person, applying contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters; and is matter which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social importance.” §311 (a). 914 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Brennan, J., dissenting On appeal to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, the case was held to await this Court’s decisions in Kaplan v. California, 413 U. S. 115 (1973), and related cases. The Appellate Department then affirmed the conviction, and certification to the Court of Appeal was denied. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 311.2, as it incorporates the definition of “obscene matter” in § 311 (a), is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgment of the Appellate Department was rendered after Miller, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ulti *Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 915 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 mately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1722. Kaplan v. California. App. Dept., Super Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari in this case and summarily reverse the judgment. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles of selling an allegedly obscene book in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 311.2 (a) (1970), which provided in pertinent part at the time of the alleged offense as follows : “Every person who knowingly . . . prepares, publishes, or prints, . . . offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits . . . any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.” As used in § 311.2, “obscene” means: “taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of [the matter] to the average person, applying contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters; and is matter which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social importance.” § 311 (a). 916 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Brennan, J., dissenting 419 U.S. On appeal, the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles affirmed the conviction. Certification to the Court of Appeal was sought and denied. This Court then granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Appellate Department, and remanded for consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), and companion cases. 413 U. S. 115 (1973). On remand, the Appellate Department again affirmed the conviction. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I n. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 311.2, as it incorporated the definition of “obscene” in § 311 (a), was constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgment of the Appellate Department was rendered after Miller, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process *Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 917 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1727. Cioffi v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1111. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan concurs, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted of obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice by threatening, intimidating, or otherwise endeavoring to influence a grand jury witness. The witness, one Perry Scheer, had been a principal iff a collapsed brokerage house whose activities were under investigation by the SEC and the FBI; there was strong evidence that Scheer had been involved in at least seven illegal securities transactions. Petitioner, who was allegedly in league with various persons who could have been harmed by Scheer’s testimony before a grand jury investigating the affairs of the brokerage house, met with Scheer on several occasions and sought to secure Scheer’s silence through veiled threats and suggestions that Scheer “take the Fifth” (or, in more contemporary parlance, “stonewall it”). Unbeknownst to petitioner, Scheer by this time was cooperating fully with federal authorities, and had been fitted out with a recording device on which he recorded several of his conversations with petitioner; these recordings were introduced at trial to corroborate and supplement Scheer’s own testimony, and were played several times for the jury. I am unable to agree that the use of recordings made under 918 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. such circumstances is consistent with constitutional guarantees. In a series of decisions beginning with On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 (1952) , this Court has held that electronic interception or recording of conversations with the consent of one party does not violate Fourth Amendment standards.1 With one notable exception, however, these decisions were handed down prior to Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), in which we formally interred much of their conceptual underpinning by holding that Fourth Amendment protections rest upon reasonable expectations of privacy rather than upon common-law property principles. That exception came in United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971), where four Members of the Court held that On Lee remained good law after Katz, four others Members maintained with equal adamancy that it did not, and Mr. Justice Black (adhering to his dissent in Katz) found it unnecessary to reach the issue. At a bare minimum, Katz must be read to require that monitoring of this sort be conducted only pursuant to a warrant: “ ‘Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’ United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” 389 U. S., at 357 (footnotes omitted). In the absence of such judicial supervision, there is no effective safeguard against the possibility of an uncontrolled electronic police state.2 1See, e. g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427 (1963); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971). 2 See United States v. White, supra, at 760 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id., at 755-756 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). In ORDERS 919 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 In my view the Executive Branch acts unlawfully when it invades an individual’s privacy through trickery or fraud. See, e. g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 344-347 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 347-348 (1966)*Vseparate opinion of Douglas, J.). The dangers posed by such invasions become particularly acute, however, when they are achieved through or accompanied by electronic monitoring of the sort presented here.3 I would grant certiorari. No. 73-1728. Dunn v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins, dissenting. Petitioner seeks review" of the Service’s order deporting him to Canada, his nation of citizenship. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Service’s “discretion . . . might have been exercised with greater compassion,” but none- Osborn v. United States, supra, the Court upheld the use of a recording of a face-to-face conversation where there had been prior judicial authorization for the recording. 385 U. S., at 329-330. In my dissent in Osborn and elsewhere, I have set forth my view that even prior judicial approval cannot validate intrusions into constitutionally protected zones of privacy for the seizure of mere evidentiary material; the need for this protection is particularly acute when the items to be seized are an individual’s own words, thoughts, papers and personal effects, even if no Fifth Amendment problem is squarely presented. Id., at 349-354 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 319-325 (1967) (Douglas, J, dissenting); Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 343 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In light of the absence of any attempt to secure judicial authorization in the present case, I see no need to press that view further at this time. 3 See, e. g., Osborn v. United States, supra, at 352-354 (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. White, supra, at 762-765 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Lopez v. United States, supra, at 463471 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 920 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Stewart, J., dissenting 419 U. S. theless upheld the order on the theory that “the scope of . . . review in this area is extremely narrow.” The facts are peculiar; or, more accurately, the Service’s action is peculiar in light of the facts. Moving to this country with his parents in 1953 (at age 9), petitioner acquired permanent resident alien status. As such, he was subject to the draft, 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 65 Stat. 76, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a), and he duly registered on his 18th birthday. In August 1966, he was ordered to report for induction on September 28, 1966. Possessing strong views against war and conscription, petitioner decided to go to Canada, rather than serve. At the border, he turned in his Alien Immigration Card but expressly refused to sign a formal renunciation of his permanent resident status. Very quickly, he thought better of his decision to leave. On September 28, his induction date, petitioner telephoned his draft board to announce that he was returning to the United States to surrender to a United States Attorney and to accept the legal penalty for refusing induction. On October 3, 1966, petitioner flew to Chicago and turned himself in to the United States Attorney. The Government took no action for 21 months, during which time petitioner studied at an American university. Finally, in July 1968, petitioner was indicted under 62 Stat. 622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a), for “evad[ing] or refus[ing] . . . service in the armed forces.” He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and 18 months’ probation, the latter conditioned on his doing civilian work of national importance. Petitioner served this sentence in full. Two years later, the Service moved to deport him, on grounds that he had fled the country to evade the draft, 66 Stat. 184, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (22), and abandoned his immigrant status in the process, 66 Stat. 183, as amended, ORDERS 921 919 Stewart, J., dissenting 79 Stat. 918, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (20). This was a surprise, for petitioner thought that the books on this matter had been balanced by his voluntary return to the United States, surrender to authorities, guilty plea, and service of sentence. The Service found that no Government official ever promised petitioner that such would be the case. Still, the reasonableness of petitioner’s impression is clear enough. Prevailing law afforded aliens an exemption from Selective Service liability if they were willing to forfeit permanent resident status and any chance at eventual citizenship, 62 Stat. 606, 50 U. S. C. App. §454 (a) (1964 ed.). Exercising this option meant an almost certain loss of an alien’s right to remain in this country. Rather than exercise this option, petitioner accepted draft law liability, and the Government solemnized his choice with prosecution, conviction, and punishment under the draft laws. Now the same Government, in the guise of the Immigration Service, wishes to disregard his earlier choice, and the burdens imposed incident to it, and to deport petitioner as if none of this had happened. In my view, the two legal grounds asserted to support deportation do not overcome the obvious injustice of the order. First: The Service found petitioner deportable for having re-entered the country, after his flight to Canada, “not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa.” 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (20). The theory is that petitioner abandoned permanent resident status, and thus his visa, when he turned in his alien card at the border. Standing alone, this theory would not be unreasonable. But I cannot square it with the fact the Government prosecuted petitioner for breaching an induction order premised on his status as a permanent resident. At the time, nonresident aliens were also subject to the draft, but only after remaining “in the United 922 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Stewart, J., dissenting 419 U. S. States in a status other than that of a permanent resident for a period exceeding one year.” 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a) (1964 ed.). If petitioner lost his permanent resident status at the border, his return would not have made him “liable for training and service in the Armed Forces” under § 454 (a) until a year later, and certainly that new liability would have required a new induction order. By submitting his case promptly and in orderly fashion to the United States Attorney, petitioner rightfully expected a responsible examination of his case by the Government. In my judgment, the decision to prosecute, nearly two years later, implied Government adherence to the view, held by petitioner then as now, that his permanent resident status, and thus the legal premise of the induction order, had not been undermined by his brief démarche in Canada. Having led petitioner through the rigors of indictment, conviction, and punishment on this theory, the Government should now be precluded from changing its mind. Cf. Raley n. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423 (1959) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965). Second: The Service also found petitioner deportable for having “departed from or . . . remained outside the United States to avoid or evade training or service in the armed forces in time of war or a period ... [of] national emergency.” 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (22). The obvious purpose of § 1182 (a) (22) is to deny admission to the United States to aliens who have used foreign asylum to escape their liabilities under the draft law. It would appear that the provision reads in the disjunctive—“departed from or . . . remained outside”—so as to reach not only those who leave the country when faced with induction orders and fail to return to comply with them in time, but also those who receive their orders while already abroad and refuse to make timely return. ORDERS 923 919 Stewart, J,, dissenting The Service reads the provision more broadly, so as to apply to any alien who departs with evasive motives, regardless of his subsequent conduct. This reading is implausible: It would prevent return of such an alien for the express purpose of reporting for induction on time. I cannot believe Congress intended the provision to apply to an alien who flirted with the idea of asylum but then made prompt return to face the music. It is true that petitioner’s actual return occurred five days after his induction date. But he phoned the draft board on that date, announcing his intent to re-enter and turn himself in, an intention he carried out promptly. On these facts, I could not find that his purpose in “remain-ting] outside the United States” for those five days was “to avoid or evade training or service.” Finally, it has been suggested that petitioner is nonetheless deportable as a convicted felon. But the Service did not base the deportation order on this ground, and I doubt that it could. Under 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (4), an alien is deportable if “convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for a year or more.” It is far from clear that refusing induction is a “crime involving moral turpitude.” Cf. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350, 353 (1960) (breach of peace not such a crime because “fraudulent conduct” not involved). To be eligible, the statutory crime must necessarily “in-volv[e] moral turpitude.” E. g., Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F. 2d 625; United States ex rel. Giglio v. Neelly, 208 F. 2d 337; United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F. 2d 399. It is feasible, and hardly uncommon, for induction to be refused on grounds which, while legally insufficient, demonstrate no moral fault. Moreover, it is unclear, at least 924 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. on the record before us, that petitioner’s crime was committed within five years of an “entry” into the United States. Brief trips abroad by permanent resident aliens do not always result in a new statutory “entry.” See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449 (1963); Vargas-Banuelos v. INS, 466 F. 2d 1371. As noted above, the Service is hardly in a position to find an abandonment of permanent resident status by petitioner during his brief stay in Canada. Because the factual setting of this case is unusual, the legal questions raised are unlikely often to recur. While this is normally a sound reason to deny review, the judgment before us is grossly unjust. The Service has noted that petitioner has a “penchant for botching up his life.” Perhaps so, but the Government’s botching up of this case has served to complete the wreckage. I would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment. No. 73-1741. Persico et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari as to Persico alone. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 1156. No. 73-1746. Johnson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Clark County. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur, dissenting. Approximately one month after pleading guilty, petitioner sought to vacate her plea on the ground that she had not been adequately advised of the rights thereby waived. The record shows that before accepting petitioner’s plea the trial judge advised her of her right to be tried by a jury and to confront witnesses against her. Petitioner’s motion was denied by the trial court and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. ORDERS 925 924 Douglas, J., dissenting In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969), we emphasized that a guilty plea is a waiver of important constitutional rights designed to protect the fairness of a trial: "Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145. Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.” Waiver of such rights as these can be accomplished only by “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). Only recently we reaffirmed the stringent standard for demonstrating the waiver of rights designed to safeguard the accused at trial, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 236-237 (1973). The accused can waive only a known right, Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, and the State has the burden of demonstrating a knowing waiver. To repeat what we said in Boykin, “[w]e cannot presume a waiver . . . from a silent record.” Boykin established that the State must demonstrate the defendant’s knowing waiver of the three constitutional rights there enumerated. Two States have so interpreted Boykin as a constitutional minimum. People v. Jaworski, 387 Mich. 21, 194 N. W. 2d 868 (1972); In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P. 2d 449 (1969). The record here fails to satisfy even this minimum standard, for the 926 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419U.S. trial judge failed to advert to the privilege against selfincrimination. The Boykin enumeration was illustrative, not exhaustive. The necessity that one be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970)) and the right to a speedy trial (Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972)) are likewise involved. Ohio seems to recognize the need to accommodate constitutional rights other than the three mentioned in Boykin, since its own Supreme Court has held that a trial judge must advise the defendant of his right to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before accepting a guilty plea. State v. Griffey, 35 Ohio St. 2d 101, 298 N. E. 2d 603 (1973). Yet the record here fails even to meet this standard. Since the Court has now held that a guilty plea forecloses constitutional challenge to the process that brought the defendant to the bar, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973), strict scrutiny over the standards for acceptance of the plea becomes all the more imperative. I would grant certiorari. No. 73-1764. Tobalina v. California. App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles of exhibiting an allegedly obscene motion picture ORDERS 927 926 Brennan, J., dissenting in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 311.2 (a) (1970) which provides in pertinent part as follows: “Every person who knowingly . . . exhibits to others, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.” As used in § 311.2: “ ‘Obscene matter’ means matter, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to the average person, applying contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i. e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is matter which taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters; and is matter which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social importance.” §311 (a). On appeal, the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles affirmed the conviction. Certification to the Court of Appeal was sought and denied. This Court then granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Appellate Department, and remanded for consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), and companion cases. 413 U. S. 912. On remand, the Appellate Department again affirmed the conviction. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 311.2, as it incorporates the definition of “obscene matter” in § 311 (a), is constitutionally over- 928 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. October 21, 1974 broad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgment of the Appellate Department was rendered after Miller, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1801. Goldstein v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari in this case and summarily reverse the judgment. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in the Corporation Court of the city of Norfolk, Virginia, of selling *Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 929 928 Brennan, J., dissenting obscene items. The statute under which he was convicted, Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-228 (Supp. 1973), provides in pertinent part: “Every person who knowingly ... [p]ublishes, sells, rents, lends, transports in intrastate commerce, or distributes or exhibits any obscene item . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” As used in that section: “The word ‘obscene’ . . . shall mean that which considered as a whole has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.” § 18.1-227 (1960). The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed by order on July 11, 1972. This Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), and companion cases. 413 U. S. 912. The Supreme Court of Virginia again affirmed the conviction. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 18.1-228, as it incorporates the definition of “obscene” in § 18.1-227, is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, 930 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. at 47, and because the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia was rendered after Miller, I would reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). No. 73-1804. Shultz, dba Walt Shultz Equipment Co., et al. v. Moore. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 294. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. This is an action for an injunction and damages for the infringement of a patent held by respondent Moore. Petitioner Shultz defended on the ground that the patent was invalid. The. patented product is a “pants topper,” used in the dry cleaning business for finishing and pressing men’s trousers. Moore obtained his patent in 1955. At the trial there was evidence that patents on devices having functions similar to Moore’s had issued prior to his patent; not all of these prior patents had been brought to the attention of the examiner who recommended that Moore be granted a patent. A jury verdict in Moore’s favor was set aside by the trial court on the ground that the subject matter was “obvious ... to a person having ordinary skill in the art,” 35 U. S. C. § 103. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the patent carries a presumption of validity overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, and that obviousness is a factual question on which the trial judge should not override the jury. With all respect, that holding permits the standard of patentability to be diluted and haphazardly applied. It bears repeating that patents derive from the specific constitutional authorization of Congress “[t]o promote *Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do no insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 931 930 Douglas, J., dissenting the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Writing against the backdrop of abuses by the Crown in granting monopolies, the Framers did not intend these “exclusive rights” to be granted freely. To justify the toll exacted by exclusivity, the invention had to make a distinctive contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge. Besides novelty and utility, a distinctive contribution expanding the frontiers of scientific and industrial knowledge was demanded. This constitutional restraint on the dispensation of patents was once mirrored in our cases under the standard of “invention.” See Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U. S. 347 (1876); Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U. S. 674 (1893); Potts v. Creager, 155 U. S. 597 (1895); Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269 U. S. 177 (1925); Mantle Lamp Co. v. Aluminum Products Co., 301 U. S. 544 (1937). The standard is now embodied in 35 U. S. C. § 103, which requires a “non-obvious subject matter.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 17 (1966). Though the label has changed, the standard of patentability is at root a constitutional standard. In determining patent validity under the statute, a court simultaneously holds the statute true to its constitutional source. This is but a specific application of the principle that statutes are construed to avoid any overreaching of constitutional limitations. E. g., Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 98 (1945); United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 47 (1953); Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, 188 (1965) (concurring opinion). In every patent infringement suit a court is called upon to oversee obedience to the constitutional standard. It cannot be delegated to the jury on the supposition that only a question of fact is involved. Factual assessments are, of course, part of the process of judging validity. 932 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. Douglas, J., dissenting The prior art must be ascertained and the unique features of the patentee’s contribution identified. But the determination whether the patentee’s distinctive contribution is of such a character as to justify the 17-year monopoly is one that demands reasoned elaboration and, therefore, treatment as a question of law. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co., 340 U. S. 147, 155 (1950) (concurring opinion). Findings that identify the unique features of the patented device and explain why they advance the art are essential to permit appellate review to insure that constitutional limitations have not been exceeded. The responsibility belongs to the courts. It will not do to leave such matters to unarticulated resolution by the jury. Nor can the courts rely upon the Patent Office always to apply the standard faithfully. The proceedings on an application are not adversary. No representative of the public appears to contest unwarranted claims; the examiner alone must face the persistent applicant. A disappointed applicant may appeal an adverse administrative decision, but no corresponding check is available to overturn an erroneous finding of patentability. It does not impugn the good faith of examiners to observe that errors on the side of patentability slip through such a process. Litigation of patent validity in infringement suits presents the only opportunity for judicial correction of the errors of generosity. The decision below holding patentability a question of fact for the jury represents an abdication which is likely to produce haphazard application of the statutory and constitutional standard. Happily, two other circuits have not adopted this approach. See Swofford v. B&W, Inc., 395 F. 2d 362 (CA5 1968); Hensley Equipment Co. N. Esco Corp., 375 F. 2d 432 (CA9 1967). I would grant certiorari. ORDERS 933 419 U.S. October 21, 1974 No. 73-6472. Isola v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari in this case and summarily reverse the judgment. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 906. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of transporting allegedly obscene materials in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1465, which provides in pertinent part as follows: “Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, sub nom. Cangiano v. United States, 491 F. 2d 906 (1974). I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which is similar in scope to § 1465, I expressed the view that “[w] hatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene ■ 934 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.” 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-6522. Sundstrom v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 489 F. 2d 859. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. Ordered by his local Selective Service board to report for a pre-induction physical examination in May 1970, petitioner arrived at the examining place attired in a black robe and wearing facial makeup, in a representation * Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 935 934 Douglas, J., dissenting of the symbol of death. Because of his appearance, petitioner was ejected from the examining station without undergoing a physical. The local board ordered petitioner to appear for a second physical examination in August 1970, but the notice failed to reach the petitioner, who at the time was traveling without a forwarding address.1 Upon learning that the petitioner had failed to appear for the second scheduled examination, the local board, acting pursuant to a new Selective Service regulation then less than two months old, ordered the petitioner to report for immediate induction. Under former practice, an induction order could not issue until the registrant had been found physically qualified for military service and had received notice to that effect. The superseding regulation 2 authorized local boards to order for induction and simultaneous examination any registrant whose lottery number had been reached but who had failed to appear for a physical examination. In September 1970, one week before his scheduled induction, petitioner returned to the board the induction order that had been mailed to him in August, stating in an accompanying letter his belief that the induction forms were “mailed in error” since he had not yet completed a physical examination and been found acceptable for military service. Although the board made no response to petitioner’s letter, it did report him to the Department of Justice as a violator when it learned of his failure to report for induction. Apparently at the urging of the Justice Department, the board sent a second induction order to petitioner on December 2, 1970, directing him to XA count that charged petitioner with violating 50 U. S. C. App. §462 by failing to appear for the second physical examination was dismissed by the trial judge on the ground that the evidence did not support a “knowing” violation. 2Executive Order No. 11537, 3 CFR 936 (1966-1970 Comp.), revising 32 CFR § 1631.7 (1970). 936 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. Douglas, J., dissenting appear for induction on the 15th. Again petitioner returned the order to the board, citing his belief that “ ‘an induction order cannot be served unless a pre-induction physical has been consummated and an acceptability statement [sent].’ ” The board did not respond to this letter. Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction for failure to report for induction, 62 Stat. 622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a), followed. The statute makes it a crime “knowingly [to] fail or neglect to perform [any] duty” required by the Selective Service laws. I do not see how petitioner can be deemed to have committed a knowing violation when the record demonstrates that the local board made absolutely no effort to correct the petitioner’s erroneous belief, based upon a recently superseded regulation, that the board lacked power to summon him for induction. Due process forbids the Government from actively misleading a citizen as to the law’s commands. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423 (1959). A citizen may be misled as much by failure to correct an erroneous impression as by incorrect advice, affirmatively conveyed. Especially in Selective Service matters where registrants deal with the Government apparatus unaided by counsel, the Government has a duty to make reasonable efforts to keep the citizen from pursuing an inaccurate interpretation of law to his detriment. See Simmons v. United States, 348 U. S. 397, 404 n. 5 (1955).3 The petitioner here advised the board on two occasions of his erroneous belief. On neither occasion 3 The failure of a local board to correct a registrant’s erroneous impression that he does not have a valid claim to an exemption as a conscientious objector has been held to vitiate a subsequent prosecution for failure to report for induction. See United States v. Sanders, 470 F. 2d 937, 939 (CA9 1972) (“[misleading conduct may consist of failure to correct an evident misunderstanding as well as to affirmatively convey incorrect information”). ORDERS 937 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 did the board respond, although a form letter or a copy of the new regulation would have dispelled petitioner’s mistaken belief as to his status. Under these circumstances I would place upon the Government a duty to inform, and hold that failure to do so bars prosecution. The new regulation was, to be sure, published. But the fiction that all men know the law, indulged in to provide a healthy incentive for men to learn the law’s command,4 need not be pressed so far as to impute knowledge of the labyrinthine passages of the Federal Register, when there is compelling evidence to the contrary. The salutary policy of the fiction will not be weakened if the rule is not absolute.5 Notice by publication is not sufficient where it may reasonably be anticipated that the notice will not reach those it is intended to address. See Lambert y. California, 355 U. S. 225 (1957); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950). Here the petitioner’s letters to the board unmistakably demonstrated that published notice was insufficient. Arguably, fairness, as well as efficiency, is served by placing the burden on the Government to advise petitioner of the change in regulations.6 I would grant certiorari. No. 73-6623. Clay et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 700. 4O . Holmes, The Common Law 40-41 (Howe ed. 1963). 5 The Model Penal Code, for example, adopts a posture of moderation in providing for ignorance of law as a defense. § 2.04 Proposed Official Draft, 1962. 6 In May 1972, the Director of Selective Service promulgated the Registrants Processing Manual, which provides that when a local board determines that a registrant has failed to appear for a scheduled physical examination it shall by letter so advise the registrant of this fact and that the registrant may be issued an order for induction and subsequent physical examination if his lottery number is reached. See 37 Fed. Reg. 10763 (May 27, 1972). 938 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-6655. Windsor v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 488 F. 2d 1364. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. The petitioner, convicted of failure to report for induction, 62 Stat. 622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a), challenges the induction order on the ground that he was improperly denied exemption from Selective Service as a conscientious objector. Petitioner completed high school under a student deferment in 1969. In January 1970, he was reclassified I-A and was ordered to report for a preinduction physical examination the following October. In January 1971, petitioner filed an application for reclassification as a conscientious objector. His local Selective Service board rejected this claim, advising petitioner by letter: “Your claim as a conscientious objector was considered by the Board on February 12, 1971, and in their opinion your professed belief in opposition to war is not a compelling or controlling force in your life, but is simply [an] expedient to avoid military service at this time and that you are not sincere in your professed belief.” Petitioner appealed to an appeal board, which affirmed without opinion the local board’s denial of exemption. The Court of Appeals, applying a rule announced in United States v. Stetter, 445 F. 2d 472 (CA5 1971), that when an applicant makes a prima facie case for exemption as a conscientious objector the board must give a statement of reasons for rejection of the application, construed the local board’s letter to petitioner as a finding of insincerity of petitioner’s asserted beliefs. The court then concluded that a finding of insincerity could be based upon the fact that petitioner waited for more than a year after his reclassification as I-A to file his application for exemption and did so only after passing ORDERS 939 938 Douglas, J., dissenting his preinduction physical examination. Accordingly, the court found that the board’s “reason” had a basis in the record and affirmed petitioner’s conviction. Elsewhere I have expressed my view that an applicant for exemption as a conscientious objector is entitled, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to a hearing before a local board on his claim. Fein v. Selective Service System, 405 U. S. 365, 382 (1972) (dissenting opinion). A statement of reasons accompanying a decision adverse to the applicant is no less a requirement of due process. Without a statement of reasons there is simply no way to ascertain whether the board has acted within its powers as prescribed by law.1 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 271 (1970); Joseph v. United States, 405 U. S. 1006 (1972) (dissenting opinion). The only statement afforded petitioner is contained in the local board’s February 1973 letter, a document insufficient in two respects to sustain the board’s denial of exemption. First, the board’s statement that petitioner’s belief “is not a compelling or controlling force in your life” gives little confidence that the board applied the correct legal standard for exemption under 62 Stat. 612, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (j). The statute authorizes exemption for any person “who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.” In Clay v. United States, 403 U. S. 698, 700 (1971), we said: “In order to qualify for classification as a conscientious objector, a registrant must satisfy three 1 A statement of reasons accompanying an adverse decision by a local or appeal board is now required by the Military Selective Service Act, 85 Stat. 353, 50 U. S. C. App. § 471a (b) (4) (1970 ed., Supp. II), but this provision of the statute is inapplicable to petitioner’s case because of its effective date. 940 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. basic tests. He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form. Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437. He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, as the term has been construed in our decisions. United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163; Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333. And he must show that this objection is sincere. Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375. In applying these tests, the Selective Service System must be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong. United States v. Seeger, supra; Gillette v. United States, supra; Williams v. United States, 216 F. 2d 350, 352.” The board’s cryptic “compelling and controlling force” language in this case may have reflected a conclusion that although petitioner met the three tests above he did not qualify for an exemption because his belief was not lifelong. Such a decision would have been entirely improper, since, assuming a sincere belief, the length of time petitioner had held it would be irrelevant. Schuman v. United States, 208 F. 2d 801 (CA9 1953); Taylor v. Chajee, 327 F. Supp. 1131 (CD Cal. 1971). Or the board might have concluded, equally erroneously, that petitioner did not qualify for exemption because his belief had not heretofore “compelled” him to express it in some organized activity. To be sure, the board’s decision might have been based on a wholly proper application of the legal standard. The difficulty is that we cannot tell from the “statement” the board has given. It is a “simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . [that if] the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with ORDERS 941 938 Douglas, J., dissenting such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196-197 (1947). The Court of Appeals viewed the board’s statement as a denial of the exemption because of insincerity. But the "compelling and controlling force” language appeared in addition to the statement that petitioner was not sincere, with no indication whether the former contributed to the rejection or served merely as a restatement of the latter ground. The board’s decision cannot be sustained on the basis of the sincerity finding alone unless it is clear from the record that the board intended it to be a wholly independent ground of decision. Cf. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U. S. 385 (1955). Even if the board’s statement is viewed solely as a rejection of petitioner’s application because of insincerity, it will not support the board’s action because it contains no reasons but merely the board’s conclusion. Applicants for exemption as conscientious objectors may be found insincere where the belief claimed is inconsistent with prior statements or conduct of the applicant, or where the applicant’s demeanor in an appearance before the board deprives him of credibility. Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375 (1955). Typically, reviewing courts have perused the record in order to discover evidence that would furnish a “basis in fact” for a denial of exemption because of insincerity. See, e. g., United States v. Abbott, 425 F. 2d 910 (CA8 1970); United States v. Weaver, 423 F. 2d 1126 (CA9 1970). It is time to demand more of the local board: a statement that identifies the evidence supporting the conclusion that the applicant is not sincere. A statement of such specificity is indispensable to assure that the board has reasoned from 942 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 the evidence.2 Such a statement will facilitate review; and requiring the familiarity with the record necessary to its preparation will enhance the decisionmaking process at the administrative level. Without such a statement, a board may too easily shield inattentiveness or misapplication of the law from judicial review behind the screen of a conclusory finding of insincerity.3 This danger is especially real where, as here, the finding of insincerity is merely tacked onto other language that betrays possible confusion about the legal standard. I would grant certiorari to consider the adequacy of the administrative action. No. 73-6666. Murray v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 178. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. Acting upon information received from the Los Angeles Police Department that a man of a specified description would arrive on a certain airplane carrying heroin inside a garment bag, a San Francisco sheriff’s deputy observed petitioner arriving on the designated flight, matching the description given and carrying a garment bag. The 2 Such a requirement, advocated by several commentators, see Note, Administrative Findings in Selective Service Litigation, 57 Va. L. Rev. 477, 485 (1971); Hansen, The Basis-in-Fact Test in Judicial Review of Selective Service Classifications: A Critical Analysis, 37 Brooklyn L. Rev. 453 (1971), has recently gained approval of two Courts of Appeals. See United Stateiiv. Stetter, 445 F. 2d 472, 485 (CA5 1971); United States ex rel. Hemes v. McNulty, 432 F. 2d 1182, 1187 (CA7 1970). 3 Instances of board members’ lack of familiarity with all the facts relevant to a classification decision are, regrettably, amply documented. See United States v. Thompson, 431 F. 2d 1265 (CAS 1970); United States v. Ford, 431 F. 2d 1310 (CAI 1970). See also In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve?, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service 20-21 (1967). ORDERS 943 942 Douglas, J., dissenting deputy stopped petitioner, searched the bag, and discovered heroin that was used to secure petitioner’s conviction for importing heroin into the United States. Petitioner appealed the conviction on the ground that the heroin should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search. The court below held that the report received from the Los Angeles police, as “corroborated” by petitioner’s appearance on the flight designated and matching the description, furnished probable cause for the forcible inspection of petitioner’s garment bag. Because the court below failed to inquire into the origin of the information furnished by the Los Angeles police, it cannot be said that probable cause for the search has been established. Had the information been based upon the observations of a Los Angeles police officer, a proper assessment of probable cause w’ould have necessitated examination of the observations on which he relied, to see whether they w’ould have justified belief by a “man of reasonable caution” that petitioner was carrying contraband, Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925). Had the police report been based upon a tip received by the Los Angeles police from an informer, somewhat greater scrutiny would have been necessary to apply the requirements of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). These cases held that to furnish probable cause a tip must disclose the informer’s observations upon wffiich any conclusion is based and must be accompanied by information supporting the informer’s credibility.* Neither kind *These requirements were held satisfied in United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573 (1971), where the affiant alleged receiving “personal information” from a “prudent person” that the defendant had recently sold illicit liquor. However one may view Harris, it plainly furnishes no support for the search here. The Court relied on the fact that the unidentified informer made admissions against penal interest as well as certain assertions of “personal knowledge”—fac- 944 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. Douglas, J., dissenting of inquiry occurred here, for the court below failed to go beyond the fact that the information came from the Los Angeles police. But the transmission of the information in the form of a Los Angeles “police report” is of no immediate analytical significance; the Los Angeles Department merely served as a conduit between the searching officer and a still undisclosed source. The fact that the searching officer received his information from another police officer does not alter the usual Fourth Amendment inquiry. On this point the holding of Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560 (1971), is dispositive; the conclusions embodied in a police bulletin are not shielded from judicial scrutiny. The court below viewed petitioner’s arrival on the designated flight and his physical appearance as corroborative of the “tip” received from the Los Angeles police and relied upon Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), in upholding the search. In Draper an informer predicted that the defendant would arrive on a certain train wearing certain clothing and carrying heroin that was recently purchased. The informer, whom the police viewed as reliable from prior dealings, had a few days earlier given information that the defendant was dealing in heroin. The Court held that when the defendant arrived on the designated train attired as the informer had predicted, the police had probable cause to make the search of his person that resulted in the discovery of heroin. Draper does not support the result here; it involved a known informer, having a reputation for reliability, who had given information previously. It is impossible to say that any of these factors were present here. The “corroboration” only established that someone was well acquainted with petitioner’s travel plans. tors necessarily absent here on the present record because the origin of the observations was not explored. ORDERS 945 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 As in Whiteley v. Warden, supra, nothing in petitioner’s appearance when the police first met him tended to confirm the allegation of criminal conduct. The decision below arguably represents a failure to follow the Fourth Amendment principles enunciated in our decisions. Accordingly I would grant certiorari. No. 73-6719. Dorman v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 438. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. In 1973 Frank Dorman was sentenced by the District Court to a term of three years for violating the travel restrictions of his bond and to two concurrent seven-year terms for the interstate transportation of forged checks. In imposing sentence, the trial judge emphasized the “very, very substantial” record of Dorman’s prior convictions. The trial judge learned of these state convictions from a presentence report, which had incorporated the convictions listed in an FBI summary. None of these documents revealed, and it has not been ascertained, whether Dorman had the assistance of counsel at the time these convictions were obtained. On appeal, Dorman sought to have his case remanded for a determination whether he lacked counsel at the time of the prior convictions, and if so for imposition of a new sentence. The Court of Appeals held that Dorman had waived any objection to the trial court’s use of the prior convictions by his failure to object after disclosure of the presentence report. Since the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), we have held that convictions obtained without the provision of counsel for the accused may not be used to enhance punishment under a recidivist statute, Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967), nor to influence the determination of a discretionary sentence, United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972), nor to impeach 946 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. the credibility of a defendant at trial, Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972). The guiding principle was stated in Burgett v. Texas: “To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense ... is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that . . . right.” 389 U. S., at 115. The Court of Appeals permits the defendant’s sentence to stand, with ample demonstration that the sentencing judge relied heavily on prior convictions, and no demonstration in the record that he had counsel during the prosecutions involved. The decision below remits the defendant to collateral challenge to his sentence. Under Fourth Circuit practice, the defendant must apparently now challenge each state conviction through independent proceedings and, if successful, move to vacate the federal sentence now in issue under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. See Brown v. United States, 483 F. 2d 116 (CA4 1973). This result is consonant neither with sound judicial administration nor with fairness to the accused. The determination whether a defendant had counsel at the time of prior convictions should ordinarily be ascertainable from an examination of the records of conviction. I would place the burden of that examination, which surely would add only a small increment to the task of preparation for trial or sentencing, upon the Government. This procedure would centralize in one proceeding all inquiry relevant to the use of prior convictions and would give positive assurance in the record that Gideon was not undercut through impermissible collateral uses of uncounseled convictions. ORDERS 947 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 In this case the sentencing occurred nearly a year after our decision in United States v. Tucker, supra, time enough for the Government to have assumed the burden of demonstrating the constitutional validity of each conviction used against the accused. I would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below. No. 73-6754. Sedillo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 151. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur, dissenting. Petitioner was walking up a freeway on-ramp when he was stopped by an officer. Petitioner gave the officer his name but was unable to produce any identification. The officer noticed an envelope in petitioner’s shirt pocket and saw through a window in the envelope that it was addressed to someone other than petitioner. He thought that the envelope contained a Treasury check, and he pulled it out of petitioner’s pocket. The officer removed the check from the envelope and saw that it had been endorsed. Petitioner was arrested, and after further investigation was tried and convicted of forgery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on the ground that the officer had probable cause to seize the check from petitioner’s person and that the absence of a warrant is excused by the plain-view doctrine. 496 F. 2d 151, 152 (CA9 1974). Judge Hufstedler wrote a dissent in which she pointed out that the incriminating aspects of the item in petitioner’s pocket simply were not in plain view. The check itself and in particular the endorsement were not visible until the envelope had been removed from petitioner’s pocket and opened. “Nothing in the record of this case supports a conclusion that [the officer] at the time of the seizure had probable cause to believe that the envelope seen in Sedillo’s pocket was 948 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. contraband, or that it contained contraband, or that it was evidence relevant to a crime that [the officer] had probable cause to believe had been committed. Accordingly, the plain-view doctrine cannot justify the seizure of the envelope and check.” Id., at 153 (footnote omitted). In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 466 (1971), the Court pointed out that the plain-view doctrine is applicable only “where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” To use the plain-view rationale in this case is to ignore the limitations on that exception to the warrant requirement which are explained by Coolidge. It appears to me that the conviction here results from police conduct which violated the Fourth Amendment. The plain-view doctrine is not applicable, and I do not see how any other exceptions to the warrant requirement would justify the conduct of the police.* I would therefore grant certiorari and set this case for argument. *Obviously the search and seizure were not incident to arrest, since the arrest did not occur until after the envelope had been removed from petitioner’s pocket and opened. I dissented in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), but even the majority position in that case would not justify the officer’s conduct here. Terry permitted a “reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Id., at 27. But that doctrine clearly has no applicability here. As Judge Hufstedler put it: “No one contends in this case that [the officer’s]’’Seizure of the envelope from Sedillo’s pocket or the examination of the envelope’s contents was necessary to protect the officer’s person.” 496 F. 2d 151, 153. ORDERS 949 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 No. 73-6943. Johnson v. Nebraska. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 191 Neb. 535, 216 N. W. 2d 517. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted of violating a city gambling ordinance, carrying a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment and a $500 fine. Following a trial before a municipal judge, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 100 days in jail and fined $500. Under Nebraska law, trial by jury is unavailable in a prosecution in municipal court for violation of a city ordinance. The Nebraska courts rejected petitioner’s assertion of a right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, on the ground that no such right applies to prosecutions for offenses carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for six months or less. The Constitution provides for trial by jury in two places. Article III, § 2, provides that “ [t] he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .” And the Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Despite these specific references to a jury in the trial of “all crimes” and in “all criminal prosecutions” the Court has held that the accused enjoys no right to demand trial by jury in prosecutions for “petty offenses.” The notion of a class of “petty offenses” for which prosecution would carry no right to jury trial first surfaced in this Court in the dicta of Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 555 (1888), which held that a conspiracy offense did not belong in the “petty” class. “Petty of 950 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. fenses” were to be defined as those punishable by summary proceedings at common law prior to the adoption of the Constitution. The exclusion of petty-offense prosecutions from the jury trial guarantee was repeated in several later cases. Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U. S. 621 (1891), involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a Louisiana ordinance regulating the location of private marketplaces. Prosecution for violation was before a magistrate only and was punishable by a $25 fine or imprisonment for 30 days. In holding that the absence of jury trial did not vitiate conviction under the ordinance, the Court repeated the Callan dicta, but the decision came more than 70 years before we held the federal right to jury trial applicable in state proceedings, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968). In Schick n. United States, 195 U. S. 65 (1904), the petty-offense exclusion was again repeated, but the holding of that case was that the defendant’s waiver of jury trial in the District Court did not invalidate his conviction. Not until District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617 (1937), did the Court squarely rule that certain prosecutions are outside the constitutional guarantee. That case involved a prosecution in the District of Columbia for violation of a statute making it a crime, punishable by a fine of $300 or less, or imprisonment of 90 days or less, to sell second-hand goods without a license. In holding that trial by jury was not required, the Court expanded the definition of “petty offenses” to embrace all those for which the authorized punishment failed to meet a requisite standard of severity. The degree of severity required to invoke the constitutional right was to be ascertained “by objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.” Id., at 628. In the years since Clawans, the Court has struggled to achieve greater precision in drawing the line ORDERS 951 949 Douglas, J., dissenting that separates “petty” from “serious” crimes. See Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 160-162; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mjg. Co., 391 U. S. 216 (1968); Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147 (1969); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 67-73 (1970). The Court’s latest expression in this quest for certainty came last Term in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506 (1974). There it was said that “our decisions have established a fixed dividing line between petty and serious offenses: those crimes carrying a sentence of more than six months are serious crimes and those carrying a sentence of six months or less are petty crimes.” Id., at 512. What apparently began in Callan as a narrow exception to the jury trial guarantee based upon the nature of the offense1 has become a rigid rule based upon the maximum authorized punishment.2 If the judgment were mine to make, I would entertain considerable doubt that petitioner’s offense can be described as “petty.” See Frank v. United States, supra, at 160 (Black, J., dissenting). Petitioner’s offense carried a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment and a $500 fine. A literal reading of the “fixed dividing line” stated in Codispoti would place petitioner’s offense in the “serious” category, for it carries “a sentence of more than six months.” I recognize, however, that the Court has never expressly considered how the interaction of authorized imprisonment and fines affects the dividing line, although it has adverted to the provisions of 18 U. S. C. § 1, defining as “petty” a crime in which both 1 Compare Mr. Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1888), with his later dissenting opinion in Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 80-81 (1904). 2 Special rules have been applied with respect to criminal contempts for which a maximum penalty is not specified. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U. S. 216 (1968); Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147 (1969); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (1974). 952 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. six months’ imprisonment and a $500 fine are authorized. See e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 161; Frank v. United States, supra, at 151. On the Court’s own terms, certiorari should be granted to resolve the ambiguity. For myself, I adhere to the views expressed by Mr. Justice Black, whom I joined, in Baldwin v. New York, supra, at 74—76, that the Constitution forbids the kind of line drawing in which the Court is now engaged. In making trial by jury applicable “in all criminal prosecutions,” the Framers foreclosed any judicial freedom to decide that in certain prosecutions trial by jury is unwarranted. The point was forcefully made by Justices McReynolds and Butler in their separate opinion in District of Columbia v. Clawans, supra: “In a suit at common law to recover above $20.00, a jury trial is assured. And to us, it seems improbable that while providing for this protection in such a trifling matter the framers of the Constitution intended that it might be denied where imprisonment for a considerable time or liability for fifteen times $20.00 confronts the accused.” 300 U. S., at 633-634. Until the language of the Constitution is amended, we are not free to impose our judgment as to what offenses are “petty.” Since, in my view, the right to trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions is among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment from abridging, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 345-347 (1963) (concurring opinion), I would apply the same rule in both state and federal prosecutions. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 162-171 (Black, J., concurring). The judgment below might arguably be permitted to stand under a view that the federal guarantee of trial by jury is not fully applicable to the States. This was ORDERS 953 419 U. S. October 21, 1974 the view of Mr. Justice Harlan, expressed in, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, id., at 171-193, and Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 117-138 (1970). I do not share that view, see id., at 106-107, and in any event it has not commanded a majority of this Court. Petitioner was denied a jury in what is unquestionably a criminal prosecution. T would grant certiorari to consider his Sixth Amendment claim. No. 73-7019. Bailey v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, adhering to its previous decisions in Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F. 2d 904 (1973) (en banc), and Wallace v. Weinberger, 488 F. 2d 606 (1973) (en banc), cert, denied, 417 U. S. 913 (1974)" held in this case that the decision of the Secretary of HEW on a request to reopen a previous denial on the merits of a claim for benefits is so far committed to agency discretion by the provisions of § 205 (h) of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 624, as amended, 53 Stat. 1371, 60 Stat. 1095, 67 Stat. 632, 42 U. S. C. §405 (h), that review of that decision is not available pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a)(2). This holding is squarely in conflict with the holdings of three other Circuits in Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F. 2d 1 (CA2 1966); Davis v. Richardson, 460 F. 2d 772 (CA3 1972); and Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F. 2d 617 (CA6 1972). It is a prime function of this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction to resolve precisely the kind of conflict here presented. This Court’s Rule 19 (l)(b). Perhaps the state of our docket will not permit us to resolve all disagreements between courts of appeals, or between federal and state courts, and perhaps we must tolerate the 954 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 21, 1974 419 U. S. fact that in some instances enforcement of federal law in one area of the country differs from its enforcement in another. These situations, it is hoped, will be few and far between. I would grant certiorari in this case. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. While I have joined Mr. Justice White’s dissent, I should add that the number of cases we take to review on the merits is well below the tolerable limit and that this case presents one of the most pressing problems on the modern scene. For the extent to which the ever-grow’ing federal bureaucracy uses “discretion” to mask irresponsible action that evades review seems to me to be eroding basic rights of the citizen. No. 74-96. Damon, Reformatory Superintendent v. Leeson; and No. 74-5405. Leeson v. Damon, Reformatory Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent in No. 74-96 for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari in No. 74-96. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 718. No. 74-126. Sigal, aka Edwards, et al. v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Application to recall and stay mandate, presented to Mr. Justice White and by him referred to the Court, denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1118. Rehearing Denied No. 73-1191. Hourihan v. Dakin et al, 416 U. S. 951. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. Assignment Order An order of The Chief Justice designating and assigning Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to perform judicial ORDERS 955 419 U.S. October 21, 25, 29, 1974 duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during the week of November 18, 1974, and for such additional time in advance thereof to prepare for the trial of cases, or thereafter as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294 fa), is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. October 25, 1974 Dismissal Under Rule 60 No. 74-5294. Williams v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court's Rule 60. October 29, 1974 Dismissal Under Rule 60 No. 50, Orig. Vermont v. New York et al. Bill of complaint dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60. [See 417 U. S. 270.] Affirmed on Appeal No. 73-1870. Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Mont. Reported below: 372 F. Supp. 1175. No. 74-32. Vallis et al. v. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. No. 73-1902. National Independent Coal Operators Assn, et al. v. Brennan, Secretary of Labor. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. D. C. Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Rehnquist would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. Reported below: 372 F. Supp. 16. 956 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-2029. Star et al. v. Preller et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Md. Reported below: 375 F. Supp. 1093. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. Appellant Star owns several bookstores in Baltimore which contain, inter alia, coin-operated viewing machines showing portions of so-called “adult” motion pictures. After a number of raids in which these motion pictures were seized for lack of a proper license from the Maryland State Board of Censors, appellant sought injunctive relief against the enforcement of Maryland’s film-licensing requirements on the ground that such requirements violate the freedoms protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We held a predecessor Maryland statute unconstitutional in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965); the three-judge District Court, however, concluded that the defects identified in Freedman had been remedied by the present statute. 352 F. Supp. 530 (Md. 1972); 375 F. Supp. 1093 (Md. 1974). The court below made much of the fact that the amended statute provides for a prompt judicial determination of obscenity after denial of a license by the Board, and that the Board must bear the burden of proof at all stages of the proceedings. I have previously set forth, at some length, my view that no form of censorship, no matter how speedy or efficient it may be, is constitutionally permissible. The cost and delay involved in contesting an adverse determination by the censor provide a very practical deterrent to free and open expression; the inevitable result is a reluctance even to attempt to disseminate ideas which, by virtue of their content, may attract the censor’s attention or draw his wrath. Moreover, by imposing his sanctions in advance, the censor circumvents all the protections of the Bill of Rights which are called into play by a criminal prosecution after the ORDERS 957 955 Brennan, J., dissenting fact. The Maryland system has no place for the^right of trial by jury, nor does it require proof beyond a reasonable doubt; step by step, by eroding these constitutional guarantees, the State facilitates its self-appointed task of imposing and ensuring conformity to an official standard of morality. I adhere to the positions I have taken in Freedman v. Maryland, supra, at 61 (concurring opinion); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 697 (1959) (concurring opinion); and Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587, 588 (1954) (concurring opinion). I would reverse the judgment below. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 66A, §§ 1-26 (1970), which requires that films be licensed before exhibition and forbids the licensing of obscene films. Pursuant to § 6 (b) of the statute a film is “obscene” if, *when considered as a whole, its calculated purpos^ or dominant effect is substantially to arouse sexual desires, and if the probability of this effect is so great as to outweigh whatever other merits the film may possess.” A three-judge court ruled adversely to appellant, and this Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 88 S. 15 (1973), and companion cases. 413 U. S. 905. The three-judge court again upheld the statute. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit 958 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U. S. the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, as it defines “obscene” in § 6 (b), is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, and because the judgment of the three-judge court was rendered after Miller, I would therefore reverse. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Appeals Dismissed No. 73-6968. Englefield v. Englefield. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. No. 74-37. Town of East Haven et al. v. United States et al. Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 452. No. 74-5145. Buxton v. Board of Directors et al. Appeal from C. A. 9th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Affirmed for Absence of Quorum No. 73-6732. Sloan v. Nixon, President of the United States, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Four Members of ORDERS 959 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 the Court have disqualified themselves in this case. Because of this absence of a quorum, 28 U. S. C. § 1, and since a majority of the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next Term of Court, the judgment is affirmed under 28 U. S. C. § 2109, which provides that under these circumstances “the court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court.” Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1398. Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded No. 74-5060. LaRuffa v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974), and Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973). Reported below: 34 N. Y. 2d 242, 313 N. E. 2d 332. Miscellaneous Orders No.-----------. Ellis v. Hawaii; and No.------. Ellis v. Powers et ux. Sup. Ct. Hawaii. Motion to consolidate cases to permit filing of a single petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. A-177 (74^269). Brian, Secretary, Human Relations Agency, et al. v. California Welfare Rights Organization et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 3d 237, 520 P. 2d 970. No. A-190 (74—244). Booze et al. v. Florida. Application for stays of mandates of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, presented to Mr. Jus 960 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U. S. tice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 291 So. 2d 262, and 293 So. 2d 107. No. A-202 (74-312). Swoap, Director, Department of Benefit Payments, et al. v. Waits et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Application to stay enforcement of injunction of Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 3d 887, 524 P. 2d 117. No. A-255. Alers v. Toledo et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Application for stay presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-256 (74-456). Hill, Attorney General of Texas, et al. v. Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast et al. Appeal from D. C. S. D. Tex. Motion of appellees to vacate stay entered by this Court on October 11, 1974 [ante, p. 805], denied. No. A-274. Economic Consultants, Inc., dba E-C Tape Service, Inc., et al. v. Mercury Record Productions, Inc., et al. Application for stay of mandate of Supreme Court of Wisconsin, presented to Mr. Justice Blackmun, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 64 Wis. 2d 163, 218 N. W. 2d 705. No. A-284 (74-409). Rose, Warden v. United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division, et al. Application to stay orders of Judge Robert M. McRae, entered August 22, 1974, presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-334. Hurst et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Application for order to have court-appointed counsel relieved and other relief, presented to Mr. Justice Stewart, and by him referred to the Court, denied. ORDERS 961 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 No. 50, Orig. Vermont v. New York et al. It is ordered by this Court that the Honorable R. Ammi Cutter be, and he is hereby, awarded the sum of $50,000 as compensation for his services as Special Master in this case, and that his disbursements totaling $5,150 be allowed. It is further ordered that the fee and disbursements be paid by the parties in the following amounts: $20,000 by the State of Vermont and $35,150 by the International Paper Co. It is further ordered that the Special Master is hereby discharged. [See 417 U. S. 270.] No. 73-689. Maness v. Meyers, Judge. 169th Jud. Dist. Ct. Tex., Bell County. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 934.] Motion of Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. No. 73-820. United States v. Guana-Sanchez. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 967.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Joseph Beeler, Esquire, of Miami, Fla., a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 73-822. Fry et al. v. United States. Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 912.] Motions of the State of California and California State Employees’ Assn, for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied. No. 73-1012. Gulf Oil]Corp. et al. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 988.] Motion of American Building Maintenance Industries for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. No. 73-1018. United States v. Mazurie et al. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 947.] Motion 962 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U.S. of respondents to dismiss writ of certiorari denied. Motion of the State of Wyoming for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae granted. No. 73-1256. Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 981.] Motion of Associated General Contractors of America et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied. No. 73-1279. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States. Ct. Cl. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 907.] Motion of National Education Assn, for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 73-1380. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians et al. v. Federal Power Commission et al.; No. 73-1666. Arizona Public Service Co. et al. v. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians et al. ; and No. 73-1667. Federal Power Commission v. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 944.] Motion of Arizona Public Service Co. et al. for divided argument granted; however, no additional time for oral argument is allowed. No. 73-1573. Withrow et al. v. Larkin. Appeal from D. C. E. D. Wis. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 417 U. S. 943.] Consideration of appellee’s suggestion of mootness deferred to oral argument. No. 74-125. Alamo Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Arizona. C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. ORDERS 963 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 Probable Jurisdiction Noted or Postponed No. 73-1820. Philbrook, Commissioner, Department of Social Welfare v. Glodgett et al.; and No. 74-132. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Glodgett et al. Appeals from D. C. Vt. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. In No. 73-1820, probable jurisdiction noted. In No. 74-132, further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on the merits. Cases consolidated and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 368 F. Supp. 211. Certiorari Granted No. 73-7031. Fowler v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Reported below: 285 N. C. 90, 203 S. E. 2d 803. No. 74-70. Goldfarb et ux. v. Virginia State Bar et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of Clark C. Havighurst for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari granted. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and petition. Reported below’: 497 F. 2d 1. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 73-6968, 74-37, and 74-5145, supra.) No. 73-1830. Szekula v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 926. No. 73-1903. Zlotnick et al. v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 161 U. S. App. D. C. 238, 494 F. 2d 1157. 964 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-1906. Herman Investment Co. et al. v. Loeffler, Trustee, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 793. No. 73-1984. New7 York Shipping Assn., Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission et al.; and No. 73-1990. International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL CTO v. Federal Maritime Commission et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below7: 495 F. 2d 1215. No. 73-2018. In re Rosen. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 315 A. 2d 151. No. 73-2022. Rollins Telecasting, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below; 494 F. 2d 80. No. 73-2048. Matlock Truck Body & Trailer Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 671. No. 73-2061. Smith v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 185. No. 73-6800. Baxter v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1404. No. 73-6895. Somerset v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6907. Holmes v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1375. No. 73-6908. Peterson v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 20, 495 F. 2d 1076. No. 73-6920. Moody v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1405. ORDERS 965 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 No. 73-6921. Vallejo v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 960. No. 73-6940. Brown v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 593. No. 73-6942. Miller v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 1405. No. 73-6945. Shabazz v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6947. Duckett et al. v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 56 Ill. 2d 432, 308 N. E. 2d 590. No. 73-6956. Jones et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 20, 495 F. 2d 1076. No. 73-6963. Kohn v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 763. No. 73-6971. Combs v. Henderson, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1241. No. 73-6978. Owen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1100. No. 73-6981. Ricketson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 367. No. 73-6990. Kearns v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6993. Rucker v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1241. 966 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-6994. Miranda v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 783. No. 73-7007. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7010. Buster v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7017. Valenti v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7033. Washington v. McCarthy, Men’s Colony Superintendent. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7036. Noland v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 529. No. 73-7071. McCravy v. Rose, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 924. No. 73-7103. Pfister v. Phoenix of Hartford Insurance Co. et al. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 293 So. 2d 187. No. 73-7104. Murray v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 922. No. 73-7105. Brown v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 214 Va. 755, 204 S. E. 2d 429. No. 73-7106. Peichev v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 917. No. 73-7109. Burke v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 373. No. 73-7110. Davis v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 967 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 No. 73-7113. DiJohn v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7114. Duhart v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 941. No. 74-41. Nalls v. Nevada. Sup. Ct. Nev. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 520 P. 2d 611. No. 74-44. Fahrig et al. v. Ledford, Executor. Ct. App. Ohio, Montgomery County. Certiorari denied. No. 74-135. Yakima Tribe of Indians of the Yakima Reservation v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 Ct. Cl. 868. No. 74-137. Wiest et al. v. Mt. Lebanon School District. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 457 Pa. 166, 320 A. 2d 362. No. 74 140. Ronvfin v. Committee on Examinations and Admissions of the Supreme Court of Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. No. 74-149. Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples National Bank of Washington. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Wash. App. 530, 518 P. 2d 734. No. 74-151. Zenith Vinyl Fabrics Corp. v. Ford Motor Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-162. Dillinger v. Mazza. (pt. App. Ohio, Hancock County. Certiorari denied. No. 74-163. Bruenn v. Bruenn. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. 968 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-164. Ohio Hoist Manufacturing Co. v. LiRocchi, dba Cable Climber Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-173. Blackshear v. Blackshear. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 232 Ga. 312, 206 S. E. 2d 429. No. 74^177. Pruitt v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 Ill. App. 3d 930, 307 N. E. 2d 142. No. 74-178. Nassau County Association of Insurance Agents, Inc., et al. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1151. No. 74-179. Jefferson Chemical Co., Inc. v. General Tire & Rubber Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1283. No. 74-182. Goodbody & Co. et al. v. Palomar Financial Corp. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 74-186. Glinsey et al. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 565. No. 74-5008. Plummer v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5010. Cushnie v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 488 F. 2d 81. No. 74-5013. Lisi v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1396. No. 74-5033. Lebron v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1160. ORDERS 969 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 No. 74—5035. Hawkins v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 319 A. 2d 328. No. 74—5036. LeFlore v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 925. No. 74—5057. Vessels v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1295. No. 74-5142. Ross v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-1583. Marcello v. Saxbe, Attorney General. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 161 U. S. App. D. C. 345, 495 F. 2d 171. No. 73-1967. Lee v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 73-6670. Rose v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 73-6902. Martinez v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 507 S. W. 2d 223. No. 73-6983. Carter v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-9. Mauro v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 45. 970 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U.S. No. 74-5012. Sholars w. Matter et al. C. A. 9th Or. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 279. No. 74 5166. Harris v. Procunier, Corrections Director. ©»A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 576. No. 73-1679. Linda Pollin Memorial Housing Corp, et al. v. Marshall et al. ; and No. 73-1680. Tenants’ Council of Tiber Island-Carrollsburg Square et al. v. Lynn, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondents Marshall et al. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in No. 73-1679 granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 73-1679, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 56, 497 F. 2d 643; No. 73-1680, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 61, 497 F. 2d 648. No. 73-1724. Miller et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 638. Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan join, dissenting. On August 25, 1972, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned a 12-count indictment against the petitioners. In eight of the 12 counts petitioners were charged with income tax fraud, in violation of § 7206 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 7206 (I).1 The indictment alleged that the 1 “§ 7206. Fraud and False statements. “Any person who— “(1) Declaration under penalties of perjury. “Willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that ORDERS 971 970 Blackmun, J., dissenting acts that were the subject of four of the fraud counts (counts II-V, inclusive) were committed on July 18 and 21, 1966, respectively. Section 6531 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6531,2 provides a 6-year period of limitations for offenses under § 7206 11). The indictment, obviously, was returned after the expiration of the 6-year period and, without more, would be subject to dismissal as out of time. See Benes v. United States, 276 F. 2d 99,107-109 (CA6 1960). Section 6531, however, has as its penultimate sentence the following: “Where a complaint is instituted before a commissioner of the United States within the period above limited, the time shall be extended until the date which is 9 months after the date of the making of the complaint before the commissioner of the United States.” With respect to the alleged offenses of July 18 and 21, 1966, a complaint was filed by the Government with a commissioner of the United States on July 17, 1972, just within the 6-year period. The record contains an it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter “shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.” 2 “§ 6531. Periods of limitation on criminal prosecutions. “No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any of the various offenses arising under the internal revenue laws unless the indictment is found or the information instituted within 3 years next after the commission of the offense, except that the period of limitation shall be 6 years— “(5) for offenses described in sections 7206 (1) and 7207 (relating to false statements and fraudulent documents).” 972 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Blackmun, J., dissenting 419 U. S. acknowledgment, and discloses, that the Government’s case had been prepared a week or 10 days before the expiration of the 6-year period; that there was time for the prosecution to have presented the case to a grand jury within that period; that a grand jury had been empaneled in the district; that, in fact, a grand jury of the district had sat in July 1972, including, specifically, the 13th and 20th days of that month; and that the situation was not one where a grand jury of the district was not in session during the closing days of the limitation period. A defense motion to dismiss the four counts was granted by the District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed. 491 F. 2d 638, 644-646 (CA5 1974). Tn Jaben v. United States, 381 U. S. 214 (1965), § 6531 was construed to apply to a situation where the Government had developed its case within the time period prescribed by the statute of limitations, but was unable to obtain an indictment because a grand jury was not in session. Mr. Justice Harlan, in speaking for the Court, observed: “More basically, the evident statutory purpose of the nine-month extension provision is to afford the Government an opportunity to indict criminal tax offenders in the event that a grand jury is not in session at the end of the normal limitation period. This is confirmed by the immediate precursor of the present section which provided for an extension ‘until the discharge of the grand jury at its next session within the district.’ I. R. C. 1939, § 3748 (a). Clearly the statute was not meant to grant the Government greater time in which to make its case (a result which could have been accomplished simply by making the normal period of limitation six years and nine months), but rather was intended to deal ORDERS 973 970 Blackmun, J., dissenting with the situation in which the Government has its case made within the normal limitation period but cannot obtain an indictment because of the grand jury schedule.” Id., at 219-220. (Footnote omitted.) Mr. Justice Goldberg, in a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, echoed this conclusion: “I agree with the Court that the purpose of the tolling provision in the statute of limitations before us, as evidenced by its language and its legislative history, is to avoid penalizing the Government when a criminal defendant cannot be indicted merely because no grand jury is sitting at the time the limitation period expires. In keeping with this purpose, the Government ought to be allowed to present a case prepared before the expiration of the limitation period to the grand jury when it next convenes, but it ought not to be allowed to take advantage of a nine-month extension to prepare a case which was not ready for submission before the end of the statutory period.” Id., at 226. This analysis of the purpose of the significant sentence of § 6531, although not determinative of the issues in Jaben, remains as this Court’s primary interpretation of the statute. The Government’s position, however, as expressed in its memorandum in opposition to the petition for certiorari,3 is essentially that the 6-year limitation period for 3 “The statute simply permits the filing of a complaint prior to the end of the limitations period as a means of extending the time for the issuance of an indictment. . . . The purpose of the complaint procedure is to allow the government additional time to present the matter to the grand jury once its case is made.” Memorandum for the United States in Opposition 3. 974 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U. S. an offense under § 7206 (1) is automatically extended and converted into a 6-year-and-9-month period, at the Government’s option, by its mere filing of an appropriate complaint with a commissioner of the United States before the expiration of the 6-year period. The Government, possibly, is right, but its position, under the circumstances of this case, appears to me to be not entirely consistent with what was said in the respective opinions in Jaben by Justices Harlan and Goldberg. I therefore would grant the petition for certiorari and test the Government’s position only upon full briefing and argument. No. 73-1780. Ditlow et al. v. Brinegar, Secretary of Transportation, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion to defer consideration and certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 161 U. S. App. D. C. 154, 494 F. 2d 1073. No. 73-1811. Bryant et al. v. North Carolina; and No. 73-1818. Horn v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment. Reported below: No. 73-1811, 285 N. C. 27, 203 S. E. 2d 27; No. 73-1818, 285 N. C. 82, 203 N. E. 2d 36. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioners Bryant and Floyd were convicted in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County of exhibiting allegedly obscene motion pictures in violation of North ORDERS 975 974 Brennan, J., dissenting Carolina Gen. Stat. § 14—190.1 (Cum. Supp. 1971). Petitioner Horn was convicted in the Superior Court of New Hanover County of selling allegedly obscene magazines in violation of the same statute. Section 14-190.1 provided in pertinent part at the times of the alleged offenses as follows: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to intentionally disseminate obscenity in any public place. A person, firm or corporation disseminates obscenity within the meaning of this Article if he or it: “(1) Sells . . . any obscene writing, picture, record or other representation or embodiment of the obscene; or “(4) Exhibits . . . any obscene still or motion picture, film, filmstrip, ... or any matter or material. . . which is a representation, embodiment, performance, or publication of the obscene. “(b) For purposes of this Article any material is obscene if: “(1) The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and, “(2) The material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary national community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and, “(3) The material is utterly without redeeming social value.” Petitioners Bryant and Floyd appealed their convictions to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, which affirmed. The Supreme Court of North Carolina dismissed an appeal and denied a petition for writ of certiorari. This Court then granted certiorari, vacated the 976 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Brennan, J., dissenting judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded for further consideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), and companion cases. 413 U. S. 913. On remand, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of North Carolina both again affirmed the convictions. Petitioner Thorn’s conviction was affirmed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of North Carolina also affirmed, in an opinion rendered after Miller was decided. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 14-190.1 was constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgments of the Supreme Court of North Carolina were rendered after Miller, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan# J., dissenting). Further, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials in these cases was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Handing v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent *Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgments, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the cases be decided on the merits. ORDERS 977 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 with the Due Process Clause, petitioners must be given an opportunity to have their cases decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which their convictions have ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgments below and remand for a determination whether petitioners should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1992. Hall, Correction Commissioner v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondents Lopez et al. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1196. No. 73-6443. Greene et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari. Reported below: 160 U. S. App. D. C. 21, 489 F. 2d 1145. No. 73-6629. Pryor v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari. Reported below: 160 U. S. App. D. C. 404, 492 F. 2d 670. No. 73-6936. Helms v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari. Reported below: 284 N. C. 508, 201 S. E. 2d 850. No. 73-6809. Falkner v. Blanton, Judge. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion to strike respondent’s brief in opposi- 978 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Douglas, J., dissenting tion and certiorari denied. Reported below: 488 F. 2d 551. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. The petitioner brought this lawsuit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, for damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief against a Florida probate judge, alleging that the latter had refused to award property clearly due the petitioner under a will. The District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte on the ground that the judge was immune from suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. By its language, § 1983 applies to “every person” acting under color of state authority. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), the Court placed a judicial gloss on that language when it held that Congress did not thereby create liability of judges for damages. Pierson should not control here, for equitable relief as well as damages were sought. I assume that subjecting judges to damage liability would discourage vigor and independence of the bench, yet there need be no fear that subjecting judges to equitable relief in § 1983 cases will inhibit desirable judicial behavior. Two Courts of Appeals have concluded that the reasons for immunity in damage actions are inapplicable when injunctions or declaratory judgments are sought and accordingly have distinguished Pierson. See Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F. 2d 389 (CA7 1972), rev’d on other grounds subnom. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974); Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383 (ED Mo. 1969), aff’d per curiam, 428 F. 2d 876 (CA8 1970). See also Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F. 2d 1205 (CA2 1972); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc'. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117 (SDNY 1969) (three-judge court) (Friendly, J.), aff’d on other grounds, 401 U. S. 154 (1971). Nothing in our cases compels the result below. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973), held that ORDERS 979 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 municipalities could not be sued under § 1983 even for equitable relief, but the holding was based on the inability to read “municipality” within the meaning of “person” as used in the statute. To read “every person” as including judges places no strain on the words; on the contrary, it is the judicial gloss Pierson v. Ray placed upon the plain language that causes mischief. Judicial narrowing of this broad remedial statute should proceed no further. I would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below. No. 73-6810. Gentile v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1404. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall concurs, dissenting. Petitioner was questioned by Texas police officers in connection with the burglary of a store. After receiving Miranda warnings, petitioner admitted participation in the robbery and disclosed that certain stolen articles could be found in his apartment. The police decided to search the apartment for the stolen goods. Instead of obtaining a warrant, however, the police officers presented petitioner with a “consent form,” which he signed. By signing the form he authorized the police “to take from my premises and property, any letters, papers, materials or any other property or things which they desire as evidence for criminal prosecution in the case or cases under investigation.” The police then went to petitioner’s apartment in search of four boxes of gum and a small radio, goods known to have been taken in the store burglary. In the course of searching for these items, one of the searching officers found a check lying on a bureau. The check was partly obscured by an article of clothing, but the officer testified that a protruding stub allowed him to determine that the payee was a person other than petitioner. The officers 980 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. Douglas, J., dissenting seized the check, and subsequent investigation revealed that it had been stolen. The officer’s discovery formed the basis for petitioner’s prosecution in the District Court for mail theft, 18 U. S. C. § 1708. Prior to trial, petitioner unsuccessfully moved to suppress the stolen check as evidence, asserting that the seizure of it violated the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner’s conviction followed and the denial of the motion to suppress was held proper on the ground that petitioner had consented to the search of his apartment. Since there is no contention that the police could otherwise have searched petitioner’s apartment without first obtaining a warrant, the lawfulness of their search turns on whether petitioner’s signing of the consent form relieved the police of this obligation. If this consent form has any validity, seizure of the stolen check from petitioner’s residence is outside its scope. The form signified consent to seizure of property “as evidence ... in the case or cases under investigation.” At the time petitioner signed the form he had been questioned and charged with the burglary of a particular store. Thus his reasonable expectations, which must govern construction of the document, were that he was authorizing the police to search his residence for evidence in connection with the only crime for which he was then a suspect.1 1 The Government argues that the seizure can nevertheless be justified under the “plain view” doctrine. But under our décisions, the “plain view” doctrine permits a seizure only where officers already searching under lawful authority make an unanticipated discovery of an object whose incriminating character is immediately apparent. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 464-471 (1971). These requirements are not met in this case. When the police entered petitioner’s house they had no reason to believe that a piece of paper on his bureau, only partially in view, was the fruit of another crime. There was nothing incriminating about a slip of paper protruding from a piece of clothing on petitioner’s bureau. The carefully confined “plain view” exception discussed in Coolidge, if extended to cover this case, would likewise validate the seizure ORDERS 981 979 Douglas, J., dissenting Wholly apart from the question of the scope of consent, I would grant certiorari to consider whether the record adequately demonstrates that petitioner gave an informed consent to search. Although petitioner had received Miranda warnings, the record is silent as to whether petitioner knew, prior to signing the consent form, that he had a right to refuse and require the police to obtain a warrant. Since in my view waiver of Fourth Amendment protections requires an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464'^1938), I would require an affirmative showing in the record that petitioner knew he had a right to refuse. While I need not here decide whether a warning would be required in every case, I note that the surest method of demonstrating that the accused had waived a known right is a showing that the officers advised him of it by a statement patterned on the warning mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). In Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), the Court held that the absence of a warning did not vitiate consent to a search in a noncustodial setting, spe-cificially reserving the question of the significance of custodial conditions, id., at 247 n. 36. The ®ourt believed that warning the subject of his right to refuse would be “impractical” under the “informal and unstructured conditions” of a roadside search. Id., at 231-232. ¥£t the circumstances under which an arrestee in police custody meets with his captors are hardly “unstructured.” When a suspect is in custody the situation is in control of the police. The pace of events will not somehow deny them an opportunity to give a warning, as the Court apparently feared would happen in noncustodial settings. Moreover, the custodial setting will permit easy docu-of a book, not covered by the warrant, but later determined to be obscene. 982 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. Douglas, J., dissenting mentation of both thd# giving of a warning and the arrestee’s response. The giving of a warning does not, of course, rule out the possibility that coercive tactics may be used to secure consent. But an affirmative communication that a right to refuse consent will be respected may serve to fortify the accused against the coercion inherent in the custodial setting. See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 468. These considerations are especially compelling where, as here, the police procurement of consent is an outgrowth of custodial interrogation. Before signing the consent form the petitioner had been in custody seven hours, and subjected to interrogation that eventually resulted in a confession. By proceeding on the basis of a “consent” form the police circumvent three important protections of the warrant procedure. First, they avoid submitting to a magistrate’s independent assessment of probable cause. Second, they are spared the necessity of making a record, in the form of an affidavit sworn to prior to the search, that guards against the possibility that an ex post facto justification will be based upon what the search turns up. Finally, to the extent the police use, as they did here, a boilerplate consent form, they are relieved of the particularity requirement of the warrant.2 Efforts by the police to proceed outside the warrant procedure by procuring consent from persons in police custody should be viewed carefully and critically. I would grant certiorari. 2 The Fourth Amendment provides in part that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” In contrast to the requirement of particularity is the wording of the “consent” form in this case, authorizing seizure of “any letters, papers, material or any other property or things which [the police] desire as evidence for criminal prosecution in the case or cases under investigation.” ORDERS 983 419 U. S. October 29, 1974 No. 73-6874. Spady et vir v. Mount Vernon Housing Authority. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 2d 573, 310 N. E. 2d 542. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. Petitioners Linda and Vincent Spady applied for public housing in Mount Vernon, N. Y., in early 1971. Their application was accepted, and in early July they were told that they were eligible for low-income public housing accommodations. On July 9, 1971, petitioners signed a lease, paid one month’s rent plus a security deposit, and were assigned to a specific apartment which would be available to them on July 15, 1971. On or before that date, however, the respondent Housing Authority learned from other tenants that Vincent Spady had previously used the name of Vincent Bentley,1 and that he had compiled a criminal record under that name. Investigation disclosed that Vincent had been arrested once on burglary charges, which were dismissed when the complaining witnesses failed to appear before the grand jury, and had been arrested again on robbery charges, which were dismissed when he was certified for treatment as a narcotics addict. Since those arrests, he had undergone treatment for his narcotics addiction, had been released as rehabilitated, and was enrolled in a methadone maintenance program. Upon learning these details, the Housing Authority revoked petitioners’ eligibility and removed them from its housing list, on the grounds that their application had been “untruthful” and had failed to reveal Vincenijs prior arrests and certification as a narcotics addict.2 Pe 1 His full name at birth was Vincent Spady, but he took the name of Bentley for several years when his mother remarried under that name. 2 It is undisputed that the application form used by the Authority did not expressly request any information concerning aliases, prior 984 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Douglas, J., dissenting 419 U. S. titioners requested an evidentiary hearing to contest the revocation, but the Housing Authority declined to grant a hearing. Petitioners then brought suit in the New York Supreme Court, which ordered the Authority to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether petitioners met applicable desirability standards for public housing eligibility. A divided Appellate Division reversed, holding that petitioners were not entitled to a hearing because they were not tenants in possession, and that the Authority’s revocation of petitioners’ eligibility had a rational basis. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the memorandum of the Appellate Division. Petitioners contend that they were entitled to an evidentiary hearing before they could be deprived of their eligibility for public housing; they further contend that the reasons advanced by the Authority in support of that revocation are so arbitrary and so lacking in any rational basis as to constitute a denial of due process of law and of the equal protection of the laws.3 Our decisions in recent years have identified a wide range of important interests which the State may not trample upon without a prior hearing. Thus we have required hearings prior to termination of welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); revo-arrests, or drug addiction. The claim of untruthfulness in the application is, therefore, simply untenable. 3 Petitioners argue that prior arrests, standing alone, have virtually no probative value in establishing actual misconduct or criminal propensities. They further argue that it is wholly irrational to discriminate against a rehabilitated addict on the basis of his prior addiction or on the basis of criminal acts committed during the period of such addiction, and that such discrimination is fundamentally inconsistent with the nature and purposes of narcotics rehabilitation programs. In the absence of a more specific evidentiary record concerning the circumstances of Vincent’s prior arrests and the extent of his rehabilitation, it is impossible to evaluate these arguments as applied to him. ORDERS 985 983 Douglas, J., dissenting cation of a driver’s license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971); revocation of parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), or probation, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973); and, under certain circumstances, termination of a teaching position at a state college or university, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), and Perry n. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972). Eligibility for public housing, under the circumstances presented here, arguably merits comparable protection. The long waiting lists maintained for low-income housing projects are ample proof of the pressing demand. An applicant who has been certified as eligible and has spent many months on a waiting list has a substantial interest in maintaining that place and a substantial expectancy of obtaining housing. Summary removal from an eligibility list just prior to occupancy can work serious injury, since the applicant may be relegated to the end of another growing line. Today’s mounting bureaucracy, both at the state and federal levels, promises to be suffocating and repressive unless it is put into the harness of procedural due process. One who need not explain the reasons for his actions can operate beyond the law. One who need not even hear a complaint from the citizen can turn sheer power into an arbitrary force.4 Bureaucrats who can, without hearings, ride herd on the people they are supposed to serve, are able to dispense with the concept of equal protection and make their ipse dixit the law. Of course not every agency action should be put down for a hearing lest the work of 4 As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 170 (1951): “The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.” (Concurring opinion.) 986 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 October 29, 1974 419 U. S. government be paralyzed. Yet one who has no interest that can be called an entitlement may still have an expectancy on which plans are built and living arrangements made. If, as in Spady’s case, he is suddenly cast into the outer darkness and placed on the State’s blacklist for housing, he may suffer greatly. The unexamined inferences of this agency and the whispered rumors of Spady’s former employer may make him and his family pariahs, so far as housing is concerned. What the decision on the merits should be is arguable. But I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for argument. No. 74—21. Mid-Florida Television Corp. v. TV 9, Inc., et al. ; and No. 74-31. Federal Communications Commission v. TV 9, Inc., et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari. Reported below: 161 U. S. App. D. C. 349, 495 F. 2d 929. No. 74-28. O’Bryan v. Chandler, Lt. S. District Judge. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 403. No. 74-77. Andrews v. City of Los Angeles et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition and certiorari denied. No. 74—141. Smith, Correctional Superintendent v. Chennault. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1367. No. 74—169. Drake-Henne, Inc., et al. v. City of Wahpeton. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 215 N. W. 2d 897. ORDERS 987 419 U. S. October 29, November 6, 7, 11, 1974 Assignment Order An order of The Chief Justice designating and assigning Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to perform judicial duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during the week of January 13, 1975, and for such additional time as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294 (a) is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. November 6, 1974 Dismissal Under Rule 60 No. 74-101. Falley v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 919. November 7, 1974 Dismissal Under Rule 60 No. 74-268. Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau v. Terrell. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 16. November 11, 1974 Affirmed on Appeal No. 73-1929. McDonald et al. v. McLucas, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. Reported below: 371 F. Supp. 831. No. 73-7089. Wright et al. v. Malloy, Commissioner, Department of Motor Vehicles. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Vt. Reported below: 373 F. Supp. 1011. 988 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U. S. Appeals Dismissed No. 73-1890. Thompson et ux. v. Clark, Treasurer of DuPage County, et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. No. 74—5187. Smith v. California. Appeal from App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Alameda, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. No. 73-6884. Hunter v. General Motors Corp., Buick Motor Division. Appeal from C. A. 6th Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Reported below: 487 F. 2d 1402. No. 73-6899. Stokes v. Buchignani et al. Appeal from D. C. E. D. Ky. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. No. 74-200. Barnett v. Gordon. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ohio dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 38 Ohio St. 2d 90, 310 N. E. 2d 251. No. 74-224. Beacon Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Columbus. Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County, dismissed for want of substantial federal question. No. 74-315. Hoogasian v. Regional Transportation Authority et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 58 Ill. 2d 117, 317 N. E. 2d 534. ORDERS 989 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 Vacated and Remanded on Appeal No. 73-1882. Burns, Commissioner, Department of Social Services, et al. v. Hein. Appeal from D. C. S. D. Iowa. Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded for reconsideration in light of the revision of regulations of the Department of Agriculture. (See 7 CFR §271.3 (c)(1)(iii)(f), 39 Fed. Reg. 26002.) Reported below: 371 F. Supp. 1091. Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded. (See also No. 73-6969, ante, p. 18.) No. 74—5021. Grier v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina (but not the judgment of conviction) are vacated and case remanded to the District Court for reconsideration in light of Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424 (1974). Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1398. Miscellaneous Orders No. A-290 (74-5492). Snider v. United States. Application for stay of execution and enforcement of judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 424. No. A-348 (74-5496). Bartlett v. Toledo Bar Assn. Application for stay of execution and enforcement of judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohiopjpresented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 39 Ohio St. 2d 100, 313 N. E. 2d 834. 990 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U.S. No. A-361. Baylor v. Hess, Judge. Application for writ of mandamus, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. 9, Orig. United States v. Louisiana et al. (Louisiana Boundary Case). Joint motion for additional time for oral argument granted and a total of two hours allotted for that purpose. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 73-820. United States v. Guana-Sanchez. C. A. 7th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 967.] Motion of respondent to dismiss writ on account of mootness denied. No. 73-848. Fusari, Commissioner of Labor v. Steinberg et al. Appeal from D. C. Conn. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 415 U. p. 912.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that John M. Creane, Esquire, of Milford, Conn., a member of the Bar of this Court be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for appellees in this case. No. 73-1106. Cousins et al. v. Wigoda et al. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. [Certiorari granted, 415 U. S. 956.] Motion of petitioners for divided argument denied. No. 73-1346. McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force, et al. v. DeChamplain. Appeal from D. C. D. C. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, 418 U. S. 904.] Motion of appellee for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis granted. Motion of appellees for additional time for oral argument denied. No. 73-1377. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency v. City of New York et al. C. A. D. C. Cir.; and No. 73-1378. Train, Administrator^* Environmental Protection Agency v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 969.] ORDERS 991 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 Motion of petitioner for additional time for oral argument denied. No. 73-1446. Roe et al. v. Doe. Ct. App. N. Y. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 907.] Motion of Authors League of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. Motion of American Psychiatric Assn, et al. for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied. No. 73-1462. White, Secretary of State of Texas, et al. v. Regester et al. Appeal from D. C. W. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 417 U. S. 906.] Motion of appellees for additional time for oral argument denied. No. 73-1471. United States et al. v. New Jersey State Lottery Commission. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 907.] Motion of petitioners to defer oral argument denied. No. 74-8. O’Connor v. Donaldson. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 894.] Motion of Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire, to permit Raymond W. Gearey, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice on behalf of petitioner granted. No. 74-70. Goldfarb et ux. v. Virginia State Bar et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 963.] Motion of Virginia State Bar to be dismissed as a party respondent denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion. No. 73-6721. Tyler et al. v. Regan, U. S. District Judge; and No. 74-318. Scarrella et al. v. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, et al. Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied. No. A-199 (74-170). Andrino v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Application for bail, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. 992 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U.S. No. 74-518. Levy v. Parker, Warden, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Application [A-362] for stay of execution and enforcement of mandate, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant stay pending decision of this Court in No. 73-1346, McLucas v. DeChamplain. Motions to expedite and consolidate with No. 73-1346 for oral argument denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 74-214. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al. v. Salfi et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Cal. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 373 F. Supp. 961. Certiorari Granted No. 73-1908. Cort et al. v. Ash. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 416. No. 74-124. Blue Chip Stamps et al. v. Manor Drug Stores. C. A. 9th Cir. ^Certiorari granted. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 136. No. 74-215. United States v. Park. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 839. No. 73-1924. Muniz et al. v. Hoffman, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 3 and 4 presented by the petition which read as follows: “3. Whether petitioners, charged with criminal contempt for an alleged violation of an injunction issued under the National Labor Relations Act, are entitled to a trial by jury under 18 U. S. C. § 3692, which provides that alleged contemnors are entitled to a jury trial in all contempt cases ‘arising under the laws of the United States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.’ ORDERS 993 419 U. S. November 11, 1974 “4. Whether Article III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution mandate a jury trial where a penalty of $25,000.00 is assessed against a labor organization in a criminal contempt proceeding.” Reported below: 492 F. 2d 929. No. 73-2000. United States v. Peltier. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Case, set for oral argument with No. 73-2050, United States v. Ortiz, ante, p. 824; No. 73-6848, Bowen v. United States, ante, p. 824; and No. 74-114, United States V. Brignoni-Ponce, ante, p. 824. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 985. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 73-1890, 74-5187, and 73-6884, supra.) No. 73-1683. Mooring et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 288 So. 2d 355. No. 73-1813. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local ZXTo. 10 v. Hoffman, Regional Director, National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 929. No. 73-1919. Willis v. United States; and No. 73-6934. Harris v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1273. No. 73-1931. National Dynamics Corp, et al. v. Federal Trade Commission. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below’: 492 F. 2d 1333. No. 73-1979. Sullivan v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 146. No. 73-1985. Newell v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 926. No. 73-2004. Washington et al. v. Florida. Dist. 994 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U.S. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 2d 407. No. 73-2011. Ramsey v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 457. No. 73-2040. Manson et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. ’Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 804. No. 73-2043. Lewis, dba Airco Engineers v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. No. 73-2053. Ridland v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 920. No. 73-2068. Bartemio v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 927. No. 73-6042. Hight v. Belgrade State Bank et al. Sup. Ct. Mont. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 Mont. 546, 514 P. 2d 766. No. 73-6759. Valenzuela v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6828. Strader v. Estelle"\Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 969. No. 73-6835. Ford v. United States; and No. 73-7075. Ford et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1295. No. 73-6861. Handy v. Nelson, Warden. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6896. Perkins v. Garrison, Warden, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6917. Fitzgerald et al. v. Boslow, Institution Director, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1240. ORDERS 995 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 No. 73-6992. Pennywell v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6997. Walker v. Hunt et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below; 492 F. 2d 1241. No. 73-7039. Gloria v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 477. No. 73-7045. Romero et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1356. No. 73-7049. Reyes v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7050. Holland v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 876. No. 73-7061. Reed v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below7: 292 So. 2d 7. No. 73-7069. Brown v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7084. Kibert v. Superintendent, Virginia State Penitentiary. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7099. Godin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 560. No. 73-7101. Joyner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 501. No. 73-7108. Card v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 927. No. 73-7118. Hill v. Pace, Sheriff. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 74-3. Anderson et al. v. Trimble, District Attorney of Cleveland County, et al. Sup. Ct. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 519 P. 2d 1352. 996 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U.S. No. 74^11. Freeman v. United States et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 926. No. 74-15. Reicin v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 563. No. 74—17. Bibler, Administratrix, et al. v. Young et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1351. No. 74-71. King’s Garden, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below’: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 100, 498 F. 2d 51. No. 74-76. Williams v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1403. No. 74-88. Phillips et al. v. Klassen, Postmaster General, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below7: 163 U. S. App. D. C. 360, 502 F. 2d 362. No. 74-122. Packerland Packing Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below7: 494 F. 2d 293. No. 74—136. Rushton & Mercier Woodworking Co., Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1160. No. 74—160. Wiles et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below7: 499 F. 2d 255. No. 74-197. Studer v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 74—198. Yates v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 509 S. W. 2d 600. ORDERS 997 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 No. 74-207. Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 230. No. 74—208. Great Lakes Steel Division, National Steel Corp., et al. v. Michie et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 213. No. 74-212. Hanzimanolis v. Murphy, Police Commissioner, City of New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 74-221. Gooch et al. v. Skelly Oil Co. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 366. No. 74-227. Lecci et al. v. Levitt, Comptroller of New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 2d 797, 316 N. E. 2d 327. No. 74—230. Rafter v. Fairfield County Trust Co. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 919. No. 74-231. Adamszewski et al. v. Local Lodge 1487, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFWCIO. et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 777. No. 74-236. Haldeman v. Sirica, U. S. District Judge. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-237. Teamsters Local Union 377 v. Scott. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 276. No. 74-239. Tucker v. Maher et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1309. No. 74-244. Booze et al. v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. feertiorari denied. Reported below: 291 So. 2d 262 and 293 So. 2d 107. 998 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-248. United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 713 and 498 F. 2d 334. No. 74—249. Perini, Correctional Superintendent v. Brooks. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 923. No. 74^257. Pyne et al. v. Green. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 311 A. 2d 675. No. 74-259. Gardner v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 Ore. App. 464, 518 P. 2d 1341. No. 74-263. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1195. No. 74-264. Banco Do Brasil v. Venore Transportation Co. et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 469. No. 74—282. Generes v. Superior Court of California for the County of Shasta et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-290. Siegferth, Guardian, et al. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 392. No. 74-291. Aanestad, Administratrix v. Beech Aircraft Corp. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-292. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. et al. v. Meyerhofer et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1190. No. 74-297. Butcher et ux. v. Burton Abstract & Title Co. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 Mich. App. 98, 216 N. W. 2d 434. ■ ORDERS 999 419 U. S. November 11, 1974 No. 73-303. Kinee et al. v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Assn, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-306. Passaic Valley Water Commission v. New Jersey ex rel. Department of Health et al. Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 N. J. Super. 251, 317 A. 2d 86. No. 74—308. Riley et al. v. Howell et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 App. Div. 2d 843, 351 N. Y. S. 2d 647. No. 74-309. Treasure Valley Potato Bargaining Assn, et al. v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 203. No. 74—5026. Tyler v. Wyrick, Warden. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5028. Hedden v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Summit County. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5039. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 921 and 922. No. 74-5040. Meyer v. Boyle, Judge. C A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 926. No. 74-5041. Caldwell v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5042. Hale v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1405. No. 74r-5044. Hammonds v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Cal. App. 3d 150, 113 Cal. Rptr. 896. 1000 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U.S. No. 74-5046. Kryder v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5047. Brewer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-5048. Rogers v. Lea County, New Mexico, Prosecutors et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5050. Yedor v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5051. Jones v. Pennsylvania. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 457 Pa. 563, 319 A. 2d 142. No. 74-5053. Roi ndtree v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 App. Div. 2d 731, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 357. No. 74-5055. Wright v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5059. Berardelli v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 126. No. 74-5061. Falk v. California Adult Authority. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5064. Jackson v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 919. No. 74-5065. Short v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1170 and 500 F. 2d 676. No. 74-5066. Burton v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 App. Div. 2d 910, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 234. ORDERS 1001 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 No. 74-5068. Parker v. Walters. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1369. No. 74-5069. Love v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1370. No. 74-5070. Sommer v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5071. Bruno v. Daggett et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5075. Dulles v. Secretary of the Treasury et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 18, 495 F. 2d 1074. No. 74-5077. Brown v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 293 So. 2d 425. No. 74-5079. Benanti v. Vincent^'Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5082. Williams v. Johnson, ‘Correctional Superintendent, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5083. Bruno v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5087. Canton, aka Combes v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 919. No. 74-5090. Tate v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 925. No. 74-5093. Fletcher et al. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 927. No. 74-5094. Chaney v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1404. 1002 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 No. 74-5095. Rosario v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below; 43 App. Div. 2d 908, 352 N. Y. S. 2d 427. No. 74—5098. Steigler v. Anderson, Warden. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 793. No. 74-5104. Samuels, aka LeBlanc v. Craven, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5105. Proffitt v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1124. No. 74-5112. Stapleton v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1269. No. 74-5115. Johnson v. Camden County Prosecutor. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5124. Joiner v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1314. No. 74-5125. Rainey v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5126. Barnes Gray, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 923. No. 74-5129. Starks v. Henderson, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74^5130. Crane v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 1385. No. 74-5132. Young v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1003 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 No. 74—5141. Woody v. Kansas. Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 215 Kan. 353, 524 P. 2d 1150. No. 74—5143. Bey, aka Williams v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 194. No. 74-5150. Bowen v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 41. No. 74—5153. Lee v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 586. No. 74^5171. Landis v. United States. C, A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5173. Robinson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below” 500 F. 2d 1401. No. 74-5179. Theriault et al. v. Carlson, Director, Bureau of Prisons, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 390. No. 74—5184. Flowers v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 927. No. 74-5186. Koblein, aka Buttons v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 911. No. 74-5193. Haymes v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 2d 639, 311 N. E. 2d 509. No. 74-5195. Parle v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Ariz. 517, 521 P. 2d 604. £ 1004 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-5203. Jones v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Ariz. 546, 521 P. 2d 978. No. 74^5205. Garcia, aka Garcia-Quesada v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 910. No. 74-5222. Coleman v. United States; and No. 74-5226. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1403. No. 74—5232. Chesney v. Connecticut. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5251. Scagliola v. Scagliola. Sup. Ct. Conn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: -----Conn. ----, 319 A. 2d 414. No. 74r-5252. Green et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 820. No. 74-5257. McDonald v. Arkansas. C. A. Sth Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 385. No. 74-5263. Rossilli v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 920. No. 74-5313. Miller v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 110 Ariz. 597, 522 P. 2d 23. No. 73-1823. Van Gundy et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508 (1957) /Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, ORDERS 1005 1004 Brennan, J., dissenting 42-47 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I n. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment. Reported below: 490 F. 2d 76. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioners were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana of receiving allegedly obscene material which had been shipped by common carrier in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which provides in pertinent part: “Whoever . . . knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce [of]— “(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character ; or “Whoever knowingly takes from such express company or other common carrier any matter or thing the carriage of which is herein made unlawful— “Shall be fined not more than 85,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . . .” The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 490 F. 2d 76 (1974). I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, I expressed the view that “[w]hatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its facd.” 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the 1006 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U.S. reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore, grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioners must be given an opportunity to have their case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which their convictions have ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgments below and remand for a determination whether petitioners should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1842. Adams et al. v. Southern California First National Bank et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Ford Motor Credit Co. et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 324. No. 73-1897. Nowlin et ux. v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 16. *Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgments, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 1007 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 No. 73-1824. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting)!^Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment. Reported below: 490 F. 2d 73. ’ Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioners were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana of transporting allegedly obscene materials in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1465, which provides in pertinent part: “Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 490 F. 2d 73 (1974). I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which is similar in scope to § 1465, I expressed the view that “[w]hatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly 1008 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U. S. obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.” 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioners must be given an opportunity to have their case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which their convictions have ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioners should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-1855. Sisca et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 1337. No. 73-2023. County of San Diego et al. v. Rincon Band of Mission Indians. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1. *A1 though four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 1009 419 U.S. November 11, 1974 No. 73-2039. Petty v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 73-2042. Ficorelli v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 218. No. 73-7074. Rollins v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 299 So. 2d 586. No. 74^85. Oakland Raiders v. Office of Emergency Preparedness et al. Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74—123. Izaak Walton League of America et al. v. St. Clair et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 849. No. 74-265. De Loraine v. MEBA Pension Trust et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr.. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 49. No. 74-286. Bates v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 900. No. 74-5045. Mason v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1241. No. 74-5091. Shirley v. State National Bank of Connecticut. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas w’ould grant certiorari. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 739. 1010 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. November 11, 1974 No. 7U5096. Bridges v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 179. No. 74-5159. Crowder v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1367. No. 74-5190. Castillo-Burgos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 217. No. 74—5207. Mabe et al. v. Clinchfield Coal Co. et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5220. Fell v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles et al. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5304. Christian v. New York. County Court N. Y., Monroe County. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 73-1932. Groner, dba Lucky Distributors v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris ^dult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 499. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas of using a com- ■ ORDERS 1011 1010 Brennan, J., dissenting mon carrier in interstate commerce for carriage of allegedly obscene matter in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which provides in pertinent part as follows: “Whoever , . . knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce [of]— “(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character “Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both . . . The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, 479 F. 2d 577 (1973) (en banc), and this Court vacated the judgment of that court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), and companion cases. 414 U. S. 969. On remand, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed the conviction. 494 F. 2d 499 (1974). I adhere to my dissent in United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139, 147 (1973), in which, speaking of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, I expressed the view that “[w]hatever the extent of the Federal Government’s power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face.” 413 U. S., at 147-148. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, I would therefore grant certiorari, and since the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was rendered after Orito, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the *Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. 1012 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 1974 419 U.S. other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483,494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 73-2027. Brewer, Warden, et al. v. Remmers et al. ; and No. 73-7066. Remmers et al. v. Brewer, Warden, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion of respondents in No. 73-2027 for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari in No. 73-7066. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1277. No. 73-7067. Fannon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 129. No. 74G14. Gissel, Executrix, et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Association of Ship’s Brokers & Agents (USA), Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 27. No. 74-95. New York v. Goggins; and No. 74-5137. Brown v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Motion of respondent in No. 74-95 for leave to proceed ORDERS 1013 419 U. S. November 11, 1974 in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 2d 163, 313 N. E. 2d 41. No. 74U99. Amato v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Donald Lambert to join in petition and certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 545. No. 74—119. Washington v. Odom. Sup. Ct. Wash. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 Wash. 2d 541, 520 P. 2d 152. No. 74^161. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Heater. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1243. No. 74-240. Simon v. Dixon et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1404. No. 74-5015. Darrow v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of Cecil Dale Pierce to join in petition and certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 64. No. 74^5078. Forrow v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied as untimely filed. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1241. No. 74-5110. Bell v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied as untimely filed. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 1406. No. 74^5262. Morgan v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied as untimely filed. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 2d 709, 313 N. E. 2d 340. No. 74-5302. Morgan v. Clark, Sheriff. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied as untimely filed. Reported below : 497 F. 2d 924. 1014 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 11, 18, 1974 419U. S. Rehearing Denied No. 73-831. Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U. S. 653. Petition for rehearing denied. November 18, 1974 Appeals Dismissed No. 74-155. Dennis v. Oklahoma. Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Okla, dismissed for want of substantial federal question. No. 7L-341. Wheeler et al. v. Monroe et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. M. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 86 N. M. 296, 523 P. 2d 540. No. 74-5327. Robinowitz v. Sargent, Governor of Massachusetts, et al. Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. No. 74R5372. Thalasinos v. Dolcino et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. H. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 114 N. H. 353, 321 A. 2d 107. Vacated and Remanded on Appeal No. 74-218. Divine, Sheriff v. Amato. Appeal from C. A. 7th Cir. Judgment vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), and the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis. 2d 354, 212 N. W. 2d 690 (1973). Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. ORDERS 1015 419 U. S. November 18, 1974 476, 508-514 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and that the Constitution prohibits retroactive application of judicially improvised obscenity standards, Miller v. California, supra, at 37-42, would affirm the judgment below. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall would affirm the judgment. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 441. Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded No. 74-108. Regan, Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, et al. v. Johnson. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Judgment vacated and case remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York with directions to dismiss cause as moot. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 925. Miscellaneous Orders No. A-340. Galley v. Callaway, Secretary of the Army, et al. Application to vacate stay entered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on September 26, 1974, presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, denied as moot. No. A-386. Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Application for injunction, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-392. Reamer v. Beall, U. S. Attorney, et al. Application for stay of judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, granted pending further order of the Court. 1016 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 18, 1974 419 U. S. No. D-24. In re Disbarment of Nitsberg. It is ordered that Michael B. Nitsberg, of New York, N. Y., be' suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-27. In re Disbarment of McDermott. It is ordered that Francis X. McDermott, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable w’ithin 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-28. In re Disbarment of Buttles. It is ordered that Robert S. Buttles, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-29. In re Disbarment of Osborne. It is ordered that George R. Osborne, of New’ York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable w'ithin 40 days requiring him to show’ cause w’hy he should not be disbarred from the practice of law7 in this Court. No. D-30. In re Disbarment of Tarr. It is ordered that Leonard N. Tarr, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue returnable within 40 days requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 73-689. Maness v. Meyers, Judge. 169th Jud. Dist. Ct. Tex., Bell County. [Certiorari granted, 416 ORDERS 1017 419 U. S. November 18, 1974 U. S. 934.] Motion of respondent for leave to file supplemental brief after argument granted. No. 73-1309. Bigelow v. Virginia. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 418 U. S. 909.] Motion for divided argument on behalf of appellant granted. No. 73-2050. United States v. Ortiz. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 824.] Motions to dispense with printing appendix and for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that John J. Cleary, Esquire, of San Diego, Cal., a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 73-6848. Bowen v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 824.] Motion of petitioner for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Michael D. Nasatir, Esquire, of Beverly Hills, Cal. a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for petitioner in this case. No. 74^13. Mullaney, Warden, et al. v. Wilbur. C. A. 1st Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 823.] Motions of respondent for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis and for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Peter J. Rubin, Esquire, of Portland, Me., a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 74-114. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 824.] Motion of respondent for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that John J. Cleary, Esquire, of San Diego, Cal., a member of the Bar of this Court, be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. 1018 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 18, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-175. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy, et al. v. Henry et al. ; and No. 74-5176. Henry et al. v. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy/et al. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 895.] Motion to dispense with printing appendix and to proceed on original record granted. No. 74-5216. Reeder, aka Blackrose v. Supreme Court of Wyoming et al. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. No. 74-5081. Myers v. Myers et al. ; and No. 74-5247. Reeder v. Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Wyoming, et al. Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied. No. 74—5287. Williams v. Albert et al. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition denied. Probable Jurisdiction Postponed No. 74-156. Hicks, District Attorney of Orange County, et al. v. Miranda, dba Walnut Properties, et al. Appeal from D. C. C. D. Cal. Further consideration of question of jurisdiction postponed to hearing of case on merits. Reported below: 388 F. Supp. 350. Certiorari Granted No. 73-1734. Gurley, dba Gurley Oil Co. v. Rhoden, Chairman, Tax Commission of Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 288 So. 2d 868. No. 74-304. Gordon v New York Stock Exchange, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported belowu 498 F. 2d 1303. No. 74G363. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1036. ORDERS 1019 419 U. S. November 18, 1974 No. 74-80. Kugler, Attorney General of New Jersey, et al. v. Helfant ; and No. 74-277. Helfant v. Kugler, Attorney General of New Jersey, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion to strike certain portions of petition in No. 74-80 and answer to the cross-petition in No. 74-277 denied. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and these petitions. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1188. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 74-5327 and 74-5372, supra.) No. 73-1575. Callahan et al. v. Kimball et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 564. No. 73-1802. Pennington v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 19 Md. App. 253, 310 A. 2d 817. No. 73-1946. Scata v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1100. No. 73-1997. Harrison v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. «'No. 73-1999. Poole v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 291 So. 2d 723. No. 73-2051. Bombacino v. Bensinger. C. A. 7th Cir. Vlhrtiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 875. No. 73-6847. Cousino v. Cousino. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6894. Sheppard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. 1020 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 18, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-6959. Pratt v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6996. Kele v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1369. No. 73-7026. Rosenberg v. Mancusi, Correctional Superintendent, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1367. No. 73-7037. Marker v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 921. No. 73-7040. Olivares-Vega v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 827. No. 73-7051. McWhirt v. Fearnow et al. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below:------Ind. App. ---------------------------------------------, 301 N. E. 2d 810. No. 73-7059. Clements v. Hopper, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7107. Cook v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1399. No. 73-7115. Richardson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 9. No. 74-25. United States v. American Renaissance Lines, Inc. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 161 U. S. App. IL C. 140, 494 F. 2d 1059. No. 74-26. McNeal v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 490 F. 2d 206. No. 74—40. Jackson et al. v. United States; and No. 73-6891. Tantillo v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 161 U. S. App. D. C. 88, 494 F. 2d 1007. ORDERS 1021 419 U.S. November 18, 1974 No. 74—63. Matthews Co. et al. v. Williams. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 819. No. 74-92. Miles v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 394. No. 74-150. Johnson v'. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1403. No. 74—171. Louisiana v. Sawhill, Administrator, Federal Energy Office, et al. ; and No. 74^181. California, by and through the State Lands Commission v. Sawhill, Administrator, Federal Energy Office, et al. Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 430. No. 74-172. Groendyke Transport, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 17. No. 74-174. Goldman et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 382. No. 74^195. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. No. 74-199. Barton v. Morton, Secretary of the Interior. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 288. No. 74-209. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community et al. v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 Ct. Cl. 137, 494 F. 2d 1386. No. 74-217. Sutton, Executor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-246. Monarch Insurance Company of Ohio v. District of Columbia et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. 1022 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. November 18, 1974 No. 74-262. C. A. 9th Cir. F. 2d 1. Ricci v. County of Riverside et al. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 No. 74-269. Brian, Secretary, Human Relations Agency, et al. v. California Welfare Rights Organization et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 Sal. 3d 237, 520 P. 2d 970. No. 74-270. Kelley, Director of Department of Conservation of Alabama, et al. v. Mobil Oil Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 784. No. 74-288. Local 1426, International Longshore- men’s Assn., AFL-CIO v. Wilmington Shipping Co. et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below :-F. 2d--. No. 74—295. Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc., et al. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1048. No. 74- 302. Tjaden v. Tjaden. Ct. App. La., 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 2d 846. No. 74-305. Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1286. No. 74^311. Swoap, Director, Department of Social Welfare, et al. v. Cooper et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 3d 856, 524 P. 2d 97. No. 74-312. Swoap, Director, Department of Social Welfare, et al. v. Waits et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 3d 887, 524 P. 2d 117. ORDERS 1023 419 U. S. November 18, 1974 No. 74^319. Marshall et al. v. City of Seattle. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 Wash. 2d 665, 521 P. 2d 693. No. 74-329. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Occidental Life Insurance Company of North Carolina. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1255. No. 74-330. Tucker v. Threlkeld. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1101. No. 74-331. Tucker v. Crikelair. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-334. Yorty v. Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District (City Council of Los Angeles, Real Party in Interest). Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 74-349. Husman Express Co. v. Bryan Truck Line, Inc. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Ohio St. 2d 103, 310 N. E. 2d 587. No. 74-356. . Brooklyn Heights Presbyterian Church et al. v. United Presbyterian Church in the Ltnited States of America et al. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-359. Thibodealt et al. v. Minnesota State Bar Assn. Sup. Ct. Minn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 300 Minn. 323, 219 N. W. 2d 920. No. 74-367. Chisholm Brothers Farm Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1137. No. 74-381. Napper et ux. v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard et al. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. 1024 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 18, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-5011. Hamlin, aka Davis v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-5037. Ferri v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1369. No. 74-5088. Gregorio v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1253. No. 74-5100. Quiroz-Santi v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 36. No. 74—5111. Miller v. Virginia. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5147. Smith v. Central Los Angeles Health Project. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5151. Jefferson v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5152. Smith v. Keller, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5156. Hurd v. Marshal of Riverside County et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5158. Monroe v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5165. Steinberg v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5168. Williams v. Dana Corp. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1407. No. 74—5169. Warren v. Aaron, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1025 419 U.S. November 18, 1974 No. 74-5170. Basalyga v. Asch. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5175. Saladin v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1404. No. 74-5181. Handy v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5192. Rooney v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 5th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 16 Ill. App. 3d 901, 307 N. E. 2d 216. No. 74^5199. Wedra v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 2d 199, 313 N. E. 2d 61. No. 74-5204. Wall v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 38. No. 74—5208. Morrow et al. v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorar denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-5215. Ballard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 876. No. 74—5227. Washington v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 922. No. 74-5236. Johnson v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1401. No. 74-5259. Ethridge v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 351. No. 74-5309. Mulcahy v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 App. Div. 2d 911, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 237. 1026 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 18, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-5323. Flint v. Mullen, Warden. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 100. No. 74-5353. Sander v. Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1403. No. 73-5354. Collier v. Cowan, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 923. No. 73-2025. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc., et al. v. United States Jaycees et al. ; and No. 73-2028. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Philadelphia et al. v. United States Jaycees et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 883. No. 74-187. First American Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Ellwein, State Examiner and Commissioner, Department of Banking and Financial Institutions, et al. Sup. Ct. N. D. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 221 N. W. 2d 509. No. 74-5049. Daniels v. Alabama. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5056. Trudeau v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5149. New v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5167. Williams v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 57 Ill. 2d 239, 311 N. E. 2d 681. ORDERS 1027 419 U. S. November 18, 1974 No. 74-5183. Sanney v. Smith, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 411. No. 74-5277. Valle-Rojas v.-United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas wTould grant certiorari. No. 73-7003. Arnold v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari on the wiretap issue. No. 74—296. Williams v. Matthews Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 819. No. 74-320. Dade County et al. v. Marine Exhibition Corp. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Motion to defer consideration and certiorari denied. Reported below: 296 So. 2d 652. No. 74—383. River Farms, Inc. v. Fountain et al. Ct. App. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 21 Ariz. App. 504, 520 P. 2d 1181. Rehearing Denied No. 73 6425. Chambers v. Delaney et al., ante, p. 876; No. 73-6467. Goodwin v. Iowta, ante, p. 846; No. 73-6873. Bonner et al. v. Marks et al., ante, p. 863; No. 73-6988. Santana v. New York et al., ante, p. 866; and No. 74-68. Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp, et al., ante, p. 870. Petitions for rehearing denied. 1028 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. November 18, 25, 1974 No. 74-5018. Rando v. Estelle, Corrections Director, ante, p. 820; and No. 74-5139. Dillingham v. Florida, ante, p. 871. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 1863, Mise., October Term, 1968. Mike v. New York, 395 U. S. 948; and No. 73-1524. Hallmark Industry v. Reynolds Metals Co. et al., 417 U. S. 932. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. November 25, 1974 Affirmed on Appeal No. 73-1626. Weaver,'. Director, Department of Public Aid of Illinois, et al. v. Randle et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ill. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Judgment affirmed. Appeal Dismissed No. 74-5349. Skufca v. Pennsylvania. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 457 Pa. 124, 321 A. 2d 889. Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded No. 73-1982. United Theatres of Florida, Inc., dba United Mini-Adult Theatre, et al. v. Gerstein; No. 73-2056. United Theatres of Florida, Inc., dba United Mini-Adult Theatre, et al. v. Gerstein; and No. 73-2057. United Theatres of Florida, Inc., dba United Mini-Adult Theatre, et al. v. Gerstein. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 3d Dist. Certiorari granted, judgments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Little Beaver Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin, 258 So. 2d 30 (Fla. App. 1972). Reported below: No. 73- ORDERS 1029 419 U. S. November 25, 1974 1982, 259 So. 2d 215; Nos. 73-2056 and 73-2057, 259 So. 2d 210. No. 74—5189. Yeager v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Upon representation of the Solicitor General set forth in his brief for the United States filed November 1, 1974, judgment vacated and case remanded to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma directing that court to hold a hearing and make appropriate findings of fact. Miscellaneous Orders No. ---------------. Graves et al. v. Lynn, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing petition denied. No. ---------------. Dellinger et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion to dispense with printing portions of appendix to petition granted. No. A-360 (74r-439). Lewis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Order entered by Mr. Justice Douglas on November 2, 1974, releasing applicant from custody upon his own recognizance, continued pending final disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. No. A-385. Kaplan v. United States Postal Service et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-392. Reamer v. Beall, U. S. Attorney, et al. Order entered by the Court on November 18, 1974 [ante, p. 1015], staying judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland is continued conditioned upon the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari on or before December 24, 1974. Should such a peti 1030 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 25, 1974 419 U.S. tion be so filed on or before December 24, 1974, this order is to continue pending this Court’s action on the petition. If the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, this order is to terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, this order is to remain in effect pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. No. A-414. Roemer et al. v. Board of Public Works of Maryland et al. D. C. Md. Application for an injunction pending appeal presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant the injunction. The Chief Justice took no part in the'consideration or decision of this application. Reported below: 387 F. Supp. 1282. No. 73-1256. Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFI^CIO. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 981.] Motion of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a reply brief as amicus curiae denied. No. 73-1543. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., et al. C. A. 6th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 929.] Motion of respondents for divided argument granted. No. 73-6642. .^rosby et al. v. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion to consolidate this case with Nos. 74-175 and 74-5176 [Middendorf v. Henry and Henry v. Middendorf, certiorari granted, ante, p. 895] denied. No. 73-7031. Fowler v. North Carolina. Sup. Ct. N. C. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 963.] Motion of ORDERS 1031 419 U.S. November 25, 1974 Richard A. Heim for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. A-325 (74—5567). Alers v. Municipality of San Juan. Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. Application for stay presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. 74-5107. Williams v. Comstock, Men’s Colony Superintendent. Motion for leave to file petition for w’rit of habeas corpus denied. No. 74—5043. Fontaine v. United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; No. 74-5237. Myers v. Carrico et al.; and No. 74-5239. Begun v. Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied. Certiorari Denied No. 73-1894. Flaxman v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 344. No. 73-1947. No. 73-1980. Cir. Certiorari No. 73-1983. Joyce v. United States; and Wallace v. United States. C. A. 7th denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 9. Wilcox County Board of Education et al. v. United States et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 575. No. 73-2007. Quick Shop Markets, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 1248. No. 73-2030. Hedden v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 287 So. 2d 179. h-J^o. 73-2063. Lue v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 531. 1032 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 25, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-2064. DiBella v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 1175. No. 73-7054 Rawls v. Daughters of Charity of Saint Vincent DePaul, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 141. No. 74-4. Washington v. .United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 620. No. 74-7. McRae v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 74-23. Pomares et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 1220. No. 74-115. Powell v. Rogers, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, U. S. Department of Labor, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1248. No. 74-152. Rice v. United States. C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 880. No. 74-203. Rosenblatt v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 Ct. Cl. 910, 497 F. 2d 928. No. 74-252. Bieski et al. v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below’: 497 F. 2d 921. No. 74-275. Jones et ux. v. Jones et ux. Sup. Ct. Kan, Certiorari denied. Reported below: 215 Kan. 102, 523 P. 2d 743. No. 74—278. McCain et al. v. Lybrand et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 509 F. 2d 1049. ORDERS 1033 419 U. S. November 25, 1974 No. 74-299. Premier Industrial Corp. v. Marlow et al. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 292 Ala. 407, 295 So. 2d 396. No. 74-347. Bierman, Administratrix v. Progressive Finance Co. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Certiorari denied. No. 74-351. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp. v. Baxter. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 437. No. 74-357. Sanders Brine Shrimp Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1156. No. 74-358. Jno. McCall Coal Co., Inc., et al. v. Culbertson, Executrix. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1403. No. 74-361. Scott v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 74-366. Fisher et al. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 923. No. 74-369. Weidinger Chevrolet, Inc. v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 459. No. 74-371. Cordle v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 Ala. App. 148, 298 So. 2d 77. No. 74-376. Susquehanna Valley Teachers’ Assn, et al. v. Central School District No. 1 of Town of Conklin et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 3d Jud. 1034 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 25, 1974 419 U.S. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 43 App. Div. 2d 198, 350 N. Y. S. 2d 805. No. 74-379. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co. et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 834. No. 74-393. Brantley et al. v. Union Bank & Trust Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 365. No. 74-397. Forgy v. Tennessee. Ct. Crim. App. Tenn. Certiorari denied. No. 74-398. Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Anita Associates et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 390. No. 74-400. Ballas v. McKiernan et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 2d 14, 315 N. E. 2d 758. No. 74-401. Vulcan Forging Co. v. Dahlberg, Simon, Jayne, Woolfenden & Gawne. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 73-462. Cappadona v. New Jersey. Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 127 N. J. Super. 555, 318 A. 2d 425. No. 74-5004. Crawley v. United States; and No. 74-5038. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-5006. Proffitt v. Becker, Chief Judge, U. S. District Court, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1035 419 U. S. November 25, 1974 No. 74-5022. Ruark, aka Thatcher v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 925. No. 74-5025. Mitchell v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 925. No. 74-5089. Kennedy v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1185. No. 74-5097. Benson et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 475. No. 74-5101. Blackshear ^.“United States. ^C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1400. No. 74-5102. Soboleski v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5127. Curry v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 99. No. 74-5133. Kreutz v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 293 So. 2d 451. No. 74-5135. Allen v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 160. No. 74 5161. Gaskins v. Titeflex Employees Collective Bargaining Assn. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1160. No. 74-5162. Flammia v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 921. No. 7^5180. Ellis v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. 1036 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 25, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-5200. Holsey v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5206. Foster et al. v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Md. 273, 323 A. 2d 419. No. 74—5212. Young v. Texas Department of Corrections. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. No. 74D5217. In re Kunkle. Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari denied. Reported below:---S. D.----, 218 N. W. 2d 521. No. 74-5219. Barcenas v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1110. No. 74—5221. Whisnant v. Davis. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1403. No. 74-5224. Wells v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1401. No. 74-5228. Vandygrift v. Patton, Judge. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5234. O’Brien v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5242. Lonquest v. Meacham, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5244. Feaster v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 871. No. 74-5254. Whitlow v. Wainwright , Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1371. ORDERS 1037 419 U. S. November 25, 1974 No. 74-5255. Lombardi v. Follette, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5256. Benevides v. Craven, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5260. Jones v. McCarthy, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5264. Erwin v. Leeke, Corrections Director, et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5269. Qadir v. County of Santa Clara et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5270. Perkins v. Oklahoma. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5271. Graham v. Hales et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5278. Pittman v. Lewis, Prison Superintendent. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5286. Lombardi v. Casscles, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5288. Myers, dba Romyco Stereo v. Ampex, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1092. No. 74-5293. Smith v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1403. No. 74^5296. Clark v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1163. No. 74^5305. Walker v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1050. No. 74^5332. Rademaker v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1404. 1038 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 25, 1974 419 U.S. No. 74-5364. Verville, Administrator v. Botsford General Hospital et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5382. Skidmore v. National Railroad Adjustment Board, Third Division, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1396. No. 73-7090. Weir v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 879. No. 74M5. Pesikoff et al. v. Secretary of Labor. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 163 U. S. App. D. C. 197, 501 F. 2d 757. No. 74-62. Genovese v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas w’ould grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 921. No. 74-131. Nocar et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 719. No. 74-5229. Taylor, aka Miller v. Bratton, U. S. District Judge. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5276. Medina v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5316. Murray v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 160. No. 74-5322. Lovely v. Laliberte et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1261. ORDERS 1039 419 U. S. November 25, 1974 No. 74—5340. Gibbs et al. v. Garver, Director, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1107. No. 74—51. Izzi v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1403. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted by a municipal court of illegal possession of a firearm. Subsequently the Federal Government became interested in the matter, and petitioner was convicted of receiving or possessing a firearm in commerce or affecting commerce. Petitioner is a previously convicted felon, which is an element of the federal offense. I would grant certiorari in this case limited to the double jeopardy issue which is raised by petitioner’s two prosecutions for the same offense. The Solicitor General argues that, because of the interstate-commerce and previously-convicted-felon elements of the federal offense, the two prosecutions did not involve the “same evidence.” I am unpersuaded by this approach to the problem, since I believe that a “same transaction” standard is appropriate. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 448-460 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). The Solicitor General also argues that the two prosecutions were permissible because they were carried out by separate sovereigns, but I do not agree with this reasoning either. See Bartkus n. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121, 150-170 (1959) (Black and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 196— 204 (1959) (Black and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). The Court of Appeals reached the merits of the double jeopardy claim here, but it did so only after noting that the claim appeared not to have been raised below. I do not believe that petitioner’s failure to plead double jeopardy at trial, if indeed there was such a failure, should block consideration of that issue. Cf. LaRufia v. New 1040 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 November 25, 1974 419 U. S. York, ante, p. 959; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U. S. 505 (1973). Because I believe that petitioner has an arguably meritorious claim on the double jeopardy issue I think we should grant certiorari on that question and set this case for argument. No. 74-116. Place v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 412. No. 74^117. International Longshoremen’s Association, Local No. 1581, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun would grant certiorari. Reported below: 489 F. 2d 635. No. 74^-176. Johnson et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1079. No. 74-251. Levinson et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 651. No. 74-298. Process Equipment Engineering Co., Inc. v. Tennessee Eastman Co., A Division of Eastman Kodak Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 921. No. 74-390. Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services v. Boines by Gaines. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari ORDERS 1041 419 U. S. November 25, 1974 denied. Reported below: 44 App. Div. 2d 765, 354 N. Y. S. 2d 252. No. 74-391. Cowan, Penitentiary Superintendent v. Caudill. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below : 500 F. 2d 1402. Rehearing Denied No. 73-1553. Green et al. v. United States, ante, p. 827; No. 73-1753. In re Estate of Cassidy et all ante, p. 882; No. 73-1889. Whitlock, Executrix v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ante, p. 839; No. 73-1972. Cannon, Warden, et al. v. Thomas et al., ante, p. 813; No. 73-6443. Greene et al. v. United States, ante, p. 977; No. 73-6616. Angel v. Coiner, Warden, ante, p. 850; No. 73-6701. Campbell v. California et al., ante, p. 853; No. 73-6768. Kopas et al. v. United States et al., ante, p. 857; and No. 73-6775. Kopas et al. v. United States Tax Court et al., ante, p. 857. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 73-1179. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., et al. v. Stamm, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, et al., 416 U. S. 974. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. No. 73-6827. Kreager v. General Electric Co. et al., ante, p. 861. Petition for rehearing denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. 1042 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. December 9, 1974 Affirmed on Appeal No. 74-256. American Institute for Shippers’ Assns., Inc., et al. v. United States et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. R. I. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. No. 74-285. George Transfer & Rigging Co., Inc. v. United States et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Md. Reported below: 380 F. Supp. 179. No. 74^360. Long Island Rail Road Co. v. United States et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. N. Y. No. 74—471. Cassidy et al. v. Willis, Election Commissioner of Delaware, et al. Affirmed on appeal from Sup. Ct. Del. Reported below: -----Del.-----, 323 A. 2d 598. No. 74—426. Joiner et al. v. City of Dallas et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. N. D. Tex. Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Powell would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. Reported below: 380 F. Supp. 754. Appeals Dismissed No. 74-307. B & L Motor Freight, Inc., et al. v. Heymann, Director, Division of Motor Vehicles, et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. J. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Powell would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. No. 74-326. Mason, Secretary, Department of Employment and Social Services, et al. v. Francis et al. Appeal from D. C. Md. Motion of appellee Francis for ORDERS 1043 419 U. S. December 9, 1974 leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, certiorari denied. No. 74-336. Smith, dba Holiday Health Club, et al. v. Keator, et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. C. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 285 N. C. 530,206 S. E. 2d 203. No. 74-344. McCollough v. Illinois. Appeal from Sup^Ct. Ill. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 57 Ill. 2d 440, 313 N. E. 2d 462. No. 74-5029. Ivory v. Florida. Appeal from Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 285 So. 2d 633. Miscellaneous Orders No. ----------------. Mark Trail Camp Grounds, Inc. v. Field Enterprises, Inc., dba Publishers-Hall Syndicate. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. No. 71-6356. Doe et al. v. McMillan et al., 412 U. S. 306. Motion of petitioners for clarification of opinion of this Court denied. No. 73-662. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, et al. v. Councilman. C. A. 10th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 414 U. S. 1111.] Motion of respondent for divided argument granted. No. 73-717. Antoine et ux. v. Washington. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wash. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 417 U. S. 966.] Motion of appellee to strike brief of the United States as amicus curiae denied. 1044 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 9, 1974 419 U. S. No. 73-1016. Lascaris, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of Onondaga County v. Shirley et al. ; and No. 73-1095. Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York v. Shirley et al. Appeals from D. C. N. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 417 U. S. 943.] Motion of Isadore Greenberg, Esquire, to permit Douglas A. Eldridge,. Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice on behalf of appellee Stuck granted. Motion of the State of Iowa for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied. No. 73-1462. White, Secretary of State of Texas, et al. v. Regester et al. Appeal from D. C. W. D. Tex. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 417 U. S. 906.] Motion of appellees for divided argument granted. No. 73-1500. Erickson, Warden v. United States ex rel. Feather et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 417 U. S. 929.] Motion of respondents for divided argument granted. No. 73-1631. Ostrer v. United States, ante, p. 829. Motion to modify denial of certiorari denied. 73-2000. United States v. Peltier. C. A. 9th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 993.] Motion for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Sandor W. Shapery, Esquire, of LaJolla, Cal., be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for respondent in this case. No. 73-6923. Rice et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of Gloria Mae Gilmore et al. to join in petition granted. No. 74-520. Montanye, Correctional Superintendent, et al. v. Haymes. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion to expedite denied. ORDERS 1045 419 U. S. December 9, 1974 No. 74-5140. Cassius v. Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 824.] Motion of petitioner to permit Frederick S. Klein, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted. No. 74-5373. Anderson v. Reed, Penitentiary Superintendent; and No. 74-5437. Lewis v. English, Facility Superintendent. Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 74M64. Cupp v. United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania et al. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied. No. 74^5368. Kennedy et al. v. Wyoming et al. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and other relief denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 74-453. Van Lare, Acting Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al. v. Hurley et al. Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. and D. C. E. D. N. Y. Application for stay presented to Mr. Justice Marshall, and by him referred to the [Court, denied. Motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted and case set for oral argument with No. 74^5054 [Taylor v. Lavine, certiorari granted, infra], Reported below: 380 F. Supp. 167. Certiorari Granted No. 73-1888. United States v. Alaska. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1155. No. 74-364. United States v. Hale. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma 1046 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 9, 1974 419 U. S. pauperis and certiorari granted. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 305, 498 F. 2d 1038. No. 74-5054. Taylor et al. v. Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis and certiorari granted. Case set for oral argument with No. 74M53 [Van Lare v. Hurley, probable jurisdiction noted, supra]. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1208. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 74-326 and 74-5029, supra.) No. 73-6830. Juarez v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6890. Ellingburg' v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6938. Green v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6991. Williams v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 73-6999. Pittman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7055. Brown v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7080. Bone v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 876. No. 73-7081. Powell v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 922. No. 73-7102. Swanson v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1376. ORDERS 1047 419 U.S. December 9, 1974 No. 74^-19. Brewer v. United States; and No. 73-6931. Mackay v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 491 F. 2d 616. No. 74-65. Clingon v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 293 So. 2d 823. No. 74-93. Brown et al. v. United States; and No. 74—138. Prader et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 829. No. 74—98. Donner v. United States ; No. 74-5106. McNamara v. United States; No. 74^5119. Mack v. United States; No. 74-5120. McNamara v. United States; No. 74-5121. Williams v. United States; and No. 74—5138. Kennedy v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 184. No. 74-109. Rachal et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 910. No. 74—110. Pfotzer et al., dba E. & E. J. Pfotzer v. Warholic et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 919. No. 74-111. Pfotzer et al. v. City of Norwalk et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 919. No. 74-133. Calderon v. Board of Education of the El Monte School District of Los Angeles County. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74—144. Cox v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 348. No. 74—146. Catena v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1319. 1048 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 9, 1974 419 U.S. No. 74-170. Andrino v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1103. No. 74-180. Siegel et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—184. Ross v. United States et al. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. No. 74—189. Im et al., Minors, by Im v. Saxbe, Attorney General, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1399. No. 74^210. Shepard v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1403. No. 74-228. Taylor v. United States; and No. 74^5285. Hearn v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 236. No. 74—233. Department of Transportation of Maryland et al. v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al.; and No. 74^234. Virginia v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 129. No. 74-243. Pacente v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 490 F. 2d 661. No. 74—247. Simmons v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 177. No. 74-266. Tucker v. Wiggins et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—271. Fresta v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1399. No. 74-273. Affiliated Fund, Inc., et al. v. Papil-sky et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 554. ORDERS 1049 419 U. S. December 9, 1974 No. 74-317. Cameron et al. v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 App. Div. 2d 355, 355 N. Y. S. 2d 19. No. 74-327. Hart v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 Ct. Cl. 925, 498 F. 2d 1405. No. 74—328. Patch v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 Ct. Cl. 924, 498 F. 2d 1405. No. 74^346. Federal Prescription Service, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 813. No. 74 355. McCormick, Executor, et al. v. Fin-nerman et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 212. No. 74-385. York International Building, Inc., et al. v. Chaney, Trustee. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-417. Heirs of Burat (Buras) v. Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District of Louisiana et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1336. No. 74-419. Automotive Chauffeurs, Parts & Garage Employees, Local Union 926, et al. v. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 321. No. 74-422. Dunbar v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 290 So. 2d 582. No. 74-435. Ward v. Philadelphia Electric Co. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. 1050 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 9, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-424. Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Franks et al. C. A. 5th Cir. 'Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 398. No. 74—425. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 18, AFL-CIO v. Dayton Power & Light Co. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 766. No. 74-430. Modern Air Transport, Inc. v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District No. 145. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1241. No. 74-433. Christman v. Hanrahan et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 65. No. 74-448. Marth, Trustee in Bankruptcy v. Dannerbeck et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 686. No. 74-451. United States v. Griffin et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 959. No. 74—455. Response of Carolina, Inc., et al. v. Leasco Response, Inc., et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 314. No. 74—457. Crane v. Industrial Commission of Illinois et al. Sup. Ut. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 Ill. 2d 158, 311 N. E. 2d 156. No. 74—480. Deering v. City of Seattle et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Wash. App. 832, 520 P. 2d 638. No. 74-482. Cissna v. McQuaid, Trustee in Bankruptcy. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1051 419 U. S. December 9, 1974 No. 74-486. New Jersey v. Sheffield et al. Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5003. Wilbanks et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 99, 497 F. 2d 686. No. 74-5014. Martinez, aka Gonzales, et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 664. No. 74-5067. Perry v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1403. No. 74-5113. Wiemer v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1399. No. 74^5117. Felts v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 80. No. 74—5177. Brawter et al. v. United States; and No. 74-5300. Kreshik v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 703. No. 74-5191. Qualls v. United States. C. A. Sth Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1238. No. 74--5197. Bryant v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 72-5211. Rockwell v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1403. No. 74-5213. Skelley v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 447. No. 74-5223. Pennick v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 184. 1052 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 9, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-5231. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 771. No. 74-5238. Mackin, aka Nelson, et al. v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 163 U. S. App. D. C. 427, 502 F. 2d 429. No. 74-5243. Jordan et al. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5249. Ellis v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5253. Poston v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1296. No. 74-5258. Wagoner v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 313 A. 2d 719 and 321 A. 2d 211. No. 74R5261. Collins v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1401. No. 74-5265. Douglas v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5273. Hill et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1245. No. 74-5275. Vasquez-Casillaz v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5282. Sanguandikul v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-5284. Davis v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5290. Brierly v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1024. ORDERS 1053 419 U. S. December 9, 1974 No. 74-5291. Lacouture v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1237. No. 7A-5292. Weaver v. Cannon, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5298. Jones v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1085. No. 74—5299. Magid v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1164. No. 74-5303. Resnick v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1401. No. 74-5308. Miller v. Nelson, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. s>No. 74-5311. Santana v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 710. No. 74-5312. King v. Moore. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5317. Ruiz v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5319. Long v. Porelle, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5324. Rogers v. Washington. Sup. Ct. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 83 Wash. 2d 553, 520 P. 2d 159. No. 74-5326. Lee v. Hopper, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 456. No. 74-5335. McCoy v. LaVallee, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1396. 1054 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 9, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74—5336. Esser v. Tripodi et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5338. McCants v. Alabama. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5339. Hartmann v. New York et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5342. Castaphney v. United States; No. 74-5344. Brown v. United States; and No. 74-5345. Goshay v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1399 and 1400. No. 74-5346. Kessler v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 Ill. 2d 493, 315 N. E. 2d 29. *No. 74 5355. Harris &. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5356. Paul v. New Mexico. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5358. D’Amico et al. v. Liberty Corp, et al. Sup. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 457 Pa. 181, 329 A. 2d 222. No. 74-5361. Cross v. Church, County ClerkRecorder. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5362. Friedman v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1352. No. 74-5377. Parries v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5380. Yopp v. Michigan. Sup. Ct. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 392 Mich. 793. ORDERS 1055 419 U. S. December 9, 1974 „No. 74^5386. Allen v. Hopper, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74 5387. Williams v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5388. Davis v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1182. No. 74-5389. Peacock v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1405. No. 74-5392. Trigg v. Illinois. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1404. No. 74-5393. Hill v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5396. Gray v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5404. Jackson v. Wyoming. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 522 P. 2d 1356. No. 74-5415. Mendoza v. Campbell, Superintendent, Motor Vehicle Division, Highway Department of Arizona. Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 111 Ariz. 71, 523 P. 2d 502. No. 74-5416. Barbosa v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5417. Stevens Asch. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5421. Gore v. Sielaff, Corrections Director. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. 561-956 0 - 76 - 64 1056 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 9, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-5428. Waters v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1406. No. 74-5440. Davis v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 73-1832. Cirillo et al. v. United States ; No. 73-1837. Lilienthal v. United States; No. 73-1859. Sorrentino et al. v. United States; and No. 73-1987. Venetucci v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 872. No. 74-104. In re Porter. Sup. Ct. Ore. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 268 Ore. 417, 521 P. 2d 345. No. 74-118. Bishop, Administrator v. Hendricks. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 289. No. 74-139. Kitchens v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 293 So. 2d 815. No. 74-154. Martinez v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 464. No. 74-219. Toliver v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1403. No. 74-232. Vigorito et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 1351. No. 74-387. Karlan v. City of Cincinnati. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas ORDERS 1057 419 U. S. December 9, 1974 would grant certiorari. Reported below: 39 Ohio St. 2d 107, 314 N. E. 2d 162. No. 74-403. Pietrunti v. Board of Education of Brick Township. Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 128 N. J. Super. 149, 319 A. 2d 262. No. 74-421. Cleveland Browns, Inc. v. United States. Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-447. Sauquoit Fibers Co., Inc. v. Leesona Corp, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas -would grant certiorari. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 271. No. 74^467. Building Owners & Managers Association of Metropolitan Detroit et al. v. Detroit Edison Co. et al. *Cir. Ct., Ingham County, Mich. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5032. Montgomery et al. v. California. Super. Ct. Cal., County of Sacramento. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. No. 74-5128. Betts v. County Court for LaCrosse County, Branch II, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1156. No. 74—5160. McNeil v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 99, 497 F. 2d 686. No. 74-5225. Walker v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. 1058 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 9, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-5375. Snyder v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 164 U. S. App. D. C. 370, 505 F. 2d 477. No. 74—5385. Eli v. Britt, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1340. No. 74^5447. Hayes v. Cady, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1212. No. 74-78. Preiser, Correctional Commissioner of New York, et al.^. Williams. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 337. No. 74-350. Troopers Lodge No. 41, Fraternal Order of Police, et al. v. Walker, Governor of Illinois, et al. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell would grant certiorari. Reported below: 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N. E. 2d 9. Mr. Justice Douglas. The petitioners are members of the Illinois State Police who, joined by their fraternal organization, challenge an Illinois regulatory program that requires disclosure of financial transactions and associations by state employees. The program was created by an executive order of the Governor of Illinois. The order established a State Board of Ethics, empowered to require designated state employees to file an annual statement of economic interest, which discloses assets and liabilities, each source of income and the amount received therefrom, and each “close economic association,” which is defined as a “busi ORDERS 1059 1058 Opinion of Douglas, J. ness or professional entity with which the person is associated as an officer, employee, director or partner or in which he has a substantial interest.” The foregoing disclosures must be made not only by the employee himself, but also by members of his immediate family sharing his household. Information so reported is open to “reasonable public inspection.” Failure to make the required disclosures subjects the employee to disciplinary action, including discharge. The executive order applies by its terms only to members of the executive branch. Were this the only element of the Illinois scheme to discourage conflict of interests among those who hold public office, I believe a substantial equal protection question would be presented. The State has an undeniably strong interest in placing beyond qucs-tion the integrity of its public service. But this is an interest that applies to all branches of the government, and where a State singles out a target group of employees, it is arguably compelled by the Equal Protection Clause to justify the differential treatment. The Illinois program, however, is greater than the executive order, and I add this word because it is not discussed in the briefs nor in the opinion in this case. The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act, passed in 1972, in addition to prescribing a “code of conduct” for legislators, requires the disclosure of “economic interest” by members of the legislature and independent agencies, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 127, §601-101 et seq. (1973).1 Criminal penalties are provided for the filing of false statements, and failure to disclose at all subjects the officer to forfeiture of his office, § 604A-107. The statute provides for public examination of statements “at all reasonable times,” § 604A-106. Judges have similar reporting obligations under a rule of 1 See also, Note, The Illinois Governmental Ethics Act—A Step Ahead Toward Better Government, 22 De Paul L. Rev. 302 (1972). 1060 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. December 9, 1974 the Illinois Supreme Court, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 110A, § 68 (1973).2 Since it appears that Illinois has offered evenhanded treatment, I accordingly join in the denial of certiorari. Rehearing Denied No. 73-1387. Fithian v. Fithian, ante, p. 825; No. 73-1559. Fairview Nursing Home v. National Labor Relations Board, ante, p. 827; No. 73-1624. Andrea Dumon, Inc., et al. v. Clairol, Inc., ante, p. 873; No. 73-1657. Estate of Meade et al. v. Commis- sioner of Internal Revenue, ante, p. 882; No. 73-1709. No. 73-1713. No. 73-1741. p. 924; No. 73-1756. ante, p. 834 ; No. 73-1826. ante, p. 810; No. 73-1935. Sneiders v. Henry, ante, p. 832; Smyzer v. Kentucky, ante, p. 832; Persico et al. v. United States, ante, Biddle, Administratrix v. Bowser, Pettitt et ux. v. City of Fresno et al., Payne, a Minor, by Payne v. City of Fort Lauderdale et al., ante, p. 875; No. 73-1953. Cannon v. Oviatt, ante, p. 810; No. 73-2061. Smith v. United States, ante, p. 964; No. 73-6625. Coulter v. United States, ante, p. 850; No. 73-6629. Pryor v. United States, ante, p. 977; and No. 73-6710. Zaun etäx. v. Fann, Sheriff, et al., ante, p. 854. Petitions for rehearing denied. 2 Statements filed by judges are not automatically open to public inspection, but litigants in a particular case may ascertain, through an administrative procedure, whether a judge has had an economic interest in the outcome. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 110A, §§ 66-68 (1973). ORDERS 1061 419JJ(.|S. December 9, 1974 No. 73-6774. Ephraim v. Estelle, Corrections Director, ante, p. 897; No. 73-6806. Sotelo et ux. v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, ante, p. 859; No. 73-6912. Lee v. Alabama, ante, p. 864; No. 73-6964. Olenz v. Teletype Corp, et A^^ante, p. 865; No. 73-6968. Englefield v. Englefield, ante, p. 958; No. 73-7019. Bailey v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, ante, p. 953; No. 74-1. Cardin v. Kentucky, ante, p. 868; No. 74-90. Keller, Secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of Florida, et al. v. Mixon, a Minor, by Carter, et al., ante, p. 880; and No. 74—194. Wall et al. v. Hardwick et al., ante, p. 888. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 73-1744. Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co. et al., ante, p. 833; No. 73-6805. Gearin v. Weyerhaeuser Line, ante, p. 884; and No. 74-86. Leonard v. Strauss--ante, p. 901. Motions for leave to file petitions for rehearing denied. Assignment Order An order of The Chief Justice designating and assigning Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to perform judicial duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit during the week of March 10, 1975, and for such additional time as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294 (a), is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. 1062 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. December 16, 1974 Appeals Dismissed No. 74—225. Marshall et al. v. Ohio; and No. 74-226. Kensinger v. Ohio. Appeals from Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County. Stays (Nos. A-1282 and A-1283) heretofore granted on July 9, 1974, by Mr. Justice Stewart are vacated. Appeals dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Mr. Justice Douglas. being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508-514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42M7 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), would note probable jurisdiction and summarily reverse the judgments. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Appellants were convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio, of possession of allegedly obscene materials with intent to distribute the materials in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.35 (Supp. 1973), which provided in pertinent part at the time of the alleged offense as follows: “No person, with knowledge of the content and character of the obscene material or performance involved, shall make, manufacture, write, draw, print, reproduce, or publish any obscene material, knowing or having reasonable cause to know that such material will be sold, distributed, circulated, or disseminated; or sell, lend, give away, distribute, circulate, disseminate, exhibit, or advertise any obscene material; or write, direct, producePpresent, advertise, or participate in an obscene performance; ORDERS 1063 1062 Brennan, J., dissenting or possess or have in his control any obscene material with intent to violate this section . . . .” As used in § 2905.35, “(A) Any material or performance is ‘obscene’ if, when considered as a whole and judged with reference to ordinary adults, any of the following apply: “(1) Its dominant appeal is to prurient interest; “(2) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting nudity, sexual excitement, or sexual conduct in a way which tends to represent human beings as mere objects of sexual appetite; “(3) Its dominant tendency is to arouse lust by displaying or depicting bestiality or extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality; “(-4) It contains a series of displays or descriptions of nudity, sexual excitement, sexual conduct, bestiality, extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty, or brutality, or human bodily functions of elimination, the cumulative effect of which is a dominant tendency to appeal to prurient interest, when the appeal to such interest is primarily for its own sake or for commercial exploitation, rather than for a genuine scientific, educational, sociological, moral, or artistic purpose.” § 2905.34. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Hamilton County affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeals. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” 1064 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 16, 1974 419 U. S. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 2905.35, as it incorporated the definition of “obscene” of § 2905.34, was constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore note probable jurisdiction and, since the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Hamilton County was rendered after Miller, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented in addition to those already treated merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, each appellant must be given an opportunity to have his case decided upon, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgments below and remand for a determination whether appellants should be afforded new trials under local community standards. No. 74-474. Conklin v. California. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Cal. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 12 Cal. 3d 259, 522 P. 2d 1049. * Although four of us would note probable jurisdiction and reverse the judgments, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 1065 419 U.S. December 16, 1974 No. 74—284. District of Columbia v. Walters et al. Appeal from Ct. App. D. C. dismissed for want of properly presented federal question. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for wTrit of certiorari, certiorari denied. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. Reported below: 319 A. 2d 332. No. 74-478. Garis v. Compania Maritima San Basilio, S. A., et al. Appeal from App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 1st Jud. Dept., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 App. Div. 2d 655, 353 N. Y. S. 2d 711. No. 74-5376. Gargallo v. Gargallo. Appeal from Ct. App. Ohio, Franklin County, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. No. 74-5403. Martinolich v. Pennsylvania. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Pa. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Reported below: 456 Pa. 136, 318 A. 2d 680. Vacated and Remanded on Appeal No. 74-499. Fitzgerald et al. v. DiGrazia et al. Appeal from D. C. E. D. Mo. Judgment vacated and case remanded for entry of a fresh judgment or decree from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, ante, p. 90. Reported below: 383 F. Supp. 668. 1066 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. December 16, 1974 Certiorari Dismissed No. 73-1739. Sandquist v. California. App. Dept., Super Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles; No. 74-158. Kuhns et al. v. California; and No. 74—159. Kuhns et al. v. California. App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Santa Cruz. Petitioners did not seek to have the Appellate Department certify their cases to the Court of Appeal pursuant to California Penal Code § 1471 and California Rules of Court 62 and 63. Accordingly, the decisions of the Appellate Department are not “[f]inal judgments . . . rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had . . . ,” 28 U. S. C. § 1257, and the petitions for writs of certiorari to their respective courts are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Banks v. California, 395 U. S. 708 (1969). Miscellaneous Orders No. A-430. Beasley v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for reduction of bail pending appeal, presented to Mr. Justice White, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. 73-1256. Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO. ' C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, 416 U. S. 981.] Motion of petitioner for leave to file a brief after argument granted. No. 73-6739. Costarelli v. Massachusetts. Appeal from Municipal Ct. of Boston. [Probable jurisdiction postponed, ante, p. 893.] Motion of appellant for appointment of counsel granted. It is ordered that Robert W. Hagopian, Esquire, of Wrentham, Mass., be, and he is hereby, appointed to serve as counsel for appellant in this case. ORDERS 1067 419 U. S. December 16, 1974 _#iNo. 74-157. United Housing Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Forman et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Motion to defer consideration of petition for writ of certiorari granted. No. 74-5522. Dolphus v. Wainwright, Corrections Director. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. No. 74-5374. Monteer v. Chief Judge^ United States pouRT of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ; and No. 74-5481. Dollar v. California et al. Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 74-201. City of Richmond, Virginia v. United States et al. Appeal from D. C. D. C. Motion of appellee Holt for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Probable jurisdiction noted. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter. Reported below: 376 F. Supp. 1344. Certiorari Granted No. 74-22. Ivan Allen Co. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 426. No. 74-415. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1011. No. 74-450. Butterfield, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, et al. v. Robertson et al. W A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 298, 498 F. 2d 1031. No. 74-452. Twentieth Century Music Corp, et al. v. Aiken. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 127. 1068 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 16, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-466. Brennan, Secretary of Labor v. Ba-chowski et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 79. No. 74—121. Phelps, Receiver in Bankruptcy v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari granted limited to Questions 1, 2, and 3 presented by the petition which read as follows: 1. “Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly granted to the United States a priority based upon the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for taxes in violation of and contrary to the priorities for payment of claims established by the Bankruptcy Act?” 2. “Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that service of a Notice of Levy upon an assignee for the benefit of creditors subsequent to the assignment reduced the bankrupt’s property then held by the assignee to the constructive possession of the United States?” 3. “Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that the Bankruptcy Court lacked summary jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy before it without the consent of the United States?” Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1283. No. 74^389. Albemarle Paper Co. et al. v. Moody et al. ; and No. 74-428. Halifax Local No. 425, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, AFL-CIO v. Moody et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari granted, cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these petitions. Reported below: 474 F. 2d 134. Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 74-284, 74-478, 745376, and 74-5403, supra.} No. 73-7058. Thomas v. United States Board of Parole et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1069 419 U.S. December 16, 1974 No. 73-7093. Miller v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 982. No. 73-7094. Wilson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 602. No. 74-127. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission et al. v. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 19, 495 F. 2d 1075. No. 74-145. Brainerd v. Beal et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 901. No. 74-191. Markham et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 178. No. 74-223. Hasty v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 876. No. 74-258. Young et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d'Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1164. No. 74-279. Mirelez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 915. No. 74-280. Bramble v. Saxbe, Attorney General, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498F. 2d 968. No. 74-281. Vowteras et al. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1210. No. 74-340. Malone v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 204 Ct. Cl. 899, 497 F. 2d 928. 1070 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. December 16, 1974 No. 74-345. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. et al. v. American President Lines, Ltd., et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 164 U. S. App. D. C. 66, 503 F. 2d 157. No. 74-368. Roberts et al. v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 520. No. 74-429. Sigma Systems Corp, et al. v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 241. No. 74M68. Webster v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 508 S. W. 2d 33. No. 74-473. Steamship Mutual Underwriting Assn., Ltd. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1352. No. 74-475. Universal Builders, Inc., et al. v. Clark et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 324. No. 74—488. Hartley et al. v. City of Chattanooga et al. ; and No. 74-490. Hudson et al. v. City of Chattanooga et al. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 512 S. W. 2d 555. No. 74-500. Remsco Associates, Inc. v. Beaver Falls Municipal Authority. Super. Ct. Pa. Certiorari denied. No. 74-507. Gonzalez et al. v. International Longshoremen’s Association, Local No. 1581, AFL-CIO. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 330. ORDERS 1071 419 U.S. December 16, 1974 No. 74^509. Monty v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 App. Div. 2d 1038, 358 N. Y. S. 2d 181. No. 74—529. Johnson v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Cuyahoga County. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5024. Doran v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Wayne County. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5030. Gibson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1398. No. 74—5076. Allison v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 62 Wis. 2d 14, 214 N. W. 2d 437. No. 74-5108. Felts v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 845. No. 74-5235. Fields v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 69. No. 74—5267. Mundt v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74^5306. Sturgeon v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1270. No. 74-5331. Dilworth v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5333. Pietras v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 182. No. 74^5341. Resnick v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 575. No. 74—5351. Duran v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. 1072 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 16, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-5359. Fonseca v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1384. No. 74-5360. Pecina v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 536. No. 74-5365. Wentz et al. v. Maryland. Ct. Sp. App. Md. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5370. Gong v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74^5406. Callahan v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 45 App. Div. 2d 819, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 549. No. 74—5442. Moynier v. Valuch et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5456. Conner v. DeRamus, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5457. Agur v. Wilson, Governor of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 961. No. 74-5462. Gibson v. Henderson, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5463. Miller v. Maryland. Crim. Ct. Baltimore City, Md. Certiorari denied. No. 74^5464. Bennett v. Michigan. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 52 Mich. App. 742, 218 N. W. 2d 407. No. 74-5467. Raymond v. Johnson, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74^5471. Sedillo, aka Baylors v. New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1073 419 U.S. December 16, 1974 No. 74-5484. No. 74-5494. No. 74-5496. St. 2d 100, 313 No. 74- 5526. No. 74-5498. tiorari denied. No. 74-5474. Arnold v. Superior Court of California, County of Alameda. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5476. Wilson v. Clanon, Prison Superintendent. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74- 5477. Paquette v. LaVallee;' Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 920. No. 74-5480. Director. C. A. Gutierrez v. Estelle, Corrections 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Alexander v. Estelle, - Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1405. Nevarez v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz,, Pima County. Certiorari denied. Bartlett v. Toledo Bar Assn. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Ohio N. E. 2d 834. Carter v. Hardy. C. A. 5th Cir. Cer- Kennedy et al. v. Meacham, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Wyo. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5559. Santana v. United States District Court. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-2008. Ayre v. Maryland. Crim. Ct. Baltimore City, Md. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, being of the view that any state or federal ban on, or regulation of, obscenity is prohibited by the Constitution, Roth United States, 354 U. S. 476, 508-514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 42-47 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult 1074 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Brennan, J., dissenting 419 U. S. Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting), would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City of possession of obscene materials with intent to sell in violation of Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 418 (1971). Section 418 provides in pertinent part as follows: “Every person who . . . has in his possession with intent to distribute . . . any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.” The Maryland courts have defined the term “obscene” by adopting the test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973). See Ebert v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 19 Md. App. 300, 313 A. 2d 536 (1973). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 418 of the Maryland Code is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, supra, at 47, I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals was rendered after Miller, reverse.* In that circumstance, I * Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. ORDERS 1075 419 U. S. December 16, 1974 have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 V. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). No. 73-6535. Wells v. Missouri. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 S. W. 2d 96. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. On April 28, 1967, petitioner and two companions allegedly robbed thé’Liberty Loan Corporation office in St. Louis of $200. During the robbery, one of petitioner’s confederates fired a shot which killed a bank employee. Petitioner was charged in separate indictments with first-degree murder and first-degree robbery by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon. At the time, the death penalty was available under Missouri law for each of these crimes, with the decision whether it should be imposed committed to jury discretion. Mo. Rev. Stat. 559.030, 560.135 (1959). Under then-applicable Missouri criminal procedure rules, it was not permissible to join in one indictment or at one trial robbery and murder charges. See Mo. Sup. Ct. Rule 24.04; Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 545.120, 545.130 (1959). Petitioner was tried first on the murder charge. Missouri punishes as first-degree murder “every homicide which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.010 (1969). While the murder indictment alleged that petitioner murdered the victim “feloniously, willfully, and premeditately, deliberately, on purpose and of . . . malice aforethought,” petitioner claims, and the Supreme Court of Missouri, as we read its opinion, found, that the murder case was tried to the jury on a felony-murder theory, with proof of the elements of 1076 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Brennan, J., dissenting 419 U.S. the robbery supplying the requisite mens rea for murder. Missouri permits trial on a felony-murder theory even though the indictment does not allege the felony but alleges directly the mens rea for first-degree murder. State v. Conway, 351 Mo. 126, 171 S. W. 2d 677 (1943). Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder by the jury, which assessed his punishment as life imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, petitioner waived his right to appeal the murder conviction and was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. At the same hearing, he withdrew his not-guilty plea to the robbery charge and entered a guilty plea. The prosecuting attorney then recommended a concurrent life sentence on the robbery conviction, and the judge imposed the recommended sentence. In 1970, petitioner sought state post-conviction remedies to vacate both the waiver of appeal from the murder conviction and the guilty plea to the robbery charge. After hearing, the trial judge held that, although both the waiver of appeal and the guilty plea were motivated by fear that the death penalty might be imposed if petitioner stood trial for robbery, the waiver and plea were voluntary. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed. 504 S. W. 2d 96 ( 1974). The Supreme Court of Missouri also rejected petitioner’s contention that the prosecution for robbery after conviction for murder on a felony-murder theory violated the constitutional protection from double jeopardy. Id., at 97, relying on State v. Moore, 326 Mo. 1199, 33 S. W. 2d 905 (1930). In my view this holding was in error. I The two charges leveled against petitioner clearly arose out of the same criminal transaction or episode, yet they were tried separately. In that circumstance, we should grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the robbery ORDERS 1077 1075 Brennan, J., dissenting conviction. I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), requires the joinder at one trial, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, of “all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U. S. 956 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U. S. 995 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Moton v. Swenson, 417 U. S. 957 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement) ; Waller v. Florida, 397 U. S. 387, 395 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N. W. 2d 222 (1973); State v. Brown, 262 Ore. 442, 497 P. 2d 1191 (1972); Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A. 2d 432 (1973), vacated and remanded, 414 U. S. 808 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A. 2d 854 (1974). Guilty pleas can be vacated on collateral attack on double jeopardy grounds, even when the double jeopardy claim was not raised before conviction. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21, 31 (1974). Further, there is no significance in the fact that Missouri law would not have permitted joinder of the two offenses here. If it is state law rather than prosecutorial abuse which results in two trials for the same offense, the “remedy lies in changing [Missouri’s] criminal procedure, not in denying petitioner the constitutional protection to which he is entitled.* Petitioner was tried twice for the same offense, *In fact, Missouri’s joinder rules have been changed since petitioner was tried. They now permit joinder of '‘[a]ll offenses which are based ... on two or more acts or transactions which constitute 1078 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 16, 1974 419 U. S. and his conviction should be reversed.” Duncan v. Tennessee, 405 U. S. 127, 133 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Turner v. Arkansas, 407 LT. S. 366 (1972). n Even on the “same evidence” theory, never adopted by this Court, see Ashe v. Swenson, supra, at 452-453; Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 197-198 (1959) (separate opinion), it is my view that the robbery conviction here violated the double jeopardy protection. The State claims that, since conviction for robbery would require proof that another was deprived of property against his will, it would involve evidence not pertinent to the murder conviction. Yet, it appears from those portions of the record now’ available to us that the murder conviction was premised upon proof of the completed robbery. We have indicated that a person cannot be tried for a greater offense which includes all the elements already established by evidence in a trial on a lesser offense. Waller v. Florida, supra. There is also some indication that the same-evidence rule operates in the other direction, to preclude retrial on a lesser offense when all of its elements have been established by evidence in a trial on a greater offense. See In re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176, 187-190 (1889); Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333, 352 (1907). This case illustrates graphically why this should be so. The prosecution threatened to retry essentially the same case in pursuit of a greater sentence, and it used the leverage of that threatened prosecution to induce the waiver of the right to appeal the murder conviction. No. 74^55. Clay v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. parts of a common scheme or plan.” Mo. Sup. Ct. Rule 24.04, as amended Dec. 7, 1970. ORDERS 1079 419 U. S. December 16, 1974 No. 74-213. Von Clemm et al. v. Banuelos, Treasurer of the United States, et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 163. No. 74-260. Tramunti d. ¿United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1334. No. 74-267. Charbonier et al. v. United States; and No. 74U5268. Burke et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1226. No. 74-5178. Castleberry v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 522 P. 2d 257. No. 74-5240. Bryan v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 775. No. 74-5272. Hawkins v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas w’ould grant certiorari. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1029. No. 74-324. City of Dallas et al. v. Southwest Airlines Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of Air Transport Association of America for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 773. No. 74-332. Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 448. 1080 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 16, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-352. Meachum, Correctional Superintendent v. LaFrance; and No. 74—5458. LaFrance v. Meachum, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 1st Cir. Motion of respondent in No. 74—352 for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 29. No. 74-458. New Jersey v. General Motors Corp, et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1404. No. 74—463. Dann, Commissioner of Patents v. Honeywell, Inc. C. C. P. A. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice White would grant certiorari. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black-mun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1344. No. 74—485. Michigan v. Davis et al. Sup. Ct. Mich. Motions of respondents for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: See 53 Mich. App. 94, 218 N. W. 2d 787. No. 74-5027. Allen v. Rose, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970). Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1373. Rehearing Denied No. 73-6800. Baxter v. United States, ante, p. 964; and No. 73-6809. Falkner v. Blanton, Judge, ante, p. 977. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 73-6605. Folks v. United States, ante, p. 849. Motion for leave to file petition for rehearing denied. ORDERS 1081 419 U. S. December 16, 23, 1974 Assignment Orders An order of The Chief Justice designating and assigning Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to perforin judicial duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on December 13, 1974, and for such additional time as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U?’S. C. § 294 (a), is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. An order of The Chief Justice designating and assigning Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to perform judicial duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit during the week of May 26, 1975, and for such additional time as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294 (a), is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. December 23, 1974 Affirmed on Appeal ^.^0. 74-517. Mercer et al. v. Michigan State Board of Education et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. Mich. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice White would note probable jurisdiction and set case for oral argument. Reported below: 379 F. Supp. 580. Appeals Dismissed No. 73-7014. Jones v. Florida. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Fla. dismissed for want of properly presented federal question. Reported below: 293 So. 2d 33. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. The Court dismisses this appeal for want of a properly presented federal question. That disposition is utterly indefensible on the record of this case. 1082 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Brennan, J_, dissenting 419 U.S. Appellant was arrested for violating Fla. Stat. § 847.05 (Supp. 1974-1975), which provides: “Any person who shall publicly use or utter any indecent or obscene language shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree ....” After the arrest, appellant was searched and marihuana was found in his possession. Appellant was then charged with using indecent or obscene language, resisting arrest, and possession of marihuana. Prior to trial, he moved to dismiss the information on the ground that on its face Fla. Stat. § 847.05 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore the arrest pursuant to § 847.05 wTas unlawful and the ensuing search and seizure of the marihuana invalid. The motion was denied. At trial by jury, the marihuana was admitted in evidence and appellant was convicted solely on the charge of possession of marihuana. The conviction was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 5, § 3 (b)(1), of the Florida Constitution, which directs the Florida Supreme Court to “hear appeals . . . from orders of trial courts . . . passing on the validity of a state statute . . . .” The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 847.05, finding that the statutory language itself was “sufficient to convey to a person of common understanding its prohibition.” 293 So. 2d 33, 34 (1974)? In view of that holding, the Florida Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the marihuana conviction could stand if § 847.05 were unconstitutional and the initial arrest therefore unlawful. Section 847.05 punishes only spoken words and, as construed by the Florida Supreme Court, is facially unconstitutional because it is not limited in application “to punish only unprotected speech” but is “susceptible of application to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, ORDERS 1083 1081 Brennan, J., dissenting 405 U. S. 518, 522 (1972). See also Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 134 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 20 (1971). In that circumstance, it is irrelevant that the statute might constitutionally reach appellant’s conduct, for “ ‘[a]lthough a statute may be neither vague, overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct charged against a particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional overbreadth as applied to others. And if the law is found deficient in one of these respects, it may not be applied to him either, until and unless a satisfactory limiting construction is placed on the statute. The statute, in effect, is stricken down on its face. . . .’” Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 521. Gooding obviously compels reversal of the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court. The Court, however, dismisses this appeal for want of a properly presented federal question. But a dismissal on that ground would be appropriate only if the federal claim had not been raised in a proper and timely manner in the state courts. See, e. g., Bailey N. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 206-207 (1945) ; Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 581-585 (1969). That cannot possibly be said of this case. The unconstitutionality of § 847.05 was the basic claim asserted by appellant and he urged it at every level in the state proceedings. And even were there doubt of this, and there can be none on this record, our jurisdiction still obtains since the Florida Supreme Court’s sole ground of decision was based upon resolution of the federal question. “There can be no question as to the proper presentation of a federal claim when the highest state court passes on it.” Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 436 (1959). Certainly it cannot be said that there is lack of a properly presented federal question because appellant was con 1084 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 23, 1974 419 U. S. victed not for violating § 847.05 but on the marihuana charge. His claim is that the marihuana seized from him and admitted in evidence against him was “fruit of the poisonous tree” because his initial arrest was pursuant to the unconstitutional § 847.05. It may be that on remand his “fruits” claim will be rejected and the marihuana conviction reinstated. But the Florida Supreme Court did not speak to that question in light of its determination, based on holding § 847.05 constitutional, that the initial arrest was valid. Appellant has properly presented the federal question decided by the Florida Supreme Court and our plain duty is to reverse that court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No. 74—69. Padilla v. Lavjne, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al. Appeal from Ct. App. N. Y. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 34 N. Y. 2d 36, 312 N. E. 2d 149. 'No. 74-434. Colorado Civil Rights Commission ex rel. McAllister ’Colorado et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Colo, dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 185 Colo. 42, 521 P. 2d 908. No. 74-5486. Brimm v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board et al. Appeal from.Ct. App. Cal., 2d App, Dist., dismissed for want of substantial federal question. No. 74-235. Seidenfaden et al. v. City of Louisville et al. Appeal from Ct. App. Ky. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would postpone further consideration of question of jurisdiction to hear ORDERS 1085 419 U. S. December 23, 1974 ing of case on the merits. Reported below: 508 S. W. 2d 42. Vacated and Remanded on Appeal No. 73-711. Cry an, Sheriff, et al. v. Hamar Theatres, Inc., et al. Appeal from D. C. N. J. [Probable jurisdiction noted, 416 U. S. 954.] Judgment vacated and case remanded to determine whether the cause is moot in light of State v. DeSantis, 65 N. J. 462, 323 A. 2d 489 (1974). No. 74-67. Dickson v. Ford, President of the United States, et al. Appeal from D; C. W. D. Tex. This is an appeal, assertedly brought under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, from a three-judge court order dismissing a complaint which sought to enjoin a federal statute upon the ground of its unconstitutionality, 28 U S. C. § 2282. The court found the case “non-justiciable, because the appellant lacked standing to sue and because the case involved a “political question.” Where a three-judge court dismisses a complaint as being non justiciable, appeal does not lie to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, ante, p. 90. Accordingly, the order is vacated and case remanded so that a fresh order may be entered from which a timely appeal may be taken to the United States Court of Appeals. 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Reported below: 379 F. Supp. 1345. No. 74-437. North v. Russell et al. Appeal from Ct. App. Ky. Upon representation of the Attorney General of Kentucky set forth in his motion to dismiss or affirm filed in this Court on November 29, 1974, judgment is vacated and case remanded for further consideration in light of the position presently asserted by the Commonwealth. Reported below: 516 S. W. 2d 103. 1086 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 23, 1974 419 U. S. Miscellaneous Orders No. A-446 ( 74-759). Moore v. United States. Ct. App. D. C. Application for release pending disposition of petition for writ of certiorari, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-467 (74-668). Selikoff v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Application for stay of incarceration, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 2d 227, 318 N. E. 2d 784. No. AM98. Gabriel v. United States et al. D. C. N. J. Application for stay, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-506. Gibbs et al. v. Howell et al. Ct. App. N. Y. Application for stay of execution of judgment upon remittitur, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-514. Boyd v. Pennsylvania State Board of Osteopathic Examiners. Pa. Commw. Ct. Application for stay of suspension of license to practice pending timely filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari, presented to Mr. Justice Brennan, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 12 Pa. Commw. 620, 317 A. 2d 307. No. 74-5588. Tucker v. Bowers, United States Attorney, et al. ; and No. 74—5621. Crane v. Stone, Correctional Superintendent, et al. Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus denied. No. 73-6650. Brown v. Illinois. Sup. Ct. Ill. [Certiorari granted, ante) p. 894.] Motion of John Thomas Moran, Jr., Esquire, to permit Robert P. Isaac ORDERS 1087 419 U. S. December 23, 1974 son, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice on behalf of petitioner granted. No. A-511. Miller v. California. App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Orange. Application for bail pending appeal, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. u^o. 35, Orig. United States v. Maine et al. Motion of Special Committee on Tidelands of National Association of Attorneys General for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 73-1708. Burns, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of Iowa, et al. v. Alcala et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 823.] Motion of Pacific Legal Foundation for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 73-1765. Meek et al. v. Pittenger, Secretary of Education, et al. Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 822.] Joint motion for additional time for oral argument granted, and a total of one and one-half hours allotted for oral argument. No. 73-1808. Laing v. United States et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 824]; and No. 74-75. United States et al. v. Hall. C. A. 6th Cir. [ Certiorari granted, ante, p. 824.] Motion to consolidate for oral argument granted. No. 73-1933. United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 893.] Motion of Independent Bankers Association of Georgia, Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. 1088 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. December 23, 1974 Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 74-456. Hill, Attorney General of Texas, et al. v. Printing Industries of the Gulf Coast et al. Appeal from D. C. S. D. Tex. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 382 F. Supp. 801. Certiorari Granted I No. 74—5116. Murphy v. Florida. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 553. Certiorari Denied. (See also No. 74-235, supra.} No. 73-1978. Mitzner et al. v. United States; No. 74-5063. Heck v. United States; No. 74r-5073. Moths v. United States; and No. 74G5086. Ross v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 778. No. 73-7076. Olson v. Texas. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 488 F. 2d 1056. No. 74—202. DiMattina, aka Zampitella v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 921. No. 74-211. Tollett v. Laman et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1231. No. 74—229. POMMERENING ET AL. V. UNITED STATES. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 92. No. 74r-348. Odland v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 148. No. 74^354. Verive v. United States; and No. 74—5109. Schulman v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1404. ORDERS 1089 419 U. S. December 23, 1974 No. 74-373. Koniecki et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1405. No. 74--382. C. A. 6th Cir. F. 2d 285. United States v. Finley Coal Co. et al. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 No. 74-386. Idaho Tax Commission v. Mahoney. Sup. Ct. Idaho. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 96 Idaho 59, 524 P. 2d 187. No. 74—399. Mayse et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 925. No. 74^105. Warren v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 205 Ct. Cl. 823, 503 F. 2d 1406. No. 74-410. Smith v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1150. No. 74-432. Community Bank et al. v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 282. No. 74-443. Liberty Loan Corp. v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 225. No. 74-449. Greenberg v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-460. Highway & Local Motor Freight Drivers Local No. 701, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Suburban Transit Corp, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 78. 1090 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 23, 1974 419 U. S. No. 74-483. O’Callaghan et al. v. Sheldon et al.; and No. 74-541. Sheldon et al. v. O’Callaghan et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1276. No. 74-502. Smart v. Jones et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 663. No. 74-505. Baldwin et al. v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct. Miss. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 297 So. 2d 157. No. 74-527. Children’s Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union, Local No. 227, AFL-CIO. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 1077. No. 74^531. Patton et al., Trustees v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 34. 1 No. 74-553. Goodyear v. Gates Rubber Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5052. McManus v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: See 516 P. 2d 277. No. 74-5118. Hill v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 297 So. 2d 660. No. 74-5123. Nunez-Villalobos v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1023. No. 74^5157. Meyers v. Venable et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1215. ORDERS 1091 419 U.S. December 23, 1974 No. 74-343. Agnew v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1400. No. 74-5131. Apodaca v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5134. Fico v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5185. Doe v. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5202. Rush et al. v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1405. No. 74-5241. Gillikin v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-5279. Klein v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 488 F. 2d 481. No. 74-5325. Van Drunen v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1393. No. 74—5407. Massengale v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 99, 497 F. 2d 686. No. 74-5509. Aiken v. Hopper, Warden. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 574. No. 74—5513. Rich v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 510 S. W. 2d 596. No. 74-5514. Clouston v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5520. Bryant v. Nelson, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. 1092 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 December 23, 1974 419 U.S. No. 74-5525. Gaito v. Matson. Super. Ct. Pa. Cer-Certiorari denied. Reported below: 233 Ga. 393, 211 S. E. 2d 771. No. 74-5540. Bush v. Craig et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 233 Ga. 393, 211 S. E. 2d 771. No. 74 5549. Haw’kins v. La Vallee, Correctional Superintendent. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 505 F. 2d 728. No. 73-1702. Lowder v. Ltnited States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Stewart would grant certiorari. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 953. No. 73-2058. Pennsylvania v. O’Shea. Sup. Ct. Pa. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 456 Pa. 288, 318 A. 2d 713. A Jib. 74-241. Hennigan et ux. v. Placid Oil Co. et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 876. No. 74-370. Goodrich v. South Dakota. Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: ------ S. D. ----•, 216 N. W. 2d 557. No. 74-523. Frasier v. Indiana. Sup. Ct. Ind. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: ----- Ind.-----, 312 N. E. 2d 77. No. 74-5017. Sedillo v. New Mexico. Sup. Ct. N. M. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. — ORDERS 1093 419 U. S. December 23, 1974 No. 74-524. Thistlethwaite v. City of New York et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 339. No. 74-580. Gooden, a minor, by Gooden, et al. v. Mississippi State University et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 441. No. 74-5016. Ayers v. Oregon. Ct. App. Ore. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 16 Ore. App. 300, 518 P. 2d 190. No. 74-5074. Estrada v. Wisconsin. Sup. Ct. Wis. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 63 Wis. 2d 476, 217 N. W. 2d 359. No. 74- 5427. Werts v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 784. ?r’No. 74-5506. Carter v. Cook. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1165. No. 74-313. Buckley et al. v. American Federation of Television & Radio Artists. C. A. 2d Cir. ; and No. 74-314. Lewis v. American Federation of Television & Radio Artists. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 74-313, 496 F. 2d 305, and No. 74-314, 34 N. Y. 2d 265, 313 N. E. 2d 735. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting. These cases, as I view them, present the issue of whether a person suffers an infringement of his First Amend- 1094 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Douglas, J., dissenting ment rights when he is compelled to pay union dues (or their equivalent) as a precondition to expressing his ideas through a public broadcasting medium? In Railway Employes’ Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 (1956), a union-shop agreement authorized under the Railway Labor Act was challenged under the First and Fifth Amendments. While holding on the merits that a union-shop requirement does not violate those Amendments, we held that the Railway Labor Act provision governing union-shop agreements constituted sufficient governmental action to require consideration of the constitutional issues: “[T]he federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.” 351 U. S., at 232. We left open the possibility that a membership or dues requirement might, in some circumstances, be imposed in contravention of the First Amendment, though no such problem was presented on the record in that case. In Hanson, governmental action was based on the Railway Labor Act, which provided that state “right to work” laws were superseded and that a union-shop agreement was permissible notwithstanding such laws. 351 U. S., at 231-232. Thus that federal Act placed “the imprimatur of the federal law” upon union-shop agreements. The Taft-Hartley Act (in contrast) authorizes union-shop agreements only in the absence of contrary state law. 61 Stat. 151, 29 U. S. C. § 164 (b). Yet there still is a substantial argument in favor of a holding that a union-shop agreement under the NLRA bears the imprimatur of federal law. The fact that §8 (a) (3) 2 is phrased in permissive rather than mandatory terms would not, in and of itself, 11 agree with the respective Courts of Appeals that issues concerning union disciplinary sanctions (or threats of such sanctions) are not properly before us. 2 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(3). ORDERS 1095 1093 Douglas, J., dissenting prevent a finding of governmental action. The Federal Government has undertaken extensive regulation of the field of labor-management relations, and by its approval and enforcement of union-shop agreements, may be said to “encourage” and foster such agreements. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F. 2d 14 (CAI 1971); cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967). It is significant that congressional permissiveness toward union-shop agreements is coupled with the NLRA’s “exclusivity” principle, whereby a majority vote of the employees in a particular category is sufficient to designate an exclusive bargaining representative whose actions bind majority and minority alike. When Congress authorizes an employer and a union to enter into union-shop agreements and makes such agreements binding and enforceable over the dissents of a minority of employees or union members, it has cast the weight of the Federal Government behind the agreements just as surely as if it had imposed them by statute. There is a substantial question whether the union-dues requirement imposed upon these petitioners should be characterized as a prior restraint or inhibition upon their free-speech rights. In some respects, the requirement to pay dues under compulsion can be viewed as the functional equivalent of a “license” to speak. In several related decisions, we have left open the possibility that First Amendment associational freedoms would be infringed by a requirement that a union member subject to a union-shop agreement pay dues to support union political activities with which he disagrees. Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 (1961); Railway Employes’ Dept v. Hanson, supra. Cf. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820 (1961). We held in Street that the Railway Labor Act should be construed to deny unions the power to compel a union member to pay dues in support of union political causes of which he disapproves; we indicated that some 1096 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. December 23, 1974 suitable formula of apportionment could be worked out, so that the union member would bear his share of the cost of collective-bargaining activities from which he benefited, but would not be forced to contribute to political activities if he did not wish to do so. Whether a similar accommodation could be worked out in the present case, I do not know. Our cases dealing with flat license fees or registration requirements, such as Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945), and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943), tend to suggest that even a minimal payment designed solely to cover administrative costs may be impermissible in a First Amendment context. There remains a question of whether an accommodation respecting dues could be worked out in the present case. Whatever the outcome, I believe that the issues are sufficiently substantial to call for plenary consideration. No. 74-498. Research Corp. v. Nasco Industries, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 358. No. 74-501. Wyeth Laboratories, a Division of American Home Products Corp. v. Reyes. C. A. 5th Cir. Motions of American Academy of Pediatrics and Conference of State and Territorial Epidemiologists for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Motion of American Medical Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1264. No. 74-546. Ditter/U. S. District Judge v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Motion of American Newspaper Publishers Assn, for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae and certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 1. ORDERS 1097 419U. S. December 23, 30, 1974, January 9, 1975 No. 74—5527. Bridges v. Tennessee. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1402. No. 74-5532. Bolden v. Cowan, Penitentiary Superintendent. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-528. Generes v. Stich et al. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari and other relief denied. Rehearing Denied No. 73-1890. Thompson et ux. v. Clark, Treasurer of DuPage County, et al., ante, p. 988; ' Wo. 74-97. Diamond et al. v. Bland, Sheriff, et al., ante, p. 885; No. 74 248. United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelw’Orkers of America, AFL-CIO, ante, p. 998; and No. 74-5187. Smith v. California, ante, p. 988. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 73-6732. Sloan v. Nixon, President of the United States, et al., ante, p. 958. Petition for rehearing denied. See this Court’s Rule 58. December 30, 1974 Dismissal Under Rule 60 No. 74-5565. Estevez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60. January 9, 1975 Dismissal Under Rule 60 No. 73-1943. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari dismissed under this Court’s Rule 60. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 878. 1098 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. January 13, 1975* Affirmed on Appeal No. 74-380. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners et al. v. Rosen. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. E. D. La. Reported below: 380 F. Supp. 875. Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins, concurring. Under the compulsion of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), which in my view were erroneously decided, I join the affirmance. No. 74-402. Rastetter et al. v. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. Ariz. Reported below: 379 F. Supp. 170. No. 74-5136. Young et al. v. Cobb, Chief, Bureau of Financial Responsibility, et al. Affirmed on appeal from D. C. S. D. Fla. Appeals Dismissed No. 73-2045. American Plant Food Corp. v. Texas. Appeal from Ct. Crim. App. Tex. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 508 S. W. 2d 598. No. 74-253. Sobottka v. Brown, Registrar of Voters. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. No. 74-413. Cerezo v. Buso et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. P. R. dismissed for want of substantial federal question. Reported below:-----P. R. R.----. *Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of cases in which orders hereinafter reported were announced on this date. ORDERS 1099 419 U. S. January 13, 1975 No. 74—5425. Ruderer v. Wood et al. Appeal from D. C. S. D. Ill. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. No. 74—5571. Ray et al. v. Hedgewald et al. Appeal from D. C. W. D. Ky. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. No. 74-5567. Alers v. Municipality of San Juan. Appeal from C. A. 1st Cir. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. No. 74-5577. Hurd v. Hurd. Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. No. 74-5583. Turner v. California. Appeal from Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist., dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded No. 74-83. Pelliccioni v. Schuyler Packing Co. et al. Super. Ct. N. J. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., ante, p. 318. Reported below’: See 65 N. J. 290, 321 A. 2d 251. No. 74-5352. Ackerson v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Upon representation of the Solicitor General set forth in his brief for the United States filed December 19, 1974, judgment vacated and case remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to permit the Government to dismiss the charges against petitioner. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissent. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 300. 1100 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 13, 1975 419 U. S. Miscellaneous Orders No. A-285. Wohlgemuth v. Planned Parenthood Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania, Inc., et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Application to vacate preliminary injunction, presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-445. Parker v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for continuance of bail pending timely filing of petition for writ of certiorari, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-501. Howard v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for bail pending appeal, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-518. McIntosh v. Woodward, Acting Director, United States Board of Parole, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Application for bail pending appeal, presented to Mr. Justice Douglas, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. A-547 ( 74-5678). Liddy v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Application for bail, presented to The Chief Justice, and by him referred to the Court, denied. Reported below: 166 U. S. App. D. C. 95, 509 F. 2d 428. No. A-553. National League of Cities, Inc., et al. v. Brennan, Secretary of Labor; and No. A-566. California et al. v. Brennan, Secretary of Labor. D. C. D. C. Stay order heretofore granted by The Chief Justice on December 31, 1974, is hereby continued on condition that appellants file their jurisdictional statements on or before January 17, 1975. Appellee may file a reply to the jurisdictional statements on or before 12 p. m., January 23, 1975. Neither the ORDERS 1101 419 U. S. January 13, 1975 jurisdictional statements nor the replies need be initially printed. Reported below: 406 F. Supp. 826. No. A-563. Huntsville Board of Education et al. v. Hereford et al. Application for recall and stay of mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, presented to Mr. Justice Powell, and by him referred to the Court, denied. No. D-25. In re Disbarment of Leach. It is ordered that Arthur Dale Leach, of Silver Spring, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show’ cause wyhy he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-26. In re Disbarment of Ketcham. It is ordered that Frank S. Ketcham, of Potomac, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-28. In re Disbarment of Buttles. It having been reported to this Court that Robert S. Buttles, of New York, N. Y., has been suspended from the practice of law’ in all of the courts of the State of New York, and this Court by order of November 18, 1974 [ante, p. 1016], having suspended the said Robert S. Buttles from the practice of law in this Court and directed that a rule issue requiring him to show’ cause why he should not be disbarred; And it appearing that the said rule w7as duly issued and served upon respondent, and that a response has been filed; It is ordered that the said Robert S. Buttles be, and he is hereby, disbarred from the practice of law in this Court and that his name be stricken from the roll of 1102 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 13, 1975 419 U. S. attorneys admitted to practice before the Bar of this Court. No. D-31. In re Disbarment of Ross. It is ordered that John A. Ross, Jr., of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-32. In re Disbarment of Germaise. It is ordered that Irwin L, Germaise, of New York, N. Y., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 35, Grig. United States v. Maine et al. Motion of Associated Gas Distributors for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. [For earlier orders herein, see, e. g., ante, p. 1087.] No. 73-1708. Burns, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of Iowa, et al. v. Alcala et al. C. A. 8th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 823.] Motion of American Association for Maternal & Child Health et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Motion of the Attorney General of Florida for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae denied. No. 73-1908. Cort et al. v. Ash. C. A. 3d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 992.] Motion of Chamber of Commerce of the United States for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 73-2047. Buck et al. v. Impeach Nixon Committee et al., ante, p. 891. Motion of respondents to retax costs denied. ORDERS 1103 419 U. S. January 13, 1975 No. 73-1765. Meek et al. v. Pittenger, Secretary of Education, et al. Appeal from D. C. E. D. Pa. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 822.] Motion of National Audio-Visual Assn., Inc., for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. No. 73-1923. Eastland et al. v. United States Servicemen’s Fund et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 823.] Motion of respondents for divided argument granted. No. 73-2060. Austin et al. v. New Hampshire et al. Appeal from Sup. Ct. N. H. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 822.] Motion of appellees to permit Charles G. Cleaveland, Esquire, to present oral argument pro hac vice granted. Motions of Attorney General of Vermont and Attorney General of New Jersey for leave to participate in oral argument as amici curiae denied. No. 74-70. Goldfarb et ux. v. Virginia State Bar et al. C. A. 4th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 963.] Motions of the Bar of the City of New York and the District of Columbia Bar for leave to file briefs as amici curiae denied. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions. No. 74-5595. Ratcliff v. Texas et al. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied. No. 74-453. Van Lare, Acting Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al. v. Hurley et al. Appeal from D. C. S. D. N. Y. and D. C. E. D. N. Y. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 1045] ; and No. 74—5054. Taylor et al. v. Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1046.] Motion to consolidate for oral argument granted. 1104 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 13, 1975 419 U. S. No. 74-304. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 1018.] Motion of Retirement Board of the Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York for leaye to file a brief as amicus curiae denied. No. 74U5295. Parmley v. Alabama et al. ; No. 74-5502. Farries v. United States District Court; and No. 74^5531. Draughon v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Motions for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus denied. No. 74—5451. Magee v. Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition, and/or certiorari denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 73-1689. United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries. Appeal from D. C. C. D. Cal. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 401 F. Supp. 1005. No. 74^548. United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi et al. Appeal from D. C. S. D. Miss. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 378 F. Supp. 558. Certiorari Granted No. 74^204. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare v. Eldridge. C. A. 4th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1230. ORDERS 1105 419 U. S. January 13, 1975 Certiorari Denied. (See also Nos. 74-5567. 74-5577, and 74—5583, supra.) No. 73-1433. Hurt v. Britton, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 73-7112. Valdez v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—49. Carlson et al. v. Carlson. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 11 Cal. 3d 474, 521 P. 2d 1114. No. 74r-57. Dykman v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 2d 633. No. 74-94. Scranton Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. Litton Industries Leasing Corp, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 778. No. 74-105. Golden Eagle, aka Austine v. Johnson, Deputy Sheriff, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1179. No. 74-128. Adolph Coors Co. v. Federal Trade Commission; and No. 74-609. Federal Trade Commission v. Adolph Coors Co. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1178. No. 74-274. Parness et ux. v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 430. No. 74-276. National Roofing Contractors Assn, et al. v. Brennan, Secretary of Labor. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1294. No. 74-287. Gables by the Sea, Inc. v. Lee et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 P. 2d 1340. 1106 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 13, 1975 419 U. S. No. 74-300. Rosen v. Lawrence. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 910. No. 74-301. Washburn v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 575. No. 74-310. Standard Forge & Axle Co., Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. C. A. 5th Cir. .Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1392. No. 74-316. Kern v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 74-321. Dunn v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 856. No. 74-325. Rovner v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1400. No. 74-372. Schenker, aka Shenker v. ^United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1367. No. 74-378. Gibson v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 854. No. 74-396. Mathis v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 292 Ala. 732, 296 So. 2d 764. No. 74-392. Orrin v. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 162 U. S. App. D. C. 97, 497 F. 2d 684. No. 74^394. Paterno et al. v. United States; and No. 74-406. Denti v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied: Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1396. ORDERS 1107 419 U. S. January 13, 1975 No. 74-388. Casey v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-407. Infelice v. United States; and No. 74-5397. Garelli v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 74-407, 500 F. 2d 1405; No. 74-5397, 500 F. 2d 1406. No. 74-414. De Veste v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-423. Provident Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Reserve Life Insurance -Co. et al. ; and No. 74-617. Reserve Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Provident Life Insurance Co. et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 715. No. 74-427. Williams v. Gagliardi, U. S. District Judge. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 403. No. 74-436. Medenica v. Callaway, Secretary of the Army. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 574. No. 74-442. Essex, Administratrix v. Vinal et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below’: 499 F. 2d 226. No. 74 445. Hasw-ell v. United States. Ct. Cl. Certiorari denied. Reported below’: 205 Ct. Cl. 421, 500 F. 2d 1133. No. 74-461. Alexander United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1. No. 74^477. Lippman v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 492 F. 2d 314. No. 74-484. Prince v. Ltnited States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1289. 1108 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 13, 1975 419 U. S. No. 74—493. Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Lysyj, dba Kent Trailer Park. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N. E. 2d 3. No. 74-494. Krause et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1109. No. 74-516. Stewart v. Kyros et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1161. No. 74-539. Nichols v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 322 A. 2d 283. No. 74—550. Philadelphia Anti-Poverty Action Commission (PAAC) et al. v. Rizzo, Mayor of Philadelphia, et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 306. No. 74-554. Parrigan v. Paderick, Penitentiary Superintendent. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 74—555. Ishler v. Toledo Bar Assn. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 39 Ohio St. 2d 33, 313 N. E. 2d 818. No. 74-559. Johnson v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 4th Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 291 So. 2d 67. No. 74-562. Mahaley et al. v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1087. No. 74-564. Vassallo v. LaTorr, Warden. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—566. Reed v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1109 419 U. S. January 13, 1975 No. 74-568. Estep, a minor, by Stanley v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 57 Ill. 2d 395, 312 N. E. 2d 618. No. 74-569. Ellis v. Hawaii. Sup. Ct. Hawaii. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 55 Haw. 458, 522 P. 2d 460. No. 74-570. Dean v. Ford Motor Co. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-581. California Moving & Storage Assn, et al. v. Public Utilities Commission of California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 74-582. Picard v. Rhode Island. Sup. Ct. R. I. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 113 R. I. 649, 324 A. 2d 631. No. 74 585. Stan.iim Co. et al. v. Board of Revision of Mahoning County et al. Sup. Ct. Ohio. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Ohio St. 2d 233, 313 N. E. 2d 14. No. 74-589. Browtn v. Baylor University Medical Center at Dallas, Texas, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 783. No. 74-590. Kastner, t/a Liberty Bell Discount, et al. v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 525, 320 A. 2d 146. No. 74-598. Education/Instruccion, Inc., et al. v. Moore, Chairman, Capitol Regional Planning Agency of Connecticut, et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 1187. No. 74-600. LaTurner et al. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 593. 1110 OCTOBER. TERM, 1974 January 13, 1975 419 U. S. No. 74 608. Carey et al. v. O’Donnell et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 U. S. App. D. C. 46, 506 F. 2d 107. No. 74-610. Northeast Master Executive Council v. Civil Aeronautics Board et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 165 U. S. App. D. C. 36, 506 F. 2d 97. No. 74-612. Finnell v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 256 Ark. 738, 512 S. W. 2d 13. No. 74-616. Peters et al. v. Clark et al. Petition for certiorari before judgment to C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-625. Calvert v. State Administrative Board of Election Laws et al. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 272 Md. 659, 327 A. 2d 290. No. 74-627. Nelson v. South Dakota. Sup. Ct. S. D. Certiorari denied. Reported below: S. D. , 220 N. W. 2d 2. No. 74—628. Liberty National Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Battle, dba Edgar H. Battle Funeral Home, et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 39. No. 74-629. Placid Oil Co. et al. v. Louisiana et al.; and No. 74D638. Texaco Inc. v. Louisiana et al. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 300 So. 2d 154. No. 74-639. Connecticut et al. v. Klarman et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 29. ORDERS 1111 419 U.S. January 13, 1975 No. 74—646. Reynolds et al. v. Paster et al. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 512 S. W. 2d 97. No. 74-665. Ciaccio v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 506 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-5020. Carrington v. Virginia State Penitentiary Superintendent. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 493 F. 2d 1355. No. 74- 5072. Stewart v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 10 Cal. 3d 902, 519 P. 2d 568. No. 74-5122. White v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: --------- Mass.-------------------------------------------------,-, and-■, 311 N. E. 2d 543, 547 and 550. No. 74—5144. O’Brien v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 74^5146. Surles v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5194. Chavers v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 294 So. 2d 489. No. 74—5201. Owens v. Cannon, Warden. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 927. No. 74-5209. Morrow v. Illinois; and No. 74—5210. Mackins v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 Ill. App. 3d 24. 308 N. E. 2d 92. No. 74—5218. Crump v. Brantley, Warden. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 17 Ill. App. 3d 318, 307 N. E. 2d 651. 1112 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U. S. January 13, 1975 No. 74^5233. Jones v. Wainwright, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 1184. No. 74-5250. Hudspeth v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5266. Lockett v. Alabama. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 910. No. 74-5283. Rodriguez-Preciado v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5289. Krappatsch, Administrator v. Capps et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 910. No. 74-5301. Ramirez v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1400. No. 74^5310. Marshall v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 76. No. 74-5314. Lawrence v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1065. No. 74-5315. Manjarres-Arce v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 426. No. 73-5320. Baker v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1402. No. 74-5321. Brown v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5328. Hallaway v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1113 419 U.S. January 13, 1975 No. 74-5329. Scott v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1401. No. 74^-5334. Garvey v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5337. Martin-Mendoza v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 918. No. 74R5343. Gearin v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 691. No. 74—5366. Whitaker et al. v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 1400. No. 74—5371. Willis et al. v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 1401. No. 74—5378. Norton v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 342. No. 74-5383. Williams v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1401. No. 74-5391. Jones et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1403. No. 74—5400. Graham v. DeWinter, United States Marshal. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74^5409. Cowles v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 67. No. 74-5410. Roberts v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 598. 1114 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 13, 1975 419 U. S. No. 74-5412. Daniels v. Alabama. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 7F-5418. Denson v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5420. Hubbard v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1254. No. 74-5432. Haygood v. United States. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 166. No. 74-5434. Villarreal v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1183. No. 74-5438. Hall v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 505 F. 2d 736. No. 74-5441. Mandujano v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 370. No. 74-5443. Vilkaitis v. Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5465. Laughlin v,j[Fnited States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5468. Magee v. Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, et al. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5518. Pemberton v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 784. No. 74-5495. Funches v. Alabama. Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 Ala. App. 330, 299 So. 2d 771. ORDERS 1115 419 U. S. January 13, 1975 No. 74-5492. Snider v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 424. No. 74—5529. McHar v. McHale. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5542. Cook v. Administrator, Veterans’ Administration. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 495 F. 2d 1371. No. 74-5545. Stone v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74^5546. Norman v. Clanon, Medical Facility Superintendent. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5547. Carpenter v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 3d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5550. Moreno v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 511 S. W. 2d 273. No. 74-5555. McAlister et al. v. Massachusetts. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. Certiorari denied. Reported below: ----Mass.-----,----, and----, 313 N. E. 2d 113, 869, and 872. No. 74-5557. Dodson v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 2d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5558. Myers, dba Romyco Stereo v. Ampex, Inc., etal. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5561. Carter v. Money Tree Co. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 783. No. 74-5569. Jones v. Georgia. Sup. Ct. Ga. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 232 Ga. 771, 208 S. E. 2d 825. No. 74-5578. Magee v. Britt, Warden, et al. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. 1116 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 13, 1975 419 U. S. No. 74-5582. Carrol v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5590. Vester v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 22 N. C. App. 16, 205 S. E. 2d 556. No. 74—5592. Cosco v. Meacham, Warden, et al. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5596. Shine v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th ’App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5601. Duarte v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 4th App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5606. Ramirez v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Cal. App. 3d 347, 114 Cal. Rptr. 916. No. 74-441. Meier v. Boldt, U. S. District Judge. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U. S. 365 (1970). No. 74-551. Lee et al. v. Arrowood, Co-executor, et al. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 138. No. 74-586. Wainwright, Corrections Director, et al. v. Means. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 299 So. 2d 577. Rehearing Denied No. 73-1823. Van Gundy et al. v. United States, ante, p. 1004; and No. 73-1824. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., et al. v. United States, ante, p. 1007. Petitions for rehearing denied. ORDERS 1117 419 U. S. January 13, 20, 1975 No. 73-6847. Cousino v. Cousino, ante, p. 1019; No. 74—187. First American Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Ellwein, State Examiner and Commissioner, Department of Banking and Financial Institutions, et al., ante, p. 1026; No. 74U419. Automotive Chauffeurs, Parts & Garage Employees, Local Union 926, et al. v. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc., ante, p. 1049; No. 74-5032. Montgomery et al. v. California, ante, p. 1057; No. 74—5161. Gaskins v. Titeflex Employees Collective Bargaining Assn., ante, p. 1035; No. 74—5168. Williams v. Dana Corp., ante, p. 1024; No. 74-5240. Bryan v. United States, ante, p. 1079; No. 74-5254. Whitlow v. Wainwright, Corrections Director, ante, p. 1036; and No. 74-5269. Qadir v. County of Santa Clara et al., ante, p. 1037. Petitions for rehearing denied. Assignment Order An order of The Chief Justice designating and assigning Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to perform judicial duties in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit during the month of January 1975, and for such additional time as may be required to complete unfinished business, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 294 (a), is ordered entered on the minutes of this Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 295. January 20, 1975 * Appeals Dismissed No. 74-5433. Kovach v. Schubert, Hospital Superintendent. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Wis. dismissed for *Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of cases in which orders hereinafter reported were announced on this date, with the exception of No. 74r-335, Pryba v. United States, infra, p. 1127. 1118 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 20, 1975 419 U. S. want of substantial federal question. Reported below: 64 Wis. 2d 612, 219 N. W. 2d 341. No. 74^5710. Smith v. California. Appeal from App. Dept., Super. Ct. Cal., County of Kern, dismissed for want of substantial federal question. No. 74-5617. Nickens v. Virginia. Appeal from Sup. Ct. Va. dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for writ of certiorari, certiorari denied. Miscellaneous Orders No. D-33. In re Disbarment of McDonald. It is ordered that Ronald F. McDonald, Jr., of Rockville, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-34. In re Disbarment of Kerr. It is ordered the Elaine Worley Kerr, of Bailey’s Crossroads, Va., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-35. In re Disbarment of Raimondi. It is ordered that Thomas Paul Raimondi, of Baltimore, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. D-36. In re Disbarment of Bomstein. It is ordered that Stanley J. Bomstein, of Baltimore, Md., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. ORDERS 1119 419 U. S. January 20, 1975 No. D-37. In re Disbarment of Hankinson. It is ordered that-Christopher Ker Hankinson, of Vienna, Va., be suspended from the practice of law in this Court and that a rule issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court. No. 73-1933. United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank et al. Appeal from D. C. N. D. Ga. [Probable jurisdiction noted, ante, p. 893.] Motion of the Solicitor General for additional time for oral argument granted and 15 additional minutes allotted for that purpose. Appellees also allotted 15 additional minutes for oral argument. No. 74-8. O’Connor v. Donaldson. C. A. 5th Cir. [Certiorari granted, ante, p. 894.] Motion of Texas et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae denied. No. 74-5574. Williams v. United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus denied. Probable Jurisdiction Noted No. 74-337. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., et al. Appeal from C. A. 2d Cir. Probable jurisdiction noted. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 18. Certiorari Granted No. 74-362. Intercounty Construction Corp, et al. v. Walter, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, U. S. Department of Labor, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 163 U. S. App. D. C. 147, 500 F. 2d 815. No. 74-653. Michigan v. Mosley. Ct. App. Mich. Certiorari granted. Reported below: 51 Mich. App, 105, 214 N. W. 2d 564. 1120 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. January 20, 1975 No. 74-157. United Housing Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Forman et al.; and No. 74-647. JJew York et al. v. Forman et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari granted; .cases consolidated, and a total of one hour allotted for oral argument. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1246. No. 74-634. United States v. Nobles. C. A. 9th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certiorari granted. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 146. Certiorari Denied. (See also No. 74-5617, supra.} No. 73-2006. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., dba Sound Values, Inc., et al. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 285. No. 74-81. Cochran v. United States; and No. 74-522. Hornsby v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 496 F. 2d 1072. No. 74—250. Cole v. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, et al. KN A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 494 F. 2d 141. No. 74-261. C. R. Fedrick, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization of California. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 38 Cal. App. 3d 385, 120 Cal. Rptr. 434. No. 74-283. Emprise Corp. v. United States; No. 74-322. Polizzi et al. v. United States; and No. 74-323. Giordano v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 856. No. 74-365. Whitted v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 21 N. C. App. 649, 205 S. E. 2d 611. ORDERS 1121 419 U. S. January 20, 1975 No. 74-446. Local 300, Laborers’ International Union of North America, et al. v. Magallanes et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Cal. App. 3d 809, 115 Cal. Rptr. 428. 'No. 74-A91. Schneider v. United States; and No. 74^5608. Dace v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 897. No. 74-526. Stollings v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 506 F. 2d 1398. No. 74-530. Lawhon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 352. No. 74—560. Rendon et al. v. District of Columbia Board of Elections. Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. No. 74-565. Breier et al. v. Bence et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501F. 2d 1185. No. 74-618. Morse v. Wilson, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1264. No. 74-624. Fenner v. Strickland. Sup. Ct. Neb. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 192 Neb. 114, 219 N. W. 2d 229. No. 74-626. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago v. O’Brien et al. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74^631. Eddie Dassin, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 74. No. 74-644. Association of Motion Picture & Television Producers, Inc., et al. v. Knopf et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Cal. App. 3d 233, 114 Cal Rptr. 782. 1122 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 20, 1975 419 U. S. No. 74^636. Pellicci v. United States. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 1106. No. 74-640. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., et al. v. O’Connell; and No. 74-642. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., et al. v. Hudak. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 74—640, 499 F. 2d 994; No. 74—642, 499 F. 2d 996. No. 74-651. Brennan, Secretary of Labor v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 859. No. 74—654. O’Dell et al. v. City of Chattanooga et al. Sup. Ct. Tenn. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 513 S.W. 2d 780. No. 74^668. Selikoff v. New York. Ct. App. N. Y. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 35 N. Y. 2d 227, 318 N. E. 2d 784. No. 74^672. City of Los Angeles v. Aaron et al. Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162. No. 74-686. Loeser v. Loeser. Ct. App. Ind. Certiorari denied. Reported below: ---Ind. App.-----, 311 N. E. 2d 636. No. 74-695. Deskins v. Kentucky. Ct. App. Ky. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 512 S. W. 2d 520. No. 74-697. Mahoney et al. v. Philadelphia Housing Authority. Pa. Commw. Ct. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 13 Pa. Commw. 243, 320 A. 2d 459. No. 74-5005. Alexander et al. v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1123 419 U. S. January 20, 1975 No. 74-5103. Baker v. Atkins, Acting Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5245. Porter v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 1006. No. 74-5274. Hurst et al. v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 497 F. 2d 923. No. 74-5297. Woods v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 74 5350. Varfis v. Richey, U. S. District Judge, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5379. Milne, aka Gordon v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 498 F. 2d 329. No. 74—5384. Crook v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 1378. No. 74-5394. Scales v. Virginia. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 214 Va. 728, 204 S. E. 2d 273. No. 74-5395. Howes v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5398. Stypmann v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5401. Corum v. California. Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5402. Cooley v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 501 F. 2d 1249. 1124 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 20,1975 419 U. S. No. 74-5408. Raven v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 728. No. 74—5411. Malone v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 502 F. 2d 554. No. 74—5430. Banks v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5448. Beamon v. Florida. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 298 So. 2d 376. No. 74-5450. Teran v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74—5452. Kochel v. United States. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. No.-74-5461. Kemper v. United States. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 327. No. 74-5470. Cochran v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 380. No. 74—5485. Mayfield v. United States. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5490. Smith v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 1037. No. 74-5501. Rodriguez v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 1397. No. 74—5503. Tubbs v. United States. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 1397. No. 74—5508. Lincoln v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5521. Romero v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. ORDERS 1125 419 U. S. January 20, 1975 No. 74--5528. Rodovich v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 499 F. 2d 358. No. 74—5533. Talley v. United States. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied: Reported below: 505 F. 2d 731. No. 74-5537. Tasby v. United States. C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 504 F. 2d 332. No. 74-5541. DeMontijo v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5605. Martin v. Florida. C. A. 5th Cir. , Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1182. No. 74—5610. Pillis v. Russo, Judge, et al. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5614. Harsany v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5618. Cherry v. Indiana. C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5622. English v. Davis, Corrections Director. Sup. Ct. Va. Certiorari denied. No. 75-5626. Besser v. Dunn, Judge, et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5630. Williams v. Estelle, Corrections Director. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 500 F. 2d 1183. No. 74-5631. Henderson v. Atkins, Acting Warden. C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5640. Adkins v. Florida. Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 295 So. 2d 120. 1126 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. January 20, 1975 No. 74-5649. Catanzarite v. Mazurkiewicz et al. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 503 F. 2d 1400. No. 74-5650. Bredy v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied. No. 74-5652. Tallent, aka Osterhout, et al. v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 44 App. Div. 2d 911, 356 N. Y. S. 2d 238. No. 74-29. Sykes v. Maryland; and No. 74^30. Fornaro v. Maryland. Crim. Ct. Baltimore City. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioners were convicted in Baltimore City District Court of showing unlicensed films in violation of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 66A, §§ 1-26 (1970 and Supp. 1974), which requires that films be licensed before exhibition and forbids the licensing of obscene films. Pursuant to § 6 (b) of the statute a film is “obscene” if, “when considered as a whole, its calculated purpose or dominant effect is substantially to arouse sexual desires, and if the probability of this effect is so great as to outweigh whatever other merits the film may possess.” The Criminal Court of Baltimore City affirmed both convictions, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari. It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult ORDERS 1127 419 U. S. January 20, 1975 Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). ■ It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, the Maryland motion picture censorship statute, as it defines “obscene” in § 6 (b), is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), and because the judgments below were rendered after Miller, I would therefore reverse. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). No. 74-222. Allred et al. v. North Carolina. Ct. App. N. C. Certiorari denied. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall would grant certiorari. Reported below: 21 N. C. App. 229, 204 S. E. 2d 214. No. 74-335. Pryba v. United States. C. A. D. C. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 163 U. S. App. D. C. 389, 502 F. 2d 391. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of transporting obscene films in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462 and of possessing such films with intent to distribute in violation of D. C. Code Ann. § 22-2001 (1973). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 163 U. S. App. D. C. 389, 502 F. 2d 391 (1974). Title 18 U. S. C. § 1462 provides in pertinent part: “Whoever brings into the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or knowingly uses any express company or other 1128 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Brennan, J., dissenting 419 U. S. common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce— “(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character; or “Whoever knowingly takes from such express company or other common carrier any matter or thing the carriage of which is herein made unlawful— “Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.” District of Columbia Code Ann. § 22-2001 (1973) provides in pertinent part: “(a)(1) It shall be unlawful in the District of Columbia for a person knowingly— “(A) to sell, deliver, distribute, or provide, or offer or agree to sell, deliver, distribute, or provide any obscene, indecent, or filthy writing, picture, sound recording, or other article or representation; “(E) to create, buy, procure, or possess any matter described in the preceding subparagraphs of this paragraph with intent to disseminate such matter in violation of this subsection. * • • * ♦ “(e) A person convicted of violating subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall for the first offense be fined not more than $3,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. A person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be fined not less than ORDERS 1129 1127 Brennan, J., dissenting $1,000 nor more than $5,000 or imprisoned not less than six months or more than three years, or both.” It is my view that, “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, 18 U. S. C. § 1462 and D. C. Code Ann. § 22-2001 (1973) are constitutionally overbroad and therefore facially invalid. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was rendered after Miller, reverse.* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 Uj' S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, it does not appear from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his convictions have ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and *A1 though four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits. 1130 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 January 20, 1975 419 U. S. remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. It is occasionally suggested that the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth, Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), has a more restricted meaning than when applied to the Federal Government. See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 500-503 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in Alberts v. California, 354 U. S. 476 (1957)). That view has never prevailed and is not at issue in this case as the prohibition of the First Amendment against abridgment of speech and press precisely fits this federal prosecution and, in my view, should bar it. That is the view I expressed in Roth, supra, at 508-514 (dissenting), a position from which I have not retreated. No. 74-353. Schubert, Hospital Superintendent v. Kovach. Sup. Ct. Wis. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 64 Wis. 2d 612, 219 N. W. 2d 341. No. 74-384. Sprinkle, Acting Warden, et al. v. Mason. C. A. 10th Cir. Motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari denied. No. 74—536. Ballew v. Alabama; and No. 74-537. Pierce v. Alabama. Sup. Ct. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 74—536, 292 Ala. 1460, 296 So. 2d 206; No. 74-537, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewtart and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting. Petitioners were convicted of distributing or exhibiting allegedly obscene publications in violation of Ala. Code, ORDERS 1131 1130 Brennan, J., dissenting Tit. 14^<§ 374 (4)(1) (Supp. 1973), which provides as follows: “Every person who, with knowledge of its contents, . . . sells, exhibits or commercially distributes, . . . any obscene printed or written matter or material, other than mailable matter . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ....” As used in § 374 (4), “obscene” means: “lewd, lascivious, filthy and pornographic and that to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, its dominant theme taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” § 374 (3). On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted certiorari in both cases and affirmed. It is my view that, “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I n. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 374 (4), as it incorporates the definition of “obscene” of §374 (3), is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgments of the Supreme Court of Alabama were rendered after Miller, reverse the convictions. In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 1132 OCTOBER. TERM, 1974 January 20, 1975 419 U. S. Further, it does not appear from the petition or response in No. 74-536 that the obscenity of the disputed materials was adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner Ballew must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate this judgment and remand for a determination whether petitioner Ballew should be afforded a new trial under local community standards. No. 74-645. National Right to Work Legal Defense & Education Foundation, Inc., et al. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion to defer consideration and certiorari denied. Reported below: See 376 F. Supp. 1060. Rehearing Denied No. 73-1902. National Independent Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan, Secretary of Labor, ante, p. 955; No. 73-6856. Robinson v. Jefferson County Board of Education et al., ante, p. 862; No. 73-6991. Williams v. California, ante, p. 1046; No. 74-426. Joiner et al. v. City of Dallas et al., ante, p. 1042; No. 74-5132. Young v. United States, ante, p. 1002; and No. 74-5527. Bridges v. Tennessee, ante, p. 1097. Petitions for rehearing denied. No. 74 44. Fahrig et al. v. Ledford, Executor, ante, p. 967. Motion for leave to proceed further herein in forma pauperis granted. Petition for rehearing denied. AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1 Effective July 1, 1975 Section 3 of the Act of Jan. 2, 1975. Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence and related amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides as follows: “Sec. 3. The Congress expressly approves the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are embraced by the orders entered by the Supreme Court of the United States on November 20, 1972,[2] and December 18, 1972,[3] 1 See Reporter’s Note, 409 U. S. 1132. The full text of the Federal Rules of Evidence as prescribed by the Court, is set forth in H. R. Doc. No. 93-46, pp. 1-43 (1973), together with The Chief Justice’s letter of submittal, id., at in. 2 The order of November 20, 1972, reads in pertinent part as set forth below. The full text of that order is printed in H. R. Doc. No. 93-46, supra, at v. “Ordered: "3. That subdivision (c) of Rule 30 and [Rule] 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be, and they hereby are, amended . . . to read [as set forth, infra, at 1134, 1136], “4. That subdivision (c) of Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be, and it hereby is, abrogated .... “5. That Rules 26, 26.1, and 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be, and they hereby are, amended ... to read [as set forth, infra, at 1136], “6. That The Chief Justice be, and he hereby is, authorized to transmit the foregoing new rules and amendments to and abrogation of existing rules to the Congress at the beginning of its next regular [Footnote 3 is on p. 11341 1133 1134 RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and such amendments shall take effect on the one hundred and eightieth day beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.” The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 read as follows: Rule 30. Depositions upon oral examination (c) Examination and cross-examination; record of examination; oath; objections.—Examination and crossexamination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witness on oath and shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in his presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be taken stenographically or recorded by any other means ordered in accordance with subdivision (b)(4) of this rule. If requested by one of the parties, the testimony shall be transcribed. session, in accordance with the provisions of Title 18 U. S. C. § 3771 and Title 28 U. S. C. §§ 2072 and 2075.” 3 The order of December 18, 1972, reads in pertinent part as set forth below. The full text of that' order is printed in H. R. Doc. No. 93-46, supra, at vm. “Ordered : “1. That Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by Order of this Court entered November 20, 1972, be, and it hereby is, further amended ... to read [as set forth, infra, at 1135], “2. That The Chief Justice be, and he hereby is, authorized to transmit the foregoing amendment of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Congress at the beginning of its next regular session in accordance with the provisions of Title 28, U. 8. C. § 2072.” 4 For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the amendments thereto, see 308 U. 8. 645, 308 U. S. 642, 329 U. S. 839, 335 U. S. 919, 341 U. S. 959, 368 U. S. 1009, 374 U. S. 861, 383 U. 8. 1029, 389 U. 8. 1121, 398 U. S. 977, and 401 U. 8. 1017. RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1135 All objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, or to the manner of taking it, or to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party, and any other objection to the proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections. In lieu of participating in the oral examination, parties may serve written questions in a sealed envelope on the party taking the deposition and he shall transmit them to the officer, who shall propound them to the witness and record the answers verbatim. Rule 32. Use of depositions in court proceedings [Subdivision (c) is abrogated.] Rule 43. Taking of testimony (a) Form.—In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. [(b) Scope of examination and cross-examination] (Abrogated) [(c) Record of excluded evidence] (Abrogated) (d) Affirmation in lieu of oath.—Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof. (e) Evidence on motions.—When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or deposition. (/) Interpreters.—The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix his reasonable compensation. The compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct, and may be taxed ultimately as costs, in the discretion of the court. 1136 RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 44-1. Determination of foreign law A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law. The amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 read as follows: Rule 26. Taking of testimony In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Rule 26.1. Determination of foreign law A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall give reasonable written notice. The court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law. Rule 28. Interpreters Thm court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix the reasonable compensation of such interpreter. Such compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law or by the government, as the court may direct. 5 For earlier publication of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the amendments thereto, see 327 U. S. 821, 335 U. S. 917, 949, 346 U. S. 941, 350 U. S. 1017, 383 U. S. 1087, 389 U. S. 1125, 401 U. S. 1025, 406 U. S. 979, 415 U. S. 1056, and 416 U. S. 1001. Reporter’s Note The next page is purposely numbered 1301. The numbers between 1136 and 1301 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish in-chambers opinions in the current preliminary print of the United States Reports with permanent page numbers, thus making the official citations immediately available. OPINIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES IN CHAMBERS FROM JULY 29 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1974 TIMES-PICAYUNE PUBLISHING CORP. v. SCHULINGKAMP ON APPLICATION FOR STAY No. A-1305. Decided July 29, 1974 Application for stay of Louisiana trial court’s order restricting media coverage of trials of defendants accused of committing highly publicized rape and murder is granted pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari in this Court, where the order imposed pervasive restraints of uncertain duration, and where alternative means for protecting the defendants’ rights, to a fair trial appear to have been available to the trial court. Mr. Justice Powell, Circuit Justice. This is an application for stay of an order of the Louisiana Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans restricting media coverage of the trials of two defendants accused of committing a highly publicized rape and murder in the city of New Orleans. The applicant, a Louisiana corporation that owns and publishes two of the city’s daily newspapers, has asked that I stay that order pending filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. Respondent, the Honorable Oliver P. Schulingkamp, has at my request filed a memorandum in opposition to the application. The record before me indicates a substantial possibility that the state; court’s order is inconsistent with this Court’s decisions governing prior restraint of the news media and that continuance of the order pending consideration of a petition for a writ 1301 1302 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion in Chambers 419 U. S. of certiorari would inflict irreparable harm, I therefore have granted the requested stay. In April 1973, a young white nursing student was raped and murdered following her visit to an elderly patient living in one of the city’s public housing projects. Shortly thereafter, two Negro suspects were arrested and charged with the crime. The case immediately became the focal point in the media for a number of more generalized concerns. The state university program that prompted the student’s unescorted visit to the housing project wras called into sharp question, as was the sufficiency of law enforcement efforts in high-crime areas of New Orleans. The case also occasioned criticism of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. Much of the initial publicity was directed toward one defendant, a 17-year-old with an apparently extensive history of juvenile offenses. Newspaper stories recounted in some detail the circumstances leading to his arrest and his subsequent alleged disclosure of the location where the victim’s body was recovered. Additionally, stories dwelt on his prior juvenile offenses. Almost all of the many newspaper references characterized him as a youth with a history of 43 juvenile arrests, the accuracy of which has since been disputed. Some newspaper accounts referred to his previous arrest on charges of murder and armed robbery without simultaneously revealing that those charges had been dropped for insufficient evidence. Others reported a psychiatric diagnosis of this defendant made several years earlier and apparently contained in the records of the juvenile probation officer. Within a few days reports concerning the crime, the accused, and other related concerns ceased to be of banner importance. Stories became shorter and began to move from the first page to less prominent positions in the papers. Newspaper coverage appears to have ceased TIMES-PICAYUNE PUB. CORP. v. SCHULINGKAMP 1303 1301 Opinion in Chambers within some 10 days of the arrest and the papers apparently published no stories about the defendants from the latter part of April until late January of the following year, when one subdued story announced the anticipated initiation of pretrial motions in the case.1 Some of the newspaper reporting that occurred in April can hardly be characterized as responsible journalism. Like many States, Louisiana maintains the confidentiality of the records of juvenile offenders. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:1586.3 (Supp. 1974). The record does not indicate how reporters came into possession of some of their information. Additionally, there appear to be inaccuracies or partial truths in matters that are of obvious importance. 1 Stories from the applicant’s newspapers were included in the defendant’s motion to restrict media coverage and have been made part of this application. They reveal that the crime obtained immediate first-page banner coverage. On April 10, 1973, stories appeared that reported discovery of the victim’s body and the arrest of a juvenile in connection with the crime. By the next day, this defendant had been identified and front-page stories began to portray his history of juvenile arrests. The arrest of the second defendant received banner coverage on April 12, as did a report that allegedly linked property stolen from the victim to the possession of the first defendant. The following day first-page banner stories appeared purportedly detailing the first defendant’s juvenile record and his psychiatric diagnosis. One newspaper also ran a picture of him being escorted to arraignment with his hands cuffed behind his back. During that same period other stories dealt with more general topics, and many mentioned this defendant and his juvenile record. Publicity began to subside around April 15 and ended a few days thereafter. The record does not disclose any subsequent newspaper accounts mentioning the defendants until the appearance on January 12, 1974, of a story reporting the expected initiation of routine pretrial motions in the case. The record does not specifically reveal the nature and extent of radio and television reporting. I assume that its timing and intensity more or less paralleled that of the newspaper reporting. 1304 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion in Chambers 419 U. S. In March 1974, some 11 months after the crime and attendant extensive publicity, counsel for the defendant who had received the most journalistic attention moved that the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans impose restrictions on reporting of the case. The court granted the motion on June 17, 1974. The court’s order imposes a total ban on reporting of testimony given in hearings on pretrial motions until after the selection of a jury and also places other selective restrictions on reporting before and during trial. At the time the order was issued, the court apparently contemplated only one trial. By its terms the order was to remain in effect until termination of the trial. The court later severed the defendants’ cases and ordered separate trials of the rape and murder charges against each. It made no modification of its media coverage order to reflect this changed circumstance. The applicant has represented that the court stated that the order would remain in effect until the termination of the last trial. Respondent has not contradicted this representation, and I assume it to be correct. The applicant sought relief from both the lower federal courts and the state court system prior to addressing this application to me. After failing to obtain immediate injunctive relief from the federal courts,2 the applicant asked the state court to vacate its order. That request was denied, as was a request that the court stay its order pending submission of application for 2 The United States District Court conducted a hearing at which it heard argument of counsel and the testimony of the respondent herein. Thereafter, the court determined that it should abstain from interfering with the state proceedings at that stage. The applicant noted an appeal from that decision and requested that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stay the state court order pending appeal. A panel of the Fifth Circuit denied the request for a stay. Neither of these decisions is before me today. TIMES-PICAYUNE PUB. CORP. v. SCHULINGKAMP 1305 1301 Opinion in Chambers supervisory and remedial writs in the Louisiana Supreme Court. On July 9, 1974, the applicant sought writs of certiorari, review, prohibition, and mandamus, and a stay of the state trial court’s order in the Louisiana Supreme Court. That same day the Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief by a vote of four to three, stating that the “[s]howing made does not justify the relief demanded.” Following one more unsuccessful attempt to obtain an injunction in the United States District Court, the applicant has requested that I, as Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, stay the state court’s order pending this Court’s consideration of a petition for a writ of certiorari. I have previously expressed my reluctance, in considering in-chambers stay applications, to substitute my view for that of other courts that are closer to the relevant factual considerations that so often are critical to the proper resolution of these questions. Graves v. Barnes, 405 U. S. 1201, 1203 (1972). In my in-chambers opinion in that case, I articulated the general standards governing the grant of a stay application: there must be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court w’ould consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed. Ibid. The question of the possibility of irreparable harm is particularly troublesome in this case. It presents a fundamental confrontation between the competing values of free press and fair trial, with significant public and private interests balanced on both sides. If the order is not stayed, the press is subjected to substantial prior restraint with respect to a case of widespread concern in the community. If, on the other hand, the order is stayed and 1306 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion in Chambers the press fails to act with scrupulous responsibility, the defendants’ constitutional right to a fair trial may be seriously endangered. The challenged portions of the order of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans impose a total prohibition on publication of testimony adduced in pretrial hearings until after selection of a jury. Noting that extensive testimony would be required in considering the many pretrial motions, including motions to suppress an alleged confession and other evidence, the court specifically ordered “that the reporting of such testimony be deferred until after the jury has been selected in order to preclude the possibility of such testimony influencing, in any way, prospective jurors yet to be selected, and rendering more difficult the task of selecting said jurors.” In addition, the state court order imposes other selective restrictions on what may be published both before and during trial. These restrictions are aimed at the content of news reporting. The order requires that the media avoid publication of interviews with subpoenaed witnesses. It also prohibits publication of any of the defendants’ criminal records or discreditable acts or of any possible confessions or inculpatory statements unless made part of the evidence in the court record. The order forbids publication of any testimony stricken by the court unless identified as having been stricken and bars publication of any leaks, statements, or conclusions of guilt or innocence that might be expressed or implied by statements of the police, prosecuting attorneys, or defense counsel. Finally, the order prohibits any editorial comment preceding or during trial “which tends to influence the Court, jury, or witnesses.” By its terms, the order remains in effect “until the conclusion of the trial. The court’s decision to continue the order during pendency of all of the trials ensures that it will TIMES-PICAYUNE PUB. CORP. v. SCHULINGKAMP 1307 1301 Opinion in Chambers extend over an indefinite and possibly lengthy period of time. The court’s order imposes significant prior restraints on media publication. As such, it would come to this Court “ ‘bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’ ” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Decisions of this Court repeatedly have recognized that trials are public events. See, e. g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 349-350 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 541 (1965); Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 374 (1947). And “reporters . . . are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through their respective media.” Estes v. Texas, supra, at 541-542. This Court also has shown a special solicitude for preserving fairness in a criminal trial. “Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meetinghall, the radio, and the newspaper.” Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 271 »(1941). See also Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 726 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961). The task of reconciling First Amendment rights with the defendant’s right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is not an easy one. This Court has observed in dictum that newsmen might be prohibited from publishing information about trials if such restrictions were necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 685 (1972). There was no indication in that opinion, however, that the standards for determining the propriety of resort to such action would materially differ from those applied in other decisions involving prior restraints of speech and publication. 1308 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion in Chambers I need only consider this question in the limited context of an application for a stay. On the record before me, and certainly in the absence of any showing of an imminent threat to fair trial, I cannot say that the order of the state court would withstand the limitations that this Court has applied in determining the propriety of prior restraints on publication. Cf. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F. 2d 496 (CA5 1972). The state court was properly concerned that the type of news coverage described above might be resumed and might threaten the defendants’ rights to a fair trial. But the restraints it has imposed are both pervasive and of uncertain duration. They include limitations on the timing as well as the content of media publication, cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974). Moreover, the court has available alternative means for protecting the defendants’ rights to a fair trial.3 3 The court has already invoked several of these procedures. For example, portions of the court’s order prohibit members of the bar and other persons under the court’s supervision and control from making extrajudicial statements prior to the termination of trial. These prohibitions are not challenged here. Additionally, respondent has indicated his intention to sequester the juries. This will protect against many of the hazards that the selective restrictions on reporting during trial are designed to prevent. Some other options may yet be used to protect the defendants’ rights. The defendant who sought the order apparently did not request that the pretrial hearings be closed to the public and press, and the court does not seem to have contemplated that possibility. As an initial matter, the court’s power to take such action is a question governed by state law. Unlike some States, Louisiana does not appear to have a specific provision authorizing such action. Cf. Cal. Penal Code §868 (1970); Iowa Code §761.13 (1973); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §95-1202 (c) (1969). This Court has not been called upon to determine whether these provisions are constitutional, and I express no view on that question. Of course, the court must conduct voir dire of the prospective jurors in these cases with particular care. Finally, the court retains the power to hold TIMES-PICAYUNE PUB. CORP. v. SCHULINGKAMP 1309 1301 Opinion in Chambers The issues underlying this case are important and difficult. Without anticipating my views on the merits, 1 have concluded that this application satisfies the standards for the grant of a stay. Accordingly, I have decided to stay that portion of the order of the Louisiana Criminal District Court that imposes direct limitations on media reporting pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court.4 persons, including members of the media, in contempt in particular limited circumstances. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941). 4 The applicant has not questioned the portions of the court’s order that relate to the conduct of other persons, and this stay order does not affect them. My order is limited to the portion of the respondent’s order directed specifically to the news media. It does not, however, stay the portion of the court’s order prohibiting the use of electronic or mechanical equipment within the court during the trial or related proceedings. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the Vieux Carre Courier Publishing Co., as amici curiae, have requested additionally that I enjoin any court proceeding about which the press is prohibited from reporting pending final disposition of this case on the merits. I find that action to be unwarranted and unwise. 1310 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion in Chambers 419 U. S. EHRLICHMAN v. SIRICA et al. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY No. A-93. Decided August 28, 1974 Application for stay of District Court’s order setting applicant’s criminal trial date, on alleged grounds that pretrial publicity precluded applicant’s receiving a fair trial in the venue at the time set and that he lacks sufficient time to prepare his defense, is denied. The responsibility for passing on a claim for a change of venue or delay in a trial because of prejudicial pretrial publicity calls for the exercise of the highest order of sound judicial discretion by the District Court, and doubts about the correctness of the order, particularly after the Court of Appeals has reviewed it and denied mandamus, do not constitute sufficient basis for contrary action by an individual Circuit Justice absent the most extraordinary circumstances. Denial of the application here indicates no view on the issues presented, and any errors in the exercise of discretion in resolving those issues are subject to appellate review. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Circuit Justice. This application comes before me as Circuit Justice for a stay of the District Judge’s order setting trial for September 30, 1974, of United States v. Mitchell, D. C. Crim. No. 74-110. Defendant Ehrlichman seeks this stay alleging that past and continuing prejudicial publicity has made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial in this venue at the time now set, and that he will not have sufficient time to prepare his defense. The trial had been set for September 9, 1974. When both the prosecution and defense asked for more time to prepare for trial the District Court denied the requests, and applicant, inter alia, petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to delay the trial. That court, sitting en banc, did not rule directly on the petition, EHRLICHMAN v. SIRICA 1311 1310 Opinion in Chambers but instead remanded and recommended that the District Judge consider delaying the trial three or four weeks so all parties would have more time to prepare; one judge based his concurrence on prejudicial publicity as well. The District Judge then ordered the trial to be deferred for three wreeks from September 9, 1974. The present application is presented to me, as Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit, to delay the start of the trial until January 1975. The application puts forth the same reasons as were before the Court of Appeals. The United States has filed a response opposing any further delay. The function of a Circuit Justice in these circumstances is limited. It does not ordinarily encompass overseeing pretrial orders in pending criminal prosecutions. Such matters are essentially within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge who must be presumed to be intimately aware of the case at hand and other factors which bear upon the relief sought. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919); Goldsby v. United States, 160 U. S. 70 (1895); Isaacs v. United States, 159 U. S. 487 (1895). The limited power of a court of appeals, whether by way of mandamus or in its supervisory function over trial courts, must be looked to as the primary source of relief since such courts are in closer touch with the facts and factors presented in the workings of the regular activities of the district courts within a circuit. Here the Court of Appeals has denied mandamus relief, but exercised something in the nature of a de facto supervisory function by remanding the issue to the District Court with intimations that some delay would be appropriate. It is only a coincidence that the location of this trial is in the same city as the seat of this Court, giving Members of this Court essentially the same ex 1312 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion in Chambers 419 U. S. posure as that of the trial judge and the Court of Appeals to the pretrial publicity which forms a partial basis for the relief requested. Except for cases coming from the District of Columbia Circuit, a Justice of this Court is ordinarily far removed from the setting of the trial. General principles about the function of a Circuit Justice in a situation of this kind are not to be formed from such a unique setting. An individual Circuit Justice does not possess the supervisory powers of a court of appeals concerning the activities of the district courts within its circuit. One course open in this setting and in light of the gravity of the claim of prejudicial pretrial publicity would be to refer this application to the full Court for action at the opening of the October 1974 Term on October 7. However, this in itself w’ould defer starting of the trial to at least sometime in the latter half of October since neither party would be expected to go to trial immediately following this Court’s action. To follow this course would have the operative effect of an additional stay of three or four weeks, assuming denial of the relief requested. The responsibility for passing on a claim for change of venue or delay in a trial because of prejudicial pretrial publicity calls for the exercise of the highest order of sound judicial discretion by the District Court. Doubts about the correctness of a district court decision fixing a trial date in these circumstances, particularly after the Court of Appeals has reviewed the matter and denied an application for mandamus, are not sufficient to form a basis for contrary action by an individual Circuit Justice. The District Court bears responsibility commensurate with its authority in such matters, and only in the most extraordinary circumstances should an individual Circuit Justice intervene. EHRLICHMAN v. SIRICA 1313 1310 Opinion in Chambers The application for a stay is therefore denied, but this action is not to be taken as intimating any view whatever on the issues presented by the order of the District Court or the action of the Court of Appeals. The resolution of these issues should they arise after verdict must await the normal appellate processes. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 362 (1966). Application denied. 1314 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion in Chambers 419 U. S. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY v. ATTORNEY GENERAL ON APPLICATION FOR STAY No. A-534. Decided December 27, 1974 Applicants, the Socialist Workers Party, its youth organization (YSA), and various individuals, brought an action against various Government officials for alleged interference in their political activities and sought an injunction, which the District Court granted, barring FBI agents and informants from attending or otherwise monitoring the YSA national convention. Except for upholding a bar against the FBI’s transmitting to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) the names of persons attending the convention, the Court of Appeals vacated the injunction, noting that the convention was open to anyone under age 29 and that the only investigative method would be the use of informants who would attend meetings as the public would and that any “chilling effect” on applicants’ rights was not sufficient to outweigh prejudice to the Government that compromising its informants would entail. Applicants apply for a stay of the Court of Appeals’ order and reinstatement of the District Court’s injunction. Held: Although, unlike the situation in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, applicants’ allegations of a “chilling effect” are sufficiently specific to satisfy Art. Ill’s jurisdictional requirements, nevertheless a stay would be improper, sinc^fthe FBI has represented that it plans no disruptive activity at the convention and will not transmit information to nongovernmental entities, and since interim relief against disclosure of delegates’ names to the CSC has been granted. Mr. Justice Marshall, Circuit Justice. This case is before me on an application to stay an order entered by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, vacating in part an order of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court had granted a preliminary injunction against the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY' A* ATT’Y GENERAL 1315 1314 Opinion in Chambers others, barring Government agents and informants from attending or otherwise monitoring the national convention of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), to be held in St. Louis, Mo., between December 28, 1974, and January 1, 1975. Applicants also seek to have the injunction of the District Court reinstated in full. Applicants, the Socialist Workers Party, the YSA—the party’s youth organization—and several individuals, originally brought this action against various Government officials, seeking injunctive and monetary relief for alleged governmental interference in the political activities of the two organizations. In the course of preparing for trial on the merits, the applicants apparently learned that the FBI planned to monitor the YSA national convention and to use confidential informants to gain information about convention activities. They sought to enjoin the FBI, its agents, and its informants from “attending, surveilling [sic], listening to, watching, or otherwise monitoring,” the convention. After several hearings, the District Court granted the injunction in the form requested by the plaintiffs. On an expedited appeal,1 the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s injunction in all respects except one: it barred the FBI from transmitting the names of persons attending the convention to the Civil Service Commission pending final determination of the action. For the reasons stated below, I have concluded that on the facts of this case, the extraordinary relief of a stay is not warranted. 1 Applicants object to the Court of Appeals’ treatment of the case as an appeal, after initially setting it as a motion for a stay. When the time is as short as it was in this case, of course, the difference between the two is very slight. The court’s determination that the District Court abused its discretion in ordering the injunction would appear to meet the standard of review for either a stay or the reversal of a preliminary injunction, 1316 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion in Chambers 419 U. S. I The applicants argue that a stay is necessary to protect the First Amendment speech and association rights of those planning to attend the YSA convention. Surveillance and other forms of monitoring, they claim, will chill free participation and debate, and may even discourage some from attending the convention altogether. Beyond this, the applicants allege that the FBI has admitted that its agents or informants “intend to participate in the convention debate posing as bona fide YSA members.”2 This “double agent” activity, the applicants claim, will result in “corruption of the democratic process” and consequent irreparable harm to the applicants and others who would participate in the convention. The applicants further assert that granting the relief requested here wall not result in injury to the FBI. The fact that the FBI has a duty to keep itself informed concerning the possible commission of crimes, applicants say, does not justify its permitting informants and agents to participate in the convention, since the YSA has not been shown to have engaged in illegal activities. They further claim that the risk that FBI informants will become identifiable by their nonattendance at the convention is not sufficient to support the Court of Appeals’ 2 Applicants argue that this admission, made after the District Court’s decision, significantly alters the balance of the equities in this case. However, the Government has represented that no FBI agents will attend the convention and that the informants who are members of the YSA will participate in the convention only in a manner consistent with their previous roles in the organization. The Government assured both the Court of Appeals and me that the FBI has authorized no disruptive activity at the YSA convention. To require informants who may be active members of the organization to remain silent throughout the convention would render them as readily identifiable in some cases as an order excluding them. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY v. ATTY GENERAL 1317 1314 Opinion in Chambers order. While the applicants’ allegations evoke an unsavory picture of deceit and political sabotage, the facts as characterized by the Court of Appeals suggest a less sinister view of the Government’s planned activities at the convention. The court noted that the convention would be open to anyone under the age of 29 ; that anyone could register; that even the “delegated” sessions would be open to anyone registered at the convention ; that the Government planned no electronic surveillance or disruptive activity; and that the only investigative method would be the use of informants who would attend the meetings just as any member of the public would be permitted to do. The Court of Appeals held that on the facts of this case, the chilling effect on attendance and participation at the convention was not sufficient to outweigh the serious prejudice to the Government of permanently compromising some or all of its informants. The 11th-hour grant or denial of injunctive relief would not be likely to have a significant effect on attendance at the convention, the court stated, and since the convention is to be open to the public and the press, the use of informants to gather information would not appear to increase appreciably the “chill” on free debate at the convention. In weighing the nature of the planned investigative activity, the justification for that activity, and the claimed First Amendment infringement in this case, the Court of Appeals determined that the balance of the equities tipped in favor of the Government and that a preliminary injunction was therefore improper. II This case presents a difficult threshold question— whether the applicants have raised a justiciable controversy under this Court’s decision in Laird v. Tatum, 408 1318 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 419 U.S. Opinion in Chambers U. S. 1 (1972). In Laird, the plaintiffs protested surveillance activities by the Army that were in many ways similar to those planned by the FBI in this case. The Court held, however, that the plaintiffs’ claim that the Army’s surveillance activities had a general chilling effect on them was not sufficient to establish a case or controversy under Art. Ill of the Constitution. The Government has contended that under Laird, a “chilling effect” will not give rise to a justiciable controversy unless the challenged exercise of governmental power is “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,” and the complainant is either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he is challenging. Id., at 11. In my view, the Government reads Laird too broadly. In the passage relied upon by the Government, the Court was merely distinguishing earlier cases, not setting out a rule for determining whether an action is justiciable or not. More apposite is the Court’s observation in Laird that the respondents’ claim was “that they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the Army needs and that the very existence of the Army’s data-gathering system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment rights.” Id., at 13. Because the “chilling effect” alleged by respondents in Laird arose from their distaste for the Army’s assumption of a role in civilian affairs or from their apprehension that the Army might at some future date “misuse the information in some way that would cause direct harm to [them],” ibid., the Court held the “chilling effect” allegations insufficient to establish a case or controversy. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY v. ATT’Y GENERAL 1319 1314 Opinion in Chambers In this case, the allegations are much more specific: the applicants have complained that the challenged investigative activity will have the concrete effects of dissuading some YSA delegates from participating actively in the convention and leading to possible loss of employment for those who are identified as being in attendance. Whether the claimed “chill” is substantial or not is still subject to question, but that is a matter to be reached on the merits, not as a threshold jurisdictional question. The specificity of the injury claimed by the applicants is sufficient, under Laird, to satisfy the requirements of Art. III. Ill Although the applicants have established jurisdiction, they have not, in my view, made out a compelling case on the merits. I cannot agree that the Government’s proposed conduct in this case calls for a stay, which, given the short life remaining to this controversy, would amount to an outright reversal of the Court of Appeals. It is true that governmental surveillance and infiltration cannot in any context be taken lightly. The dangers inherent in undercover investigation are even more pronounced when the investigative activity threatens to dampen the exercise of First Amendment rights. See DeGregory v. New Hamp. Atty. Gen., 383 U. S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U. S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 F. S. 449 (1958). But our abhorrence for abuses of governmental investigative authority cannot be permitted to lead to an indiscriminate willingness to enjoin undercover investigation of any nature, whenever a countervailing First Amendment claim is raised. In this case, the Court of Appeals has analyzed the competing interests at some length, and its analysis seems to me to compel denial of relief. As the court 1320 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion in Chambers 419 U. S. pointed out, the nature of the proposed monitoring is limited, the conduct is entirely legal, and if relief were granted, the potential injury to the FBI’s continuing investigative efforts would be apparent. Moreover, as to the threat of disclosure of names to the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeals has already granted interim relief. On these facts, I am reluctant to upset the judgment of the Court of Appeals.3 As noted above, the Government has stated that it has not authorized any disruptive activity at the convention. In addition, the Government has represented that it has no intention of transmitting any information obtained at the convention to nongovernmental entities such as schools or employers. I shall hold the Government to both representations as a condition of this order. Accordingly, the application to stay the order of the Court of Appeals and to reinstate the injunction entered by the District Court is Denied. 3 This is especially true where, as here, the matter before me involves a preliminary injunction granted without- a full hearing on the merits. Much of the information before me is in dispute. The denial of the stay in this case in no way affects the outcome of the case on the merits, which was filed in 1973 and is still pending in the District Court. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. BRENNAN 1321 Opinion in Chambers NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES et al. v. BRENNAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR ON APPLICATION FOR STAY No. A-553. Decided December 31, 1974 Applicant, States, municipalities, and others, which have brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, request, inter alia, a stay of provisions that go into effect January 1, 1975, following the District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction and dismissal of the complaint, which the court characterized as involving “a difficult and substantial question of law.” In view of various factors, including that court’s concern, the pervasive impact of its*judgment on all state and municipal governments, and the brevity of time, an order is entered granting the requested relief until the application can be presented to the full Court at the earliest convenient date. Sec: 406 F. Supp. ¿26. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Circuit Justice. This matter came to me as an individual Circuit Justice for the District of Columbia Circuit after the close of regular business hours of this Court on Tuesday, December 31, 1974, on a motion of the above-named applicants, States and municipalities, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors’ Conference. The application of said parties requests a stay of those parts of the 1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq., which go into effect January 1, 1975, a stay of the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, 29 CFR Part 553, 39 Fed. Reg. 44142, Employees of Public Agencies Engaged in Fire Protection or Law Enforcement Activities, including security personnel in correctional institutions of said States and municipalities, and an injunction against enforcement by 1322 OCTOBER TERM, 1974 Opinion in Chambers 419 U. S. the Secretary of Labor, or by any other person in any federal court, to enforce parts of the said 1974 Amendments to the above-described Act, which went into effect May 1, 1974. The above-entitled case was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on December 12, 1974. A three-judge District Court was convened and on Monday, December 30, 1974, heard arguments on plaintiffs’ and plaintiff intervenors’ (all of whom, except for plaintiff intervenor State of California, are applicants on this application) application for a preliminary injunction. Earlier today an order was entered, denying a preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled action. The three-judge District Court in denying the relief on the day after it heard arguments expressed the view that the complaint raised “a difficult and substantial question of law” but concluded that it was bound by this Court’s holding in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). In light of the pervasive impact of the judgment of the District Court on every state and municipal government in the United States, the novelty of the legal questions presented, the expressed concern of the District Court as to the substantiality of the constitutional questions raised, the brevity of time available to the District Court and to me as Circuit Justice, and the extent and nature of the injury to the applicants, it is not appropriate to take final action as an individual Justice. Against this background, and balancing the injury to the contemplated enforcement of the regulations by the Secretary, against the injury to the applicants if they are ultimately successful, and sharing the doubts and concerns articulated by the District Court, I am not prepared—less than five hours before the regulations of the NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. BRENNAN 1323 1321 Opinion in Chambers Secretary become effective—to do more than enter an interim order granting the relief prayed for until the application can be presented to the full Court at the earliest convenient date. At that time the entire matter can be considered with the benefit of a response from the Solicitor General on behalf of the Secretary. Accordingly, an order will be entered forthwith, granting the relief prayed for until further order of the Court and referring the application to the full Court. The Solicitor General has been directed to file any response he desires to make on or before Wednesday, January 8, 1975. INDEX ACCESS TO COURTS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; III, 1; IV. ACQUISITIONS. See Antitrust Acts, 1, 3; Procedure, 1. ACTIVITIES AFFECTING COMMERCE. See Federal-State Relations. “ACTUAL MALICE” STANDARD. See Procedure, 5. ADEQUATE REMEDIES. See Justiciability; Tucker Act, 2. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION. See Immigration and Nationality Act. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. See Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review; National Labor Relations Act, 1; Procedure, 1. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. See Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review. ADVISING CLIENT NOT TO PRODUCE SUBPOENAED MATERIAL. See Contempt. AEROSPACE FASTENERS. See Constitutional Law, II, 4; III, 6. AGENCY. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 2. AGREEMENTS TO DROP INDICTMENT COUNTS. See Procedure, 4. ALABAMA. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. ALIEN COMMUTERS. See Immigration and Nationality Act. AMERICAN SEAMEN. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT. See Internal Revenue Code. ANTITRUST ACTS. Seé 'also Procedure, 1. 1. Clayton Act—“Effects on commerce” theory—Want of proof.—• “Effects on commerce” theory, whereby §§ 3 and 7 of Clayton Act 1325 1326 INDEX ANTITRUST ACTS—Continued. would be held to extend to acquisitions and sales having substantial effects on commerce, even if legally correct, fails here for want of proof, since respondents presented no evidence of effect on interstate commerce from use of asphaltic concrete in interstate highways. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., p. 186. 2. Robinson-Patman Act—Local activities.—In face of longstanding judicial interpretation of language of § 2 (a) of Clayton Act, as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, requiring that “either or any of the purchases involved in such [price] discrimination [be] in commerce,” as meaning that § 2 (a) applies only where “at least one of the two transactions which, when compared, generate a discrimination . . . cross[es] a state line,” and continued congressional silence on subject, this Court is not warranted in extending § 2 (a) beyond its clear language to reach a multitude of local activities hitherto left to state and local regulation. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., p. 186. 3. Robinson-Patman and Clayton Acts—Material used in interstate highways—“Effects on commerce” theory.—“In commerce” language of § 2 (a) of Clayton Act, as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, and of §§ 3 and 7 of Clayton Act does not extend on an “effects on commerce” theory to petitioners’ sales and acquisitions with respect to a material sold for use in constructing interstate highways» Gulf Oil Corp. v. Cqpp Paving Co., p. 186. 4. Robinson-Patman and Clayton Acts—Material used in interstate highways—“In commerce.”—Fact that interstate highways are instrumentalities of commerce does not render petitioners’ conduct with respect to a material sold for use in constructing these highways “in commerce” as a matter of law for purposes of § 2 (a) of Clayton Act, as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, and §§ 3 and 7 of Clayton Act. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., p. 186. APPEALS. See also Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review; Jurisdiction; Procedure, 5. 1. Motoi carrier—Certificate of public convenience and necessity— Conformity to authority sought—Remand.—Whether or not certificate of public convenience and necessity granted an appellant by Interstate Commerce Commission and erroneously set aside by District Court ^conformed to authority set forth in company’s application, an issue not briefed or argued in this Court, should be considered by District Court on remand. Bowman Transp. v. Ark.-Best Freight System, p. 281. 2. Three-judge district court—Denial of injunctive relief—Court INDEX 1327 APPEALS—Continued. of appeals—Standing to sue.—When a three-judge district court denies plaintiff injunctive relief on grounds that, if sound, would have justified dissolution of court as to that plaintiff or a refusal to convene a three-judge court to begin with, review of denial is available in Murt of appeals; and since here three-judge District Court’s deoision that complaint attacking constitutionality of Illinois automobile repossession and resale statutes was nonjusticiable for lack of “standing” was a ground upon which that court could have dissolved itself, leaving complaint’s disposition to single judge, Court of Appeals should determine *WRiding” issue, which this Court has no jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 to consider. Gonzalez v. Employees Credit Union, p. 90. 3. Three-judge District Court—Unconstitutionality oj state unemployment compensation procedures—Intervening changes in law.-— Judgment of three-judge District Court holding that Connecticut “seated interview” procedures for assessing continuing eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits violated due process is vacated and ca^se is remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening changes in Connecticut law. Fusari v. Steinberg, p. 379. “ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS’’ STANDARD OF REVIEW. Sea Judicial Review, 1. ARMED FORCES. See Constitutional Law, III, 2; V. ASPHALTIC CONCRETE, fee Antitrust Acts, 1, 3-4. ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS. See Elections; Stays, 4. ATTORNEYS. See Contempt. AUTHORIZATION CARDS. See National Labor Relations Act, 2. AUTOMOBILES. See Appeals, 2; Federal Employers’ Liability Act. BANK ACCOUNTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 7. BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT. See Procedure, 1. BANK MERGER ACT. See Procedure, 1. BANKRUPTCY ACT. See also Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act. 1. Priority wage claims—Trustee’s obligation to withhold taxis.— A trustee in bankruptcy for an employer is required by withholding provisions of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and similar provisions of New York City Administrative Code to withhold taxes from payment of priority claims for wages earned by employees 1328 INDEX BANKRUPTCY ACT—Continued. prior to employer’s bankruptcy, but unpaid at inception of bankruptcy proceeding. Otte v. United States, p. 43. 2. Priority wage claims—Withholding taxes—Necessity for proofs of claim.—Proofs of claim by United States and New York City with respect to withholding taxes on priority wage claims of employees of bankrupt employer are not required. Since tax liability accrues only when wage is paid, and since wages subject to wage claims here, although earned before bankruptcy, were not paid prior thereto, so that bankrupt employer’s tax liability came into being only during bankruptcy, the taxes are not like debts of bankruptcy for which proofs of claim must be filed. Otte v. United .Strifes, p. 43. 3. Priority wage claims—Withholding-tax returns—Burden on estate.—Requiring trustee in bankruptcy for employer to withhold federal and New York City taxes from payment of priority claims for wages earned by employees prior to employer’s bankruptcy, but unpaid at inception of bankruptcy proceedings, and to report and file returns does not unduly burden administration of bankrupt estates «o as to contravene spirit of Act, for burden is same as any employer, or receiver, arrangement debtor, or other fiduciary, with a like number of employees must bear; moreover, both Internal Revenue Code and New York City Administrative Code allow trustee to withhold taxes at a flat rate, thus facilitating tax computation. Otte v. United States, p. 43. 4. Priority wage claims—Withholding-tax returns and reports.— From obligation of trustee in bankruptcy for employer to withhold taxes from payment of priority claims for wages earned by employees prior to employer’s bankruptcy, but unpaid at inception of bankruptcy proceeding, it follows that trustee is also required to prepare and submit to wage claimants and to taxing authorities reports and returns required of employers under §§ 6051 (a)^ 6001, and 6011 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and similar provisions of New York City Administrative Code. Otte v. United States, p. 43. 5. Withholding taxes—Second priority.-—Federal and city withholding taxes arc entitled, as are priority wage claims from which they emergej/to second priority of payment under § 64a (2) of Act. Such taxes are not within fourth priority under §64a(4), since they did not become due and owing by bankrupt but only after wage claims were paid following bankruptcy. Nor are such taxes entitled to first priority under §64a(l), since they are not costs or expenses of administration of bankrupt estate, but are part of INDEX 1329 BANKRUPTCY ACT—Continued. wage ciaiws. themselves and are carved out of payment of those claims. Otte v. United States, p. 43. BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, I. BANKS. See Procedure, 1. BARS. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. BURDEN OF ASKING FOR UNION ELECTION. See National Labor Relations Act, 2. BUSINESS AND OCCUPATION TAXES. See Constitutional Law, II, 4; III, 6. CALIFORNIA. *See Antitrust Acts. CANADA. See Immigration and Nationality Act. CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION. See Tucker Act, 2-3. CARD MAJORITY. See National Labor Relations Act, 2. CARRIERS. See Appeals, 1; Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review. CASE OR CONTROVERSY. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Justiciability; Mootness; Stays, 4. CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECES- SITY. See Appeals, 1 Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review. CERTIFICATES OF STATE APPELLATE COURT. U^e Jurisdiction. CHANGE OF VENUE. See Stays, 3. CHIEF WITNESSES. See Procedure, 4. CHILLING EFFECT. See Stays, 4. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871. State action—Electrib1 utility—Termination of service.—Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with respondent utility’s challenged termination of petitioner’s electric service for nonpayment allegedly without notice, hearings, and an opportunity to pay amounts _due, to make respondent’s conduct' attributable to State for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment in guit under Act, petitioner having shown no more than that respondent was a heavily regulated privately owned public utility with a partial monopoly and that it elected to terminate service in a manner that Pennsylvania ‘Utility Commission found permissible under state law. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison rCo., p. 345. 1330 INDEX CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES. See Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act, 2-3. CLAIMS FOR TAXES. See Bankruptcy Act, 1-3, 5. CLAIMS FOR WAGES. See Bankruptcy Act. CLASS ACTIONS. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Mootness. CLAYTON ACT. See Antitrust Acts; Procedure, 1. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING. See National Labor Relations Act, 2. COLUMBUS, OHIO. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. COMMERCE. See Antitrust Acts; Federal-State Relations. COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, II; ITT, 5-6; Jurisdiction. COMMERCE WITH INDIAN TRIBES. See Constitutional Law, IT, 2-3; ITT, 5. COMMON LAW OF PARDONS. Sec Constitutional Law, V. COMMON-LAW STANDARD OF MALICE. See Procedure, 5. COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE. See Constitutional Law, V. COMMUTERS. See Immigration and Nationality Act. COMPETITION. See Antitrust Acts. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY. See Procedure, 1. CONDEMNATION. See Justiciability; Tucker Act. CONDITIONAL COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE. See Constitutional Law, V. CONGRESS. See Constitutional Law, IT, 2-3. CONNECTICUT. See Appeals, 3. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS. See Internal Revenue Code. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION (CONRAIL). See Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability; Tucker Act. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Sce*'’also Appeals, 2-3; Civil Rights Act of 1871; Contempt; Elections; Federal-State Relations; Internal Revenue Code; Jurisdiction; Justiciability; Procedure, 3; Standing to Object; Stays, 2, 4; Tucker Act. I. Bankruptcy Clause. Uniformity requirement—Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act).—Rail Act does not contravene uniformity require- INDEX 1331 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. mcnt of Bankruptcy Clause. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, p. 102. II. Commerce Clause. 1. “Forward” contract for cotton—Refusal to enforce.—Mississippi Supreme Court’s refusal to enforce “forward” contract between appellaij» Tennessee cotton merchant and appellee Mississippi farmer on grounds that contract was wholly intrastat^ and that Mississippi courts could not be used to enforce contract as appellant was doing business in Slate without requisite certificate, contravened Commerce Cltwtse, since cotton in instant transaction, though to be delivered to appellant at local -warehouse, was to be there temporarily for sorting and classification for out-of-state shipment and was thus already in stream of interstate commerce. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, p. 20. 2. Regulation of liquor in Indian country.—Congress has authority under Art. I, § 8, of Constitution to regulate distribution of alcoholic beverages by establishments such as respondents’ bar, which was located on non-Indian land on outskirts of an unincorporated village within an Indian reservation. Such authority is adequate, even though land was held in fee by non-Indians and persons regulated were non-Indians. United States v. Mazurie, p. 544. 3. Regulation of liquor in Indian country—Delegation of authority.—Congress could validly delegate to an Indian reservation’s tribal council its authority under Art. I, § 8, of Constitution to regulate distribution of alcoholic beverages by establishments such as respondents’ bar, whreh was located on non-Indian land on outskirts of an unincorporated village within a reservation. Independent authority of Indian tribes over matters that affect, internal and social relations of tribal life is sufficient to protect Congress’ decision to vest in tribal councils this portion of its own authority <‘to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes” under Art. I, § 8. United States v. Mazurie, p. 544. 4. Washington business and occupation tax.—Washington’s business and occupation tax is not repugnant to Commerce Clause, appellant out-of-state manufacturer, upon whose unapportioned gross receipts from sale of aerospace, fasteners to its principal Washington customer tax was imposed, having made no showing of multiple taxation on its interstate business, tax being apportioned to activities taxed, all of which are intrastate. Standard Steel Co. v. Wash. Revenue Dept., p. 560. 1332 INDEX CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. III. Due Process. 1. Durational residency requirement—Divorce.—Iowa durational residency requirement for divorce does not violate Duer, Process .Clause of Fourteenth Amendment on asserted ground that it denies litigant opportunity to make individualized showing of bona fide residence and thus bars access to divorce courts. Even if appellant could make an individualized showing of physical presence plus intent tb remain, she would not be entitled to divorce, for Iowa requires not merely “domicile” in that sense, but residence in State for one year. Moreover, no total deprivation of access to divorce courts but only delay in such acc^ is involved here. Sosna v. Iowa, p. 393. 2. Male naval officers—Mandatory discharge.—Challenged legislative classification, whereby naval officer with more than nine years of active service, who failed for a second time to be selected for promotion, was subject to a mandatory discharge under 10 U. S. C. § 6382 (a), whereas if he had been a woman officer he would have been entitled under 10 U. S. C. § 6401 to 13 years of commissioned service before a mandatory discharge for want of promotion, is completely rational and does not violate Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment. Schlesinger v. Ballard, p. 498. 3. Suspension from school—Property and liba'ty rights.—Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property and liberty interest that qualify for protection under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Goss v. Lopez, p. 565. 4. Suspension from school—Required procedure.—Due process requires, in connection with public^chool student’s suspension of 10 days or less, that student be given oral or written notice of charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of evidence authorities have and an opportunity to present his version. Generally, notice and hearing should precede student’s removal from school, since hearing may almost immediately follow misconduct, but if prior notice and hearing are not feasible, as where student’s presence endangers persons or property or threatens disruption of academic process, thus justifying immediate removal from school, necessiry notice and hearing should follow as soon as practicable. Goss v. Lopez, p. 565. 5. of criminal statute—Introducing liquor into Indian country.—Title 18 U. S. C. § 1154, under which respondent bar operators were convicted of introducing spirituous beverages into Indian country, is not unconstitutionally vague. Given nature of INDEX 1333 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. bar’s location on non-Indian land on outskirts of an unincorporated village within Indian reservation and surrounding largely Indian population, statute was sufficient to advise respondents that their bar was not excepted from tribal regulation by virtue of being located in a non-Indian community. United States v. Mazurie, p. 544. 6. Washington business and occupation tax.—Imposition of Washington’s business and occupation tax on appellant out-of-state manufacturer’s unapportioned gross receipts from its safe of aerospace fasteners to its principal Washington customer, does not violate due processias measure of tax bears a relationship to benefits conferred on appellant by State.. -Standard ' Steel Cou y} Wash. Revenue Dept., p. 560. 7. Writ of garnishment—Lack of hearing.—Georgia statute permitting a writ of garnishment to be issued in pending suits on an affidavit of plaintiff or his attorney containing only conclusory allegations, prescribing filing of a bond as only method of dissolving garnishment, which deprives defendant of use of property in garnishee’s hands pending litigation, and making no provision for an early hearing, violates Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., p. 601. IV. Equal Protection of the Laws. Durational residency requirement—Divorce.—Iowa durational residency requirement for divorce is not unconstitutional on alleged ground that it establishes two crosses of persons and discriminates against those who have recently exercised their right to travel to Iowa. Appellant was not irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of what she sought, and such requirement may reasonably be justified on grounds of State’s interest in requiring those seeking divorce from its courts 4o be genuinely attached to State, as well a®of State’s desire to insulate its divorce decrees from likelihood of successful collateral attack. Sosna v. Iowa, p. 393. V. Executive Pardoning Power. Death sentence under Uniform Code of Military Justice—Commutation to life imprisonment.—Conditional commutation to life imprisonment, without possibility of parole;’ of petitioner’s death sentence for murder under Art. 118 of UCMJ, w* within President’s powers under Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, of Constitution to “grant Reprieved and Pardons for Offenses against the Unite# States.” Since pardoning power derives from Constitution alone, it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by any statute, including Art. 1334 INDEX CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. 118, and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, did not affect such conditional commutation of petitioner’s sentence. Schick v. Reed, p. 256. VI. First Amendment. Freedom of speech—Injunction against picketing.—Alabama courts’ action in enjoining picketing of foreign-flag ship by petitioner maritime unions which were protesting, as substandard, wages paid foreign crewmen who manned ship, violated no right conferred upon petitioners by First and Fourteenth Amendments, because that action is well within that “broad field in which a State, in enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy.” American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S. S. Assn., p. 215. VII. Sixth Amendment. Selection of jury—Exclusion of women.—Requirement that petit jury be selected from a representative cross section of community, which is fundamental to jury trial guaranteed by Sixth Amendment, is violated by systematic exclusion of women from jury panels, which in judicial district here involved amount to 53%, of citizens eligible for jury service. Taylor v. Louisiana, p. 522. CONTEMPT. Lawyer—Advice to client not to produce subpoenaed material— Fifth Amendment.—A lawyer is not subject to penalty of contempt for advising his client, during trial of a civil case, to refuse on Fifth Amendment grounds to produce material demanded by a subpoena duces tecum when lawyer believes in good faith that material may tend to incriminate his client. To hold otherwise would deny constitutional privilege against self-incrimination means of its own implementation, since when a witness is so advised advice becomes an integral part of protection accorded witness by Fifth Amendment. Mane's v. Meyers, p, 449. CONTRACTS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. CONVENTION DELEGATES. S^ Elections; Procedure, 2. “CONVEYANCE TAKING.’’ See Justiciability, 1; Tucker Act, 1, 3. CORPORATIONS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. INDEX 1335 COTTON FARMERS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. COTTON MERCHANTS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. COURT OF CLAIMS. See Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act. COURTS-MARTIAL. See Constitutional Law, V. COURTS OF APPEALS. See Appeals, 2. CREDENTIALS CONTESTS. See Elections; Procedure, 2. CRIMINAL LAW. See Constitutional Law, III, 5; V; VII; Procedure, 3-4; Standing to Object; Stays, 2-3. CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. DAILY ALIEN COMMUTERS. Seo Immigration and Nationality Act. DAMAGES. See Procedure, 5. DAMAGE TO REPUTATION. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. DEATH SENTENCES. See Constitutional Law, V. DELAY IN TRIAL. See Stays, 3. DELEGATES. See Elections; Procedure, 2. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. See Constitutional Law, II, 3. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION. See Elections; Procedure, 2. DEMOCRATIC PARTY GUIDELINES. See Elections; Procedure, 2. DENIAL OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. See Appeals, 2. DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4, 7. DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. DIRECT APPEALS. See Appeals, 2. DIRECTED VERDICTS. See Procedure, 5. DISCLOSURES BY PROSECUTION. See Procedure, 4. DISCRETION. See Stays, 3. DISCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. DISMISSALS. See Procedure, 1-2, 5. 1336 INDEX DISTRIBUTION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. DISTRICT COURTS. See Appeals; Judicial Review, 1; Stays, 1. DIVORCE. See Constitutional Law, III, if IV; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Mootness. DOING BUSINESS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. DOMESTIC RELATIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1; IV; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Mootness. DROPPING OF INDICTMENT COUNTS. See Procedure, 4. DUE PROCESS. See Appeals, 3; Civil Rights Act of 1871; Constitutional Law, III. DURATIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS. Sec Constitutional Law, III, lBlV; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Mootness. EARLY HEARINGS. See Constitutional Law, III, 7. "EFFECTS ON COMMERCE" THEORY. See Antitrust Acts, 1,3. ELECTIONS. See also Procedure, 2. National Party Convention—Selection of delegates—State system as against Party guidelines.—In selection of candidates for national office a National Party Convention serves-pervasive national interest, which is paramount to any intM^i of a State in protecting integrity of its electoral process, and Illinois Circuit Court erred in enjoining petitioners, who had been Selected by National Democratic Party Credentials Committe’e; from acting as Illinois delegates at 1972 National Convention, as against respondent rival delegates, who had been elected in state primary election, since such injunction abridged Sssociational rights of petitioners and their Party and Party's right to determine composition of its National Convention in accordance with Party standards. Cousins v. Wigoda, p. 477. ELECTRIC UTILITIES. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, ^ce Appeals, 3. EMINENT DOMAIN. See Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Bankruptcy Act, 1-4; Federal Employers’ Liability Act; National Labor Relations Act, 2. INDEX 1337 ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. ENGLISH COMMON LAW OF PARDONS. See Constitutional Law, V. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, Constitutional Law, in, 2; iv?; “EROSION TAKING.” See Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act, 2. EVIDENCE. See also Antitrust Acts, Unconstitutional Law, III, 4; Federal-State Relations; Privacy; Procedure, 5. Sufficiency—Question for statM courts.—Petitioner maritime unions’ contention that record in state action to enjoin petitioners’ picketing of foreign-flag ship protesting ’substandard wages paid foreign crewmen who manned ship, fails to support conclusion that there was a substantial question whether picketing constituted “wrongful interference’1* with business of respondenw^an association representing stevedores, and a shipper, is without merit. Question whHher evidence is sufficient to make out a cause of action created by state law and tried in s®ite courts is a matter for decision by those courts. American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S. S. Assn., p. 215. EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM JURIES. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. EXCLUSIVE-DEALING ARRANGEMENTS. See Antitrust Acts. EXECUTIVE PARDONING POWER. See Constitutional Law, V. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES. Sen Procedure, 3. FAILURE TO BE PROMOTED. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. FAIR CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT. See Stays, 1. FAIR TRIALS. See Stays, 2-3. “FALSE LIGHT” THEORY. See Privacy; Procedure, 5. FARMWORKERS. See. Immigration and Nationality Act. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Sec Stays, 4. FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT. 1. “While employed"—Lack of requirements.—District Court’s findings that petitioner employee of trucking company worked most of time on respondent railroad’s premises and that respondent’s employees,, were responsible for checking safety conditions on railroad cars showed only that two companies’ operations were closely re- 1338 INDEX FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT—Continued. latcd, not that respondent’s employees supervised operation of unloading automobiles from respondent’s railroad car to trucking company’s auto trailer, and consequently FELA’s “while employed” requirement remains unsatisfied even under proper te°t. Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., p. 318. 2. "Whil&£mployed”—Lack o/ requirements.—“While employed” language of FELA requires not only that. FELA plaintiff be an agent of rail carrier but carrier’s servant/' and here District Court erred in holding that petitioner['^mployee of trucking company (who according;,to court’s findings was neither a borrowed servant of respondent railroad nor a dual servant of respondent and trucking company) came within coverage of FELA, since those findings also did not establish a master-servant relationship between respondent and trucking company that would be necessary to render petitioner a subsarvant of railroad. Nor was District Court’s conclusion that respondent was “responsible” for operation of unloading automobiles from respondent’s railroad car to trucking company’s auto trailer tantamount to a finding that railroad controlled or had right to control physical conduct of trucking company employees like petitioner in unloading operation. Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co, p. 318. FEDERAL QUESTIONS. See Jurisdiction. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD. See Procedure, 1. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See^lso Mootness. Rule 23 (a)—Class action—Named representative—Protection of class.—Test of Rule 23 (a) that named representative in a class action “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” is met here in appellant’s class action challenging constitutionality of Iowa’s durational residency requirement for divorces, even though appellant had long since satisfied such requirement by time case reached this Court, where it is unlikely that segments of class represented would have interests conflicting with appellant’s, and interests of class have been competently urged at pach level of proceeding. Sosna v. Iowa, p. 393. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See also Antitrust Acts, 2; Constitutional Law, II, 1; VI; Elections; Evidence; Jurisdiction; Procedure, 3. Picketing of foreign ships—National Labor Relations Act—Nonpre-emption of state-court jurisdiction.—Jurisdiction of Alabama courts over action by respondents, an association representing stevedoring companies, and a shipper, seeking injunctive relief INDEX 1339 FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS—Continued. against picketing of foreign-flag ship by petitioner maritime unions which were protesting, as substandard, wages paid foreign crewmen who manned ship, was not pre-empted by NLRA. American Radio Assn. v. Mobile Si Assn., p. 215. FEMALE JURORS. See Constitutional Law, VII. FEMALE NAVAL OFFICERS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. FIFTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, III, 2; Contempt; Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act. FINAL SYSTEM PLAN. See Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability; Tucker Act. FIREMEN. See Stays, 1. FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VI; Elections; Internal Revenue Code; Stays, 2, 4. FOREIGN COMMERCE. See Federal-State Relations. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. FOREIGN-FLAG SHIPS. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. "FORWARD” CONTRACTS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Appeals, 3; Civil Rights Act of 1871; Constitutional Law, III, 1, 3-4, 7; IV; VI; VII; Elections; Standing to Object. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. See Elections; Stays, 4. FREEDOM OF RELIGION. See Internal Revenue Code. FREEDOM OF SPEECH. See Constitutional Law, VI; Stays, 4. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. See Stays, 2. GARNISHMENT. See Constitutional Law, III, 7. GEORGIA. See Constitutional Law, III, 7. GOOD-FAITH LEGAL ADVICE, fee Contempt. GOVERNMENTAL INFILTRATION OR SURVEILLANCE. See Stays, 4. "GREEN CARDS.” See Immigration and Nationality Act. GROSS RECEIPTS TAXES. See Constitutional Law, II, 4; III, 6. 1340 INDEX GUIDELINES. See Elections; Procedure, 2. HABEAS CORPUS. See Procedure, 3. HEARING EXAMINERS. See Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review. HEARINGS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4, 7. HIGHWAYS. See Antitrust Acts, 1, 3-4. “HOT PLANTS.’’ See Antitrust Acts, 3-4. ILLINOIS. See Elections; Procedure, 2. ILLINOIS COMMERCIAL CODE. See Appeals, 2. ILLINOIS MOTOR VEHICLE CODE. See Appeals, 2. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. Alien commuters—“Special immigrants.”—Alien commuters are immigrants who are ‘‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” and are '“returning from a temporary visit abroad” when they enter United' States, and this “special immigrant” classification is applicable to both daily and seasonal commuters. This has long been administrative construction of statute in context of aliem'com-muters, a factor which must be accorded great weight when, as here, Congress has considered subject and has not seen fit to alter administrative practice. Saxbe v. Bustos, p. 65. IMPARTIAL JURY TRIALS. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. INCOME TAXES. Sec Bankruptcy Act; Internal Revenue Code. “IN COMMERCE.’’ See Antitrust Acts, 2, 4. INDIAN COUNTRY. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. INDICTMENTS. .¡See Procedure, 4. INFORMANTS. See Stays, 4. INJUNCTIONS. See Appeals, 2; Constitutional Law, VI; Federal-State Relations; Internal Revenue Code. INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS. See Appeals, 2. INTERIM RELIEF. See Stays, 1. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. .^See also Bankruptcy Act. Anti-Injunction Act—Withholding—Conscientious objectors.—AntiInjunction Act, 26 U. S. C. § 7421 fa»), which prohibits suits, “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax,” bars injunctive relief on First Amendment grounds against withholding income taxes from portion of appellee conscientious INDEX 1341 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE—Continued. objectors’ wages deemed allocable to military expenditures; and since appellees concededly cannot show that Government would not prevail in a refund action, they do not qualify for judicial exception from § 7421 (a) under rules prescribed by Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U. S. 1. United States v. American Friends ServiciCom., p. 7. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. Sec Antitrust Acts, 1, 4; Constitutional Law, II, 1, 4; III, 6; Federal-State Relations; Jurisdiction. INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT. See Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. Seetalso Appeals, 1; Judicial Review. Motor carriers—Certificates of public convenience and necessity— ICC’s approach—Divergence from hearing examiners.—In granting appellant motor carriers’ applications for certificates' of public convenience and neaKssity over opposition of appellee competing carriers, ICC was entitled to take an approach, divergent from that of its hearing examiners, favoring added competition among carriers. Bowman Transp. v. Ark.-Best Freight System, p. 281. INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS. See Antitrust Acts, 1, 3-4. INTERVENING CHANGES IN LAW. See Appeals, 3. INTERVENING DECISIONS. See Constitutional Law, V; Procedure, 3. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. INTRASTATE COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, II, 1, 4; III, 6; Jurisdiction. INTRASTATE SALES. See Antitrust Acts. INVASION OF PRIVACY. See Privacy; Procedure, 5. IRREPARABLE INJURIES. See Constitutional Law, III, 7; Internal Revenue Code; Stays, 2. JUDICIAL DISCRETION. See Stays, 3. JUDICIAL REVIEW. See 'also Appeals, 1; Interstate Commerce Commission. 1. Interstate Commerce Commission order—Motor carriers— Certificated of public convenience and necessity.—District Court erred in refusing to enforcP ICCvs order authorizing issuance of 1342 INDEX JUDICIAL REVIEW—Continued. certificates of public convenience and necessity to appellant motor carriers on ground that ICC had acted arbitrarily in refusing to credit, certain evidence introduced by appellee competing carriers. Bowman Transp. v. Ark-Best Freight System, p. 281. 2. Lapse of time—Evidentiary hearings—Ultimate agency decision—Reopening of record.—Lapse of time between conclusion of evidentiary hearings on appellant motor carriers’ applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity and ultimate agency decision by Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing such certificates, does not justify a reviewing court’s requiring that record be reopened. Bowman Transp. v. Ark.-Best Freight System, p. 281. JURIES. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. JURISDICTION. See also Antitrust Acts; Appeals, 2; Constitutional Law, II, 1; Federal-State Relations. Supreme Court—Appeal—Decision below on federal question.— On appeal from Mississippi Supreme Court’s dismissal of appellant Tennessee cotton merchant’s suit against appellee Mississippi farmer for refusal to deliver cotton under a “forward” contract on grounds that contract was wholly intrastate and that Mississippi courts could not be used to enforce contract as appellant w'as doing business in State without requisites certificate, certificate executed by Chief Justice of Mississippi Supreme Court makes it' clear that federal question was raised and decided by that court on validity of state statute as applied to facts under Commerce Clause of Federal Constitution, and this ,Court has jurisdiction over appeal. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, p. 20. JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES. Sec National Labor Relations Act, 1. JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES. Seeg Constitutional Law, VII ; Standing to Object. JURY TRIALS. Seo Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. JUST COMPENSATION. See Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act. JUSTICIABILITY. See also Appeals, 2~ Constitutional Law, I; Stays, 4; Tucker Act. 1. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act)—“Conveyance taking” issues.—In action attacking constitutionality of Rail Act, certain basic “conveyance taking” issues are now ripe for adjudication. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, p. 102. INDEX 1343 JUSTICIABILITY—Continued. 2. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act)—“Erosion taking”—Availability of Ticker Act remedy.—In action attacking constitutionality of Rail Act, issue of availability of a Tucker Act remedy if Rail Act effects an “erosion taking1' is ripe for adjudication in view of distinct possibility that compelled continued rail operations bjilPenii Central, which in past several years has sustained great losses and is not ''reorganizable on an income basis within a reasonable time under § 77” of Bankruptcy Act, would injure plaintiffs below without any assurance before Final System Plan is implemented of their being compensated. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, p. 102. JUVENILE OFFENDERS. See Stays, 2. KNOWING FALSEHOODS. ¡¡gleg Privacy; Procedure, 5. LABOR. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations; National Labor Relations Act. LABOR REGULATIONS. See Stays, 1. LABOR UNIONS. See Constitutional Law, VE Evidence; Federal-State Relations; National Labor Relations Act. LACK OF HEARING OR NOTICE. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4, 7. LAWYERS. See Contempt. LESSENING OF COMPETITION. See Antitrust Acts. LIBERTY INTERESTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. LIFE IMPRISONMENT. See Constitutional Law, V. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See Procedure, 1. LIQUID ASPHALT. See Antitrust Acts, 1, 3-4. LIQUOR LICENSES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. LOUISIANA. See Stays, 2. MALE NAVAL OFFICERS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. MALICE. See Procedure, 5. MANDATORY DISCHARGES FOR WANT OF PROMOTION. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. MARITIME OPERATIONS. See Federal-State Relations. MARITIME UNIONS. .Ree Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. 1344 INDEX MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP. S* Federal Employers’ Liability Act. MATERIAL USED IN INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS. See Antitrust Acts, 1, 3-4. MEDIA COVERAGE OF CRIMINAL TRIALS. See Stays, 2-3. MEN NAVAL OFFICERS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. MERGERS. See Procedure, 1. MEXICO. See Immigration and Nationality Act. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. See Internal Revenue Code. MISCONDUCT OF STUDENTS. See Constitutional Law, HI, 3-4. MISSISSIPPI. See Constitutional Law, II, 1 ; Jurisdiction. MONITORING OF NATIONAL CONVENTION. See Stays, 4. MOOTNESS. See also Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Satisfaction of residency requirement for divorce.—Live controversy—Class action.—Fact that appellant had long since satisfied durational residency requirement for divorac in Iowa by time class action challenging constitutionality of such requirement reached this Court does not moot ease, since controversy remains very much alive for class of unnamed peiSons’^vhom she represents and who, upon certification of class action, acquired legal status separate from her asserted interest. Sosna v. Iowa., p. 393. MOTOR CARRIERS. See Appeals, 1 ; Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review. MOTOR VEHICLES. See Appeals, 2. MULTIPLE TAXATION. See Constitutional Law, II, 4; III, 6. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. See Stays, 1. MURDER. See Constitutional Law, V. NATIONAL CONVENTIONS. See Stays, 4. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. See Elections; Procedure, 2. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT. See also Constitutional Law, VI; Federal-State Relations. 1. Jurisdictional dispute—Unfair labor practice—§ 10 (k) determination—Applicability of §5 of Administrative Procedure Act.— Section 5 of APA, which prohibits commingling prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in agency proceedings, and generally applies to “every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined INDEX 1345 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT—Continued. on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” (§ 2 (d) of APA definingjiadjudicatjon” as “agency process for formulation of an order,” and “order” as “the whole or a part of a final disposition ... of an agcncV in a matter other than rule making”), does not govern proceedings conducted under § 10 (k) of NLRA. Section 10 (k) determination is not itself a “final disposition” within the meaning of “order” and “adjudication” in § 2 (d) of APA, nor is it “agency process for the formulation of an order” within meaning of § 2 (d). ITT v. Electrical Workers, p. 428. 2. Union’s majority status—Authorization cards—Refusal of recognition—National Labor Relations Board election procedure— Union’s burden.—An employer who has not engaged in an unfair labor practice impairing electoral proems does not commit a violation of §8 (a) (5) of NLRA simply because he refuses to accept evidence of union’s majority status other than results of NLRB election. At least in absence of any agreement, to permit majority status to be determined by means other than NLRB election, a union that is refused recognition despite authorization cards or other evidence purporting to show that it represents a majority of employees has burden of taking next step and invoking NLRB’s election procedure. Linden Lumber Division v. NLRB, p. 301. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. Sec Federal-State Relations; National Labor Relations Act. NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS. See Elections; Procedure, 2. NATIONAL RAIL CRISIS. See Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability; Tucker Act. NAVAL OFFICERS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. NEGLIGENCE. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act. NEW ORLEANS. See Stays, 2. NEWSPAPERS. Sce-Privacy; Procedure, iff; Stays, 2. NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. See Bankruptcy Act, 1-4. “NEXUS TO COMMERCE’’ THEORY. See Antitrust Acts. 1974 AMENDMENTS TO FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT. See Stays, 1. NON-INDIAN COMMUNITIES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. 1346 INDEX NONPAYMENT OF UTILITY BILLS. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. NOTICE. See Constitutional Law, HI, 3-4, 7. OHIO. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. PARDONS. See Constitutional Law, V. PAROLE. See Constitutional Law, V. PAYMENT OF WAGES. See Bankruptcy Act. PEACEFUL PICKETING. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. PENNSYLVANIA. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. PERSONAL INJURIES. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act. PETIT JURIES. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. PICKETING. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. POLICE. See Stays, 1. POLITICAL PARTIES. See Elections; Procedure, 2; Stays, 4. POWER TO COMMUTE SENTENCE. See Constitutional Law, V. PRE-EMPTION. See Federal-State Relations. PREPARATION FOR TRIAL. See Stays, 3. PRESIDENTIAL COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE. See Constitutional Law, V. PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS. See Elections; Procedure, 2. PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS. See Constitutional Law, V. PRETRIAL PUBLICITY. See Stays, 2-3. PRICE DISCRIMINATION. See Antitrust Acts, 2. PRIMARY ELECTIONS. See Elections. PRIOR HEARINGS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. PRIORITY OF TAX OR WAGE CLAIMS. See Bankruptcy Act, 5. PRIOR NOTICE. See. Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. PRIOR RESTRAINTS. See Stays, 2. INDEX 1347 PRISON SECURITY PERSONNEL. See Stays, 1. PRIVACY. jSee also Procedure, 5. Invasion of privacy—Newspaper story—SufficiMcy of evidence— Knowing or reckless falsehoods—Scope of reporter’s employment.— In petitioners’ diversity action against respondent newspaper publisher and reporter for invasion of privacy based on feature story in newspaper discussing impact upon petitioners’ family of father’s death in a bridge oollapse, evidence was sufficient to support jury finding that respondents had published knowing or reckless falsehoods about petitioners, particularly with respect to “calculated falsehoods” about petitioner mother’s being present when story was being prepared, and that respondent reporter’s writing of story was within scope of his employment at newspaper so as to render respondent publisher vicariously liable under respondeat superior for knowing falsehoods in story. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., p. 245. PRIVATE ACTION. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC UTILITIES. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. See Contempt. PROCEDURE. See also Appeals, 2-3. 1. Clayton Act suit—Bank acquisition—Stay.—Where Government’s Clayton Act sui^to enjoin appellee’s acquisition of banks was brought within 30 days after Federal Reserve Board’s approval of acquisition as required by Bank Holding Company Aoi, but before Comptroller of Currency had approved it its required by Bank Merger Act, District Court erred in dismissing suit without prejudice and ruling that Government should bring a new suit if and when Comptroller approved acquisition, but should stay suit until Comptroller acts. Such procedure will conserve judicial resources and fully protect both parties, and avoid possible prejudice to Government, which by being required to wait for Comptroller’s approval before filing suit would risk having complete relief barred by time limitation of Bank Holding Company Act. United States v. Michigan National Corp., p. 1. 2. Court of Appeals judgment—Supreme Court stay—Res judicata—Political convention credentials contest.—This Court’s per curiam, staying Court of Appeals judgment affirming District Court’s dismissal of action by purported Illinois delegate to 1972 Democratic “National Convention challenging constitutionality of Democratic Party® guidelines for selecting delegates, and granting Party’s counterclaim for injunction against Illinois state-court action 1348 INDEX PROCEDURE—Continued. to enjoin seating of rival delegates, unqualifiedly suspended operative effects of Court of Appeals judgment without resolving merits of controversy; and rival delegate^’ contention that this Court’s action in staying such judgment left it as a res judicata bar to injunction is not open for consideration, not having been pleaded and proved in state court as required by’ state law. Cousins v. Wigoda, p. 477. 3. Federal habeas •corpus—State courts’ opportunity to decide federal constitutional question—No resubmission.—Since‘fetare1 courts had a full opportunity to determine federal constitutional issue before petitioner resorted to federal forum in habeas corpus action filed after State Supreme Court held unconstitutional criminal statute challenged in federal action, no substantial state interest would be served by requiring petitioner to resubmit his constitutional claim to state courts. Francisco v. Gathright, p. 59. 4. Indictment—Dropping of counts against witness—Required disclosure.—Where Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting petitioner denied during trial that two counts of three-count indictment against Government’s chief witness involving'same events for which petitioner was convicted had been dropped in return for witness’ cooperation and |psjimony, but United States Attorney’s records indicated that Assistant had agreed to drop two founts in return for guilty plea to third count, Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming petitioner’s^enviction is vacated and case is remanded to that court so that if on basis of Government’s documentation it is unable to decide whether Assistant “failed to make any required disclosure,” it can remand rase to District Court for further proceedings. Ring v. United States, p. 18. 5. Setting aside verdict—Error—Privacy action.—Court of Appeals erred in setting aside jury’s verdict for compensatory damages in petitioners’ diversity action against respondent newspaper publisher and reporter for invasion of privacy based on a feature story in newspaper dismissing impact upon petitioners’ family of father’s death in a bridge collapse and Containing a number of inaccuracies and false statements about family. The record discloses that District Judge when he dismissed punitive damages claim was not referring to “actual malice” standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, but to common-law standard of malice that is generally required under state tort law to support punitive damages award and that in a “false light” case would focus on defendant’s attitude toward plaintiff’s privacy and not on truth or falsity of material published, and thus was not determining that INDEX 1349 PROCEDURE—Continued. petitioners had failed to introduce evidence of knowing falsity or reckless disregard of truth. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., p. 245. PROHIBITED PURPOSE OF PICKETING. See Constitutional Law, VI; Federal-State Relations. PROMOTIONS. Sec Constitutional Law, III, 2. PROOFS OF CLAIM. See Bankruptcy Act, 2. PROPERTY INTERESTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. PROPERTY RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3, 7. PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY. See Appeals, 1; Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review. PUBLIC POLICY. See Constitutional Law, VI; Federal-State Relations. PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. PUBLIC UTILITIES. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. PUNITIVE DAMAGES. See Procedure, 5. QUALIFICATIONS FOR DOING BUSINESS. See Constitutional Law, II, 1; Jurisdiction. RAIL ACT. See Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability; Tucker Act. RAILROADS. See Constitutional Law, I; Federal Employers’ Liability Act; Justiciability; Tucker Act. RATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. RECKLESS DISREGARD OF TRUTH. See Privacy; Procedure, 5. REFUND ACTIONS. See Internal Revenue Code. REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE UNION. See National Labor Relations Act, 2. REGIONAL RAIL REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1973. See Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability; Tucker Act. REGULATION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. REGULATION OF UTILITIES. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. REGULATIONS OF SECRETARY OF LABOR. Me Stays, 1. RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS. See Internal Revenue Code. 1350 INDEX REMAND. See Appeals, 1 ; Procedure, 4. REMEDIES. See Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act. REOPENING OF AGENCY PROCEEDINGS. See Judicial Review, 2. REORGANIZATIONS. See Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability; Tucker Act. REPORTERS. See Privacy; Procedure, 5. REPOSSESSION. See Appeals, 2. REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS. See National Labor Relations Act, 2. REPRESENTATIVE CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. REPUTATION OF STUDENTS. ( jSee Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. REQUIRED DISCLOSURES BY PROSECUTION. See Procedure, 4. RESALES. See Appeals, 2. RES JUDICATA. See Procedure, 2. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. See Privacy. RETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS. See Appeals, 2. RETROACTIVITY. See Constitutional Law, V. RIGHTS OF ASSOCIATION. See Elections; Stays, 4. RIGHTS TO EDUCATION. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. RIGHTS TO LIBERTY. See Constitutional Law, III, 3. RIGHTS TO PROPERTY. See Constitutional Law, III, 3, 7. RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL. See Stays, 2-3. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. RIGHT TO TRAVEL. See Constitutional Law, III, 1; IV. RIPENESS FOR ADJUDICATION. ^Justiciability. ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT. See Antitrust Acts, 2-4. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Mootness. SALES. Sec Antitrust Acts, 1, 3-4. SCHOOLS. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT. See Privacy. INDEX 1351 SCOPE OF REVIEW. See Judicial Review, 1. SEAMEN. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. SEASONAL ALIEN COMMUTERS. See Immigration and Nationality Act. “SEATED INTERVIEW’’ PROCEDURES. See Appeals, 3. SECONDARY BOYCOTTS. See Constitutional Law, VI; Federal- State Relations. SECURITY AGREEMENTS. See Appeals, 2. SELECTION FOR PROMOTION. Sec Constitutional Law, III, 2. SELECTION OF JURIES. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. SETTING ASIDE VERDICTS. See Procedure, 5. SEX DISCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law, III, 2; VII. SHERMAN ACT. See Antitrust Acts. SHIPPERS. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. SIXTH AMENDMENT. Sec Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES. See Bankruptcy Act. SPECIAL COURT. See Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability; Tucker Act. SPECIAL IMMIGRANTS. See Immigration and Nationality Act. SPIRITUOUS BEVERAGES. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3; III, 5. STANDARD FOR FELA LIABILITY. Ssc Federal Employers’ Liability Act. STANDING TO OBJECT. See also Constitutional Law, VII. Male criminal defendant—Challenge to jury-selection scheme— Exclusion of women.—Appellant, a convicted male criminal defendant, had standing to make claim that state jury-selection scheme whereby women were systematiadly excluded from jury panels is unconstitutional, there being no rule that awh a claim may be asserted only by defendants who arc members of group excluded from jury service. Taylor v. Louisiana, p. 522. STANDING TO SUE. Sec Appeals, 2. STATE ACTION. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. 1352 INDEX STATE COURTS. See* Constitutional Law, II, 1; III, 1; IV; VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations; Procedure, 3. STATE EMPLOYEES, See Stays, 1. STATE REGULATION OF UTILITIES. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. STATE TAXES. See Constitutional Law, II, 4; III, 6. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. See Procedure, 1. STAYS. See also Procedure, 1-2. 1. Fair Labor Standards Act—1974 Amendments.—In view of various factors, including concern of District Court, which, while dismissing applicants’ complaint challenging constitutionality of 1974 Amendments to FLSA, characterized it as involving “a difficult and substantial question of law,” pervasive impact of that court’s judgment on all state and municipal governments, and brevity of time, an order is entered granting stay of provisions that go into effect January 1, 1975, until application can be presented to full Court at earliest convenient date. National League of Citre* v. Brennan (Burger, C. J., in chambers), p. 1321. 2. Order restricting media coverage of criminal trials.—Application for stay of Louisiana trial court’s order restricting media coverage of trials of defendants accused of committing highly publicized rape and murder is granted, pending timely filing and disposition of petition for certiorari in this Court, where or®r imposed pervasive restraints of uncertain duration, and alternative meaiis for protecting defendants’ rights to fair trial appear to have been available to trial court. Times-Picayune Pub. Corp. v. Schulingkamp (Powell, J., in chambers), p. 1301. 3. Order setting criminal trial date.—Application for stay of District Court’s order setting applicant’s criminal trial date, on alleged grounds that pretrial publicity precluded applicant’s receiving fair trial in venue at time set and that he lacks sufficient time to prepare his defense, is denied. Responsibility for passing on claim for change of venue or delay in trial because of prejudicial pretrial publicity calls for' exercise of highest order of sound judicial discretion by District Court, and doubts about correctness of order, particularly after Court of Appeals has reviewed it and denied manda-mul, do not constitute sufficient basis for contrary action by individual Circuit Justice absent most extraordinary circumstances. Ehrlichman v. Sirica (Burger, C. J., in chambers) , p. 1310. 4. Order vacating injunction against FBI attendance at convention—Although applicants’ aWjLtions of a “chilling effect” if FBI INDEX 1353 STAYS—Continued. agents and informants were allowed to attend youth organization’s national convention are sufficiently specific to satisfy Art. Ill’s jurisdictional requirements, nevertheless a stay of Court of Appeals’ order vacating District Court’s injunction barring FBI agents and informants from attending or otherwise monitoring such convention would be improper, since FBI hwj represented that it plans no disruptive-activity at convention and will not transmit information to nongovernmental entities, and since interim relief against disclosure of delegates’'names to Civil Service Commission has been granted. Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General (Marshall, J., in chambers), p. 1314. STEVEDORES. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM. See Contempt. SUBSTANDARD WAGES. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. See Antitrust Acts, 1; Evidence; Privacy. SUPREME COURT. See also Appeals, 2; Jurisdiction. 1. Assignments of Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, pp. 954, 987. 2. Assignment of Mr. Justice'* Clark (retired) to tH? United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, p. 1061. 3. Assignments of Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to the United Stated Court of Appeals for the^Second Circuit, p. 1081. 4. Assignment of Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to the- United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, p. 1117. 5. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 1134. 6. Amendments, to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, p. 1136. SUSPENSIONS FROM SCHOOL. See Constitutional Law, III, 3-4. SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM JURIES. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE. See Justiciability, 2; Tucker Act. TAX CLAIMS. ^Bankruptcy Act, 2, 5. TAXES, gee Bankruptcy Act; Constitutional Law, II, 4; III, 6; Internal Revenue Code. 1354 INDEX TAX REFUND ACTIONS. See Internal Revenue Code. TAX REPORTS OR RETURNS. See Bankruptcy Act, 3-4. TEMPORARY SUSPENSIONS FROM SCHOOL. See Constitu- tional Law, III, 3-4. TERMINATION OF ELECTRIC SERVICE. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. THREE-JUDGE COURTS. See Appeals, 2-3. TIE-IN SALES. See Antitrust Acts, 1, 3-4. TIME LIMITATIONS. See Procedure, 1. TORTS. See Privacy; Procedure, 5. TRANSPORTATION. See Appeals, 1; Interstate Commerce Commission; Judicial Review. TRIAL BY JURY. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. TRIBAL REGULATION. See Constitutional Law, II, 2-3. TRUCKING COMPANIES. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act. TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY. See Bankruptcy Act. TUCKER ACT. See also Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability, 2. 1. Adequate remedy—Taking of railroad property—Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act).—Tucker Act guarantees an adequate remedy at law for any taking of railroad property that might occur as a result of final conveyance provisions of Rail Act. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, p. 102. 2. Remedy—Continuance of rail operations—“Erosion taking"— Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act).—Tucker Act remedy is not barred by Rail Act, but is available to provide just compensation for any “erosion taking” effected by Rail Act with respect to compelled continuation of rail operations by Penn Central pending Final System Plan’s implementation. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, p. 102. 3. Remedy—“Conveyance taking”—Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 (Rail Act).—For same reasons as obtained with respect to “erosion taking” issue, a suit in Court of Claims is available under Tucker Act for a cash award to cover any shortfall between consideration that railroads receive for their rail properties finally conveyed under Rail Act and constitutional minimum. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, p. 102. INDEX 1355 UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS. See Stays, 4. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. See Appeals, 3. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES. See Federal-State Relations; National Labor Relations Act. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. See Constitutional Law, V. UNIFORMITY REQUIREMENT OF BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, I. UNION ELECTIONS. See National Labor Relations Act, 2. UNIONS. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations; National Labor Relations Act. UNITED STATES NAVY. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. UNITED STATES RAILWAY ASSOCIATION. See Constitutional Law, I; Justiciability; Tucker Act. UNLOADING OPERATIONS. J® Federal Employers’ Liability Act. UTILITIES. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. VAGUENESS. See Constitutional Law, III, 5. VENIRES. See Constitutional Law, VII; Standing to Object. VENUE. See Stays, 3. VERDICTS. See Procedure, 5. VICARIOUS LIABILITY. See Privacy. WAGE CLAIMS. See Bankruptcy Act. WAGES. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. WANT OF PROOF. See Antitrust Acts, 1; Evidence; Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 1. WASHINGTON. See Constitutional Law, II, 4; III, 6. “WHILE EMPLOYED’’ REQUIREMENT OF FELA. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act. WITHHOLDING TAXES. See Bankruptcy Act; Internal Revenue Code. WITNESSES. See Procedure, 4. WOMEN NAVAL OFFICERS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. 1356 INDEX WORDS AND PHRASES. 1. “Agency process for the formulation of an order.” § 2 (d), Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §551 (7). ITT v. Electrical Workers, p. 428. 2. “Engaged in or affecting commerce.” §§2(6) and (7), National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (6) and (J). American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S. S. Assn., p. 215. 3. “Final disposition.” §2(d), Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551 (6). ITT v. Electrical Workers, p. 428. 4. “In commerce.” §2 (a), Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13; §§ 3, 7*, Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 14, 18. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., p. 186. 5. “Lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (27) (B) (Immigration and Nationality Act). Saxbe v. Bustos, p. 65. 6. “Payment of wages.” § 3402 (a), Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 if. S. C. § 3402 (a). Otte v. United States, p. 43. 7. “Returning from temporary visit abroad.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a)(27)(B) (Immigration and Nationality Act). Saxbe v. Bustos, p. 65. 8. “Wages.” §3102 (a), Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 3102 (a). Otte v. United States, p. 43. 9. “While . . . employed.” 45 U. S. C. § 51 (Federal Employers’ Liability Act). Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., p. 318. WRIT OF GARNISHMENT. See Constitutional Law, III, 7. WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS. See Constitutional Law, VI; Evidence; Federal-State Relations. YOUTH SOCIALIST ALLIANCE. See Stays, 4.