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2. *Speedy trial—Seven-year delay.*—On record here where petitioner, a federal prisoner, was at all times available to the State for trial on state criminal charge, there was no valid excuse for the seven-year prejudicial delay in bringing him to trial, and the judgment against him must be vacated by the trial court. *Dickey v. Florida*, p. 30.

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2. *Federal-state relations—Railway labor dispute—Picketing.*—A federal injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions to 28 U. S. C. § 2283. The Federal District Court's determination that the union had a right to "engage in self-help" under federal law, was not a decision that federal law precluded an injunction based on state law. *Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Engineers*, p. 281.

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1. *Direct appeal to Supreme Court—Order denying declaratory judgment.*—An order granting or denying only a declaratory judgment may not be appealed to Supreme Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, which permits "an appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction." *Mitchell v. Donovan*, p. 427.

2. *Disparity of welfare payments—Challenge on equal protection and statutory grounds—Preliminary injunction.*—District Court, which granted preliminary injunction on basis of violation of equal protection in disparate welfare payments, should have opportunity to pass on propriety of granting interim relief on basis of appellees' statutory claims, in light of subsequently decided case of *Rosado v. Wyman*, 397 U. S. 397, or, if question is reached, continuing the injunction in light of *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U. S. 471. *Wyman v. Rothstein*, p. 275.

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4. *Increased sentence on retrial—Due process—Writ of certiorari dismissed.*—Following grant of certiorari here, where petitioner was given increased sentence after retrial, to consider retroactivity of *North Carolina v. Pearce*, 395 U. S. 711, facts emerged indicating that the due process standards of that case were not violated here, and the writ is dismissed. *Moon v. Maryland*, p. 319.

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8. *Speedy trial—State criminal trial of federal prisoner—Seven-year delay.*—On record here where petitioner, a federal prisoner, was at all times available to the State for trial on state criminal charge, there was no valid excuse for the seven-year prejudicial delay in bringing him to trial, and the judgment against him must be vacated by the trial court. *Dickey v. Florida*, p. 30.

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- RECKLESS DISREGARD.** See Constitutional Law, VI; Libel.
- RECLASSIFICATIONS.** See Selective Service Regulations.
- RECOVERY.** See Taxes.
- REDUCTION OF BENEFITS.** See Constitutional Law, II; Procedure, 6.
- RE-EXAMINATION OF DECISION.** See Injunctions, 1; Labor; Norris-LaGuardia Act; Procedure, 7, 9.
- REFUSAL OF SERVICE.** See Burden of Proof, 1-2; Constitutional Law, III, 1-2.
- REGISTRY OF SHIPS.** See Jones Act.
- REGULATIONS.** See Selective Service Regulations.
- RELIEF.** See also Burden of Proof, 1-2; Constitutional Law, III, 1-2; Extraordinary Remedies; Federal-State Relations; Injunctions, 2; Judicial Review; Jurisdiction, 1.

Action by Judicial Council—Challenge by District Judge—Supreme Court.—Whether or not Council's action concerning assignment of cases is reviewable here, petitioner District Judge, in present posture of case, is not entitled to extraordinary remedy that he seeks since, after expressly acquiescing in the division of cases in the district, following the Council's later order, he has not sought relief either from the Council or other tribunal, and such relief may yet be open. *Chandler v. Judicial Council*, p. 74.

- RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.** See Constitutional Law, IV; Selective Service Act; Selective Service Regulations.
- RELIGIOUS SCRUPLES.** See Constitutional Law, VII, 1; Juries.
- REMEDIES.** See Admiralty; Extraordinary Remedies; Injunctions, 1; Judicial Review; Labor; Norris-LaGuardia Act; Procedure, 7, 9; Relief.
- REMOVAL.** See Injunctions, 1; Labor; Norris-LaGuardia Act; Procedure, 7, 9.
- REOPENING CLASSIFICATIONS.** See Selective Service Regulations.
- REPORTING OF NEWS.** See Constitutional Law, VI; Libel.
- REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS.** See National Labor Relations Board; Procedure, 5.
- RESENTENCES.** See Procedure, 4; Sentences.
- RESERVES FOR BAD DEBTS.** See Taxes.
- RESIDENTS.** See Constitutional Law, III, 3; Jones Act; Voting.
- RESTAURANTS.** See Burden of Proof, 1-2; Constitutional Law, III, 1-2.
- RETRIALS.** See Constitutional Law, I; Procedure, 3-4; Sentences.
- RETROACTIVITY.** See Procedure, 4; Sentences.
- REVOCATION OF ORDERS.** See Extraordinary Remedies; Judicial Review; Relief.
- RIGHT TO VOTE.** See Constitutional Law, III, 3; Voting.
- RULES.** See Constitutional Law, V; Jurisdiction, 2.
- SAILORS.** See Jones Act.
- SCHOOL SITES.** See Constitutional Law, VI; Libel.
- SCRUPLES AGAINST DEATH PENALTY.** See Constitutional Law, VII, 1; Juries.
- SEAMEN.** See Jones Act.
- SECONDARY BOYCOTTS.** See Federal-State Relations; Injunctions, 2; Jurisdiction, 1.
- SEGREGATION.** See Burden of Proof, 1-2; Constitutional Law, III, 1-2.

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT. See also **Constitutional Law**, IV; **Selective Service Regulations**.

Conscientious objector—Religious beliefs.—Petitioner's conviction for refusal to submit to induction despite his claim for conscientious objector status, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which concluded that his beliefs were not sufficiently "religious" to meet the terms of § 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, is reversed. *Welsh v. United States*, p. 333.

SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS.

Reopening classification—Conscientious objector—Administrative appeal.—Where registrant makes nonfrivolous allegations of facts not previously considered by his draft board, that, if true, would be sufficient to warrant granting reclassification, board must reopen the classification, unless truth of new allegations is conclusively refuted by other reliable information in registrant's file, thus affording registrant an administrative appeal from an adverse determination on the merits. *Mulloy v. United States*, p. 410.

SELF-HELP. See **Federal-State Relations**; **Injunctions**, 2; **Jurisdiction**, 1.

SELF-INCRIMINATION. See **Constitutional Law**, VII, 1; **Juries**.

SENTENCE OF DEATH. See **Constitutional Law**, VII, 1; **Juries**.

SENTENCES. See also **Procedure**, 4.

Increased sentence on retrial—Due process—Writ of certiorari dismissed.—Following grant of certiorari here, where petitioner was given increased sentence after retrial, to consider retroactivity of *North Carolina v. Pearce*, 395 U. S. 711, facts emerged indicating that the due process standards of that case were not violated here, and the writ is dismissed. *Moon v. Maryland*, p. 319.

SENTENCING STANDARDS. See **Constitutional Law**, VII, 1; **Juries**.

SHIPS. See **Admiralty**; **Jones Act**.

SIXTH AMENDMENT. See **Constitutional Law**, VII; **Juries**; **Procedure**, 8.

SKITS. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

SLANDER. See **Constitutional Law**, VI; **Libel**.

SPEEDY TRIAL. See **Constitutional Law**, VII, 2; **Procedure**, 8.

STANDARDS. See **Constitutional Law**, VII, 1; **Juries**.

STARE DECISIS. See **Admiralty**; **Procedure**, 9.

- STATE ACTION.** See **Burden of Proof**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, III, 1-2.
- STATE COURTS.** See **Federal-State Relations**; **Injunctions**, 1-2; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Labor**; **Norris-LaGuardia Act**; **Procedure**, 7, 9.
- STATE-ENFORCED CUSTOM.** See **Burden of Proof**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, III, 1-2.
- STATE LEGISLATOR.** See **Constitutional Law**, VI; **Libel**.
- STATE RESIDENTS.** See **Constitutional Law**, III, 3; **Voting**.
- STATE TERRITORIAL WATERS.** See **Admiralty**.
- STATE-WIDE CUSTOM.** See **Burden of Proof**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, III, 1-2.
- STATUTORY CLAIMS.** See **Procedure**, 2.
- STORE RESTAURANTS.** See **Burden of Proof**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, III, 1-2.
- STRATEGY.** See **Extraordinary Remedies**; **Judicial Review**; **Relief**.
- STREET SKITS.** See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.
- STRIKES.** See **Injunctions**, 1; **Labor**; **Norris-LaGuardia Act**; **Procedure**, 7, 9.
- SUMMARY JUDGMENT.** See **Burden of Proof**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, III, 1-2.
- SUPREME COURT.** See **Appeals**; **Procedure**, 1.
1. Amendments to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, p. 975.
 2. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, p. 981.
 3. Appointment of Clerk, p. 946.
 4. Appointment of Director of Administrative Office of the United States Courts, p. 946.
 5. Assignment of Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, p. 932.
 6. Assignment of Mr. Justice Clark (retired) to United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, p. 933.
 7. Rules of the Supreme Court, p. 1009.
- SUPREME COURT RULES.** See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.
- SWITCHING YARDS.** See **Federal-State Relations**; **Injunctions**, 2; **Jurisdiction**, 1.
- TAX BENEFIT RULE.** See **Taxes**.

TAXES.

Income taxes—Transfer of partnership assets to corporation—Bad debt reserve.—The so-called tax benefit rule, that recovery of item that produced income tax benefit in a prior year is to be added to income in recovery year, is not applicable here as partnership, although its business terminated with transfer of assets to corporation and it had no "need" for bad debt reserve, received no gain as result of transaction and there was thus no "recovery" of the benefit of the bad debt reserve. *Nash v. United States*, p. 1.

TEACHERS. See **Burden of Proof**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, III, 1-2.

TENTH CIRCUIT. See **Extraordinary Remedies**; **Judicial Review**; **Relief**.

TERRITORIAL WATERS. See **Admiralty**; **Jones Act**.

THEATRICAL PRODUCTIONS. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

THEISTIC BELIEFS. See **Constitutional Law**, IV; **Selective Service Act**.

TIMELINESS OF FILING. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

TRANSFER OF ASSETS. See **Taxes**.

TRANSPORTATION. See **Federal-State Relations**; **Injunctions**, 2; **Jurisdiction**, 1.

TRIALS. See **Constitutional Law**, I; **Procedure**, 3.

TRIBUNALS. See **Extraordinary Remedies**; **Judicial Review**; **Relief**.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES. See **National Labor Relations Board**; **Procedure**, 5.

UNIFORMS. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

UNIONS. See **Federal-State Relations**; **Injunctions**, 1-2; **Jurisdiction**, 1; **Labor**; **National Labor Relations Board**; **Norris-LaGuardia Act**; **Procedure**, 7, 9.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT.
See **Constitutional Law**, IV; **Selective Service Act**.

UNSEAWORTHINESS. See **Admiralty**.

UNTIMELINESS. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

VAGRANCY. See **Burden of Proof**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, III, 1-2.

VALID ELECTIONS. See **National Labor Relations Board; Procedure**, 5.

VENIREMEN. See **Constitutional Law**, VII, 1; **Juries**.

VESSELS. See **Admiralty; Jones Act**.

VIETNAM CONFLICT. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. See **Constitutional Law**, I; **Procedure**, 3.

VOTING. See also **Constitutional Law**, III, 3.

Residents of federal enclaves—Equal protection of the laws.—Residents on grounds of National Institutes of Health are treated by the State of Maryland, in which that federal enclave is located, as state residents to such an extent that it violates the Equal Protection Clause to deny them the right to vote in that State. *Evans v. Cornman*, p. 419.

WAIVERS. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

WAR. See **Constitutional Law**, IV; **Selective Service Act**.

WARRANTS. See **Constitutional Law**, VII, 2; **Procedure**, 8.

WEARING OF UNIFORM. See **Constitutional Law**, V; **Jurisdiction**, 2.

WELFARE PAYMENTS. See **Constitutional Law**, II; **Procedure**, 2, 6.

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA. See **Extraordinary Remedies; Judicial Review; Relief**.

WHITE TEACHER. See **Burden of Proof**, 1-2; **Constitutional Law**, III, 1-2.

WITNESSES. See **Constitutional Law**, VII, 2; **Procedure**, 8.

WORDS.


1. "*Religious training and belief.*" § 6 (j), **Universal Military Training and Service Act**, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j). *Welsh v. United States*, p. 333.

2. "*Theatrical production.*" 10 U. S. C. § 772 (f). *Schacht v. United States*, p. 58.


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
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
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















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