

# INDEX.

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## ACTION.

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## AGENT.

1. If a factor be employed by several foreign merchants, unconnected with each other, he may remit, by a general bill, payable to one, with separate drafts on him, in favor of each of the others; but notice of such a remittance must be given to all the parties. In such a case, if a partial loss occurs, it must be borne as a general average, by all who are concerned. *Schenkhouse v. Gibbs*.....\*137
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1. A writ of error, regularly tested, with a blank for the return-day, was allowed to be amended, the term to which it was returnable, the time when it was filed in the court below, and when in the supreme court, appearing by indorsements on the writ. *Mossmann v. Higginson*.....\*12
2. The *test* of a writ of error is amendable, of course. *Course v. Stead*.....\*22
3. The writ of error was directed to the judges, &c., of the district aforesaid, and no district was previously named, but the attestation of the record was in the proper district; the record was returned from the court thereof, and the proper district was indorsed on the writ: *Held*, that the omission might be supplied. ....*Id.*
4. Where there is a variance between the writ and the count, the writ may be amended by the *præcipe*, and if the execution varies from the judgment, the former may be amended by the latter. *Black v. Wistar*.\*267

## APPROPRIATION.

1. A., being indebted to several persons in Philadelphia, remitted a bill to B., in his favor, A. saying at the same time, that in a few days he would send directions about its disposition, which he accordingly did, and ap-

portioned the proceeds of the bill among certain of his creditors; subsequently, one of them laid a foreign attachment upon A.'s funds, in the hands of the acceptor of the bill, and of B.: *Held*, that B. became a trustee for the creditors, from the time of receiving A.'s appropriation, and that the creditors thereupon acquired such an interest in the trust fund, as could not be divested, or affected by the attachment. *Sharpless v. Welsh*.....\*279

## ASSIGNMENT.

1. A., being largely indebted, many of his creditors had commenced suit against him; and when some were on the eve of obtaining judgment, A. executed an assignment of several estates to B. and C., in trust to sell the same, and distribute the proceeds thereof, ratably, and in proportion to the whole amount of the debts of A., among such of his creditors as should, in writing, agree to accept the same, within nine months after the date of the assignment; and to pay to A. the shares of such creditors as should not so agree to accept their proportions, in order that he might therewith compound with, and satisfy such creditors; no schedule accompanied the deed; it was made without the consent of any of the creditors of A.; and there was no proof that the assignment was delivered to the assignees for more than two months after its date: *Held*, that the assignment was fraudulent in law, and void as against a creditor, who had obtained judgment, previously to any one assenting to take under the assignment. *Burd v. Smith*. \*76
2. It seems, that voluntary assignments, stipulating for a general release to the debtor, or with a classification of creditors, according to which a priority of payment is to be observed, may be valid. ....*Id.*
3. Where there is an assignment for the benefit of such creditors of the assignor's, as shall, within a certain period, execute a general release to them, a creditor who has not executed the release, cannot maintain an action against the assignees. *Mather v. Pratt*. \*224

## ASSUMPSIT.

1. *Assumpsit*, upon a special agreement of intestate, that if plaintiff would live with him, and work his plantation (consisting of 260 acres), until the plaintiff was of age, that intestate would give him 100 acres of it; he did so remain, but was maintained, &c., by intestate: intestate had three legitimate and three illegitimate children; he had once intimated an intention of putting plaintiff on a footing with his other children: *Held*, that

under the circumstances of the case, it would be excessive to give the full value of the land in damages; that the jury might depart from that standard, and that the intimation of intestate, that he would give plaintiff a child's share of his estate, might be construed as explanatory of his former promise *Conrad v. Conrad*.....\*180

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1. An auctioneer's bond is a security for his customers, as well as for the payment of the duties to the state. *Lea v. Yard*....\*95

## AWARD.

1. An award of referees cannot give a right to land, but will settle a dispute about it, either in an ejection, or in an action of trespass, and such an award may be conclusive, if this be the agreement of the parties. *Calhoun's Lessee v. Dunning*.....\*120
2. An award, under a submission by an arbitration bond, will not be invalidated, except for a plain error in law or fact, specifically set forth: the court will not exercise its equitable powers, except where it can do justice to both parties. *Williams v. Paschall*....\*284

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## BANK CHECK.

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## BANKRUPT.

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## BILL OF EXCEPTION.

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## BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE.

1. A promissory note, expressed in commercial form, was made in Philadelphia, dated there, and made payable at the Bank of the United States, but it was delivered in New York: *Held*, that it was to be governed by the law of the latter place. *Ludlow v. Birmingham*.....\*47
2. The note was indorsed in blank, and a foreign attachment was served on the maker

while the note was in the possession of the defendant to the attachment, who, after such service, passed the note to a third person, for a full consideration: *Held*, that the attachment could not be sustained. .... *Id.*

3. If an indorsee of a bill, which has been protested, promises to pay it (although the protest has not been transmitted to him), he is bound by such promise; unless at the time of making it, some material fact was unknown to him. *Donaldson v. Means.*\*109

4. Notice of non-payment of a promissory note, by the maker, must be given by the holder to the indorser, with a demand of payment from him, within a reasonable time. *Bank of N. America v. Petit.*\*127

5. What constitutes a notice within a reasonable time, still remains, in Pennsylvania, a fact for the jury to determine. .... *Id.*

6. The indorser of a promissory note, must receive notice, within a reasonable time, of the non-payment of the note by the maker. *Bank of N. America v. Wycoff.*\*151

7. A. & B. being indebted to C. & Sons, foreign merchants, delivered a bill of exchange, drawn by one S., and indorsed by A. & B., to C., one of the firm of C. & Sons, but he refused to remit it on their account and risk; the bill was returned unpaid and protested, and then A. & B. tendered to C. the principal and interest of it, and demanded its restitution, with the protest, but he rejected this offer, saying, that he would settle it with S.; B. then told C., that they, A. & B., should consider the bill at the risk of C. & Sons, from that day; C. afterwards entered into an arrangement with S., and took his note for principal, damages and charges, but before the note became due, S. failed; A. & B. sued C. & Sons for the damages included in the note, with interest from its date; and C. & Sons sued A. & B., for the original consideration of the indorsement of the bill: *Held*, that A. and B. were entitled to their demand, and that their debt to C. & Sons was paid in law, by the conduct of the latter. *Keppele v. Carr.*\*155

8. When a promissory note has been dishonored by the maker, the indorser is not liable to pay it, if the holder neglects to give him due notice of non-payment: what is due notice is, in Pennsylvania, a matter of fact to be decided by the jury. *Ball v. Dennison.*\*163

9. Where the holder of a negotiable note indorses it to a third person, after a commission of bankruptcy has issued against the payee, the indorsee may prove under the commission, but subject to all just off-sets,

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#### BOND.

1. The sureties in an official bond of a state treasurer, who has subsequently been frequently re-elected, are only answerable for a default by him, during his period of service, next ensuing the date of the bond. *Commonwealth v. Baynton.*\*282

2. In an action by the assignee of a bond, against the assignor, upon a written assignment, in general terms, parol testimony is not admissible, to show, that the defendant had expressly guaranteed the payment. *O'Hara v. Hall.*\*340

3. The survivor of two joint obligees is, at law, entitled to the possession of the joint securities; and a court of equity will not interfere with the disposition of them, unless some ground is laid for its interposition. *Penn v. Butler.*\*354

4. A bond was given, payable 30th July 1735, "in good public bills of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, or current lawful money of New England, with interest;" many partial payments had been made, in a depreciated currency, and indorsed at their nominal amounts; in the year 1752, there had been a tender in bills of credit, current in New Hampshire; the province bills, contracted for, had been called in, and the currency of the country had gradually depreciated: *Held*, 1st. That the tender was not good, but that the partial payments ought to be allowed, according to the indorsements: 2d. That as to the balance due, the loss from the depreciated currency ought to be divided between the parties. *Deering v. Parker*, App. \*xxiii.

#### CERTIORARI.

See PRACTICE, 15, 17, 18, 19.

#### CHALLENGE.

1. On an indictment, under the act of congress of 26th March 1804, for casting away and destroying a vessel, of which the defendant was the owner, to the prejudice of the underwriters, the accused has the right of peremptory challenge, as at common law, on a capital charge. *United States v. Johns.*\*412

## CITIZENSHIP.

1. A citizen of one state, removing to another, purchasing real estate, paying taxes and residing in the latter for about four years, becomes a citizen thereof, so far as regards the jurisdiction of a federal court, notwithstanding a temporary absence, during which he acquired and exercised municipal rights in a third state. *Knox v. Greenleaf...*\*360

## CITY LOTS.

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## COLLATERAL WARRANTY.

See WARRANTY.

## COMMISSION.

1. A commission issued to four commissioners jointly, was executed by three only, two of whom were of the defendant's nomination; on objection by the defendant to the reading of the depositions, it was held, that the commission was not well executed. Commissioners do not derive their authority from the parties, but from the court. *Guppy v. Brown...*\*410

## CONFESSiON.

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## CONFISCATION.

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## CONSIDERATION.

1. The smallest portion of benefit or accommodation, is sufficient, to create a valid consideration for a promise. *Austyn v. McLure*, \*226  
2. A bond given in consideration of the purchase of land in Luzerne county, under the Connecticut title, is void. *Mitchell v. Smith...*\*269

## CONSTITUTION.

1. The act of the legislature of Georgia, of the 4th of May 1782, inflicting penalties on, and confiscating the estate of such persons as are therein declared guilty of treason, is not repugnant to the constitution of that state. *Cooper v. Telfair...*\*14  
2. It seems, that the supreme court of United States can declare an unconstitutional law invalid ..... *Id.*  
3. *Quare?* Whether this court can invalidate laws enacted previously to the adoption of the constitution of the United States?.... *Id.*

4. The act of 11th April 1795, declaring as criminal offences, the taking possession of lands, or conspiring to convey, possess or settle them, in the counties of Northampton, &c., under any title not derived from Pennsylvania, is constitutional. *Commonwealth v. Franklin...*\*255

## CONTRACT.

1. Where there has been payment of the price of land, under a parol agreement for the sale of it, an action will lie to recover damages for the non-performance of such a contract. *Bell v. Andrews* ..... \*152  
2. A contract to receive from "J.B., or order," certain stocks, is negotiable. *Reed v. Ingraham* ..... \*169  
3. Wherever there is a gross misrepresentation of facts, relating to the subject of a contract, it is fraudulent and void, as against the party who made the misrepresentation. *Cochran v. Cummings...*\*250

## COVENANT.

1. In an action of covenant, it is sufficient to assign the breach, in terms as general as those in which the covenant is expressed. *Bender v. Fromberger* ..... \*436, 441  
2. The breach assigned was, that the defendant was not seized of a good estate in fee, &c.; and the defendant pleaded *non infregit conventionem*, and performance with leave, &c., upon which issues were joined: Held, that they were sufficient for the court to enter judgment upon. .... *Id.*  
3. A covenant that one is seized of an indefeasible estate in fee, may be broken, without an eviction. .... *Id.*  
4. A special warranty, in a deed, has not the effect of controlling a precedent general covenant. .... *Id.*  
5. The covenantee of title cannot recover the value of improvements, made by him, after his purchase from the covenantor. .... *Id.*

## COURTESY.

1. A tenant by the courtesy initiate, has not an estate, forfeitable upon his attainder for treason. *Pemberton's Lessee v. Hicks...*\*168

## DAMAGES.

1. Unless the penalty for breach of a contract, is a sum agreed to be paid and received, absolutely, in lieu of performance, damages may be recovered commensurate with the injury suffered by a non-performance. *Graham v. Bickham...*\*149

2. In cases sounding in damages, where they are susceptible of calculation by numbers, a jury ought to follow such standard. *Walker v. Smith*.....\*389

## DESTROY.

1. The meaning of the word "destroy," in the act of congress of 26th March 1804, is to unfit a vessel for service, beyond the hope of recovery by ordinary means; casting away, is a species of destroying. *United States v. Johns*.....\*412

## DEVISE.

1. Testator devised as follows: "Item, I give to my two sons, namely, W. and F., all my land at, &c., to be equally divided between them and their heirs for ever." "If any one of my aforesaid children should die, before they come to lawful age, their lands to go to the survivors; that is, if T. should die before he comes to lawful age, I give his share of land, where W. now lives, to my daughter E., to her and the lawfully begotten heirs of her body for ever; provided, T. have heirs before he comes to lawful age, then to him and his heirs for ever; and likewise, if W. should die without heirs, to go to F., and if A. should die without heirs, to go to V., and if J. should die, before he comes to lawful age, without heirs, then his share of land here, where I now live, I give to my daughter C., to her and her lawfully begotten heirs of her body for ever: *Held*, that W. took an estate in fee-simple, subject to an executory devise to F. *Robinson v. Lessee of Adams*, App. \*xii.

## DISCONTINUANCE.

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1. It need not be shown, that a distress was made on the demised premises. *Water's Ex'r v. McLellan*.....\*208

## DOWER.

1. Writ of dower, damages and costs, on. *Sharp v. Petit*.....\*212  
 2. Testator, *inter alia*, bequeathed to his widow 1000*l.*, and appointed her and two others executors; before his death, he had sold and conveyed certain premises, taking bonds and a mortgage from the purchaser for the purchase-money; at the suit of the executors, judgment was obtained against the purchaser, and the same property sold under an execution issued thereon; at the instance of

the widow, one of the executors purchased it, for the use of the estate, who, with the consent and approbation of the widow, resold the premises; the widow, during these transactions, never suggested a claim of dower, and the testator's debts far exceeded his assets: *Held*, that if her conduct was an intimation to the public, and particularly to the parties, that she meant to waive her right to dower, her claim was barred. *Deshler v. Beery*.....\*300

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## ELECTION.

1. If a judge of an election propose illegal questions to one desiring to vote, and insist upon obtaining answers to them, before he will accept the vote, a person threatening the judge for such conduct, is not liable to an indictment under the 17th section of (the election law) the act of 15th February 1799. *Commonwealth v. Gibbs*.....\*253

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1. Equity will not relieve a party who has been guilty of gross delay, and who has lain by until he could make his election, with certainty as to its result, to complete a contract or not. *Hollingsworth v. Fry*.....\*345

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## EVIDENCE.

1. A law of any of the states may be read in the supreme court, without having been

established as a fact in the court below.  
*Course v. Stead*.....\*22

2. A boy, about 12 years old, indicted for arson, in burning some stables, containing hay, &c., had made a formal, and to all appearances, voluntary confession, to the mayor of the city of Philadelphia, which was repeated at subsequent periods; previously, however, he had been visited by several persons, who represented to him the enormity of his crime, and that a confession would excite public compassion, and probably be the means of obtaining his pardon, adding, that they would be his friends; while a contrary course, in case of his conviction, would leave him without hope; the inspectors of the prison, too, took him into the dungeon, and said, that he would be confined in it, dark and cold, without food, unless he made a full disclosure, which, if he did make, he should be well accommodated, and might expect pity and favor: *Held*, that his confession was admissible in evidence, and that the point for consideration was, whether the prisoner had falsely declared himself guilty of a capital offence. *Commonwealth v. Dillon*.....\*116

3. In ejectment, a record of an action of trespass between the defendant and one C. was offered in evidence by the defendant; C. had there pleaded *liberum tenementum*, and there had been a reference in the case, on which the property at present in dispute was awarded to the defendant, and it appearing that the plaintiff had never controverted C.'s right, it was *held*, that the record was admissible. *Calhoun's Lessee v. Dunning*...\*120

4. Parol evidence of a deed is admissible, without notice to produce it, as against one, not a party to the deed; nor can he be compelled to produce it, if he is merely a witness thereto. *Edgar's Lessee v. Robinson*..\*132

5. Parol evidence was admitted, to explain the meaning of the words "the deed of conveyance," in articles of agreement, as meaning a deed conveying land free of all incumbrances. *Zantzinger v. Ketch*.....\*132

6. A book of original entries (some of which were made in plaintiff's handwriting, and some in that of a clerk), relating to a mercantile transaction in a foreign country, produced and sworn to by plaintiff, was admitted in evidence. *Seagrove v. Redman*....\*145

7. Nothing that passes before a judge, on a question of bail, can be evidence on the trial of a cause, unless it was clearly admitted as a fact, by the opposite party. *Jackson v. Winchester*.....\*205

8. A copy of a manifest, taken from the books of a custom-house, is a copy of a record, and it may be given in evidence, when properly proved. *United States v. Johns*.....\*412

9. An exemplification of a law of a state, under the great seal thereof, is admissible in evidence, without any other attestation.....*Id*.

10. The record of a court of admiralty, is always proof of a condemnation and the cause of it. *Russell v. Union Ins. Co.*,\*421

11. When the record of a court of admiralty exhibits documents, which, if produced, would be admissible in evidence, and no objection has been made to the reading of them, the record is proof of the fact contained in such papers.....*Id*.

## EXECUTOR.

1. If debt be brought against executors, on simple contract, it will be bad, on demurrer, but if they plead to issue, they cannot afterwards make the objection. *Carson v. Hood's Ex'rs*.....\*108

2. Testator died seised of 23 acres of land, which were sold under an execution, on a judgment obtained for a debt of testator, against the executors, but the premises had been previously conveyed to another, for a full consideration. *Quere?* 1st. Whether the land could be sold by virtue of the judgment, without a *scire facias* against the terre tenant? 2d. Whether the land was liable for the testator's debts, after having been aliened by the heir at law, *bona fide* and for a valuable consideration? *Morris's Lessee v. Smith*.....\*119

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1. If the indorsee of a note, after obtaining judgment against the maker, should discharge him from custody under a *ca. sa.*, issued by virtue of the judgment, the debt will be extinguished and the indorser released. *McFadden v. Parker*.....\*275

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1. A *feme covert* gave bond to pay a debt of her husband; she was seised of a separate estate, under a deed of settlement, with power to make a will, she did make a will, and in it directed the payment of her debts. *Quere?* Whether her estate, in the hands of her executors, was liable to pay the amount of the bond. *Smith v. Brodhead's Ex'rs*....\*115

## FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.

1. The inquisition in a case of forcible entry and detainer, stated that A. "was possessed in his demesne as of fee, &c., and continued so seized and possessed," until "he was thereof disseised." *Held*, that it was not error. *Commonwealth v. Fitch*.....\*212

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1. Under the 19th section of the act of congress of the 18th February 1793, goods, exceeding \$800 in value, transported without a permit, from Maryland, across Delaware, to Pennsylvania, are liable to forfeiture. *Priestman v. United States*.....\*28

2. If the condition of a grant by the commonwealth has not been fulfilled, advantage can only be taken of a breach of a condition, by the commonwealth, in a method prescribed by law. *Commonwealth v. Coxe*.....\*171

3. Where a forfeiture of land granted by the commonwealth has been incurred, no advantage can be taken of it, except by the state, in the form directed by law. *Morris's Lessee v. Neighman*.....\*209

## FRAUD.

1. If a man, who forbids a sale, or slanders a title, becomes himself the purchaser of the land, it is always *prima facie*, a mark of unfairness; and inadequacy of price, though not conclusive to avoid a sale, affords an argument of great weight, against a purchaser to whom fraud is imputed. *Lessee of Weitzell v. Fry*.....\*218

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1. In *assumpsit*, infancy may be given in evidence, under the general issue, but the jury may decide, whether it is a sufficient discharge. *Stansbury v. Marks*.....\*180

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1. An injunction will neither be granted by the court, nor a single judge, without reasonable notice to the adverse party, or his attorney. *State of New York v. State of Connecticut*.....\*1

2. What is reasonable notice?.....*Id.*

3. An injunction will not be granted to stay proceedings in common-law suits, at the instance of a state, not a party thereto, nor interested in their decision.....*Id.*\*3

## INSURANCE.

1. The expenses incurred for seamen's wages, provisions and extra-pilotage, during an embargo on a vessel, are recoverable as a partial loss, from the underwriter on freight. *Jones v. Insurance Co. of North America*....\*246

2. The plaintiff, a resident in Philadelphia, received notice, in August 1793, of the seizure by the French government, of goods which he had insured; soon afterwards, he left home in consequence of the appearance of the pestilence in Philadelphia, and did not return until about the 19th November next ensuing, and then went to South Carolina on business; it was not, however, until the 21st January 1794, that he intimated to the underwriters an intention to abandon, when he stated in a letter to them, "that he meant to abandon." *Held*, that by such declaration, the plaintiff had made his election to abandon, and that there is no particular form of abandonment, though it must be made within a reasonable time after intelligence of the loss has been received: what is a reasonable time is a question of fact. *Bell v. Beveridge*....\*272

3. If a vessel which has been captured, carried out of her course, and afterwards released, remain, for the purpose of trading, a longer time than is necessary to prepare for her

voyage, at the port to which she has been taken by her captor, it will be a deviation. *Kingston v. Girard*.....\*247

4. In an action on a policy of insurance, in which the declaration was for a total loss, and it appeared, that the assured had demanded payment of a total loss, which was refused; but there was no actual abandonment, nor offer to abandon, and the proof was of a loss in its nature total; it was *held*, that the jury might find damages as for a partial loss. *Watson v. Ins. Co. of North America*.....\*283

5. Barratry is an act committed by the master of a vessel, of a criminal nature, without the license or consent of the owner: there must be fraud in the transaction; and should the act be done solely to benefit the owner, it does constitute barratry. *Croussillat v. Ball*.....\*294

6. If the master be the general agent and consignee of the owner, the acts of the master as such, cannot, any more than those of the principal himself, be denominated barratry. *Id.*

7. An insurer who has paid the amount of a loss, can in the case of a double insurance recover a rateable contribution from the other insurer. *Thurston v. Koch*.....\*348

8. Insurance was effected by the plaintiff, who was the owner of a vessel, on her freight and cargo by separate policies, "at and from New York to Cape François, with liberty to proceed to another port, should Cape François be blockaded;" the vessel sailed from New York, with instructions where to proceed, if she could not enter Cape François; she was prevented from entering that port, or any other designated in the instructions given to the master, and was obliged by the blockading force to go to another place, where the master disposed of the goods, and invested the proceeds in a return-cargo, with which the ship returned to New York: *Held*, that the insured might abandon and recover as for a total loss. *Symonds v. Union Insurance Co.*.....\*417

9. A person having a lien on a cargo, has an insurable interest, which he may cover by an insurance on the goods; and if the insured in such case has lost the possession of them, he may abandon as for a total loss. *Russel v. Union Ins. Co*.....\*421

10. Where the insurance of a special interest is attended with a greater risk, than that of the principal ownership; the omission to disclose the fact of such special interest would vacate the policy. *Id.*

11. In an action on a policy on a vessel, her prime cost is not conclusive evidence of her value, against the assured; but evidence is admissible to show her real value, and the assured are entitled to recover to this amount. *Snell v. Delaware Insurance Company*..\*430

12. An American vessel insured at and from Philadelphia to Havana, was captured by British cruisers, carried into port by them, and there libelled as prize; a decree of restitution was subsequently obtained, after which, though before actual restitution and without knowledge of the decree, she was abandoned; the insurance was effected, and the abandonment made by the agent for the owners, one of whom was with her at the time of the decree of restitution: *Held*, that the assured might recover as for a total loss. *Dutilh v. Gatliff*.....\*446

13. Freight was insured on a voyage from P. to S.; the government of the country having refused permission to land the cargo at S., it was brought home: *Held*, that the freight was earned, and that the assured were not entitled to recover any thing under the policy. *Morgan v. Ins. Co. of North America*..\*455

14. Freight advanced is an insurable interest, and is subject to general average: salvage constitutes general average. *Sansom v. Ball*.....\*459

15. If an agent, having an insurable interest in goods, insure them on behalf of his principal, in case of a loss, the former cannot recover on his own account, though he may on that of his principal. *Donath v. Insurance Co. of North America*.....\*463

16. When a voyage is entire, and the risk has once commenced, there can be no return of the premium; but when, by a course of trade, or an agreement of the parties, a voyage is divided into distinct parts; and on one of these parts no risk has been run, there will be an apportionment of the premium, and part shall be returned.....*Id.*

## INTEREST.

1. A judgment *nisi*, was made absolute by an agreement, which stipulated that proceedings should be stayed until the trial of certain foreign attachments, which had been laid before the commencement of the suit, upon the funds in question: *Held*, that interest should be allowed in the judgment, but only from the time of the settlement of the principle involved in those attachments, by the trial of one of them. *Fitzgerald v. Caldwell*...\*151

2. Personal residence must accompany every the commencement of the suit upon the funds in question: *Held*, that interest should be allowed on the judgment, but only from the time of the settlement of the principle involved in those attachments, by the trial of one of them. *Fitzgerald v. Caldwell*...\*251

3. Interest is due on the ascertained balance of

an account, from the time of a demand of payment. In case of a war, the payment of interest on a debt due by a citizen of a belligerent country, to one of a neutral state, will be enforced, unless a remittance cannot be made with safety. *Crawford v. Willing*.....\*286

## INTESTATE.

1. In every case of intestacy, the heir at common law will take the real estate, where its descent is not specifically altered by an act of assembly. *Johnson v. Haines's Lessee*.....\*64
2. Intestate died on the 13th February 1797, without issue, and leaving no widow, father, mother, brother or sister, but leaving nephews and nieces: *Held*, that the heir at common law was entitled to intestate's real estate, and that the act of assembly of the 19th April 1794, did not provide for this specific case.....*Id.*

## INTRUDERS.

See LAND, 1.

## JOINT OBLIGATION.

See BOND, 3.

## JUDGE.

1. If the presiding judge of a court of common pleas wilfully prevent his associate from delivering his sentiments to the grand jury, after the president has concluded his charge; it is not an indictable offence, and therefore, not a case in which an information will be granted; but every judge has a right, and it is emphatically his duty, to deliver his sentiments upon every subject that occurs in court. *Commonwealth v. Addison*.....\*225

See RECORDER.

## JUDGMENT.

See INTEREST, 1.

## JUDICIARY.

See JURISDICTION.

## JURISDICTION.

1. Where the jurisdiction of the federal courts depends on alienage, or the citizenship of the parties, it must be set forth on the record. *Turner v. Enville*.....\*7
2. Where an action is brought upon a promissory note, in a federal court, by an indorser

against the maker, not only the parties to the suit, but also the payee, must be stated on the record, to be such as to give the court jurisdiction. *Turner v. Bank of North America*.....\*8

3. In proceedings in a federal court, in equity, to foreclose, it is as necessary to describe the parties, as in any other suit. *Mossman v. Higginson*.....\*12
4. The decree of the court below was reversed, although it was on a supplemental suit in equity, from want of a proper description of the parties to give a federal court jurisdiction. *Course v. Stead*.....\*22
5. A colorable and collusive conveyance to the lessee of the plaintiff in ejectment, for the purpose of bringing the suit in a federal court, will not give it jurisdiction, and the court will, on motion, dismiss the suit. *Maxwell's Lessee v. Levy*.....\*330
6. The jurisdiction of a federal court, is not, *prima facie*, general, but special. ....*Id.*
7. The circuit court cannot take original cognizance of a suit for a penalty, incurred by an offence against the laws of the United States. If the offence was committed within a state, it must be tried in such state. *Evans v. Bollen*.....\*342
8. The jurisdiction of the state courts extends to the case of a forgery of powers of attorney to receive warrants for lands granted by acts of congress for military services. *Commonwealth v. Schaffer*.....App. \*xxvi

## JUROR.

See CHALLENGE: PRACTICE, 23.

## LAND.

1. A mere improvement right, subsequent to a legal right vested in another, ought never to be rendered effectual in favor of a settler. *Calhoun's Lessee v. Dunning*.....\*120
2. Blunston's licenses have always been deemed valid, and many titles in Pennsylvania depend upon them. ....*Id.*
3. Ejectment. Location and warrant. *Gander's Lessee v. Burns*.....\*122
4. Personal residence must accompany every settlement, on which a survey can be regularly made, unless such danger exists, as would prevent a man of reasonable firmness, from remaining on the land, and even then, the *animus residendi* must appear. Deadening an acre or two of timber, planting a few peach-stones, apple-seeds and potatoes, can never be circumstances amounting to a settlement; though a cabin should also be put up—if the party resides at a distance, and no

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tenant actually occupies the land. *Evans's Lessee v. Highlands*.....\*161

5. The settlement and residence made necessary by section 9th of the act of 1792, within the times respectively mentioned therein, are not excused by the proviso in the same section; but if a warrant-holder has been prevented from making such settlement, or has been driven therefrom, by force of arms, and has persisted in his endeavors to make such settlement, no advantage can be taken of him, from want of a successive continuation of his settlement. *Commonwealth v. Cox*.....\*171

6. The settlement required by section 9th of the act of 1792, need not be made within the time prescribed therein, if the warrant-holder was, by force of arms, prevented from making such settlement, provided he persisted in his endeavors to effect it, after the removal of the force; and in that case, he has not incurred a forfeiture of his land. *Morris's Lessee v. Neighman*.....\*209

7. A warrant which loses its descriptive location, by a prior warrant, may be laid on any vacant land; but due diligence must be used in making the survey, and a return of it. If a deputy-surveyor die, before a survey has been executed, for the execution of which he has given an order to his assistant, but it was alleged, that neither the assistant, nor the warrant-holder, knew of the death, before the survey was made, it was held, that in an old transaction, where the title depends upon it, the examination of the allegation should not be very strict. *Bell's Lessee v. Levers*.....\*210

8. Neither the negligence, nor the fraud of a public officer, shall work an injury to a warrant-holder.....*Id.*

9. A lost warrant becomes an appropriation, if it is removed to other land which is vacant, and an actual survey is returned into the land-office, and there accepted; provided, no warrant, particularly describing the land, has been delivered to the deputy-surveyor, before the survey has been made. *Hepburn's Lessee v. Levy*.....\*218

10. To constitute a legal settlement, there must be a personal residence, unless such danger exists, as would affect a man of reasonable firmness. *McLaughlin's Lessee v. Dawson*.....\*221

11. Warrants granted under the act of April 3d 1792, are not *ipso facto* void, where the conditions of settlement and residence, within the time specified therein, have not been performed. The case of every such warrant must depend on, and be governed by, its own peculiar circumstances. *Attorney-General v. The Grantees*.....\*237

12. Patents, and prevention-certificates, recited in the patents, are not conclusive evidence against the commonwealth, or any person claiming under the act, that the patentees have performed the conditions enjoined on them, although they have pursued the form prescribed by the land-officers.....*Id.*

13. The act of the 9th of March 1796, declared those Pennsylvania claimants, who had complied with the terms of the confirming law (while the said law was in existence), entitled to the benefit of the same, and enacted that the sums found due to them, should be credited to them in taking out new warrants, in any part of the state where vacant land may be found: Held, that the act did not apply to warrants to be located on lots within the city of Philadelphia. *Commonwealth v. McKissick*.....\*292

14. To constitute a settlement under the act of April 3d, 1792, so as to vest in any one an incipient title to the lands lying north and west of the Ohio, &c., there must have been an occupancy by him, accompanied by a *bonâ fide* intention to reside upon the land, either in person or by a tenant. The making of improvements merely is not such a settlement. *Balfour's Lessee v. Meade*.....\*339

15. The proviso of the 9th section of that act applies solely to those who had incipient titles, which could only have been created by such occupancy, or by warrant. A warrant of acceptance for these lands, not founded on such settlement, though containing a false recital of it, gives no title.....*Id.*

16. A grantee by warrant of lands lying north and west of the Ohio, &c., who was prevented from making such settlement as the law requires, for the space of two years from the date of his warrant, but who, during that period, persisted in his endeavors to make the settlement, although he afterwards made no such attempt, is entitled to hold his land in fee-simple. It is not every slight or temporary danger which will excuse him, but such as a prudent man ought to regard. *Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass*.....\*364

17. A grantee of lands by warrant, without a patent, will not be presumed, from the lapse of a length of time, to have paid the consideration-money; but he has an equitable estate, and though he is not entitled to a verdict in his favor, in an action of ejectment, brought by one having the legal title, yet he may compel a conveyance of the legal title, by paying or tendering what is due; and in such case, resort must be had to this court, when sitting in equity. *Penn's Lessee v. Klyne*.....\*379

See **MANOR**.

## LANDLORD AND TENANT.

See RENT.

## LEGACY.

1. Testatrix had, for some time before her death, been in a low state of health; the defendant had taken charge of her affairs, and had some accounts against her, but had borrowed 150*l.* from her, for which he had given a bond; the will contained a bequest of 200*l.* to him, "provided he brings no account against me and my estate;" *Quære?* Whether the legacy is a release of the bond? *Massey v. Leaming*.....\*112

## LETTER OF CREDIT.

1. In order to render a letter of credit obligatory, it is not necessary, that it should be answered. *Eddowes v. Niell*.....\*133  
 2. A lapse of 19 years, without notice of a default in payment, by the principal, is not, considering the circumstances of this case, such gross negligence, as to discharge the surety, and from the nature of this contract, such a lapse of time will not warrant a presumption of payment.....*Id.*

## LEX LOCI.

1. A contract is governed by the law of the place where it is made. *Conframp v. Bunnel*.....\*419  
 2. Where the *lex loci contractus* protects a party from execution on a judgment upon a contract, he will not be liable to arrest on mesne process out of this court, for the same cause.....*Id.*

See PAYMENT, 2.

## LIEN.

1. A sheriff's sale of land, by virtue of a judgment and execution, subsequent to a mortgage to the trustees of the loan-office, does not destroy its lien. *Febeiger's Lessee v. Craighead*.....\*151  
 2. A. had taken out a *ca. sa.* against the defendant, and during his imprisonment under it, his land was sold under an execution of the plaintiff; and afterwards, the defendant was discharged from custody, as an insolvent debtor: *Held*, that the lien of A.'s judgment was discharged, and that he had no claim to the proceeds of the sale. *Freeman v. Ruston*.....\*203  
 3. The purchaser of lands of an intestate, sold by an order of an orphans' court, holds them, discharged from the lien of a judgment ob-

tained against the intestate in his lifetime. *Moliere's Lessee v. Noe*.....\*450

## LIQUIDATION.

See DUTIES.

## MANOR.

1. A claimant under the proprietaries, of a proprietary tenth or manor, must make his title under the divesting law of 1779, and show that the land was called and known by the name of such tenth or manor, and that it was duly surveyed, and returned into the land-office before July 4th, 1776. *Penn's Lessee v. Klyne*.....\*402

## MANDAMUS.

1. *Quære?* Whether a mandamus can be issued against the secretary of the land-office, commanding him to prepare and deliver patents in favor of a warrantee of a tract of land. *Commonwealth v. Coxe*.....\*171

## MANSLAUGHTER.

1. What is manslaughter? *Commonwealth v. Biron*.....\*125

## MASTER OF A VESSEL.

1. The master of a vessel may bind his owners personally, by borrowing money to make necessary repairs to a vessel in a foreign port, if the lenders, after due inquiry, did not know that the master had sufficient funds to relieve the necessity. *Wainwright v. Crawford*.....\*225

## MESNE PROFITS.

See EJECTMENT.

## MONTH.

See TIME, 1.

## MORTGAGE.

1. If the purchaser of property knows, at the time of his purchase, of the existence of a mortgage, which has not been recorded according to the act of assembly, the premises will be bound by the mortgage. *Stroud v. Lockart*.....\*153  
 2. A mortgage, voluntarily given in contemplation of bankruptcy, and intended as a preference to a particular creditor, is void. *Rundle v. Murgatroyd's Assignees*.....\*304

## MURDER.

1. Although murder in the first degree is by the act of assembly confined to the wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing of another, yet the intention remains as much as ever the criterion of the crime. *Respublica v. Mulatto Bob*.....\*143
2. To constitute the crime of murder on the high seas; the mortal stroke must be given, and the death happen on the high seas. The defendant had given a mortal stroke to one in the haven of Cape Frangois, but the deceased did not die, until his removal on shore: *Held*, that the offence was not cognisable under the 8th section of the act of congress of the 30th April 1790. *United States v. McGill*.....\*426

## NEW TRIAL.

See PRACTICE, 10, 23.

## NOTICE.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE, 3, 4, 6: EVIDENCE, 4: INJUNCTION: LETTER OF CREDIT: MORTGAGE, 1.

## OFFICER.

See LAND, 6.

## ORPHANS' COURT.

See LIEN, 3.

## PARTITION.

1. It did not appear by the return of a writ of partition, that the parties attended, or were warned to attend at its execution, and the inquisition did not state, that the property was assigned and delivered, but merely that it was allotted: *Held*, that the partition was valid. *Ewing v. Houston*.....\*67

## PARTNERS.

1. A partner is liable for the acts of his co-partner, in relation to partnership business, whether they be known to the former or not. *Crawford v. Willing*.....\*286
2. One partner cannot maintain *assumpsit* against the other, to recover the balance of the proceeds of a partnership adventure, unless the partners have settled their account, and struck the balance. *Ozeas v. Johnson*.....\*434

## PAYMENT.

1. Where a forged check of a customer is received by a bank, as cash, and passed to the

credit of a depositor (who is ignorant of the forgery, and who has paid the full value of the check), it is equivalent to an actual payment, and if the depositor, after having been informed of the forgery, on a sudden misconception of his rights, agrees that if the check is a forgery, it is no deposit, it will not constitute a promise to refund. *Levy v. Bank of the United States*.....\*234

2. Where by a contract between American citizens, a payment is to be made in a foreign country, the intention of the parties must govern the form of payment. *Searight v. Calbraith*.....\*325

See AGENT, 1: APPROPRIATION.

## PENALTY.

See DAMAGE, 1.

## PERJURY.

See REPEAL.

## PILOT.

1. Where a collision is occasioned by the gross negligence of a public pilot, while navigating a vessel, the owner is liable for the injury done: *Held*, that in all cases proper for a legal indemnification in damages, the compensation should be equivalent to the injury. *Bussy v. Donaldson*.....\*206

## PLEADING.

See COVENANT: PRACTICE, 14.

## POSSESSION.

1. The act of suffering goods to remain in the hands of the defendant, after they have been levied on, furnishes no presumption of fraud; but if the intention of leaving them is fraudulent, a subsequent execution will be preferred. *Levy v. Wallis*.....\*167
2. Where, after a fair purchase at public sale, under a distress for rent, goods are left in the possession of the former owner, they cannot be taken under an execution against him; such continued possession is not a fraud on creditors. *Water's Ex'r's v. McClellan*..\*208
3. A number of young cattle were among the goods: *Held*, that the jury might consider, whether the expense of maintaining these cattle exceeded a fair compensation for the use of them, and if such were their opinion, they might make a reasonable reduction for them .....*Id.*
4. Where bricks, after having been levied on, are suffered to remain in the possession of

the defendants, a purchaser from one of them, without notice of the levy, is entitled to hold the goods, discharged from the lien of the execution. *Chancellor v. Phillips*. . . . . \*213  
 5. Goods, though chiefly household furniture, suffered to remain in the possession of the defendant, for more than a year after a levy, are liable to a subsequent execution. *United States v. Conyngham* . . . . . \*358

## PRACTICE.

1. In a suit in equity, a *subpoena* must be served sixty days before its return. *State of New York v. State of Connecticut* . . . . . \*6
2. *Non-pros*, for not appearing on a writ of error. *Hazlehurst v. United States* . . . . . \*6
3. The value of the matter in dispute could neither be determined by the demand of the plaintiff, nor fixed by the finding of the jury; and the court allowed the value to be ascertained by affidavits, on ten days' notice, in the state where the action was originated; the writ of error not to be a *supersedeas*. *Williamson v. Kincaid* . . . . . \*20
4. A writ of error, not returned at the term to which it is returnable, is a nullity. *Blair v. Miller* . . . . . \*21
5. A writ of error will only lie in the case of a final judgment. *Rutherford v. Fisher* . . . . . \*22
6. Whatever may be the original nature of the suit in a circuit court, it cannot be removed into the supreme court, except by writ of error. *Blaine v. The Charles Carter* . . . . . \*22
7. A rule was granted, to ascertain by affidavits, the value of the land in dispute, in order to sustain the jurisdiction of the supreme court on a writ of error. *Course v. Stead* . . . . . \*22
8. This court can enter judgment for the plaintiff in error, without remitting the record to the court below for that purpose. *Ludlow v. Bingham* . . . . . \*47
9. After a verdict, it will be presumed, that everything was done at the trial, which was necessary to support the action, unless the contrary appear upon the record. *Carson v. Hood* . . . . . \*108
10. When a new trial will be granted. *Bradley's Lessee v. Bradley* . . . . . \*112
11. The court will not direct a nonsuit for want of proof by the plaintiffs, of a material fact, where they have offered some evidence of it. *Vaughan v. Blanchard* . . . . . \*124
12. A decision of the board of property was pronounced upon a *caveat*, in favor of the defendant, on the 14th of February 1796: a declaration, entitled as of April term 1796, was served by a private individual, on the defendant, on the 10th August 1796; and it was entered on the docket of the supreme court, on the 20th of that month; but contrary to expectation, the court had risen on the preceding day, which, of course, then ended the term: *Held*, that the ejectment was well brought within the six months allowed by the act of 1792. *Nicholson's Lessee v. Wallis* . . . . . \*154
13. An appeal from an orphans' court dismissed, because it did not appear that a definitive decree had been pronounced. *McClay v. Hanna* . . . . . \*160
14. Issues were joined on the pleas of *non assumpsit* and payment: plaintiffs had been obliged to send a commission to another state, to prove the assumption; and when the jury was about to be empanelled, defendant moved to strike out the former plea: *Held*, that he should not be allowed to strike it out. *Jackson v. Winchester* . . . . . \*205
15. *Quare?* Whether *certiorari* to remove the proceedings in a case of forcible entry and detainer, operates as a *supersedeas*. *Anonymous* . . . . . \*214
16. After a case has been referred, and several meetings have been held by the referees, at which the parties have exhibited their respective proofs, and have been heard, the plaintiff cannot discontinue the suit, without the leave of the court, which, in such a case, would not be granted, unless there are very cogent reasons. *Pollock v. Hall* . . . . . \*222
17. A bill of exceptions to the charge of the court, may be tendered at any time before the jury have delivered their verdict, even when they are ready to deliver it, and are at the bar. *Jones v. Insurance Co. of North America* . . . . . \*246
18. The return to a *certiorari*, to remove the proceedings before the mayor of Philadelphia, under an ordinance against huckstering, did not state a conviction, the offence, nor the place where the business was conducted: *Held*, that it was error. *Mayor, &c. v. Mason* . . . . . \*266
19. A *certiorari* to remove an indictment from a court of quarter sessions to a circuit court, will be granted, on an application by the defendant, supported by his affidavit, in the usual form, unless something is shown in relation to his character or conduct, to induce the supposition, that public justice is likely to be impaired by the removal. *Commonwealth v. Lyon* . . . . . \*302
20. A *certiorari*, issued to remove an indictment from a court of quarter sessions of, &c., to the circuit court, was directed to the judges of the court of common pleas of, &c., and returned by the associate judges of that court: *Held*, that the direction and return of the writ were fatally irregular. *Commonwealth v. Franklin* . . . . . \*316

21. As between creditors, judgments do not relate to the preceding term, but they take priority, according to the times of their entry. *Welsh v. Murray*.....\*320

22. A defendant cannot be compelled to proceed to trial, until payment of the costs of a former action, between the same parties, for the same cause, which had been non-pressed. *Hurst's Lessee v. Jones*.....\*353

23. A verdict will not be set aside, on account of the alienage of a juror. *Semble*, that it is a cause of challenge, before he is sworn. *Hollingsworth v. Duane*.....\*353

24. Under the 20th section of the act of assembly of the 24th February 1806, an action may be removed from the court of common pleas to the supreme court, on or before the first day of the term, next after that to which the original writ is returnable. *Lyle v. Baker*.....\*433

25. Upon a bill of exceptions to another point, and after a general verdict, the court is not bound to consider a judgment by default in replevin, as an affirmation of property. *W. B. v. Latimer*.....App. \*

#### PRIORITY.

See PRACTICE, 2.

#### PRIVILEGE.

1. A member of the general assembly is privileged from arrest, summons, citation or other civil process, during attendance on his public business, but the benefit of his privilege must be duly claimed at a proper time. *Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin* .....\*107

2. It seems, that his suits cannot be forced to a trial and decision, while the session of the legislature continues. .... *Id.*

3. A *charge d'affaires* is entitled to privilege from arrest, until his return home, although he has been for some months superseded by a minister plenipotentiary; the detention of the former being occasioned by his official business. The court will discharge him from arrest, without requiring proof from the department of state of his reception in his diplomatic character by the president. *Dupont v. Pichon*.....\*321

4. A witness is privileged from arrest, for a reasonable time, to prepare for his departure, and return to his home, as well as during his actual attendance upon the court. *Smythe v. Banks*.....\*329

5. A member of congress is not exempt from the service nor obligations of a *subpæna* in a criminal case. *United States v. Cooper*, \*341

6. A citizen of another state, who, when in attendance on court as a suitor, has been sub-

pœnaed as a witness in another cause, is privileged from an arrest in execution, issuing from a state court, while at his lodgings; and the sheriff will be indemnified by an order of discharge of a court of competent jurisdiction. *Hurst's Case*.....\*387

#### PROMISSORY NOTE.

See BILL OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTE.

#### RECORDER.

1. The Recorder of the city of Philadelphia, is not a judge, within the meaning of the 8th section of the 2d article of the constitution of the state of Pennsylvania. *Commonwealth v. Dallas* .. .....\*229

#### REFEREES.

1. Referees have no power to erect a new and arbitrary tribunal, to determine future controversies between the parties. *Livezey v. Gorgas*.....\*71

2. Where, on a reference to two persons, with power to choose an umpire, if they should disagree, an umpire is appointed, who receives the statement of the case from the referees, in the absence of the parties, and without hearing them; the award will be set aside. *Falconer v. Montgomery*.....\*232

3. An umpire chosen under a rule of reference, by the referees, must not rely upon the information reported by them, but he must examine the case himself, in the presence of the parties. An award will be set aside, if the referees have refused a party sufficient time to procure necessary evidence. All the testimony should be heard, and the documents seen by the parties, in the presence of the referees. *Passmore v. Pettit*.....\*271

See PRACTICE, 16.

#### REGISTRY.

1. An action of trover for a vessel, cannot be maintained, by one whose title depends upon a contract in fraud of the registry laws and public policy of the United States. *Duncanson v. McLure*.....\*308

2. Replevin cannot be maintained for a vessel, by the registered owner; he having received the full value of it from another, for whom he is mere trustee, in fraud of the laws of the United States. *Murgatroyd v. McLure*, \*342

3. An American registered vessel, while at sea, sold in part to resident citizens of the United States, without a bill of sale, reciting her registry, and without a new registry until her

arrival in her home port, does not lose her privileges as an American vessel. *Willing v. United States*.....\*374

4. An action cannot be maintained in our courts, founded on a contract between a citizen and an alien, by which the former undertook to purchase vessels and cargoes in his own name for the latter, and in like manner, to import the return cargoes, in fraud of the registry and revenue laws of the United States. *Maybin v. Coulon*.....\*298

## REMITTANCE.

See AGENT, 1: APPROPRIATION.

## RENT.

1. If a landlord interrupt the tenant's enjoyment of demised premises, the rent is suspended, unless it be shown that such an interruption was in pursuance of a reserved privilege. *Vaughan v. Blanchard*.....\*124

## REPEAL.

1. The act of congress of the 19th December 1803, repealing the bankrupt law, is a bar to any prosecution for the perjury of a bankrupt, before the commissioners. *United States v. Passmore*.....\*372

## SALE.

1. Where land mortgaged to the trustees of the general loan-office, has been sold by the sheriff of the county, under an alleged precept from the state treasurer, issued by virtue of the act of 1st April 1790, and the writ has been lost, parol evidence of it is admissible. The requisition of the act, that advertisements of the sale shall be posted at some public places, is merely directory to the sheriff, and where there has been no actual injury, it should not affect the title of a *bond fide* purchaser. *Lessee of Weitzell v. Fry*.....\*218

## SALVAGE.

1. American re-captors are entitled to salvage, for rescuing an armed neutral vessel from French captors, by whom she was manned. *Talbot v. The Amelia*.....\*34

## SET-OFF.

1. A. & B., partners in trade, issued a foreign attachment against the effects of C., who was indebted to them, in the hands of D.: A. & B. were the indorsers of a note which was discounted by D., but before it came due, A. & B. died, and the note was protested, and the

executors of B., who was the surviving partner, obtained judgment against C., and also against D., as garnishee. The debt due by A. & B. to D., cannot be set off against the debt due by D., as garnishee, to B.'s executors. *Crammond v. Bank of the United States*.....\*291

2. In a suit brought by the commonwealth, the defendant cannot indirectly recover from the state a substantive independent claim. *Commonwealth v. Mallack*.....\*303

## SETTLEMENT.

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## SHIP.

See MASTER OF A VESSEL: REGISTRY.

## STATE SEAL.

See EVIDENCE, 9.

## STATE TREASURER.

See BOND, 1.

## SUBPOENA.

See PRACTICE, 1.

## SURVEY.

1. A survey under a warrant of resurvey, is good as an original survey, though it recite another, which is invalid. *Penn's Lessee v. Klyne*.....\*403

See LAND, 6.

## TENDER.

1. The demand, by a creditor, of payment, in a certain species of coin, does not dispense with the obligation on the debtor to make a tender, agreeable to his own sense of the law, and the contract. *Searight v. Calbraith*, \*325

## TIME.

1. The computation of time must be by calendar months, in the exception (in the 10th section of the act of 1780, for the gradual abolition of slavery) of domestic slaves attending upon persons passing through, or sojourning in the state, &c., provided they be not retained therein longer than six months. *Commonwealth v. Chambre*.....\*143

2. Where the time of payment is made a substantial circumstance, it enters into the essence of the contract, and it must be observed. *Hollingsworth v. Fry*.....\*345

## TREASON.

See CURTESY.

## TRUST.

See APPROPRIATION: ASSIGNMENT.

## VARIANCE.

1. A summons in partition, described the property to be divided as follows: "one ferry at the river Susquehanna, in Hellam township, in, &c., six messuages, &c., with the appurtenances, in the same township of Hellam, in, &c." The writ of partition, in the recital of the summons, had these words, "with the appurtenances, in the same township of Hellam and Windsor, in, &c.;" and in the specification of the property, the ferry was omitted, though it was named in another part of the writ. The inquisition enumerated among the premises which were divided, "the ferry, and also a fishery, on the river Susquehanna, at or near the said ferry, &c.:" Held, that these variances were not fatal. *Ewing v. Houston*.....\*67

## VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT.

See ASSIGNMENT.

## WAR.

1. Limited hostilities, authorized by two governments against each other, constitute a public war, and render the parties, respectively, enemies to each other. *Bas v. Tingy*....\*87

2. An American vessel, captured by a French privateer, on the 31st March 1799, and recaptured by a public armed American ship, on the 21st April 1799, was condemned to pay salvage, under the act of congress of the 2d March 1799..... *Id.*

## WARRANT.

See LAND, 6, 7, 9, 10.

## WARRANTY.

1. A collateral warranty of an ancestor, who had no estate in possession of the premises,

is an estoppel to his heir. *Kesselman's Lessee v. Old*.....\*168

2. The Statute 4 Anne, c. 16, § 21, is not in force in Pennsylvania.

## WATER-COURSE.

1. Case, for obstructing a water-course, by which the plaintiff's meadow was watered: plaintiff having proved his right to the course, his counsel executed and filed a writing, by which they bound him to release any damages that the jury might give, if defendant should execute a deed, securing to plaintiff the enjoyment of the water, and the court advised the jury on this condition, to find the full value of the meadow in damages. *Anonymous*.....\*147

2. Every one has a right to use the water passing through his land, as he pleases, provided, he does not injure his neighbor's mill, and that, after using the water, he returns it to its ancient channel. *Beissel v. Sholl*...\*211

## WILL.

See DEVISE: LEGACY.

## WITNESS.

1. Plaintiff, a certificated bankrupt, was admitted to prove a parol acceptance of a bill of exchange, the foundation of the action, after he had released his interest, at the bar, his assignees having previously entered into security for costs. *McEwen v. Gibbs*..\*137

2. A slave is not a competent witness. *Respublica v. Mulatto Bob*.....\*145

3. An executor, who is entitled to a share in the residuum of his testator's estate, which is interested in the suit, is not a competent witness to prove notice of the non-payment of a note, although the objection appear on his cross-examination. *Bank of North America v. Wycoff*..... \*151

4. The president of an incorporated company, by which a vessel has been insured, is a competent witness against the defendant, on an indictment, for fraudulently casting away and destroying the vessel. *United States v. Johns*.....\*412











