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ABORTIONS. See also **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

1. *First trimester of pregnancy—Decision to abort.*—For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician; the State may define the term "physician" to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined. *Roe v. Wade*, p. 113.

2. *Right to abortions.*—A woman's constitutional right to an abortion is not absolute. *Doe v. Bolton*, p. 179.

3. *Second trimester—Maternal health—Viability—Potentiality of human life.*—For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. *Roe v. Wade*, p. 113.

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Commerce Act that “[t]he Commission may, after hearing . . . establish reasonable rules . . .” did not trigger §§ 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act requiring a trial-type hearing and the presentation of oral argument by the affected parties; and the ICC’s proceeding was governed only by § 553 of the APA requiring notice prior to rulemaking. *United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.*, 406 U. S. 742. *United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co.*, p. 224.

2. *Rulemaking procedure—Consultation with affected parties—No adversary trial.*—The “after hearing” language of § 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act does not by itself confer upon interested parties either the right to present evidence orally and to cross-examine opposing witnesses, or the right to present oral argument to the agency’s decisionmaker. *United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co.*, p. 224.

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1. *Electric utility company—Contracts with other suppliers—Restrictive provisions.*—The record supports the District Court’s findings that Otter Tail—solely to prevent the municipal systems from eroding its monopolistic position—refused to sell power at wholesale or to wheel (transmit) it, and that Otter Tail to the same end invoked restrictive provisions in its contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation and other suppliers, the court correctly concluding that such provisions, *per se*, violated the Sherman Act. *Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States*, p. 366.

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2. *Electric utility company—Court order to transfer power from other source.*—The District Court's decree does not conflict with the regulatory responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission, for the court's order for wheeling power to correct Otter Tail's anticompetitive and monopolistic practices is not counter to the authority of the FPC, which lacks the power to impose such a requirement; and appellant's argument that the decree overrides FPC's power over interconnections is premature, there being no present conflict between the court's decree and any contrary ruling by the FPC. *Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States*, p. 366.

3. *Electric utility company—Municipal plant—Dilatory litigation.*—The District Court should determine on remand whether the litigation that Otter Tail was found to have instituted for the purpose of maintaining its monopolistic position was "a mere sham" within the meaning of *Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight*, 365 U. S. 127, so that the litigation would lose its constitutional protection in line with the Court's decision in *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, 404 U. S. 508, which was decided after the District Court had entered its decree. *Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States*, p. 366.

4. *Electric utility company—Municipal system—Refusal to sell power.*—Otter Tail is not insulated from antitrust regulation by reason of the Federal Power Act, whose legislative history manifests no purpose to make the antitrust laws inapplicable to power companies. The essential thrust of the authority of the Federal Power Commission is to encourage voluntary interconnections. Though the FPC may order interconnections if "necessary or appropriate in the public interest," antitrust considerations, though relevant under that standard, are not determinative. *Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States*, p. 366.

5. *Pooling of patents—Effect on market.*—In order to "pry open to competition" the market closed by the antitrust violations, an order for mandatory, nondiscriminatory sales to all bona fide applicants is appropriate relief, and where, as in this case, the manufacturer may choose not to make bulk-form sales, and the licensees are not bound by the court's order for mandatory sales, further relief in the form of reasonable-royalty licensing of the patents is also proper. *United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.*, p. 52.

6. *Pooling of patents—Limited sublicensing.*—Where patents are directly involved in antitrust violations and the Government presents a substantial case for relief in the form of restrictions on the patents, the Government may challenge the validity of the patents regardless

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of whether the owner relies on the patents in defending the antitrust action. *United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.*, p. 52.

7. *Regional brewer—Penetration of New England market—Acquisition of major local producer—On-the-fringe potential competitor.*—The District Court erred in assuming that, because respondent would not have entered the market *de novo*, it could not be considered a potential competitor. The court should have considered whether respondent was a potential competitor in the sense that its position on the edge of the market exerted a beneficial influence on the market's competitive conditions. *United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.*, p. 526.

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Class action—Direct appeal—Cross-appeals.—While 28 U. S. C. § 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclosed when the case is properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. *Roe v. Wade*, p. 113.

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1. *Border dispute—Ohio River—Long acquiescence.*—Ohio's long acquiescence in the location of the Ohio-Kentucky line at the northern edge of the Ohio River bars Ohio's present claim that the boundary is at the middle of the river. *Ohio v. Kentucky*, p. 641.

2. *Texas and Louisiana disputed area—Islands—Special Master's Report.*—Special Master's Report, to the extent that it recommends the relevant boundary be the geographic middle of Sabine Pass, Lake and River (collectively Sabine) and not the west bank or the middle of the main channel and that all islands in the east half of the Sabine when Louisiana was admitted as a State in 1812, or thereafter formed, should be awarded to Louisiana, is adopted; decision on the Report with respect to islands in the west half of the Sabine existing in 1812 or thereafter formed, is deferred pending further proceedings. *Texas v. Louisiana*, p. 702.

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CIVIL RIGHTS.

1. *Community swimming pool—Use by members and guests only—Exclusion of Negroes.*—Respondents' racially discriminatory membership policy violates 42 U. S. C. § 1982. The preferences for membership in Wheaton-Haven gave valuable property rights to white residents in the preference area that were not available to Negro vendees, and this case is therefore not significantly distinguishable from *Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.*, 396 U. S. 229. *Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn.*, p. 431.

2. *Membership club—Geographic preference area—Whites-only policy.*—Wheaton-Haven is not a private club within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 2000a (e), since membership, until the association reaches its full complement, "is open to every white person within the geographic area, there being no selective element other than race." Wheaton-Haven is thus not even arguably exempt by virtue of § 2000a (e) from 42 U. S. C. § 1981 or § 1982. *Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn.*, p. 431.

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State court's determination of voluntariness—Federal habeas corpus—Standards.—Trial judge's determination, on totality of circumstances, that respondent's confessions were voluntary, evidences that he correctly applied correct voluntariness standards and, since the District Court could have been reasonably certain that he would have granted relief if he had believed respondent's testimony, courts below erroneously concluded that the opinion of the trial court did not meet the requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d)(1). *LaVallee v. Delle Rose*, p. 690.
- CONFIDENTIAL PAPERS.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.

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I. Due Process.

1. *Criminal abortion laws—Legitimate state interests.*—State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health and the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at various stages of the woman's approach to term. *Roe v. Wade*, p. 113.

2. *Criminal trial—Denial of right of cross-examination.*—The application of the "voucher" rule, that a party may not impeach his own witness, prevented petitioner through cross-examination of that witness (McDonald) from exploring the circumstances of McDonald's three prior oral confessions and challenging his renunciation of the written confession, and thus deprived petitioner of the right to contradict testimony that was clearly "adverse." *Chambers v. Mississippi*, p. 284.

3. *Criminal trial—Exclusion of oral confessions of another.*—The trial court erred in excluding hearsay statements of another person (McDonald) which were critical to petitioner's defense and which bore substantial assurances of trustworthiness, including that each was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance, that each was corroborated by other evidence in the case, that each was in a real sense against McDonald's interest, and that McDonald was present and available for cross-examination by the State. *Chambers v. Mississippi*, p. 284.

4. *Fee for filing appeal—Increased welfare payments.*—Appellants were not deprived of due process by filing fee, which they were allegedly unable to pay, required for review by state appellate court of agency determination resulting in lower welfare payments, since the increase in welfare payments has less constitutional significance than the interest of appellants in *Boddie v. Connecticut*, 401 U. S.

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371, and since evidentiary hearings provided a procedure, not conditioned on payment of any fee, through which appellants were able to seek redress. *Ortwein v. Schwab*, p. 656.

5. *Georgia Criminal Code—Procedural conditions.*—The Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) accreditation requirement is an invalid violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the State has not shown that only hospitals (let alone those with JCAH accreditation) meet its interest in fully protecting the patient; and a hospital requirement failing to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy would be invalid on that ground alone, see *Roe v. Wade*, ante, p. 113. The interposition of a hospital committee on abortion, a procedure not applicable as a matter of state criminal law to other surgical situations, is unduly restrictive of the patient's rights, which are already safeguarded by her personal physician. Required acquiescence by two co-practitioners also has no rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on her physician's right to practice. *Doe v. Bolton*, p. 179.

6. *Incarcerated material witness—Compensation.*—Distinction between compensation for pretrial detention and for trial attendance is not so unreasonable as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since Congress could determine that in view of length of pretrial confinement and costs necessarily borne by the Government, only minimal compensation for pretrial detention is justified, particularly since witness has a public duty to testify. *Hurtado v. United States*, p. 578.

7. *Vagueness—Best clinical judgment.*—The requirement that a physician's decision to perform an abortion must rest upon "his best clinical judgment" of its necessity is not unconstitutionally vague, since that judgment may be made in the light of *all* the attendant circumstances. *United States v. Vuitch*, 402 U. S. 62. *Doe v. Bolton*, p. 179.

II. Elections.

Primary elections—Enrollment in political party.—New York's delayed enrollment scheme did not violate petitioners' constitutional rights; it did not absolutely prohibit petitioners from voting in the 1972 primary, but merely imposed a time deadline on their enrollment, which they chose to disregard. They were not deprived of their right to associate with the party of their choice or subsequently to change to another party, provided they observed the statutory time limit. The cutoff date for enrollment, which occurs about eight months before a presidential, and 11 months before a non-

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presidential, primary, is not arbitrary when viewed in light of the legitimate state purpose of avoiding disruptive party raiding. *Rosario v. Rockefeller*, p. 752.

III. Equal Protection of the Laws.

1. *Bicameral state legislature—Apportionment on population basis.*—In the implementation of the basic constitutional principle that both houses of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned substantially on a population basis (*Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U. S. 533), more flexibility is permissible with respect to state legislative reapportionment than with respect to congressional redistricting. *Mahan v. Howell*, p. 315.

2. *Corporate property—Personal property tax.*—An Illinois constitutional provision subjecting corporations and similar entities, but not individuals, to ad valorem taxes on personalty comports with equal protection requirements, the States being accorded wide latitude in making classifications and drawing lines that in their judgment produce reasonable taxation systems. *Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 277 U. S. 389, disapproved. *Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.*, p. 356.

3. *Filing-fee requirement—Rational justification.*—Filing fee required for review by state appellate court of agency determination resulting in lower welfare payments is not violative of equal protection, since the applicable standard in the area of social and economic regulation when a suspect classification is not present is rational justification and here the requirement of rationality is met. *Ortwein v. Schwab*, p. 656.

4. *Good-time credit toward parole eligibility—Presentence county jail incarceration.*—Under the New York scheme good-time credit takes into account a prisoner's performance under the program of rehabilitation that is fostered under the state prison system, but not in the county jails which serve primarily as detention centers. Since the jails have no significant rehabilitation program, a rational basis exists for declining to give good-time credit for the pretrial jail-detention period; and the statute will be sustained even if fostering rehabilitation was not necessarily the primary legislative objective, cf. *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301, 331; *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U. S. 471, 486. *McGinnis v. Royster*, p. 263.

5. *Impending elections—Interim plan by District Court—One senatorial multimember district.*—Legislature's three senatorial electoral districts being impermissibly discriminatory and the fall 1971 elections being at hand, the District Court, which was under severe

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time pressures, did not abuse its discretion in prescribing an interim plan of combining the three districts into one multimember district. *Mahan v. Howell*, p. 315.

6. *Rational legislative purpose—Voters' voice in local issues.*—The State's objective of preserving the integrity of political subdivision lines is rational since it furthers the legislative purpose of facilitating enactment of statutes of purely local concern and preserves for the voters in the political subdivisions a voice in the state legislature on local matters. *Mahan v. Howell*, p. 315.

7. *Reapportionment—Election of state officials—Preservation of political boundaries.*—Reapportionment of electoral districts for Virginia's House of Delegates complied with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the legislature's maximum population percentage variation, which was not excessive, resulted from the State's rational objective of preserving the integrity of political subdivision lines. *Mahan v. Howell*, p. 315.

8. *Reapportionment—Equal-population districts.*—Given the wider constitutional latitude in state legislative reapportionment, the population disparities reflected in the legislature's maximum percentage deviation are within tolerable constitutional limits. *Mahan v. Howell*, p. 315.

9. *Registration to vote—Residence requirements.*—Arizona's 50-day durational voter residency and registration requirements as applied to other than presidential elections are constitutionally permissible in light of Arizona's special problems arising from the State's legitimate needs to correct registrations accomplished by volunteer personnel and to interrupt registration work to take care of activities occasioned by its fall primaries. *Marston v. Lewis*, p. 679.

10. *Registration to vote—Residence requirements.*—Closure of voter registration 50 days before November general elections for other than presidential elections, although approaching the outer constitutional limits, is permissible to promote the important interests of Georgia in accurate voter lists. *Burns v. Fortson*, p. 686.

11. *State senatorial districts—Discrimination against military personnel.*—The establishment by the legislature of three numerically ideal senatorial electoral districts by assigning to one of them about 36,700 persons who were "home-ported" at the U. S. Naval Station, Norfolk, regardless of where they actually resided, because that is where they were counted on official census tracts, was constitutionally impermissible discrimination against military personnel, cf. *Davis v. Mann*, 377 U. S. 678. *Mahan v. Howell*, p. 315.

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12. *Watershed improvement districts—Limitation of franchise.*—Limitation of franchise to property owners in the creation and maintenance of a Wyoming watershed improvement district, for which they bear the primary burden and share the benefits, is not violative of equal protection requirements. *Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec District*, p. 743.

13. *Water storage districts—Limitation of franchise.*—Restricting the voting for board of directors of water storage district to landowners who may not be residents does not violate the principle enunciated in such cases as *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U. S. 533, that governing bodies should be selected in a popular election in which every person's vote is equal. Since assessments against landowners are the sole means by which expenses of district are paid, it is not irrational to repose franchise in landowners but not residents. *Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District*, p. 719.

14. *Water storage districts—Weighted voting.*—Permitting the weighting of votes for board of directors of water storage district according to assessed valuation of land does not evade the principle that wealth has no relation to voter qualifications where, as here, the expense as well as the benefit is proportional to the land's assessed value. *Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District*, p. 719.

IV. Fifth Amendment.

Voice exemplars—Identification purposes.—The compelled production of the voice exemplars would not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, since they were to be used only for identification purposes, and not for the testimonial or communicative content of the utterances. *United States v. Dionisio* p. 1.

V. Fourth Amendment.

1. *Appearance of witness—Compulsion to give exemplar.*—Since neither the summons to appear before the grand jury, nor its directive to give a voice exemplar, contravened the Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring a preliminary showing of reasonableness before respondent could be compelled to furnish the exemplar. *United States v. Dionisio*, p. 1.

2. *Compulsion to appear before grand jury—Voice recordings.*—A subpoena to compel a person to appear before a grand jury does not constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the fact that many others besides respondent were ordered to give voice recordings did not render the subpoena unconstitutional. *Davis v. Mississippi*, 394 U. S. 721, distinguished. The

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grand jury's directive to make the voice recording infringed no valid Fourth Amendment interest. *United States v. Dionisio*, p. 1.

3. *Handwriting exemplars—Compelled production.*—The specific and narrowly drawn directive to furnish a handwriting specimen, which, like the compelled speech disclosure upheld in *United States v. Dionisio*, ante, p. 1, involved production of physical characteristics, violated no legitimate Fourth Amendment interest. *United States v. Mara*, p. 19.

VI. Freedom of Speech.

Campus publication—"Indecent speech."—Expulsion of student for distributing on campus a publication assertedly containing "indecent speech" proscribed by a bylaw of university's Board of Curators was an impermissible violation of her First Amendment free speech rights since the mere dissemination of ideas on a state university campus cannot be proscribed in the name of "conventions of decency." *Papish v. University of Missouri Curators*, p. 667.

VII. Just Compensation Clause.

Incarcerated material witness—Per diem and subsistence.—The \$1 statutory per diem plus subsistence in kind for incarcerated witnesses before trial does not violate Just Compensation Clause, as detention of material witness is not a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. *Hurtado v. United States*, p. 578.

VIII. Right to Travel.

Residence requirement for medical service—Out-of-state patients.—The Georgia residence requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by denying protection to persons who enter Georgia for medical services there. *Doe v. Bolton*, p. 179.

CONSUMPTION OF FUEL. See **Procedure**, 3; **Taxes**, 2-3.

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COURTS. See also **Confessions**; **Procedure**, 3; **Taxes**, 2-3.

1. *No trial on state charge—Claim of speedy trial—State remedies on that claim.*—The exhaustion doctrine of *Ex parte Royall*, 117 U. S. 241, does not bar a petition for federal habeas corpus alleging, under *Smith v. Hooy*, 393 U. S. 374, a constitutional claim of present denial of a speedy trial, even though the petitioner has not yet been brought to trial on the state charge. The petitioner must, however, have exhausted available state court remedies for consideration of that constitutional claim. *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.*, p. 484.

2. *Petitioner in jail in Alabama—Pending Kentucky detainer—Demand for speedy trial in Kentucky.*—Under *Peyton v. Rowe*, 391 U. S. 54, which discarded the "prematurity doctrine" of *McNally v. Hill*, 293 U. S. 131, the petitioner was "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2241 (c)(3) for purposes of a habeas corpus attack on the Kentucky indictment underlying the detainer, even though he was confined in an Alabama prison; the jurisdiction of a district court considering a habeas corpus petition requires only that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian of the prisoner. *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.*, p. 484.

3. *Speedy trial—Habeas corpus petition—District of prisoner's confinement.*—*Ahrens v. Clark*, 335 U. S. 188, on which respondent relies, can no longer be viewed as requiring that habeas corpus petitions be brought only in the district of the petitioner's confinement. Here, since respondent was properly served with process in the Western District of Kentucky, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the District Court should have dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.*, p. 484.

CRIMINAL LAW. See also **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Confessions**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1-3, 5-7; IV; V, 1-3; VII-VIII; **Courts**, 1-3; **Federal-State Relations**; **Grand Juries**, 1-2; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Mootness**; **Parole**, 2; **Procedure**, 1; **Saving Clauses**; **Standing to Sue**, 1-3; **Unions**.

Double jeopardy—Jury sworn—Defective indictment—Mistrial.—Under the circumstances of this case, the trial judge's action in declaring a mistrial was a rational determination designed to imple-

CRIMINAL LAW—Continued.

ment a legitimate state policy, with no suggestion that the policy was manipulated to respondent's prejudice. The declaration of a mistrial was therefore required by "manifest necessity" and the "ends of public justice," and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth did not bar respondent's retrial. *Illinois v. Somerville*, p. 458.

CROSS-EXAMINATIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.

CUSTODIAL WORKERS. See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.

CUSTODIANS. See **Courts**, 1-3.

CUSTODY. See **Courts**, 1-3.

DEADLINES. See **Constitutional Law**, II.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See **Taxes**, 5.

DECENCY. See **Constitutional Law**, VI.

DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

DECREASED WELFARE PAYMENTS. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; **Procedure**, 2.

DEFECTIVE INDICTMENTS. See **Criminal Law**.

DEFERRED TAXATION. See **Taxes**, 4.

DELAYED ENROLLMENT. See **Constitutional Law**, II.

DE NOVO ENTRIES. See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.

DETAINERS. See **Courts**, 1-3.

DETENTION. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.

DETENTION CENTERS. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.

DISCLOSURE. See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.

DISCRIMINATION. See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MILITARY PERSONNEL. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.

DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF STATUTE. See **Standing to Sue**, 3.

- DISSEMINATION OF IDEAS.** See **Constitutional Law**, VI.
- DISTRIBUTION OF WATER.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 12-14.
- DISTRIBUTIONS ON CAMPUS.** See **Constitutional Law**, VI.
- DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES.** See **Taxes**, 4.
- DOCTORS.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2; **Taxes**, 4.
- DOCUMENTS.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- DOMINANT MARKET FORCES.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- DONATIVE INTENT.** See **Taxes**, 5.
- DOSAGE-FORM PATENTS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- DOUBLE JEOPARDY.** See **Criminal Law**.
- DRIVERS' LICENSES.** See **Jurisdiction**, 2.
- DRUGS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Parole**, 2; **Patents**, 1-2; **Saving Clauses**.
- DUE PROCESS.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Confessions**; **Constitutional Law**, I; VII-VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1-2; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2; **Witnesses**, 1-2.
- DURATIONAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 9-10.
- DUTY TO TESTIFY.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.
- ECONOMIC LEVERAGE.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- EDGE OF THE MARKET.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- ELECTIONS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II; III, 9-10.
- ELECTORAL DISTRICTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- ELECTRIC UTILITIES.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- EMBRYOS.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.
- EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES.** See **Fair Labor Standards Act**; **Unions**.
- ENDS OF PUBLIC JUSTICE.** See **Criminal Law**.

- ENROLLMENT.** See **Constitutional Law**, II.
- EQUAL-POPULATION DISTRICTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II; **Parole**, 1; **Procedure**, 2; **Taxes**, 1.
- ERRORS.** See **Criminal Law**.
- ESTATES.** See **Taxes**, 5.
- ESTOPPEL.** See **Boundaries**, 1; **Procedure**, 4.
- EVIDENCE.** See **Confessions**; **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.
- EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.
- EXECUTIVE ORDERS.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- EXEMPLARS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.
- EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE.** See **Courts**, 1-3.
- EXPULSION.** See **Constitutional Law**, VI.
- EXTORTION.** See **Unions**.
- EXTRA-MARITAL RELATIONS.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-3.
- FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT.**
Realty management company—Separately owned buildings—Custodial workers.—Company managing commercial properties for a fee whose services include hiring, firing, supervising, and negotiating wages of those employed in the buildings is an "enterprise" within the meaning of § 3 (r) of the Act since it conducts related activities through unified operations or control, for a common business purpose. It is irrelevant, for purposes of defining the enterprise under § 3 (r), that the building owners, who are not defendants in this enforcement action under the Act, have no relationship with one another and no common business purpose, since their activities as employers are not at issue here. *Brennan v. Arnheim & Neeley, Inc.*, p. 512.
- FAIR TRIALS.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.
- FEDERAL CRIMES.** See **Unions**.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See also **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7, VIII; **Courts**, 1-3; **Jurisdiction**, 2; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1, 3; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2; **Taxes**, 2-3; **Unions**.

Alleged abortionist—Pending criminal prosecutions—Childless couple—Future complications.—The District Court correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting declaratory, relief to Dr. Hallford, who alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense against the good-faith state prosecutions pending against him, *Samuels v. Mackell*, 401 U. S. 66; the Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. *Roe v. Wade*, p. 113.

FEES. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.

FETUSES. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

FIFTH AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; IV; V, 1-2; VII; **Criminal Law**; **Grand Juries**, 1-2; **Witnesses**, 1-2.

FILING FEES. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.

FIRST AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law**, VI.

FLORIDA. See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2.

FLOTERIAL DISTRICTS. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.

FOREIGN RELATIONS. See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.

FORUM. See **Courts**, 1-3.

FOUNDATIONS. See **Taxes**, 4.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1-5, 7; II-III; VI; **Criminal Law**; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Parole**, 1; **Procedure**, 1-2; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2; **Taxes**, 1.

FOURTH AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law**, IV-V; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. See also **Judicial Review**, 1-2.

1. *Classified documents—Advice to The President—Exemptions to the compelled-disclosure rule.*—Exemption 1 does not permit

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT—Continued.

compelled disclosure of the six classified documents or *in camera* inspection to sift out “non-secret components,” and petitioners met their burden of demonstrating that the documents were entitled to protection under that exemption. *EPA v. Mink*, p. 73.

2. *Classified documents—Exemptions to the compelled-disclosure rule.*—Exemption 5 does not require that otherwise confidential documents be made available for a district court’s *in camera* inspection regardless of how little, if any, purely factual material they contain; in implying that such inspection be automatic, the Court of Appeals order was overly rigid; and petitioners should be afforded the opportunity of demonstrating by means short of *in camera* inspection that the documents sought are clearly beyond the range of material that would be available to a private party in litigation with a Government agency. *EPA v. Mink*, p. 73.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH. See **Constitutional Law**, VI.

FREIGHT CARS. See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2.

FUEL STORAGE. See **Procedure**, 3; **Taxes**, 2-3.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

FUNGICIDES. See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.

GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS. See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.

GEOGRAPHIC PREFERENCE AREAS. See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.

GEORGIA. See **Abortions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 5, 7; VIII; **Standing to Sue**, 2.

GIFTS. See **Taxes**, 5.

GOOD-FAITH PROSECUTIONS. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

GOOD-TIME CREDIT. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.

GOVERNMENT BONDS. See **Taxes**, 5.

GRAND JURIES. See also **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3.

1. *Appearance of witness—Compulsion to give exemplar.*—Since neither the summons to appear before the grand jury, nor its directive to give a voice exemplar, contravened the Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring a preliminary show-

GRAND JURIES—Continued.

ing of reasonableness before respondent could be compelled to furnish the exemplar. *United States v. Dionisio*, p. 1.

2. *Compulsion to appear before grand jury—Voice recordings.*—A subpoena to compel a person to appear before a grand jury does not constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the fact that many others besides respondent were ordered to give voice recordings did not render the subpoena unconstitutional. *Davis v. Mississippi*, 394 U. S. 721, distinguished. The grand jury's directive to make the voice recording infringed no valid Fourth Amendment interest. *United States v. Dionisio*, p. 1.

3. *Handwriting exemplars—Compelled production.*—The specific and narrowly drawn directive to furnish a handwriting specimen, which, like the compelled speech disclosure upheld in *United States v. Dionisio*, ante, p. 1, involved production of physical characteristics, violated no legitimate Fourth Amendment interest. *United States v. Mara*, p. 19.

GRISEOFULVIN. See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.

GROSS ESTATES. See **Taxes**, 5.

GROSS RENTALS. See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.

GUESTS. See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.

HABEAS CORPUS. See **Confessions**; **Courts**, 1-3; **Criminal Law**.

HANDWRITING. See **Constitutional Law**, V, 3; **Grand Juries**, 3.

HEALTH FOUNDATIONS. See **Taxes**, 4.

HEARINGS. See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2; **Jurisdiction**, 2; **Procedure**, 2.

HEARSAY TESTIMONY. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.

HOBBS ACT. See **Unions**.

HOMEOWNERS. See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.

HOME-PORTED PERSONNEL. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.

HOSPITALS. See **Abortions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 5, 7; VIII; **Standing to Sue**, 2.

HOUSE OF DELEGATES. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.

IDENTIFICATIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.

- ILLEGAL RESTRAINTS OF TRADE.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-3.
- ILLINOIS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 2; V, 3; **Criminal Law**; **Grand Juries**, 3; **Procedure**, 3; **Taxes**, 1-3.
- IMPANELED JURIES.** See **Criminal Law**.
- IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.
- IN CAMERA INSPECTIONS.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- INCARCERATED WITNESSES.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.
- INCENTIVE CHARGES.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2.
- INCOME TAXES.** See **Taxes**, 4.
- INCREASED WELFARE PAYMENTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.
- "INDECENT SPEECH."** See **Constitutional Law**, VI.
- INDICTMENTS.** See **Courts**, 1-3; **Criminal Law**.
- INHERITANCES.** See **Taxes**, 5.
- INJUNCTIONS.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.
- INTEGRATION.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.
- INTEGRITY OF COUNTY LINES.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- INTENT.** See **Criminal Law**.
- INTERAGENCY MEMORANDA.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- INTERCONNECTIONS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- INTERNAL REVENUE CODE.** See **Taxes**, 4-5.
- INTERSTATE COMMERCE.** See **Procedure**, 3; **Taxes**, 2-3; **Unions**.
- INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.** See also **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2.

1. *Freight-car shortages—Commission procedure—Exclusion of oral argument.*—The language of § 1 (14) (a) of the Interstate Commerce

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION—Continued.

Act that “[t]he Commission may, after hearing . . . establish reasonable rules . . .” did not trigger §§ 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act requiring a trial-type hearing and the presentation of oral argument by the affected parties; and the ICC’s proceeding was governed only by § 553 of the APA requiring notice prior to rulemaking. *United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.*, 406 U. S. 742. *United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co.*, p. 224.

2. *Rulemaking procedure—Consultation with affected parties—No adversary trial.*—The “after hearing” language of § 1 (14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act does not by itself confer upon interested parties either the right to present evidence orally and to cross-examine opposing witnesses, or the right to present oral argument to the agency’s decisionmaker. *United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co.*, p. 224.

INTERVENTION. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS. See **Taxes**, 5.

INVESTIGATIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.

INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION. See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.

INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS. See **Confessions**.

ISLANDS. See **Boundaries**, 2.

JAIL TIME. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.

JANITORIAL STAFF. See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.

JEOPARDY. See **Criminal Law**.

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION. See **Parole**, 2; **Saving Clauses**.

JUDICIAL REVIEW. See also **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Jurisdiction**, 2; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

1. *Classified documents—Advice to The President—Exemptions to the compelled-disclosure rule.*—Exemption 1 does not permit compelled disclosure of the six classified documents or *in camera* inspection to sift out “non-secret components,” and petitioners met their burden of demonstrating that the documents were entitled to protection under that exemption. *EPA v. Mink*, p. 73.

JUDICIAL REVIEW—Continued.

2. *Classified documents—Exemptions to the compelled-disclosure rule.*—Exemption 5 does not require that otherwise confidential documents be made available for a district court's *in camera* inspection regardless of how little, if any, purely factual material they contain; in implying that such inspection be automatic, the Court of Appeals order was overly rigid; and petitioners should be afforded the opportunity of demonstrating by means short of *in camera* inspection that the documents sought are clearly beyond the range of material that would be available to a private party in litigation with a Government agency. *EPA v. Mink*, p. 73.

JURIES. See **Criminal Law**.

JURISDICTION.

1. *Conviction in absentia—Appeal to State's Supreme Court—No waiver of confrontation on appeal.*—Where issues presented in petition for certiorari were not raised below or passed upon by the State's highest court, and where the only issue actually litigated does not alone justify exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. *Tacon v. Arizona*, p. 351.

2. *Drivers' licenses—Revocation—No prior hearing.*—Since it is not clear whether the California Supreme Court judgment reversing the lower court is based on federal or state constitutional grounds, or both, and therefore whether this Court has jurisdiction on review, that judgment is vacated and the case remanded. *Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Rios*, p. 425.

JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.

JUSTICIABILITY. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

KENTUCKY. See **Boundaries**, 1; **Courts**, 1-3; **Procedure**, 4.

LABOR. See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.

LABOR UNIONS. See **Unions**.

LANDOWNERS. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 12-14.

LAWFUL STRIKES. See **Unions**.

LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.

- LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- LEGITIMATE STATE PURPOSES.** See **Constitutional Law**, II.
- LENGTH OF RESIDENCE.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 9-10.
- LESSEES.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 13-14.
- LESSENEO COMPETITION.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- LICENSED HOSPITALS.** See **Abortions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 5, 7; VIII; **Standing to Sue**, 2.
- LICENSES.** See **Jurisdiction**, 2.
- LICENSING.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- LIMITATION OF FRANCHISE.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 12-14.
- LINE-HAUL RAILROADS.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2.
- LITIGATION.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- LITIGATION WITH AGENCIES.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- LIVE BIRTHS.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.
- LOCAL ISSUES.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- LONG ACQUIESCENCE.** See **Boundaries**, 1; **Procedure**, 4.
- LOUISIANA.** See **Boundaries**, 2; **Unions**.
- LOWER WELFARE PAYMENTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.
- MAINTENANCE STAFF.** See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.
- MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS.** See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.
- MANDATORY SENTENCES.** See **Parole**, 2; **Saving Clauses**.
- MANIFEST NECESSITY.** See **Criminal Law**.
- MANUFACTURING PATENTS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- MARIHUANA.** See **Jurisdiction**, 1.
- MARKET-EXTENSION MERGERS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- MARKETS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.

- MARRIED PARENTS.** See **Standing to Sue**, 3.
- MARRIED PERSONS.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-3.
- MARYLAND.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.
- MATERIAL WITNESSES.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.
- MAXIMUM HOURS.** See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.
- MAXIMUM PAROLE DATES.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.
- MAXIMUM PERCENTAGE DEVIATION.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- MEMBERS.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.
- MERGERS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- MICROSIZE DOSAGES.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- MILITARY PERSONNEL.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- MINIMUM WAGES.** See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.
- MINNESOTA.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- MISSISSIPPI.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.
- MISSOURI.** See **Constitutional Law**, VI.
- MISTRIALS.** See **Criminal Law**.
- MONOPOLIES.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- MOOTNESS.** See also **Abortions**, 1, 3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1; **Federal-State Relations**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1.
- Suit during pregnancy—Pregnancy to term—Appeals.*—Contrary to appellee's contention, the natural termination of Roe's pregnancy did not moot her suit. Litigation involving pregnancy, which is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," is an exception to the usual federal rule that an actual controversy must exist at review stages and not simply when the action is initiated. *Roe v. Wade*, p. 113.
- MOTHERS.** See **Standing to Sue**, 3.
- MOTIONS.** See **Boundaries**, 1; **Procedure**, 4.
- MOTOR VEHICLES.** See **Jurisdiction**, 2.

- MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- MURDER.** See **Confessions**.
- NARCOTICS.** See **Parole**, 2; **Saving Clauses**.
- NATIONAL BREWERS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- NATIONAL DEFENSE.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- NATURAL PERSONS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 2; **Taxes**, 1.
- NEGROES.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.
- NEW ENGLAND STATES.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- NEW YORK.** See **Confessions**; **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Parole**, 1.
- NONPUBLIC SERVICES.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 12-14.
- NONRESIDENT VOTERS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 12-14.
- NONSECRET COMPONENTS.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- NORFOLK NAVAL STATION.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- NORTH DAKOTA** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- NUCLEAR TESTS.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- OBSTETRICIANS.** See **Abortions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 5, 7; VIII; **Standing to Sue**, 2.
- OFFICE BUILDINGS.** See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.
- OFFICIAL CENSUS TRACTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- OHIO.** See **Boundaries**, 1; **Procedure**, 4.
- OHIO RIVER.** See **Boundaries**, 1; **Procedure**, 4.
- OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- ON-THE-FRINGE IMPACT.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.

ORAL ARGUMENTS. See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2.

ORAL CONFESSIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. See **Boundaries**, 1-2; **Procedure**, 4.

OUT-OF-STATE ACQUISITIONS. See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.

OVERBREADTH. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

OWNERS OF SAVINGS BONDS. See **Taxes**, 5.

PARENTS. See **Standing to Sue**, 3.

PAROLE. See also **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Saving Clauses**.

1. *Equal protection—Good-time credit toward parole eligibility—Presentence county jail incarceration.*—Under the New York scheme good-time credit takes into account a prisoner's performance under the program of rehabilitation that is fostered under the state prison system, but not in the county jails which serve primarily as detention centers. Since the jails have no significant rehabilitation program, a rational basis exists for declining to give good-time credit for the pretrial jail-detention period; and the statute will be sustained even if fostering rehabilitation was not necessarily the primary legislative objective, cf. *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U. S. 301, 331; *Dandrige v. Williams*, 397 U. S. 471, 486. *McGinnis v. Royster*, p. 263.

2. *Mandatory sentence—Repealed statute—Saving clause.*—Under the saving clause in Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, parole under 18 U. S. C. § 4208 (a) is unavailable to petitioners since by its terms that provision is inapplicable to offenses for which mandatory penalties are provided; and in any event, decision to grant early parole under that provision must be made "[u]pon entering a judgment of conviction," which occurs before the end of the prosecution. *Bradley v. United States*, p. 605.

PARTNERSHIPS. See **Taxes**, 4.

PARTY AFFILIATIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, II.

PARTY-WITNESS RULE. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.

PATENTS. See also **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6.

1. *Pooling of patents—Effect on market.*—In order to "pry open to competition" the market closed by the antitrust violations, an order for mandatory, nondiscriminatory sales to all bona fide applicants is appropriate relief and where, as in this case, the manu-

PATENTS—Continued.

facturer may choose not to make bulk-form sales, and the licensees are not bound by the court's order for mandatory sales, further relief in the form of reasonable-royalty licensing of the patents is also proper. *United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.*, p. 52.

2. *Pooling of patents—Limited sublicensing.*—Where patents are directly involved in antitrust violations and the Government presents a substantial case for relief in the form of restrictions on the patents, the Government may challenge the validity of the patents regardless of whether the owner relies on the patents in defending the antitrust action. *United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.*, p. 52.

PENAL INSTITUTIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.

PENALTIES. See **Parole**, 2; **Saving Clauses**.

PENITENTIARIES. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.

PENNSYLVANIA. See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.

PER DIEM CHARGES. See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2.

PER DIEM COMPENSATION. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.

PERJURED TESTIMONY. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.

PER SE VIOLATIONS. See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.

PERSONAL LIBERTY. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 2; **Taxes**, 1.

PERSONS. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

PHYSICAL PRESENCE. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Courts**; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Witnesses**, 1-2.

PHYSICIANS. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2; **Taxes**, 4.

POLITICAL PARTIES. See **Constitutional Law**, II.

POLITICAL SUBDIVISION LINES. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.

- POOLING OF PATENTS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- POOR PERSONS.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; **Procedure**, 2.
- POPULATION DISPARITIES.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- POTENTIAL COMPETITION.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- POTENTIALITY OF HUMAN LIFE.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.
- PREGNANCIES.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.
- PRENATAL LIFE.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.
- PRESENCE IN COURTROOM.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.
- PRESENTENCE TIME.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.
- PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS.** See **Confessions**.
- PRETRIAL DETENTION.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.
- PRETRIAL TIME.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.
- PRIMARY ELECTIONS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II; III, 9-10.
- PRINTING EXEMPLARS.** See **Constitutional Law**, V, 3; **Grand Juries**, 3.
- PRISONERS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Courts**, 1-3; **Parole**, 1.
- PRIVACY.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; IV; V, 1-3; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Grand Juries**, 1-3; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.
- PRIVATE CLUBS.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.
- PRIVATE DOCUMENTS.** See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.
- PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.** See **Abortions**, 2; **Constitutional Law**, I, 5, 7; VIII; **Standing to Sue**, 2.
- PROBATION.** See **Parole**, 2; **Saving Clauses**.

PROCEDURE. See also **Abortions**, 1-3; **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Appeals**; **Boundaries**, 1-2; **Confessions**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1-5, 7; III, 3; VIII; **Criminal Law**; **Federal-State Relations**; **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2; **Mootness**; **Standing to Sue**, 1-3; **Taxes**, 2-3.

1. *Class action—Direct appeal—Cross-appeals.*—While 28 U. S. C. § 1253 authorizes no direct appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone, review is not foreclosed when the case is properly before the Court on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments as to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical. *Roe v. Wade*, p. 113.

2. *Fee for filing appeal—Evidentiary hearings—Increased welfare payments.*—Appellants were not deprived of due process by filing fee, which they were allegedly unable to pay, required for review by state appellate court of agency determination resulting in lower welfare payments, since the increase in welfare payments has less constitutional significance than the interest of appellants in *Boddie v. Connecticut*, 401 U. S. 371, and since evidentiary hearings provided a procedure, not conditioned on payment of any fee, through which appellants were able to seek redress. *Ortwein v. Schwab*, p. 656.

3. *State court interpretation—Use tax on aviation fuel—Mistaken impression.*—The “burn off” rule is not unconstitutional, being distinguishable from a tax imposed on consumption such as was invalidated in *Helson v. Kentucky*, 279 U. S. 245. Since some of Illinois Supreme Court majority were under the mistaken impression that *Helson* precluded use of the “burn off” interpretation, case is remanded to enable that court to construe the temporary-storage provision under state law free from any constraint that such interpretation would not be constitutionally permissible. *United Air Lines v. Mahin*, p. 623.

4. *Supreme Court—Original jurisdiction—Motion for leave to file amended bill of complaint.*—In the exercise of its original jurisdiction, this Court is not invariably bound by common-law precedent or by current rules of civil procedure. Requirement of motion for leave to file a complaint permits the Court to dispose of it at a preliminary stage in an appropriate case, such as where the claim is barred as matter of law and a hearing on the issues presented “would only serve to delay adjudication on the merits and needlessly add to the expense that the litigants must bear.” *Ohio v. Kentucky*, p. 641.

PROCOMPETITIVE EFFECTS. See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.

- PROPERTY OWNERS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 12-14.
- PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS.** See **Criminal Law**.
- PROSECUTIONS.** See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Parole**, 2; **Procedure**, 1; **Saving Clauses**; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.
- PROSECUTORIAL MANIPULATION.** See **Criminal Law**.
- PUBLICATIONS.** See **Constitutional Law**, VI.
- PUBLIC DISCLOSURES.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-2; **Grand Juries**, 1.
- PUBLIC UTILITIES.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS.** See **Constitutional Law**, II; III, 12-14.
- RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.
- "RAIDING" BY POLITICAL PARTIES.** See **Constitutional Law**, II.
- RAILROADS.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2.
- RATE ORDERS.** See **Administrative Procedure**, 1-2; **Interstate Commerce Commission**, 1-2.
- RATIONALITY.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.
- REAL PROPERTY.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2; **Fair Labor Standards Act**.
- REAPPORTIONMENT.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- REASONABLE ROYALTY LICENSING.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- RECIPIENTS OF WELFARE.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.
- RECORDINGS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-2; **Grand Juries**, 1.
- REGIONAL BREWERS.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 7.
- REGISTRATION TO VOTE.** See **Constitutional Law**, II.
- REGULATIONS.** See **Taxes**, 5.
- REGULATORY AGENCIES.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.
- REHABILITATION.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.

- RELIEF.** See Abortions, 1-3; Appeals; Confessions; Constitutional Law, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; Federal-State Relations; Mootness; Procedure, 1; Standing to Sue, 1-3.
- REMEDIES.** See Courts, 1-3.
- RENUNCIATIONS.** See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3.
- REPEALED STATUTES.** See Parole, 2; Saving Clauses.
- REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER.** See Boundaries, 2.
- RESALES.** See Antitrust Acts, 5-6; Patents, 1-2.
- RESENTENCING.** See Parole, 2; Saving Clauses.
- RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS.** See Abortions, 2; Constitutional Law, I, 5, 7; VIII; Standing to Sue, 2.
- RESTRAINTS OF TRADE.** See Antitrust Acts, 5-6; Patents, 1-2.
- RETAIL FRANCHISES.** See Antitrust Acts, 1-4.
- RETIREMENT PLANS.** See Taxes, 4.
- REVOCATIONS.** See Jurisdiction, 2.
- RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION.** See Constitutional Law, II.
- RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION.** See Jurisdiction, 1.
- RIGHT OF PRIVACY.** See Abortions, 1-3; Appeals; Constitutional Law, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; Federal-State Relations; Mootness; Procedure, 1; Standing to Sue, 1-2.
- RIGHT TO PRACTICE.** See Abortions, 2; Constitutional Law, I, 5, 7; VIII; Standing to Sue, 2.
- RIGHT TO TRAVEL.** See Abortions, 2; Constitutional Law, I, 5, 7; VIII; Standing to Sue, 2.
- RIGHT TO VOTE.** See Constitutional Law, II.
- RULEMAKING.** See Administrative Procedure, 1-2; Interstate Commerce Commission, 1-2.
- RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.** See Boundaries, 1; Procedure, 4.
- RULES OF EVIDENCE.** See Constitutional Law, I, 2-3.
- RURAL ELECTRIFICATION.** See Antitrust Acts, 1-4.
- SABINE RIVER.** See Boundaries, 2.
- SALES.** See Antitrust Acts, 5-6; Patents, 1-2.

SAVING CLAUSES. See also **Parole**, 2.

Mandatory sentence—Repealed statute—Saving clause for “prosecutions.”—Word “prosecutions,” in saving clause in Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, is to be accorded its normal legal sense, under which sentencing is part of concept of prosecution. *Bradley v. United States*, p. 605.

SAVINGS BONDS. See **Taxes**, 5.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.

SECRETARY OF LABOR. See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.

SECRET DOCUMENTS. See **Freedom of Information Act**, 1-2; **Judicial Review**, 1-2.

SEGREGATION. See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.

SEIZURES. See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-2; **Grand Juries**, 1-2.

SELF-INCRIMINATION. See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.

SENATORIAL ELECTORAL DISTRICTS. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.

SENTENCES. See **Parole**, 2; **Saving Clauses**.

SERIES “E” BONDS. See **Taxes**, 5.

SHAM LITIGATION. See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.

SHERMAN ACT. See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-6; **Patents**, 1-2.

SINGLE WOMEN. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-3.

SIXTH AMENDMENT. See **Courts**, 1-3.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REGULATION. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.

SOUTH DAKOTA. See **Antitrust Acts**, 1-4.

SPECIAL MASTER. See **Boundaries**, 1-2; **Procedure**, 4.

SPECIMENS. See **Constitutional Law**, V, 3; **Grand Juries**, 3.

SPEEDY TRIAL. See **Courts**, 1-3.

SPONTANEOUS CONFESSIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.

STANDARDS. See **Confessions**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 4; III, 3; **Procedure**, 2.

STANDING TO SUE. See also **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1.

1. *Alleged abortionist—Pending criminal prosecutions—Childless couple—Future complications.*—The District Court correctly refused injunctive, but erred in granting declaratory, relief to Dr. Hallford, who alleged no federally protected right not assertable as a defense against the good-faith state prosecutions pending against him, *Samuels v. Mackell*, 401 U. S. 66; the Does' complaint, based as it is on contingencies, any one or more of which may not occur, is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. *Roe v. Wade*, p. 113.

2. *Case or controversy—Interim termination of pregnancy—Non-prosecuted physicians.*—Doe's case presents a live, justiciable controversy, and she has standing to sue, *Roe v. Wade*, ante, p. 113, as do the physician-appellants, and it is therefore unnecessary to resolve the issue of the other appellants' standing. *Doe v. Bolton*, p. 179.

3. *Class action—Mother of illegitimate child—Discriminatory application of Texas' criminal nonsupport law.*—Although appellant, mother of an illegitimate child, has an interest in her child's support, application of Texas Penal Code Art. 602 would not result in support but only in the father's incarceration, and a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another. *Linda R. S. v. Richard D.*, p. 614.

STATE BOUNDARIES. See **Boundaries**, 1-2; **Procedure**, 4.

STATE COURT REMEDIES. See **Courts**, 1-3.

STATE LEGISLATION. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-3.

STATE LEGISLATURES. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 1, 5-8, 11.

STATE PRISONS. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.

STATE PROSECUTIONS. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

STATE STATUTES. See **Standing to Sue**, 3.

STATE TAXES. See **Procedure**, 3; **Taxes**, 2-3.

- STATE UNIVERSITIES.** See **Constitutional Law**, VI.
- STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.** See **Procedure**, 3; **Standing to Sue**, 3; **Taxes**, 2-3.
- STATUTORY RELEASE DATES.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 4; **Parole**, 1.
- STORAGE OF FUEL.** See **Procedure**, 3; **Taxes**, 2-3.
- STRIKES.** See **Unions**.
- STUDENTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, VI.
- SUBLICENSEES.** See **Antitrust Acts**, 5-6; **Patents**, 1-2.
- SUBPOENAS.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.
- SUBSISTENCE.** See **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.
- SUMMONSES.** See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-3; **Grand Juries**, 1-3.
- SUPERVISORY STAFF.** See **Fair Labor Standards Act**.
- SUPPORT.** See **Standing to Sue**, 3.
- SUPREME COURT.** See **Boundaries**, 1-2; **Procedure**, 4.
Assignment of Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, p. 961.
- SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTS.** See **Taxes**, 5.
- SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE.** See **Parole**, 2; **Saving Clause**.
- SWIMMING POOLS.** See **Civil Rights**, 1-2.
- TAXES.** See also **Constitutional Law**, III, 2; **Procedure**, 3.
1. *Equal protection—Corporate property—Personal property tax.*—An Illinois constitutional provision subjecting corporations and similar entities, but not individuals, to ad valorem taxes on personalty comports with equal protection requirements, the States being accorded wide latitude in making classifications and drawing lines that in their judgment produce reasonable taxation systems. *Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 277 U. S. 389, disapproved. *Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.*, p. 356.
2. *Illinois use tax—Aviation fuel—Storage and consumption.*—Illinois use tax statute as authoritatively construed by State's highest court to tax storage of aviation fuel and not consumption does not place unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Cases allow-

TAXES—Continued.

ing taxation of storage of fuel before loading have not outlived their usefulness. *United Air Lines v. Mahin*, p. 623.

3. *Illinois use tax*—"Burn off" rule—*Aviation fuel*—*Consumption*.—The "burn off" rule is not unconstitutional, being distinguishable from a tax imposed on consumption such as was invalidated in *Helson v. Kentucky*, 279 U. S. 245. Since some of Illinois Supreme Court majority were under the mistaken impression that *Helson* precluded use of the "burn off" interpretation, case is remanded to enable that court to construe the temporary storage provision under state law free from any constraint that such interpretation would not be constitutionally permissible. *United Air Lines v. Mahin*, p. 623.

4. *Medical services partnership*—*Payments to retirement fund*—*Tax assessment against individual members*.—The retirement fund payments, notwithstanding the fact that they were contributed directly to the trust, were compensation for services that the medical partnership (Permanente) rendered under the medical-service agreement and should have been reported as income to Permanente; and the individual partners should have included their shares of that income in their individual returns, since the existence of conditions upon the actual receipt by a partner of income fully earned by the partnership is not a relevant factor in determining its taxability to him. *United States v. Basye*, p. 441.

5. *Savings bonds*—*Co-ownership registration*—*Inter vivos delivery with donative intent*.—United States Savings Bonds are includable for federal estate tax purposes in the gross estate of a decedent registered co-owner who, with donative intent, had delivered the bonds to the other co-owners but who had not complied with applicable Treasury Department regulations for making *inter vivos* transfers of such bonds by having them reissued in the names of the other co-owners alone. *United States v. Chandler*, p. 257.

TEMPORARY STORAGE. See **Procedure**, 3; **Taxes**, 2-3.

TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.

TERRITORIAL CONFINES. See **Courts**, 1-3.

TESTIMONIAL CONTENT. See **Constitutional Law**, IV; V, 1-2; **Grand Juries**, 1-2.

TESTIMONY. See **Confessions**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3, 6; VII; **Witnesses**, 1-2.

- TEXAS.** See Abortions, 1, 3; Appeals; Boundaries, 2; Constitutional Law, I, 1; Federal-State Relations; Mootness; Procedure, 1; Standing to Sue, 1.
- THREE-JUDGE COURTS.** See Abortions, 1-3; Appeals; Constitutional Law, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; Federal-State Relations; Mootness; Procedure, 1; Standing to Sue, 1-2.
- TIME DEADLINES.** See Constitutional Law, II.
- "TOE-HOLD" ACQUISITIONS.** See Antitrust Acts, 7.
- TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS.** See Freedom of Information Act, 1-2; Judicial Review, 1-2.
- TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS.** See Antitrust Acts, 1-4.
- TREASURY DEPARTMENT.** See Taxes, 5.
- TRIAL ATTENDANCE.** See Constitutional Law, I, 6; VII; Witnesses, 1-2.
- TRIALS.** See Administrative Procedure, 1-2; Constitutional Law, I, 6; VII; Criminal Law; Interstate Commerce Commission, 1-2; Jurisdiction, 1; Witnesses, 1-2.
- TRIMESTERS.** See Abortions, 1, 3; Appeals; Constitutional Law, I, 1; Federal-State Relations; Mootness; Procedure, 1; Standing to Sue, 1.
- TRUSTS.** See Taxes, 4.
- TULARE LAKE.** See Constitutional Law, III, 13-14.
- UNBORN CHILDREN.** See Abortions, 1-3; Appeals; Constitutional Law, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; Federal-State Relations; Mootness; Procedure, 1; Standing to Sue, 1-2.
- UNIFIED OPERATIONS.** See Fair Labor Standards Act.
- UNIONS.**
Strike in progress—Acts of violence against employer's property.—The Hobbs Act, which makes it a federal crime to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery or extortion, does not reach the use of violence (which is readily punishable under state law) to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher wages in return for genuine services that the employer seeks. *United States v. Enmons*, p. 396.
- UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS.** See Taxes, 5.
- UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.** See Constitutional Law, VI.
- UNLAWFUL CUSTODY.** See Courts, 1-3.

- UNMARRIED PARENTS.** See *Standing to Sue*, 3.
- UNMARRIED PERSONS.** See *Abortions*, 1-3; *Appeals*; *Constitutional Law*, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; *Federal-State Relations*; *Mootness*; *Procedure*, 1; *Standing to Sue*, 1-3.
- UNREASONABLE SEARCHES.** See *Constitutional Law*, IV; V, 1-3; *Grand Juries*, 1-3.
- USE TAXES.** See *Procedure*, 3; *Taxes*, 2-3.
- UTILITIES.** See *Antitrust Acts*, 1-4.
- VAGUENESS.** See *Abortions*, 1-3; *Appeals*; *Constitutional Law*, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; *Federal-State Relations*; *Mootness*; *Procedure*, 1; *Standing to Sue*, 1-2.
- VALUATION OF LAND.** See *Constitutional Law*, III, 12-14.
- VIABILITY.** See *Abortions*, 1-3; *Appeals*; *Constitutional Law*, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; *Federal-State Relations*; *Mootness*; *Procedure*, 1; *Standing to Sue*, 1-2.
- VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY.** See *Constitutional Law*, III, 1, 5-8, 11.
- VOICE EXEMPLARS.** See *Constitutional Law*, IV; V, 1-2; *Grand Juries*, 1-2.
- VOLUNTARINESS.** See *Confessions*.
- VOLUNTARY POWER INTERCONNECTIONS.** See *Antitrust Acts*, 1-4.
- VOTING.** See *Constitutional Law*, II; III, 12-14.
- VOUCHER RULE.** See *Constitutional Law*, I, 2-3.
- WATER DISTRICTS.** See *Constitutional Law*, III, 13-14.
- WATERSHED IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS.** See *Constitutional Law*, III, 12.
- WEALTH.** See *Constitutional Law*, III, 13-14.
- WEIGHTED VOTING.** See *Constitutional Law*, III, 12-14.
- WELFARE PAYMENTS.** See *Constitutional Law*, I, 4; III, 3; *Procedure*, 2.
- "WHEELING" ELECTRICITY.** See *Antitrust Acts*, 1-4.
- WHOLESALE POWER.** See *Antitrust Acts*, 1-4.
- WHOLESALEERS.** See *Antitrust Acts*, 5-6; *Patents*, 1-2.
- WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION.** See *Freedom of Information Act*, 1-2; *Judicial Review*, 1-2.

WITNESSES. See also **Constitutional Law**, I, 6; IV; V, 1-2; VII; **Grand Juries**, 1-2.

1. *Incarcerated witness—Per diem and subsistence—Pretrial detention.*—The \$1 statutory per diem plus subsistence in kind for incarcerated witnesses before trial does not violate Just Compensation Clause, as detention of material witness is not a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment; and distinction between compensation for pretrial detention and for trial attendance is not so unreasonable as to violate the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. *Hurtado v. United States*, p. 578.

2. *Material witness—Unable to give bail—Per diem compensation.*—Material witness incarcerated because of inability to give bail is entitled under 28 U. S. C. § 1821 to same \$20 per diem compensation as is allowed nonincarcerated witness during trial or other proceeding at which he is in “attendance,” *i. e.*, has been summoned and is available to testify in a court in session, regardless of whether he is physically present in the courtroom. *Hurtado v. United States*, p. 578.

WORDS.

1. *“After hearing.”* § 1 (4) (a), Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (14) (a). *United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co.*, p. 224.

2. *“Enterprise.”* 29 U. S. C. § 203 (r). *Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc.*, p. 512.

3. *“In custody.”* 28 U. S. C. § 2241 (c) (3). *Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.*, p. 484.

4. *“Prosecutions.”* § 1103 (a), Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U. S. C. § 171n. *Bradley v. United States*, p. 605.

WRITINGS. See **Constitutional Law**, V, 3; **Grand Juries**, 3.

WRITTEN CONFESSIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, I, 2-3.

WYOMING. See **Constitutional Law**, III, 12.

ZONES OF PRIVACY. See **Abortions**, 1-3; **Appeals**; **Constitutional Law**, I, 1, 5, 7; VIII; **Federal-State Relations**; **Mootness**; **Procedure**, 1; **Standing to Sue**, 1-2.





















